Map 7.

1 Bangladesh
 CHAPTER 7
Genocide in Bangladesh

ROUNAQ JAHAN

Introduction
The birth of Bangladesh in 1971 was a unique phenomenon in that it
was the first nation-state to emerge after waging a successful liberation
war against a postcolonial state, Pakistan. The partition of India in 1947
on the basis of religion created a single, independent state of Pakistan,
carved out of two primarily Muslim majority territories in the Western
and Eastern parts of India, separated by 1,600 k. However, over the
years, disparities and divisions started emerging between the Eastern
and Western parts of Pakistan (Jahan, 1972). The Muslims in East and
West Pakistan were divided by language, ethnicity, and culture. Though
the Bengali Muslims of East Pakistan comprised the majority of the pop-
ulation, their language and culture were threatened by the non-Bengali
ruling elites who belonged to West Pakistan. The Bengalis were politi-
cally excluded as the country was ruled by either non-elected civilian
leaders or military dictators from West Pakistan. East Pakistan was also
economically exploited as resources were transferred from East to West
Pakistan (Sobhan, 1962; Rahman, 1968).
In 1970 the Awami League (AL) led by the Bengali nationalist leader
Bangabandhu Shiekh Mujibur Rahman (Sheikh Mujib), won an over-
whelming victory in the Pakistan general election, the first free election
held in the country. But the West Pakistan-based leadership refused to
hand over power. Instead, on March 25, 1971, they arrested Shiekh
Mujib and launched a military campaign throughout East Pakistan. This
triggered the declaration of independence of Bangladesh on March 26,
1971, and the start of a national liberation war which received logistical
support from India. The liberation war reached its culmination in a

249
250 v R. Jahan

full-scale conventional war between Pakistan and the joint forces of

India and Bangladesh. Ultimately, Pakistan surrendered to the joint
forces on December 16, 1971.
The nine-months-long liberation war in Bangladesh in 1971 drew
world attention because of the genocide committed by the Pakistani
armed forces, which, with the support of local militant groups, con-
ducted widely documented massacres, tortures, rapes, disappearances,
destruction of property, and forced displacements (Loshak, 1971; Mas-
carenhas 1971; Schanberg 1971; Coggin, Shepherd, & Greenway, 1971).
Newspaper reports, testimonies before the U.S. Congress and other
studies published during 1971 and afterwards describe in detail many of
the atrocities. The declassified documents of the U.S. government show
that the U.S. government officials serving in East Pakistan in 1971 used
the term “genocide” to describe the events they had knowledge of at that
time and/or were witnessing first-hand (Blood telegram, 1971, published
in Gandhi, 2002).
The Pakistani military attacks targeted the Bengali nationalists with a
particular focus on selected groups such as the students, intellectuals, and
the Hindu community. Estimates of the number of victims vary. Bangla-
desh authorities claim that nearly three million people were killed; approx-
imately 200,000 girls and women were raped; 10 million took refuge in
India, and another 30 million were displaced within the country.
After independence, the new government in Bangladesh made
attempts to bring the perpetrators of these atrocities to justice. But inter-
nal and international pressures prevented that from happening.
However, the demand for justice and accountability were persistently
raised by civil society groups within Bangladesh. Finally, in the 2008
parliamentary elections impunity became a major campaign issue and
the AL, which won an overwhelming victory, promised to prosecute
these crimes. In 2009 Bangladesh established an International Crimes
Tribunal (ICT), a domestic court with a mandate to prosecute Bangla-
deshi collaborators involved in the 1971 atrocities. The ICT is conduct-
ing an investigation and has begun to issue arrest warrants of alleged
suspects. In 2010, four suspects were arrested. These recent actions of
the Bangladesh government have received international support. At the
same time, the government has been advised to ensure that this justice
meets international standards (ICT Briefing, July 2010).
This chapter briefly addresses the following questions: What were the
historical forces and trends that led to the genocide? How was the geno-
cide committed? Who committed the genocide? What were the responses
to the genocide? What has been the impact of the genocide? What are the
contestations about the genocide? And, finally, why is the Bangladesh case
important to understanding the complexities of genocide?
 Genocide in Bangladesh v 251

Historical Forces and Trends Leading to the Genocide

The Pakistan government’s military action and genocide in Bangladesh
caught outside observers as well as the Bengali nationalists by surprise.
After all, the Bengali nationalists were not involved in any armed strug-
gle prior to March 25, 1971. They were essentially waging a peaceful
constitutional movement for democracy and autonomy. Their only
crime, as U.S. Senator Edward Kennedy observed, appeared to have
been to win an election (Malik, 1972).
A brief analysis of Pakistan’s history from 1947 till 1971 illustrates the
forces and trends that led to military action and genocide in Bangladesh.
Soon after the creation of Pakistan, unelected civil–military bureaucratic
elites from West Pakistan monopolized state power and started behav-
ing like colonial masters toward the Bengalis in East Pakistan. The Paki-
stani rulers threatened the linguistic and cultural identity of the Bengalis.
They thwarted all attempts of democratic rule to keep the Bengalis, who
were the majority of the population, from gaining control of political
decision-making positions (Jahan, 1972). The Bengalis had little repre-
sentation in the Pakistani military as the British colonialists did not
recruit Bengalis in the military, considering them as a “non-martial”
race. The Pakistan military, composed of mainly Punjabis and Pathans,
imbibed this British colonialist image of Bengalis as “non-martial,” a
physically weak race not interested in serving or unable to serve in the
army (Marshall, 1959). The following remarks of General Ayub Khan
(1967), Pakistan’s first military dictator (1958–1968), about the Bengalis
in his memoirs reflect the typical attitude of the Pakistani ruling elites:

East Bengalis probably belong to the very original Indian races . . .

They have been and still are under considerable Hindu cultural
and linguistic influence. . . . They have all the inhibitions of down
trodden races. . . . Their popular complexes, exclusiveness, suspi-
cion and . . . defensive aggressiveness . . . emerge from this histori-
cal background. (p. 187)

The conflict between Bengalis in East Pakistan and West Pakistan-

based non-Bengali rulers first started over the issue of Bengali language
and culture. Though the Bengalis comprised 54% of Pakistan’s popula-
tion, in 1948 the ruling elites declared their intention to make Urdu,
which was the language of only 7% of the population, the sole state lan-
guage. Bengali students immediately protested the decision and
launched a movement that continued for the next eight years, until the
Pakistan Constitution, adopted in 1956, recognized both Bengali and
Urdu as state languages (Ahmad, 1967).
252 v R. Jahan

The Bengalis had to defend not only the right to practice their own
language, but other creative expressions of their culture such as litera-
ture, music, dance, and art. The Pakistani ruling elites looked upon
Bengali language and culture as too “Hindu leaning” and made repeated
attempts to “cleanse” it from Hindu influence (Umar, 1966; 1967; 1969).
First, in the 1950s, attempts were made to force Bengalis to substitute
Bengali words with Arabic and Urdu words. Then, in the 1960s, state-
controlled media such as television and radio banned songs written by
Rabindra Nath Tagore, a Bengali Hindu, who won the Nobel Prize in
1913 and whose poetry and songs were equally beloved by Bengali
Hindus and Muslims. The attacks on their language and culture as
“Hindu leaning” alienated the Bengalis from the state-sponsored Islamic
ideology of Pakistan, and as a result the Bengalis started emphasizing a
more secular ideology and outlook.
The Bengali nationalist movement was also fueled by a sense of eco-
nomic exploitation. Though jute, the major export-earning commodity,
was produced in East Pakistan, most of the economic investments took
place in West Pakistan. A systematic transfer of resources took place
from East to West Pakistan, creating a growing economic disparity and
a feeling among the Bengalis that they were being treated as a colony by
Pakistan (Sobhan, 1962; Rahman, 1968; Jahan, 1972).
In the 1950s and 1960s, a group of Bengali economists carefully docu-
mented the process of economic disparity and marshaled arguments in
favor of establishing a “two-economy” system in Pakistan (Sobhan,
1970). The movement toward autonomy initiated in the 1950s culmi-
nated in the famous Six-Point Program of 1966, which not only rejected
the central government’s right of taxation, but demanded that the power
to tax and establish trade and commercial relations, including the estab-
lishment of separate accounts of foreign exchange earning, be placed in
the hands of the two provincial governments of East and West Pakistan.
However, it was the barriers erected by the powers that be that both
prevented the Bengalis from participating in the political process and
resulted in their exclusion from state power that gradually drove the
Bengalis to demand autonomy, and finally to demand self-determination
(Jahan, 1972). From the beginning, the Bengalis demanded democracy
with free and regular elections, a parliamentary form of government,
and freedom of political parties and the media. But the ruling elites in
Pakistan hindered every attempt at instituting democracy in the country
(Callard, 1957; Sayeed, 1967). In 1954 a democratically elected govern-
ment in East Bengal was dismissed within 90 days of taking power. A
constitution was adopted in 1956, after nine years of protracted negotia-
tions, only to be abrogated within two years by a military coup. In 1958,
just before the first nationally scheduled election, the military took direct
 Genocide in Bangladesh v 253

control of the government. This was out of fear that the Bengalis might
dominate in a democratically elected federal government.
The decade of the 1960s saw the military rule of General Ayub Khan.
It was eventually toppled in 1969 as a result of popular mass movements
in both wings (East and West) of Pakistan. However, after the fall of
Ayub, another military dictator, General Yahya Khan, who was the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces, took charge of the govern-
ment. The Yahya regime acceded to a number of key demands of the
Bengali nationalist movement, including the holding of a free demo-
cratic national election on the basis of one person, one vote. The first
free democratic national elections held in Pakistan in 1970, two decades
after the birth of the country, resulted in a sweeping victory for the
Bengali nationalist party, the AL. The election results gave the AL not
only total control over their own province, but also a majority nationally
and a right to form the federal government.
Once again, the ruling elites in Pakistan took recourse to unconstitu-
tional measures to prevent the Bengalis assuming state power. On March
1, 1971, General Yahya postponed indefinitely the scheduled March 3
session of parliament. This, in turn, threw the country into a constitu-
tional crisis. The AL responded by launching an unprecedented non-
violent, non-cooperation movement, which resulted in the entire
administration of then East Pakistan coming to a virtual standstill. Even
the Bengali civil and military officials complied with the non-
cooperation movement. The movement demonstrated that the Bengali
nationalists had total allegiance and support of the Bengali population.
The Yahya regime initiated political negotiations with the AL, but at
the same time flew thousands of armed forces in from West to East Paki-
stan, thus preparing for military action. On March 25, 1971, General
Yahya abruptly broke off the negotiations and unleashed a massive
armed strike, which was named Operation Searchlight. In two days of
uninterrupted military operations, in the capital city of Dhaka, hundreds
of ordinary citizens were killed; houses and property were destroyed;
and the leader of the AL, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was
arrested. The army also launched armed attacks in Chittagong, Comilla,
Khulna, and other garrison cities. Simon Dring, a reporter with the
Daily Telegraph, London, and Michel Laurent, an Associated Press pho-
tographer, escaped the Pakistani dragnet and roamed Dhaka and the
countryside. On March 28 they reported that the loss of life had reached
15,000 in the countryside. On the Dhaka University campus, 17 profes-
sors and some 200 students were killed in cold blood (Loshak, 1971,
pp. 88–126).
One of the main reasons behind the atrocities was to terrorize the
population into submission. The Pakistani military regime calculated
254 v R. Jahan

that since the Bengalis had no previous experience in armed struggle,

they would be frightened and crushed in the face of overwhelming fire
power, mass killings, and destruction. Another factor that influenced the
Pakistani military’s action was their assumption, as previously noted, of
racial superiority as a “martial race.” Cleansing of Bengali Muslims from
Hindu influence was a goal often repeated by the Pakistani military
during the 1971 genocide.
The genocide in Bangladesh, which started with the Pakistani military
operation against unarmed citizens on the night of March 25, continued
unabated for nearly nine months until the Bengali nationalists, with the
help of the Indian army, succeeded in liberating the country from Paki-
stani occupation forces on December 16, 1971. The atrocities committed
by the Pakistani army were widely reported by the international press
during 1971 (Loshak, 1971; Mascarenhas, 1971; Schanberg, 1971;
Jenkins, Clifton, & Steele, 1971; Coggin et al., 1971).
From the eyewitness accounts documented during and immediately
after the genocide in 1971, as well as those published over the last 40
years, it is possible to analyze the major features of the Bangladesh geno-
cide—how it was committed and who was involved, both the perpetra-
tors and the victims in the genocide.

How was the Genocide Committed?

On March 25, 1971, as the Pakistani government initiated military
action in Bangladesh, a number of sites and groups of people were
selected as targets of attack. In Dhaka, for example, the university
campus, the headquarters of the police and the Bengali paramilitia,
slums and squatter settlements, and Hindu-majority localities, all were
selected as special targets. The Pakistani ruling elites believed that the
leadership of the Bengali nationalist movement came from the intellec-
tuals and students; that the Hindus and the urban lumpenproletariat
were the main supporters; and that the Bengali police and army officials
could be potential leaders in any armed struggle. In the first two days of
army operations in Dhaka, hundreds of unarmed people were killed on
the university campus, and in the slums and the old city where Hindus
lived. Eyewitness accounts at the end of this chapter provide chilling
insights into the killings on the Dhaka university campus.
The news of the Dhaka massacres immediately spread to the rest of
the country. Instead of cowing the unarmed Bengalis into submission,
which was ostensibly the intention of the Pakistani army in initiating the
brutal killings, nationalist sentiments were inflamed. On March 26,
1971, within 24 hours of the armed crackdown in Dhaka, the independ-
ence of Bangladesh was declared over the radio from the city of
 Genocide in Bangladesh v 255

Chittagong on behalf of the AL and its leader, Bangabandhu Sheikh

Mujibur Rahman.
Spontaneous resistance was organized in all the cities and towns of
the country. The AL politicians, Bengali civilian administration, police,
army, students, and intellectuals constituted the leadership of the resist-
ance. This first phase of the liberation war was, however, amateurish and
uncoordinated and only lasted approximately six weeks. By the middle
of May, the Pakistani army was successful in bringing the cities and
towns under their control, though the villages remained largely “liber-
ated” areas.
In occupying one city after another, the Pakistani army used the supe-
riority of its fire and air power to its advantage. These operations also
involved massive killings of civilians and wanton looting and destruc-
tion of property. The leadership of the resistance generally left the scene
prior to the Pakistani army’s arrival. They took refuge either in India or
in the villages. But, in any case, the Pakistani army engaged in killings
and burnings in order to terrorize the civilian population. Again, Awami
Leaguers, students and intellectuals, civilian and army officers, and
Hindus were selected as targets of attack (Malik, 1972). The army’s cam-
paign against the cities and towns not only led to massive civilian casu-
alties; it also resulted in a large-scale dislocation of people. Nearly 10
million people—Hindus as well as Muslims—took refuge in neighboring
India, and approximately 30 million people from the cities took refuge
in the villages. Government offices, educational institutions, and facto-
ries were virtually closed.
The second phase of the liberation war (from mid-May to September)
was a period of long-term planning for both the Bengali nationalists and
the Pakistani government. The Bengali nationalists established a
government-in-exile and undertook external publicity campaigns in
support of their cause. They also recruited nearly 100,000 young men as
freedom fighters who underwent military training and undertook guer-
rilla operations inside Bangladesh. The Pakistani army essentially dug
into their own strongholds during this time, with periodic operations in
rural areas to punish the villagers for harboring freedom fighters. The
army also engaged in large-scale looting and raping of girls and women.
In fact, systematic and organized rape was the special weapon of war
used by the Pakistani army during the second phase of the liberation
struggle. During the first phase, young able-bodied males were targeted
for death; during the second phase, girls and women became the targets
of Pakistani aggression. During army operations, girls and women were
raped in front of close family members in order to terrorize and inflict
racial slander. Girls and women were also abducted and repeatedly
raped and gang-raped in special camps run by the army near army
256 v R. Jahan

barracks. Many of the rape victims either were killed or committed

suicide. Altogether, it is estimated that approximately 200,000 girls and
women were raped during the 1971 genocide (Brownmiller, 1981). An
eyewitness account of the rape camps organized by the Pakistani army is
included in this chapter.
All through the liberation war, able-bodied young men were sus-
pected of being actual or potential freedom fighters. Thousands were
arrested, tortured, and killed. Eventually, cities and towns became bereft
of young males who either took refuge in India or joined the liberation
war. During the second phase, another group of Bengali men in the rural
areas (those who were coerced or bribed to collaborate with the Pakista-
nis) fell victim to the attacks of Bengali freedom fighters.
The third phase of the liberation struggle (from October till mid-
December) saw intensified guerrilla action and finally a brief conven-
tional war between Pakistan and the combined Indian and Bangladeshi
forces, which ended with the surrender of the Pakistani army on Decem-
ber 16, 1971 (Palit, 1972; Ayoob & Subrahmanyan, 1972). In the last
week of the war, when their defeat was virtually certain, the Pakistani
government engaged in its most brutal and premeditated genocidal
campaign. In order to deprive the new nation of its most talented lead-
ership, the Pakistani military decided to kill the most respected and
influential intellectuals and professionals in each city and town. Between
December 12 and 14, selected intellectuals and professionals were
abducted from their houses and murdered. Many of their names were
later found in the diary of Major-General Rao Forman Ali, advisor to
the Martial Law Administrator and Governor of occupied Bangladesh
(Malik, 1972).
The victims of the 1971 genocide were, thus, first and foremost Ben-
galis. Though Hindus were especially targeted, the majority of the
victims were Bengali Muslims—ordinary villagers and slum dwellers—
who were caught unprepared during the Pakistani army’s spree of
wanton killing, rape, and destruction. As previously mentioned, the
Pakistani ruling elites identified certain groups as their special ene-
mies—students and intellectuals, Awami Leaguers and their supporters,
and Bengali members of the armed forces and the police. However,
many members of these targeted groups went into hiding or into exile in
India after the initial attack. As a result, the overwhelming majority of
the victims were defenseless, ordinary poor people who stayed behind in
their own houses and did not suspect that they would be killed, raped,
taken to prison, and tortured simply for the crime of being born a
Bengali.
The sheltered and protected life of women, provided by the Bengali
Muslim cultural norm, was virtually shattered in 1971. Thousands of
 Genocide in Bangladesh v 257

women were suddenly left defenseless and forced to fend for themselves
as widows and rape victims. The rape victims were particularly vulner-
able. Though they were casualties of the war, many of them were dis-
carded by their own families as a way for the latter to avoid shame and
dishonor (Brownmiller, 1981; Jahan, 1973b).

Who Committed the Genocide?

The Pakistani government (the Yahya regime) was primarily responsible
for the genocide. Not only did it prevent the AL and Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman from forming the federal government, but it opted for a mili-
tary solution to a constitutional crisis. In doing so, it decided to unleash
a brutal military operation in order to terrorize the Bengalis. Yahya’s
decision to put General Tikka Khan (who had earned the nickname of
“Butcher of Baluchistan” for his earlier brutal suppression of Baluchi
nationalists in the 1960s) in charge of the military operation in Bangla-
desh was an overt signal of the regime’s intention to launch a genocide.
The Pakistani military leaders, however, were not the only culprits.
The political parties (e.g., the Pakistan People’s Party [PPP]) also played
an important role in instigating the army to take military action in Bang-
ladesh. The PPP and its leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, supported the army
action all through 1971 (Bhutto, 1971; Jahan, 1973a).
There were also Bengalis who collaborated with the Pakistani regime.
During the second phase of the liberation war, the Pakistani government
deliberately recruited Bengali collaborators. Many of the Islamist politi-
cal parties and groups such as the Muslim League and the Jamaat-e-
Islami (JI), who were opposed to the AL, collaborated with the army.
Peace committees were formed in different cities and localities and
under their auspices rajakars (armed volunteers) were raised and given
arms to counter the freedom fighters. Two armed vigilante groups (Al
Badr and Al-Shams) were trained and took the lead in the arrest and
killing of the intellectuals during December 12–14, 1971. Some Bengali
intellectuals were also recruited to conduct propaganda in favor of the
Pakistanis.
The non-Bengali residents of Bangladesh—the Biharis—were the
other group of collaborators. Many of them acted as informants and
participated in riots in Dhaka and Chittagong. Biharis, however, also
became victims of acts of violence committed by Bengalis.

The Response to the Genocide

The response to the genocide can be analyzed at various levels. At the
official level, world response toward the 1971 genocide was determined
258 v R. Jahan

by geopolitical interests and major power alignments. Officially, from

the beginning, India took cognizance of the genocide and supported
Bangladesh. The Soviet Union—India’s major superpower ally at the
time—and other Eastern Bloc countries were also supportive of Bangla-
desh (Jackson, 1975).
Predictably, Pakistan launched a propaganda campaign denying that
it had committed genocide. Pakistan’s allies, Islamic countries, and
China supported Pakistan’s stance. The official policy of the United
States was to “tilt in favor of Pakistan” because Pakistan was used as an
intermediary to open the door to China (Jackson, 1975).
At the non-official level, however, there was a great outpouring of
sympathy for the Bangladesh cause worldwide because of the genocide.
The Western media—particularly that of the United States, Britain,
France, and Australia—kept Bangladesh on the global agenda all
through 1971. Well-known Western artists and intellectuals also came
out in support of Bangladesh. George Harrison, the former Beatle, and
Ravi Shankar, master of the sitar, held a concert to support Bangladesh.
André Malraux, the noted French author, volunteered to go and fight
with the Bengali freedom fighters. In the United States, citizen groups
and individuals lobbied Congress successfully to halt military aid to
Pakistan. Despite the Nixon Administration’s official support of the
Pakistani government, influential senators and congressmen such as
Frank Church and Edward Kennedy spoke out strongly against the gen-
ocide. Members of parliament in the United Kingdom and other
Western countries were also highly critical of the Bangladesh genocide.
Both officially and unofficially, India played a critical role in mobiliz-
ing support for Bangladesh. The genocide and the resultant influx of 10
million refugees in West Bengal and neighboring states created sponta-
neous unofficial sympathy. The press, political parties, and voluntary
organizations in India pressed Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to
immediately intervene in Bangladesh when the Pakistani army cracked
down in March 1971. The Indian government initially refused to inter-
vene but gave moral and financial support to the Bangladesh
government-in-exile as well as the freedom fighters. It also sponsored a
systematic international campaign in favor of Bangladesh. Finally, in
December 1971, when the ground was well prepared, Bangladesh was
liberated as a result of direct Indian army intervention (Jackson, 1975).
The world’s sympathy for the Bangladesh people in the aftermath of
the 1971 genocide was also demonstrated by the tremendous relief and
rehabilitation efforts mounted by the United Nations and private volun-
tary organizations in Bangladesh. Even before the liberation of Bangla-
desh, large-scale relief efforts were undertaken by the world community
to feed the refugees in the India-based camps. And during the first two
 Genocide in Bangladesh v 259

years of the new nation’s existence, “as many as 72 foreign relief groups,
including UN agencies, contributed to what observers considered the
largest single and most successful emergency relief endeavor of our
times” (O’Donnell, 1984, p. 112). Nearly $1.3 billion of humanitarian aid
was given to Bangladesh during that period.
However, despite the generous response of the international commu-
nity in giving humanitarian aid, there was very little support for the war
crime trials that Bangladesh proposed to hold. In the 1970s the world
community was yet to embrace the human rights framework which
became more universally acceptable in the 1990s. Hence Bangladesh’s
demands for holding war crimes trials did not receive international
support. The Indian army quickly removed the 93,000 Pakistani prison-
ers of war (POW) from Bangladesh soil to India in order to prevent any
reprisals against them. India and other friendly countries were support-
ive of a negotiated package deal as a way to settle all outstanding issues
between Pakistan and Bangladesh, including trial of the war crimes. In
1972 Bangladesh requested that India turn over 195 Pakistani military
and civilian officials out of 93,000 Pakistani POWs so they could be tried
for their role in specific atrocities. In response Pakistan filed a claim
against India in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), claiming that
only Pakistan could try its citizens for breaches of the Genocide Con-
vention. At the same time, Pakistan held some 250,000 Bengalis who
were working and living in Pakistan, in internment camps. Known as
“stranded East Pakistanis,” their release was promised by Pakistan only
in exchange for Pakistani POWs. After two years of persistent interna-
tional pressure to drop the war crime trials, in early 1974 India, Paki-
stan, and Bangladesh signed a tripartite agreement which allowed the
Pakistani POWs and “stranded East Pakistanis” to return to their respec-
tive homes. Pakistan withdrew its ICJ claim and promised to conduct its
own trials. Pakistan also recognized the independence of Bangladesh.
Soon after the end of the liberation war, the Bangladeshi government
also initiated actions to bring to trial alleged Bengali collaborators
during the genocide. On January 24, 1972 the Bangladesh Collaborators
(special Tribunals) Order (Collaborators Order) was promulgated by a
Presidential Decree which provided for prosecution of “collaborators”
before special tribunals for wide-ranging criminal acts including
murder, rape, arson, and genocide. Between 1972 and 1974 some 37,400
people were arrested and investigations commenced. On July 20, 1973
the Bangladeshi parliament passed the International Crimes Tribunal
Act (ICTA), which drew heavily on the International Military Tribunal
(IMT) Charter used at Nuremberg. The ICTA was to serve as the basis
for the establishment of a national tribunal and specialized investigation/
prosecution unit to try people for genocide, crimes against humanity,
260 v R. Jahan

war crimes, and other crimes under international law. However, numer-
ous clemency measures halted the plans to conduct the trials. In Febru-
ary 1973 the Bangladeshi government passed the Bangladesh Liberation
Struggle (Indemnity) Order which granted freedom fighters immunity
from prosecution for acts committed in connection with the liberation
war. On May 16, 1973 clemency was granted to those who were con-
victed of petty offences under the Collaborators Order. On November
30, 1973 the Bangladeshi government announced a general amnesty for
all collaborators, except those accused of murder, rape, arson, or geno-
cide. As a result, 26,000 people detained under the Collaborator’s Order
were released; another 11,000 lower-level, local, alleged collaborators
went on to face trial and approximately 750 were convicted (ICTJ Brief-
ing, July 2010).
After the military coup and assassination of Sheikh Mujib in August
1975, the new regime adopted a policy of seeking political support from
the Islamist parties and groups to counter the AL. As a result, the state
policy toward the collaborators was reversed. The new government
repealed the Collaborators Order, disbanded the tribunals set up under
it and pardoned and released all those detained and convicted. The gov-
ernment also passed an Indemnity Ordinance that gave those involved
in Sheikh Mujib’s assassination immunity from legal action. The ICTA,
however, was never repealed.
The policy aimed at rehabilitating and rewarding the collaborators con-
tinued all through the rule of two military dictators, Ziaur Rahman
(1975–1981) and H.M. Ershad (1982–1990). These policies were pursued
even after the restoration of democracy in 1991, when the Bangladesh
Nationalist Party (BNP), founded by the military ruler Ziaur Rahman,
formed the government with the support of the Jamaat-i-Islami. It was
then left to civil society actors to undertake transitional justice initiatives.
In 1992 an unofficial People’s Tribunal was constituted in Dhaka that
conducted a mock trial of several suspected Bangladeshi collaborators
and convicted and sentenced them to death in absentia. Organizations
such as Gathak Dalal Nirmul Committee and Liberation War Museum
began private efforts to collect documentation of the atrocities, carry out
public education, memorialize mass graves, and organize national and
international conferences. The issue of the trial for the perpetrators of
the genocide gained a boost when the former Sector Commanders of the
liberation war started a nationwide campaign during 2007–2008 to
undertake such trials. The AL finally included it as one of its election
pledges before the 2008 parliamentary elections.
Following the AL’s landslide electoral victory in March 2009, the
Bangladeshi government again announced various steps to prosecute
Bangladeshi collaborators, after a silence of nearly 33 years. In late 2009
 Genocide in Bangladesh v 261

an amendment to the 1973 ICTA was passed, promising the independ-

ence of the tribunal in the exercise of its judicial function and fair trials.
Three judges were appointed to the tribunal and a team of prosecutors
began investigations. Funds were allocated to conduct the various activi-
ties for the preparation of the trials. On July 27, 2010, the ICT issued
arrest warrants for four suspects who were all senior leaders of the
Jamaat-e-Islami. The government promised that indictments and trials
would proceed as of 2011.
While the recent developments in Bangladesh constitute a rare
example of a national search for accountability, international observers
have raised various concerns about the planned trials, including, for
example, the following: the legality of the death penalty under the ICT;
judicial independence during the course of the trials; the possibility of
victimizing in various ways the political opposition; the potential limits
placed on the rights of suspects and the accused; and the lack of special-
ized experience in investigation and prosecution of mass crimes com-
mitted nearly 40 years ago (ICTJ Briefing, July 2010).

The Impact of the Genocide

A major impact of the genocide was the introduction of violence in
Bangladesh society, politics, and culture. Prior to 1971, Bengalis were a
relatively peaceful and homogeneous community with a low level of
violent crimes. They were highly faction-ridden and politicized, but dif-
ferences and disputes were generally settled through negotiations, litiga-
tion, and peaceful mass movements. After the Pakistani armed attack,
Bengalis took up arms and for the first time engaged in armed struggle.
The genocide, looting, burning, and rapes brutalized the Bangladeshi
society. After witnessing so much violence, the people seem to have
developed a higher degree of tolerance toward wanton violence. A quali-
tative change has taken place in regard to people’s attitudes towards
conflict resolution. Armed violence has now become much more preva-
lent in Bangladesh.
The role of the Bengali collaborators in perpetrating the genocide has
created deep division and mistrust in the otherwise homogeneous
Bengali social fabric. In addition, the failure to hold the collaborators
accountable for their atrocities because of political expediency created a
culture of impunity which impeded the development of rule of law in
the country. Protection and rewards given to the individuals, against
whom there were allegations of committing war crimes, by post-1975
military governments and the BNP-led governments signaled that
crimes would go unpunished if criminals pledge political support to the
regime in power.
262 v R. Jahan

Additionally, the genocide has had several long-term impacts on dif-

ferent target groups. First, after 1971 many members of the Hindu com-
munity felt unsafe and decided not to return to Bangladesh.
Furthermore, there has been a steady migration of young Hindus to
India even after Bangladesh was liberated, particularly after the 1975
change of regime when the state’s commitment towards secularism was
abandoned and the government adopted a more Islamist stance. Second,
students and youth, who became familiar with the use of arms, did not
give them up after 1971. They started using sophisticated weapons in
settling political scores. Continuous armed conflicts between rival
student groups have resulted in destroying the academic atmosphere
and the standard of educational institutions. Finally, the status of
women was altered as a result of the genocide. Following the ravage of
war, thousands of destitute women, for the first time, entered a variety
of paid employment outside their homes, such as public works pro-
grams, rural extension work, civil administration, police work, and
employment in garment industries. Surprisingly, women’s participation
in paid economic work did not result in commensurate empowerment
of women. Violence against women has not diminished. It has become
widespread and common.

Contestations about the genocide

Contestations about the genocide and the issue of Bangladeshi collabo-
rators started soon after 1971. As noted earlier, the Pakistan government
steadfastly refused to accept that acts of genocide had been committed
in 1971. The Hamoodur Rahman Commission (1972), established by the
government of Pakistan, acknowledged that atrocities took place but
refers to a smaller number of casualties in its report. Though civil society
organizations in Pakistan recognized the genocide and offered apologies
to the people of Bangladesh, the Pakistan government never offered a
formal apology. In 2002, on an official visit to Bangladesh, the president
of Pakistan regretted the “excesses” committed by the Pakistani soldiers
but the statement fell short of expressing apologies for the 1971
genocide.
In the last 40 years there has been very little academic debate about the
1971 genocide. No scholar has questioned whether the atrocities have
taken place, though recently one Indian academic (Bose, 2005) posited
that the number of victims were much less than what Bangladesh has
claimed. Her research methodology and findings, have, however, been cri-
tiqued as flawed and biased by others (Mookherjee, 2006).
Though there is widespread acceptance that massive atrocities were
committed in 1971, the issue of justice for the victims and accountability
 Genocide in Bangladesh v 263

for the perpetrators became contested even within Bangladesh as a result

of regime change. After the 1975 army coup and the overthrow of the
AL government, many of the collaborators who had been opposed to the
Awami League joined the political parties floated by the two military
dictators, Ziaur Rahman and H.M. Ershad. The military dictators chose
to emphasize the country’s Islamic ideology, allowed religion-based
parties to function, and appointed a few well-known collaborators to
their cabinets. All of this was done to broaden support for their undemo-
cratic rule.
The gradual ascendance of the Islamist forces in the country became
evident when democracy was restored in 1991. After the 1991 election,
the BNP, founded by Ziaur Rahman, succeeded in forming the govern-
ment with the support of the Islamist party, Jamaat-e-Islami, a party
which opposed the independence of Bangladesh and actively collabo-
rated with Pakistan. However, the growing political influence of the col-
laborators of the 1971 genocide enraged the victims of the genocide.
Several civil society groups started mass campaigns demanding that the
alleged collaborators be tried in a court of law. The genocide and the col-
laborators’ issue, which had been marginalized during the military rule
(1975–1990), were again brought back to center stage of the political
arena following the return of democratically elected governments in the
1990s.
During the 1996 election campaign, the AL pursued a two-pronged
strategy. On the one hand, it kept Jamaat-i-Islami from forming an elec-
toral alliance with the BNP; on the other, it successfully utilized the anti-
Jamaat campaign launched by the NGOs and cultural organizations
whose work with education and women’s empowerment had come
under attack by Jamaat. In the 1996 election, the AL was returned to
power after 21 years. The ruling BNP contested the election without the
support of the Jamaat and lost, while the Jamaat experienced a massive
loss of seats. During the four years of the AL government (1996–2000),
textbooks used in public schools and programs in state-sponsored media
began to specifically refer to the genocide committed by the Pakistanis
(in previous decades, reference was often made to the genocide without
specifying the name of Pakistan). However, the AL did little to initiate
the war crimes trials during its tenure.
The AL lost the 2001 election when the BNP was successful in
forming an electoral coalition with the Jamaat and the other Islamist
parties to pool anti-AL votes to win a majority in the First Past the Post
(FPTP) electoral system. Thirty years after opposing the birth of Bangla-
desh and collaborating with Pakistan, Jamaat-e-Islami succeeded in
gaining a share in state power as a partner in the BNP-led coalition. Two
well-known collaborators became cabinet ministers.
264 v R. Jahan

Jammat’s share in state power further fueled demands for the trial of
the collaborators. As noted earlier, during 2007–2008, the Sector Com-
mander’s Forum, a civil society initiative of former Sector Commanders
of the liberation war, initiated a nationwide campaign to press for trials.
The issue acquired a level of political potency and the AL picked up on
the issue in its election campaign. The party’s massive electoral victory
was in some measure served by the pledge. The government has finally
begun the process of trying the collaborators. However, these efforts
have been criticized by the opposition political parties, the BNP and the
Jamaat, who claim that the government is using the trials to victimize
the opposition. As of today (mid-2011), there is no consensus between
the two main political parties, the AL and the BNP, about the trial of the
collaborators.

Why the Bangladesh Case is Important to Understanding the

Complexities of Genocide
An analysis of the Bangladesh case is important to understanding the
complexities of genocide for several reasons. First, it showcases how the
world’s response to genocide is often determined by geopolitical inter-
ests. Super and regional powers generally recognize or ignore acts of
genocide through the prism of their own national interests. In the case
of Bangladesh, India and her allies recognized the Bangladesh genocide
while Pakistan and her allies, Islamic bloc countries, China, and the
United States refused to recognize the atrocities as acts of genocide.
Second, the Bangladesh case exemplifies the difficulties of sustaining
world attention on specific cases of genocide for a prolonged period.
Though the genocide received widespread international media attention
during 1971, very soon after the media turned to other issues and Bang-
ladesh became an almost forgotten case.
Third, the Bangladesh case underscores how once atrocities are started
by one group, resistance is organized by the victims, who can, in turn, also
commit atrocities. Atrocities committed by one group often lead to retalia-
tory atrocities by the other groups. The Pakistani military started killing
Bengalis; the latter then initiated counter mobilization and the counter
attacks were not only aimed at the Pakistani military but also against the
alleged collaborators of the Pakistanis, both Bengalis and Biharis.
Finally, the Bangladesh case illustrates the complexities of instituting
justice for the victims and accountability for the perpetrators of geno-
cide. Internal as well as external pressures can be created to halt the
process of justice. Changes in international and domestic political cir-
cumstances and expediency can also impede accountability, as had hap-
pened in Bangladesh.
 Genocide in Bangladesh v 265

The Bangladesh case also shows how the denial of justice and
accountability can haunt generations for decades and create deep
schisms in society. Despite the fact that after the military takeover of
state power in 1975 there was official neglect and denial of war crimes,
this could not erase the memory of the genocide and demands for
accountability and justice. Civil society groups kept alive the memory of
the atrocities through documentation, films, public education, and other
forms of memorialization. Demands for justice and accountability were
persistently raised by non-state actors. It was argued that democracy and
the rule of law could not be established in the country so long as the per-
petrators of atrocities of 1971 enjoyed impunity for their crimes. Sadly
and tellingly, war crimes and collaborator issues continue to create deep
social and political divides in the country.

Eyewitness Accounts
The following eyewitness accounts of the 1971 genocide depict different
incidents. The first two eyewitness accounts describe the mass murders
committed on March 25 on the Dhaka University campus. The first
account is by a survivor of the killings in one of the student dormitories
(Jagannath Hall) where Hindu students lived. The second account is by
a university professor who witnessed and videotaped the massacres on
the Dhaka University campus. The third and fourth eyewitness testimo-
nies describe the mass rape of women by the Pakistanis. The fifth testi-
mony describes the killings in the village of Bangabandhu Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman, the leader of the nationalist movement. The last
account describes the atrocities of the non-Bengali Biharis who collabo-
rated with the Pakistan army.
The testimonies are taken from two sources. One is a Bengali book
entitled 1971: Bhayabaha Abhignata (Terrible Experiences) (1996),
which was edited by Rashid Haider and is a collection of eyewitness
accounts. Sohela Nazneen translated the accounts from Bengali to
English. The other source, The Year of the Vulture (1972), is Indian jour-
nalist Amita Malik’s account of the genocide. In Malik’s book Dhaka is
spelled “Dacca,” which was the spelling used in 1972.

Account 1: Massacre at Jagannath Hall

This testimony is from Kali Ranjansheel’s “Jagannath Hall e-Chilam” (“I
was at Jagannath Hall”). In 1971: Bhayabaha Abhignata (1989, p. 5).
Reprinted with permission.

I was a student at the Dhaka University. I used to live in room number

235 (South Block) in Jagannath Hall. On the night of 25th of March, I
266 v R. Jahan

woke up from sleep by the terrifying sound of gunfire. Sometimes the

sound of gunfire would be suppressed by the sound of bomb explo-
sions and shell-fire. I was so terrified that I could not even think of
what I should do! After a while I thought about going to Shusil, assist-
ant general secretary of the student’s union. I crawled up the stairs
very slowly to the third floor. I found out that some students had
already taken refuge in Shusil’s room, but he was not there. The stu-
dents told me to go to the roof of the building where many other
students had taken shelter but I decided (rather selfishly) to stay by
myself. I crawled to the toilettes at the northern end of the third floor
and took refuge in there. I could see the east, the south and the west
from the window. I could see that the soldiers were searching for stu-
dents with flashlights from room to room, were taking them near the
Shahid Minar [Martyr’s memorial] and then shooting them. Only
the sound of gunfire and pleas of mercy filled the air. Sometimes the
Pakistanis used mortars and were shelling the building. The tin sheds
in front of Assembly and some of the rooms in North Block were set
on fire. . . .
After some time, about 40 to 50 Pakistani soldiers came to the South
Block and broke down the door of the dining room. The lights were
turned on and they were firing at the students who took shelter in that
room. . . . When the soldiers came out they had Priyanath [the caretaker
of the student dormitory] at gunpoint, and forced him to show the way
through all the floors of the dormitory. During this time I was not able
to see them as I left the toilette by climbing up the open window and
took shelter on the sunshed of the third floor. But I could hear the crack-
ing sounds of bullets, the students pleading for mercy and the sound of
the soldiers rummaging and throwing things about in search of valu-
ables. The soldiers did not see me on the sunshed. . . .
After they left, I again took refuge in the washroom. I peeked through
the window and saw that the other students’ dormitory, Salimullah Hall,
was on fire. The northern and the eastern parts of the city were on fire
too as the north and east horizon had turned red. The whole night, the
Pakistani soldiers continued their massacre and destruction. . . . Finally I
heard the call for the morning prayer. . . .
The curfew was announced at dawn and I thought that this merciless
killing would stop. But it continued. The soldiers started killing those
who had escaped their notice during the night before. . . .
It was morning and I heard the voices of some students. I came out
of the toilette, and saw that the students were carrying a body down-
stairs while soldiers with machine guns were accompanying them. It
was the dead body of Priyanath. I was ordered to help the students
and I complied. We carried bodies from the dormitory rooms and
 Genocide in Bangladesh v 267

piled them up in the field outside. There were a few of us there—stu-

dents, gardeners, two sons of the gateskeeper and the rest were jani-
tors. The janitors requested the Pakistanis to let them go since they
were not Bengalis. After a while the army separated the janitors from
us. . . .
All the time the soldiers were cursing and swearing at us. The sol-
diers said, “We will see how you get free Bangladesh! Why don’t you
shout ‘Joy Bangla’ [Victory to Bengal]!” The soldiers also kicked us
around. After we had finished carrying the bodies, we were divided
into groups. They then took my group to one of the university quar-
ters and searched almost every room on the fourth floor and looted
the valuables. Downstairs we saw dead bodies piled up, obviously
victims from the night before. They also brought down the flag of
Bangladesh. . . .
After we came back, we were again ordered to carry the dead bodies
to the Shahid Minar. The soldiers had already piled up the bodies of
their victims and we added other bodies to the piles. If we felt tired and
slowed down, the soldiers threatened to kill us. . . .
As my companions and I were carrying the body of Sunil (our dormi-
tory guard), we heard screams in female voices. We found that the
women from the nearby slums were screaming as the soldiers were
shooting at the janitors (the husbands of the women). I realized that our
turn would come too as the Pakistanis started lining up those students
who were before us, and were firing at them. My companion and I barely
carried the dead body of Sunil toward a pile where I saw the dead body
of Dr. Dev [professor of philosophy]. I cannot explain why I did what I
did next. Maybe from pure fatigue or maybe from a desperate hope to
survive!
I lay down beside the dead body of Dr. Dev while still holding onto
the corpse of Sunil. I kept waiting for the soldiers to shoot me. I even
thought that I had died. After a long time, I heard women and children
crying. I opened my eyes and saw that the army had left and the dead
bodies were still lying around and women were crying. Some of the
people were still alive but wounded. All I wanted to do was to get away
from the field and survive.
I crawled towards the slums. First I went to the house of the electri-
cian. I asked for water but when I asked for shelter his wife started
crying aloud and I then left and took refuge in a toilette. Suddenly I
heard the voice of Idu who used to sell old books. He said, “Don’t be
afraid. I heard you are alive. I shall escort you to safety.” I went to old
Dhaka city. Then I crossed the river. The boatman did not take any
money. From there, I first went to Shimulia, then, Nawabganj and finally
I reached my village in Barishal in the middle of April.
268 v R. Jahan

Account 2: Horror Documentary

This testimony is from Amita Malik’s The Year of the Vulture (1972,
pp. 79–83).
At the professors’ funeral, Professor Rafiq-ul-Islam of the Bengali
Department whispered to me, “At the television station you will find
that there is a film record of the massacre of professors and students at
Jagannath Hall. Ask them to show it to you.”
This sounded so incredible that I did not really believe it. However, I
wasted no time in asking Mr. Jamil Chowdhury, the station manager of
TV, whether he did, indeed, have such a film with him: “Oh yes,” he
said, “but we have not shown it yet because it might have dreadful reper-
cussions.” He was, of course, referring to the fact that the Pakistani army
was still very much in Dacca in Prisoner-of-War (POW) camps in the
Cantonment, and it would have been dangerous to show them gunning
down professors and students at Dacca University. The people of Dacca
had shown tremendous restraint so far, but this would have been going
a bit too far. However, I had it confirmed that NBC VISNEWS and other
international networks had already obtained and projected the film.
“But who shot the film?” I asked in wonder.
“A professor at the University of Engineering, who had a video tape
recorder and whose flat overlooks the grounds of Jagannath Hall,” said
Mr. Chowdhury.
It was therefore by kind courtesy of Dacca TV that I sat in their small
projection room on January 5 and saw for the first time what must be a
unique actuality film, something for the permanent archives of world
history.
The film, lasting about 20 minutes, first shows small distant figures
emerging from the hall carrying the corpses of what must be the stu-
dents and professors massacred in Jagannath Hall. These are clearly
civilian figures in lighter clothes and, at their back, seen strutting arro-
gantly even at that distance, are darker clad figures, the hoodlums of the
Pakistan army. The bodies are laid down in neat, orderly rows by those
forced to carry them at gunpoint. Then the same procession troops back
to the Hall. All this time, with no other sound, one hears innocent bird-
song and a lazy cow is seen grazing on the university lawns. The same
civilians come out again and the pile of bodies grows.
But after the third grisly trip, the action changes. After the corpses are
laid on the ground, the people carrying them are lined up. One of them
probably has a pathetic inkling of what is going to happen. He falls on
his knees and clings to the legs of the nearest soldier, obviously pleading
for mercy. But there is no mercy. One sees guns being pointed, one hears
the crackle of gunfire and the lined up figures fall one by one, like the
 Genocide in Bangladesh v 269

proverbial house of cards or, if you prefer, puppets in a children’s film.

At this stage, the bird-song suddenly stops. The lazy cow, with calf,
careers wildly across the lawn and is joined by a whole herd of cows
fleeing in panic.
But the last man is still clinging pathetically to the jackboot of the
soldier at the end of the row. The soldier then lifts his shoulder at an
angle, so that the gun points almost perpendicularly downwards to the
man at his feet, and shoots him. The pleading hands unlink from the sol-
dier’s legs and another corpse joins the slumped bodies in a row, some
piled on top of the very corpses they had to carry out at gunpoint, their
own colleagues and friends. The soldiers prod each body with their rifles
or bayonets to make sure that they are dead. A few who are still wrig-
gling in their death agony are shot twice until they stop wriggling.
At this stage, there is a gap because Professor Nurul Ullah’s film prob-
ably ran out and he had to load a new one. But by the time he starts
filming again, nothing much has changed except that there is a fresh pile
of bodies on the left. No doubt some other students and professors had
been forced at gunpoint to carry them out and then were executed in
turn. Insofar as one can count the bodies, or guess roughly at their
number in what is really a continuous long-shot amateur film, there are
about 50 bodies by this time. And enough, one should think.
Professor Nurul Ullah’s world scoop indicated that he was a remark-
able individual who through his presence of mind, the instinctive reac-
tion of a man of science, had succeeded in shooting a film with
invaluable documentary evidence regardless of the risk to his life.
I immediately arranged to track him down and he very kindly asked
me to come round to his flat. Professor Nurul Ullah is a professor of
electricity at the University of Engineering in Dacca. I found him to be a
quiet, scholarly, soft-spoken, and surprisingly young man with a charm-
ing wife. He is normally engrossed in his teaching and students. But he
happened to be the proud possessor of a video tape recorder which he
bought in Japan on his way back from a year at an American university.
He is perhaps the only man alive who saw the massacre on the lawns of
Dacca University on the first day of the Pakistani army crack-down.
It was fascinating to sit down in Professor Nurul Ullah’s sitting room
and see the film, twice, with him, the second time after he had shown me
the bedroom window at the back of his flat which overlooked both the
street along which the soldiers drove to the university and the university
campus. When he realized what was happening, he slipped his micro-
phone outside [through] the window to record the sounds of firing. The
film was shot from a long distance and under impossible conditions.
Professor Nurul Ullah’s description of how he shot the film was as dra-
matic and stirring as the film itself:
270 v R. Jahan

On March 25, 1971, the day of the Pakistani crack-down,

although I knew nothing about it at the time, my wife and I had
just had breakfast and I was looking out of my back windows in
the professors’ block of flats in which I and my colleagues from
the Engineering University live with our families. Our back
windows overlook a street across which are the grounds of Jagan-
nath Hall, one of the most famous halls of Dacca University. I
saw an unusual sight, soldiers driving past my flat and going
along the street which overlooks it, towards the entrance to the
University. As curfew was on, they made announcements on
loudspeakers from a jeep that people coming out on the streets
would be shot. After a few minutes, I saw some people carrying
out what were obviously dead bodies from Jagannath Hall. I
immediately took out my loaded video tape recorder and decided
to shoot a film through the glass of the window. It was not an
ideal way to do it, but I was not sure what it was all about, and
what with the curfew and all the tension, we were all being very
cautious. As I started shooting the film, the people carrying out
the dead bodies laid them down on the grass under the super-
vision of Pakistani soldiers who are distinguishable in the film,
because of their dark clothes, the weapons they are carrying and
the way they are strutting about contrasted with the civilians in
lighter clothes who are equally obviously drooping with fright.
As soon as firing started, I carefully opened the bedroom
window wide enough for me to slip my small microphone just
outside the window so that I could record the sound as well. But
it was not very satisfactorily done, as it was very risky. My wife
now tells me that she warned me at the time: “Are you mad, do
you want to get shot too? One flash from your camera and they
will kill us too.” But I don’t remember her telling me, I must have
been very absorbed in my shooting, and she says I took no notice
of what she said.
It so happened that a few days earlier, from the same window I
had shot some footage of student demonstrators on their way to
the university. I little thought it would end this way.
Anyway, this macabre procession of students carrying out
bodies and laying them down on the ground was repeated until
we realized with horror that the same students were themselves
being lined up to be shot.
After recording this dreadful sight on my video tape recorder,
I shut it off thinking it was all over—only to realize that a fresh
batch of university people were again carrying out bodies from
inside. By the time I got my video tape recorder going again, I
 Genocide in Bangladesh v 271

had missed this new grisly procession but you will notice in the
film that the pile of bodies is higher.
I now want to show my film all over the world, because
although their faces are not identifiable from that distance in
what is my amateur film, one can certainly see the difference
between the soldiers and their victims, one can see the shooting
and hear it, one can see on film what my wife and I actually saw
with our own eyes. And that is documentary evidence of the bru-
tality of the Pak army and their massacre of the intellectuals.

Account 3: Our Mothers and Sisters

The following testimony is from M. Akhtaurzzaman Mondol’s “Ama-
derMa Bon” (“Our Mothers and Sisters”) in 1971: Bhayabaha Abhignata
(1996, p. 197). It was translated by Sohela Nazneen. Reprinted with
permission.

We started our fight to liberate Vurungamari from the Pakistani occu-

pation forces on November 11, 1971. We started attacking from West,
North and East, simultaneously. The Indian air forces bombed the Paki-
stani stronghold on November 11 morning. On November 13 we came
near the outskirts of Vurungamari, and the Indian air force intensified
their air attack. On November 14 morning the guns from the Pakistani
side fell silent and we entered Vurungamari with shouts of “Joy Bangla”
[Victory to Bengal]. The whole town was quiet. We captured 50 to 60
Pakistani soldiers. They had no ammunition left. We found the captain
of the Pakistan forces, Captain Ataullah Khan, dead in the bunker. He
still had his arms around a woman—both died in the bomb attack in the
bunker. The woman had marks of torture all over her body. We put her
in a grave.
But I still did not anticipate the terrible scene I was going to witness
as we were heading toward east of Vurungamari to take up our posi-
tions. I was informed by wireless to go to the Circle Officer’s office. After
we reached the office, we caught glimpses of several young women
through the windows of the second floor. The doors were locked, so we
had to break them down. After breaking down the door of the room,
where the women were kept, we were dumbfounded. We found four
naked young women, who had been physically tortured, raped, and bat-
tered by the Pakistani soldiers. We immediately came out of the room
and threw in four lungis [dresses] and four bed sheets for them to cover
themselves. We tried to talk to them, but all of them were still in shock.
One of them was six to seven months pregnant. One was a college
student from Mymensingh. They were taken to India for medical
272 v R. Jahan

treatment in a car owned by the Indian army. We found many dead

bodies and skeletons in the bushes along the road. Many of the skeletons
had long hair and had on torn saris and bangles on their hands. We
found 16 other women locked up in a room at Vurungamari High
School. These women were brought in for the Pakistani soldiers from
nearby villages. We found evidence in the rooms of the Circle Officer’s
office which showed that these women were tied to the window bars and
were repeatedly raped by the Pakistani soldiers. The whole floor was
covered with blood, torn pieces of clothing, and strands of long hair. . . .

Account 4: The Officer’s Wife

This testimony is from Amita Malik’s The Year of the Vulture (1972,
pp. 141–142).

Another pathetic case is that of a woman of about 25. Her husband was
a government officer in a subdivision and she has three children. They
first took away the husband, although she cried and pleaded with them.
Then they returned him half-dead, after brutal torture. Then another lot
of soldiers came in at 8 or 9 A.M. and raped her in front of her husband
and children. They tied up the husband and hit the children when they
cried.
Then another lot of soldiers came at 2.30 P.M. and took her away.
They kept her in a bunker and used to rape her every night until she
became senseless. When she returned after three months, she was preg-
nant. The villagers were very sympathetic about her but the husband
refused to take her back. When the villagers kept on pressing him to take
her back, he hanged himself. She is now in an advanced stage of preg-
nancy and we are doing all that we can do to help her. But she is incon-
solable. She keeps on asking, “But why, why did they do it? It would
have been better if we had both died.”

Account 5: The Maulvi’s Story

This testimony appears in Amita Malik’s The Year of the Vulture (1972,
pp. 102–104).

On April 19, 1971, about 35 soldiers came to our village in a launch at

about 8 A.M. A couple of days earlier, I had asked the Sheikh’s father
and mother to leave the village, but they refused. They said, “This is our
home and we shall not go away.”
Soon after I heard the sound of the launch, a soldier came running
and said, “Here Maulvi, stop, in which house are the father and mother
of the Sheikh?” So first, I brought out his father. We placed a chair for
 Genocide in Bangladesh v 273

him but they made him sit on the ground. Then Sheikh Sahib’s amma
[mother] was brought out. She took hold of my hand and I made her sit
on the chair. The soldiers then held a sten-gun against the back of the
Sheikh’s abba [father] and a rifle against mine. “We will kill you in 10
minutes,” said a soldier looking at his watch.
Then they picked up a diary from the Sheikh’s house and some medi-
cine bottles and asked me for the keys of the house. I gave them the
bunch of keys but they were so rough in trying to open the locks that the
keys would not turn. So they kicked open the trunks. There was nothing
much inside except five teaspoons, which they took. They saw a framed
photograph and asked me whose it was. When I said it was Sheikh
Sahib’s, they took it down. I tried to get up at this stage but they hit me
with their rifle butts and I fell down against the chair. Finally, they
picked up a very old suitcase and a small wooden box and made a
servant carry them to the launch.
Then they dragged me up to where the Sheikh’s father was sitting and
repeated, “We shall shoot you in 10 minutes.”
Pointing to the Sheikh’s father, I asked: “What’s the point of shooting
him? He’s an old man and a government pensioner.”
The soldiers replied, “Is liye, keonki wohne shaitan paida kiya hai”
[“Because he has produced a devil.”].
“Why shoot me, the imam of the mosque?” I asked.
“Aap kiska imam hai? Aap vote dehtehain” [“What sort of an imam
are you? You vote.”], they replied.
I said, “The party was not banned, we were allowed to vote for it. We
are not leaders, we are janasadharan [the masses]. Why don’t you ask
the leaders?”
The captain intervened to say that eight minutes were over and we
would be shot in another two minutes. Just then a major came running
from the launch and said we were to be let alone and not shot.
I immediately went towards the masjid [mosque] and saw about 50
villagers inside. Three boys had already been dragged out and shot. The
soldiers asked me about a boy who, I said, was a krishak [cultivator].
They looked at the mud on his legs and hands and let him go. Khan
Sahib, the Sheikh’s uncle, had a boy servant called Ershad. They asked
me about him. I said he was a servant. But a Razakar maulvi, who had
come with them from another village, said he was the Sheikh’s relative,
which was a lie. The boy Ershad was taken to the lineup. He asked for
water but it was refused.
Another young boy had come from Dacca, where he was employed in
a mill, to enquire about his father. He produced his identity card, but
they shot him all the same. They shot Ershad right in front of his mother.
Ershad moved a little after falling down so they shot him again. Finally,
274 v R. Jahan

the boy who had carried the boxes to the launch was shot. With the
three shot earlier, a total of six innocent boys were shot by the Pakistani
army without any provocation. They were all good-looking and there-
fore suspected to be relatives of the Sheikh.
After this, the Sheikh’s father and mother were brought out of the
house. Amma was almost fainting. And the house was set on fire and
burnt down in front of our eyes until all that remained was the frame of
the doorway which you can still see.
Altonissa, the lady with the bloodstained clothes of her son, is the
mother of Tomb Yad Ali who was shot. They did not allow her to
remove her son’s body for burial, because they wanted the bodies to be
exposed to public view to terrorize the villagers.
They also shot Mithu, the 10-year-old son of this widowed lady. She
had brought him up with the greatest difficulty—they never had any-
thing to eat except saag-bhaat [spinach and rice]. They shot little Mithu
because he had helped the Mukti Bahini. You can now ask the ladies
about their narrow escape.
Shaheeda Sheikh, Sheikh Mujib’s niece, then added that fortunately
all the women were taken away to safety across the river to a neighbour-
ing village three days before the Pakistani soldiers came. For months
they had lived in constant terror of Razakars pouncing on them from
bushes by the village pond. Beli Begum, Mujib’s niece, a strikingly lovely
woman, told me how she had fled from the village when seven months
pregnant and walked 25 miles to safety. Pari, a girl cousin, escaped with
a temperature of 104 degrees. Otherwise they would all have been killed.

Account 6: Massacre at Foys Lake

This testimony is from Abdul Gofran’s “Foys Lake—Gonohataya”
(“Massacre at Faiz Lake”), which first appeared in 1971: Bhayabaha
Abhignata (1996). It was translated by Sohela Nazneen.

I own a shop near Akbar Shah mosque in Pahartali. On November 10th,

1971, at 6 A.M. about 40 to 50 Biharis came to my shop and forced me
to accompany them. I had to comply as any form of resistance would
have been useless against such a large number of people.
They took me to Foys Lake. As we passed through the gates of Foys
Lake I saw that hundreds of non-Bengalis had assembled near the Pum-
phouse and wireless colony. The Bengalis who had been brought in were
tied up. They were huddled by the side of the lake, which was at the
north side of the Pumphouse. Many of the Biharis were carrying knives,
swords and other sharp instruments. The Biharis were first kicking and
beating up the Bengalis brutally and then were shoving their victims
 Genocide in Bangladesh v 275

towards those carrying weapons. This other group of armed Biharis were
jabbing their victims in the stomach and then severing their heads with
the swords. I witnessed several groups of Bengalis being killed in such a
manner. . . . When the Biharis came for me, one of them took away my
sweater. I then punched him and jumped into the lake. . . . I swam to the
other side and hid among the bushes. . . . The Biharis came to look for me
but I was fortunate and barely escaped their notice. From my hiding
place I witnessed the mass murder that was taking place. Many Bengalis
were killed in the manner which had been described earlier.
The massacre went on till about 2 o’clock in the afternoon. After they
had disposed of the last Bengali victim, the Biharis brought in a group of
ten to twelve Bengali men. It was evident from their gestures that they
were asking the Bengalis to dig a grave for the bodies lying around. I also
understood from their gestures that the Biharis were promising the
group that if they completed the task they would be allowed to go free.
The group complied to their wish. After the group had finished burying
the bodies, they were also killed, and the Biharis went away rejoicing.
There were still many dead bodies thrown around the place.
In the afternoon many Biharis and [the] Pakistani army went along
that road. But the Pakistani soldiers showed no sign of remorse. They
seemed rather happy and did nothing to bury the dead.
When night fell I came back to my shop but left Chittagong the next
day.

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Map 8.1 East Timor