CASE DIGEST – LABOR LAW
ARIEL A. TRES REYES, petitioner, vs.
MAXIM’S TEA HOUSE and JOCELYN POON, respondents.
G.R. No. 140853 February 27, 2003
Facts:
Respondent had employed Ariel Tres Reyes as a driver since
October 1995. In the wee hours of the morning of September 27, 1997,
petitioner and seven of his co-employee passengers met an accident when
he noticed a ten-wheeler truck coming his way at full speed despite the fact
that the latter’s lane had a red signal light on. Petitioner maneuvered to
avoid collision, but nonetheless the van was driving struck the truck which
they sustained physical injuries and both vehicles were damaged. The
management of Maxim's required petitioner to submit, within forty-eight
hours, a written explanation as to what happened. He complied but his
employer found his explanation unsatisfactory and as a result he was
preventively suspended for thirty (30) days, Maxim's terminated petitioner
for cause.
The Labor Arbiter found that petitioner was grossly negligent in failing
to avoid the collision petitioner filed a "Motion for Partial Reconsideration"
with the NLRC. The NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter on the
ground that there was no negligence on petitioner's part. Respondents
moved for reconsideration of the foregoing decision, but said motion was
denied by the Commission Respondents then filed a special civil action for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals, the appellate court decided in favor of
the employer and its manager.
Issue:
Whether or not the “Motion for Partial Reconsideration” be considered
as an appeal to the NLRC considering that the motion contained no
statement when petitioner received a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s decision to
determine the timeliness of the motion cum appeal, petitioner’s failure to
pay the necessary filling fees and for want and verification and absence of
proof that it was filed within the reglementary period.
Ruling:
Yes, the “Motion for Partial Reconsideration” be considered as an
appeal to the NLRC.
In one of the Court decided cases that in labor cases, rules of
procedure should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. They
are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and where
their strict application would result in the frustration rather than promotion of
substantial justice, technicalities must be avoided. Technicalities should not
be permitted to stand... in the way of equitably and completely resolving the
rights and obligations of the parties. Where the ends of substantial justice
shall be better served, the application of technical rules of procedure may
be relaxed.
In this case, it would have readily seen that the said pleading had
complied with the technical requirements of an appeal. The records also
clearly show the basis for the finding of the Commission that the appeal
fees were paid. That petitioner’s declaration in his motion that he received
a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s decision on September 28, 1998 is more than
sufficient compliance with said requirement imposed by Section 3, Rule VI
and likewise find that the motion in question was filed with the NLRC on
October 8, 1998 or on the tenth (10th) day from the date of receipt by
petitioner of his copy of the Labor Arbiter’s decision. Hence, the Court are
constrained to conclude that the appellate court had no basis for
concluding that the NLRC had gravely abuse its discretion when NLRC
gave due course to the motion and treated it as an appeal when in fact the
petitioner complied the requisites for substantial requirements for an
appeal.
