1Q3B. QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION. Minister's representative and it is not suggested, and could not be suggested, that they were denied the right of putting forward anything they desired to put forward on their own behalf. In the unlikely event of an inquiry of this sort being held and the Minister's representative denying a person, against whom allega- tions of negligence are being made, the right to be heard in his own defence, I am far from satisfied that such a person would not have any remedy in this court. I am convinced, however, that that remedy would not be by way of appeal under section 229. [Their Lordships proceeded to hear the applications by the two appellants for relief under section 230 of the Act. Both applications were dismissed. ] Appeals and applications dismissed with costs to the district auditor. The Minister of Housing and Local Government did not ask for costs. Solicitors: J. @. Haley; Jaques & Co. for Barker & Midgley, Blackpool; Solicitor, Ministry of Housing and Local Government. D. F. MOUNT LTD. v. JAY & JAY (PROVISIONS) Co. LTD. Sale of Goods—Lien of unpaid seller—Transfer to buyer of document of title—Transfer by him to sub-buyer of new document of title—Goods at wharf sold to buyer for resale—Delivery order by seller in favour of buyer—Fresh delivery order by buyer on resale—Eifect on unpaid seller's right of lien—Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 71), ss. 25 (2), 47, proviso. On October 3, 1957, the defendants, owners of a consignment of canned peaches in cartons lying at a wharf, sold part of the con- signment to M. for resale to two of M.’s customers, agreeing that the purchase price should be paid by M. out of the moneys received from his customers. ‘The defendants made out delivery orders in favour of M. which were indorsed by M. please transfer to our sub- “order” and sent them to the wharfingers. On October 4, M. sold the goods to the plaintifis and at the same time agreed to repurchase them a week later at a price which would give the plaintifis a small profit. M. made out a fresh delivery order in the same form as those made out by the defendants in his favour, except that it was in favour of the plaintiffs and signed by him, and sent it to Disreicr AvpIvor FoR ASHTON-IN- ‘MAgeRFrELD. Salmon J. 1959 July 1, 2, 11. Salmon J.° Tax & Jay (Provisions) Co. Lap, QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION. [1960] the plaintiffs, receiving in return their cheque for the purchase price. A week later, the plaintifis sent that delivery order to the wharf and, in pursuance of their agreement with M., sent him a delivery order in respect of the goods made out in his favour, receiving from M. a cheque for the higher price of the goods. M."s cheque was dishonoured, whereupon the plaintiffs cancelled tho delivery order in his favour. Meanwhile, the defendants, who had not been paid, cancelled their contract with M. and requested the wharfingers to cancel the delivery orders of October 3 made out in his favour. M. was subsequently prosecuted to conviction for obtaining money by fraud from the plaintiffs. An interpleader summons was issued by the wharfingers to decide who was entitled to the goods: Held, (1) that the defendants had assented to M. reselling the goods in the sense that they intended to renounce their rights against the goods and to take the risk of M.’s honesty, and, accordingly, had assented to the resale within the meaning of section 47 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893.1 Mordaunt Brothers v. British Oil and Cake Mills Itd. [1910] 2 K.B. 802 applied. Per curiam. In the absence of assent by the defendants to the resale by M., their rights as unpaid sellers under section 47 would not have been defeated by the proviso, since, on the plain language of the proviso, it applied only where a document of title had been transferred to a buyer, and the same document was then trans- ferred by him to a person taking in good faith and for valuable consideration. (2) That section 25 (2) of the Act did not apply only where the buyer transferred the actual document of title in his possession with the consent of the seller, for the purpose of the subsection was to Protect an innocent person in his dealings with a buyer who appeared to have the right to deal with the goods, and in such 1 Sale of Goods Act, 1808, s. 95 (2): * Where person having bought “or agreed to buy goods obtains, “with the consent of the seller, “* possession of the goods or the docu- “ments of title to the goods, the “delivery or transfer by that person, “or by @ mercantile agent acting for “him, of the goods or documents of “title, under any sale, pledge, or ‘other disposition thereof, to any “‘person receiving the same in good “faith and without notice of any lien “or other right of the original ‘seller “‘in respect of the goods, shall have “the same effect as if the person “‘making the delivery or transfer “‘ were a mercantile agent in posses- ‘gion of the goods or documents of “title with the consent of the owner."* “8. 47: “ Subject to the provisions “of this Act, the unpaid seller's right “of lien or retention or stoppage in “ transitu is not affected by any sale, ‘or other disposition of the goods “which the buyer may have made, “unless the seller has assented there- “to: Provided that where a docu- “ment of title to goods has been “lawfully transferred to any person “‘as buyer or owner of the goods, ‘and that person transfers the docu- “ment to a person who takes the “document in good faith and for “valuable consideration, then, if “such last-mentioned transfer was by “way of sale, the unpaid seller's right “‘of lien or retention or stoppage in “‘transitu is defeated. . . .”1 QB. QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION. cases it provided that any transfer of the goods or documents of title held by the buyer to a person acting in good faith and without notice of any want of authority on the part of the buyer should be as valid as if expressly authorised by the seller; accordingly, the plaintiffs were entitled to the delivery of the goods. IvTERPLEADER SUMMONS. The following statement of facts is summarised from the judgment. In September, 1957, the defendants, Jay & Jay (Pro- visions) Co. Ltd., merchants, bought 500 cartons each containing 48 tins of Dorchester brand Australian Standard Yellow Cling sliced peaches for 21s. 103d. per dozen tins, part of a consignment of 4,500 cartons imported by another firm and lying in the ware- house of Delta Storage Ltd. at Delta Wharf, Greenwich. Towards the end of September the defendants’ managing director told one Merrick that the goods were for sale, and on October 3 he agreed to sell to Merrick 150 cartons at 22s. per dozen tins for resale by Merrick to one of his customers. It was agreed that the profit should be divided equally between Merrick and the defendants. Later the same day the defendants’ managing director also agreed to sell Merrick a further 100 cartons at 21s. 9d., also for resale, requesting to be paid at once. Merrick made it plain that he would pay the defendants for the goods with the moneys he received from his customers. Two delivery orders were made out by the defendants in favour of Merrick. ‘They were addressed to the wharfingers, dated October 3, 1957, and stated “ Please “ supply Messrs. L. 8. T. Merrick . . . the under-mentioned goods ‘entered by us in the ship Newcastle Star... . Charges from ‘seven days to be paid by goods.”” The goods were described and the signature of the defendants added. The second delivery order was in precisely the same terms. Merrick added his name and address, which had been inadvertently omitted from the delivery orders, indorsed them “' Please transfer to our sub-order ” and sent them on to the wharfingers. They were received by the wharfingers well before November 6, 1957. ‘The defendants never received any part of the purchase price from Merrick. Meanwhile, on October 4, 1957, Merrick had offered to sell the 250 cartons to the plaintiffs at 20s. 6d. per dozen tins, making a total sale price of $1,019 17s. 6d. The plaintiffs agreed to buy and at the same time accepted an offer made by Merrick to re- purchase the cartons a week later at a price which would give the plaintifis a profit of 6d. a dozen tins. On October 4 Merrick gave the plaintiffs a delivery order in respect of the cartons against which the plaintiffs gave him a cheque for £1,019. That delivery 1 QB. 1960. n 161 1959 D, PF, Mounr Lr. ° Tay & Tay, (Provisions) Co. Lap.162 1959 Dz PF, Mouyr Lap. . Jax & Jay (Provisions) Co. Lap, QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION. [1960] order, except that it was signed by Merrick and made out in favour of the plaintifis, was in the same form as those made out by the defendants on October 3 and sent by Merrick to the wharfingers. Merrick cashed the plaintiffs’ cheque. On October 11, 1957, the plaintiffs sent the delivery order which they had received from Merrick to the wharf and on the same day sent Merrick a delivery order for the cartons. The following day Mer- rick sent the plaintifis a cheque for £1,045 in pursuance of his agreement to repurchase the cartons, but the cheque was dis- honoured and consequently the plaintiffs purported to cancel the delivery order made out by them in favour of Merrick. On November 6 the defendants, who had been unable to obtain payment from Merrick, wrote to him cancelling their contract with him and wrote to the wharfingers requesting them to cancel the delivery orders of October 3, 1957, made out in Merrick’s favour. Subsequently Merrick was prosecuted to conviction for obtaining £1,019 17s. 6d. by fraud from the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to delivery of the cartons still in the wharf and the defendants claimed to be entitled to exercise all the rights of an unpaid seller in respect of them, The wharfingers issued an interpleader summons to decide who was entitled to the delivery of the cartons. 8. C. Silkin for the plaintiffs. The parties here are dealing not with specific goods but with unascertained parts of a bulk holding which the warehouseman holds. Bach successive vendor gives a purchaser from him a delivery order which gives to that purchaser the right to delivery from the warehouseman of an unascertained portion of the goods. The warehouseman records that right by entry in his books. The goods become specific only when in some way appropriated to the delivery order, usually by actual delivery. At that point, but not before, the property passes. Meanwhile the warehouseman holds a collection of delivery orders and a parallel quantity of unallocated goods. In those circumstances it would not be unreasonable to find a trade custom which governs the rights of the various parties, particu- larly as traders deal in goods at high speed, often paying cash against delivery order. On payment of cash, and, indeed, even before, they regard their rights as secure. Accordingly, the trade custom contended for is that a purchaser’s right to receive goods becomes irrevocable as soon as a delivery order made out in his favour is accepted and recorded by the warehouseman.1Q.B. QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION. If the custom is established, that is an end of the defence. If not, the defendants rely upon all the rights of an unpaid seller. 163 1959 D, F, Assuming that, although never in possession of the goods, they Mourn Lip. can rely upon these rights, it is contended that they are defeated by both parts of section 47 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, in that (i) on the facts they assented to the sub-sale to the plaintiffs, since they deferred their own right to payment until Merrick had himself received payment from a purchaser from him—they con- tracted to receive half Merrick’s profit on the resale; and they left the name of the transferee blank on the delivery orders so that Merrick could insert the name of any sub-purchaser he chose. Thus they showed a clear intention to renounce their own rights as an unpaid seller so as to enable Merrick to resell: see Mordaunt Brothers v. British Qil and Cake Mills Ltd.? (ii) The delivery orders are documents of title: section 62 (1) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, and section 1 (4) of the Factors Act, 1889. On a proper construction of sections 47 and 25 (2) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, and section 10 of the Factors ‘Act, 1889, the issue of the delivery orders to the plaintiffs was a transfer by way of sale (or pledge) within the meaning of the proviso: see Ant, Jurgens Margarinefabricken v. Louis Dreyfus & Co. for the special meaning of “‘ transfer’ in the context of the section. In the further alternative the plaintiffs rely upon attornment by the warehouseman as agent for the defendants consisting of: (i) The entry in the warehouseman’s books of the plaintiffs” liability for rent together with the actual fact of their liability as expressed on the delivery orders. A very little will suffice for attornment: per Scruton L.J. in Laurie and Morewood v. Dudin & Sons. (ii) Delivery by the warehouseman to the plaintiffs’ sub-purchaser of 25 cases out of the 250, since this could only be referable to the plaintifis’ right to 250: see Gillett v. Hill.s This was not affected by the prior notice to the warehouseman given by the defendants stopping the goods, since the warchouse- man as agent of the defendants had ostensible authority to deal with the goods even after such notice. S. H. Noakes for the defendants. There is no such custom as that for which the plaintiffs contend. On that assumption a vital question may be how far section 25 (2) of the Sale of Goods 2 [1910] 2 K.B. 502, 4 [1926] 1 K.B. 223, 297; 42 8 [1914] 8 K.B. 40. TLR. M9, 5 (1834) 2 Cr. & M, 530, Jar & av (Provisions) Co. Lap.164 1959 D. F, Moust Lav. °. Jax & Jay (Provisions) Co. Lrp. QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION. [1960] Act, 1898, applies to the present case. That subsection is in the same terms as sections 9 and 10 of the Factors Act, 1889, and applies where a person obtains (a) possession of the goods or (b) the documents of title thereto. It is clear that Merrick never obtained actual possession of the goods. Did he obtain con- structive possession? The wharfingers could not have obtained constructive possession of the goods, because there was no acknowledgment as required by section 29 (8) of the Act of 1893. The mere receipt of the delivery orders by the wharfingers and the recording of that receipt in their books does not operate as an attornment: see Laurie and Morewood v. Dudin ¢ Sons,¢ in particular per Bankes L.J." and Serutton L.J.* [Satmtow J. ‘The essence of the transaction is communication to the other side.] Yes. Laurie and Morewood v. Dudin & Sons® shows that the mere giving of a delivery note to a sub-buyer does not operate to pass the property. Clearly, on that authority, here there was no passing of the property in the goods, because there was no acknowledgment by the wharfinger. Section 25 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, being merely a reproduction of sections 9 and 10 of the Factors Act, 1889, the same interpretation of ‘‘ transfer of documents of title ’’ ought to apply as in the Factors Act, 1889. By section 11 of the earlier Act transfer of documents may be effected in one of two ways, either by handing over the document or indorsing it to a person like 8 cheque. Neither was done here, and, accordingly, there was no transfer of a document of title. To constitute such a transfer it must be the original document which is transferred: see also the proviso to section 47 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893. If that proposition is accepted, the proviso is inapplicable, because it refers to ““ the document.” Here it is admitted that the actual document was not transferred. [Satmon J. referred to Ant. Jurgens Margarinefabricken v. Louis Dreyfus & Co.°] In that case there was a transfer by indorsement. Pickford J.” emphasised the’ difference between handing over the original document and creating a new one. As to the meaning of ‘‘ assent ’’ in section 47 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, see Mordaunt Brothers v. British Oil and Cake * [1926] 1 K.B, 223. ® [1926] 1 K.B. 228, 7 Ibid. 280. 19 [1914] 8 KB. 40. * Thid. 987. 1 Ibid. 44.1QB. QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION. Mills Lid. The assent required means an assent given in such circumstances as show that the unpaid seller intends that the sub-contract shall be carried out irrespective of the terms of the original contract. The only difference between the facts of Mor- daunt’s case * and the present is that in that case the goods were actually held by the defendants, whereas here they were being held by the wharfingers as agents. Mordaunt's case is on all fours with the present as regards any question of assent to the sub-sale bringing the case within the first part of section 47. There is not a shred of evidence that the defendants here assented to the sub-sale. They stipulated for immediate payment by Merrick, which is evidence to the contrary. Silkin in reply. The material difference between the present case and Mordaunt’s case” is that there the sub-purchaser came along after the original purchase had been entered into and informed the seller of the sub-purchase and the seller merely acknowledged that information. That was rightly held not to amount to an assent to the sub-sele. The situation is quite different here, because the sub-sale was contemplated from the very start and in effect formed a part of the contract between the plaintifis and Merrick. [Saumon J. If you are right on this part of section 47, nothing else arises.] That is so, but it is submitted that the other part of section 47 also protects the plaintiffs. One purpose of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, is to protect purchasers in successive dealings with goods. It is important to construe its wording in a way beneficial to purchasers. As to section 47, once it is accepted, as it was in Jurgens’ case," that the word “ transfer "’ in the first part of the proviso means not merely the passing of a document received by the transferor, but includes the actual issue and delivery of a document by the issuer, it becomes quite illogical to give a more restricted meaning to the word “ transfer "’ in the second part of the sentence. The reasoning of Pickford J. in Jurgens’ case was based on broad common sense and protection for innocent purchasers. It would work the other way to hold that the expression “‘ transfer of the document’ in the second part of the sentence in the proviso means only the transfer of the actual document referred to in the first part. What is important is not the document itself but what it represents—i.e., the title 12 [1910] 2 K.B. 502. M4 Tid. 44. 43 [1914] 3 K.B. 40. 165, 1959 D.F. Movst Lap. °. Jay & Jay (Provisions) Co. Lap.166 1959 D. F, Mount Lap. v Tay & Jax (Provisions) Go. Lap. QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION. [1960] to the goods which are being sold. That is exemplified by the words “if such . . . transfer was by way of sale.” It is the goods which are transferred by way of sale, not the documents. It follows that when using the words “ transfer” and “ transfer “‘by way of sale’’ the draftsman must have had in mind: the transfer of the title whether by passing the goods from hand to hand or by the passing of a document. The effect is precisely the same. [Sanmon J. Does not ‘‘ the document” in the second part of the proviso suggest one piece of paper?] Literally that is so, but read in its context it is submitted that the draftsman had in mind either the document itself or a document analogous thereto which delivers the title. If it were not 0, it would mean that the accident of making out a fresh document would create a difference in the rights of the parties, including those who had nothing to do with the making of the document. ‘As to sections 10 and 11 of the Factors Act, 1889 (which by virtue of section 21 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, are unaffected by that Act), section 11 provides that transfer can be by endorse- ment alone—not necessarily endorsement and delivery. Here on the evidence the custom followed in all cases is to endorse the delivery order “ please transfer to our sub-order "’ and then to send it to the wharfinger. That alone does not constitute endorsement, since it does not refer to any particular person, but it indicates to the wharfinger that he will be receiving another delivery order which will be the sub-order referred to. Once that delivery order is made out in the name of a particular person and is received by the wharfinger, it completes the endorsement on the preceding delivery order by identifying the ‘ sub-order” referred to. If the court takes the view that the custom is not sufficiently established, it may be this is why the words ‘* Please “transfer to our sub-order,” which otherwise would seem to have no purpose, are inserted—to effect endorsement and hence transfer and so to defeat the unpaid seller's rights, as provided for in these sections. Cur. adv. vult, July 17, Satmon J. stated the facts, held that the transaction between Merrick and the plaintiffs was a sale and continued: The case raises the familiar problem—which of two innocent persons, the plaintiffs or the defendants, shall suffer for the trickery of a rogue.1 QB. QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION. The plaintiffs rely first on section 47 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893. [His Lordship read section 47, and continued: ] There is a proviso to the section, with which I shall deal in a moment. The plaintiffs contend that the defendants assented to the sale or disposition of the 250 cartons by Merrick to the plaintiffs, and thereby lost their right as unpaid sellers to the lien which they would otherwise have had upon the cartons. The defendants contend that if they assented to the sub-sale by Merrick, their assent was not an assent within the meaning of section 47, and rely upon Mordaunt Brothers v. British Oil and Cake Mills Ltd.* It is clear from Pickford J.’s judgment? in that case that the assent contemplated by section 47 means “‘ an assent given in such cir- “cumstances as show that the unpaid seller intends that the “sub-contract shall be carried out irrespective of the terms of ‘the original contract’ and must be “* such an assent as in the “circumstances shows that the seller intends to renounce his “rights against the goods.” Pickford J. held that there had been no such assent on the part of the sellers. The facts of that case are, however, very different from those of the present case, There the sellers had at no time any reason to doubt the buyer’s ability to pay, and were not informed of the sub-sale until after the sale was effected. Pickford J. held that the sellers had assented to the sub-sale merely in the sense that they acknowledged its existence and the right of the sub-buyer to have the goods subject to their own paramount rights under the contract with the original buyer to hold the goods until paid the purchase price. In the present case the defendants were anxious to get rid of the goods on a falling market. They knew that Merrick could only pay for them out of the money he obtained from his custo- mers, and that he could only obtain the money from his customers against delivery orders in favour of those customers. In my view, the true inference is that the defendants assented to Merrick reselling the goods, in the sense that they intended to renounce their rights against the goods and to take the risk of Merrick’s honesty. The defendants are reputable merchants and I am sure that it was not their intention to get rid of their goods on a falling market through Merrick on the basis that, if he defaulted, they could hold the goods against the customers from whom he obtained the money out of which they were to be paid. The sale of the 250 cartons was a sale of unascertained goods. In my judgment, however, there is no reason why section 47 1 [1910] 2 K.B, 502. 2 Ibid. 507. 167 1959 D. F, Moowr Lap. o Tax & Jax (Provistoxs) Co. Lap. Salmon J.bai QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION. (1960) 1959 should not apply to unascertained goods, although I respectfully DF, agree with Pickford J. that an inference can in some circumstances Mount Lap. more readily be drawn against the seller in the case of a sale of Jax & Jay SDeCific goods than in the case of a sale of unascertained goods. (@rovisioxs) T hold that the defendants assented to the sale of the cartons by al "Merrick within the meaning of section 47. This is enough to dispose of the case, but I will deal briefly with some of the other points which have been canvassed. Mr. Silkin argues that even had there been no sufficient assent by the defendants, he would be entitled to succeed under the proviso to section 47, [His Lordship read the proviso and continued: ] It is conceded that the plaintiffs took that delivery order in good faith and for valuable consideration. Mr. Noakes argues, how- ever, that there has been no transfer by Merrick within the meaning of the proviso. The material words to consider are: “".. where a document of title to goods has been lawfully trans- “ferred to any person as buyer, . . . and that person transfers the “document to a person... .” It seems to me that these words confine the proviso to cases where a document is transferred to the buyer and the same document is then transferred by him to the person who takes in good faith and for valuable consideration. If Merrick had indorsed the delivery orders he received from the defendants and transferred them to the plaintiffs, the proviso would, in my judg- ment, have applied; but he did not do so. He sent those delivery orders to the wharf, and made out a fresh delivery order in favour of the plaintiffs. It is strange that there appears to be no authority on this point. It is clear that the person who transfers the document of title to the buyer may originate it himself and need not have received it from some third party in order to ‘‘ transfer "’ it within the meaning of the proviso: see Ant. Jurgens Margarinefabricken v. Louis Dreyfus & Co.? In my judgment, however, on the plain language of the section, it must be that very document which is transferred by the buyer for the proviso to operate. I am con- scious that this construction leads to a very artificial result, but I cannot avoid it without doing violence to the plain language of the section. Mr. Silkin, however, also relies on section 25 (2) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1898. [His Lordship read the subsection and continued: ] It seems to me that the language of this subsection Salmon J. 8 [1914] 8 K.B. 40,1QB. QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION. is less rigorous than that of the proviso to section 47 and does not compel me to hold that the subsection applies only in those cases where the buyer transfers the same document as that of which he is in possession with the consent of the seller. I would observe that there seems to be no authority on this point. The object of the subsection is to protect an innocent person in his dealings with a buyer who appears to have the right to deal with the goods in that he has been allowed by the seller to be in possession of the goods or documents of title relating to them. In such a case the subsection provides that any transfer of the goods or documents of title by the buyer to a person acting in good faith and without notice of any want of authority on the part of the buyer shall be as valid as if expressly authorised by the seller. In the present case the defendants sent the documents of title to Merrick with the intention that they should enable him to obtain money from his customers. With the help of these docu- ments, which he sent to the wharf so that the wharfingers would give reassuring reply to any inquiry that the plaintiffs might make, or at least not query any delivery order they received from the plaintiffs, Merrick managed to obtain a substantial sum of money from the plaintiffs. In my view, the transfer by Merrick of the delivery order dated September 4 [instead of October 4] was, by virtue of section 25 (2), as valid as if expressly authorised by the defendants. The plaintiffs further relied upon custom. The only custom I find proved is the custom for delivery orders to state on their face the number of days (usually seven) from their date after which the person in favour of whom the delivery order is made out shall be liable to the wharfinger for his charges. When the wharfinger receives the delivery order from such person and registers it in his books, he is by custom entitled, without further notice, to charge such person warehousing charges from the date specified in the delivery order. This is a narrower custom than that for which the plaintifis contended. Scrutton L.J. pointed out in Laurie and Morewood v. Dudin & Sons * that in the absence of proof of attornment by custom, there must be some sort of communication from the wharfinger to the person holding the delivery order to constitute an attornment. In the present case the wharfingers made no communication to the plaintiffs, but there exists the custom to which I have referred. ¢ [1926] 1 K.B. 999, 997; 42 T.L.R. 149. 169 1959 D.F, Moowr Ip. o. Jax & Jay (Provisions) Co. Lr. Salmon J.170 1959 D. B, Mouwr Lap. o. Tay & Jay (Provistons) Co. Lap. Salmon J. 1959 Oct, 8, 9. Diplock J. QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION. [1960] I am not sure of its relevance here, since these proceedings are not against the wharfingers. It may well be, however, that after seven days from the date of the delivery order, the wharfingers would be precluded from denying the rights, at any rate, of any innocent party from whom they had received it. As I hold, however, the clear view that the plaintiffs are entitled to succeed against the defendants under the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, I need discuss custom no further. There will be judgment for the plaintiffs. Judgment for the plaintiffs with costs. Declaration that the plaintiffs were entitled to the delivery of the cartons. Solicitors: Gershon, Young & Co.; Gouldens. we GLADSTONE v. BOWER. Agriculture—Agricultural holding—Tenancy—Protection—Letting of farm and land for period of 18 months—Whether let for interest less than tenancy from year to year—Agricultural Holdings Act, 1948 (11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 63), s. 2 (1). By an agreement in writing the plaintiff let to the defendant a farm and land for a term of 18 months. After the expiry of the term by efiluxion of time the defendant failed to give up possession, contending, inter alia, that by virtue of section 2 (1) of the Agricul- tural Holdings Act, 1048," the agreement took effect as an agreement for the letting of the farm for a tenancy from year to year, under which, no notice to quit having been given, she was entitled to [Reported by E. Canvr-Taomas, Barrister-at-Law.] tenaney from year to year he would in respect of that land be the tenant “of on agricultural holding, then, “unless the letting or grant was 1 Agricultural Holdings Act, 1948, 8. 2: (1) Subject to the provisions “of this section, where under an agreement made on or after the first day of March, 1948, any land is let “to a person for use as agricultural “and for an interest less than o “tenancy from year to year, or o “person is granted a licence to occupy land for use as agricultural “land, and the circumstances are “such that if his interest were o “‘approved by the Minister before “the agreement was entered into, the “agreement shall take effect, with “the necessary modifications, as if it “were an agreement for the letting ‘of the land for a tenancy from year “to year: