A National Security Policy (NSP) paper has recently been released by Pakistan purportedly after working seven years on

it through a vast consultative process. There are two parts of the policy, a classified portion and a public document. The
latter, about a 50-page document attempts to address Pakistan’s national security beyond the old world perception of
borders, kinetics and territory. It is a conceptual document meant for doctrinal guidance and to that extent does not
overstep to get into unnecessary details. Yet there are clear indicators reflective of the thinking within Pakistan’s current
leadership.
The life of this policy is five years and it’s to be reviewed every year too. It’s not possible to address the plethora of
issues contained within, some of them mentioned only peripherally. Some significant aspects particularly those affecting
the subcontinent and Indo Pak relations will be examined here.
It’s good to remember that the classified part of the policy would obviously bear the whole truth as far as detail is
concerned. Yet at the outset it is obvious that the NSP is being put out at a time when Pakistan is feeling the heat of
international pressure and struggling to establish an image of sobriety. Under FATF pressure for being unable to curtail
terrorist financing, in the eye of the storm for its continued support to elements who promote extremist violence and
terror, and suffering a radical backlash internally, Pakistan is clearly not in any take off stage to adopt the new policy. It is
more likely a projection to placate opinion internationally that things are changing in Pakistan.
It’s quite clear that Pakistan has fully realised how inadequately it has addressed the entire domain of economics. From
geo-economics to the nuances of handling local economic issues, Pakistan has messed it royally. There was a time when
Pakistanis proudly indicated to Indians that the quality of life in their country was far superior. Since then, much water
has flown down the Indus and the Ganges.
Pakistan is one of those nations today which actually stands on the verge of a potential catastrophic class divide with the
yawning gap between haves and have-nots, raising fears of the streets turning even more violent. While Pakistan’s
leadership may allege an external hand and proxies in terms of its internal dynamics, the truth is that economic
deprivation as a nation in general, dependence on doles and aid, and inability to bring technical and other high-quality
education to the masses, has all prevented its people from rising above obscurantist practises and belief.
The focus on geo-economics and more prudent management of the internal economy is a sensible step as a part of the
NSP, but executing this through the maze of challenges is likely to prove a nightmare. Its geo-strategic location can be of
immense value if it utilises it better rather than only as an obstacle or a threat. Trade with India and transit facilities for
Indian trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia can prove very beneficial to both countries. However, through this policy
Pakistan is seeking conditionalities with India for resumption of trade; it is primarily afraid of being swamped by Indian
goods at the cost of its own industry.
In attempting to focus on economics as the core centre of its policy, Pakistan obviously looks at creating resources for
higher levels of human security. However, considering that it is the Pakistan Army which manages foreign and defence
policy and also has high stakes in the economic policy, the division of the pie will be contingent upon how the Army
perceives the state of threats.
While we in India would definitely look at the bilateral aspects of security, the interesting part is the inconsistencies
involved with Pakistan’s internal security. We are aware that Pakistan’s strategy against India has been based upon the
entire idea of retribution for the military defeat in 1971. The Pakistan Armed Forces had adopted the idea of a thousand
cuts to bleed India through a slow process of hybrid conflict using multiple domains. Among them was the employment
of obscurantist Islamic ideology to wean J&K away.
The blowback from this policy deeply affected Pakistan’s internal security which ultimately led to a four year long
military campaign to defeat it. While the NSP too obliquely refers to proxies at the core of the threats within, the truth is
that Pakistan has to recognize and accept that unless it finds a solution to the ideological issues, the struggle to
modernise as a state is going to be an insurmountable challenge. No one expects Pakistan to accept all this but if under
FATF pressure it could carry out some 27 changes in its various ways of functioning it could possibly still find ways to get
out of the woods.
While Pakistan may wish for peace with India over the next hundred years, the sincerity of this is immediately
questionable when it lays down that it cannot do business of peace with the current Indian Government. The longevity
of the NSP is five years and the Modi Government in India will be in office for 30 months. That in effect means that the
application of this policy to Pakistan’s main adversary is for less than half of its life span. If the current government
returns to power, then the policy will again be in limbo for another five years, making it almost meaningless.
The real meaning of this is that with India there is no change of policy. A below threshold hybrid conflict under Pakistan’s
control is intended to serve Pakistan’s interest; in actual effect the Pakistan Army’s interest.
The NSP downplays the nuclear strategic aspects and mentions this in just a paragraph, emphasising on the deterrence
factor against India. What the world worries about does not find mention; whether the strategic assets are under
guaranteed security from rogue elements. Information and cyber are two domains likely to dictate the future of warfare,
especially the hybrid variety. There appears a level of confidence in handling these; the Chinese backing is well known.
The maritime domain finds mention perhaps because of the recent and continuing hype about the Indo Pacific and the
presence of India at the high table with the US and its allies. It says – “The self-professed role of any one country as a so-
called net security provider in the wider Indian Ocean would affect the region’s security and economic effects
negatively”. Although Pakistan is cooperating with China in the North-West Indian Ocean for mutual security of the sea
lanes clearly it is fearful of an Indian naval blockade of its coastline. This fear is apparently addressed in its short
paragraph on ‘maritime competition’.
In relation to J&K, the NSP alleges human rights violations by India in Kashmir. It professes that “it remains steadfast in
its moral, diplomatic, political and legal support to the people of Kashmir until they achieve their right to self-
determination.” That spells no departure from the policy actively adopted over the last 33 years with no window of
opportunity to exploit the current ceasefire. Probably the over 100-page classified part of the NSP will contain more
detail on J&K and how Pakistan proposes to take forward the conflict.
While specifically addressing issues related to India it states – “the political exploitation of a policy of belligerence
towards Pakistan by India’s leadership has led to the threat of military adventurism and non-contact warfare to our
immediate east”. Someone reading this in the stand-alone mode without knowing the context and without knowledge
of affairs of the subcontinent would consider Pakistan as the most benign state, bullied into conformism. Even in the
articulation of its national security policy, Pakistan has exhibited its masterly control over communication and
information, projecting India as the villain of the peace and the most aggressive nation on the face of the earth while
suitably concealing how it has used asymmetry to total advantage in every field of security.
Of interest is also the paragraph on relations with the US which runs on expected lines about peace and cooperation.
“Broadening the partnership beyond a narrow counter-terrorism focus will be a priority”. What Pakistan fully realizes is
that the US seeks its cooperation to ensure that the Taliban in Afghanistan remains under check at a threshold to
prevent destabilisation of the region and proliferation of terror networks. The US is dependent on Pakistan to ensure
that it can focus its energy in the Indo Pacific region.  US pressure on India to enhance its limit of tolerance a couple of
notches is also likely.
All in all, some old wine in new bottles, suitably articulated and without sounding acidic or overtly aggressive is what
Pakistan’s new NSP is all about. It means very little; it’s the classified policy which needs to be accessed to get a measure
of what is cooking. The NSP is neither a guideline for internal consumption nor a message to India. It’s primarily
addressed at its western audience to soft sell Pakistan as a nation in pursuit of peace. If the Indian strategic community
lets this pass uncontested and without suitable garnishing of our analyses it would indeed be sacrilege.
even years of “rigorous analysis and consultation”; over 600 academics, civil society members,
students consulted; inputs taken from civilian and military stakeholders; independent experts
engaged in multiple rounds of consultation—all this to produce a National Security Policy  that a
think-tank intern, armed with nothing more than good Googling skills, a flair for jargon and
politically-correct hackneyed phrases, and an ability to cut, paste, and collate different elements,
could write in under seven days. For anyone to call this anodyne and unimaginative document—
which contains no new ideas, floats no new or exciting concept, reflects no fresh thinking, breaks no
new ground, indicates no change in the ruling paradigm of Pakistan—a “historic achievement”, is
nothing but a travesty.
Superficial ideation
The NSP 2022-26 is suffused with rehashed ideas like the “Islamic welfare state”, “regional
connectivity”, “shared prosperity”, “human security”; borrowed concepts like “unity in diversity”;
and glib terms that strike a resonance, especially in the West, including “melting pot for global
economic interests”—that are fitted in the context of Pakistan projecting an image of a country that
is breaking with its sordid past and forging a new path for itself. But, the fact is, when you cut
through the verbiage, and the use of too-clever-by-half turns of phrase—“We are interested in
providing economic bases, not military bases ”—there is nothing new or novel, and nothing that
signals any change on the ground, in this ‘new’ National Security Policy. It is, therefore, at, best a
superficial enunciation of desires and aspirations with no clarity on how to achieve these vaulting
objectives. Perhaps, that bit is in the classified portion of the NSP. But if the public document is
anything to go by, it is unlikely that the classified portion has anything even closely resembling a
policy, let alone the building blocks and the roadmap underlying the purported policy.
The sovereignty slogan sounds hollow considering the alacrity with which the current
dispensation has bulldozed the bill making the State Bank of Pakistan completely autonomous
under the diktat of the International Monetary Fund.
Disconnect between policy and politics
The NSP opens with a message from Prime Minister Imran Khan, who talks of “bold visions and big
ideas”, neither of which are present in the document. He then declares that the NSP “centres on my
government’s vision, which believes that the security of Pakistan rests in the security of its citizens.
This citizen-centric approach to national security prioritises national cohesion and the prosperity of
people, while guaranteeing fundamental rights and social justice without discrimination.” But this is
laughable because the Imran Khan regime is actually a negation of all these values, as is his
proclaimed desire to achieve the full potential of people through, “delivery-based good governance
through strengthening of institutions, rule of law, transparency, accountability, and openness.”
The fact is that his hybrid regime has undermined institutions—he has politicised the army and his
ministers have threatened to burn down the Election Commission; rule of law is non-existent—
the Sahiwal encounter and repeated instances of enforced disappearances  stand testimony to that
fact, as does the extra constitutional authority  exercised by the first husband of his third wife; claims
of transparency were exposed to be false when Imran Khan tried to block release on information on
gifts received as head of government because he is alleged to have sold off an expensive
watch gifted by the Saudis and pocketed the money; and accountability has become a euphemism
for political victimisation of opponents. No surprise then, that the main opposition party, Pakistan
Muslim League–Nawaz (PMLN) has already debunked the NSP and made it clear that they don’t
subscribe to it.
The national security framework in the NSP states that, “Pakistan is committed to safeguarding its
sovereignty in all its manifestations by ensuring national cohesion and harmony, preserving
territorial integrity, enhancing economic independence, and ensuring the writ of the state.” But this
very same regime has compromised the writ of the state with its abject surrender before the Tehrik-
e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) just a few months back. As for economic independence, it is a little rich
coming from a regime that has been surviving on foreign loans for budgetary support. The
sovereignty slogan sounds hollow considering the alacrity with which the current dispensation has
bulldozed the bill making the State Bank of Pakistan completely autonomous under the diktat of the
International Monetary Fund.
Pedestrian prescriptions for economy
Economic security has been placed as the “core element of national security”. But the ‘policy
objective’ is just so trite: To join the ranks of “upper middle-income countries by focusing on
enhanced productivity, investment, and savings, addressing the external imbalance, and astute
fiscal management.” What the NSP doesn’t lay out is how Pakistan will enhance productivity,
generate savings, promote investment, practise fiscal prudence and address the external imbalance.
The section on economics lists external imbalance, horizontal inequalities (between regions) and
vertical inequalities (between different classes) as the three challenges to national security. But the
prescriptions offered are typical high school textbook—correct the current account deficit through
export growth, attract foreign direct investment, increase remittances, and ensure fiscal deficit is
kept in check.
The mismanagement of the economy—high inflation, low growth, shortages of energy and other
essentials, joblessness, and skyrocketing tariffs on fuel and energy—have actually raised
economic distress levels to unbearable levels.
Vertical inequalities are sought to be addressed by “preventing elite capture of policy, removing
barriers and expanding opportunities for low income households.” All very nice, except for the fact
that under the Imran Khan dispensation, ‘elite capture’ has only gotten further strengthened with
favours being doled out to cronies, especially those involved in the real estate business. The
mismanagement of the economy—high inflation, low growth, shortages of energy and other
essentials, joblessness, and skyrocketing tariffs on fuel and energy—have actually raised economic
distress levels to unbearable levels. Imran Khan’s idea of expanding opportunities is to give the poor
a hen or a calf or free langar, night shelters, etc.
The lack of imagination and bias of the ruling Punjabi elite is even more manifest on why they think
horizontal inequalities need to be addressed. Instead of saying that the acute regional disparities
fuel grievances in the deprived and exploited regions like Balochistan, the NSP seems to believe that
the problem really lies in how these disparities “have been used by sub-nationalist elements to
generate a narrative of grievance”. The solution offered—economic packages—has been done to
death in the past. If NSP was a serious document, it would have gone beyond these packages that
just haven’t worked. On the contrary, it is doubling down on the same old failed policy.
Geoeconomics behind adventurism in Afghanistan
Geoeconomics is, of course, the new buzzword that the National Security Advisor Moeed Yusuf has
introduced in the Pakistani strategic lexicon. But from a time when geoeconomics was supposed to
drive geopolitical and geo-strategic imperatives, to the NSP where geoeconomics only supplements
the focus on geostrategy, there has been a somewhat nuanced shift, something that the old,
reconstructed legion of ex-servicemen in their new avatar of ‘strategic analysts’ had been labouring
on. The NSP only regurgitates the oft-heard claims of “Pakistan’s prized geoeconomic location”,
which provides “north-south and east-west connectivity for South and Central Asia, Middle-East and
Africa”. It also admits that “Westward connectivity is also a significant driver for Pakistan’s
continued push for regional peace and stability in Afghanistan.” The foreign policy section says this
with even more clarity: “Afghanistan’s potential as a gateway for economic connectivity with
Central Asian states is a key driver for Pakistan’s support for peace in Afghanistan.” This has been
one of Pakistan’s dreams since the collapse of the Soviet Union and emergence of the Central Asian
states in the early 1990s.
The NSP only regurgitates the oft-heard claims of “Pakistan’s prized geoeconomic location”,
which provides “north-south and east-west connectivity for South and Central Asia, Middle-
East and Africa”.
Pakistan has wanted to control and dominate Afghanistan to serve as the trade and transit hub for
Central Asia. The only difference is that this ambition is now couched in the new jargon of
connectivity and geoeconomics. The thing is that the location advantage never had any real
economic utility, only strategic—first in the context of the USSR and then in the context of
Afghanistan. The geoeconomic aspect of this location is relevant only in the context of India,
without which Pakistan is a bridge to nowhere. After all, without India, South Asia doesn’t really
matter in an economic sense. But Pakistan has itself severed all links with India in a knee jerk
reaction to the constitutional reforms in Jammu and Kashmir in 2019.