CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 A Standing Committee comprising experts in the field of design and operation of
EHV Substations from CEA, various power utilities and research/academic
institutes was constituted under Section 73, Clause(1) of the Electricity Act, 2003,
to investigate the failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation / switchyard
equipment such as Power/Generator Transformer, Circuit Breaker (CB),
Instrument Transformer [i.e. Current Transformer (CT), Potential Transformer PT
& Capacitor Voltage Transformer(CVT)], Surge Arrester (SA), Isolator, Wave Trap,
Coupling Capacitor, XLPE Cable etc. and recommend measures to avert recurrence
of such failures in future. As a part of such activity, CEA has been receiving reports
of failures of various substation / switchyard equipment from power utilities.
Office order vide which Standing Committee was constituted is enclosed at
Annexure- IV.

1.2 The prime objective of Standing Committee is to visit site of failure, investigate the
cause of failure, discuss the cause of failure of various substation / switchyard
equipment of Power utilities in the meeting, recommend remedial measures to
prevent recurrence of such failures in future and prepare a compendium of all
failures. In the process the participating utilities are mutually benefitted so as to
adopt best practices. As per the requirement of the Standing Committee, all
utilities are supposed to report the failure of substation/ switchyard equipment of
220 kV and above voltage class to CEA. In fact, number of failure cases remain
unreported as many of power utilities [State Transmission Utilities, Private
Utilities/Licensees, Central Transmission Utilities, Public Sector Power Utilities] in
the country neither report the failure of substation / switchyard equipment nor
participate in such National level meeting. Hence the basic purpose of formation
of above standing committee gets defeated.

1.3 In most of the cases, the visit to site of failure do not materialize and analysis of
cause of failure is done based on information provided by utilities in prescribed
format. The information furnished by utilities is generally found to be inadequate
for analysis of cause of failure. Either many vital information is found to be missing
or not available with O&M section because the O&M history of equipment /
transformer, records of all test results including tests carried out before & after
failure incidences (factory tests, pre-commissioning tests, tests carried out during
O&M etc.) are not properly maintained.

1.4 A meeting of the Standing Committee of experts was held in CEA on 1st March
2017 to discuss cause of failure of substation equipment for which
information/failure report was received in CEA between 1st September 2015 and

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31st December 2016 from various utilities. Minutes of the meeting are enclosed at
Annexure - III.

1.5 In most of the cases of failure of CT / CVT / PT/ SA, the equipment had blasted. In
such cases it becomes difficult to pin point the cause of failure. Some of the failures
of equipment / transformers could be due to ageing.

1.6 Quantity of failed equipment and years of service put in by these equipment
before failure, reported to CEA between 1st September 2015 and 31st December
2016, is given in Table-I. Details of these failures are provided at Annexure-II.

TABLE-1

Nos. of equipment failed

Years of
Service Transformers/ Reactors Surge Coupling
CB CT CVT/PT
GT Arrester Capacitor
0-5 2
6 2 0 6 13 0
years
5-10 2
3 0 9 2 5 0
years
10-15 0
5 3 2 3 3 1
years
15-20 0
2 0 3 1 3 0
years
More 0
than 20 5 1 2 10 4 1
years

Total 21 4 6* 16^ 22 # 28 $ 2

* Total reported CB failures are 7 Nos.; information on year of commissioning for 1 No. CB
is not available, hence years of service could not be determined.
^ Total reported SA failures are 17 Nos.; information on year of commissioning for 1 No.
SA is not available, hence years of service could not be determined.
# Total reported CT failures are 26 Nos.; information on year of commissioning for 4 Nos.
CTs is not available, hence years of service could not be determined.
$ Total reported CVT/PT failures are 32 Nos.; information on year of commissioning for 4
Nos. CVTs/PTs is not available, hence years of service could not be determined.

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1.7 Previous report was published in March 2016 which contained the information
regarding failure of substation equipment reported to CEA between 1st October
2014 and 31st August 2015.

1.8 Failure of Transformers:

(i) The transformer, the costliest equipment in a switchyard/substation, is expected

to serve the entire life of a substation which is considered to be 35 years as per
CERC norm. However, it has been observed that many Transformers have failed
within first few years of service which is a matter of concern.

(ii) Twenty-one (21) transformer failure cases have been reported to CEA during the
period from September 2015 to December 2016 by nine (9) Utilities. Out of these
twenty-one (21) transformers, one transformer is 765 kV class, seven (7) Nos. of
transformers are of 400 kV class [5 Nos. ICTs and 2 Nos. GTs] and thirteen (13)
Nos. of transformers are of 220kV class [one GT and 12 Nos. ICTs]. Seventeen (17)
numbers of failures are due to internal insulation failure, two (2) number of
failures are attributed to bushing failure, one failure on account of ageing and in
case of one failure, sufficient information was not available to determine any
cause of failure. It is a matter of concern that 9 Nos. of transformers have failed
within 10 years of operation/service. It is highlighted that number of transformer
failure cases remains unreported as many of power utilities [State Transmission
Utilities, Private Utilities/Licensees, Central Transmission Utilities, Public Sector
Power Utilities] in the Country do not report the failures.

(iii) Summary of failure of Inter Connecting Transformers (ICTs) / Generator

Transformers (GTs) reported to CEA between 1st September 2015 and 31st
December 2016 is detailed below (Table 2):
TABLE - 2

Year of Probable
Utility/Name Date of
Equipment Make Rating commis Cause of
of substation failure
sioning failure*
Power DTL BHEL 220/33kV, 2005 02.02.2016 Internal
transformer Geeta Colony 100MVA insulation
(18 Nos.) failure
DTL EMCO 315 MVA, 2010 08.03.2016 Internal
Bawana 400/220/33 insulation
kV failure
DTL EMCO 100 MVA, 2006 04.09.16 Internal
Papankalan 220/66-33/11 insulation
kV failure

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DTL BHEL 100 MVA, 1994 11.09.16 Internal

Park Street 220/66-33/11 insulation
kV failure
DTL BHEL 400/220/33 2000 11.12.2016 Internal
Bawana kV, 315 MVA insulation
failure
DTL BHEL 100 MVA, 2005 01.12.2016 Internal
Geeta Colony 220/33/11 insulation
kV failure
DTL EMCO 220/33/11k 2014 19.10.2016 Internal
Wazirpur V, 100 insulation
MVA failure

PGCIL CGL 500 MVA, 2016 15.11.2016 Internal

Bareilly 765/400 kV insulation
failure
HVPNL Areva 315 MVA, 2013 22.04.2015 Internal
Nawada 400/220 kV insulation
failure
HVPNL BHEL 220/66 kV, 2003 13.03.2015 Internal
Madanpur 100 MVA insulation
failure
APTRANSCO BHEL 100 MVA, 2010 11.10.2015 Internal
Pulivendula 220 kV /132 insulation
kV failure
APTRANSCO EMCO 220/132kV, 1999 24.08.2016 Bushing
Tadikonda 100 MVA failure

APTRANSCO TOSHIBA 220/132 kV, 2015 24.09.2016 Internal

Gudivada 160 MVA insulation
failure
TANTRANSCO EMCO 230/110/11 2008 01.12.2015 Sufficient
Manali kV, 100 MVA information
not
available
TANTRANSCO BHEL 100 MVA, 1994 31.03.2016 Internal
Gummidipoon 230/110 kV insulation
di failure
KSEB BHEL 33.3 MVA, 1978 04.05.2016 Ageing
Edamon 220/110 kV
KPTCL CGL 1-Ph, 167 2004 02.06.2016 Bushing
Hoody MVA, 400 failure
/220/33 kV

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OPTCL BHEL 315 MVA, 2005 12.11.2016 Internal

Meramundali 400/220/33 insulation
kV failure
Generator KPCL CGL 250MVA, 1991 23.05.15 Internal
Transformers Raichur TPS 15.75/220kV insulation
(3 Nos.) failure
KPCL BHEL 207 MVA, 2015 28.08.2015 Internal
Bellary TPS 21/400/√3 insulation
kV failure

KPCL CGL 250 MVA, 1994 28.02.2016 Internal

Raichur TPS 15/420 kV insulation
failure
* Probable cause of failure is based on information, data & reports furnished by the utility.

(iv) CEA Officers visited sites of Delhi Transco Ltd. (DTL) for joint investigation of
following failure cases of transformers (Table-3). The Officers collected relevant
data/information from site, interacted with substation staff, and carried out
inspection of the transformer through inspection window, wherever feasible.
Based on the information/data collected from the sites, preliminary reports were
prepared. The reports of these visits are enclosed at Annexure-I.

TABLE-3

Utility/Name Year of Date of

Make Rating
of substation commissioning failure
DTL BHEL 220/33kV, 2005 02.02.2016
Geeta Colony 100MVA
DTL EMCO 315 MVA, 2010 08.03.2016
Bawana 400/220/33 kV
DTL EMCO 100 MVA, 2006 04.09.16
Papankalan 220/66-33/11 kV
DTL BHEL 100 MVA, 1994 11.09.16
Park Street 220/66-33/11 kV
DTL BHEL 400/220/33 kV, 2000 11.12.2016
Bawana 315 MVA
DTL BHEL 100 MVA, 2005 01.12.2016
Geeta Colony 220/33/11 kV

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1.9 Failure of Reactors:

(i) Four (4) Nos. reactor failure cases have been reported to CEA during the period
from September 2015 to December 2016 by PGCIL. Out of these, one reactor is of
765 kV class and remaining three are of 400 kV class. Three Nos. failures are
attributed to internal insulation failure and one number failure is due to bushing
failure. Cause of failure is based on information, data & reports furnished by the
utility. It is a matter of concern that all four Nos. of reactors have failed within 10
years of operation/service.

(ii) Summary of failure of Reactors reported to CEA between 1st September 2015 and
31st December 2016 is detailed below (Table-4):

TABLE-4

Equipment Utility/Name Make Rating Year of Date of Probable

of substation commissioning failure Cause of
failure*
Reactor PGCIL BHEL 420 kV, 2009 28.09.2016 Bushing
(4 Nos.) Kota 80 MVAR failure
PGCIL BHEL 420 kV, 2006 05.11.15 Internal
Satna 50 MVAR insulation
failure
PGCIL CGL 765 kV, 2012 28.11.2015 Internal
Bina 80 MVAR insulation
failure
PGCIL BHEL 420 kV, 2012 29.02.2016 Internal
Binaguri 125 insulation
MVAR failure
* Probable cause of failure is based on information, data & reports furnished by the utility.

1.10 Failure of Circuit Breakers (CBs):

Seven (7) Nos. of cases of CB failure have been reported to CEA during the period
from September 2015 to December 2016 by four (4) Utilities. Out of these seven
(7) Nos. of CBs, two CBs are of 400kV class and remaining five (5) Nos. of CBs are
of 220kV class. In all these cases of CB failures, failed pole or component such as
Pre-Insertion Resistor (PIR), Grading Capacitor etc. had to be replaced with the
new one. Repair of failed CB was not possible in any of the cases. In most of the
cases, cause of failure of CB was internal insulation failure.

1.11 Failure of Current Transformers(CTs):

It is observed that twenty-six (26) Nos. of cases of CT failure have been reported
to CEA during the period from September 2015 to December 2016 by six (6)
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Utilities. All twenty- six (26) CTs are of 220kV class. It is observed that in most of
the cases, the CTs have blasted and have been replaced. It is a matter of concern
that twelve (12) Nos. of CTs have failed within 10 years of operation. Information
on year of commissioning is not available for four (4) Nos. of CT, hence service
rendered by these CTs could not be ascertained.

1.12 Failure of Potential Transformers (PTs) / Capacitive Voltage Transformers (CVTs):

It is observed that thirty-two (32) Nos. of cases of CVT / PT failure have been
reported to CEA during the period from September 2015 to December 2016 by
seven (7) Utilities. Out of these thirty-two (32) CVTs / PTs, five (5) Nos. of CVTs are
of 400kV class and rest seventeen (17) Nos. of CVTs / PTs are of 220kV class. In
most of the cases, the CVTs / PTs have blasted and have been replaced. It is a
matter of concern that eighteen (18) Nos. of CVTs / PTs have failed within 10 years
of operation. Information on year of commissioning is not available for four (4)
Nos. of CVT/PT, hence service rendered by them could not be ascertained.

1.13 Failure of Surge Arresters (SAs):

It is observed that seventeen (17) Nos. of cases of SA failure have been reported
to CEA during the period from September 2015 to December 2016 by four (4)
Utilities. Out of these seventeen (17) Nos. of SAs, three Nos. of SAs are of 400kV
class and rest fourteen (14) Nos. of SAs are of 220kV class. In most of the cases,
the SAs have blasted and have been replaced. It is a matter of concern that nine
(9) Nos. of SAs have failed within 10 years of operation. Information on year of
commissioning is not available for one No. SA, hence service rendered by it could
not be ascertained.

1.14 Failure of Coupling Capacitor:

Failure of two Nos. of Coupling Capacitors, both of 220 kV voltage class, have been
reported to CEA between September 2015 to December 2016 by two Utilities.
Both Coupling Capacitors have burst due to internal fault leading to operation of
distance relay.

1.15 Summary of failure of CB/CT/CVT/PT/SA/Coupling Capacitor:

TABLE-5

Equipment Year of Date of

Utility Make Rating
(Quantity) commissioning failure
Circuit BBMB Siemens 220 kV 2015 31.05.15
Breaker (7)
KPTCL ABB 220kV 2000 20.10.2015

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KPCL CGL 2000 A 2002 12.11.2015

BBMB CGL 400kV, 3150A, 2001 22.01.2016
40KA for 3 Sec.
KPCL BHEL 2000 A 1994 13.04.2016
APTRANSCO CGL 400kV, 2000 A 2012 06-09-2016
BBMB Siemens 220kV NA 08.12.2016
CT BBMB SCT 220 kV 2015 31.05.15
(26) TANTRANSCO TELK 230 kV 1985 24.08.2015
KSEB VITRANS 220 kV NA 19.05.2015

TANTRANSCO SCT 230 kV 2012 25.05.2015

TANTRANSCO TELK 230 kV 1986 26.09.2015

MPPTCL SCT 220 kV, 800- 2011 25.07.2015

400/1 A

MPPTCL TELK 220 kV, 800- 1993 18.08.2015

400/1 A

KPTCL W.S.Industries 220 kV NA 15.10.2015

KPTCL Mehru 220 kV 2012 24.10.2015

APTRANSCO TELK 220 kV 1981 22.12.2015

KPTCL SCT 220 kV Class 2007 22.02.2016

CT of Ratio
800/1-1-1-1-
1A

KPTCL Sri 220 kV 2003 24.02.2016

Venkateshwar
Electicals Ltd
KPTCL HBB 220 kV, 800- 1984 26.02.2016
600-400-
200/1-1-1A

TANTRANSCO Areva 220 kV, 600/1 2009 14.02.2016

A
APTRANSCO TELK 220 kV 1993 21.02.2016
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BBMB NTPLC-24 220 kV 1979 17.04.2016

APTRANSCO BHEL 220 kV, Ratio: 1993 06.06.2016

800-600-
400/1-1-1-1-1
KPTCL SCT 220 kV, Ratio: 2001 27.06.2016
800-600-400-
300/1 Amp
KPTCL (2 nos.) SCT 3000-2000 / 1- 2016 27.05.2016
1-1-1-1 Amps
APTRANSCO BHEL 220 kV NA 30.07.2016

APTRANSCO BHEL 220 kV NA 10.03.2016

APTRANSCO TELK 400 kV 2000 04.04.2016

KPTCL TELK 220 kV 2005 22.08.2016

BBMB BHEL 220kV, 1988 06.07.2016

1200/800/600/
400/300/1-1-
1A
BBMB ASEA 220 kV 1969 09.12.2016

KSEB TELK 220 kV NA 19.05.2015

CVT/ PT
(32) KSEB CGL 220 kV 1994 03.08.2015

BBMB WSI 220 kV 1990 10.07.2015

TANTRANSCO SCT 230 kV 2012 07.03.2015

TANTRANSCO CGL 230 kV 2007 26.04.2015

KPTCL CGL 220 kV 1998 22.09.2015

KPTCL WSI 400 kV 2005 23.09.2015

KPTCL WSI 220 kV 2004 24.09.2015

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TANTRANSCO HBB 230 kV 1983 13.12.2015

APTRANSCO SCT 220 / 110 kV 2012 18.09.2015

BBMB CGL 220 kV 2001 08.07.2015

PGCIL CGL 400 kV 2005 05.10.2015

APTRANSCO CGL 220 kV 1995 19.10.2015

APTRANSCO Trench Electric 220 kV 1996 24.11.2015

(2 nos.)
APTRANSCO SCT 220kV/√3 / 2012 26.11.2015
110V/√3

KPTCL ABB 400/√3kV / NA 15.12.2015

110/√3V,
4400pF

APTRANSCO SCT 220 kV 2011 23.02.2016

APTRANSCO SCT 220 kV 2011 02.03.2016

APTRANSCO Trench Electric 220 kV 1992 15.03.2016

KPTCL SCT 220 kV 2012 07.03.2016

KPTCL Areva 220 kV 2006 27.09.2015

KPTCL SCT 220 kV 2011 02.04.2016

KPTCL WSI 400kV/√3 / NA 12.05.2016

110/√3 V,
Single Phase,
8800 pF
KPTCL SCT 220 kV 2011 13.10.2015

KPTCL SCT 220 kV 2014 23.07.2016

APTRANSCO SCT 220 kV 2011 01.08.2016

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KPTCL SCT 220 kV 2011 12.07.2016

KPTCL SCT 220 kV 2010 01.07.2016

APTRANSCO SCT 220 kV 2011 13.05.2016

KPTCL SCT 220 kV 2011 30.05.2016

NHDC CGL 400 kV 2003 18.05.2016

SA KSEB NA 220 kV NA 19.05.2015

(17)
BBMB CGL 198 kV 2006 19.11.2015

TANTRANSCO CGL 400 kV 2006 11.03.15

KPTCL WSI 220 kV 1992 17.12.2015

KPTCL CGL 220 kV 2008 27.12.2015

KPTCL CGL 220 kV 2003 06.03.2016

Reliance CGL 220 kV 2005 30.11.2015

KPTCL CGL 216 kV, 10 kA 2001 28.12.2015

GETCO CGL 220 kV 1999 19.12.2015

TANTRANSCO CGL 390 kV 2006 13.12.2015

TANTRANSCO CGL 230 kV 1998 16.06.2016

TANTRANSCO CGL 230 kV 2000 19.06.2016

BBMB CGL 400 kV 2006 19.09.16

TANTRANSCO CGL 216 kV, 10 kAp 2006 26.05.2016

TANTRANSCO OBLUM 230 kV 2016 13.12.2016

BBMB CGL 198 kV 2006 25.04.2016

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APTRANSCO ELPRO 220 kV 1980 18.05.2016

Isolator (1) BBMB Elektrolites 220 kV 2015 31.05.15

BBMB: 01
Elektrolites
: 01
Coupling TANTRANSCO CGL 230 kV 2001 30.11.2015
capacitor
(2) GETCO WSI 220 kV 1984 11.11.2015

Note: Quantity in brackets indicates number of failed equipment.

2.0 OBSERVATIONS:
(i) It is observed that reported failures are primarily due to following reasons:
a. Normal Ageing
b. Failure of Insulation system (For CB/CT/PT/CVT/SA/Coupling Capacitor)
c. Failure of Insulation system & Bushing (For Transformers & Reactors)
d. Lack of good maintenance practice
e. Frequent System Faults and transient over voltages generated by the
system.
(ii) Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) Practices using modern diagnostic tools is
not being followed by most of the utilities and in general, periodic Time Based
Maintenance (TBM) is still being practiced.
(iii) Adequate modern Diagnostic tools are not available with most of the State
Utilities.
(iv) In most of the failure cases equipment blast or get completely damaged making
it impossible to carry out any test after failure. Without tests, internal condition
of the failed equipment cannot be assessed and cause of failure cannot be
determined.
(v) Most of the utilities are facing problem due to shortage of supporting staff for
operation & maintenance of sub-station equipment. Sometimes interpretation
of test results becomes difficult in absence of experts / experienced O&M staffs.
(vi) Sometimes due to unavailability of shut down, maintenance of equipment is
deferred which affects the efficient functioning of the equipment and further
deteriorate the health of equipment.
(vii) In most of the cases of failures, utilities do not furnish factory test reports, pre-
commissioning test reports, history of O&M & repairs, relay settings,

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environmental & system conditions at the time of failure etc. which makes it very
difficult to analyse the cause of failure.
(viii) In case of failure of transformers and reactors, report of detailed internal
inspection carried out by OEM at site or at its works are not provided.
(ix) In some cases, even though, there are indications of abnormalities after carrying
out diagnostic tests, no corrective actions are taken.
(x) It is observed that sometimes same tests are carried out using different test
methods with different kind/rating of test apparatus under different
environment conditions which results in inconsistent and erroneous results.

3.0 RECOMMENDATIONS:
Recommended measures suggested by the Committee for the Utilities to improve
the performance of the substation equipment are listed below. Some of the
recommendations are being repeated from the previous report (March 2016) with
the objective to remind the actions required to be taken by utilities to improve
performance of equipment and to use modern diagnostic tools for condition
assessment so as to keep substation equipment healthy for long trouble-free &
reliable operation.

3.1 General Recommendations:

(i) The utilities should report to the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) about
the failure of equipment, even if warranty has expired, which may help the
manufacturers to take corrective action for improving the product design.
(ii) The practice of Condition Based Monitoring using modern diagnostic tools should
be followed instead of conventional Periodic / Time Based Maintenance. Some of
the important diagnostic tools have also been suggested in Central Electricity
Authority (Technical Standards for Construction of Electrical Plants and Electric
Lines) Regulations, 2010.
(iii) The frequency/periodicity of measurement should be changed depending on
condition/healthiness of equipment in operation. The trend of the test results
should be monitored rather than absolute values of test result.
(iv) Utilities should follow best practices for maintenance of each equipment. All the
equipment which have reached/approaching end of service life need to be
monitored closely and utility should plan and take action in advance for
replacement of such equipment in a phased manner.
(v) The utilities should make it a practice to carry out various tests on major electrical
equipment at sites one or two months prior to expiry of warranty period of
respective equipment so that any abnormality observed in test results can be
discussed with OEM for taking up further necessary action within warranty period.
(vi) The utilities must be careful while storing the equipment as spare or keeping
transformer in the yard for long time before putting in to service. The
manufacturer’s recommendation for storage should be followed strictly.
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(vii) Utilities should take appropriate actions for repair/replacement of concerned

equipment as soon as some abnormality is observed through visual inspection or
diagnostic tests.
(viii) Most of the utilities are facing problem due to shortage of supporting staff for
operation & maintenance of sub-station equipment. The manpower should be
strengthened for efficient operation & maintenance.
(ix) The regular cleaning of dust deposited on the housings of major equipment and
bushings of transformer in Thermal Power Plant are essential to avoid flash over
across the insulators, as such frequent flashover across the bushing / housing of
equipment (due to operation in such dusty environment) may lead to failure of
equipment. Wherever feasible, the porcelain housings of major equipment
(CB/LA/CT/CVT) and bushings of transformer may be protected by providing Room
Temperature Vulcanisation (RTV) coating. RTV coating over porcelain housing of
equipment (CB/LA/CT/CVT) / bushings of transformer & reactors may also be
considered by utilities for substation equipment installed in pollution prone areas.
(x) Utilities should create and maintain complete data base of
equipment/transformers including previous test reports (reports of factory
tests/pre-commissioning tests/tests during O&M etc.), operation & maintenance
history of equipment with make, model & year of commissioning etc. for proper
evaluation, interpretation of test results and for taking Run-Refurbish-
Replacement decision.
(xi) However, merely maintaining the history of O&M is not sufficient. Test results are
not useful if correct method of testing is not followed. All tests and maintenance
should be carried out as per best practices. The method of testing as well as the
conditions while conducting the tests should be consistent / identical to previous
testing condition as far as possible. For example, test voltage, tap position at which
test is conducted etc. should be maintained while measuring IR or Turns Ratio, or
conducting SFRA and other similar tests. Details of test kits, should be maintained
so that the test results can be compared with subsequent test results. For variation
in temperature, required correction factors could be incorporated. Calibration of
the testing instruments should be ensured for reliability of the assessment.

3.2 Recommendations for Transformers (ICT & GT) and Instrument Transformers
(CT/PT/CVT):

(i) The proper handling, loading, unloading, and storage at site before assembling play
important role in satisfactory operation of equipment / transformer.
(ii) The erection of major equipment including transformers should always be carried
out by experienced technical team under the close supervision of manufacturer.
(iii) Inordinate delay in commissioning of equipment /transformer after reaching at site
should be avoided.
(iv) When there is a wide gap between the year of manufacturing and year of
commissioning of the transformers, proper care must be taken to ensure
satisfactory operation of transformer. Storage of transformer should be done as per
manufacturer’s recommendations.
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(v) Transformer should not be kept for more than three (3) months with inert gas
(Nitrogen) filling and all throughout the period, required pressure needs to be
maintained in order to avoid the exposure of active part to atmosphere. After three
(3) months, transformer should be filled with oil under vacuum and transformer
should be provided with oil conservator including oil level indicator and breather.
The oil parameters need to be monitored regularly.
(vi) Whenever there is movement of transformer either from manufacturing works or
from one station to other, SFRA should be carried out before movement and after
shifting to new location. SFRA signature would provide valuable information about
deformation in winding /core during transportation.
(vii) OLTC is one of the contributors to the failure of transformer. Possibility of
eliminating OLTC from 400kV & 765kV class transformer should be considered
(based on system studies) in consultation with Regional Power Committee (RPC) and
Regional Load Dispatch Centre (RLDC) / POSOCO and CEA. The reduction in number
of steps can also be considered in case of OLTC of 220kV and below voltage class
transformers. The removal of OLTC will simplify the design and manufacturing of
transformers.
(viii) Tertiary winding should be avoided, wherever feasible, as it increases the
probability of failure of the transformer. Tertiary terminals of transformer prone to
short circuiting by external element such as bird or animal may be suitably insulated.
(ix) An internal inspection of the failed transformer on-site is warranted at times to
locate fault inside the transformer and to assess the extent of damage. As far as
possible, internal inspection should be carried out in association with OEM / in
presence of representative of OEM. All safety precautions must be observed at all
times. Internal inspection must be performed by experienced staff with proper
training. The internal inspection should not cause any further damage to the
transformer and precaution should be taken to prevent ingress of moisture and any
foreign material into the transformer and hence internal inspection should be
meticulously planned.
(x) Periodic oil testing including DGA (wherever feasible) in case of instrument
transformers are recommended. Health of gaskets and bellows needs to be checked
periodically for CTs. Thermo vision scanning of CTs, CVTs and PTs should also be
carried out regularly as a good maintenance practice.
(xi) While measuring tan delta of transformer bushing/CT/PT/CVT, apart from absolute
value, rate of rise of tan delta should also be monitored and it should not be more
than 0.1% per year. Frequency of measurement should be increased in case tan delta
value is approaching 0.7%. Following tables can be referred while measuring tan δ
and capacitance of CVTs:

Change in Tanδ Monitoring Frequency

Upto +0.002 Three yearly

+0.002 to +0.003 Yearly

Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment 16

CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

Above +0.003 Alarming

Change in Capacitance Monitoring Frequency

upto ±2% Three yearly

±2% to ±3% Yearly

Above ±6% Alarming

(Source: - CBIP Manual on EHV Substation Equipment Maintenance)

(xii) The capacitance and tan delta measurement of transformer bushing at variable
frequency and DGA of bushing oil should be carried out for health assessment of
bushings as this has been proved to be very effective in assessing the condition of
in-service bushings.
(xiii) The change in secondary voltage of CVTs is a very good indicator of the
condition/health of CVTs. Following table may be referred for monitoring of
secondary voltage:

Drift in secondary Condition Monitoring

Voltage (to be Frequency
measured by 0.2 / 0.5
class multimeter)

Upto ± 0.5 volts Healthy Six monthly

± 0.5 to ±0.8 volts To be monitored 03monthly
±0.8 to ±1.2 volts Close monitoring Monthly
±1.2 to ±2.0 volts Close monitoring 15 days
above +2.0 volts Alarming replacement
-0.8 to -4.0 volts Close monitoring 15 days
less than -4.0 volts Alarming replacement
(Source: - CBIP Manual on EHV Substation Equipment Maintenance)

(xiv) Following table can be referred while measuring tan δ of CTs:

Value of Tanδ Monitoring Frequency

Upto 0.007 (annual [email protected]) Yearly

0.007 to 0.011 Half Yearly

Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment 17

CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

Above 0.011 Replace the CT

(Source: - CBIP Manual on EHV Substation Equipment Maintenance)

(xv) Oil level should be checked before charging. For CTs with metallic bellows, the oil
should be present upto the top of the bellow for proper functioning. The oil leakage
needs to be checked periodically. Bellow level should be closely watched. The level
of bellows of all CTs in one bay should be same at any time. Different bellow level
may be an indicator of oil leakage, gassing or fault. Similarly, Capacitor units & EMU
of CVTs in one bay should have same oil level indication at any time.

(xvi) Varistors protect the CVT from over voltage due to Ferro-resonance (FR) oscillations.
They may fail in service if FR is sustained or the energy to be discharged is beyond
its designed capacity. Simple visual check will ensure the healthiness. A varistor
should be replaced by the varistor of the same voltage rating, as secondary voltage
is tuned to a varistor.

3.3 Recommendations for Surge Arrester:

(i) Measurement of the 3rd harmonic resistive component of leakage current is a very
good method for assessing healthiness of SA. If 3rd harmonic component of resistive
current is more than 150 µA, then Insulation Resistance (IR) value test should also
be conducted and if current exceeds 350 µA, then SA should be removed from
service and replaced. The measurement of leakage current before and after the
monsoon should be carried out so as to ascertain the effect of moisture.

(ii) Before erection, the condition of the Arrester unit should be checked and it should
be ensured that there is no damage during erection. If SA is kept on an uneven
surface, it is likely to damage the pressure relief diaphragm. Any damage to this thin
& sensitive material while handling & erecting will result into moisture entry into
Surge Arrester, which will lead to its failure.

(iii) Thermal scanning is another simple on-line check often used on SAs to locate hot
spot due to improper/defective terminations/excessive watt loss.

(iv) The specification of SA should include Sealing Test which can be carried out at
manufacturer’s works to ensure proper sealing against ingress of moisture.

(v) Digital surge counter’s employment in substations could be explored.

3.4 Recommendations for Circuit Breaker:

Dynamic Contact Resistance Measurement (DCRM) test kit is a very important tool to
assess the healthiness of circuit breaker. This test may be carried out once in two
years. Moreover, while formulating the specification for procurement of CB for new
Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment 18
CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

substation, provision for procurement of Operational Analyzer along with Dynamic

Contact Resistance Measurement (DCRM) test kit should be included for one
substation or a group of nearby substations depending upon the requirement.

*********************************************************************

Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment 19

CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS TO INVESTIGATE

THE FAILURE OF 220 KV AND ABOVE VOLTAGE CLASS SUBSTATION EQUIPMENT HELD
ON 01.03.2017 IN CEA, NEW DELHI, IN CONNECTION WITH REPORTED FAILURES FROM
SEPTEMBER 2015 TO DECEMBER 2016 AT VARIOUS SUBSTATIONS IN THE COUNTRY
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The list of participants is enclosed as Annexure-A.

(1) Chief Engineer (PSE&TD) & Chairman of the subject Standing Committee
welcomed the participants and highlighted the importance of timely reporting of
failures to the Committee. He stated that discussing the failures and sharing of
operating experiences and maintenance practices of utilities will help in adopting
best practices of maintenance and thereby reducing the failures. He further
informed that during the period from 1st September 2015 to 31st December 2016,
110 Nos. equipment failures (21 Nos. transformers, 4 Nos. Reactors, 7 Nos. CBs,
26 Nos. CTs, 32 Nos. CVTs/PTs, 17 Nos. LAs, 2 Nos. Coupling Capacitors, one No.
Line Isolator) were reported to CEA by Fourteen (14) utilities. He further
highlighted that only one incidence of failure has been reported from the Eastern
Region that is from OPTCL.

(2) Chairman informed that owing to a large number of failures of CGL make
Instrument Transformers (IT) and Surge Arresters (SA), CGL was requested to
depute concerned expert for discussion and deliberation. Mr. Yesuraj, GM (R&D),
was deputed by CGL to make a presentation before the Committee and for a
healthy interaction between manufacturer and utilities for discussing about
causes of failure and best maintenance practices required to be adopted to
minimize the failures.

(3) Member Secretary informed about the absence of the representatives from KPCL,
MPPTCL and GETCO. He further stated that a draft report prepared based on
information provided by utilities between September 2015 and December 2016,
was uploaded on CEA’s website and the same was also communicated to the
concerned utilities prior to meeting. He stated that the utilities submit incomplete
information about the failure because of which it becomes difficult to analyze the
failure cases. He requested to provide adequate information available with them
along with test reports and photographs of failed equipment. He informed that in
most of the failure reports of CT/CVT/PT/SA, failure type is mentioned as
‘Equipment Flashed’ which do not convey the actual description of failure. Utilities
were requested to describe the failure properly in future reports so that
misinterpretation of failure type is avoided.

(4) Mr. Yesuraj gave a presentation pertaining to failures of Instrument Transformers

and SA. Some of the significant points/issues highlighted in CGL’s presentation are
as follows:

Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment 220
CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

(a) At the outset, Mr. Yesuraj informed that most of failures listed in CEA’s draft
failure report have not been reported to CGL by the utilities, specially by the
utilities in the Northern region. Moreover, details of the failure provided by
the utilities to CGL are not adequate to pin point the cause of failures. If
detailed information about failure is provided, it helps manufacturers to take
corrective action for improving the quality of product as well as would help the
manufacturer to suggest corrective action to be taken by user to avoid
repetition of such failures in future.

(b) He intimated that based on failure of CGL make CVTs, reported by utilities,
certain design changes were made in CVT model in 2007. After carrying out
modification, not a single incident of CVT failure has been reported to CGL.
Hence, intimation of failure to the manufacturer brings positive results.

(c) He also cautioned against use of N2 gas cushion in CT as the gas is absorbed by
oil as temperature rises; the same is released as bubbles when oil cools down
leading to partial discharge, which sometimes result in blasting of CT.

(d) Various queries raised by different utilities were discussed during interaction
with CGL representatives. CGL presentation included various suggestions to
improve reliability and availability of Instrument Transformers & Surge
Arresters.

(5) After CGL’s presentation, PGCIL’s representative made a brief presentation on

failure of transformer & reactors in PGCIL substations.

(a) Presentation included the technical details of failed equipment, observations

made during internal inspection & various tests carried out after failure, and
conclusion derived based on the observations and tests. PGCIL representative
presented about the pre-commissioning procedures and condition based
monitoring procedures followed in PGCIL including various offline condition
assessment & diagnostic techniques. He also informed about standard
proforma of PGCIL for reporting of failure of substation equipment which can
be filled up easily by a junior level officer without making mistakes to avoid
misreporting.

(b) The Chairman requested PGCIL to report all failures of equipment of 220 kV
and above voltage class to CEA’s Standing Committee, participate regularly in
the meeting and share their experiences highlighting the remedial action
taken, which will benefit other participating utilities.

During presentation it was informed that the problems in bushing & winding (for
both transformers & reactors) and OLTC (in transformers) leads to failure of
transformers & reactors.

Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment 221
CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

(6) Due to paucity of time, it was not possible to discuss each & every case of failure.
However, during the course of presentations by CGL & PGCIL representatives,
various critical issues relating to failure of Transformers, Reactors, Instrument
Transformers and Surge Arresters were discussed and following points emerged:

(a) The utilities must be careful while storing the equipment as spare or keeping
transformer in the yard for long time before putting in to service.

(b) The utilities should report OEMs about the failure of equipment even after
expiry of warranty period, which may help the manufacturers to take
corrective action for improving the product design.

(c) Utilities should make it a practice to carry out various tests on major electrical
equipment at sites one or two months before the expiry of warranty period of
respective equipment.

(d) Shortage of operation and maintenance personnel and lack of proper training
are matter of concern. Utilities should look into such issues with seriousness.

Instrument Transformers:

(e) Oil level should be checked before charging. For CTs with metallic bellows, the
oil should be present upto the top of the bellow for proper functioning. The oil
leakage needs to be checked periodically. Bellow level should be closely
watched. The level of bellows of all CTs in one bay should be same at any time.
Different bellow level may be an indicator of oil leakage, gassing or fault.
Similarly, Capacitor units & EMU of CVTs in one bay should have same oil level
indication at any time.

(f) Varistors protect the CVT from over voltage due to Ferro-resonance (FR)
oscillations. They may fail in service if FR is sustained or the energy to be
discharged is beyond its designed capacity. Simple visual check will ensure the
healthiness. A varistor should be replaced by the varistor of the same voltage
rating, as secondary voltage is tuned to a varistor.

(g) The secondary voltage of CVT is an indicator of health of CVT and drifting of
secondary voltage beyond a certain limit is a clear indication of problem in CVT.

Surge Arresters:

(h) Before erection, the condition of the Arrester unit should be checked and it
should be ensured that there is no damage during erection. If SA is kept on an
uneven surface, it is likely to damage the pressure relief diaphragm. Any

Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment 222
CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

damage to this thin & sensitive material while handling & erecting will result
into moisture entry into Surge Arrester, which will lead to its failure.

(i) Thermal scanning is another simple on-line check often used on SAs to locate
hot spot due to improper/defective terminations/excessive watt loss.

(j) Monitoring of Leakage Current and IR value are essential for accessing the
healthiness of Surge Arrestors (SAs). Measurement of the 3rd harmonic
resistive component of leakage current is a very good method for assessing
healthiness of SA which can be done on-line. If 3rd harmonic component of
resistive current is more than 150 µA then Insulation Resistance (IR) value test
should also be conducted and if current exceeds 350 µA then LA should be
removed from service and replaced. The measurement of leakage current
before and after the monsoon should be carried out so as to ascertain the
effect of moisture.

(k) The specification of SA should include Sealing Test which can be carried out at
manufacturer’s works to ensure proper sealing against ingress of moisture.

(l) Digital surge counter’s employment in substations could be explored.

The meeting ended with vote of thanks to the Chair.

Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment 223
REPORT ON FAILURE OF 220 KV AND ABOVE VOLTAGE
CLASS SUBSTATION EQUIPMENT

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 A Standing Committee comprising experts in the field of design and operation
of EHV Substations from CEA, various power utilities and research/academic
institutes was constituted under Section 73, Clause(1) of the Electricity Act,
2003, to investigate the failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation /
switchyard equipment such as Power/Generator Transformer, Circuit Breaker,
Instrument Transformer, Surge Arrester, Isolator, Wave Trap, Coupling
Capacitor etc. and recommend measures to avert recurrence. As a part of such
activity, CEA has been receiving reports of failures of various substation /
switchyard equipment from power utilities. Office order vide which Standing
Committee was constituted is enclosed at Annexure- III.

1.2 The prime objective of Standing Committee is to visit site of failure,

investigate the cause of failure, discuss the cause of failure of various
substation / switchyard equipment of Power utilities in the meeting and
recommend remedial measures to prevent recurrence of such failures in future.
In the process the participating utilities are mutually benefitted so as to adopt
best practices. As per the requirement of the Standing Committee, all utilities
are supposed to report the failure of substation/ switchyard equipment of 220
kV and above voltage class to CEA. In fact, number of failure cases remains
unreported as many of power utilities [State Transmission Utilities, Private
Utilities/Licensees, Central Transmission Utilities, Public Sector Power
Utilities] in the country neither report the failure of substation / switchyard
equipment nor participate in such National level meeting. Hence the basic
purpose of formation of above standing committee gets defeated.

1.3 In most of the cases, the visit to site of failure do not materialize and analysis
of cause of failure is done based on information provided by utilities in
prescribed format. The information furnished by utilities is generally found to
be inadequate for analysis of cause of failure. Either many vital information is
found to be missing or not available with O&M section because the O&M
history of equipment / transformer, records of all test results including tests
carried out before & after failure incidences (factory tests, pre-commissioning
tests, tests carried out during O&M etc.) are not properly maintained.

1.4 A meeting of the Standing Committee of experts was held in CEA on 04.11.15
to discuss cause of failure of substation equipment for which
information/failure report was received in CEA between 1st October 2014 and
31st August 2015 from various utilities. Minutes of the meeting are enclosed at
Annexure - II.

3
1.5 In most of the cases of failure of CT / CVT / PT/ SA, the equipment had
blasted. In such cases it becomes difficult to pin point the cause of failure.
Some of the failures of equipment / transformers could be due to ageing.

1.6 Details of failures, reported to CEA between 1st October 2014 and 31st August
2015, in terms of year of service are as below:

Years of Nos. of equipment failed

Service Transformers CB LA CT CVT PT XLPE cable
0-5 years 2 1 3 9 1 0 3
6-10 years 2 0 2 3 2 0 0
11-15 years 0 1 2 1 3 0 0
16-20 years 2 1 0 1 2 1 0
More than
0 0 1 5 1 0 0
20 years
6 No. 21 No.
(information (information
Total 6 No. on year of
commissioni
8 No. on year of
commissioni
9 No. 1 No. 3 No.
ng NA on 3 ng NA on 2
CB) CT)

1.7 Failure of Transformers:

The transformer, the costliest equipment in a switchyard/substation, is expected to

serve the entire life of a substation which is considered to be 35 years as per CERC
norm. It has become a matter of concern for utilities as many transformers are failing
much before their useful life.

(i) Twenty four (24) transformer failure cases have been reported to CEA during
the period from October 2011 to August 2015 by fourteen (14) Utilities. Number
of transformer failure cases remains unreported. Details of reported failures in
terms of year of service are as below:

Years of Service No. of Transformers failed

0-5 years 7 (29%)
6-10 years 5 (21%)
11-15 years 2 (8%)
16-20 years 4 (17%)
More than 20 years 6 (25%)
Total 24 Nos.
It is observed that many Transformers have failed within first few years of
service which is a matter of concern as Transformers, in general, are meant to
serve for 30-35 year. Out of these twenty four (24) transformers, seven (7) Nos.
of transformers are of 400kV class [5 Nos. are GTs and 2 Nos. are ICTs] and
4
 seventeen (17) Nos. of transformers are of 220kV class [one is GT and 16 Nos.
are ICTs]. Six (6) Number of failures are attributed to bushing failure, fourteen
(14) numbers are due to internal insulation failure, one failure on account of
OLTC and rest three (3) numbers of failures are due to other reasons. It is a
matter of concern that 50% of transformer i.e. 12 Nos. of transformer has failed
within 10 years of operation.

(ii) Summary of failure of Inter Connecting Transformers (ICTs) / Generator

Transformers (GTs) reported to CEA between 1st October 2014 and 31st August
2015 is detailed below:

For
details
Equipment Year of Date of Reason of
Utility Rating Make refer
commissioning failure failure
Annex
- I.
Power 100 MVA,
transformer 220/110/1
(4) 1 kV Grounding
(closed of Y-phase
KPTCL delta with NGEF 1998 21.08.14 tertiary Q
tertiary bushing by
winding crow
externally
grounded)
80/100 Bharat
OLTC
HPSEBL MVA, Bijlee 2012 05.09.14 CC
operation
220/66 kV Ltd.
100 MVA,
220/66-
Internal
DTL 33/11 kV BHEL 1994 07.09.14 H
fault
(unloaded
tertiary)
100 MVA,
Design
BBMB 220/132 Areva 2008 29.12.14 GG
fault
kV
Generator HV
transformer bushing
207 MVA,
(2) KPCL BHEL 2007 06.04.15 failure E
21/400 kV
near lower
end zone
220.6
MVA, Bushing
PPCL BHEL 2012 24.03.15 A
16.5/400 failure
kV

5
1.8 Failure of Current Transformers(CTs):

It is observed that twenty one (21) Nos. of cases of CT failure have been
reported to CEA during the period from October 2014 to August 2015 by eight
(8) Utilities. It is observed that in most of the cases, the CTs have blasted and
have been replaced. Out of these twenty one (21) CTs, five (5) Nos. of CTs are
of 400kV class and rest sixteen (16) Nos. of CTs are of 220kV class. It is a
matter of concern that about 57% of CTs i.e. Twelve (12) Nos. of CTs have
failed within 10 years of operation

1.9 Failure of Voltage Transformers (VTs) / Capacitive Voltage

Transformers (CVTs):

It is observed that ten (10) Nos. of cases of CVT / PT failure have been
reported to CEA during the period from October 2014 to August 2015 by four
(4) Utilities. In most of the cases, the CVTs / PTs have blasted and have been
replaced. Out of these ten (10) CVTs / PTs, one CVT is of 400kV class and
rest nine (9) Nos. of CVTs / PTs are of 220kV class. It is a matter of concern
that 33% of CVTs / PTs i.e. Three (3) Nos. of CVTs / PTs have failed within
10 years of operation.

1.10 Failure of Surge Arresters (SAs):

It is observed that eight (8) Nos. of cases of SA failure have been reported to
CEA during the period from October 2014 to August 2015 by four (4)
Utilities. In most of the cases, the SAs have blasted and have been replaced.
Out of these eight (8) Nos. of SAs, one SA is of 400kV class and rest seven
(7) Nos. of SAs are of 220kV class. It is a matter of concern that about 68% of
SAs i.e. five (5) Nos. of SAs have failed within 10 years of operation

1.11 Failure of Circuit Breakers (CBs):

It is observed that six (6) Nos. of cases of CB failure have been reported to
CEA during the period from October 2014 to August 2015 by four (4)
Utilities. Out of these six (6) Nos. of CBs, one CBs is of 400kV class and rest
five (5) Nos. of CBs are of 220kV class.

1.12 Summary of failure of CT/VT/CVT/CB/SA/XLPE Cable during this

period is listed below:

For
Year of details
Date of
Equipment Utility Make Rating commis refer to
failure
sioning Annex-
I.
XLPE M/s LS Cables 400 kV 2013 11.06.14 B
Cable DTL & systems (3)
(3) 400 kV 2014 01.01.15 C

6
 400 kV 2013 16.03.15 D
CT TELK(1) 230 kV 1986 09.09.14 J
(21) TANTRANSCO
M/s SCT(1) 230 kV 2014 04.01.15 M
Shree
Venkateshwara
KPTCL Electical 220 kV 2006 21.08.14 P
Industries Pvt
Ltd.(1)
220 kV 2012 R
29.03.14
220 kV 2014 04.05.14 S
220 kV 2012 02.05.14 T
SCT(6)
220 kV 2011 11.06.14 U
MPPTCL
220 kV 2006 27.04.14 V
220 kV 2005 22.05.10 Z
Alstom(1) 220 kV 2011 30.01.14 W
WS
220 kV 2007 30.09.14 Y
Industries(1)
MPGENCO TELK(1) 400 kV 1983 11.02.15 AA
APPGCL TELK(1) 245 kV 1979 10.08.14 BB
420 kV 2015 05.02.15 KK
ABB(2)
420 kV 2015 07.02.15 KK
BBMB WSI(1) 420 kV 1995 05.02.15 KK
BHEL(1) 400 kV 2002 02.03.15 LL
TELK(1) 245 kV 1990 09.03.15 NN
BHEL(1) 220 kV NA 12.10.14 RR
APTRANSCO
WSI Ltd.(1) 220 kV NA 18.10.14 SS
NPCIL TELK(1) 220 kV 1993 11.03.15 F
CVT 230 kV 1998 15.10.14 I
(9)
CGL (4) 245 kV 1998 04.10.14 K
TANTRANSCO
230 kV 2003 25.04.15 N
230 kV 2000 01.04.15 O
MPPTCL Alstom (1) 220 kV 2004 08.08.14 X
BBMB BHEL (1) 400 kV 2013 24.12.14 JJ

7
 WSI Ltd. (1) 245 kV 1990 09.03.15 NN
CGL (1) 245 kV 2007 01.04.15 OO
GETCO CGL (1) 220 kV 2001 20.03.15 VV
PT (1) GETCO BHEL (1) 220 kV 1996 07.06.15 WW
LA TANTRANSCO CGL (1) 230 kV 2001 15.11.14 L
(8)
CGL (2) 198 kV 2006 27.10.14 FF
198 kV 2006 15.02.15 II
BBMB ELPRO (2) 198 kV 2000 08.03.15 MM
198 kV 1985 15.05.15 PP
OBLUM (1) 245 kV 2010 09.03.15 NN
APTRANSCO CGL (1) 400 kV 2012 12.11.14 TT
GETCO LAMCO (1) 220 kV 2013 24.06.15 XX
CB 400 kV,
PGCIL SIEMENS(1) 2014 23.02.15 UU
(6) 3000 A
KSEB TELK(1) 220 kV 1999 28.04.15 G
APTRANSCO CGL(1) 220 kV NA 30.10.14 QQ
245 kV, NA 19.10.14 DD
SIEMENS(2)
BBMB 245 kV NA 15.05.15 EE
CGL(1) 255 kV 2002 25.12.14 HH

Note: Quantity in brackets indicates number of failed equipment.

2.0 OBSERVATIONS:

(i) It is observed that reported failures are primarily due to following reasons:

a. Normal Ageing
b. Frequent System Faults and transient over voltages generated by the
system.
c. Failure of Insulation system (For CB/CT/PT/CVT/SA)
d. Failure of Insulation system, Bushing & OLTC (For Transformers)
e. Lack of good maintenance practice
f. Failure of joints & terminations (For EHV XLPE Cables)

(ii) Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) Practices using modern diagnostic

tools is not being followed by most of the utilities and in general, periodic
Time Based Maintenance (TBM) is still being practised.

8
(iii) Adequate modern Diagnostic tools are not available with most of the State
Utilities.
(iv) Most of the utilities are facing problem due to shortage of supporting staff
for operation & maintenance of sub-station equipment. Sometimes
Interpretation of test results becomes difficult in absence of experts /
experienced O&M staffs.
(v) Sometimes due to unavailability of shut down, maintenance of equipment is
deferred which affects the efficient functioning of the equipment and further
deteriorate the health of equipment.

3.0 RECOMMENDATIONS:

Some recommended measures suggested by the Committee for the Utilities to

improve the performance of the substation equipment are listed below:

3.1 General Recommendations:

(i) Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) should be consulted to discuss

about the cause of failure.
(ii) The practice of Condition Based Monitoring using modern diagnostic tools
should be followed instead of conventional Periodic / Time Based
Maintenance. Some of the important diagnostic tools have also been suggested
in Central Electricity Authority (Technical Standards for Construction of
Electrical Plants and Electric Lines) Regulations, 2010.
(iii) The frequency/periodicity of measurement should be changed depending on
condition/healthiness of equipment in operation. The trend of the test results
should be monitored rather than absolute values of test result.
(iv) Utilities should follow best practices for maintenance of each equipment. All
the equipment which have reached/approaching end of service life need to be
monitored closely and utility should plan and take action in advance for
replacement of such equipment in a phased manner.
(v) The utilities should make it a practice to carry out various tests on major
electrical equipment at sites one or two months prior to expiry of warranty
period of respective equipment so that any abnormality observed in test results
can be discussed with OEM for taking up further necessary action within
warranty period.
(vi) The manufacturer’s recommendation for storage should be followed strictly in
case of inordinate delay in commissioning of equipment as well as for long
storage of equipment as spares.
(vii) Most of the utilities are facing problem due to shortage of supporting staff for
operation & maintenance of sub-station equipment. The manpower should be
strengthened for efficient operation & maintenance.
(viii) The regular cleaning of dust deposited on the housings of major equipment
and bushings of transformer in Thermal Power Plant are essential to avoid
flash over across the insulators. As such frequent flashover across the bushing
9
 / housing of equipment (due to operation in such dusty environment) may lead
to failure of equipment. As an alternative to regular cleaning, the porcelain
housings of major equipment (CB/LA/CT/CVT) and bushings of transformer
may be protected by providing Room Temperature Vulcanisation (RTV)
coating. RTV coating over porcelain housing of equipment (CB/LA/CT/CVT)
/ bushings of transformer & reactors may also be considered by utilities for
substation equipment installed in pollution prone areas as an alternative to
Polymer housed equipment.
(ix) Utilities should create and maintain complete data base of
equipment/transformers including previous test reports (reports of factory
tests/pre-commissioning tests/tests during O&M etc.), operation &
maintenance history of equipment with make, model & year of commissioning
etc. for proper evaluation, interpretation of test results and for taking Run-
Refurbish-Replacement decision.
3.2 Recommendations for Transformers (ICT & GT) and Instrument
Transformers (CT/PT/CVT):

(i) OLTC is one of the contributors to the failure of transformer. Possibility of

eliminating OLTC from 400kV & 765kV class transformer should be considered
(based on system studies) in consultation with Regional Power Committee (RPC)
and Regional Load Dispatch Centre (RLDC) / POSOCO and CEA. The
reduction in number of steps can also be considered in case of OLTC of 220kV
and below voltage class transformers. The removal of OLTC will simplify the
design and manufacturing of transformers.
(ii) Whenever there is movement of transformer either from manufacturing works or
from one station to other, SFRA should be carried out before movement and
after shifting to new location. SFRA signature would provide valuable
information about deformation in winding /core during transportation.
(iii) Oil sampling for transformer oil testing should be done as per relevant IS/IEC.
The oil sample should be tested in NABL accredited laboratory on calibrated
equipment. Apart from monitoring absolute values of key parameters, trend of
change in key values should also be closely monitored. In case of suspicious test
results, second sample should also be got tested to ensure efficacy of test results.
(iv) The proper handling, loading, unloading, and storage at site before assembling
play important role in satisfactory operation of equipment / transformer.
Moreover, the erection of major equipment including transformers should
always be carried out by experienced technical team under the close supervision
of manufacturer. Inordinate delay in commissioning of equipment /transformer
after reaching at site should be avoided. When there is a wide gap between the
year of manufacturing and year of commission of the transformers, proper care
must be taken to ensure satisfactory operation of transformer:
a. Storage of transformer should be done as per manufacturer’s
recommendations.

10
 b. Transformer should not be kept for more than three (3) months with inert gas
(Nitrogen) filling and all throughout the period, required pressure needs to
be maintained in order to avoid the exposure of active part to atmosphere.
c. After three (3) months, transformer should be filled with oil under vacuum
and transformer should be provided with oil conservator including oil level
indicator and breather. The oil parameters need to be monitored regularly.
(v) Tertiary winding should be avoided, wherever feasible, as it increases the
probability of failure of the transformer. Transformer banks (formed out of
single phase units) and 5 limbed 3 phase units should only be provided with
tertiary winding of rating one third of HV rating. Tertiary terminals of
transformer prone to short circuiting by external element such as bird or animal
may be suitably insulated.
(vi) Periodic oil testing including DGA (wherever feasible) in case of instrument
transformers are recommended. Health of gaskets and bellows needs to be
checked periodically for CTs. Thermo vision scanning of CTs, CVTs and PTs
should also be carried out regularly as a good maintenance practice.
(vii) While measuring tan delta of transformer bushing/CT/PT/CVT, apart from
absolute value, rate of rise of tan delta should also be monitored and it should
not be more than 0.1% per year. Frequency of measurement should be increased
in case tan delta value is approaching 0.7%. Following tables can be referred
while measuring tan δ and capacitance of CVTs:

Change in Tan Monitoring Frequency

Upto +0.002 Three yearly
+0.002 to +0.003 Yearly
Above +0.003 Alarming

Change in Capacitance Monitoring Frequency

upto ±2% Three yearly
±2% to ±3% Yearly
Above ±6% Alarming
(Source: - CBIP Manual on EHV Substation Equipment Maintenance)

(viii) The change in secondary voltage of CVTs is a very good indicator of the
condition/health of CVTs. Following table may be referred for monitoring of
secondary voltage:

Drift in secondary Condition Monitoring

Voltage (to be Frequency
measured by 0.2 / 0.5
class multimeter)

Upto ± 0.5 volts Healthy Six monthly

11
 ± 0.5 to ±0.8 volts To be monitored 03monthly
±0.8 to ±1.2 volts Close monitoring Monthly
±1.2 to ±2.0 volts Close monitoring 15 days
above +2.0 volts Alarming replacement
-0.8 to -4.0 volts Close monitoring 15 days
less than -4.0 volts Alarming replacement
(Source: - CBIP Manual on EHV Substation Equipment Maintenance)

(ix) Following table can be referred while measuring tan δ of CTs:

Value of Tan Monitoring Frequency

Upto 0.007 (annual [email protected]) Yearly
0.007 to 0.011 Half Yearly
Above 0.011 Replace the CT
(Source: - CBIP Manual on EHV Substation Equipment Maintenance)

(x) The capacitance and tan delta measurement of transformer bushing at variable
frequency and DGA of bushing oil should be carried out for health assessment
of bushings as this has been proved to be very effective in assessing the
condition of in-service bushings.
3.3 Recommendations for Surge Arrester:

Measurement of the 3rd harmonic resistive component of leakage current is a

very good method for assessing healthiness of SA, which can be done on-line. If
3rd harmonic component of resistive current is more than 150 µA, then
Insulation Resistance (IR) value test should also be conducted and if current
exceeds 350 µA, then SA should be removed from service and replaced. The
measurement of leakage current before and after the monsoon should be carried
out so as to ascertain the effect of moisture. The specification of SA should
include Sealing Test of SA which can be carried out at manufacturer’s works to
ensure proper sealing against ingress of moisture.
3.4 Recommendations for Circuit Breaker:
Dynamic Contact Resistance Measurement (DCRM) test kit is a very important
tool to assess the healthiness of circuit breaker. This test may be carried out once
in two years. Moreover, while formulating the specification for procurement of
CB for new substation, provision for procurement of Operational Analyzer along
with Dynamic Contact Resistance Measurement (DCRM) test kit should be
included for one substation or a group of nearby substations depending upon the
requirement.
3.5 Recommendations for XLPE Cables:
(i) The earthing in respect of cable terminations & cross bonding arrangement
needs to be rechecked to ensure safe operation of cable.

12
 (ii) The monitoring of healthiness of Sheath Voltage Limiter (SVL) and
monitoring of Partial Discharge (PD) of all straight through joints &
terminations is essential.
(iii) Distributed Temperature Sensors should be installed along the length of cable
for monitoring of hot spot temperature of cable and joints.

*********************************************************************

13
 Annexure-II

MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS

TO INVESTIGATE THE FAILURE OF 220 KV AND ABOVE VOLTAGE
CLASS SUBSTATION EQUIPMENT HELD ON 04.11.15 IN CEA, NEW
DELHI, IN CONNECTION WITH REPORTED FAILURES FROM
OCTOBER 2014 TO AUGUST 2015 AT VARIOUS SUBSTATIONS IN THE
COUNTRY
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The list of participants is enclosed as Appendix-1.

Chief Engineer (PSETD) & Chairman of the subject Standing Committee (Substation)
welcomed the participants. He stated that discussing the failures and sharing of
experiences and maintenance practices of utilities will help in adopting best practices
of maintenance and thereby reducing the failures. The Chairman informed that during
above period 52 nos. equipment failures (4 nos. of Interconnecting Transformers, 2
nos. of Generator Transformers, 3 nos. of cable, 8 nos. of SAs, 19 nos. of CTs, 9 nos.
CVTs, 6 nos. of CBs, one no of PT) were reported by fourteen (14) utilities. He also
highlighted that number of utilities do not report the failure of equipment and prime
objective of formation of above committee gets defeated due to non-participation of
utilities and non-reporting of failures. The representatives from PGCIL, PPCL
(Pragati Power Corporation Limited), GETCO and NPCIL did not attend the meeting.

A draft report, prepared based on information provided by utilities between October

2014 and August 2015, was uploaded on the CEA’s website prior to the meeting. The
failure of various substation equipments and their important maintenance practices
were discussed in detail in the meeting. Summary of discussion is as follows:

1. During deliberation on transformer failure in KPTCL installation, KPTCL

informed that it is their practice to provide tertiary winding with 100 MVA
transformers and bringing out all three terminals of tertiary outside the tanks to
carry out various tests. The Committee suggested that tertiary winding may be
avoided for 3 phase power transformers rated less than 160 MVA as it increases
the probability of failure of the transformer. However, tertiary winding may be
provided for single phase power transformers. Tertiary terminals of transformer
prone to short circuiting by external element such as bird or animal may be
insulated by insulating sleeves. The Committee also suggested SFRA test should
be carried at factory as well as at site before commissioning of transformers and
test results should be reference signature for future use. The capacitance and tan
delta measurement of transformer bushing at variable frequency and DGA of
bushing oil should be carried out for health assessment of bushings as this has
been proved to be very effective in assessing the condition of in-service bushings.

2. There were two straight through joint failures and one termination failure in 400
kV XLPE cable system at Bamnauli substation of DTL. Director (Substation) and
Member Secretary stated that for the first time EHV cable failures have been
included in the report so that other utilities are also benefited from the discussion.
He informed that CEA team had visited the site of failure to assess the cause of
failure and it was observed that DTS was not properly installed for monitoring hot
82
 spot temperature along the route of cable. It was concluded that partial discharge
at joint location could be one of the reasons of failure of the cable. The GM, DTL
discussed about failure of XLPE cable and also informed that laying of cable is
being modified as recommended by M/s LS Cables, the supplier of cable system.
The snaking of cable is being done to reduce the mechanical stress at joints during
faults in the system.
3. Regarding CT failures, the Committee recommended that in addition to tan delta
and Insulation Resistance tests, DGA of tank oil of CT should also be monitored
wherever feasible. The committee also suggested ensuring the health of gaskets
and bellows periodically for CTs. Thermo vision scanning of CTs, CVTs and PTs
should also be carried out regularly as a good maintenance practice. Following
tables can be referred while measuring tan δ and capacitance of CVTs:

Change in Tan Monitoring Frequency

Upto +0.002 Three yearly

+0.002 to +0.003 Yearly

Above +0.003 Alarming

Change in Capacitance Monitoring Frequency

upto ±2% Three yearly

±2% to ±3% Yearly

Above ±6% Alarming

The change in secondary voltage of CVTs is a very good indicator of the

condition/health of CVTs. Following table may be referred for monitoring of
secondary voltage:

Drift in secondary Voltage Condition Monitoring Frequency

(to be measured by 0.2 / 0.5
class multimeter)

Upto ± 0.5 volts Healthy Six monthly

± 0.5 to ±0.8 volts To be monitored 03monthly
±0.8 to ±1.2 volts Close monitoring Monthly
±1.2 to ±2.0 volts Close monitoring 15 days
above +2.0 volts Alarming replacement
-0.8 to -4.0 volts Close monitoring 15 days
less than -4.0 volts Alarming replacement

Following table can be referred while measuring tan δ of CTs:

83
 Value of Tan Monitoring Frequency

Upto 0.007 (annual [email protected]) Yearly

0.007 to 0.011 Half Yearly

Above 0.011 Replace the CT

4. Monitoring of Leakage Current and IR value are essential for accessing the
healthiness of Surge Arrestors (SAs). Measurement of the 3rd harmonic resistive
component of leakage current is a very good method for assessing healthiness of
SA which can be done on-line. If 3rd harmonic component of resistive current is
more than 150 µA then Insulation Resistance (IR) value test should also be
conducted and if current exceeds 350 µA then LA should be removed from
service and replaced. The measurement of leakage current before and after the
monsoon should be carried out so as to ascertain the effect of moisture. The
specification of SA should include Sealing Test of SA which can be carried out at
manufacturer’s works to ensure proper sealing against ingress of moisture.
5. The Committee suggested that while formulating the specification for
procurement of CB for new substation, provision should be made for procurement
of Operational Analyzer along with Dynamic Contact Resistance Measurement
(DCRM) test kit, which are useful tools to assess healthiness of CB. These
diagnostic tools can also serve/cater to the requirement of nearby substations.

6. The Chairman stated that OLTC is one of the causes of failure of transformer.
Utility should carry out system studies and the possibility of removal of OLTC
from power transformers of voltage rating 400 kV and above may be explored in
consultation with respective Regional Power Committee (RPC). The removal of
OLTC will simplify the design and manufacturing of transformers.

7. It was recommended that oil sampling for transformer oil testing should be done
as per relevant IS/IEC. The oil sample should be tested in NABL accredited
laboratory on calibrated equipment. Apart from monitoring absolute values of key
parameters, trend of change in key values should also be closely monitored. In
case of suspicious test results, second sample should also be got tested for
eliminating element of doubt.

8. The Committee recommended that utilities should make it a practice to carry out
various tests on major electrical equipment at sites one or two months before the
expiry of warranty period of respective equipment.

9. The Chairman stated that shortage of operation and maintenance personnel and
lack of proper training are matter of concern. Utilities should look into such issues
with seriousness.
84
It was decided that in the next meeting a representative from
PGCIL/NTPC/equipment manufacturer/supplier of diagnostic tools will be invited to
share their experience and highlight about the use of various modern diagnostic tools
in monitoring the healthiness of various substation equipments.

The meeting ended with vote of thanks to the Chair.

85
 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 A Standing Committee comprising experts in the field of design and

operation of EHV Substations from CEA, various power utilities and
research/academic institutes was constituted under Section 73, Clause (l)
of the Electricity Act, 2003, to investigate the failure of 220 kV and above
voltage class substation / switchyard equipment such as Power/Generator
Transformer, Circuit Breaker (CB), Instrument Transformer [i.e. Current
Transformer (CT), Potential Transformer (PT) & Capacitor Voltage
Transformer (CVT)], Surge Arrester (SA), Isolator etc. and recommend
measures to avert recurrence of such failures in future. As a part of such
activity, CEA has been receiving reports of failures of various substation /
switchyard equipment from power utilities. Office order vide which
Standing Committee was constituted is enclosed at Annexure- V.

1.2 The prime objective of Standing Committee is to visit site of failure,

investigate the cause of failure, discuss the cause of failure of various
substation / switchyard equipment of Power utilities in the meeting,
recommend remedial measures to prevent recurrence of such failures in
future and prepare a compendium of all failures. In the process, the
participating utilities are mutually benefitted so as to adopt best practices.

1.3 As per the requirement of the Standing Committee, all utilities are
supposed to report the failure of substation/ switchyard equipment of 220
kV & above voltage class to CEA. In fact, number of failure cases remain
unreported as many of power utilities [State Transmission Utilities, Private
Utilities/Licensees, Central Transmission Utilities, Public Sector Power
Utilities] in the country neither report the failure of substation /
switchyard equipment nor participate in such National level meeting.
Hence, the basic purpose of formation of above standing committee gets
defeated. This fact has been brought to the notice of Hon’ble Central
Electricity Regulatory Commission, Joint Electricity Regulatory
Commission and all State Regulatory Commissions.

1.4 In most of the cases, due to delay in reporting of event, the visit to site of
failure do not materialize and analysis of cause of failure is done based on

Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment 1

 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

information provided by utilities. The information furnished by utilities is

generally found to be inadequate for analysis of cause of failure. Either
many vital information is found to be missing or not available with O&M
section because the O&M history of equipment / transformer, records of
all test results including tests carried out before & after failure incidences
(factory tests, pre-commissioning tests, tests carried out during O&M etc.)
are not properly maintained.

1.5 For the information and use of the utilities, the format for furnishing of
information of failure of substation equipment is provided at Annexure III.
The utilities should provide adequate information in the format and submit
it to CEA along with supporting test reports, O&M history, disturbance
recorder data, photographs etc. as early as possible after the occurrence
of failure.

1.6 A meeting of the Standing Committee of experts was held in CEA on 24th
September 2018 to discuss cause of failure of substation equipment for
which information/failure report was received in CEA between 1st January
2017 and 31st March 2018 from various utilities. Minutes of the meeting
are enclosed at Annexure – IV.

1.7 During discussion in the meeting on the failure of Surge Arresters of

KPTCL, it emerged that some of the arresters were reported failed in view
of leakage current in these arresters found to be more than acceptable
values during leakage current measurement. The committee decided that
such cases should not be treated as failures and hence has been left out
from the report.

1.8 Previous report on failure of substation equipment was published in July

2017 which contained the information regarding failure of substation
equipment reported to CEA between 1st September 2015 and 31st
December 2016.

2.0 Brief details of the failure of substation equipment reported to CEA

between 1st January 2017 and 31st March 2018

2.1 The Committee investigates failures of 220 kV and above voltage class
equipment only. Failure of total 72 Nos. of Transformers, GTs, Reactors,
Circuit Breakers, Instrument Transformers, Surge Arresters and XLPE

Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment 2

 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

Cable of 220 kV and above voltage rating was reported to CEA between
1st January 2017 and 31st March 2018. The voltage wise quantity of each
equipment has been indicated in the Table-1 below:

TABLE-1

Equipment Voltage Class Total

Quantity
220 kV 400 kV 765 kV (Nos.)
Quantity (Nos.)

Interconnecting 9 6 0 15
Transformers

Generator 0 1 0 1
Transformers

Reactors 0 3 2 5

Circuit Breaker 4 0 0 4

Current Transformer 8 0 0 8

Potential 11 2 0 13
Transformer/Capacitive
Voltage Transformer

Surge Arrester 19 6 0 25

XLPE Cable 1 0 0 1
Grand Total 72

2.2 Quantity of failed equipment and years of service put in by these

equipment before failure, reported to CEA between 1st January 2017 and
31st March 2018, is given in Table-2.

Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment 3

 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

TABLE-2

Years of Nos. of equipment failed

Service
Transformers Reactors CB Surge CT CVT/PT XLPE
/ GT Arrester Cable

0-5 years 7 3 1 1 1 5 0

Over 5 yrs- 3 0 2 3 1 2 1
10 years

Over 1 2 0 11 1 0 0
10yrs. -15
years

Over 15 1 0 0 6 2 0 0
yrs. -20
years

More than 4 0 1 1 3 3 0
20 years

Total 16 5 4 22* 8# 10$ 1

* Total reported SA failures are 25 Nos.; information on year of commissioning for

3 No. SA is not available, hence years of service could not be determined.
# Total reported CT failures are 08 Nos.; information on year of commissioning for
1 Nos. CT is not available, hence years of service could not be determined.
$ Total reported CVT/PT failures are 13 Nos.; information on year of
commissioning for 3 Nos. CVTs/PTs is not available, hence years of service could
not be determined.

2.3 Complete detail of all above-mentioned failures is provided at

Annexure-I.

2.4 Failure of Transformers:

(i) Transformer, the costliest equipment in a switchyard/substation, is

expected to serve the entire life of a substation which is considered to be

Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment 4

 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

35 years as per CERC norm. The expected life in other countries are 40
years in USA, 45 years in Germany and 36 years in Australia. However, it
has been observed that many transformers installed in Indian utilities
have failed within first few years of service which is a matter of concern.

(ii) Summary of failure of Inter Connecting Transformers/GTs reported to

CEA between January 2017 and March 2018 is detailed below (Table 3):

TABLE - 3

S. Utility Substation Make Rating Year of Date of Probable

No. commis failure Cause of
sioning failure*

1. PGCIL Raigarh CGL 315 MVA, 2008 03.09.2017 Winding

400/220 insulation
kV failure

2. PGCIL Jalandhar BHEL 315 MVA, 2000 13.12.2017 Winding

400/220 insulation
kV failure

3. PGCIL Kolar BHEL 167 MVA, 2007 11.02.2017 Bushing

400 kV failure
level
4. PGCIL Bidadi Alstom 500 MVA, 2012 16.09.2017 Winding
420 kV insulation
level failure

5. DTL Naraina CGL 100 MVA, 2002 26.07.2017 Insulation

220/66- failure
33/11 kV
6. DTL Lodhi BHEL 100 MVA, 1994 22.03.2017 Winding
Road 220/33/ insulation
11 kV failure

7. DTL Okhla EMCO 100 MVA, 2010 07.04.2017 Winding

220/33 kV insulation
failure

Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment 5

 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

8. DTL Preet BHEL 100 MVA 2017 12.03.2018 Erection

Vihar 220/33/ Deficiency
11 kV
9. DTL Pappankal BHEL 160 MVA 2018 09.03.2018 Winding
a-III 220/66/ problem/
11 kV manufacturin
g defect

10. OPTCL Bhadrak CGL 100 MVA, 2015 31.05.2017 Winding

220/132/3 insulation
3kV failure

11. OPTCL New BHEL 160 MVA, 2014 09.02.2017 Inter turn
Bolangir 220/132/ fault
33 kV
12. KPTCL Sirsi Kirloskar 50 MVA 1982 15.07.2017 Ageing
220/110/
11 kV
13. KPTCL Bidnal T&R 100 MVA, 2013 15.11.2016 Probable
220/110 manufacturing
kV defect

14. PPCL Bawana BHEL 292.4 2014 08.10.2017 Inter turn

MVA, fault
16.5/420
kV
15. MPPTCL Bina BHEL 315 MVA, 1994 15.01.2018 OLTC
400/220/
33 kV
16. MPPTCL Bina 315 MVA, 1995 14.02.2018 Winding
400/220/ insulation
33 kV failure

* Probable cause of failure is based on information, data and reports furnished

by the utility.

Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment 6

 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

(iii) As can be seen from Table 3 above, sixteen (16) transformer failure cases
have been reported to CEA during the period from January 2017 and
March 2018 by six (6) Utilities. It is a matter of concern that more than
50% of the reported failed transformers were in operation/service for less
than 10 years. It is highlighted that a large number of transformer failure
cases remains unreported as many of power utilities [State Transmission
Utilities, Private Utilities/Licensees, Central Transmission Utilities, Public
Sector Power Utilities] in the Country do not report the failures.

(iv) In case of failure of Transformers in the substations of PGCIL, a team

constituted by PGCIL carried out the investigation of failure of these
Transformers. Reports as prepared by the team has been enclosed as
Annexure-II.

(v) As per the information available for reported failure, number of failures
caused due to fault in the particular location/component of the
transformer has been indicated in the pie chart below. As can be seen
from the pie chart, 12 Nos. transformers out of 16 Nos. failed due to
failure/flashover in the winding.

FAULT LOCATION IN THE TRANSFORMER

Magnetic Circuit (1
No.)
OLTC (1 No.)

Bushing (1 No.)

Winding (13 Nos.)

Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment 7

 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

(vi) Failures of transformers during 2013-2017: The number of different

transformer failures as reported in last 5 years to CEA has been shown in
the graph below:

TRANSFORMER FAILURE DURING 2013-2017

18 17
16
14
12 11
10 9
8
8
6
4 4 4 4 4
4 3 3 3 3 3
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0
0
0-5 years

11-15 years
16-20 years

Total
0-5 years
6-10 years

6-10 years
11-15 years
16-20 years

Total
0-5 years

Total
0-5 years

Total
0-5 years

11-15 years
16-20 years

Total
6-10 years
11-15 years
16-20 years

6-10 years
11-15 years
16-20 years

6-10 years
More than 20 years

More than 20 years

More than 20 years

More than 20 years

More than 20 years

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

2.5 Failure of Reactors:

(i) Five (5) nos. Reactor failure cases have been reported to CEA during the
period from January 2017 and March 2018 by PGCIL. Out of these, two
reactors are of 765 kV class and remaining three are of 400 kV class.
Three nos. failures are attributed to internal insulation failure/flashover;
one number failure is due to bushing failure; and one due to excessive
vibration due to 2nd harmonics. Cause of failure is based on information,
data & reports furnished by the utility.

(ii) Summary of failure of Reactors reported to CEA between January 2017

and March 2018 is detailed below (Table 4):

Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment 8

 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

TABLE - 4

S. Substation Make Year of Date of Probable

No. Utility Rating commis failure Cause of
sioning failure*

1. PGCIL Vizag CGL 3-phase, 2005 28.04.2017 Excessive

80 MVAR, vibration due
400 kV to 2nd
harmonic
component

2. PGCIL Agra CGL 1-phase, 2005 22.05.2017 Bushing

16.67 Failure
MVAR,
420 kV
3. PGCIL Satna CGL 3-phase, 2012 01.06.2017 Internal
80 MVAR, flashover
765 kV
4. PGCIL Kishenganj CGL 80 MVAR, 2016 01.09.2017 Failure of
400 kV HV
insulation

5. PGCIL Varanasi TBEA 80 MVAR, 2016 27.12.2017 Internal

765 kV flashover

(iii) In case of failure of Reactors in the substations of PGCIL, a team

constituted by PGCIL carried out the investigation of failure of these
Reactors. Reports as prepared by the team has been enclosed as
Annexure-II.

(iv) Failures of reactors during 2013-2017: The number of different reactor

failures as reported in last 5 years to CEA has been shown in the graph
below. No reactor failure was reported during 2013 & 2014.

Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment 9

 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

REACTOR FAILURE DURING 2013-2017

6
5
5

4
3
3
2 2 2
2
1 1 1 1
1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
Total

Total

Total

Total

Total
11-15 years
16-20 years

11-15 years
16-20 years

16-20 years

11-15 years
16-20 years

16-20 years
0-5 years
6-10 years

0-5 years
6-10 years

0-5 years
6-10 years
11-15 years

0-5 years
6-10 years

6-10 years
11-15 years
0-5 years
More than 20 years

More than 20 years

More than 20 years

More than 20 years

More than 20 years

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

2.6 Failure of Circuit Breakers (CBs), Instrument Transformers (CT/PT/CVT) &

Surge Arresters SAs):

(i) Summary of failure of CBs, CTs., PTs, CVTs & SAs reported to CEA
between January 2017 and March 2018 is detailed below (Table 5):

Table-5
Equipme
Year of
nt Date of
Utility Make Rating commissioni
(Quantity failure
ng
)
Circuit BBMB Siemens 245 kV 2008 20.11.2017
Breaker
(4) APTRANSCO BHEL 245 kV 1998 22.10.2017

KSEB CGL 245 kV 2015 05.11.2017

TANTRANSC AREVA 230 kV 2009 12.04.2017
O
CT (8) TANTRANSC ABB 230 kV 2004 11.09.2017
O
KPTCL SVEI Pvt. Ltd 220 kV 2006 29.9.2016
KPTCL CGL 220 kV 1998 05.11.2016

Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment 10

 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

KPTCL Hindustan 220 kV 1995 02.04.2017

Brown Boveri
KPTCL SCT 220 kV 2000 05.09.2017

APTRANSCO WSI 220 kV 1993 17.01.2017

APTRANSCO BHEL 220 kV NA 27.03.2018

MSETCL MEHRU 220 kV 2017 11.08.2017

CVT/PT KPTCL WSI 420 kV NA 26.07.2016

(13)
KPTCL WSI 220 kV NA 07.09.2016

KPTCL WSI 220 kV 2014 28.01.2017

KPTCL SCT 220 kV 2011 04.07.2017

KPTCL SCT 220 kV 2014 13.08.2017

BBMB WSI 220 kV 1988 12.04.2017

BBMB WSI 220 kV 1989 15.04.2017

TANTRANSCO CGL 230 kV 1994 17.10.2016

APTRANSCO SCT 220 kV 2011 19.11.2016

APTRANSCO SCT 220 kV 2011 18.11.2016

APTRANSCO ABB 220 kV 2016 09.12.2016

MSETCL CGL 220 kV 2010 08.01.2018

KPTCL WSI 400 kV NA 19.10.2017

SA (25) BBMB CGL 220 kV 2006 17.04.2017

TANTRANSCO CGL 230 kV 1988 11.11.2016

TANTRANSCO CGL 230 kV 2003 22.02.2017

KPTCL CGL 230 kV NA 22.01.2017

TANTRANSCO CGL 400 kV 2006 16.02.2018

KPTCL CGL 220 kV 2009 15.01.2017

KPTCL CGL 220 kV 2003 09.01.2017

KPTCL CGL 400 kV 2002 12.09.2017

Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment 11

 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

KPTCL CGL 400 kV NA 29.10.2016

KPTCL CGL 220 kV 2003 06.11.2016

KPTCL CGL 400 kV NA 11.11.2016

KPTCL CGL 220 kV 2003 18.11.2016

KPTCL CGL 220 kV 1999 19.11.2016

BBMB CGL 220 kV 2006 18.12.2016

APTRANSCO ELPRO 220 kV 1998 02.12.2016

TANTRANSCO LAMCO 220 kV 2015 07.08.2016

TANTRANSCO CGL 220 kV 2006 24.12.2016

TANTRANSCO CGL 400 kV 2006 05.02.2017

KPTCL CGL 220 kV 2003 11.12.2017

KPTCL CGL 220 kV 2003 23.02.2018

KPTCL CGL 220 kV 2002 07.03.2018

KPTCL CGL 400 kV 2002 21.01.2018

KPTCL CGL 220 kV 2002 07.03.2018

MSETCL CGL 220 kV 2008 25.07.2017

MSETCL CGL 400 kV 2002 30.03.2018

(ii) From January 2017 to March 2018, four (4) nos. of cases of CB failure
have been reported to CEA during the period by four (4) Utilities. In three
of the cases, cause of failure of CB was internal insulation failure while
one no. CB failed due to ageing.

(iii) Failures of CBs during 2013-2017: The number of different CB failures

as reported in last 5 years to CEA has been shown in the graph below.

Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment 12

 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

CIRCUIT BREAKER FAILURES DURING 2013-2017

12
10
10

8
6
6
4 4
4 3 3 3 3
2 2 2 2
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
Total

Total

Total

Total

Total
11-15 years
16-20 years

16-20 years

11-15 years
16-20 years
0-5 years
6-10 years

0-5 years
6-10 years
11-15 years
16-20 years

0-5 years
6-10 years
11-15 years
16-20 years

0-5 years
6-10 years
11-15 years

0-5 years
6-10 years
More than 20 years

More than 20 years

More than 20 years

More than 20 years

More than 20 years

Information NA

Information NA

Information NA

Information NA

Information NA
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

(iv) It is observed that eight (8) nos. of cases of CT failure have been reported
to CEA during the period from January 2017 to March 2018 as reported
by four (4) utilities.

(v) In case of PT/CVT, thirteen (13) nos. of failure have been reported to CEA
during the period from January 2017 to March 2018 by five (5) Utilities.
However, it may be noted that due to a handful of utilities reporting the
failure, it is not possible to successfully capture the statistics of service
life of key electrical equipment in the substations across various utilities
in India.

(vi) In most of the cases of failure of CT / CVT / PT, the equipment had blasted
or flashed over. In such cases, it becomes difficult to pin point the cause
of failure. Some of the failures of equipment / transformers could be due
to ageing.

(vii) Failures of CTs/PTs/CVTs during 2013-2017: The number of different

CT/PT/CVT failures as reported in last 5 years to CEA has been shown in
the graph below.

Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment 13

 0
5
10
15
20
25
0
10
15
20
25

4
0-5 years 0-5 years

0
6-10 years 6-10 years

3
11-15 years 11-15 years

1 2 1 0

2
16-20 years 16-20 years

2013

2013
5

1
More than 20 years More than 20 years

3
Information NA Information NA
11

13
Total Total

3
0-5 years 0-5 years
3

2
6-10 years 6-10 years

1
11-15 years 11-15 years 0 0

6
16-20 years 16-20 years

2014

2014
More than 20 years More than 20 years
7 6

0 0
Information NA Information NA
CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

22

12
Total Total
8

4
0-5 years 0-5 years

6
6-10 years 6-10 years

4
11-15 years 11-15 years
0 1 1

3
16-20 years 16-20 years
2015

2015
7

4
More than 20 years More than 20 years
2

2
Information NA Information NA
19

23
Total Total

11
0-5 years 0-5 years
CT Failure pattern

6-10 years 6-10 years

11-15 years PT/CVT Failure Pattern 11-15 years

Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment

2 3 3 2

1 1 1
16-20 years 16-20 years
2016

2016
6

0
More than 20 years More than 20 years
2

3
Information NA Information NA
18

Total 17 Total

3
0-5 years

14
0-5 years

2
6-10 years 6-10 years
11-15 years 11-15 years

0 0
16-20 years 16-20 years
2017

2017
More than 20 years 3 More than 20 years
1 0 1 1 2 1

Information NA 0 Information NA
6

Total Total

(viii) As per the reports received by CEA, twenty five (25) nos. of cases of SA
failure have occurred in 2017 and till March 2018. These reports have
been furnished by five (5) utilities. Out of these, seven (7) nos. of SAs are
of 400kV class and rest eighteen (18) nos. of SAs are of 220/230kV class.
 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

(ix) Failures of SAs during 2013-2017: The number of different SA failures

as reported in last 5 years to CEA has been shown in the graph below.

SA FAILURE PATTERN
17 17
18
16
14
12 10
9
10
8 6 6 6
5 5
6 4
3 3 3 3
4 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 0 0 0 0 0
0

11-15 years
16-20 years
0-5 years
6-10 years
11-15 years
16-20 years

Total
0-5 years
6-10 years
11-15 years
16-20 years

Total
0-5 years
6-10 years
11-15 years
16-20 years

Total
0-5 years
6-10 years
11-15 years
16-20 years

Total
0-5 years
6-10 years

Total
More than 20 years

More than 20 years

More than 20 years

More than 20 years

More than 20 years

Information NA

Information NA

Information NA

Information NA

Information NA
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

2.7 One number case of failure of 220 kV XLPE Cable of DTL was reported.
The cable had failed in February 2018. The failure may be attributed to
improper restoration of original installation conditions of cable during
excavation for metro work.

3.0 OBSERVATIONS:
(i) It is observed that reported failures are primarily due to following
reasons:
a. Normal Ageing
b. Failure of Insulation system for CB/CT/PT/CVT/SA.
c. Failure of Insulation system & Bushing for Transformers &
Reactors.
d. Lack of prudent maintenance practices
e. Frequent System Faults and transient over voltages generated by
the system.
f. Improper installation (XLPE cable)
(ii) In most of the failure cases of CT/PT/CVT/SA, equipment blast or get
completely damaged making it impossible to carry out any test after

Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment 15

 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

failure. Without tests, internal condition of the failed equipment cannot

be assessed and cause of failure cannot be determined. However, in most
of the cases it is assumed that degradation of insulation due to ingress
of moisture and transient system voltages might be the reason of failure
of these equipment.
(iii) Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) Practices using modern diagnostic
tools is not being followed by most of the utilities and in general, periodic
Time Based Maintenance (TBM) is still being practiced.
(iv) Adequate modern Diagnostic tools are not available with most of the
State Utilities.
(v) Most of the utilities are facing problem due to shortage of technical staff
for operation & maintenance of sub-station equipment. Sometimes
interpretation of test results becomes difficult in absence of experts /
experienced O&M staff.
(vi) Sometimes due to unavailability of shut down, maintenance of
equipment is deferred which affects the efficient functioning of the
equipment and further deteriorate the health of equipment.
(vii) In most of the cases of failures, utilities do not furnish factory test
reports, pre-commissioning test reports, history of O&M & repairs, relay
settings, environmental & system conditions at the time of failure etc.
which makes it very difficult to analyse the cause of failure.
(viii) In case of failure of transformers and reactors, report of detailed internal
inspection carried out by OEM at site or at its works are not provided.
(ix) In some cases, even though, there are indications of abnormalities after
carrying out diagnostic tests, no corrective actions are taken.
(x) It is observed that sometimes same tests are carried out using different
test methods with different kind/rating of test apparatus under different
environment conditions which results in inconsistent and erroneous
results.

4.0 RECOMMENDATIONS:
Recommended measures suggested by the Committee for the Utilities to
improve the performance of the substation equipment are listed below.
Some of the recommendations are being repeated from the previous report
(July 2017) with the objective to remind the actions required to be taken
by utilities to improve performance of equipment and to use modern
diagnostic tools for condition assessment so as to keep substation
equipment healthy for long trouble-free and reliable operation.

Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment 16

 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

4.1 General Recommendations:

(i) The utilities should report to the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM)
about the failure of equipment, even if warranty has expired, which may
help the manufacturers to take corrective action for improving the product
design.

(ii) The practice of Condition Based Monitoring using modern diagnostic tools
should be followed instead of conventional Periodic / Time Based
Maintenance. Some of the important diagnostic tools have also been
suggested in Central Electricity Authority (Technical Standards for
Construction of Electrical Plants and Electric Lines) Regulations.

(iii) The frequency/periodicity of measurement should be changed depending

on condition/healthiness of equipment in operation. The trend of the test
results should be monitored rather than absolute values of test result.

(iv) Utilities should follow best practices for maintenance of each equipment.
All the equipment which have reached/approaching end of service life need
to be monitored closely and utility should plan and take action in advance
for replacement of such equipment in a phased manner.

(v) The utilities should make it a practice to carry out various tests on major
electrical equipment at sites one or two months prior to expiry of warranty
period of respective equipment so that any abnormality observed in test
results can be discussed with OEM for taking up further necessary action
within warranty period.

(vi) The utilities must be careful while storing the equipment as spare or
keeping transformer in the yard for long time before putting in to service.
The manufacturer’s recommendation for storage should be followed
strictly.

(vii) Utilities should take appropriate actions for repair/replacement of

concerned equipment as soon as some abnormality is observed through
visual inspection or diagnostic tests.

(viii) Frequent failures of equipment of any particular make should be

thoroughly investigated in consultation with OEM and necessary action
including design modification, if required, should be carried out by OEM.

Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment 17

 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

(ix) Most of the utilities are facing problem due to shortage of supporting staff
for operation & maintenance of sub-station equipment. The manpower
should be strengthened for efficient operation & maintenance.

(x) The regular cleaning of dust deposited on the housings of major equipment
and bushings of transformer in Thermal Power Plant are essential to avoid
flash over across the insulators, as such frequent flashover across the
bushing / housing of equipment (due to operation in such dusty
environment) may lead to failure of equipment. Wherever feasible, the
porcelain housings of major equipment (CB/LA/CT/CVT) and bushings of
transformer may be protected by providing Room Temperature
Vulcanisation (RTV) coating. RTV coating over porcelain housing of
equipment (CB/LA/CT/CVT) / bushings of transformer & reactors may
also be considered by utilities for substation equipment installed in
pollution prone areas.

(xi) Utilities should create and maintain complete data base of

equipment/transformers including previous test reports (reports of factory
tests/pre-commissioning tests/tests during O&M etc.), operation &
maintenance history of equipment with make, model & year of
commissioning etc. for proper evaluation, interpretation of test results and
for taking Run-Refurbish-Replacement decision.

(xii) However, merely maintaining the history of O&M is not sufficient. Test
results are not useful if correct method of testing is not followed. All tests
and maintenance should be carried out as per best practices. The method
of testing as well as the conditions while conducting the tests should be
consistent / identical to previous testing condition as far as possible. For
example, test voltage, tap position at which test is conducted etc. should
be maintained while measuring IR or Turns Ratio, or conducting SFRA
and other similar tests. Details of test kits, should be maintained so that
the test results can be compared with subsequent test results. For
variation in temperature, required correction factors could be
incorporated. Calibration of the testing instruments should be ensured for
reliability of the assessment.

4.2 Recommendations for Transformers (ICT & GT) and Instrument

Transformers (CT/PT/CVT):

(i) The proper handling, loading, transportation, unloading, and storage at

site before assembling play important role in satisfactory operation of
equipment / transformer.

Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment 18

 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

(ii) The erection of major equipment including transformers should always

be carried out by experienced technical team under the close supervision
of manufacturer.

(iii) Inordinate delay in commissioning of equipment /transformer after

reaching at site should be avoided.

(iv) When there is a wide gap between the year of manufacturing and year of
commissioning of the transformers, proper care must be taken to ensure
satisfactory operation of transformer. Storage of transformer should be
done as per manufacturer’s recommendations.

(v) Transformer should not be kept for more than three (3) months with dry
air/inert gas (Nitrogen) filling and all throughout the period, required
pressure needs to be maintained in order to avoid the exposure of active
part to atmosphere. After three (3) months, transformer should be filled
with oil under vacuum and transformer should be provided with oil
conservator including oil level indicator and breather. The oil parameters
need to be monitored regularly.

(vi) As far as possible the transformer should be transported filled with dry
air. Use of nitrogen for this purpose should be avoided.

(vii) Whenever there is movement of transformer either from manufacturing

works or from one station to other, SFRA should be carried out before
movement and after shifting to new location. SFRA signature would
provide valuable information about deformation in winding /core during
transportation.

(viii) OLTC is one of the contributors to the failure of transformer. Possibility

of eliminating OLTC from 400kV & 765kV class transformer should be
considered (based on system studies) in consultation with Regional Power
Committee (RPC) and Regional Load Dispatch Centre (RLDC) / POSOCO
and CEA. The reduction in number of taps/steps can also be considered
in case of OLTC of 220kV and below voltage class transformers. The
removal of OLTC will simplify the design and manufacturing of
transformers.

(ix) Tertiary winding should be avoided, wherever feasible, as it increases the

probability of failure of the transformer. Tertiary terminals of transformer
prone to short circuiting by external element such as bird or animal may
be suitably insulated.

Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment 19

 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

(x) An internal inspection of the failed transformer on-site is warranted at

times to locate fault inside the transformer and to assess the extent of
damage. As far as possible, internal inspection should be carried out in
association with OEM / in presence of representative of OEM. All safety
precautions must be observed at all times. Internal inspection must be
performed by experienced staff with proper training. The internal
inspection should not cause any further damage to the transformer and
precaution should be taken to prevent ingress of moisture and any foreign
material into the transformer and hence internal inspection should be
meticulously planned.

(xi) The capacitance and tan delta measurement of transformer bushing at

variable frequency and DGA of bushing oil should be carried out for health
assessment of bushings as this has been proved to be very effective in
assessing the condition of in-service bushings.

(xii) Periodic oil testing including DGA (wherever feasible) in case of

instrument transformers are recommended. Health of gaskets and
bellows needs to be checked periodically for CTs. Thermo vision scanning
of CTs, CVTs and PTs should also be carried out regularly as a good
maintenance practice.

(xiii) While measuring tan delta of transformer bushing/CT/PT/CVT, apart

from absolute value, rate of rise of tan delta should also be monitored and
it should not be more than 0.1% per year. Frequency of measurement
should be increased in case tan delta value is approaching 0.7%.
Following tables can be referred while measuring tan δ and capacitance
of CVTs:

Change in Tanδ Monitoring Frequency

Upto +0.002 Three yearly

+0.002 to +0.003 Yearly

Above +0.003 Alarming

Change in Capacitance Monitoring Frequency

upto ±2% Three yearly

Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment 20

 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

±2% to ±3% Yearly

Above ±6% Alarming

(Source: - CBIP Manual on EHV Substation Equipment Maintenance)

(xiv) The change in secondary voltage of CVTs is a very good indicator of the
condition/health of CVTs. Following table may be referred for monitoring of
secondary voltage:

Drift in secondary Condition Monitoring

Voltage (to be measured Frequency
by 0.2 / 0.5 class
multimeter)
Upto ± 0.5 volts Healthy Six monthly
± 0.5 to ±0.8 volts To be monitored 03monthly
+0.8 to +1.2 volts Close monitoring Monthly
+1.2 to +2.0 volts Close monitoring 15 days
above +2.0 volts Alarming replacement
-0.8 to -4.0 volts Close monitoring 15 days
less than -4.0 volts Alarming replacement
(Source: - CBIP Manual on EHV Substation Equipment Maintenance)
(xv) Following table can be referred while measuring tan δ of CTs:

Value of Tanδ Monitoring Frequency

Upto 0.007 (annual Yearly
[email protected])
0.007 to 0.011 Half Yearly

Above 0.011 Replace the CT

(Source: - CBIP Manual on EHV Substation Equipment Maintenance

Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment 21

 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

(xvi) Oil level should be checked before charging. For CTs with metallic bellows,
the oil should be present upto the top of the bellow for proper functioning.
The oil leakage needs to be checked periodically. Bellow level should be
closely watched. The level of bellows of all CTs in one bay should be same
at any time. Different bellow level may be an indicator of oil leakage, gassing
or fault. Similarly, Capacitor units & EMU of CVTs in one bay should have
same oil level indication at any time.

(xvii) Varistors protect the CVT from over voltage due to Ferro-resonance (FR)
oscillations. They may fail in service if FR is sustained or the energy to be
discharged is beyond its designed capacity. Simple visual check will ensure
the healthiness. A varistor should be replaced by the varistor of the same
voltage rating, as secondary voltage is tuned to a varistor.

4.3 Recommendations for Surge Arrester:

(i) Measurement of the 3rd harmonic resistive component of leakage current is

a very good method for assessing healthiness of SA. If 3rd harmonic
component of resistive current is more than 150 µA, then Insulation
Resistance (IR) value test should also be conducted and if current exceeds
350 µA, then SA should be removed from service and replaced. The
measurement of leakage current before and after the monsoon should be
carried out so as to ascertain the effect of moisture.

(ii) Before erection, the condition of the Arrester unit should be checked and it
should be ensured that there is no damage during erection. If SA is kept on
an uneven surface, it is likely to damage the pressure relief diaphragm. Any
damage to this thin & sensitive material while handling & erecting will result
into moisture entry into Surge Arrester, which will lead to its failure.

(iii) Thermal scanning is another simple on-line check often used on SAs to
locate hot spot due to improper/defective terminations/excessive watt loss.

(iv) The specification of SA should include Sealing Test which can be carried out
at manufacturer’s works to ensure proper sealing against ingress of
moisture.

(v) Digital surge counter’s employment in substations could be explored.

Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment 22

 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

4.4 Recommendations for Circuit Breaker:

Dynamic Contact Resistance Measurement (DCRM) test kit is a very

important tool to assess the healthiness of circuit breaker. This test may
be carried out once in two years. Moreover, while formulating the
specification for procurement of CB for new substation, provision for
procurement of Operational Analyzer along with Dynamic Contact
Resistance Measurement (DCRM) test kit should be included for one
substation or a group of nearby substations depending upon the
requirement.
4.5 Recommendations for XLPE Cable:

(i) The cable should be laid in the configuration as approved during design
stage as per manufacturer’s recommendations. If cable is repaired, it
should be restored to its original laying condition.

(ii) The monitoring of healthiness of Sheath Voltage Limiter (SVL) and

monitoring of Partial Discharge (PD) of all straight-through joints &
terminations in addition to hot spot monitoring using Distributed
Temperature Sensor (DTS) is essential.

Report on failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment 23

 File No.CEA-PS-14-97/3/2018-PSETD Division

Minutes of the Meeting of Standing Committee of Experts to investigate

the failure of equipment at 220 kV and above substation (January 2017
to March 2018) on 24th Sept. 2018 in CEA, New Delhi

List of participants is attached in Annexure-I

1. Chief Engineer(PSE&TD) welcomed all the representatives of CPSUs
and State Utilities and various OEMs present and gave background
and purpose of the Committee. He informed that total 79 nos. of
failures has been reported during January 2017 and March 2018 by
PGCIL, DTL, OPTCL, KPTCL, TANTRANSCO, APTRANSCO, BBMB,
MSETCL & KSEB. Out of these, there have been failures of 12 nos. of
transformers, 5 nos. reactors, 4 nos. CB, 28 nos. CT/PT/CVT and 30
nos. SA during this period. He urged all participants to participate
actively and express their views on the failures and suggest measures
to prevent such failures.
2. Director (PSE&TD) requested all the utilities to furnish their failure
reports indiscriminately and not selectively, so that realistic
assessment of failures in the country could be made. The failure report
should be complete in all regards along with test reports, O&M reports
and photographs. He informed that the proforma for reporting of
failure is available on CEA website.
3. Presentations, on the various failures that had occurred between
January 2017 to March 2018 and were reported to CEA (Annexure-II),
were given by PGCIL, DTL, BBMB, KPTCL, OPTCL, TANTRANSCO,
MSETCL, MPTCL and KSEB on their respective equipment failures.
The failure incidents and the subsequent findings were deliberated
upon in the meeting by the experts in the Committee. The problem
areas in the subject matter at hand were brought to the fore and
various helpful suggestions from the participating members were made
to address the prevalent issues that the utilities are facing regarding
the failures of the substation equipment. Based on the deliberations
made in the meeting, the recommendations will be appropriated in the
final report of the Standing Committee.
4. Member Secretary, WRPC, suggested to include 66kV Generators
failures in the purview of the Standing Committee as well, as it
impacts the entire plant. He also said that the state utilities are not
well aware of the Regulations and they also have problems on the
fronts of workmanship and maintenance. He also commented that the
inspection done in state owned substations are not upto the standard.
In this regard, it was observed that the CPSUs are generally following
the standard practices, but some state utilities fall short and needs
updation.
5. Member Secretary, NRPC, suggested the utilities to avoid unnecessary
delay in the reporting in the event of equipment failure and take
necessary measures to communicate the same promptly so that
inspection, if necessary, could be made possible. He further suggested

245
 File No.CEA-PS-14-97/3/2018-PSETD Division

that in case of any equipment failure, photographic and video graphic

documentation shall also be done in addition to the written failure
report, so that the failure incident could be properly analysed by the
Committee. NRPC suggested that Electrical Inspectorate should also
share their findings with CEA in the event of discovering any
abnormalities during their field inspections. Utilities were also advised
to take necessary measures to ensure proper maintenance of their
substations and to adhere to the Regulations/Guidelines provided by
CEA. Care must be taken while placing the cables in the switchyard
and they should be properly laid in the trenches or ducts and should
be properly isolated. He suggested that Standard Operating Procedure
(SOP) for storage of equipment at site may be specified for the utilities.
Director (PSE&TD) suggested that BHEL, being a major OEM, may
provide necessary input for SOP for storage.
6. Chief Engineer (PSE&TD) suggested that spillage of oils from
transformers should be checked regularly, only trained operators
should be appointed and CCTV cameras should be installed at
substations so that in the event of any failure/accident/sabotaging,
complete sequence could be made available to investigator.
7. Chief Engineer (PSPA-II) said that many utilities tend to report failures
of only transformers and reactors, and the failures of other equipment
are not reported. He suggested to practice condition-based
maintenance instead of time-based maintenance. The utilities should
maintain the record of all the relevant test results including the factory
test reports, pre-commissioning test reports and the same should be
available at substations. While determining the health of the
equipment, the trend of the values of the test results should be
analyzed instead of the absolute values alone. He also recommended
use of modern diagnostic tools for tests so that minimum human
interference and inadvertent tampering occurs.
8. OPTCL informed that watt loss test is carried out by them to check
healthiness of Surge Arresters (SA) and if it is found to be more than
150 mW, the arrester is replaced. During discussion on failure of
transformer of OPTCL it was informed that no fire fighting system was
installed for protection of the transformer. It was also noticed by the
committee that since the transformer failed immediately after
replacement of bushing, poor storage condition of bushings may also
be a cause of failure.
9. PGCIL said that proper care should be taken in cases where bushing is
stored for long duration at the site and its condition should be checked
before commissioning. It is not enough to merely have the tan Rδ value
under 0.7%, but it should also be ensured that the increase in tan δ
value of stored bushing from the factory result is not more than 0.1%
which is indicative of moisture ingress. It was suggested that the tan δ
value should be measured at different frequencies, and that in healthy
condition, the value should increase with the increase in frequency. In
case of SAs trend of the values of leakage current should be observed
and if the variation in two subsequent readings, taken six months
apart, is more than 20µA, Insulation Resistance (IR) should be

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 File No.CEA-PS-14-97/3/2018-PSETD Division

conducted to assess the health of SA. BBMB also stated that the rate
of change of tan δ is indicative of the health of SA. WRPC suggested
thermal scanning as a good indicator of the condition of SA and its
connectors.
10.NRPC stated that many substations of various utilities are found
lacking in the areas like fire fighting system, proper storage of
equipment, proper testing before installation, and even the reliability of
the test kits. PGCIL recommended that demo of test kits should be
conducted to ensure its reliability and repeatability of measurement.
11.Regarding transformer failures, BHEL proposed that the utilities may
consider making an assessment of the health of all of its transformers
based on the diagnostic tests and consider overhauling of transformers
wherever deemed necessary. It was also suggested that tertiary
windings should be avoided as far as possible.
12.WRPC stated that after few years when short circuit fault level of the
substation goes up the transformer will be at risk despite proper
testing and maintenance. To which CE(PSPA-II) informed that fault
current limiters or bus splitting should be adopted to take care of
increased fault level.
13.CE (PSETD) suggested that the utilities have every right to repeat any
of the type tests including short circuit test at their own cost and the
bidder may be asked to quote price for the same at the time of bidding.
He said that this will help improve the quality of the product and act
as an additional quality assurance from the manufacturer’s side.
14.PGCIL shared with the Committee that it has over 2400 in-service
transformers and reactors of 220 kV and above level, and has a annual
failure rate of 0.5% for reactors and 0.6% for transformers, which is
well below the international annual rate of failure of 1% -1.5%. PGCIL
informed that they had recently faced problems in the particular make
bushings and had the cases of bursting of bushings. After this, they
carried out DGA & variable frequency tan δ of all the bushings of the
same make in all their stations and many bushings were found faulty.
Variable frequency tan δ test is a very good indicator of moisture
content in bushings. Every year 40-50 bushings in PGCIL substations
are replaced based on variable frequency tan δ test. PGCIL also stated
that if the bushing is of good quality and proper care is taken by the
OEM during the manufacturing process, there shall not be any need of
correction factor for tan δ tests. The faulty bushings are, in general,
replaced by RIP bushings.
15.WRPC recommended to introduce RIP bushings in Make in India
program. He highlighted that even if a RIP bushing will fail, it will not
lead to any fire in the transformer. NRPC said that care should be
taken while taking the oil sample for DGA and standard procedure
should be followed. BHEL informed that as a corrective measure to
address the cases of failures of bushings they have renovated the
entire plant of bushings at Bhopal and assured that proper care is
being taken so that such incidences could be minimised.
16.PGCIL also reported that they were facing problems with some
reactors. After consultation with OEM, they had decided to get some

247
 File No.CEA-PS-14-97/3/2018-PSETD Division

design modification in the windings of the reactors. It was said that the
process of replacement with modified deign reactors is ongoing. The
reactors were reportedly working satisfactorily after the replacement.
NRPC suggested PGCIL to replace the remaining reactors as soon as
possible, so that any untoward incident may be avoided.
17.BBMB suggested faster methods for detection of earth faults in circuit
breakers, which they claimed had successfully prevented many cases
of pole bursting. They also informed about breaker head flashover
problem wherein insufficient gap after opening of the breaker was
observed. This happened while synchronizing or immediately after
desynchronizing and resulted in the bursting of the pole of CB. The
internal chamber of the pole, in such cases, was found to be
carbonised rendering the SF6 in the chamber useless. WRPC
suggested that after 4-5 fault current trippings, full maintenance of
the contacts of CB should be carried out. PGCIL suggested that if the
CB has tripped the rated breaking current three times, the entire
contact mechanism should be replaced. However, if the interrupted
current is lesser, accordingly the permissible increased number of
interruptions before the replacement of contact mechanism, may be
allowed. CE (PSETD) suggested that only Circuit Breaker capable of
breaking higher time constant currents should be used in switchyards
associated with generating plants. BBMB was requested to submit the
detailed failure reports of all the failures in the subject period in their
stations to CEA & NRPC.
18.KPTCL told the Committee that 12 out of 17 cases of failures of SA
were discovered during leakage current measurement. The Committee
decided that these cases will not be treated as failures and as such will
not be included in the report of the Committee.
19.WRPC highlighted that TANTRANSCO does not connect shield wire
between gantry and the dead-end tower leaving the portion
unprotected from lightning. TANTRANSCO confirmed the same. The
committee suggested that if substation is protected from lightning
through shield wire, it should be connected to cover all areas of the
substation including area between dead end tower and gantry.
20.BHEL recommended the use of Controlled Switching Devices (CSD) for
switching of transformers and reactors as it will reduce the stress on
the equipment, especially GTs, thus improving its life. It was suggested
that the operation of fire-fighting system should be linked to SCADA
and the same shall be communicated to the OEM, as it will help in
assessing its condition and performance pattern.
21.The Committee opined that erection & commissioning of all major
equipment should be done by OEM so that problems arising due to
ignorance and lack of attentiveness by inexperienced personnel may be
curtailed.
22.MSETCL said that the connection between bus and transformer at
substations through overhead conductor should be avoided as far as
possible; instead single-core cable should be used for such connection.
23.RRVNL said that the neutral of the transformer should be connected
to the earthing mat through a separate electrode. PGCIL suggested

248
 File No.CEA-PS-14-97/3/2018-PSETD Division

that the neutral of transformers should be connected to earth through

two conductors to avoid any problems of hotspot in the neutral. CE
(PSETD) said that the neutral of 1-ph hot spare transformer should
also be connected to ground to avoid any fault in the event of any
surge current.
24.Based on data & information provided by the utilities and
deliberations held during the meeting a final report incorporating
recommendations made during the meeting shall be prepared and
shall be circulated to all stakeholders.

The meeting ended with a vote of thanks to the Chair.

249
MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS TO
INVESTIGATE THE FAILURE OF 220 KV AND ABOVE VOLTAGE CLASS
SUBSTATION EQUIPMENT HELD ON 09.01.15 IN CEA, NEW DELHI, IN
CONNECTION WITH REPORTED FAILURES FROM APRIL 2014 TO
SEPTEMBER 2014 AT VARIOUS SUBSTATIONS IN THE COUNTRY
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The list of participants is enclosed as Annexure-1.

Chief Engineer (SETD) & Chairman of the subject Standing Committee (Substation)
welcomed the participants and highlighted the importance of timely reporting of failures to the
Committee. He also stated that discussing the failures and sharing of experiences and
maintenance practices of utilities will help in adopting best practices of maintenance and
thereby reducing the failures. The representatives from PGCIL, KPTCL, and APPGCL had
not attended the meeting. A draft report, prepared based on information provided by utilities
between April 2014 and September 2014, was sent by post to concerned utilities prior to
meeting and matter was discussed in detail with representatives of utilities present in the
meeting.

Director (SETD) & Member Secretary of the Standing Committee informed that during above
period 39 nos. equipment failures (16 nos. of LAs, 9 nos. of CTs, 6 nos. CVTs, 5 nos. of CBs,
transformer, wave trap & PT one each) were reported by eight (8) utilities. He also
highlighted that number of utilities do not report the failure of equipment and prime objective
of formation of above committee is getting defeated due to non-participation of utilities and
non-reporting of failures. The failure of 100MVA transformer could not be discussed in detail
due to absence of representative of KPTCL. The committee observed that the transformer was
commissioned after four years of manufacturing and suggested that such inordinate delay in
commissioning should be avoided by utilities as manufacturers generally do not recommend
for keeping transformer without oil for more than three (3) months. The manufacturer’s
recommendation should be followed if delay is more than three (3) months. It was also
observed that most of the utility do not indicate the type of Surge Arrester (SA), which has
failed. Utilities were requested to indicate the type of Surge Arrester (Metal oxide gapless
type / SiC gapped type).

Failures of equipment of BBMB were discussed in detail as follow:

1. BBMB informed that at present in BBMB substations, 66 kV & 132 kV CTs with tan
delta value of 1.5% and 1.1% respectively are allowed to be in service. The Committee
suggested that general practice of 0.7% tanδ limit should be followed.
2. The rate of rise of tan delta should not be more than 0.1% per year. Also the practice
of tanδ measurement should be annual as against the current practice of once in two
years.
3. It was also intimated by BBMB that CVTs are being replaced by PT in BBMB as PTs
are less prone to failure.
4. The Committee suggested that while formulating the specification for procurement of
CB for new substation, provision for procurement of Operational Analyzer along with
Dynamic Contact Resistance Measurement (DCRM) test kit, which are very useful
tool to assess healthiness of CB, should be included for one substation or a group of
nearby substations depending upon the requirement.
44
 5. BBMB informed that it is a general practice to replace the Surge Arrestor of
transformer if 3rd harmonic resistive component of leakage current exceeds 100µA
considering the importance and safety of transformers.
6. BBMB also informed that leakage current monitoring is being done once in two years.
The committee suggested for reducing the periodicity of measurement and the
measurement of 3rd harmonic resistive component of leakage current should be carried
out. If harmonic current is found to be more than 150 µA, measurement of insulation
resistance should also be carried out and for leakage current value exceeding 350 µA,
SA should be replaced.

Representatives of Tamil Nadu Transmission Corporation Ltd., Chhattisgarh State Power

Transmission Corporation Ltd. (CSPTCL), KPCL and Madhya Pradesh Transmission
Corporation Ltd. (MPPTCL) furnished the missing information in draft report in respect of
previously reported failures.

Regarding failures of CBs in Raichur Thermal Power Station, KPCL informed that both CBs,
located near cooling towers of the Thermal Power Plant, had failed due to ash and dust
deposition. KPCL generally carry out hot line water washing to clean the CB housing to
prevent flashover across the insulator housing. However, KPCL has now decided to use Room
Temperature Vulcanizing (RTV) coating over porcelain housing of CB. The members of the
Committee also supported the action taken by KPCL and committee suggested that similar
initiatives should be taken by other utilities for substation equipment installed in pollution
prone areas. On enquiry about the cost, KPCL informed that about Rs 2.35 lakhs would be
required for RTV coating of one CB (i.e 3 poles).

MPPTCL submitted additional reports of failures of equipment occurred during last three
years in Sabalgarh sub-station. MPPTCL informed that all failed CTs were of SCT make. It
was reported that Tan delta value of failed CTs as well CTs which are in service are found to
be quite high. The Committee suggested that these equipment need to be replaced at the
earliest.

After detail discussion, the committee felt to highlight some of the important maintenance
practices for various equipment as indicated below.

CVT
• Only top and middle stacks are tested for tan delta.
• Capacitance variation of -5% to +5% of pre-commissioning value is allowed.
• Secondary voltage measurement : half yearly
• If secondary voltage changes then measurement of capacitance should be done. CVT
needs to be replaced for variation in secondary voltage by more than 2.0 Volts.

CT
• Pre-commissioning test: tan delta, Insulation Resistance
• After one month of charging and within one year: DGA
• Tan delta test is repeated every year.
• For higher failure rate of CTs of a particular make, DGA is conducted.

45
PT

• Tan delta, DGA: every year

• Tan delta on PT is carried out in GST mode after removing jumper.

CB

• DCRM - once in two(2) years.

• CB operating timings – Once in a year
• Tan delta of grading capacitors should be < 0.007
[The rate of rise of tan delta should not be more than 0.001 per year]
• The capacitance of grading capacitors should be within +/- 5% of rated value / pre-
commissioning test value

Oil Impregnated Paper (OIP) Bushing

• Bushing oil DGA and Capacitance & Tandelta at variable frequency & temperature
should be carried out for health assessment which has proved to be very effective in
detecting the deteriorated condition of many in-service bushings.

The Committee observed that maximum number of SA failure was reported during this six
month period and most of the SAs were of CGL make. Representatives of various utilities
wanted that the matter should be brought to the notice of M/s CGL and requested to take up
the matter with M/s CGL and to invite M/s CGL for discussion in order to reduce the failure
rate of such vital equipment in substation.

Director (SETD) enquired about fire fighting arrangements in the switchyard and for
transformer / reactors. Some of the utilities did not have any fire fighting arrangement except
portable fire extinguishers.

Fire fighting provision should be made available in line with the requirement of Central
Electricity Authority (Technical Standards for Construction of Electrical Plants and Electric
Lines) Regulations, 2010. Various diagnostic tools as suggested in above Regulations should
be used regularly for periodic maintenance / Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) of
substation equipment and every utility should adopt best practices for maintenance of
equipment in the substation / switchyard. CBIP Manual on Substation Equipment
Maintenance (Publication no. 294), which provides valuable guidance for maintenance of
various equipment / material, may also be referred. Utilities should follow CBM practice and
periodicity of maintenance need to be modified from time to time depending on condition of
equipment and trend analysis.

The meeting ended with vote of thanks to the Chair.

46
MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS
TO INVESTIGATE THE FAILURE OF 220 KV AND ABOVE VOLTAGE
CLASS SUBSTATION EQUIPMENT HELD ON 26.06.14 IN CEA, NEW
DELHI, IN CONNECTION WITH REPORTED FAILURES FROM
OCTOBER 2013 TO MARCH 2014 AT VARIOUS SUBSTATIONS IN THE
COUNTRY
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The list of participants is enclosed as Annexure-1.

In the absence of Chief Engineer-I/c (SETD) due to health reasons, Director

(Substation) and Member Secretary of the subject Standing Committee welcomed the
participants. No representative from APTRANSCO & MSETCL attended the meeting.
A draft report based on information provided by utilities between October 2013 and
March 2014 was sent by post to concerned utilities prior to meeting. This draft report
was discussed in the meeting and based on the inputs received in the meeting the same
has been finalized.

Representative of Tamil Nadu Transmission Corporation Ltd. furnished missing

information in draft report in respect of previously reported failures and reported
some additional failures which were not reported earlier.

Representative of Electricity Department, Dadra & Nagar Haveli, furnished reports of

routine tests conducted before and after failure of 100 MVA, 220/66 kV transformer.

Representative of KSEB furnished missing information in draft report in respect of

previously reported failures. Following points were highlighted during deliberation of
KSEB representative with the Committee:

1. KSEB stated that PTs in its substations cannot be tested as no test tap has been
provided.
2. PGCIL pointed out that Dynamic Contact Resistance Measurement (DCRM)
is a very important tool to gauge healthiness of circuit breaker and failures of
breaker due to mis-alignment of contacts could easily be avoided by use of
DCRM once in two years. KSEB submitted that they are slowly adopting this
practice of using DCRM in its substations.
3. Measurement of wattloss is not reliable for testing of LA. 3rd harmonic current
measurement is very good method for assessing healthiness of LA and it could
be done on-line. If 3rd harmonic current is more than 150 µA then Insulation
Resistance (IR) value test should also be conducted and if current exceeds 350
µA then LA should be removed from service. Infrared Scanning technique is
also helpful and KSEB stated that they are planning to purchase the same.
4. While measuring tan delta of transformer bushing, apart from absolute value,
rate of rise of tan delta should also be monitored and frequency of
measurement should be increased in case rate of rise is more than 0.1% per
year. Representative of KSEB stated that opening test tap of bushings of
BHEL transformers installed in their substations is not easy and measurement
of tan delta in these transformers is very difficult. However, it is learnt that
BHEL has modified their design to mitigate this problem. For keeping a
transformer idle for a long time the manufacturer needs to be consulted.
47
Representatives of BBMB furnished missing information in the draft report.
Following are the gist of discussion:

1. BBMB practice is to measure leakage current of LA once every two years.

The Committee was of the view that leakage current should be measured twice
a year preferably before and after monsoon which is PGCIL practice also. As
per PGCIL’s experience more than 90% LA failures could be avoided by
regularly measuring leakage current.
2. BBMB representative stated that LA is replaced in their substations if 3rd
harmonic current exceeds 350 µA.
3. The committee was of the view that proper analysis and interpretation of test
results is very important to take suitable action on the future of equipment.
4. It was felt that transformers should be tested for DGA and SFRA after every
through fault case as the fault fed by transformer during through faults may
have effect on its winding structure.
5. Sometimes circuit breakers fail because of dielectric failure due to capacitive
switching. The breakers should be type tested for capacitive switching.

Representatives of Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. (KPCL) furnished missing

information in the draft report. Failures of equipment in the substations of KPCL and
Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Ltd. (KPTCL) were discussed in the
meeting. KPTCL informed that 300 VA burden is specified for PT in their substations,
which in the Committee’s view is on higher side and it may be brought down to 50
VA maximum. Regarding LA failures, KPTCL informed that they don’t have 3rd
harmonic current measurement kit, however, they are in process of procuring these
kits.

Representative of Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd. (RRVPNL) narrated

the incident which led to the failure of 100 MVA, 220/132 kV transformer at Nokha
S/s, Rajasthan, and the case was discussed in the meeting. He was requested to furnish
information regarding failure of 220 kV CVT in MIA S/s, ALwar.

Representative of PGCIL shared with participants their prevalent practices for

following equipment:

CVT
• Only top and middle stacks are tested for tan delta.
• Capacitance variation of -5% to 10% is allowed.
• Secondary voltage measurement : half yearly
• If secondary voltage changes then measurement of capacitance should be done.

CT
• Pre-commissioning test: tan delta, Insulation Resistance
• After one month of charging and within one year: DGA
• Tan delta test is repeated every year.
• For higher failure rate of CTs of a particular make, DGA is conducted.

48
PT

• Tan delta, DGA: every year

• Tan delta on PT is carried out in GST mode after removing jumper.

CB

• DCRM once in 2 years.

Bushing

• Tan delta one a year, in GST mode (jumper need not be removed)
• DGA should be conducted if failure rate of a particular make is more.

PGCIL informed that, of late they had realised the importance of keeping only
3 nos. CTs per diameter in one and half breaker scheme of 400 kV substations as
against conventionally employed 4 CTs. To this effect they are in the process of
modifying their 400 kV substations. This will also help in reducing number of CT
failures.

Director (SETD) remarked that that various diagnostic tools as suggested in

Central Electricity Authority (Technical Standards for Construction of Electrical
Plants and Electric Lines) Regulations, 2010, should be used regularly for periodic
maintenance and condition based maintenance of substation equipment. The
Committee is also of the view that every utility should make a list of tests needed to
be performed for periodic maintenance of each equipment alongwith defined
periodicity. For comprehensive details CBIP Manual on Substation Equipment
Maintenance (Publication no. 294) may also be referred. The utility representatives
were also requested to submit their failure reports in the revised format, which shall
be uploaded on CEA’s website.

The Member Secretary of the Committee thanked all participants.

49
MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS
TO INVESTIGATE THE FAILURE OF 220 KV AND ABOVE VOLTAGE
CLASS SUBSTATION EQUIPMENT HELD ON 26.11.13 IN CEA, NEW
DELHI, IN CONNECTION WITH REPORTED FAILURES FROM APRIL
2013 TO SEPTEMBER 2013 AT VARIOUS SUBSTATIONS IN THE
COUNTRY
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The list of participants is enclosed as Annexure-1.

Chief Engineer-I/C (SETD), and Chairman of the Standing Committee of Experts to

investigate the failure of 220 kV and above voltage class substation equipment,
welcomed the participants. No representative from TANTRANSCO, APGENCO &
PGCIL attended the meeting.

Failure of 315 MVA, 400/220/33 kV Power Transformer at Jodhpur S/s of

RVPNL, Rajasthan on 20.05.13:

Representatives of RRVPNL informed that the power transformer was damaged with
heavy sound and fire was seen all around. It was observed by staff of RRVPNL that
HV bushing (B-phase) fell down on emulsifier system with explosion and changed the
direction of emulsifier nozzles. Differential trip isolated the transformer from the
power system. This transformer did not have any non return conservator valve due to
which oil came out of damaged bushings and caught fire. Fire was external and it
damaged the tank. All bushings, nearby 400 kV side LAs, clamps & connectors were
also damaged. After fault, LV tests were performed on the transformer and results
were found to be generally in order indicating that no fault took place inside the
transformer. Capacitance and Tan delta tests were performed on the transformer in
July 2012 and results were same as obtained in pre-commissioning test. However,
results were near the limit recommended in standards. Due to non-availability of shut
down, these tests could not be repeated later on. Adjacent transformer narrowly
escaped damage. Representative of BHEL, manufacturer of the transformer, also
inspected the damaged transformer and as per their view transformer is beyond repair.
RRVPNL is of the view that since LV results are in order indicating that the core-
winding structure is intact, transformer can be repaired. It was informed by RRVPNL
that the utility in future plans to procure both water emulsifier system and Nitrogen
based fire prevention system for all new transformers, which is a good move and was
appreciated by the Committee. RRVPNL felt that the oil sump should be 30 meter
away from the transformer with valve near the sump. Further, one bay separation
between transformers was considered as a must for future.

Failure of following equipment at various substations of Bhakra Beas

Management Board (BBMB):

1. B-phase & Y-phase, 220 kV Current Transformer (CT) of Badshahpur-I feeder

at 220 kV Samaypur substation on 21.05.13
2. B-phase, 220 kV Potential Transformer (PT) of Jamalpur-II feeder at 220 kV
Jalandhar substation on 17.06.13
3. R-phase 220 kV Capacitor Voltage Transformer (CVT) of Narela-III feeder at
400 kV Panipat substation on 01.07.13
27
 4. Y-phase, 198 kV Lightning Arrester (LA) of 220 kV Panipat-Kurukshetra
feeder at 400 kV Panipat substation on 08.08.13
5. R-phase, 220 kV Current Transformer (CT) of bus sectionalizer at 220 kV
Samaypur substation on 16.09.13

Representatives of BBMB were requested to provide missing information in the draft

report at the earliest. BBMB informed that tan delta was performed in all the
substations of BBMB in 2011. It was also informed that IR measurement and tan delta
test kits are available with BBMB. However, it is not a common practice in BBMB to
conduct tan delta and other tests regularly on equipment other than transformer apart
from tightening of connections and cleaning etc. The Committee recommended that
BBMB should conduct regular maintenance tests on all substation equipment. The
Committee felt that B-phase CT on Badshahpur-I feeder at 220 kV Samaypur
substation could have deteriorated during approximately five years’ storage, and the
manufacturer should invariably be consulted in regard to storage condition and pre-
commissioning tests.

Utilities reported that they are facing problem of shortage of staff due to which it
becomes very difficult to carry out maintenance of substation equipment regularly.

The Committee was of the view that various diagnostic tools as suggested in
Central Electricity Authority (Technical Standards for Construction of Electrical
Plants and Electric Lines) Regulations, 2010, should be used regularly for periodic
maintenance and condition based maintenance of substation equipment. The
Committee is also of the view that every utility should make a list of tests needed to
be performed for periodic maintenance of each equipment alongwith defined
periodicity. For comprehensive details CBIP Manual on Substation Equipment
Maintenance may also be referred. All the equipment which have served for 25 years
and more should be tested more frequently and utility should be prepared for
replacement of the equipment if trend of deteriorating results is observed. Chairman
of the Committee advised that when an equipment fails, original equipment
manufacturer (OEM) should also be consulted. CPRI suggested that before procuring
the instrument transformers utilities should make sure that the same have been
subjected to type tests such as short circuit test and temperature rise test. CPRI also
recommended periodic oil testing in case of CT/PT/CVT, and utilizing the services of
mobile testing lab of CPRI.

The Chairman of the Committee thanked all participants.

28
MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS
TO INVESTIGATE THE FAILURE OF 220 KV AND ABOVE VOLTAGE
CLASS SUBSTATION EQUIPMENT HELD ON 04.11.15 IN CEA, NEW
DELHI, IN CONNECTION WITH REPORTED FAILURES FROM OCTOBER
2014 TO AUGUST 2015 AT VARIOUS SUBSTATIONS IN THE COUNTRY
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The list of participants is enclosed as Annexure-1.

Chief Engineer (PSETD) & Chairman of the subject Standing Committee (Substation)
welcomed the participants. He stated that discussing the failures and sharing of
experiences and maintenance practices of utilities will help in adopting best practices
of maintenance and thereby reducing the failures. The Chairman informed that during
above period 52 nos. equipment failures (4 nos. of Interconnecting Transformers, 2
nos. of Generator Transformers, 3 nos. of cable, 8 nos. of SAs, 19 nos. of CTs, 9 nos.
CVTs, 6 nos. of CBs, one no of PT) were reported by fourteen (14) utilities. He also
highlighted that number of utilities do not report the failure of equipment and prime
objective of formation of above committee gets defeated due to non-participation of
utilities and non-reporting of failures. The representatives from PGCIL, PPCL (Pragati
Power Corporation Limited), GETCO and NPCIL did not attend the meeting.

A draft report, prepared based on information provided by utilities between October

2014 and August 2015, was uploaded on the CEA’s website prior to the meeting. The
failure of various substation equipments and their important maintenance practices
were discussed in detail in the meeting. Summary of discussion is as follows:

1. During deliberation on transformer failure in KPTCL installation, KPTCL

informed that it is their practice to provide tertiary winding with 100 MVA
transformers and bringing out all three terminals of tertiary outside the tanks to
carry out various tests. The Committee suggested that tertiary winding may be
avoided for 3 phase power transformers rated less than 160 MVA as it increases
the probability of failure of the transformer. However, tertiary winding may be
provided for single phase power transformers. Tertiary terminals of transformer
prone to short circuiting by external element such as bird or animal may be
insulated by insulating sleeves. The Committee also suggested SFRA test should
be carried at factory as well as at site before commissioning of transformers and
test results should be reference signature for future use. The capacitance and tan
delta measurement of transformer bushing at variable frequency and DGA of
bushing oil should be carried out for health assessment of bushings as this has been
proved to be very effective in assessing the condition of in-service bushings.

2. There were two straight through joint failures and one termination failure in 400
kV XLPE cable system at Bamnauli substation of DTL. Director (Substation) and
Member Secretary stated that for the first time EHV cable failures have been
included in the report so that other utilities are also benefited from the discussion.
He informed that CEA team had visited the site of failure to assess the cause of
failure and it was observed that DTS was not properly installed for monitoring hot
spot temperature along the route of cable. It was concluded that partial discharge at
joint location could be one of the reasons of failure of the cable. The GM, DTL
discussed about failure of XLPE cable and also informed that laying of cable is
being modified as recommended by M/s LS Cables, the supplier of cable system.
The snaking of cable is being done to reduce the mechanical stress at joints during
faults in the system.
3. Regarding CT failures, the Committee recommended that in addition to tan delta
and Insulation Resistance tests, DGA of tank oil of CT should also be monitored
wherever feasible. The committee also suggested ensuring the health of gaskets
and bellows periodically for CTs. Thermo vision scanning of CTs, CVTs and PTs
should also be carried out regularly as a good maintenance practice. Following
tables can be referred while measuring tan δ and capacitance of CVTs:

δ
Change in Tanδ Monitoring Frequency

Upto +0.002 Three yearly

+0.002 to +0.003 Yearly

Above +0.003 Alarming

Change in Capacitance Monitoring Frequency

upto ±2% Three yearly

±2% to ±3% Yearly

Above ±6% Alarming

The change in secondary voltage of CVTs is a very good indicator of the

condition/health of CVTs. Following table may be referred for monitoring of
secondary voltage:

Drift in secondary Voltage Condition Monitoring Frequency

(to be measured by 0.2 / 0.5
class multimeter)

Upto ± 0.5 volts Healthy Six monthly

± 0.5 to ±0.8 volts To be monitored 03monthly
±0.8 to ±1.2 volts Close monitoring Monthly
±1.2 to ±2.0 volts Close monitoring 15 days
above +2.0 volts Alarming replacement
-0.8 to -4.0 volts Close monitoring 15 days
less than -4.0 volts Alarming replacement

Following table can be referred while measuring tan δ of CTs:

δ
Value of Tanδ Monitoring Frequency

Upto 0.007 (annual [email protected]) Yearly

0.007 to 0.011 Half Yearly

Above 0.011 Replace the CT

4. Monitoring of Leakage Current and IR value are essential for accessing the
healthiness of Surge Arrestors (SAs). Measurement of the 3rd harmonic resistive
component of leakage current is a very good method for assessing healthiness of
SA which can be done on-line. If 3rd harmonic component of resistive current is
more than 150 µA then Insulation Resistance (IR) value test should also be
conducted and if current exceeds 350 µA then LA should be removed from service
and replaced. The measurement of leakage current before and after the monsoon
should be carried out so as to ascertain the effect of moisture. The specification of
SA should include Sealing Test of SA which can be carried out at manufacturer’s
works to ensure proper sealing against ingress of moisture.
5. The Committee suggested that while formulating the specification for procurement
of CB for new substation, provision should be made for procurement of
Operational Analyzer along with Dynamic Contact Resistance Measurement
(DCRM) test kit, which are useful tools to assess healthiness of CB. These
diagnostic tools can also serve/cater to the requirement of nearby substations.

6. The Chairman stated that OLTC is one of the causes of failure of transformer.
Utility should carry out system studies and the possibility of removal of OLTC
from power transformers of voltage rating 400 kV and above may be explored in
consultation with respective Regional Power Committee (RPC). The removal of
OLTC will simplify the design and manufacturing of transformers.

7. It was recommended that oil sampling for transformer oil testing should be done as
per relevant IS/IEC. The oil sample should be tested in NABL accredited
laboratory on calibrated equipment. Apart from monitoring absolute values of key
parameters, trend of change in key values should also be closely monitored. In case
of suspicious test results, second sample should also be got tested for eliminating
element of doubt.

8. The Committee recommended that utilities should make it a practice to carry out
various tests on major electrical equipment at sites one or two months before the
expiry of warranty period of respective equipment.

9. The Chairman stated that shortage of operation and maintenance personnel and
lack of proper training are matter of concern. Utilities should look into such issues
with seriousness.

It was decided that in the next meeting a representative from PGCIL/NTPC/equipment

manufacturer/supplier of diagnostic tools will be invited to share their experience and
highlight about the use of various modern diagnostic tools in monitoring the
healthiness of various substation equipments.

The meeting ended with vote of thanks to the Chair.

 Annexure - I
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Central Electricity Authority, New Delhi

1. Shri S.K.Ray Mohapatra, Chief Engineer, PSETD .........in the Chair

2. Shri Y.K.Swarnkar, Director, PSETD
3. Shri Faraz, Assistant Director, PSETD
4. Ms. Noopur Chaudhary, Assistant Director, PSETD
5. Ms. Bhaavya Pandey, Assistant Director, PSETD

Central Power Research Institute

1. B.M. Mehra, Joint Director

Bhakra Beas Management Board

1. Shri Arun Kumar, Director

2. Shri Rakesh Singla, Addl. SE

TANTRANSCO

1. Shri S.Rajendiran, S.E.

Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. (KPCL)

1. Shri H.R. Ramesh, S.E. (Electrical)

Kerala State Electricity Board

1. Shri Jayarajan C.N., Executive Engineer

Madhya Pradesh Power Transmission Corporation Ltd.

1. Shri Sanjay Nigdikar, E.E. (Testing)

Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Ltd.

1. Shri C. Venkateswarlu, D.E. (O&M), Nellore

2. Shri G. Sree Rama Kumar, D.E. (O&M), Kurnool
3. Shri S. Sira Rama Krishna, D.E.

Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Ltd.

1. Shri S.S. Mithare, E.E.

2. Shri B.V. Girish, E.E.

Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd.

1. Shri Suresh Kumar, C.E.

Delhi Transmission Corporation Ltd.

1. Shri Harjiwan Vyas, E.D. (T)

2. Shri R.S. Meena, Dy. GM (T)

Knowledge Cluster

1. Shri Jagdish Sandhanshir, Director

 Report on investigation of failure of 315 MVA Auto transformer at 400 kV Bawana
Substation of Delhi Transco Ltd.(DTL)

1.0 Introduction:
1.1 DTL vide letter No. F.DTL/206/F.06/2015-16/Mgr(Bawana)/353 dated 08.03.2016
requested CEA to investigate the cause of failure of 315 MVA, 400/220/33 kV Auto
transformer (failed on 8th March 2016 at 1201 hrs) in Bawana sub-station of DTL.

1.2 A team of officers from PSE&TD Division of CEA [Sh. Y.K.Swarnkar,

Director(Substation); Sh. Faraz, Assistant Director; and Ms. Bhaavya Pandey,
Assistant Director] along with officers of DTL visited the site of failure on 9th
March 2016. The details of visit are as under.

2.0 About Substation:

2.1 The 400/220/66 kV substation of DTL at Bawana has 6 Nos. of 315 MVA, 400/220
kV auto transformers and one no. 100 MVA, 220/66 kV power transformer. There
are 6 Nos. line bays at 400 kV level (Tikrikalan-I&II, Abdullapur, Dipalpur, and
Mandola-I&II) and 8 Nos. line bays & provision for 4 Nos. future bays at 220 kV
level. Bawana S/s is connected at 400 kV level to adjacent switchyard of Bawana
Power Plant of Pragati Power Corporation Ltd.

3.0 Sequence of Events:

3.1 On 08.03.16, at 1201 hrs., EMCO make 315 MVA auto transformer (ICT-4) tripped
with heavy jerk and sound with following facia/relay indications and caught fire:

a. Differential protection 87 T1
b. Differential 3-ph trip
c. Differential R-ph trip
d. Differential Y-ph trip
e. Differential B-ph trip
f. WTI/PRV trip
g. Overcurrent and earth fault Protection
h. 64 T2 REF protection
i. REF trip
j. Buchholz trip
k. OLTC Buchholz Y-ph trip

3.2 After hearing the sound, staff present at substation rushed to the switchyard and
found 220 kV bushing of Y & B-phase of ICT-4 under fire. Nitrogen Injection Fire
Protection System and High Velocity Water Spray System operated but fire could
not be controlled. Fire tenders from nearby Bawana Power Plant of PPCL rushed to
the site and quenched the fire.

3.3 Brief details of the failed transformer are as follows:

1
 Capacity 315 MVA
Voltage HV:400 kV
MV:220 kV
LV: 33 kV (Tertiary-unloaded)
Phase 3 phase
S. No. HT/1798/13000
Make EMCO Ltd.
Type of Cooling ONAN/ONAF/OFAF
Vector group YNa0d11
Insulation level 1300(HV)/950(MV)/250(LV)/95 (N) kVp
Year of manufacturing 2009
Year of commissioning 2010
Impedance (%) 11.88% (NT)
Tap range -10% to +10% in steps of 1.25% each

4.0 Observations:

4.1 Prior to fault, load on transformer was 121 MW. The transformer was operating on
normal tap 9B at the time of failure. OLTC has not been operated since
commissioning.

4.2 During physical inspection of the failed transformer at site, it was observed that MV
Bushings of Y & B-phase had completely damaged due to fire, burnt insulation
paper and connecting rods of bushings were visible, ceramic housing was found
scattered around transformer and flanges had damaged (Exhibits-I & II).

Exhibit-I

2
 Exhibit-II Exhibit-III

4.3 MV bushing of R-phase and tertiary bushings were also found damaged (Exhibit-III
& IV). Since the direction of wind was away from HV bushings, not much damage
to HV bushings was observed, however some petticoats of bushings had chipped.

Exhibit-IV

4.4 Transformer tank was found bulged at MV side and it had cracked at a number of
places (Exhibits-V & VI).

3
 Exhibit-V Exhibit-VI

4.5 220 kV Surge Arresters had completely damaged due to heat (Exhibit-VII), surge
counters had melted and ZnO blocks & pieces of arrester housing were scattered on
the ground (Exhibit-VIII).

Exhibit-VII Exhibit-VIII

4.6 220 kV Bus Post Insulators, aluminium pipes, and disc insulators of jack bus on MV
side were also burnt due to fire (Exhibits-IX & X).

4
 Exhibit-IX Exhibit-X

4.7 One of the tertiary bushings was removed in front of the CEA team and tank was
inspected through that opening. No visible damage to tertiary terminals was
observed.

4.8 Tertiary of transformer is unloaded. All three terminals of tertiary winding have
been brought outside the tank and terminals were not insulated.

4.9 The event logger data indicates that the fault current level was 44.827 kA. 400 kV
side main breaker and tie breaker had opened within 53 ms and 57 ms respectively
of operation of differential relay.

4.10 The event logger data also indicates operation of Differential relay and
PRV/Buchholz which might have led to operation of Nitrogen Injection Fire
Protection System.

4.11 It was informed by DTL representative that High Velocity Water Spray (HVWS)
System had operated, however, it could not quench the fire of bushings. It appears
that water mist from water spray system could not provide sufficient cooling effect
around transformer tank & bushings due to wind and thus HVWS system was not
able to extinguish fire.

4.12 It was informed by DTL that surge counter of 220 kV R-phase surge arrester was
not functional and it was bypassed through a cable.
5
4.13 Common earthing pit was provided for all three SAs (R,Y&B phases) on 220 kV
side. Earthing electrode was not visible in any of the earth pits for transformer
neutral and SAs on 400 kV & 220 kV side.

4.14 It was observed that the high resistive gravels spread over the earthmat in the
switchyard area was covered with grasses in many areas of the switchyard defeating
the very purpose of spreading of gravels.

Exhibit-X
5.0 O &M History of failed transformer:

No major overhaul has been carried out on the transformer since its commissioning.
Capacitance & tan delta measurement and DGA of oil was carried out in February
2016 and various LV tests (magnetic balance, magnetising current measurement, ratio
test, vector group measurement, winding resistance measurement, PI measurement
etc.) and testing of oil parameters were carried out in July 2010 and no abnormality
was observed.

6.0 Probable cause of failure:

6.1 The bushings were dislocated from its original position and damage to the transformer
due to fire was so severe that it was not possible to carry out any test on failed
transformer.

6.2 Operation of Differential relay along with operation of Buchholz, OSR (OLTC
Buchholz) & PRV relays indicates fault inside the transformer. Operation of REF
indicates that fault involves ground. The flow of heavy fault current in windings might
have led to rise in winding temperature and operation of WTI Trip.

6
6.3 High energy arcing due to fault inside the transformer tank might have led to sudden
pressure rise in tank and tripping of Buchholz & PRV. PRV being a slow operating
device might not have been able to bring down the gas pressure inside the tank to safe
value and high rate of rise of gas pressure might have resulted in cracks at weak areas
of the transformer tank.

6.4 It was informed by DTL staff that at first fire was noticed on Y-phase MV bushing
only and later on it spread to other accessories and equipment. It is possible that
damage to insulation of Y-phase MV winding might have taken place. This is also
supported by event logger data showing 44 kA fault current in Y-phase. The detailed
investigation, after opening of tank, will provide the extent of damage, type of
failure(s) and other valuable information.

6.5 Buchholz relay (OSR) of OLTC of Y & B-phase had operated indicating oil surge in
respective OLTCs which might be due to fault in regulating (tap) windings.

7.0 General Remarks and Recommendations:

7.1 The practice of Condition Based Monitoring with the use of various modern
diagnostic tools as suggested in Central Electricity Authority (Technical Standards for
Construction of Electrical Plants and Electric Lines) Regulations, 2010, is
recommended.

7.2 The frequency/periodicity of measurement should be changed depending on

condition/health of transformer in operation.

7.3 In addition to PRV which operates when static pressure inside the transformer tank
crosses a pre-set pressure limit, use of Fast Depressurization System which works on
first dynamic peak of pressure and is very fast should be explored for future orders of
transformers.

7.4 Other than transformer banks formed out of single phase units and 5- limbed 3-ph
units, the tertiary winding may be avoided in-line with above mentioned CEA’s
Regulations as it increases the probability of failure of the transformer. Tertiary
winding terminals taken out of the tank of transformer should be kept insulated to
avoid short circuiting between terminals or terminal to ground.

7.5 Separate earthing pits should be used for earthing of individual Surge Arresters.

7.6 Switchyard area should be properly maintained to prevent growth of grass so that
benefit of spreading of the gravel is realised and safety of personnel is not
compromised.

7.7 DR & event logger information may be used for co-relating the sequence of events
and operation of protection relays of transformer.

7.8 After opening of the transformer tank, detail inspection of the transformer is required
to be carried out by OEM/ expert of repairing agency which may not be possible at
site. The feedback/ learnings from the investigation should be used for planning future
7
course of action. The detailed findings of the failed transformer may be provided to
CEA after completion of thorough internal inspection of the failed transformer.

The failure of the ICT-4 shall be discussed in the meeting of the Standing Committee
of Experts to Investigate the causes of failure of 220 kV & above substation
equipment and final report shall be submitted thereafter.

8
 REPORT ON INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF 100 MVA, 220/66-33/11 KV
POWER TRANSFORMER AT 220KV GEETA COLONY SUBSTATION OF DELHI
TRANSCO LTD. (DTL)

1.0 Introduction:
1.1 DTL vide letter No. F.DTL/206/2015-16/Mgr(T)O&M-E-2/22 dated 04.02.2016
requested CEA to investigate the cause of failure of 100 MVA, 220/66-33/11 kV
Power transformer (failed on 02.02.16 at 1326 hrs) in Geeta Colony sub-station of
DTL.
1.2 A team of officers from PSE&TD Division of CEA [Sh. Y.K.Swarnkar,
Director(Substation); Sh. Faraz, Assistant Director; and Ms. Bhaavya Pandey,
Assistant Director] alongwith officers of DTL visited the site of failure on 05.02.16.
The details of visit are as under.

2.0 Background:
2.1 One 220 kV double circuit line from Patparganj S/s and one 220 kV double circuit
line from South of Wazirabad S/s of DTL are terminating in Geeta Colony
substation of DTL. This substation feeds power at 33 kV to Geeta colony-l, Geeta
colony-ll, Kanti Nagar-l, Kanti Nagar-ll, Kailash Nagar-l, Kailash Nagar-ll and
Shakarpur feeders. Two Nos. of 100 MVA, 220/66-33/11 kV power transformers are
in operation on 220 kV Geeta Colony substation. Both transformers are of BHEL
make and are operating in parallel.
2.2 BHEL make 100 MVA, 220/66-33/11 kV power transformer with serial no.
2015821 failed during operation on 02.02.16 at 1326 hrs.
2.3 Brief details of the failed transformer are as follows:

Capacity 100 MVA

Voltage HV: 220 kV
MV: 66-33 kV (33kV tap was in use)
LV: 11 kV (Tertiary-unloaded)

Phase 3 phase
S. No. 2015821
Make BHEL
Type of Cooling ONAN/ONAF/OFAF
Vector group YNyn0d11
Insulation level 1050(HV)/325(MV)/170(LV)/95 (N) kVp
Year of manufacturing 2004
Year of commissioning 2005 (31st August)
Impedance (%) 11.72% (HV-MV) maximum tap
15.21% (HV-MV) normal tap
21.83% (HV-MV) minimum tap
Tap range -15% to +5% in steps of 1.25% each
1
3.0 Observations:

3.1 Prior to fault, load on transformer was 23 MW. Maximum loading on transformer
was 32 MW on the day of fault (2nd February). Transformer was not loaded even up
to 50% of its capacity for the last many days. The transformer was operating on tap
5 (Normal Tap is Tap 3) at the time of failure.
3.2 Tertiary of transformer is unloaded. All three terminals of tertiary winding have
been brought outside the tank and terminals were not insulated.
3.3 During physical inspection of the failed transformer at site, it was observed that
there was minor dislocation of all three HV bushings from their turrets (Exhibit-I),
MV bushing flanges of Y & B phases had cracked, LV bushing of B phase had
punctured (Exhibit-II) and transformer tank had cracked at a number of places
(Exhibits -III&IV), although there was no visible sign of bulging of the tank.

Exhibit-I Exhibit-II

2
 Exhibit-III Exhibit-IV

3.4 There was no damage to nearby equipment/ material of the substation.

3.5 Transformer was checked for internal damage through inspection window. Visible
damage was observed on Y-phase winding (Exhibits- V&VI). Damage on other
windings was not visible through inspection window. The extent of damage inside
the transformer would be assessed only after opening of tank.

Exhibit-V Exhibit-VI

3.6 As per information provided by DTL the transformer had tripped on Differential
relay, Buchholz relay, OSR and PRV.
3.7 The event logger data indicates that the contribution of fault current from 220 kV
side was 17.266 kA. 220 kV and 33 kV side breaker had opened within 69 ms of
operation of differential relay.
3.8 There is no provision for fire protection of the transformers in the substation.
3.9 Time stamping of the relays/event logger/disturbance recorder at the substation was
not synchronised to the Indian Standard Time.

3
4.0 O &M History of failed transformer:

It was informed by DTL that since 2011, Buchholz relay of the transformer had
operated in number of occasions. Most of the times it was found that the winding
resistance values were on higher side. During inspection by DTL/BHEL, most of the
times it was found that either winding lead connections were loose or core-yoke was
found shorted with transformer tank. In last 6 years, MV side bushings have been
replaced number of times when tan delta values were found to be alarming.

5.0 Analysis of cause of failure:

5.1 Following tests were conducted on the transformer post failure:

 Magnetic balance test

 Magnetizing current
 Tan δ test of HV, MV and LV windings
 Sweep Frequency Response Analysis (SFRA)
 DGA
 Winding resistance measurement test

5.2 Magnetizing current in Y-phase was found to be 1.06 A compared to 3.6 mA in R-

ph and 3.5 mA in B-ph which is very high. Also, very low voltage (0.506 V) was
observed in Y-ph in magnetic balance test when 231 V was applied on R-phase
which indicates problem in Y-phase winding. DGA of oil indicated high
concentration of Hydrogen (H2-2064ppm)), Ethylene (C2H4-271 ppm), Methane
(CH4-148 ppm), Acetylene (C2H2-398.8). Total Dissolved Combustible Gases
(TDCG) was 3064 which is higher than normal value. These high concentration of
acetylene gas could be due to high energy arcing inside the tank. Significant
variation was observed while comparing the pre and post fault signatures/ traces of
SFRA tests carried out on transformer. The test result indicates problem in core coil
assembly.
5.3 Operation of Differential, Buchholz, OSR & PRV relays indicates internal fault of
the transformer. The internal winding insulation failure might have led to inter turn
winding insulation failure, which is also supported by the test results and
preliminary internal inspection. The fault is most likely in Y- ph of winding. The
detailed investigation after opening of tank will provide the extent of damage, type
of failure(s) and other valuable information.
5.4 High energy arcing inside the transformer tank might have led to sudden pressure
rise and tripping of oil surge relay & PRV. Rate of rise of gas pressure might be very
high (before operation of PRV), which might have resulted in cracks at weak areas
of the transformer tank.

6.0 General Remarks and Recommendations:

6.1 The practice of Condition Based Monitoring with the use of various modern
diagnostic tools as suggested in Central Electricity Authority (Technical Standards
for Construction of Electrical Plants and Electric Lines) Regulations, 2010, is
recommended.
4
6.2 The frequency/periodicity of measurement should be changed depending on
condition/health of transformer in operation.
6.3 Fire protection system for transformers should be installed as per Central Electricity
Authority (Technical Standards for Construction of Electrical Plants and Electric
Lines) Regulations, 2010 so that damage due to delay in extinguishing of fires can
be prevented.
6.4 Except for transformer banks formed out of single phase units and 5- limbed 3-ph
units, the tertiary winding may be avoided in line with above mentioned CEA
Regulations as it increases the probability of failure of the transformer. Tertiary
winding terminals taken out of the tank of transformer to avoid short circuiting
between terminals or terminal to ground should be kept insulated.
6.5 It was informed by DTL that second transformer commissioned at Geeta colony
substation also had problems since commissioning and had tripped many times due
to various reasons. It is advised that complete overhaul of this transformer should be
taken up in consultation with OEM to avoid repeated failure/outage of transformer.
6.6 During visit of CEA officers, the failed transformer tank was inspected through
inspection window only. Detail inspection of the transformer is required to be
carried out by OEM/ expert of repairing agency after opening the tank, which may
not be possible at site. The feedback/ warnings from the investigation should be used
for planning future course of action. A detailed report of the failed transformer may
be provided to CEA after thorough internal inspection of the failed transformer is
carried out.
6.7 Time stamping of all relays/DR/event loggers in all substations of DTL should be
properly synchronised to Indian Standard Time through GPS so that DR & event
logger information may be used for co-relating the sequence of events and operation
of protection relays of transformer.

5
MINUTES OF THE MEETING WITH MANUFACTURERS OF TRANSFORMERS
(ON BEHALF OF IEEMA) HELD IN CEA AT NEW DELHI ON 06/01/2016 TO
DISCUSS ABOUT THE CAUSES OF HIGH RATE OF FAILURES OF 220 kV AND
ABOVE VOLTAGE CLASS TRANSFORMERS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The list of participants is enclosed as Annexure-1.

1.0 Chief Engineer (PSE&TD), CEA, welcomed the participants and thanked the
delegates from Transformer Manufacturing Industry for sparing their valuable time
for the discussion on the causes of high rate of failure of power of transformers much
before their useful life.

1.1 He informed that a Standing Committee, comprising experts in the field of design and
operation of EHV Substations from CEA, various power utilities and
research/academic institutes was constituted (in the year 2006) under Section 73,
Clause(l) of the Electricity Act, 2003 to investigate the failure of 220 kV and above
substation equipment and recommend measures to avert recurrence. As part of such
activity, CEA has been receiving reports of failures of various substation equipments
from various utilities.

1.2 The transformer, the costliest equipment in a switchyard/substation, is expected to

serve the entire life of a substation which is considered to be 35 years as per CERC
norm. It has become a matter of concern for utilities as many transformers are failing
much before their useful life.

1.3 Chief Engineer (PSE&TD) further informed that 24 transformer failure cases have
been reported to CEA during the period from October 2011 to August 2015 by 14
Utilities. He stated that number of transformer failure cases remains unreported as
number of utilities including PGCIL, NTPC, NHPC and Private Utilities in the
country do not report failures to CEA. Details of reported failures in terms of year of
service are as below:

Years of Service No. of Transformers failed

0-5 years 7 (29%)
6-10 years 5 (21%)
11-15 years 2 (8%)
16-20 years 4 (17%)
More than 20 years 6 (25%)
Total 24 Nos.
1.4 It is observed that many Transformers have failed within first few years of service
which is a matter of concern as Transformers, in general, are meant to serve for 30-35
year. Out of these 24 transformers, 6 Number of failures are attributed to busing
failure, 14 numbers are due to internal insulation failure, one failure on account of
OLTC and rest 3 numbers of failures are due to other reasons. It is a matter of
concern that 50% of transformer i.e. 12 Nos. of transformer has failed within 10 years
of operation.

1.5 Chief Engineer (PSE&TD) stated that objective of this meeting was to discuss with
transformer manufacturers about measures to be taken to improve service life of the
transformers and minimize rate of failures. CEA requested manufacturers to come out
 with the suggestions as to what action should be taken by manufacturers to improve
performance of transformers and what action can be taken by utilities in respect of
modification in specifications, testing, operation and maintenance of transformers etc.

2.0 Following points emerged after discussion:

1. CIGRE study shows that ageing of Transformers is not the main reason of
failure. Bushing failure, insulation failure, OLTC failure etc are main
contributor towards failure of transformers.
2. The postmortem of failed transformer needs to be done by utilities to come out
real cause of failure without hiding the facts, be it manufacturing/design
defects or system problem or operation & maintenance issue or negligence of
utilities who is supposed to maintain the healthiness of transformer.
3. Increase in system fault and voltage stress due to transient over voltage
generated by the system e.g. VFT generated by GIS installation are
detrimental to the transformer health leading to increase in failure.
4. Availability of advanced computation tools have helped manufacturer to
optimize the design and to reduce cost. Sometimes competition has compelled
manufacturers to reduce cost by optimizing design at the cost of factor of
safety and quality of material used in manufacturing process. The utilities
should insist for Quality product rather than low cost product. The technical
specification need to be framed accordingly.
5. The proper handling, loading, unloading, storage at site before assembling
plays important role in satisfactory operation of transformer. Moreover, the
erection of transformers should always be carried out by experienced technical
team under the close supervision of manufacturer. Inordinate delay in
commissioning of transformer after reaching at site should be avoided. When
there is a wide gap between the year of manufacturing and year of commission
of the transformers, proper care must be taken to ensure satisfactory operation
of transformer:

a) Storage of transformer should be done as per manufacturer’s

recommendations.
b) Transformer should not be kept for more than three (3) months with
inert gas (Nitrogen) filling and all throughout the period, required
pressure needs to be maintained in order to avoid the exposure of
active part to atmosphere.
c) After three (3) months, transformer should be filled with oil under
vacuum and transformer should be provided with oil conservator
including oil level indicator and breather. The oil parameters need to
be monitored regularly.

6. Many utilities complain about the leakage of oil from transformer. The
manufacturers need to ensure that high quality material is used for sealing
system for oil and gas.
7. Whenever there is movement of transformer either from manufacturing works
or from one station to other, SFRA should be carried out before movement and
after shifting to new location. SFRA signature would provide valuable
information about deformation in winding /core during transportation.
8. OLTC is one of the contributors to the failure of transformer. Possibility of
eliminating OLTC from 400kV & 765kV class transformers should be
 considered (based on system studies) in consultation with POSOCO/RLDC
and CEA. Utilities like NHPC & NTPC have taken proactive step by
eliminating tap changer from Generator Transformers. The reduction in
number of steps can also be considered in case of OLTC of 220kV and below
voltage class transformers.
9. Devices sensitive to the rate of rise of pressure inside the transformer tank
may be considered in place of PRD which operates only above a set pressure.
10. It is being observed that technical specification of transformer is not uniform
across the utilities. There is wide variation in technical requirement.
Standardization of specification including Quality Assurance Plan (QAP) is
the need of hour. The utilities may also consider following additional
measures to improve performance of transformer.

a) The maximum temperature rise of oil and winding may be reduced by

5oC.
b) Maximum value of tanδ for winding and bushing in particular may be
limited to 0.5.
c) The adequate insulation should be provided between core and ground
and insulation resistance between core and ground should be about 1
MΩ.
d) Switching impulse withstand voltage test may be specified for
transformers of 220 kV class.
e) Better quality of cellulose paper insulation should be used, thermally
upgraded paper can also be considered for all rating of power
transformer. But all manufacturers were not in favour of use of
thermally upgraded paper for all ratings of power transformer.
f) Use of Fiber Optic Sensors for hot spot monitoring of winding can be
considered for all transformers of 100 MVA and above rating.
g) Three phase partial discharge measurement may be resorted to.

11. There was divergent view regarding stage inspection of transformer at

manufacturer works. Some of the manufacturers were of view that stage
inspection is not required. However, all were in favour of factory inspection
and stringent tests. The online facility is being developed by some of the
manufacturers to facilitate utilities to monitor various stages of manufacturing
process of their transformer without visiting the manufacturer’s works and in
the process stage inspection at manufacturer’s works can be avoided by
utilities, if they desire.
12. The history of transformer, records of all test results including tests carried out
before & after failure incidences (factory tests, pre-commissioning tests, tests
during O&M etc.) should be properly maintained and should be available at
the substation for the benefit of O&M staffs.
13. Time based maintenance is not sufficient to monitor the health of equipment.
Condition Based Maintenance practice should be followed. More focus should
be on the trend of test results rather than absolute values.
14. On-line Condition monitoring is the trend of future. Composite health
monitoring devices (with intelligent IEDs) which can monitor a number of
parameters like tanδ, capacitance of winding and bushing, gas formation,
moisture content etc are available and such diagnostic tools should be used.
To start with critical transformers may be focused because of high cost of
online condition monitoring devices.
 15. Lot of valuable time is lost in transportation from the failure site to
manufacturer’s works & back to site and for replacement of failed
transformers, if spare transformer is not available. The manufacturers should
take initiative to promote and carry out on-site repair of transformers, which
would save lot of valuable time and money.
16. IEEMA requested CEA to include representation from manufacturers in the
Standing Committee.

The meeting ended with vote of thanks to the Chair.

 Annexure - I
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Central Electricity Authority, New Delhi

1. Shri S.K.Ray Mohapatra, Chief Engineer, PSETD .........in the Chair

2. Shri Y.K.Swarnkar, Director, PSETD
3. Ms. Bhaavya Pandey, Assistant Director, PSETD
4. Ms. Noopur Chaudhary, Assistant Director, PSETD
5. Mr. Mohit Mudgal, Assistant Director, PSETD

IEEMA

1. Mr. J. Pandey, Sr. Director

2. Mr. Uttam Kumar, Executive officer

Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited

1. Mr. V.K. Bassi, AGM

2. Mr. A. Kulshreshtha, AGM
3. Mr. J.S. Kuntia, AGM

Crompton Greaves Ltd.

1. Mr. Abhay Dukle, AGM (Design)

Alstom
]
1. Mr. Vijay S Kumaran

Bharat Bijlee Ltd.

1. Mr. M P Singh, GM
2. Mr. D.R. Torvi, GM Electrical

EMCO

1. Ms. Anagha Dixit, GM Engineering

Transformer & Rectifiers

1. Mr. Jitendra Mamtora, Chairman