En Primeur 3
En Primeur 3
Abstract
Introduction
The International Oce of Vine and Wine reports that the world total viticultural area reached
19.55 millions acres in 2000. Two-thirds of this surface is located in Europe (mainly in France,
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and represent 56% of the overall wine growing. France remains
a leading actor in the world wine market despite the sharp competition following the emergence
of new-world producers (South Africa, Chile, New Zealand among others) of high quality wine.
Even if the market share of France in the global wine production in volume has decreased from
time established reputation like the Grands Crus Classés, remain the most famous and among
the most expensive wines worldwide. Could it be that reputation is better valued than quality
in the Bordeaux wine region? We propose to address this question by analyzing two distinct
Bordeaux wine markets: the `en primeur' market and the more traditional market for bottled
1
La revue du vin de France n 451, May 2001.
2
From a total value of sales of 3.1 billion euros in 2001, 1.2 billion come from wine sold on foreign markets
corresponding to a volume of 2.5 million of hectolitres (source: Conseil Interprofessionnel du Vin de Bordeaux).
1
wine.
The en primeur market, which is a kind of `future market' specic to the Bordeaux wine
region, occurs every year in spring. En primeur refers to the process of buying new wine several
months after the grape harvest while it is still in barrel. This market allows producers to get
prices, hence attracting more and more nancial speculators (see Hadj Ali and Nauges, 2002).
The en primeur market in Bordeaux region may generate up to 600 million euros a year.
4
The opening of the en primeur market constitutes one of the most important events on the
Bordeaux market place. The new vintage is oered for the rst time and the prices, set by the
producers themselves, are revealed. Little is known about the way producers choose these prices.
If prices are expected to vary with objective characteristics such as appellation and ranking,
5
there is however a large uncertainty still attached to future quality as the wine is not yet matured.
Indeed, information regarding future quality of the wine mainly come from the observation of the
and released on the traditional (competitive) market, some additional information regarding
quality may be obtained through personal or experts' tasting. Is there any signicant eect of
Using panel data, we show that reputation and quality have very similar impacts on the en
primeur price and on the price of bottled wine. Reputation, that we choose to measure by the
3
Payment occurs at the time of the en primeur sales and bottled wine is delivered one to two years after.
4
Le Monde, 2001.
5
The appellation is a regional designation and the rank is a system of classication specic to the Bordeaux
region.
6
Tasting sessions involving wine experts may also occur before the opening of the en primeur market however
we do not observe such judgement or grade in our data set.
2
classication of wine (both in terms of ranking and appellation), is found highly correlated with
the en primeur price chosen by the producers but ranks and appellation are also highly priced
by the consumers in their purchase of bottled wine. Reputation is highly valued in particular for
the wines belonging to the most famous groups namely the Premiers Grands Crus Classés inside
both the 1855 and the Saint Emilion classications. Furthermore, the vintage year (a proxy for
climatic conditions of the growing year) is found to be a signicant determinant of both prices
(en primeur price and the price of bottled wine) while the current quality of each bottled wine
Results about en primeur price are new in this literature, while our results on bottled
wine conrm the ndings of Ginsburgh, Monzak and Monzak (1994), Combris, Lecocq and
Visser (1997) and Landon and Smith (1998), who also analyze price data from the Bordeaux
wine region. These three studies agree on the signicant impact of objective characteristics
(vintage, region etc.) and reputation (as measured by ranking) on wine price on the one hand,
and nd a moderate inuence of current quality (as measured by experts' grades or sensory
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we dene precisely what we call reputation
and quality. In Section 2 we present the data and make some descriptive analysis of wine price
on the en primeur market and on the market for bottled wine. Econometric analysis addressing
the issue of reputation and quality impacts on wine price for the en primeur market and for the
market for bottled wine are detailed respectively in Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 summarizes the
3
1 Reputation and quality
The impact of the characteristics of a good on its price is commonly addressed through the
estimation of a hedonic function. If the good is traded on a competitive market, the estimated
coecients from the regression of price on characteristics can be interpreted as the valuation of
the good attributes by the consumers. This interpretation is obviously erroneous in the case of
en primeur wine as the price is set by the producers themselves. The estimated parameters will
instead measure the correlation between the price set by the château and the characteristics of
the wine.
In the Rosen (1974) framework, the characteristics used in the hedonic function should be the
ones for which consumers have perfect information. Objective characteristics such as appellation,
rank and vintage (or harvest) year are good candidates as they are easily accessible to the
In the present paper, we call reputation the combination of appellation, ranking and name
of the château. We do not follow the approach used by Landon and Smith (1997, 1998) and
Oczkowski (2001), who measure reputation through lagged quality scores, because we are pri-
marily interested in measuring the impact of the long-time established fame of Bordeaux châteaux
Indeed, the rst system of ranking in the Bordeaux region dates back to 1855. It was
during the Exposition Universelle that Napoléon III, the Emperor of France at the time, invited
Bordeaux's wine brokers to rank the region's wines according to price. They eventually agreed
upon a ve-tier, Classed Growths or Crus Classés (CC), classication system ranging from
4
Premiers Crus (1CC, First Growth) to Cinquièmes Crus (5CC, Fifth Growth). The nal list
consisted of 61 leading châteaux. Nearly all the selections came from the Médoc region,
7 with the
exception of the most prominent Graves château, Haut-Brion (Pessac Léognan appellation), and
the highly rated, sweet wines of Sauternes and Barsac. Sweet wines are classied in Premiers Crus
Classés (1CC, First Growth) or Deuxièmes Crus Classés (2CC, Second Growth), the château
Yquem being the only one classied in Premier Cru Supérieur (1CS, First Superior Growth).
This Classication System of 1855, largely unchanged to this day, is more and more contested
because, as explained by Combris, Lecocq and Visser (1997), Many châteaux have changed
ownership, certain châteaux have doubled even tripled their cultivation surface, new vinication
methods have been introduced. The Crus Bourgeois (CB), which are the châteaux from the
Médoc region that were not originally ranked, were not classied until 1920. By 1932, there were
444 châteaux listed and numbers have uctuated ever since. A new classication of the Crus
Bourgeois (CB) of the Médoc and Haut Médoc is currently in process and should be displayed
Saint Emilion wines (Saint Emilion Grand Cru appellation) were not formally classied until
1955 (subsequently revised in 1969, 1985/86 and 1996), with a distinction between Premiers
Grands Crus Classés A (C1A, First Top Growth A), Premiers Grands Crus Classés B (C1B,
First Top Growth B) and Grands Crus Classés (C, Top Growth). Similarly, some of the wines
of Graves (Pessac Léognan appellation) were not ocially classied (CC, Classed Growth) until
1953 with others following in 1959. The Pomerol wines always refused being classied. Thus
7
Haut Médoc, Margaux, Médoc, Moulis, Pauillac, Saint Estèphe, Saint Julien are the appellation groups found
in our sample.
5
the non-classied (NC) wines in the sample are the Pomerol wines and those wines that are not
Apart from reputation, quality is expected to be another determinant of the price of wine.
The debate on the price-quality relationship has always been controversial (see Lecocq and Visser,
2002 for a good survey and some illustrative examples). The quality of a wine depends on many
factors. We may distinguish two stages in the wine-making process. First stage would be the
growing of grapes until the harvest. It is well known that the quality of the grapes (aromatic
intensity, level of acidity and sugar, quantity of tannins, etc.), for a given grape variety, is highly
inuenced by the climatic conditions of the growing year, but also by decisions taken by the
producer such as the clearing of grapes, the date of harvest, the type of harvest (manual or
mechanical), the level of investment. The second stage would be the so-called making-process
of the wine, which takes place after the harvest. The cellar master (maître de chai) has to take
decisions (grape mixing, type of barrels, duration of fermentation and maturation processes,
temperature, etc.) during the whole making-process (which lasts often eighteen months in the
Bordeaux region) that will be determinant for the future quality of the wine. These decisions
are not observable neither by the econometrician, nor by the consumer in general. Only when
the wine is bottled some additional information on quality will be publicly known and easily
accessible to the consumer through wine guides or magazines. Note that the en primeur sales
take place before the second stage is completed so the only information available to the consumers
(and to the econometrician) at the opening of the en primeur market will be the expected overall
quality of the wine based on the information on the climatic conditions that prevailed before the
6
harvest.
Climatic conditions have been included in the hedonic price equation by Ashenfelter, Ashmore
and Lalonde (1995), Byron and Ashenfelter (1995) and Ginsburgh, Monzak and Monzak (1994)
and have been proved highly signicant. In the present study, we will use vintage dummies to
control for the climatic conditions of the growing year, both in the model of en primeur price
and in the model of the price for bottled wine. The information on the quality of each particular
wine, as provided by the experts (Robert Parker here) during tasting sessions, will be available
only when the wine is in bottle and thus will be included in the hedonic equation for bottled
wine only. We argue that it is better to use a single and publicly available measure of quality
etc.) or chemical characteristics (such as the wine's sugar and acid level) as done in Combris,
Lecocq and Visser (1997, 2000) or Nerlove (1995) because these latter characteristics are not
2 Descriptive analysis
The data record white and red wine produced by 185 châteaux between 1982 and 1998, except
Prices vary considerably across the wines in the data set. En primeur price and the price of
bottled wine are known for every wine that we dene as the production of one château and one
8
Oczkowski (1994, 2001), Gergaud (1998), Jones and Storchmann (2001), and Schamel and Anderson (2001)
also use grades as a measure of the quality of the wine.
9
To some extent, this has been conrmed by Combris, Lecocq and Visser (1997, 2000) who show that sensory
traits are statistically insignicant for Bordeaux and Burgundy wine.
10
This vintage has been removed from the catalogue by the broker.
7
Table 1: En primeur prices for each rank (prices in 1990 euros equivalent)
vintage. They correspond to the price of a 75cl bottle in euro equivalent (base 1990). The price
of the bottled wine is observed every quarter between June 1996 and July 2000, which amounts
to 16,586 observations in all. As our data were provided by one of the most famous broker house
in Bordeaux they can be considered as fairly representative of the market for Bordeaux wine on
vintage judgement as given by Wine Spectator (see Appendix), the largest circulation U.S. wine
magazine, and the grade attributed to each wine by Robert Parker's famous guide.
12
We report in Table 1 the average en primeur prices inside each ranking for the whole period
covering vintage years from 1982 to 1998 (1,454 observations in all). These statistics show that
en primeur prices match the hierarchy of ranking: inside each ranking, the greater the rank, the
higher the en primeur price. In the 1855 classication for example, prices of wine belonging to
the group of Premiers Crus Classés (1CC) lie largely above the price of those being classed from
Table 2, which gives some descriptive statistics on en primeur prices as observed for each
11
The broker's catalogue contains market values for wine computed from the prices proposed by all the wholesale
wine merchants on the Bordeaux place.
12
Both quality indices rise by unit intervals from a minimum of 50 to a maximum of 100.
8
Table 2: En primeur prices for each vintage year (prices in 1990 euros equivalent)
82 83 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
Mean 15 17 19 15 17 13 16 14 14 9 9 10 13 17 20 17
Std Dev 16 15 15 14 13 7 10 11 15 5 5 7 8 12 15 13
Nb obs. 68 59 68 76 17 87 98 102 33 85 115 118 127 129 145 127
vintage year, shows the uctuation of en primeur prices between 1982 and 1998. Three sub-
periods may be distinguished: in the rst sub-period (82-91 vintage) the en primeur price does
not vary much from one vintage year to another. Between 1992 and 1994 the average en primeur
price decreased and increased after 1995 until 1998. Indeed, the wine of the 1991 to 1994 vintages
was not recognized by Wine Spectator as a `good' wine, as was also the case for the 1997 vintage.
However the latter was sold at the highest en primeur price for the period considered. So if
the trend of the en primeur prices matches the tasters judgement (price increases when overall
quality of the vintage is much more appreciated) at the beginning of the period, this seems no
longer true at the end as illustrated in Figure 1. In addition to the average en primeur price for
all wines and the grade attributed by Wine Spectator, we graph separately average en primeur
prices of the Premiers Grands Crus Classés from the Médoc region
13 and from the Saint Emilion
region (C1A). We set apart these two groups of châteaux as they are the most famous coming
from the Bordeaux wine region and they may be traded at prohibitive prices in auction markets
when getting old, as luxuries. Saint Emilion Premiers Grands Crus Classés A are sold at the
highest price on the en primeur market, followed by the Médoc Cinq Grands Crus (5GC). They
follow a similar trend all along the period except for the 1998 vintage (the châteaux from Saint
13
The Cinq Grands Crus (5GC) are the ve châteaux inside the 1CC group that produce red wine: château
Haut-Brion, château Late-Rothschild, château Latour, château Margaux and château Mouton-Rothschild.
9
Figure 1: En primeur prices and Wine Spectator ratings for the 1982-1998 vintages
Emilion increased the en primeur price whereas the ones from Médoc lowered it). We clearly see
from the picture that a structural change occurred in the mid-nineties. This eect can also be
illustrated by computing the correlation coecients between the overall grade attributed to the
vintage by Wine Spectator and the average en primeur price (see Table 3).
These simple statistics give interesting insights: on the whole period the correlation coecient
between en primeur price and grade is moderate (0.21 when considering all wines). The results are
much dierent if correlation coecients are computed before and after 1994. When considering
the wine from the 1982 to 1993 vintages, en primeur price and grade are positively correlated, this
correlation being quite strong especially for the Premiers Grands Crus Classés : 0.84 and 0.86
respectively for the Cinq Grands Crus from Médoc and the Premiers Crus Classés A from Saint
Emilion. However, for the 1994 to 1998 vintages, the correlation coecient becomes negative,
10
Table 3: Correlation between price and grade
showing clearly that the trend of en primeur prices no longer matches the experts' judgement.
14
Prices of bottled wine from 1982 to 1998 vintages are observed between June 1996 and July
2000. During this period, the market for Bordeaux wine experienced feverish activity following
the entry on the market of wealthy buyers, namely multi-millionaires from emerging market
economies (Taïwan, Singapore, Brasil, Russia...). The `French paradox' assessing health benets
of wine consumption also contributed to the success of the wine market. This wealth eect
generated an extraordinary ination which is illustrated by our data (see Table 4). The average
price (all wines) per quarter almost doubled between the rst quarter (6-7/96) and the sixth
quarter (8-10/97). Because of large market uctuations we consider from now on a detrended
price in order to correctly assess the impact of the wine's characteristics on its price. A quarterly
price index is built from the regression of the log of price on quarter dummies.
Figures reported in Table 5 show that the price of bottled wine also matches the ranking.
We clearly see that the Premiers Crus Classés (1CC and C1A groups) are priced signicantly
above the others. Furthermore, it is shown from Table 6 that prices embody simultaneously an
`age' eect and a `vintage' eect. On the one hand, quality varies between vintages: `very good'
14
The correlation coecients in the column Overall of the table remain almost the same if we exclude the 5GC
and C1A wines.
11
Table 4: Average price of bottled wine for each quarter (prices in 1990 euros equivalent)
Table 5: Prices of bottled wine for each rank (detrended prices in 1990 euros equivalent)
Table 6: Price of bottled wine for each vintage year (detrended prices in 1990 euros equivalent)
82 83 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
Mean 86 41 45 43 38 31 40 44 23 16 16 16 21 18 14 13
Nb obs. 697 381 686 826 60 1,034 1,341 1,385 286 951 1,825 2,013 2,158 1,557 1,023 363
12
ones (1982, 1990, 1995) as well as `bad' ones (1987, 1991 to 1994) are easily identiable. On the
other hand, the price gets higher when a bottle gets older: not only the wine gets better (up to
a certain limit) but it also becomes even more dicult to nd it on the market.
The `age' eect is more emphasized in Figure 2 where we graph the average price of bottled
price for wines belonging to the Cinq Grands Crus group (5GC), the Premiers Crus Classés A
group (C1A) and average price for all wines. We clearly see that the average price per bottle
increases with age. Prices of wines belonging to 5GC and C1A groups are pretty close to each
other but lie largely above average price of all wines. Note from the picture that the price starts
to increase after the age of ve years (20 quarters). The trend in prices of the top growth wines is
similar to the trend in prices of the whole average until the age of around 15 years (60 quarters).
Later, the price of the Premiers Grands Crus Classés (5GC and C1A) experiences a sharper
The descriptive analysis shows that en primeur price varies with wine ranking and the overall
quality of the vintage as assessed by Wine Spectator. We propose to measure more precisely
the relative impact of reputation and quality by regressing en primeur price on wine's objective
characteristics (ranking, appellation), and its vintage year. The year dummies will act as a
proxy for climatic conditions of the growing year and thus for the overall quality of the vintage.
These are the only variables that will be used to measure the impact of quality in this model
15
The average eect of age is computed with wine from dierent vintage years and so of dierent quality.
13
Figure 2: Price of bottled wine at dierent ages
as the grades that might be attributed to the wine during tasting sessions are not observed in
our data set. We distinguish the group of the Cinq Grands Crus (5GC), the ve red wines
of the Premiers Crus Classés (1CC) group, by including a zero-one dummy variable. We take
advantage of the panel form of the data by allowing for a random individual eect accounting
for an unobserved château eect. Note that this eect might include the unobservable decisions
The model tting the logarithm of the en primeur price is estimated using Generalized Least
Squares. The overall regression is made on 1,454 wines produced by 163 dierent châteaux. Rank
dummies have to be interpreted with respect to the group Premiers Crus Classés including white
wine from 1CC and 1CS (we will call this group 1CCb from now on);
16 Barsac is chosen as the
16
The Premier Cru Supérieur (1CS) group includes the château Yquem only.
14
Almost all vintage dummies are signicant at a 95% condence level. Note rst that estimated
coecients are found negative for those years in which wine was said (see Wine Spectator grades)
of `low' quality (1987, 1991 to 1994) and positive for `good' years, the only exception being the
1997 vintage (this vintage gets the highest coecient even if experts disliked it). Thus the
vintage dummies partly capture the impact of climatic conditions on the overall quality of the
vintage. Second, the coecients of vintage dummies corresponding to the years 1996 to 1998
are larger than the others in magnitude. As noted earlier, the post-1995 period corresponds to
an exceptional boom in the Bordeaux wine market. So it might be the case that, after 1995,
producers choose en primeur price considering not only the expected quality of the vintage but
Note the signicant eect of the rank on the en primeur price with respect to the group of
Premiers Crus Classés (1CCb) (most dummies are signicant at a 95% condence level), even
for the old 1855 classication which is today more and more contested: the lower the rank, the
lower the en primeur price. We nd in particular a large premium for those wines which belong
to the top groups: Cinq Grands Crus and the best-classied Saint Emilion wines (C1A group).
Any of the appellation dummies are signicant at the 95% condence level.
These results show that reputation (here appellation and above all ranking) has a higher
correlation than quality (as measured through vintage eects) with en primeur price. However,
quality in this model is measured only by vintage dummies and, as mentioned in the rst section,
quality might also be determined by some unobservable decisions taken by the producer. These
15
Table 7: Econometric analysis of en primeur price
Vintage Appellation
Vint. 83 0.0377 0.1960 Bordeaux blanc 0.7063 0.0870
Vint. 85 0.1653 0.0000 Haut Médoc 0.1957 0.3840
Vint. 86 0.0214 0.4330 Margaux 0.0390 0.8460
Vint. 87 0.2914 0.0000 Médoc 0.2241 0.5720
Vint. 88 0.0225 0.3980 Moulis 0.1247 0.6650
Vint. 89 0.2050 0.0000 Pauillac 0.1662 0.4300
Vint. 90 0.0599 0.0200 Pessac Leognan 0.3319 0.1680
Vint. 91 0.2691 0.0000 Pomerol 0.3630 0.1240
Vint. 92 0.3695 0.0000 Sauternes 0.3351 0.0800
Vint. 93 0.2265 0.0000 Saint Emilion Grand Cru 0.1901 0.6450
Vint. 94 0.0943 0.0000 Saint Estèphe 0.1332 0.5320
Vint. 95 0.0962 0.0000 Saint Julien 0.2598 0.2000
Vint. 96 0.3662 0.0000
Vint. 97 0.5215 0.0000
Vint. 98 0.4196 0.0000
Rank
1855 classication
Cinq Grands Crus 0.6590 0.0090
2CC 0.3410 0.0600
3CC 0.5419 0.0200
4CC 0.6205 0.0060
5CC 0.7018 0.0020
CB 0.8823 0.0000
Saint Emilion
C1A 1.1435 0.0160
C1B 0.1806 0.6760
C 0.2898 0.4900
Graves
CC 0.5837 0.0220
Non-classied 0.4738 0.0290
16
unobservable eects have been specied in our model as random château eects and estimations
show that they account for 81% of the total unexplained variance.
Another possible approach to weigh the relative impact of reputation and quality is to com-
pare the model tting the en primeur price using `quality' variables only (i.e. the model that
includes as explanatory variables the vintage dummies only) with the overall model including
also `reputation' variables (i.e. rank and appellation groups). The R-square of the latter reaches
0.62 whereas the former has an overall t equal to 0.12 only, which shows that the introduction of
`reputation' variables improves to a large extent the explanation of en primeur price variations.
Finally, to get a more precise idea of the impact of reputation and quality we compute
the marginal eect of each of the variables in the full model (see Table 8). As the dependent
variable has been transformed in logarithm, taking the exponential of each estimated coecient
gives the `multiplicative' marginal eect of the corresponding variable (relative to the base case
when looking at dummy variables). As an example the marginal eect of being classied in the
Cinquièmes Crus Classés (5CC) group is equal to 0.50; it means that, all other characteristics
being equal, a wine belonging to this group will be priced 0.50 times the price of a wine classied
in the Premiers Crus Classés (1CCb) group (the base case). Ranks exhibit marginal eects
ranging from 0.41 for the Crus Bourgeois (CB) to 3.14 for the Premiers Grands Crus Classés
A from the Saint Emilion region, which means that a wine classied C1A is priced around
eight times a wine ranked CB, all others things equal. The magnitude of reputation eects (as
measured by the marginal eects of the rank) is much larger than the magnitude of quality: the
marginal eects corresponding to vintage dummies vary from 0.69 (1992 vintage) to 1.69 (1997
17
Table 8: Marginal eects in the model for en primeur price
18
vintage).
On the competitive market for bottled wine, wines of dierent ages are traded between a high
number of sellers and buyers. As already spotted in the descriptive analysis, the impact of age
on price is quite complex and as this relationship could be non-linear we include as covariates in
the model the age of the wine both in level and in squares.
The model ts the logarithm of the detrended price of bottled wine, using Generalized Least
Squares on a panel data set of 185 châteaux. Unobserved heterogeneity is, as in the previous
model, accounted for by introducing a random château eect. Estimation results (see Table 9)
show that 70% of price variability is explained by the model. The overall quality of the vintage
as measured by Wine Spectator is highly valued by the consumers. Low quality wines such
as the ones from the 1987, 1991, 1992 and more particular the 1997 vintages exhibit large
negative estimated parameters. Indeed the vintage dummies capture almost exclusively the
vintage ratings attributed by Wine Spectator as the correlation coecient between estimated
parameters and grade is equal to 0.81. The quality of the wine in particular, as evaluated by
Robert Parker 's grade, is found a signicant but moderate determinant of price. The positive
coecient associated with the variable AGE conrms the intuition that a wine getting older will
be higher priced. Furthermore, the signicant and negative coecient associated with the age
squared conrms that the relationship between price and age is not linear. It is however dicult
to be more precise as age impacts prices simultaneously through a scarcity eect (mainly for
the good vintages) and a quality eect. It is important to know that this quality eect is not
19
Table 9: Hedonic analysis of the price of bottled wine
20
Table 10: Marginal eects in the model for bottled wine
21
straightforward as the time before a wine reaches maturity can vary from a wine to another (it
Reputation inuences the price of bottled wine as was the case for the en primeur price.
However, unlike the en primeur model most of the appellation dummies are signicant relative
to the base case (Barsac). The highest coecient associated with the Pomerol appellation group
could be explained because of the presence of prestigious wines such as Petrus in this non-
We repeat the same exercises as before, tting rst the model of bottled wine price using
variables inuencing quality only (vintage year, Parker's grade, and age of the wine
18 ). The
overall R-square is found equal to 0.42 (0.12 in the en primeur price model), that we have to
compare to 0.70 which is the R-square obtained when `reputation' variables are incorporated.
Second, we measure that the unobservable château eects represent 71% (88% in the en primeur
price model) of total unexplained variance of the whole model. These two results might suggest
that there is more information on quality while the wine has been bottled and that quality has
a stronger impact on the price of bottled wine than on the en primeur price.
As in the previous section we compute the marginal eect of each variable (see Table 10).
This table shows that the marginal eects of the ranking are large, ranging from 0.36 for the Crus
Bourgeois (CB) group to 3.04 for wines from Saint Emilion belonging to the group of Premiers
Grands Crus Classés A (C1A). Note that the ordering as well as the magnitude of the marginal
eects of the ranks are very similar in both models. As for the en primeur price, there is a large
17
The tannin, which is a major component in the structure of red wine, depends on grape variety. A structure
involving more tannin will benet more from a long stay in the cellar.
18
The R-square of the sub-model is unchanged whether the age of wine is included or not.
22
Table 11: Marginal eects of cross rates and ranks on the price of bottled wine
1855 classication
Cinq Grands Crus (1CC red) 1.051 1.053 1.037
1CC white 1.035 1.035 1.024
2CC 1.030 1.030 1.023
3CC 1.020 1.028 1.022
4CC 1.022 1.024 1.018
5CC 1.024 1.027 1.019
CB 1.017 1.021 1.015
Saint Emilion
C1A 1.035 1.054 1.037
C1B 1.017 1.026 1.019
C 1.012 1.031 1.015
Graves
CC 1.024 1.026 1.020
Non-classied 1.029 1.030 1.020
price premium associated with the groups of the Premiers Grands Crus Classés (5GC and C1A).
For bottled wine, appellation eects are also quite important as shown by the magnitude of the
marginal eects. Relative to Barsac, these eects range from a minimum of 0.46 for Bordeaux
Blanc to a maximum of 2.83 for Pomerol. In contrast, age and Parker 's ratings have a much
smaller impact on price. An additional quarter in age increases the price by a factor of 1.01 or,
equivalently, an additional one year for a bottle drives the price up by a factor of 1.06. The
marginal impact of the quality as announced by Parker is the following: ve additional points
Reputation and quality as judged by the experts might not be independent. This may
be checked by including the cross-product of Parker's rating and wine ranking as explanatory
variables in the model. To avoid multicollinearity, we only keep in the model the cross-products
23
and we remove the rank dummies and Parker 's rating as variables in level. Marginal eects
of variables crossing Parker's rating and ranks are reported in column 2 of Table 11. We also
propose to compare the ratings attributed by Robert Parker to the ones given by the Wine
Spectator magazine. As we do not observe Wine Spectator ratings for each of the wines, we
estimate the model and compute the marginal eects on the sub-sample of the 6,383 wines for
which we have both Parker and Wine Spectator grades. Marginal eects are found in columns 3
The marginal eect is larger for those wines belonging to top ranks (1CC and C1A) which
would mean that consumers value more a better judgement for top quality wines than for wines
belonging to lower ranks. From columns 3 and 4, we see that marginal eects are always larger
when Parker is the advisor, which may show the stronger inuence of Robert Parker on con-
sumers' choices.
5 Conclusion
This paper addresses the issue of measuring the relative impact of reputation and quality on the
price of wine, where the reputation of a wine is dened through its appellation and its rank.
The analysis is made on a panel data set of châteaux from the Bordeaux wine region, covering
sixteen vintages and including time-series observations of prices representative of the Bordeaux
region. The analysis of reputation is highly relevant as the old system of classication dates
back to the nineteenth century. The well-established reputation of the châteaux is found to be
determinant in the setting of en primeur price by the producers but also to be highly valued by
the consumers when they purchase bottled wine. Reputation is highly priced, in particular when
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the wine belongs to the most famous groups namely the Premiers Grands Crus Classés inside
The overall quality of the vintage, as measured in the present study by Wine Spectator 's
grade, is signicantly valued by the consumers on the market for bottled wine, but this impact
is much smaller than the impact of reputation. On the en primeur market it seems that during
the last four years the way the producers choose the en primeur prices have changed. Producers'
behaviour might have been inuenced by the boom experienced by the wine market during the
The impact of Robert Parker 's ratings is found to have a small even if signicant impact on
We also show that reputation and quality eects are not independent and that a better grade
is more highly valued by the consumers when they consider top quality wines. Furthermore, our
In addition to pioneering results on en primeur price, this analysis conrms previous ndings
that reputation is a major determinant of the price of bottled wine and that present quality as
measured by experts' ratings has a much smaller impact. Thus despite the criticism that the
ranking system should be updated, we show that consumers still highly value the rank of the
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Appendix: Overall Wine Spectator ratings for vintage years
Wine Spectator magazine makes a four-tier classication: Classic, Outstanding, Good to very
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