IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

WILLIAM DAVIS, et al., )

)
Plaintiffs, )
)
C.A. No. 1:21-cv-01773-TLA
v. )
)
)
KIRK NEAL, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)

DOC DEFENDANTS’ OPENING BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THEIR

PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND MOTION TO SEVER

SAUL EWING ARNSTEIN & LEHR LLP

James D. Taylor, Jr. (#4009)

SAUL EWING ARNSTEIN & LEHR LLP
1201 N. Market Street, Suite 2300
Wilmington, DE 19810
302-421-6800
[email protected]

Counsel for DOC Defendants

Dated: September 16, 2022
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................... i

INTRODUCTION AND NATURE AND STAGE OF THE PROCEEDING ............................... 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ............................................................................................. 2

STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................................................. 3

A. PLAINTIFFS ALLEGE WHOLLY SEPARATE INCIDENTS AND INJURIES. ........... 3

B. PLAINTIFFS’ COUNTS ARE VAGUE AND INCOMPLETE. ....................................... 4

ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 7

A. THE STANDARD FOR DISMISSAL APPLIES HERE. .................................................. 7

B. THE STANDARD FOR SEVERANCE LIKEWISE APPLIES FOR ANY REMAINING

CLAIMS. .................................................................................................................................... 8

C. SEVERAL COUNTS FAIL UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 8. ................................................. 9

1. Count II—Lack of Adequate Medical Care .............................................................. 9

2. Count IV—Failure to Intervene .............................................................................. 10

3. Count VI—Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress ........................................ 11

4. Count IX—Violation of Plaintiffs’ Substantive Due Process Rights ..................... 12

D. CERTAIN COUNTS ALSO FAIL UNDER 12(B)(6). .................................................... 12

E. THE COURT SHOULD SEVER ALL REMAINING CLAIMS..................................... 14

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 17
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE(S)

CASES

Adger v. Coupe,
No. 21-1841, 2022 WL 777196 (3d Cir. Mar. 14, 2022) ..........................................................9

Arunachalam v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp.,

No. CV 20-1020-LPS, 2021 WL 7209362 (D. Del. Dec. 29, 2021) .....................................8, 9

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009) ..................................................................................................................7

Barrett v. McDonald,
No. CV 14-742-LPS, 2015 WL 5679732 (D. Del. Sept. 25, 2015) ..........................................7

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544 (2007) ..................................................................................................................7

Biggins v. Danberg,
Civ. Action No. 10-732-GMS, 2012 WL 37132 (D. Del Jan. 6, 2012) .............................15, 16

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc.,

662 F.3d 212 (3d Cir. 2011) ......................................................................................................7

Cannon v. Delaware,
2012 WL 1657127 (D. Del. May 9, 2012) ................................................................................7

Crichlow v. Doe,
Civ. Action No. 12-303-GMS, 2012 WL 1673004 (D. Del. May 11, 2012) ...........................15

Drumgo v. Burris,
Civ. Action No. 12-068-GMS, 2012 WL 1657196 (D. Del. May 9, 2012) .............................16

Fatir v. Markell,
Civ. Action No. 16-315-GMS, 2016 WL 5946870 (D. Del. Oct. 12, 2016) ...........................15

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,

578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009) ......................................................................................................7

Green v. Poorman,
Civil Action No. 20-85-SRF, 2022 WL 2527079 (D. Del. July 7, 2022) ................................11

Hall v. Florida,
572 U.S. 701 (2014) .................................................................................................................13
Henderson v. Correct Care Solutions, LLC,
45 F. Supp. 3d 416 (D. Del. 2014) ..........................................................................................10

Jerry-El v. Wetzel,
No. 19-3105, 2022 WL 72728 (3d Cir. Jan. 7, 2022) ..............................................................15

Jordan v. Delaware,
433 F. Supp. 2d 433 (D. Del. 2006) .........................................................................................11

Malleus v. George,
641 F. 3d 560 (3d Cir. 2011)....................................................................................................14

Mincy v. Klem,
303 F. App’x 106 (3d Cir., Dec. 16, 2008) ..............................................................................15

Parkell v. Linsey,
Civ. No. 17-543-LPS, 2017 WL 3485817 (D. Del. Aug. 14, 2017) ..................................15, 16

Ricks v. Shover,
891 F. 3d 468 (3d Cir. 2018)....................................................................................................10

Salley v. Secretary of Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections,

565 F. App’x 77 (3d Cir. May 1, 2014) ...................................................................................15

Smith v. Mensinger,
293 F. 3d 641 (3d Cir. 2002)....................................................................................................10

Staats v. Phelps,
Civ. No. 19-101-LPS, 2019 WL 4415404 (D. Del. Sept. 16, 2019)..................................15, 16

Thompson v. Ferguson,
849 F. App’x 33 (3d Cir. 2021) ...............................................................................................15

Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation v. Siemens Mobility, Inc.,

330 F.R.D. 143 (D. Del. 2019) ......................................................................................9, 16, 17

Wilson v. Sinners,
No. CV 16-986-LPS, 2018 WL 1414839 (D. Del. Mar. 19, 2018) ..........................................8

OTHER AUTHORITIES

U.S. Const. amend. IV ...................................................................................................................10

U.S. Const. amend. VIII.....................................................................................................10, 13, 14

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 ..................................................................................................................... passim

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).......................................................................................................... passim

ii
Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 ................................................................................................................... passim

Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 .......................................................................................................................9, 15

iii
 INTRODUCTION AND NATURE AND STAGE OF THE PROCEEDING

Sussex Correctional Institution in Georgetown, Delaware (“SCI”) is a correctional facility

maintained by the State of Delaware, Department of Correction (“DOC”). Plaintiffs are 39 past

and current inmates of SCI—as of the filing of the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), 15

Plaintiffs were no longer incarcerated, and three Plaintiffs were incarcerated elsewhere. SAC at

1-4. In a breathtaking 844-paragraph, 105-page SAC, Plaintiffs have sued 42 current, and former

SCI employees, as well as an unspecified number of John Doe Defendants for injuries allegedly

suffered during the Plaintiffs’ respective confinement at SCI. The SAC jumbles together wholly

unrelated claims and incidents involving separate events and discrete injuries. No two Plaintiffs

were injured in the same incident, and only some Defendants are alleged to have injured more than

one Plaintiff.

Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint on or about December 17, 2021. See ECF No. 1.

They filed their Amended Complaint on February 16, 2022, ECF No. 3, and the SAC by stipulation

of the parties on July 21, 2022. ECF No. 29. Through a stipulation entered on August 29, 2022,

the parties agreed that the Defendants represented by the undersigned would respond to the SAC

by September 16, 2022. ECF No. 32. 1 The SAC includes ten counts, 2 none of which identify

1
The undersigned represents those Defendants the DOC was able to identify from Plaintiffs’
pleadings after a reasonable internal inquiry. See, ECF No. 26, ECF No. 31 and August 29, 2022
Oral Order. The parties agreed, however, that those Defendants whom DOC was unable to locate
but are still alleged to be current or former DOC employees will be treated as John Doe defendants
for the time being, and the instant Motion is therefore filed on behalf of both the DOC Defendants
and the Doe Defendants.
2
The SAC contains a typographical error, labeling both Plaintiffs’ claims for assault and battery
and intentional infliction of emotional distress as Count VI. Id. at 102.
the Plaintiff(s) pursuing the claim nor the Defendant(s) against whom the claim is stated. Context

provides some clues as to some Defendants for a couple of the Counts. But no Defendant can

know, with even the minimum of particularity, how many and which claims are being pursued

against them. By pleading in this way, Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the threshold requirements

of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (despite now three opportunities to do so). For a number of Counts, there are

Defendants for whom Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate a colorable

claim. Indeed, for almost all Defendants, there are claims for which the allegations of the SAC

fail to plead one or more elements. For at least these Defendants on at least these claims, Plaintiffs

have failed to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

As to all Defendants, Counts VII and VIII of the SAC fail as a matter of law. Plaintiffs’

claim at Count VII for “violations of the law of dignity,” does not assert a cause of action

recognized in Delaware or in the Third Circuit. Plaintiffs’ claim at Count VIII for retaliation is

conclusory, unsupported by factual allegations, and fails to state a claim.

Finally, for any remaining claims, Defendants respectfully submit that those claims should

be severed into one suit per Plaintiff. Given the discrete nature of the alleged harms, severance

would also protect any remaining Defendants against the substantial prejudice that is likely to arise

from defending these disparate claims.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, defendants must be apprised of the nature of the claims against

them. The SAC fails to meet the threshold for Defendants as to at least Counts II, IV, the second

Count VI (intentional infliction of emotional distress), and Count IX.

2
 To the extent Plaintiffs’ claims are stated against all Defendants, a number of claims are

not supported by factual allegations for a subset of Defendants and should be dismissed as to those

Defendants under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

In Count VII, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim as to all Defendants. That Count, entitled

“Violations of the Law of Dignity,” does not state a cause of action recognized in Delaware or the

Third Circuit, and the Count should be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Count VIII is conclusory, not supported by factual allegations, and should be dismissed

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Severance of any remaining claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 and 21.

STATEMENT OF FACTS 3

The Plaintiffs in this action are 39 individuals who are, or were at one point, inmates at

SCI. See generally SAC. The Defendants are 42 named individuals, and an unspecified number

of John Does currently or formerly employed at SCI, including former SCI Warden Truman Mears

and Deputy Warden Jon Beck. Id. at 5-9.

A. PLAINTIFFS ALLEGE WHOLLY SEPARATE INCIDENTS AND

INJURIES.

Plaintiffs allege that each of them were harmed one or more times during their incarceration

at SCI, typically—but not exclusively—alleging that they were subject to the excessive use of

force and denial of proper medical care. See SAC ¶¶ 88 to 808. Notably, each Plaintiff alleges he

3
Defendants dispute many of the facts alleged in the SAC, and to the extent necessary, they will
show them to be false following discovery. For purposes of this Motion under Rule 12(b)(6),
however, the facts alleged by Plaintiffs, to the extent they can be ascertained, are taken as true.

3
was injured in incidents distinct from the other Plaintiffs. See id. The allegations do not relate to

one incident involving all parties. Indeed, no Plaintiff alleges that he was injured at the same time

as any other Plaintiff. Rather the SAC recites 39 distinct incidents allegedly taking place between

January 2020 and February 2022, with the only common element being their location: SCI.

B. PLAINTIFFS’ COUNTS ARE VAGUE AND INCOMPLETE.

At the end of these factual allegations, Plaintiffs assert ten claims collectively and

(presumably) against all Defendants. SAC ¶¶ 809-844. No count specifies which Plaintiffs are

pursuing the claim or which Defendants are allegedly liable. Id. But it is indisputable that for a

number of Counts, there are either no allegations or insufficient allegations to make out the

elements for a number of the Defendants. For example:

• Six Plaintiffs make no allegations that they were denied medical care (Count II), id. at ¶¶

377-408, 427-43, 577-99, 636-44, 655-72;

• Seven Plaintiffs make either no allegations or minimal allegations of emotional distress,

failing to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress (Plaintiff’s second

Count VI), id. at ¶¶ 88-139, 239, 343, 444-61, 528, 599;

• Nine Plaintiffs fail to allege that they filed grievances after suffering injuries, thus failing

to plead a violation of substantive due process claim (Count IX), id. at ¶¶ 114-39, 427-43,

577-99, 614-22, 636-44, 655-72, 726-45, 773-92; and

• While Plaintiffs allege in a conclusory fashion in the body of their claim for failure to

intervene (Count IV) that “[e]ach of the individual Correctional Officer Defendants and

the John Doe Defendants had actual knowledge of the violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional

rights by the others,” SAC ¶ 819, there are no allegations to support (and it is implausible

to conclude) that every Defendant correctional officer knew about every instance of alleged

4
 harm spanning a two-year period. Further, the allegations fail to allege with specificity

that at least four Defendants were in a position to intervene in any purported constitutional

violation. Id. at ¶¶ 88-113, 444-61, 623-35, 726-45.

Context sheds some light on which claims may be asserted against which Defendants, but

even there, Defendants are left to speculate. For example, Plaintiffs’ claim for failure to supervise

at Count III only discusses Warden Mears and Deputy Warden Beck in the body of the Count,

suggesting that Count is directed only at those two. Id. at ¶¶ 814-17. Alternatively, the claim for

failure to intervene at Count IV alleges harmful omissions by “[e]ach of the individual

Correctional Officer Defendants” suggesting Mears and Beck (as supervisors, not officers) are

excluded. Id. at ¶ 819 (emphasis added). But, Plaintiffs’ assault and battery claim, at Count VI,

alleges “[e]ach of the Defendants . . . engaged in acts of assault and battery against Plaintiffs,” id.

at ¶ 827, signaling that the claim is stated against all Defendants (including both officers and

supervisors). Plaintiffs’ excessive force claim at Count I omits any descriptive word like “each,”

instead stating only that “Defendants’ use of excessive force” was unconstitutional. Id. at ¶ 810.

Indeed, other than Counts III, IV, and the assault claim at Count VI, all of the other claims use the

generic term “Defendants” without any modifier like “each” or “Correctional Officer,” and without

discussing any Defendants by name. Id. at ¶¶ 809-13, 821-25, 829-44.

1. SAC Count II

For Count II, it is impossible to determine against whom the claims are stated. Count II

alleges “fail[ure] to provide appropriate medical treatment.” Id. at ¶ 812. But there’s no indication

in the body of the Count or in the factual allegations which Defendants purportedly had a duty to

treat Plaintiffs. No medical personnel are named as Defendants, yet many Plaintiffs chiefly take

issue with the quality of their medical care. A table setting forth those Defendants who do not

5
believe or are unable to determine whether a claim has been filed against them under Count II,

along with the corresponding Plaintiffs and allegations, is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.

2. SAC Count IV

Plaintiffs’ claims for failure to intervene at Count IV do not allege facts as to at least four

Defendants, for the relevant Plaintiffs do not allege they were harmed under circumstances where

another Defendant could have intervened. A table setting forth those four Defendants, the

corresponding Plaintiffs, and the relevant allegations is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.

3. SAC Count VI (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress)

Plaintiffs similarly fail to allege facts that would justify maintaining claims for the second

Count VI, intentional infliction of emotional distress, for a number of Defendants. For some

Defendants, the Plaintiffs alleging claims against them do not state specific allegations of

emotional distress. Many of those Plaintiffs that do allege distress fail to allege it was severe, and

others fail to attribute their emotional distress directly to particular Defendants. A table identifying

those Defendants who do not believe or are unable to determine whether a claim has been filed

against them under this Count VI, along with the corresponding Plaintiffs and allegations, is

attached hereto as Exhibit 3.

4. SAC Count IX

Plaintiffs’ Count IX alleges that Plaintiffs were denied “full and fair administrative

hearing[s]” concerning “Defendants’ assaults.” Id. at ¶ 843. There is no indication in the SAC as

to which Defendants are purportedly responsible. Some Plaintiffs allege that they filed grievances;

however, all but one of those Plaintiffs fail to allege that they filed with a particular person, instead

alleging only that they allegedly filed grievances and were ignored. A table setting forth those

Defendants who do not believe or are unable to determine whether a claim has been filed against

6
them under Count IX, along with the corresponding Plaintiffs and allegations, is attached hereto

as Exhibit 4.

ARGUMENT

A. THE STANDARD FOR DISMISSAL APPLIES HERE.

When considering a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court must accept

the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true but disregard any legal conclusions. Fowler v. UPMC

Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). The Court must ultimately determine whether

the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for

relief.” Id. at 211. In other words, “the complaint must do more than allege [Plaintiffs’]

entitlement to relief; rather, it must ‘show’ such an entitlement with its facts.” Cannon v.

Delaware, 2012 WL 1657127, at *5 (D. Del. May 9, 2012). “When the allegations in the

complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency

should . . . be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and

the court.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).

The Third Circuit has cautioned that when determining the sufficiency of a complaint, “the

court should identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled

to the assumption of truth.” Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011).

“Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops

short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The Court is not obligated to accept as true bald assertions,

unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences . . . .” Barrett v. McDonald, No. CV 14-742-

LPS, 2015 WL 5679732, at *2 (D. Del. Sept. 25, 2015) (internal citations omitted.) Additionally,

“[a] complaint may be subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when an affirmative defense

appears on its face.” Id. (internal citations omitted.)

7
 This Court also “has the power to dismiss a complaint that fails to comply with Rule 8 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Wilson v. Sinners, No. CV 16-986-LPS, 2018 WL 1414839,

at *3 (D. Del. Mar. 19, 2018). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, a complaint must include “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

However, “the complaint must also ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.’” Arunachalam v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., No. CV 20-1020-LPS,

2021 WL 7209362, at *5 (D. Del. Dec. 29, 2021) (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.

3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008)). “To avoid dismissal, allegations must not be ‘so undeveloped that

[they fail to] provide a defendant the type of notice of claim which is contemplated by Rule 8.’”

Id. at *8 (quoting Phillips, 515 F. 3d at 232).

B. THE STANDARD FOR SEVERANCE LIKEWISE APPLIES FOR ANY

REMAINING CLAIMS.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a) provides:

(1) Plaintiffs. Persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if:

(A) they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect

to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or

occurrences; and

(B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action.

In other words, Rule 20 “contemplates two tests for joinder [and] . . . [i]n order to permit

joinder, both tests must be satisfied.” Phillips Electronics North America Corp. v. Contec Corp.,

220 F.R.D. 415, 417 (D. Del. 2004) (emphasis added). The District of Delaware has held that the

two tests “are necessary,” but “even if the claims at issue meet both requirements, joinder may still

be refused ‘in the interest of avoiding prejudice and delay, ensuring judicial economy, or

safeguarding principles of fundamental fairness.’” Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies

8
Corporation v. Siemens Mobility, Inc., 330 F.R.D. 143, 147-48 (D. Del. 2019) (quoting In re EMC

Corp., 677 F. 3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).

When parties have been improperly joined, “[o]n motion or on its own, the court may at

any time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a party.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. When considering the Rule 20 requirement that parties’ claims arise out of the

same transaction or occurrence, this Court “analyzes whether there is a ‘logical relationship

between the separate causes of action’ such that ‘there is substantial evidentiary overlap in the

facts giving rise to the’ different sets of claims or the claims ‘share an aggregate of operative

facts.’” Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation, 330 F. R. D. at 148 (quoting In re

EMC Corp., 677 F. 3d at 1358).

C. SEVERAL COUNTS FAIL UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 8.

Plaintiffs’ claims for lack of adequate medical care (Count II), failure to intervene (Count

IV), intentional infliction of emotional distress (the second Count VI), and violation of Plaintiffs’

substantive due process rights (Count IX) should be dismissed as to those Defendants identified in

the tables at Exs. 1-4. Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to give those Defendants “fair notice of what the

. . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Arunachalam, 2021 WL 7209362, at *5 (quoting

Phillips, 515 F. 3d at 231). See also Adger v. Coupe, et. al., No. 21-1841, 2022 WL 777196, at *4

(3d Cir. Mar. 14, 2022) (explaining that “challenges under Rule 8 might be employed as to certain

specific defendants” even where some plaintiffs may have alleged claims against some

defendants).

1. Count II—Lack of Adequate Medical Care

To state a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment for failure to provide adequate

medical care, a plaintiff must allege “(1) a serious medical need and (2) acts or omissions by prison

officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need.” Henderson v. Correct Care Solutions,
9
LLC, 45 F. Supp. 3d 416, 419 (D. Del. 2014). As demonstrated by the table at Ex. 1, a number of

Plaintiffs do not allege that they were denied access to appropriate medical care; for those who do,

the allegations are typically unclear as to whether a Defendant purportedly bears responsibility, or

whether the alleged fault lies with a non-party medical professional that provided care. Because

Plaintiffs fail to give Defendants fair notice, Count II should be dismissed as to the 29 Defendants

listed in the table at Ex. 1.

2. Count IV—Failure to Intervene

To state a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment for failure to intervene,4 a plaintiff

must allege that a state actor defendant “had a reasonable opportunity to intervene and simply

refused to do so.” Ricks v. Shover, 891 F. 3d 468, 479 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Smith v. Mensinger,

293 F. 3d 641, 650-51 (3d Cir. 2002)). The window during which intervention is constitutionally

required is limited: “liability will only attach if the opportunity to intervene is ‘realistic and

reasonable.’” Ricks, 891 F. 3d at 479 (quoting Smith, 293 F. 3d at 651). The Court in Ricks, for

instance, affirmed dismissal of a failure to intervene claim because the alleged use of force against

plaintiff was over before the plaintiff could get the would-be intervenor’s attention. Id.

The Plaintiffs make the wild allegation in the body of Count IV that “[e]ach of the

individual Correctional Officer Defendants . . . were present at the scene when Plaintiffs were

assaulted and had the opportunity to intervene,” SAC ¶ 819. That cannot be so. There are 40

4
Plaintiffs label their claim “Count IV – Fourth Amendment – Failure to Intervene,” SAC at 101,
but the Third Circuit recognizes an alleged failure to intervene in the use of excessive force context
as a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Ricks v. Shover, 891 F. 3d 468, 479 (3d Cir. 2018);
Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F. 3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 2002).

10
correctional officers named as Defendants in this matter. The incidents described in the SAC

allegedly occurred over a two-year period, and Plaintiffs do not (and could not) allege that all 40

Defendants were present at every purported assault. And, as demonstrated in the table at Ex. 2,

there are no specific allegations that at least four of Defendants were in a position to intervene in

any one incident. Because Plaintiffs fail to meet the statutory requirements for pleading, Count

IV should be dismissed as to those four Defendants under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.

3. Count VI—Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Delaware law, a party

must allege “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) an intent to cause severe emotional distress

or reckless disregard with respect to causing emotional distress; and, (3) the conduct actually

caused severe emotional distress.” Jordan v. Delaware, 433 F. Supp. 2d 433, 444 (D. Del. 2006)

(quoting Capano Mgmt. Co. v. Transcon. Ins. Co., 78 F. Supp. 2d 320, 327 (D. Del. 1999)). As to

the third prong, the distress must be “so severe that ‘no reasonable man could be expected to endure

it.’” Green v. Poorman, Civil Action No. 20-85-SRF, 2022 WL 2527079, at *9 (D. Del. July 7,

2022) (quoting Dayton v. Collison, C.A. No. N17C-08-100 CLS, 2020 WL 3412701, at *12 (Del.

Super. Ct. June 22, 2020)).

Plaintiffs have not clearly stated, and it is not clear from context, which of them bring

claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress or which Defendants are purportedly liable.

As demonstrated by the table at Ex. 3, a number of Plaintiffs do not specifically allege that they

suffered emotional distress; for some who do, the distress alleged does not appear to be sufficiently

severe to state a claim; others are not clear as to which Defendant purportedly caused the distress.

Plaintiffs’ Count VI for intentional infliction of emotional distress should therefore be dismissed

11
as to the 12 Defendants listed in the table at Ex. 3, because the Plaintiffs fail to give Defendants

the required notice under Rule 8.

4. Count IX—Violation of Plaintiffs’ Substantive Due Process Rights

Plaintiffs assert a substantive due process violation because they were allegedly denied

“the right to a full and fair administrative hearing to challenge and bring to light Defendants’

assaults.” SAC ¶ 843. Plaintiffs have not clearly stated, however—and it is not clear from

context—which of them bring this claim and against whom. As demonstrated by the table at Ex.

4, not all Plaintiffs allege that they submitted a grievance or otherwise registered a complaint about

their treatment, such that they would expect a hearing. In addition, for the Plaintiffs that allege

they registered a complaint that was ignored, the allegations are unclear as to which Defendant

purportedly bears responsibility. Because the Plaintiffs fail to meet the statutory requirements for

pleading for the 38 Defendants listed in the table at Ex. 4, Count IX should be dismissed as to

those Defendants under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.

D. CERTAIN COUNTS ALSO FAIL UNDER 12(B)(6).

Dismissal is also appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for Counts II, IV, the Count

VI for intentional infliction, and Count IX for a subset of Defendants. The tables at Exs. 1-4

highlight that Plaintiffs have failed to state certain claims as to a number of Defendants by failing

to allege facts that would satisfy the elements. Without cumulatively reproducing the information

captured in the tables, the Defendants for whom a 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper are:

Count II – Sgt. Hastings, CO Miles Vernet, Sgt. Robert Givens, Sgt. Andrew Cassidy, CO

Keen, CO Humes, Brandon Messick, Sgt. Kevin Braswell, Lyle Neal, Matthew Long, CO

Duperon, CO Brandon Wilkens, CO Keefer, CO West, CO Amy Mathis, Cpl. Joseph Kraft, CO

Jeff Purdy, Sgt. Hudson, CO Wright, CO Aaron Bianca, CO Jared Payton, CO Eric Layman CO

Roswell, CO Jones, Co Hood, Deputy Warden Jon Beck;

12
 Count IV – Matthew Long, CO Wright, Sgt. Deon Brown;

Count VI (intentional infliction) – Sgt. Kevin Braswell, Lyle Neal, Matthew Long, CO

Evanglett, CO Wright, Sgt. Fountain, Sgt. Correa;

Count IX – Sgt. Kevin Braswell, Lyle Neal, Ryan Maddox, CO Evanglett, CO Duperon,

CO Brandon Wilkens, CO Keefer, CO West, CO Amy Mathis, Cpl. Joseph Kraft; CO Miles

Vernet, CO Jeff Purdy, Isaac Mitchell, Sgt. Hudson, Sgt. Hastings, Sgt. Robert Givens, Brandon

Messick, Sgt. Jeremiah Purnell, Sgt. Andrew Cassidy, CO Keen, CO Humes, Sgt. Steven Long,

Cpl. Steele, Sgt. Joseph McCarthy, CO Wright, CO Naomi Strand, Sgt. Correa, Sgt. Fountain, CO

Aaron Bianca, CO Jared Payton, CO Eric Layman, CO Roswell, CO Jones, CO Hood, Sgt. Deon

Brown, Sgt. Russell, CO Jefferson, CO Spencer.

As to all Defendants, the Court should dismiss Counts VII and VIII of the SAC under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Count VII seeks relief for “Violations of the Law of Dignity.” SAC ¶¶ 832-

34. No Delaware or Third Circuit case has embraced such a cause of action. And, while the

Supreme Court has recognized a duty to protect human dignity inherent in the Eighth Amendment

to the U.S. Constitution, it has only done so in death penalty cases involving infirm or juvenile

defendants. See Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 708 (2014) (“By protecting even those convicted

of heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the

dignity of all persons.”) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005)). There is no cause

of action for violation of dignity under these circumstances.

Count VIII, a claim for retaliation, alleges that “[s]ince the filing of this action, the named

Plaintiffs have been subjected to various acts of retaliation, including without limitation additional

acts of excessive force and physical abuse, deprivation of basic amenities and verbal and emotional

abuse.” SAC ¶ 837 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs do not support this conclusion with any specific

13
factual allegations elsewhere in the SAC 5—indeed, Plaintiffs’ use of the word “additional” implies

that Count VIII is not founded in the allegations of the Complaint, but some other harm.

“[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more

than labels and conclusions . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above

the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks omitted). When

weighing the sufficiency of a complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), courts in the Third Circuit

employ a three-step test: “(1) identifying the elements of the claim, (2) reviewing the complaint to

strike conclusory allegations, and then (3) looking at the well-pleaded components of the

complaint and evaluating whether all of the elements identified in part one of the inquiry are

sufficiently alleged.” Malleus v. George, 641 F. 3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). Plaintiffs’ only

allegations in support of Count VIII are conclusory. Alleging that Plaintiffs are entitled to relief

as a result of unspecified harms that are not mentioned in the SAC is a textbook example of placing

the “right to relief [at] the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Count VIII should

therefore be dismissed as to all Defendants pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

E. THE COURT SHOULD SEVER ALL REMAINING CLAIMS.

For any claim that may remain, the Court should sever these disparate claims. When

considering whether to sever, courts look to whether the plaintiffs’ claims arise out of the “same

transaction, occurrence, or series of occurrences.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1)(A). The Third Circuit

5
Only five Plaintiffs—Reece, Harding, Maddux, Ray and Bennett—specifically allege that they
were harmed after the original Complaint was filed in this case, while a sixth Plaintiff, Sudler,
alleges injuries close in time to the original filing. See SAC ¶¶ 492-505, 518-28, 673-725, 746-
92. However, none of these Plaintiffs were parties to the original Complaint, see ECF 28-2 at 3-
5, and none of them link their harm to retaliation for the original Complaint. See SAC, supra.

14
and District of Delaware have a robust body of caselaw examining inmates’ claims through this

lens, uniformly holding that prisoners’ claims based on alleged misconduct at different times

involving different defendants do not satisfy the transaction or occurrence test. Jerry-El v. Wetzel,

No. 19-3105, 2022 WL 72728, at *3 (3d Cir. Jan. 7, 2022); Thompson v. Ferguson, 849 F. App’x

33, 36 (3d Cir. 2021); Salley v. Secretary of Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 565 F. App’x 77,

81-82 (3d Cir. May 1, 2014); Mincy v. Klem, 303 F. App’x 106, 108 (3d Cir., Dec. 16, 2008);

Staats v. Phelps, Civ. No. 19-101-LPS, 2019 WL 4415404, at *1 (D. Del. Sept. 16, 2019); Parkell

v. Linsey, Civ. No. 17-543-LPS, 2017 WL 3485817, at *3-4 (D. Del. Aug. 14, 2017); Fatir v.

Markell, Civ. Action No. 16-315-GMS, 2016 WL 5946870, at *4-6 (D. Del. Oct. 12, 2016);

Crichlow v. Doe, Civ. Action No. 12-303-GMS, 2012 WL 1673004, at *1-3 (D. Del. May 11,

2012); Biggins v. Danberg, Civ. Action No. 10-732-GMS, 2012 WL 37132, at *2-3 (D. Del Jan.

6, 2012).

In Jerry-El, plaintiff filed two claims against two separate correctional officers for

overexposing him to secondhand smoke over two different time periods. 2022 WL 72728, at *3 .

The District Court dropped the claim against the second correctional officer pursuant to Rule 21.

Id. The Third Circuit affirmed on the basis that the claim against the second correctional officer

failed the transaction or occurrence test, because the two different exposures to secondhand smoke

occurred at different times and in different cell blocks. Id. The decision in Jerry-El stands for the

proposition that the same type of alleged harm committed by different correctional officers at

different times, even in the same prison facility, does not pass the transaction or occurrence test of

Rule 20. See also Parkell, 2017 WL 3485817, at *3-4 (dismissing plaintiff’s complaint and urging

him to file separate complaints for each violation of his rights by different personnel in the same

prison); Drumgo v. Burris, Civ. Action No. 12-068-GMS, 2012 WL 1657196, at *1-2 (D. Del.

15
May 9, 2012) (same); Biggins v. Danberg, Civ. Action No. 10-732-GMS, 2012 WL 37132, at *2-

4 (D. Del. Jan. 6, 2012) (same).

Staats is also instructive. In Staats, five inmates at the James T. Vaughn Correctional

Center brought claims together regarding their respective treatment during, and in the weeks

following, the State retaking the facility in the wake of a prison riot. 2019 WL 4415404, at *4-6.

After dismissing the case (with leave to refile for certain claims), this Court also severed the case

into five separate cases—one per plaintiff. Id. The Court noted that some plaintiffs had been

released and others had been transferred, and for the sake of case administration, the plaintiffs

should pursue their claims separately. Id. The decision was consistent with this Court’s holding

in Westinghouse that even if Rule 20’s requirements are satisfied, “joinder may still be refused ‘in

the interest of avoiding prejudice and delay, ensuring judicial economy, or safeguarding principles

of fundamental fairness.’” Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation, 330 F.R.D. at 147-

48 (D. Del. 2019) (quoting In re EMC Corp., 677 F. 3d at 1356).

Severance is particularly appropriate here. Though Plaintiffs allege similar harms, all

taking place at SCI, the harms are completely distinct—Plaintiffs were purportedly injured at times

and places completely unique to each of them. Plaintiffs’ highly individual harms do not pass the

transaction or occurrence test under Rule 20, and that alone is an appropriate reason to sever.

Moreover, nearly half of the Plaintiffs have been released from incarceration or transferred out of

SCI, complicating the case administration. The procedural history, number of amendments, and

unserved (and unidentified) Defendants highlight those challenges, and case administration can

only get more complicated once discovery starts, and Plaintiffs and Defendants propound separate

sets of discovery requests and notices of deposition—all for wholly discrete claims with no

evidentiary overlap.

16
 Most importantly, each individual Defendant has a right to a proceeding free from unfair

prejudice. The 844-paragraph, 105-page SAC is full of abhorrent allegations designed to

overwhelm and inflame. The cumulative weight bears the very real risk that a defendant is found

liable simply because there are dozens of named defendants similarly accused of misconduct. That

risk is inconsistent with principles of fundamental fairness to which each defendant is entitled.

Conversely, severing the claims into one suit per Plaintiff would ensure that the allegations against

each Defendant would be considered only on their own terms rather than against a sea of troubling

allegations. See Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation, 330 F.R.D. at 147-48

(quoting In re EMC Corp., 677 F. 3d at 1356) (holding severance may be appropriate “in the

interest of avoiding prejudice.”). There is no colorable argument that the prejudice Defendants

would suffer by keeping the claims together is offset by any worthwhile competing interest, and

the Defendants respectfully ask the Court to sever any remaining claims.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Counts II, IV, VI (intentional infliction of emotional

distress), and Count IX of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed as to the

above-enumerated Defendants under either Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 or 12(b)(6), Counts VII and VIII

should be dismissed as to all Defendants under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and this matter should be

severed to create a separate case for each Plaintiff as to all remaining claims.

[Signature on the following page.]

17
 Respectfully submitted,

SAUL EWING ARNSTEIN & LEHR LLP

/s/James D. Taylor, Jr.

James D. Taylor, Jr. (#4009)
SAUL EWING ARNSTEIN & LEHR LLP
1201 N. Market Street, Suite 2300
Wilmington, DE 19810
302-421-6800
[email protected]

Counsel for Defendants

Dated: September 16, 2022

18
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on September 16, 2022 copies of the foregoing DOC Defendants’ Opening

Brief in Support of Their Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint and

Motion to Sever, as well as the accompanying Motion, Exhibits, and proposed Order, were e-filed

via CM/ECF to all counsel of record.

/s/James D. Taylor, Jr.

James D. Taylor, Jr. (#4009)

19
EXHIBIT 1
 Count II – Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments – Lack of Adequate Medical Care

Defendant Allegedly Harmed Relevant Allegations

Plaintiff(s)
Sgt. Hastings Richard Edwards; None of these Plaintiffs allege they were denied
Jamal Solomon; appropriate medical care. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 377-408;
Charles Robinson 636-44; 655-72.
CO Miles Vernet Augustine Haymond takes issue with the care he received after
Haymond; Richard a purported altercation with Vernet, id. at ¶¶ 251,
Edwards; Barry 266; Edwards and Kline do not allege that they
Kline; Bryon Kelly were denied appropriate medical care, id. at ¶¶ 377-
408; 427-43; Kelly takes issue with the care he
received after a purported altercation with Vernet.
Id. at ¶¶ 605-12.
Sgt. Robert Richard Edwards Edwards does not allege he was denied appropriate
Givens medical care. Id. at ¶¶ 377-408.
Sgt. Jeremiah Richard Edwards; Edwards does not allege he was denied appropriate
Purnell Danny Harding, Jr.; medical care, id. at ¶¶ 377-408; Harding alleges he
Nathan was denied care after an incident where Purnell was
Lewandowski; Reuel present, but it is unclear if Purnell was allegedly
Ray involved, id. at ¶¶ 527-28; Lewandowski takes
issue with the care he received after a purported
altercation with Purnell, alleges he filed medical
requests that were ignored but does not say by
whom, id. at ¶¶ 571, 573; Ray takes issue with the
care he received after a purported altercation
involving Purnell. Id. at ¶ 767.
Sgt. Andrew Richard Edwards Edwards does not allege he was denied appropriate
Cassidy medical care. Id. at ¶¶ 377-408.
CO Keen Richard Edwards; Edwards does not allege he was denied appropriate
Jason Bennett medical care, id. at ¶¶ 377-408; Bennett takes issue
with care he received unrelated to Keen. Id. at ¶¶
777-78, 781, 788-791.
CO Humes Richard Edwards Edwards does not allege he was denied appropriate
medical care. Id. at ¶¶ 377-408.
Brandon Richard Edwards Edwards does not allege he was denied appropriate
Messick medical care. Id. at ¶¶ 377-408.
Sgt. Kevin Isaac Montague Montague takes issue with the care he received
Braswell after a purported altercation with Braswell. Id. at
¶¶ 106-07.
Lyle Neal Isaac Montague Montague takes issue with the care he received
after a purported altercation with Neal. Id. at ¶¶
106-07.
Matthew Long Isaac Montague Montague takes issue with care he received
unrelated to Long. Id. at ¶¶ 106-07.
CO Duperon Keith Campbell; Campbell and Sudler take issue with care they
 Shamir Sudler received after purported altercations with Duperon.
Id. at ¶¶ 173, 175; 684.
CO Brandon Keith Campbell Campbell takes issue with care he received after a
Wilkens purported altercation with Wilkens. Id. at ¶¶ 173,
175.
CO Keefer Keith Campbell Campbell takes issue with care he received after a
purported altercation with Keever. Id. at ¶¶ 173,
175.
CO West Keith Campbell Campbell takes issue with care he received after a
purported altercation with West. Id. at ¶¶ 173, 175.
CO Amy Mathis Adam Calloway Calloway takes issue with care he received after a
purported altercation with Mathis. Id. at ¶ 205.
Cpl. Joseph Charles Turner Turner takes issue with care he received after a
Kraft purported altercation with Kraft. Id. at ¶¶ 236-37.
CO Jeff Purdy Barry Kline; Bryon Kline does not allege that he was denied
Kelly appropriate medical care, id. at ¶¶ 427-43; Kelly
takes issue with care he received after a purported
altercation with Purdy. Id. at ¶¶ 605-12.
Sgt. Hudson George Sturgis Sturgis does not allege he was denied appropriate
medical care after the alleged incident involving
Hudson. Id. at ¶¶ 356-65.
CO Wright Gerald Lusby Lusby takes issue with the care he received after an
alleged incident involving Wright. Id. at ¶¶ 454-55.
CO Aaron Kendall Smith Smith takes issue with the care he received after a
Bianca purported altercation with Bianca. Id. at ¶ 552.
CO Jared Payton Kendall Smith Smith takes issue with the care he received after a
purported altercation with Payton. Id. at ¶ 552.
CO Eric Layman Kendall Smith Smith takes issue with the care he received after a
purported altercation with Layman. Id. at ¶ 552.
CO Roswell Bradley Zahner Zahner does not allege that he was denied
appropriate medical care. Id. at ¶¶ 577-89.
CO Jones Bradley Zahner Zahner does not allege that he was denied
appropriate medical care. Id. at ¶¶ 577-89.
CO Hood Atiba Mayfield Mayfield does not allege that he was denied
appropriate medical care. Id. at ¶¶ 590-99.
Sgt. Deon Patricio Bautista Bautista alleges he filed sick call requests that were
Brown ignored after he had a purported altercation with
Brown, but does not name the personnel that
ignored the request. Id. at ¶ 632.
Sgt. Russell Jimmie Moore Moore alleges he was harmed and denied medical
care after encountering Russell, but it is unclear
whether Russell was allegedly involved. Id. at ¶¶
733-43.
Deputy Warden N/A Beck is not named in any of Defendants’ specific
Jon Beck factual allegations; Defendants have not alleged
that Beck bears responsibility for inadequate
medical treatment by virtue of his position or
policymaking authority. See generally id. at ¶¶ 88-
808
EXHIBIT 2
 Count IV – Fourth Amendment – Failure to Intervene

Defendant Allegedly Harmed Relevant Allegations

Plaintiff(s)
Matthew Long Isaac Montague Montague does not allege Long was present for his
physical injuries. Id. at ¶¶ 88-113.
CO Wright Gerald Lusby Lusby claims Wright—and Wright alone—kept
him out in the sun despite protests, suggesting that
Wright is an alleged aggressor and there are no
possible intervenors. See id. at ¶¶ 444-61.
Sgt. Deon Patricio Bautista Bautista alleges he had a minor physical altercation
Brown with Brown and does not allege that any other SCI
personnel were present, suggesting there were no
possible intervenors. See id. at ¶¶ 623-35.
Sgt. Russell Jimmie Moore It is unclear from Moore’s allegations whether
Russell was allegedly in a position to intervene in
his claimed assault. See id. at ¶¶ 726-45.
EXHIBIT 3
 Count VI – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendant Allegedly Harmed Relevant Allegations

Plaintiff(s)
Sgt. Kevin Isaac Montague Montague does not allege suffering severe
Braswell emotional distress. See id. at ¶¶ 88-113.
Lyle Neal Isaac Montague Montague does not allege suffering severe
emotional distress. See id. at ¶¶ 88-113.
Matthew Long Isaac Montague Montague does not allege suffering severe
emotional distress. See id. at ¶¶ 88-113.
CO Evanglett William Davis Davis does not allege suffering severe emotional
distress. See id. at ¶¶ 114-39.
Cpl. Joseph Charles Turner It is unclear if Turner is alleging severe emotional
Kraft distress; Turner states he is in extreme fear of
leaving his cell and being attacked again. See id. at
¶ 239.
Sgt. Steven Long Kevin Ignudo; Atiba Ignudo alleges he is in extreme fear when he is
Mayfield around Long and the other guards that allegedly
assaulted him, and that this fear is heightened when
he allegedly sees other inmates assaulted, id. at ¶
343; Mayfield alleges only that he feels traumatized
and helpless after his alleged assault, that he is
frightened when he hears other inmates have been
assaulted, and that he tries to avoid interaction with
correctional officers. Id. at ¶ 599.
Cpl. Steele Kevin Ignudo Ignudo alleges he is in extreme fear when he is
around Steele and the other guards that allegedly
assaulted him, and that this fear is heightened when
he allegedly sees other inmates assaulted. Id. at ¶
343.
Sgt. Joseph Kevin Ignudo Ignudo alleges he is in extreme fear when he is
McCarthy around McCarthy and the other guards that
allegedly assaulted him, and that this fear is
heightened when he allegedly sees other inmates
assaulted. Id. at ¶ 343.
CO Wright Gerald Lusby Lusby does not allege suffering severe emotional
distress. See id. at ¶¶ 444-61.
Sgt. Fountain Danny Harding, Jr. Harding alleges only that “the full extent of [his]
physical and emotional injuries is presently
unknown.” Id. at ¶ 528.
Sgt. Correa Danny Harding, Jr. Harding alleges only that “the full extent of [his]
physical and emotional injuries is presently
unknown.” Id. at ¶ 528.
CO Hood Atiba Mayfield Mayfield alleges only that he feels traumatized and
helpless after his alleged assault, that he is
frightened when he hears other inmates have been
assaulted, and that he tries to avoid interaction with
correctional officers. Id. at ¶ 599.
EXHIBIT 4
 Count IX – Violation of Plaintiffs’ Substantive Due Process Rights

Defendant Allegedly Harmed Relevant Allegations

Plaintiff(s)
Sgt. Kevin Isaac Montague Montague alleges that that after a purported
Braswell altercation with Braswell, he “filed grievances, all
of which were ignored or disregarded,” but he does
not say by whom. Id. at ¶ 113.
Lyle Neal Isaac Montague Montague alleges that that after a purported
altercation with Neal, he “filed grievances, all of
which were ignored or disregarded,” but he does
not say by whom. Id. at ¶ 113.
Ryan Maddox Isaac Montague, Montague alleges that after an altercation with
Neki T. Gibbs, Sr. Maddox, he “filed grievances, all of which were
ignored or disregarded,” but he does not say by
whom, id. at ¶ 113; Gibbs alleges that he filed
grievances against Maddox that were sent to a non-
party, Capt. Mitchell, that Mitchell ignored. Id. at ¶
281.
CO Evanglett William Davis Davis does not allege that he was denied process.
See id. at ¶¶ 114-39.
CO Duperon Keith Campbell; Campbell alleges that after a purported altercation
Shamir Sudler with Duperon, he filed grievances that were
dismissed, and that he was “prevented from seeking
redress for his injuries,” id. at ¶ 178, but does not
place blame on anyone in particular; Sudler alleges
he is too scared of retaliation to file a grievance,
though he does not allege that he was threatened
with retaliation. Id. at ¶¶ 673-98.
CO Brandon Keith Campbell Campbell alleges that after a purported altercation
Wilkens with Wilkens, he filed grievances that were
dismissed, and that he was “prevented from seeking
redress for his injuries,” id. at ¶ 178, but does not
place blame on anyone in particular.
CO Keefer Keith Campbell Campbell alleges that after a purported altercation
with Keefer, he filed grievances that were
dismissed, and that he was “prevented from seeking
redress for his injuries,” id. at ¶ 178, but does not
place blame on anyone in particular.
CO West Keith Campbell Campbell alleges that after a purported altercation
with West, he filed grievances that were dismissed,
and that he was “prevented from seeking redress for
his injuries,” id. at ¶ 178, but does not place blame
on anyone in particular.
CO Amy Mathis Adam Calloway Calloway alleges that after a purported altercation
with Mathis, he “attempted to file grievances but
 was denied access to the appropriate forms,” id. at ¶
207, but does not say by whom.
Cpl. Joseph Charles Turner Turner alleges that after a purported altercation
Kraft with Kraft, there was a subsequent hearing where a
reviewing officer determined “Kraft was wrong,”
id. at ¶ 240; Turner’s only other allegation about
process is the conclusory “Turner subsequently
filed grievances which were ignored or
disregarded.” Id. at ¶ 242
CO Miles Vernet Augustine Haymond alleges that his mother complained about
Haymond; Richard his treatment to SCI after a purported altercation
Edwards; Barry with Vernet, but received no response, and that
Kline; Bryon Kelly generally he “filed grievances which were
disregarded,” id. at ¶¶ 253, 272; Edwards alleges he
reported an altercation with Vernet to Defendants
Mears and Beck, id. at ¶ 404; Kline does not allege
the was denied process, see id. at ¶¶ 427-43; Kelly
alleges that he “filed a grievance but it was ignored
or disregarded, id. at ¶ 609, but does not say by
whom.
CO Jeff Purdy Barry Kline; Bryon Kline does not allege the was denied process, see
Kelly id. at ¶¶ 427-43; Kelly alleges that he “filed a
grievance but it was ignored or disregarded, id. at ¶
609, but does not say by whom.
Isaac Mitchell Augustine Haymond alleges that his mother complained about
Haymond; Timothy his treatment to SCI after a purported altercation
Newcomb; Warren with Vernet, but received no response, and that
Selby generally he “filed grievances which were
disregarded,” id. at ¶¶ 253, 272; Newcomb alleges
that after a purported altercation with Mitchell he
“subsequently filed grievances . . . none of which
were adjudicated,” id. at ¶ 425, but does not say
with whom he filed; Selby does not allege he was
denied process. See id. at ¶¶ 614-22.
Sgt. Hudson George Sturgis Sturgis alleges that he filed grievances after a
purported altercation with Sgt. Hudson, but does
not say what happened to those grievances. Id. at
¶¶ 355, 373.
Sgt. Hastings Richard Edwards; Edwards alleges he reported an altercation with
Jamal Solomon; Hastings to Defendants Mears and Beck, id. at ¶
Charles Robinson 404; neither Solomon nor Robinson alleges they
were denied process. See id. at ¶¶ 636-44, 655-72.
Sgt. Robert Richard Edwards Edwards alleges he reported an altercation with
Givens Givens to Defendants Mears and Beck. Id. at ¶
404.
Brandon Richard Edwards Edwards alleges he reported an altercation with
Messick Messick to Defendants Mears and Beck. Id. at ¶
404.
Sgt. Jeremiah Richard Edwards; Edwards alleges he reported an altercation with
Purnell Danny Harding, Jr.; Purnell to Defendants Mears and Beck, id. at ¶ 404;
Nathan Harding alleges he has been denied the opportunity
Lewandowski; Reuel to file a grievance, but does not say by whom, id. at
Ray ¶ 527; Lewandowski alleges that after a purported
altercation with Purnell, he filed a grievance that
has not been adjudicated, but does not allege any
Defendant is responsible, id. at ¶ 574; Ray alleges
that after a purported altercation with Purnell, he
filed a grievance that was “ignored or disregarded,”
id. at ¶ 770, but he does not say by whom.
Sgt. Andrew Richard Edwards Edwards alleges he reported an altercation with
Cassidy Cassidy to Defendants Mears and Beck. Id. at ¶
404.
CO Keen Richard Edwards; Edwards alleges he reported an altercation with
Jason Bennett Keen to Defendants Mears and Beck, id. at ¶ 404;
Bennett does not allege he was denied process. See
id. at ¶¶ 773-92.
CO Humes Richard Edwards Edwards alleges he reported an altercation with
Humes to Defendants Mears and Beck. Id. at ¶
404.
Sgt. Steven Long Kevin Ignudo; Atiba Ignudo alleges that after a purported altercation
Mayfield with Long, he filed a grievance “which has not
been adjudicated,” but he does not say with whom
he filed, id. at ¶ 340; Mayfield does not allege he
was denied process. See id. at ¶¶ 590-99.
Cpl. Steele Kevin Ignudo Ignudo alleges that after a purported altercation
with Steele, he filed a grievance “which has not
been adjudicated,” but he does not say with whom
he filed. Id. at ¶ 340.
Sgt. Joseph Kevin Ignudo Ignudo alleges that after a purported altercation
McCarthy with McCarthy, he filed a grievance “which has not
been adjudicated,” but he does not say with whom
he filed. Id. at ¶ 340.
CO Wright Gerald Lusby Lusby alleges he filed “several grievances against
Defendant Wright” that were all “ignored or
disregarded” but does not say with whom he filed.
Id. at ¶ 461.
CO Naomi George Sturgis Sturgis alleges he filed a grievance after a
Strand purported altercation with Strand, but does not say
how that grievance was resolved. Id. at ¶ 355.
Sgt. Correa Danny Harding, Jr. Harding alleges he has been denied the opportunity
to file a grievance, but does not say by whom. Id.
at ¶ 527.
Sgt. Fountain Danny Harding, Jr. Harding alleges he has been denied the opportunity
to file a grievance, but does not say by whom. Id.
at ¶ 527.
CO Aaron Kendall Smith Smith alleges that after a purported altercation with
Bianca Bianca, he “filed several grievances . . . but they
were all ignored or disregarded,” id. at ¶ 555, but
Smith does not say with whom he filed.
CO Jared Payton Kendall Smith Smith alleges that after a purported altercation with
Payton, he “filed several grievances . . . but they
were all ignored or disregarded,” id. at ¶ 555, but
Smith does not say with whom he filed.
CO Eric Layman Kendall Smith Smith alleges that after a purported altercation with
Layman, he “filed several grievances . . . but they
were all ignored or disregarded,” id at ¶ 555, but
Smith does not say with whom he filed.
CO Roswell Bradley Zahner Zahner does not allege he was denied process. See
id. at ¶¶ 577-89.
CO Jones Bradley Zahner Zahner does not allege he was denied process. See
id. at ¶¶ 577-89.
CO Hood Atiba Mayfield Mayfield does not allege he was denied process.
See id. at ¶¶ 590-99.
Sgt. Deon Patricio Bautista After a purported altercation with Brown, Bautista
Brown claims he filed a grievance and several subsequent
grievances that have not been resolved, id. at ¶ 634,
but does not say with whom.
Sgt. Russell Jimmie Moore Moore does not allege he was denied process. See
id. at ¶¶ 726-45.
CO Jefferson Jimmie Moore Moore does not allege he was denied process. See
id. at ¶¶ 726-45.
CO Spencer Jimmie Moore Moore does not allege he was denied process. See
id. at ¶¶ 726-45.