546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Domino vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 134015. July 19, 1999.*

JUAN DOMINO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, NARCISO Ra. GRAFILO, JR., EDDY B.
JAVA, JUAN P. BAYONITO, JR., ROSARIO SAMSON and
DIONISIO P. LIM, SR., respondents. LUCILLE CHIONGBIAN-
SOLON, intervenor.

Election Law; Residence; Actions; Courts; Judgments; Inclusion and

Exclusion Proceedings; The determination of a Metropolitan Trial Court
in the exclusion proceedings as to the right of a person to be included or
excluded from the list of voters in the precinct within its territorial
jurisdiction does not preclude the COMELEC, in the determination of such
person’s qualification as a candidate, to pass upon the issue of compliance
with the residency requirement.—The contention of DOMINO that the
decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion
proceedings declaring him a resident of the Province of Sarangani and not
of Quezon City is final and conclusive upon the COMELEC cannot be
sustained. The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX
of the

_______________

* EN BANC.

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VOL. 310, JULY 19, 1999 547

Domino vs. Commission on Elections
Omnibus Election Code, over a petition to deny due course to or cancel
certificate of candidacy. In the exercise of the said jurisdiction, it is within
the competence of the COMELEC to determine whether false
representation as to material facts was made in the certificate of candidacy,
that will include, among others, the residence of the candidate. The
determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the
exclusion proceedings as to the right of DOMINO to be included or
excluded from the list of voters in the precinct within its territorial
jurisdiction, does not preclude the COMELEC, in the determination of
DOMINO’s qualification as a candidate, to pass upon the issue of
compliance with the residency requirement.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Res Judicata; A decision in
an exclusion or inclusion proceeding, even if final and unappealable, does
not acquire the nature of res judicata.—The proceedings for the exclusion
or inclusion of voters in the list of voters are summary in character. Thus,
the factual findings of the trial court and its resultant conclusions in the
exclusion proceedings on matters other than the right to vote in the precinct
within its territorial jurisdiction are not conclusive upon the COMELEC.
Although the court in inclusion or exclusion proceedings may pass upon
any question necessary to decide the issue raised including the questions of
citizenship and residence of the challenged voter, the authority to order the
inclusion in or exclusion from the list of voters necessarily carries with it
the power to inquire into and settle all matters essential to the exercise of
said authority. However, except for the right to remain in the list of voters
or for being excluded therefrom for the particular election in relation to
which the proceedings had been held, a decision in an exclusion or
inclusion proceeding, even if final and unappealable, does not acquire the
nature of res judicata. In this sense, it does not operate as a bar to any
future action that a party may take concerning the subject passed upon in
the proceeding. Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding would neither
be conclusive on the voter’s political status, nor bar subsequent
proceedings on his right to be registered as a voter in any other election.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; It is not within
the competence of the trial court, in exclusion proceedings, to declare the
challenged voter a resident of another
municipality—the jurisdiction of the court is limited only to determining
the right of the voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that the
challenged

548

548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Domino vs. Commission on Elections

voter is not qualified to vote in the precinct in which he is registered,

specifying the ground of the voter’s disqualification.— Moreover, the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in its 18 January decision
exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared DOMINO a resident of the
Province of Sarangani, approved and ordered the transfer of his voter’s
registration from Precinct No. 4400-A of Barangay Old Balara, Quezon
City to precinct 14A1 of Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani. It is not
within the competence of the trial court, in an exclusion proceedings, to
declare the challenged voter a resident of another municipality. The
jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is limited only to
determining the right of voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare
that the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precinct in which he
is registered, specifying the ground of the voter’s disqualification. The trial
court has no power to order the change or transfer of registration from one
place of residence to another for it is the function of the election
Registration Board as provided under Section 12 of R.A. No. 8189. The
only effect of the decision of the lower court excluding the challenged
voter from the list of voters, is for the Election Registration Board, upon
receipt of the final decision, to remove the voter’s registration record from
the corresponding book of voters, enter the order of exclusion therein, and
thereafter place the record in the inactive file.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Res Judicata; A decision in a
Petition for Exclusion filed by the voter himself cannot be considered as basis
for the dismissal by reason of res judicata of a Petition to Deny Due Course
to/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy filed by others against the former, for,
as between the first and second actions, there is no identity of parties, identity
of subject matter and identity of causes of action.—Finally, the application of
the rule on res judicata is unavailing. Identity of
parties, subject matter and cause of action are indispensable requirements
for the application of said doctrine. Neither herein Private Respondents nor
INTERVENOR, is a party in the exclusion proceedings. The Petition for
Exclusion was filed by DOMINO himself and his wife, praying that he and
his wife be excluded from the Voter’s List on the ground of erroneous
registration while the Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate
of Candidacy was filed by private respondents against DOMINO for
alleged false representation in his certificate of candidacy. For the decision
to be a basis for the dismissal by reason of res judicata, it is essential that
there must be between the first and the second action identity of parties,
identity of subject matter and

549

VOL. 310, JULY 19, 1999 549

Domino vs. Commission on Elections

identity of causes of action. In the present case, the aforesaid essential

requisites are not present.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Residence” and “Domicile,”
Explained; It is doctrinally settled that the term “residence,” as used in the
law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office,
means the same thing as “domicile,” which imports not only an intention
to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention.—It is doctrinally settled that the
term “residence,” as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for
suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as “domicile,” which
imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
“Domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever
absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.
“Domicile” is a question of intention and circumstances. In the
consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely:
(1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when
once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can
have but one residence or domicile at a time.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; A person’s “domicile” once established is
considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established.—A person’s “domicile” once established is considered to
continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established. To
successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and
definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must
basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite
period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While “residence” simply requires bodily
presence in a given place, “domicile” requires not only such bodily
presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to make it
one’s fixed and permanent place of abode, one’s home.—It is the
contention of petitioner that his actual physical presence in Alabel,
Sarangani since December 1996 was sufficiently established

550

550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Domino vs. Commission on Elections

by the lease of a house and lot located therein in January 1997 and by the
affidavits and certifications under oath of the residents of that place that
they have seen petitioner and his family residing in their locality. While
this may be so, actual and physical is not in itself sufficient to show that
from said date he had transferred his residence in that place. To establish a
new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled
with conduct indicative of that intention. While “residence” simply
requires bodily presence in a given place, “domicile” requires not only
such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent
to make it one’s fixed and permanent place of abode, one’s home.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Intention to acquire a domicile without actual
residence in the locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does
the fact of physical presence without intention.—As a general rule, the
principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved and
intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new
domicile. No change of domicile will result if either of these elements is
absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence in the locality
does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical
presence without intention.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Lease; A lease contract may be indicative
of a person’s intention to reside in a particular locality but it does not
engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one’s
original domicile.—The lease contract entered into sometime in January
1997, does not adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract
may be indicative of DOMINO’s intention to reside in Sarangani but it
does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment
of one’s original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his
permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to abandon
it does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus the date of the
contract of lease of a house and lot located in the province of Sarangani,
i.e., 15 January 1997, cannot be used, in the absence of other
circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence
requirement.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While voting is not conclusive of
residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence—
exercising the right of election franchise is a deliberate public asser-

551

VOL. 310, JULY 19, 1999 551

Domino vs. Commission on Elections

tion of the fact of residence, and is said to have decided preponderance in a

doubtful case upon the place the elector claims as, or believes to be, his
residence.—Further, Domino’s lack of intention to abandon his residence in
Quezon City is further
strengthened by his act of registering as voter in one of the precincts in
Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise
to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where
DOMINO registered in his former barangay. Exercising the right of
election franchise is a deliberate public assertion of the fact of residence,
and is said to have decided preponderance in a doubtful case upon the
place the elector claims as, or believes to be, his residence. The fact that a
party continuously voted in a particular locality is a strong factor in
assisting to determine the status of his domicile.
Same; Commission on Elections; Jurisdiction; The jurisdiction of the
COMELEC over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificates of
candidacy continues even after election, if for any reason no final
judgment of disqualification is rendered before the election, and the
candidate facing disqualification is voted for and receives the highest
number of votes, and provided further that the winning candidate has not
been proclaimed or has taken his oath of office.—As previously
mentioned, the COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus
Election Code, has jurisdiction over a petition to deny due course to or
cancel certificate of candidacy. Such jurisdiction continues even after
election, if for any reason no final judgment of disqualification is rendered
before the election, and the candidate facing disqualification is voted for
and receives the highest number of votes and provided further that the
winning candidate has not been proclaimed or has taken his oath of office.
Same; Same; Same; Electoral Tribunals; The Electoral Tribunals’
sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a
candidate has become a member of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, and a candidate must be proclaimed and must have taken
his oath of office before he can be considered a member.—It has been
repeatedly held in a number of cases, that the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal’s sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress
as provided under Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution begins only
after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives.
The fact of ob-

552
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Domino vs. Commission on Elections

taining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically

vest the position in the winning candidate. A candidate must be proclaimed
and must have taken his oath of office before he can be considered a
member of the House of Representatives.
Same; It is now settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the
second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the
winning candidate is disqualified—when the majority speaks and elects
into office a candidate by giving the highest number of votes cast in the
election for that office, no one can be declared elected in his place.—It is
now settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest
number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning
candidate is disqualified. In every election, the people’s choice is the
paramount consideration and their expressed will must, at all times, be
given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate
by giving the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, no
one can be declared elected in his place.
Same; It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not
acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and
imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have
positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.—It
would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the
majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively
declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. To
simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other
votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voters. He
could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a
field which excludes the qualified candidate, the conditions would have
substantially changed. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are
filled by those who have received the highest number
of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no
measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or
plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.

553

VOL. 310, JULY 19, 1999 553

Domino vs. Commission on Elections

Same; The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an

office is only that the election fails entirely—in such case, the electors have
failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity.—The effect of a
decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the
election fails entirely, that the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from
the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as now
only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has
obtained a plurality of votes and does not entitle the candidate receiving
the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such case, the
electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity. To allow
the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the elective position
despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate
without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and
meaning of democracy and the people’s right to elect officials of their
choice.

PANGANIBAN, J., Separate Opinion:

Election Law; Words and Phrases; Statutory Construction; When the

Constitution speaks of residence, the word should be understood,
consistent with Webster, to mean actual, physical and personal presence in
the district that a candidate seeks to represent.—That a member of the
House of Representatives must be a resident of the district which he or she
seeks to represent “for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the election” is a constitutional requirement that
should be interpreted in the sense in which ordinary lay persons understand
it. The common people who ratified the Constitution
and were thereafter expected to abide by it would not normally refer to the
journals of the Constitutional Commission in order to understand the words
and phrases contained therein. Rather, they would usually refer to the
common source being used when they look up for the meaning of words—
the dictionary. In this sense, Webster’s definition of residence should be
controlling. When the Constitution speaks of residence, the word should be
understood, consistent with Webster, to mean actual, physical and
personal presence in the district that a candidate seeks to represent. In
other words, the candidate’s presence should be substantial enough to
show by overt acts his intention to fulfill the duties of the position he seeks.

554

554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Domino vs. Commission on Elections

Same; Same; Conflict of Laws; The original concept of domicile,

which arose from American jurisprudence, was not intended to govern
political rights—it was designed to resolve the conflict of laws between or
among states where a decedent may have lived for various reasons, for the
purpose of determining which law was applicable as regards his estate.—
At any rate, the original concept of domicile, which arose from American
jurisprudence, was not intended to govern political rights. Rather, it was
designed to resolve the conflict of laws between or among states where a
decedent may have lived for various reasons, for the purpose of
determining which law was applicable as regards his estate. Allow me to
quote this short disquisition: “x x x This question first came before the
courts at an early day, long before our present easy and extensive means of
transportation, and at a time before the present ready movement from one
country to another. At that time, men left for Europe for the Western
Continent or elsewhere largely for purposes of adventure or in search of an
opportunity for the promotion of commerce. It was at a time before the
invention of the steamboat and before the era of the oceanic cable. Men left
their native land knowing that they would be gone for long periods of time,
and that means of communication with their home land were infrequent,
difficult, and slow. The traditions of their native
country were strong with these men. In the event of death, while absent,
they desired that their property should descend in accordance with the laws
of the land of their birth. Many such men were adventurers who had the
purpose and intent to eventually return to the land of their nativity. There
was a large degree of sentiment connected with the first announcement of
the rules of law in the matter of the estates of such men. x x x
Same; Same; Applying the concept of domicile in determining
residence as a qualification for an elective office would negate the
objective behind the residence requirement of one year (or six months, in
the case of local positions).—Specifically, I submit that applying the
concept of domicile in determining residence as a qualification for an
elective office would negate the objective behind the residence requirement
of one year (or six months, in the case of local positions). This required
period of residence preceding the day of the election, I believe, is rooted in
the desire that officials of districts or localities be acquainted not only with
the metes and bounds of their constituencies but, more important, with the
constituents themselves—their needs, difficulties, potentials for growth
and development and all matters vital to their common welfare. Such
requisite

555

VOL. 310, JULY 19, 1999 555

Domino vs. Commission on Elections

period would precisely give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with

their desired constituencies, and likewise for the electorate to evaluate their
fitness for the offices they seek.
Same; Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; The Constitution
is not a document reserved only for scholarly disqualification by the most
eminent legal minds of the land—its contents and words should be
interpreted in the sense understood by the ordinary men and women who
place their lives on the line in its defense and who pin their hopes for a
better life on its fulfillment.—The Constitution is the most basic law of the
land. It enshrines the most cherished aspirations and ideals of the
population at large. It is not a document reserved only for scholarly
disquisition by the most eminent legal minds of the
land. In ascertaining its import, lawyers are not meant to quibble over it, to
define its legal niceties, or to articulate its nuances. Its contents and words
should be interpreted in the sense understood by the ordinary men and
women who place their lives on the line in its defense and who pin their
hopes for a better life on its fulfillment.
Same; Same; Same; The Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s
document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever
be present in the people’s consciousness, its language as much as possible
should be understood in the sense they have in common use.—The call for
simplicity in understanding and interpreting our Constitution has been
made a number of times. About three decades ago, this Court declared: “It
is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are
couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in
which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being essential for the
rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people’s
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in
the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of
the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of
the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people
mean what they say. Thus there are cases where the need for construction
is reduced to a minimum.”

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.

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556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Domino vs. Commission on Elections

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Brillantes,

Navarro, Jumamil, Arcilla, Escolin &
Martinez Law Offices for petitioner.
Bacungan, Opinion & Rivilla for private
respondents.
 Fornier & Fornier Law Firm for Intervenor Thomas More
Law Center.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Challenged in this case for certiorari with a prayer for

preliminary injunction are the Resolution of 6 May 19981 of the
Second Division of the Commission on Elections (hereafter
COMELEC), declaring petitioner Juan Domino (hereafter
DOMINO) disqualified as candidate for representative of the Lone
Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani in the 11 May
1998 elections, and the Decision of 29 May 19982 of the
COMELEC en banc denying DOMINO’s motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedents are not disputed.
On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy
for the position of Representative of the Lone Legislative District of
the Province of Sarangani indicating in item nine (9) of his certificate
that he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected
for one (1) year and two (2) months immediately preceding the
election.3
On 30 March 1998, private respondents Narciso Ra. Grafilo, Jr.,
Eddy B. Java, Juan P. Bayonito, Jr., Rosario Samson and Dionisio
P. Lim, Sr., filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due
Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy, which was docketed
as SPA No. 98-022 and assigned to the Second Division of the
COMELEC. Private respondents F

_______________

1 Annex “A” of Petition, Rollo 41-50. Per Desamito, J., Comm., with Guiani, J.
and Calderon, A., Comms., concurring.
2 Rollo, 51-54.
3 Annex “1” of Comment in Intervention, Rollo, 304.

557

VOL. 310, JULY 19, 1999 557

Domino vs. Commission on Elections
alleged that DOMINO, contrary to his declaration in the certificate
of candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the
province of Sarangani where he seeks election. To substantiate
their allegations, private respondents presented the following
evidence:
1. Annex “A”—the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent for
the position of Congressman of the Lone District of the
Province of Sarangani filed with the Office of the Provincial
Election Supervisor of Sarangani on March 25, 1998, where
in item 4 thereof he wrote his date of birth as December 5,
1953; in item 9, he claims he have resided in the
constituency where he seeks election for one (1) year and
two (2) months; and, in item 10, that he is registered voter of
Precinct No. 14A-1, Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani;
2. Annex “B”—Voter’s Registration Record with SN
31326504 dated June 22, 1997 indicating respondent’s
registration at Precinct No. 4400-A, Old Balara, Quezon
City;
3. Annex “C”—Respondent’s Community Tax Certificate No.
11132214C dated January 15, 1997;
4. Annex “D”—Certified true copy of the letter of Herson D.
Dema-ala, Deputy Provincial & Municipal Treasurer of
Alabel, Sarangani, dated February 26, 1998, addressed to
Mr. Conrado G. Butil, which reads:

“In connection with your letter of even date, we are furnishing you
herewith certified xerox copy of the triplicate copy of COMMUNITY
TAX CERTIFICATE NO. 11132214C in the name of Juan Domino.
Furthermore, Community Tax Certificate No. 11132212C of the same
stub was issued to Carlito Engcong on September 5, 1997, while
Certificate No. 11132213C was also issued to Mr. Juan Domino but was
cancelled and serial no. 11132215C was issued in the name of Marianita
Letigio on September 8, 1997.”

5. Annex “E”—The triplicate copy of the Community Tax

Certificate No. 11132214C in the name of Juan Domino
dated September 5, 1997;
 6. Annex “F”—Copy of the letter of Provincial Treasurer
Lourdes P. Riego dated March 2, 1998 addressed to Mr.
Herson D. Dema-ala, Deputy Provincial Treasurer and
Municipal Treasurer of Alabel, Sarangani, which states:

558

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 558

Domino vs. Commission on Elections

“For easy reference, kindly turn-over to the undersigned for

safekeeping, the stub of Community Tax Certificate containing Nos.
11132201C-11132250C issued to you on June 13, 1997 and paid under
Official Receipt No. 7854744.
Upon request of Congressman James L. Chiongbian.”

7. Annex “G”—Certificate of Candidacy of respondent for

the position of Congressman in the 3rd District of Quezon
City for the 1995 elections filed with the Office of the
Regional Election Director, National Capital Region, on
March 17, 1995, where, in item 4 thereof, he wrote his
birth date as December 22, 1953; in item 8 thereof his
“residence in the constituency where I seek to be elected
immediately preceding the election” as 3 years and 5
months; and, in item 9, that he is a registered voter of
Precinct No. 182, Barangay Balara, Quezon City;
8. Annex “H”—a copy of the APPLICATION FOR
TRANSFER OF REGISTRATION RECORDS DUE TO
CHANGE OF RESIDENCE of respondent dated August 30,
1997 addressed to and received by Election Officer Mantil
Alim, Alabel, Sarangani, on September 22, 1997, stating
among others, that “[T]he undersigned’s previous residence
is at 24 Bonifacio Street, Ayala Heights, Quezon City, III
District, Quezon City; wherein he is a registered voter” and
“that for business and residence purposes, the undersigned
has transferred and conducts his business and reside at
Barangay
 Poblacion, Alabel, Province of Sarangani prior to this
application”;
9. Annex “I”—Copy of the SWORN APPLICATION FOR
CANCELLATION OF VOTER’S [TRANSFER OF]
PREVIOUS REGISTRATION of respondent subscribed and
sworn to on 22 October 1997 before Election Officer Mantil
Allim at Alabel, Sarangani.4

For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the
one-year residence requirement and that he has been residing in
Sarangani since January 1997. In support of the said contention,
DOMINO presented before the COMELEC the following exhibits, to
wit:
1. Annex “1”—Copy of the Contract of Lease between Nora
Dacaldacal as Lessor and Administrator of the properties
of deceased spouses Maximo and Remedios Dacaldacal
and respondent as

_______________

4 Supra note 1, at 42-44.

559

559 VOL. 310, JULY 19, 1999

Domino vs. Commission on Elections

Lessee executed on January 15, 1997, subscribed and

sworn to before Notary Public Johnny P. Landero;
2. Annex “2”—Copy of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of
Estate with Absolute Deed of sale executed by and
between the heirs of deceased spouses Maximo and
Remedios Dacaldacal, namely: Maria Lourdes, Jupiter and
Beberlie and the respondent on November 4, 1997,
subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Jose A.
Alegario;
3. Annex “3”—True Carbon Xerox copy of the Decision dated
January 19, 1998, of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro
Manila, Branch 35, Quezon City, in
 Election Case No. 725 captioned as “In the Matter of the
Petition for the Exclusion from the List of voters of
Precinct No. 4400-A Brgy. Old Balara, Quezon City,
Spouses Juan and Zorayda Domino, Petitioners, -versus-
Elmer M. Kayanan, Election Officer, Quezon City,
District III, and the Board of Election Inspectors of
Precinct No. 4400-A, Old Balara, Quezon City,
Respondents.” The dispositive portion of which reads:

1. Declaring the registration of petitioners as voters of

Precinct No. 4400-A, Barangay Old Balara, in District III
Quezon City as completely erroneous as petitioners were
no longer residents of Quezon City but of Alabel,
Sarangani where they have been residing since December
1996;
2. Declaring this erroneous registration of petitioners in
Quezon City as done in good faith due to an honest
mistake caused by circumstances beyond their control and
without any fault of petitioners;
3. Approving the transfer of registration of voters of
petitioners from Precinct No. 4400-A of Barangay Old
Balara, Quezon City to Precinct No. 14A1 of Barangay
Poblacion of Alabel, Sarangani; and
4. Ordering the respondents to immediately transfer and
forward all the election/voter’s registration records of the
petitioners in Quezon City to the Election Officer, the
Election Registration Board and other Comelec Offices of
Alabel, Sarangani where the petitioners are obviously
qualified to exercise their respective rights of suffrage;

4. Annex “4”—Copy of the Application for Transfer of

Registration Records due to Change of Residence
addressed to Mantil Alim, COMELEC Registrar, Alabel,
Sarangani, dated August 30, 1997;

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 560

Domino vs. Commission on Elections
 5. Annex “5”—Certified True Copy of the Notice of
Approval of Application, the roster of applications for
registration approved by the Election Registration Board
on October 20, 1997, showing the spouses Juan and
Zorayda Bailon Domino listed as numbers 111 and 112
both under Precinct No. 14A1, the last two names in the
slate indicated as transferees without VRR numbers and
their application dated August 30, 1997 and September 30,
1997, respectively;
6. Annex “6”—same as Annex “5”;
7. Annex “6-a”—Copy of the Sworn Application for
Cancellation of Voter’s Previous Registration (Annex “I,”
Petition);
8. Annex “7”—Copy of claim card in the name of
respondent showing his VRR No. 31326504 dated
October 20, 1997 as a registered voter of Precinct No.
14A1, Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani;
9. Annex “7-a”—Certification dated April 16, 1998, issued
by Atty. Elmer M. Kayanan, Election Officer IV, District
III, Quezon City, which reads:

“This is to certify that the spouses JUAN and ZORAYDA DOMINO are no
longer registered voters of District III, Quezon City. Their registration records
(VRR) were transferred and are now in the possession of the Election Officer
of Alabel, Sarangani. This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr.
JUAN DOMINO.

10. Annex “8”—Affidavit of Nora Dacaldacal and Maria

Lourdes Dacaldacal stating the circumstances and
incidents detailing their alleged acquaintance with
respondent;
11. Annexes “8-a,” “8-b,” “8-c” and “8-d”—Copies of the
uniform affidavits of witness Myrna Dalaguit, Hilario
Fuentes, Coraminda Lomibao and Elena V. Piodos
subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Bonifacio
F. Doria, Jr., on April 18, 1998, embodying their alleged
personal knowledge of respondent’s residency in Alabel,
Sarangani;
 12. Annex “8-e”—A certification dated April 20, 1998,
subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Bonifacio,
containing a listing of the names of fifty-five (55)
residents of Alabel, Sarangani, declaring and certifying
under oath that they personally know the respondent as a
permanent resident of Alabel, Sarangani since January
1997 up to present;

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561 VOL. 310, JULY 19, 1999

Domino vs. Commission on Elections

13. Annexes “9,” “9-a” and “9-b”—Copies of Individual

Income Tax Return for the year 1997, BIR form 2316 and
W-2, respectively, of respondent; and,
14. Annex “10”—The affidavit of respondent reciting the
chronology of events and circumstances leading to his
relocation to the Municipality of Alabel, Sarangani,
appending Annexes “A,” “B,” “C,” “D,” “D-1,” “E,” “F,”
“G” with sub-markings “G-1” and “G-2” and “H” his
CTC No. 11132214C dated September 5, 1997, which are
the same as Annexes “1,” “2,” “4,” “5,” “6-a,” “3,” “7,”
“9” with submarkings “9-a” and “9-b” except Annex “H.”5

On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a

resolution declaring DOMINO disqualified as candidate for the
position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani for lack
of the one-year residence requirement and likewise ordered the
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy, on the basis of the
following findings:
What militates against respondent’s claim that he has met the residency
requirement for the position sought is his own Voter’s Registration Record
No. 31326504 dated June 22, 1997 [Annex “B,” Petition] and his address
indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City. This
evidence, standing alone,
negates all his protestations that he established residence at Barangay
Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani, as early as January 1997. It is highly
improbable, nay incredible, for respondent who previously ran for the same
position in the 3rd Legislative District of Quezon City during the elections
of 1995 to unwittingly forget the residency requirement for the office
sought.
Counting, therefore, from the day after June 22, 1997 when respondent
registered at Precinct No. 4400-A, up to and until the day of the elections
on May 11, 1998, respondent clearly lacks the one (1) year residency
requirement provided for candidates for Member of the House of
Representatives under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.
All told, petitioner’s evidence conspire to attest to respondent’s lack of
residence in the constituency where he seeks election and while it may be
conceded that he is a registered voter as contem-

_______________

5 Rollo, 45-48.

562

562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Domino vs. Commission on Elections

plated under Section 12 of R.A. 8189, he lacks the qualification to run for
the position of Congressman for the Lone District of the Province of
Sarangani.6

On 11 May 1998, the day of the election, the COMELEC issued

Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No. 3046, ordering that the
votes cast for DOMINO be counted but to suspend the
proclamation if winning, considering that the Resolution
disqualifying him as candidate had not yet become final and
executory.7
The result of the election, per Statement of Votes certified by
the Chairman of the Provincial Board of Canvassers, 8 shows that
DOMINO garnered the highest number of votes over his
opponents for the position of Congressman of the Province of
Sarangani.
 On 15 May 1998, DOMINO filed a motion for reconsideration
of the Resolution dated 6 May 1998, which was denied by the
COMELEC en banc in its decision dated 29 May 1998. Hence, the
present Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction alleging, in the main, that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction when it ruled that he did not meet the one-year
residence requirement.
On 14 July 1998, acting on DOMINO’s Motion for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order, the Court directed the parties to
maintain the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of the
instant petition.9
On 15 September 1998, Lucille L. Chiongbian-Solon, (hereafter
INTERVENOR), the candidate receiving the second highest
number of votes, was allowed by the Court to Intervene. 10
INTERVENOR in her Motion for Leave to Intervene

_______________

6 Rollo, 48-49.
7 Annex “6” of Petition, id., 167-168.
8 Annex “H,” id., 169.
9 Rollo, 352.
10 Id., 1535.

563

VOL. 310, JULY 19, 1999 563

Domino vs. Commission on Elections

and in her Comment in Intervention11 is asking the Court to uphold

the disqualification of petitioner Juan Domino and to proclaim her
as the duly elected representative of Sarangani in the 11 May 1998
elections.
Before us DOMINO raised the following issues for resolution,
to wit:
a. Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City declaring petitioner as resident of
Sarangani and not of Quezon City is
 final, conclusive and binding upon the whole world,
including the Commission on Elections.
b. Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject
congressional district for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the May 11, 1998 elections; and
c. Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction
over the petition a quo for the disqualification of
petitioner.12

The first issue.

The contention of DOMINO that the decision of the

Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion
proceedings declaring him a resident of the Province of Sarangani
and not of Quezon City is final and conclusive upon the
COMELEC cannot be sustained.
The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX
of the Omnibus Election Code, over a petition to deny due course
to or cancel certificate of candidacy. In the exercise of the said
jurisdiction, it is within the competence of the COMELEC to
determine whether false representation as to material facts was
made in the certificate of candidacy, that will include, among
others, the residence of the candidate.
The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City in the exclusion proceedings as to the right of DOMINO to be
included or excluded from the list of voters in the precinct within
its territorial jurisdiction, does not preclude

______________

11Id., 241-303.
12Petition, 15, Rollo, 17.

564

564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Domino vs. Commission on Elections
the COMELEC, in the determination of DOMINO’s qualification
as a candidate, to pass upon the issue of compliance with the
residency requirement.
The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list
of voters are summary in character. Thus, the factual findings of the
trial court and its resultant conclusions in the exclusion proceedings
on matters other than the right to vote in the precinct within its
territorial jurisdiction are not conclusive upon the COMELEC.
Although the court in inclusion or exclusion proceedings may pass
upon any question necessary to decide the issue raised including the
questions of citizenship and residence of the challenged voter, the
authority to order the inclusion in or exclusion from the list of voters
necessarily carries with it the power to inquire into and settle all
matters essential to the exercise of said authority. However, except
for the right to remain in the list of voters or for being excluded
therefrom for the particular election in relation to which the
proceedings had been held, a decision in an exclusion or inclusion
proceeding, even if final and unappealable, does not acquire the
nature of res judicata.13 In this sense, it does not operate as a bar to
any future action that a party may take concerning the subject passed
upon in the proceeding.14 Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding
would neither be conclusive on the voter’s political status, nor bar
subsequent proceedings on his right to be registered as a voter in any
other election.15
Thus, in Tan Cohon v. Election Registrar 16 we ruled that: x x x
It is made clear that even as it is here held that the order of the City
Court in question has become final, the same does not constitute
res adjudicata as to any of the matters therein contained. It is
ridiculous to suppose that such an important and intricate matter of
citizenship may be passed upon and determined with finality in
such

_______________

13See Ozamis v. Zosa, 34 SCRA 425 [1970].

14 Mayor v. Villacete, et al., 2 SCRA 542, 544 [1961]; Tan Cohon v. Election
Registrar, 29 SCRA 244 [1969].
15Supra note 13, at 427-428.
16Supra note 14, at 250.
 565

VOL. 310, JULY 19, 1999 565

Domino vs. Commission on Elections

a summary and peremptory proceeding as that of inclusion and

exclusion of persons in the registry list of voters. Even if the City
Court had granted appellant’s petition for inclusion in the
permanent list of voters on the allegation that she is a Filipino
citizen qualified to vote, her alleged Filipino citizenship would still
have been left open to question.
Moreover, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in its
18 January decision exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared
DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani, approved and
ordered the transfer of his voter’s registration from Precinct No.
4400-A of Barangay Old Balara, Quezon City to precinct 14A1 of
Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani. It is not within the
competence of the trial court, in an exclusion proceedings, to
declare the challenged voter a resident of another municipality.
The jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is limited
only to determining the right of voter to remain in the list of voters
or to declare that the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the
precinct in which he is registered, specifying the ground of the
voter’s disqualification. The trial court has no power to order the
change or transfer of registration from one place of residence to
another for it is the function of the election Registration Board as
provided under Section 12 of R.A. No. 8189.17 The only effect of
the decision of the lower court excluding the challenged voter from
the list of voters, is for the Election Registration Board, upon
receipt of the final decision, to re-

_______________

17 Sec. 12. Change of Residence to Another City or Municipality.—Any registered

voter who has transferred residence to another city or municipality may apply with
the Election Officer of his new residence for the transfer of his registration records.
The application for transfer of
registration shall be subject to the requirements of notice and hearing and the
approval of the Election Registration Board, in accordance with this Act. Upon
approval of the application for transfer, and after notice of such approval to the
Election Officer of the former residence of the voter, said Election Officer shall
transmit by registered mail the voter’s registration record to the Election Officer of
the voter’s new residence.

566

566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Domino vs. Commission on Elections

move the voter’s registration record from the corresponding book

of voters, enter the order of exclusion therein, and thereafter place
the record in the inactive file.18
Finally, the application of the rule on res judicata is unavailing.
Identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action are
indispensable requirements for the application of said doctrine.
Neither herein Private Respondents nor INTERVENOR, is a party
in the exclusion proceedings. The Petition for Exclusion was filed
by DOMINO himself and his wife, praying that he and his wife be
excluded from the Voter’s List on the ground of erroneous
registration while the Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy was filed by private respondents against
DOMINO for alleged false representation in his certificate of
candidacy. For the decision to be a basis for the dismissal by
reason of res judicata, it is essential that there must be between the
first and the second action identity of parties, identity of subject
matter and identity of causes of action.19 In the present case, the
aforesaid essential requisites are not present. In the case of Nuval
v. Guray, et al.,20 the Supreme Court in resolving a similar issue
ruled that:
The question to be solved under the first assignment of error is whether or
not the judgment rendered in the case of the petition for the exclusion of
Norberto Guray’s name from the election list of Luna, is res judicata, so as to
prevent the institution and prosecution of an action in quo warranto, which is
now before us.
 The procedure prescribed by section 437 of the Administrative Code, as
amended by Act No. 3387, is of a summary character and the judgment
rendered therein is not appealable except when the petition is tried before
the justice of the peace of the capital or the circuit judge, in which case it
may be appealed to the judge of first instance, with whom said two lower
judges have concurrent jurisdiction.

_______________

182nd par. of Sec. 142, Art. XII of the Omnibus Election Code.
19See Mendiola v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 492 [1996].
2052 Phil. 645, 647-648 [1928].

567

VOL. 310, JULY 19, 1999 567

Domino vs. Commission on Elections

The petition for exclusion was presented by Gregorio Nuval in his dual
capacity as qualified voter of the municipality of Luna, and as a duly
registered candidate for the office of president of said municipality, against
Norberto Guray as a registered voter in the election list of said
municipality. The present proceeding of quo warranto was interposed by
Gregorio Nuval in his capacity as a registered candidate voted for the
office of municipal president of Luna, against Norberto Guray, as an
elected candidate for the same office. Therefore, there is no identity of
parties in the two cases, since it is not enough that there be an identity of
persons, but there must be an identity of capacities in which said persons
litigate. (Art. 1259 of the Civil Code; Bowler vs. Estate of Alvarez, 23
Phil., 561; 34 Corpus Juris, p. 756, par. 1165)
In said case of the petition for the exclusion, the object of the litigation,
or the litigious matter was the exclusion of Norberto Guray as a voter from
the election list of the municipality of Luna, while in the present quo
warranto proceeding, the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter is
his exclusion or expulsion from the office to which he has been elected.
Neither does there exist, then, any identity in the object of the litigation, or
the litigious matter.
 In said case of the petition for exclusion, the cause of action was that
Norberto Guray had not the six months’ legal residence in the municipality
of Luna to be a qualified voter thereof, while in the present proceeding of
quo warranto, the cause of action is that Norberto Guray has not the one
year’s legal residence required for eligibility to the office of municipal
president of Luna. Neither does there exist therefore, identity of causes of
action.
In order that res judicata may exist the following are necessary: (a)
identity of parties; (b) identity of things; and (c) identity of issues (Aquino
vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 850). And as in the case of the petition for
exclusion and in the present quo warranto proceeding, as there is no
identity of parties, or of things or litigious matter, or of issues or causes of
action, there is no res judicata.

The Second Issue.

Was DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at

least one year immediately preceding the 11 May 1998 election as
stated in his certificate of candidacy?
We hold in the negative.
568

568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Domino vs. Commission on Elections

It is doctrinally settled that the term “residence,” as used in the

law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office,
means the same thing as “domicile,” which imports not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. 21
“Domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever
absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to
return.22 “Domicile” is a question of intention and circumstances. In
the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in
mind, namely: (1) that a man
must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once
established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man
can have but one residence or domicile at a time.23
Records show that petitioner’s domicile of origin was Candon,
Ilocos Sur24 and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new
domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara,
Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the
position of representative of the 3rd District of Quezon City in the
May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had
effectively abandoned his “residence” in Quezon City and has
established a new “domicile” of choice at the Province of
Sarangani.
A person’s “domicile” once established is considered to
continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established.25 To successfully effect a change of domicile one must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a
bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one and definite acts which

_______________

21Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408, 415 [1993], citing
Nuval v. Guray, supra note 17.
22Id., citing Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967].
23Alcantara v. Secretary of Interior, 61 Phil. 459, 465 [1935].
24Annex “2,” supra note 3, at 305.
25Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 711
[1991].

569

VOL. 310, JULY 19, 1999 569

Domino vs. Commission on Elections

correspond with the purpose.26 In other words, there must basically

be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time; the change
of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place
chosen for the new domicile must be actual.27
It is the contention of petitioner that his actual physical
presence in Alabel, Sarangani since December 1996 was
sufficiently established by the lease of a house and lot located
therein in January 1997 and by the affidavits and certifications
under oath of the residents of that place that they have seen
petitioner and his family residing in their locality.
While this may be so, actual and physical is not in itself
sufficient to show that from said date he had transferred his
residence in that place. To establish a new domicile of choice,
personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct
indicative of that intention. While “residence” simply requires
bodily presence in a given place, “domicile” requires not only such
bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable
intent to make it one’s fixed and permanent place of abode, one’s
home.28
As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical
presence in the locality involved and intention to adopt it as a
domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No
change of domicile will result if either of these elements is absent.
Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence in the
locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact
of physical presence without intention.29

_______________

26Aquino v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 400, 423, [1995], citing 18 Am Jur, 211-
220.
27 Supra note 18, at 415, citing 17 Am. Jur., sec. 16, pp. 599601; Romualdez v.
RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408, 415 [1993].
28Velilla v. Posadas, 62 Phil. 624, 631-632 [1935].
2925 Am Jur 2d, Domicil, 14.

570

570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Domino vs. Commission on Elections
 The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does
not adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract
may be indicative of DOMINO’s intention to reside in Sarangani
but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove
abandonment of one’s original domicile. The mere absence of
individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long,
without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change
of domicile.30 Thus the date of the contract of lease of a house and
lot located in the province of Sarangani, i.e., 15 January 1997,
cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the
reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement.
Further, Domino’s lack of intention to abandon his residence in
Quezon City is further strengthened by his act of registering as voter
in one of the precincts in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive
of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence
especially in this case where DOMINO registered in his former
barangay. Exercising the right of election franchise is a deliberate
public assertion of the fact of residence, and is said to have decided
preponderance in a doubtful case upon the place the elector claims as,
or believes to be, his residence.31 The fact that a party continuously
voted in a particular locality is a strong factor in assisting to
determine the status of his domicile.32
His claim that his registration in Quezon City was erroneous
and was caused by events over which he had no control cannot be
sustained. The general registration of voters for purposes of the
May 1998 elections was scheduled for two (2) consecutive
weekends, viz.: June 14, 15, 21, and 22.33
While, Domino’s intention to establish residence in Sarangani
can be gleaned from the fact that be bought the house he was
renting on November 4, 1997, that he sought cancellation of his
previous registration in Quezon City on 22 October

_______________

30Supra note 24, at 715.

 31Ex Parte Weissinger, 247 Ala 113, 22 So 2d 510.
32Re Meyers’ Estate, 137 Neb 60, 288 NW 35.
33Section 7, R.A. No. 8189.

571

VOL. 310, JULY 19, 1999 571

Domino vs. Commission on Elections

1997,34 and that he applied for transfer of registration from Quezon

City to Sarangani by reason of change of residence on 30 August
1997,35 DOMINO still falls short of the one year residency
requirement under the Constitution. In showing compliance with
the residency requirement, both intent and actual presence in the
district one intends to represent must satisfy the length of time
prescribed by the fundamental law.36 Domino’s failure to do so
rendered him ineligible and his election to office null and void.37
The Third Issue.

DOMINO’s contention that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction

in the present petition is bereft of merit. As previously mentioned,
the COMELEC, under Sec. 78,
Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, has jurisdiction over a
petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy.
Such jurisdiction continues even after election, if for any reason no
final judgment of disqualification is rendered before the election,
and the candidate facing disqualification is voted for and receives
the highest number of votes38 and provided

_______________

34Annex “E-2,” supra note 3, at 100-101.

35Annex “E-4,” Rollo, 105.
36Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 [1995].
37 Gaerlan v. Catubig, 17 SCRA 376 [1966]; Sanchez v. Del Rosario, 1 SCRA
1102 [1961].
 38 SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.—Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast
for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension
of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
SEC. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.—
The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to

572

572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Domino vs. Commission on Elections

further that the winning candidate has not been proclaimed or has
taken his oath of office.39
It has been repeatedly held in a number of cases, that the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s sole and exclusive
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress as provided under Section
17 of Article VI of the Constitution begins only after a candidate
has become a member of the House of Representatives.40
The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an election
does not automatically vest the position in the winning candidate. 41
A candidate must be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of
office before he can be considered a member of the House of
Representatives.
In the instant case, DOMINO was not proclaimed as
Congressman-elect of the Lone Congressional District of the
Province of Sarangani by reason of a Supplemental Omnibus
Resolution issued by the COMELEC on the day of the election
ordering the suspension of DOMINO’s proclamation should he
obtain the winning number of votes. This resolution was issued by
the COMELEC in view of the non-finality of its 6 May 1998
resolution disqualifying DOMINO as candidate for the position.
 Considering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as
Congressman-elect in the Lone Congressional District of the
Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member of the
House of Representatives. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the
Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction over the issue of his
ineligibility as a candidate.42

_______________

petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in

Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
39 Lazatin v. COMELEC, 157 SCRA 337 [1998]; Ututalum v.
COMELEC, 181 SCRA 335 [1990].
40Aquino v. COMELEC, et al., 248 SCRA 400 [1995].
41Id., at 417; supra note 33, at 340-341.
42Fernandez v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 135354, October 20, 1998.

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VOL. 310, JULY 19, 1999 573

Domino vs. Commission on Elections

Issue raised by INTERVENOR.

After finding that DOMINO is disqualified as candidate for the

position of representative of the province of Sarangani, may
INTERVENOR, as the candidate who received the next highest
number of votes, be proclaimed as the winning candidate?
It is now settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the
second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in
case the winning candidate is disqualified.43 In every election, the
people’s choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed
will must, at all times, be given effect. When the majority speaks
and elects into office a candidate by giving the highest number of
votes cast in the election for that office, no one can be declared
elected in his place.44
 It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has
not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a
winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the
majority of which have positively declared through their ballots
that they do not choose him.45 To simplistically assume that the
second placer would have received the other votes would be to
substitute our judgment for the mind of the voters. He could not be
considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field
which excludes the qualified candidate, the conditions would have
substantially changed.46
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by
those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the
election for that office, and it is fundamental idea in all republican
forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no
measure can be declared carried unless he or it

_______________

43 Labo v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 [1989]; Abella v. COMELEC, 201 SCRA

253 [1991]; supra note 33.
44Benito v. COMELEC, 235 SCRA, 436, 441 [1994].
45Geronimo v. Ramos, 136 SCRA 435, 446 [1985].
46Supra note 37, at 424.

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Domino vs. Commission on Elections

receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the

election.47
The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an
office is only that the election fails entirely, that the wreath of victory
cannot be transferred48 from the disqualified winner to the repudiated
loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration of
election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes 49
and does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest
number of votes to be declared elected. In such case, the electors
have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity. 50 To
allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the
elective position despite his rejection by the electorate is to
disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to
undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the
people’s right to elect officials of their choice.51
INTERVENOR’s plea that the votes cast in favor of DOMINO
be considered stray votes cannot be sustained. INTERVENOR’s
reliance on the opinion made in the Labo, Jr. case52 to wit: if the
electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate’s
disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety, would nevertheless cast their votes in favor of the
ineligible candidate, the electorate may be said to have waived the
validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying
their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the
eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may
be deemed elected, is misplaced.

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47Supra note 41, at 446-447, citing 20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.
48Supra note 41, at 452, citing Luison v. Garcia, 103 Phil. 457 [1958].
49Id., citing Villar v. Paraiso, 96 Phil. 664 [1955].
50Id., citing Llamaso v. Ferrer, 84 Phil. 490 [1949].
51 Supra note 41, at 441-442, citing Badelles v. Cabile, 27 SCRA 113, 121
[1969].
52211 SCRA 297, 312 [1992].

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Domino vs. Commission on Elections

Contrary to the claim of INTERVENOR, petitioner was not

notoriously known by the public as an ineligible
candidate. Although the resolution declaring him ineligible as
candidate was rendered before the election, however, the same is
not yet final and executory. In fact, it was no less than the
COMELEC in its Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No. 3046 that
allowed DOMINO to be voted for the office and ordered that the
votes cast for him be counted as the Resolution declaring him
ineligible has not yet attained finality. Thus the votes cast for
DOMINO are presumed to have been cast in the sincere belief that
he was a qualified candidate, without any intention to misapply
their franchise. Thus, said votes can not be treated as stray, void, or
meaningless.53
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The
resolution dated 6 May 1998 of the COMELEC 2nd Division and
the decision dated 29 May 1998 of the COMELEC En Banc, are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,

Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., In the result; please see separate opinion.
Quisumbing, J., In the result, only insofar as Petitioner
Domino is adjudged disqualified.
Purisima and Pardo, JJ., No part.

SEPARATE OPINION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

I concur “in the result”: the petitioner failed to fulfill the one-
year residence requirement in order to qualify as a candi-

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53 Reyes v. COMELEC, 254 SCRA 514, 529 [1996].

 576

576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Domino vs. Commission on Elections

date for congressman of the lone district of Sarangani. With all due
respect, I disagree however with the majority view that residence
as a qualification for candidacy for an elective public office
imports the same meaning as domicile.
That a member of the House of Representatives must be a
resident of the district which he or she seeks to represent “for a
period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of
the election”1 is a constitutional requirement that should be
interpreted in the sense in which ordinary lay persons understand
it. The common people who ratified the Constitution and were
thereafter expected to abide by it would not normally refer to the
journals of the Constitutional Commission in order to understand
the words and phrases contained therein. Rather, they would
usually refer to the common source being used when they look up
for the meaning of words— the dictionary.2 In this sense,
Webster’s definition of residence3 should be controlling.
When the Constitution speaks of residence, the word should be
understood, consistent with Webster, to mean actual, physical and
personal presence in the district that a candidate seeks to represent.
In other words, the candidate’s presence should be substantial
enough to show by overt acts his intention to fulfill the duties of the
position he seeks.
If the framers of our basic law intended our people to
understand residence as legal domicile, they should have said so.
Then our people would have looked up the meaning of domicile
and would have understood the constitutional provision in that
context. However, the framers of our Constitution did

_______________

1 § 6, Art. 6 of the 1987 Constitution.

 2 See Dissenting Opinion in Marcos v. Comelec, 255 SCRA xi, October 25, 1995.
3 Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, G. & C. Merriam Co., 1979 ed.: “x x x
the act or fact of dwelling in a place for some time x x x; the act or fact of living or
regularly staying at or in some place for the discharge of a duty or the enjoyment of a
benefit x x x; the place where one actually lives as distinguished from his domicile or
a place of temporary sojourn x x x.”

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Domino vs. Commission on Elections

not. I therefore submit that residence must be understood in its

common dictionary meaning as understood by ordinary lay
persons.
At any rate, the original concept of domicile, which arose from
American jurisprudence, was not intended to govern political
rights. Rather, it was designed to resolve the conflict of laws
between or among states where a decedent may have lived for
various reasons, for the purpose of determining which law was
applicable as regards his estate. Allow me to quote this short
disquisition:4
“x x x This question first came before the courts at an early day, long
before our present easy and extensive means of transportation, and at a
time before the present ready movement from one country to another. At
that time, men left for Europe for the Western Continent or elsewhere
largely for purposes of adventure or in search of an opportunity for the
promotion of commerce. It was at a time before the invention of the
steamboat and before the era of the oceanic cable. Men left their native
land knowing that they would be gone for long periods of time, and that
means of communication with their home land were infrequent, difficult,
and slow. The traditions of their native country were strong with these
men. In the event of death, while absent, they desired that their property
should descend in accordance with the laws of the land of their birth. Many
such men were adventurers who had the purpose and intent to eventually
return to the land of their nativity. There was a large
degree of sentiment connected with the first announcement of the rules of
law in the matter of the estates of such men. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
These reasons, which were, to an extent at least, historical and patriotic,
found early expression in the decisions of the courts on the question of
domicile. x x x”

Subsequently, domicile was used in other “conflicts” cases

involving taxation, divorce and other civil matters. To use it to
determine qualifications for political office is to enlarge its

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4 In Re Jones’ Estate, 182 NW 227, 229-230 (1921); 16 ALR 1286.

578

578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Domino vs. Commission on Elections

meaning beyond what was intended, resulting in strained and

contortive interpretations of the Constitution.
Specifically, I submit that applying the concept of domicile in
determining residence as a qualification for an elective office
would negate the objective behind the residence requirement of
one year (or six months, in the case of local positions). This
required period of residence preceding the day of the election, I
believe, is rooted in the desire that officials of districts or localities
be acquainted not only with the metes and bounds of their
constituencies but, more important, with the constituents
themselves— their needs, difficulties, potentials for growth and
development and all matters vital to their common welfare. Such
requisite period would precisely give candidates the opportunity to
be familiar with their desired constituencies, and likewise for the
electorate to evaluate their fitness for the offices they seek.
If all that is required of elective officials is legal domicile, then
they would qualify even if, for several years prior to the election,
they have never set foot in their
districts (or in the country, for that matter), since it is possible to
maintain legal domicile even without actual presence, provided
one retains the animus revertendi or the intention to return.
The Constitution is the most basic law of the land. It enshrines
the most cherished aspirations and ideals of the population at large.
It is not a document reserved only for scholarly disquisition by the
most eminent legal minds of the land. In ascertaining its import,
lawyers are not meant to quibble over it, to define its legal niceties,
or to articulate its nuances. Its contents and words should be
interpreted in the sense understood by the ordinary men and
women who place their lives on the line in its defense and who pin
their hopes for a better life on its fulfillment.
The call for simplicity in understanding and interpreting our
Constitution has been made a number of times. About three
decades ago, this Court declared:5

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5 JM Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413, 422-423,
February 18, 1970, per Fernando, J. (later CJ).

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Domino vs. Commission on Elections

“It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions

are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to
be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed in which case the significance thus attached to them
prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it
being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be
present in the people’s consciousness, its language as much as
possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it,
based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what
they
 say. Thus there are cases where the need for construction is
reduced to a minimum.”
Having said this, I still believe that Petitioner Juan Domino
failed to adduce sufficient convincing evidence to prove his actual,
physical and personal presence in the district of Sarangani for at
least one year prior to the 1998 elections.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition at bar.

Petition dismissed; Questioned resolution and decision

affirmed.
Notes.—It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a
certificate of candidacy, which ought to be decisive in determining
whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution’s
residency qualification requirement. (RomualdezMarcos vs.
Commission on Elections, 248 SCRA 300 [1995])
A possible exception to the rule that a second placer may not be
declared the winning candidate is predicated on the concurrence of
two assumptions, namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest
number of votes is disqualified, and (2) the electorate is fully aware
in fact and in law of a candidate’s disqualification so as to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast
their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. (Grego vs.
Commission on Elections, 274 SCRA 481 [1997])

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