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Villarroel vs. Estrada

Oblicon Case

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
24 views2 pages

Villarroel vs. Estrada

Oblicon Case

Uploaded by

D. Ram
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Villarroel vs.

Estrada
G.R. No. L-47362 December 19, 1940
JUAN F. VILLARROEL, recurrente-apelante,
vs. BERNARDINO ESTRADA, recurrido-apelado.

PONENTE : AVANCEÑA, Pres.

TOPIC : Moral Obligations: Distinctions

PRINCIPLE : The rule that a new promise to pay a prescribed debt must be made by
the same obligated person or by another legally authorized by him, is not
applicable to the present case in which the fulfillment of the obligation of the
originally obligated party is not required, but of the one who then voluntarily
wanted to assume this obligation

FACTS
Alejandro F. Callao, mother of the defendant Juan F. Villarroel, obtained from spouses Mariano
Estrada and Severina a loan of P1,000 payable after seven years in May of 1912. Alejandra
passed away, leaving the defendant as sole heir. The spouses Estrada also died, leaving the
plaintiff Bernardino Estrada as the only heir.
On August 9, 1930, the defendant signed a document declaring that he owes the plaintiff the
amount of P1,000, with an interest of 12 percent per year.
In a court action, the CFI ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount claimed of
P1,000 with its statutory interest of 12 percent per year from August 9, 1930 until its full
payment. This judgment is appealed.

ISSUE
Whether or not a moral obligation may be demanded

RULING
No. But an obligation voluntarily entered may be demanded. It will be noted that the parties in
the present cause are, respectively, the only heirs of the original creditors and the debtor. This
action is exercised by virtue of the obligation that the defendant as the only child of the original
debtor contracted in favor of the plaintiff, sole heir of the original creditors. It is admitted that
the amount of P1,000 to which this obligation is incurred is the same debt of the mother of the
defendant to the parents of the plaintiff.
Although the action to recover the original debt has already prescribed when the lawsuit was
filed in this case, the question that arises in this appeal is mainly whether, notwithstanding such
prescription, the action filed is admissible. However, this action is not based on the original
obligation contracted by the mother of the defendant, which has already prescribed, but on the
one contracted by the defendant on August 9, 1930 (Exhibit B) when assuming the fulfillment of
that obligation, already prescribed. Being the defendant the only heir of the original debtor,
with the right to succeed her in her inheritance, that debt legally incurred by her mother,
although it lost its effectiveness by prescription, is now, however, for him a moral obligation,
which is a consideration sufficient to create and make effective and enforceable its obligation
voluntarily contracted on August 9, 1930 in Exhibit B.
The rule that a new promise to pay a prescribed debt must be made by the same obligated
person or by another legally authorized by him, is not applicable to the present case in which
the fulfillment of the obligation of the originally obligated party is not required, but of the one
who then voluntarily wanted to assume this obligation. (Translated from original Spanish to
English through Google Translate)

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs to the appellant. So it is ordered.

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