Message Authentication and

Hash Function
 Security Requirements
• Disclosure
• Traffic analysis
• Masquerade
• Content modification
• Sequence modification
• Timing modification
• Source repudiation
• Destination repudiation
• Disclosure: Release of message contents to any
person or process not possessing the appropriate
cryptographic key.

• Traffic analysis: Discovery of the pattern of traffic

between parties. In a connection-oriented
application, the frequency and duration of
connections could be determined. In either a
connection-oriented or connectionless environment,
the number and length of messages between
parties could be determined.
• Masquerade: Insertion of messages into the
network from a fraudulent source. This includes
the creation of messages by an opponent that
are purported to come from an authorized entity.
Also included are fraudulent acknowledgments
of message receipt or nonreceipt by someone
other than the message recipient.

• Content modification: Changes to the contents

of a message, including insertion, deletion,
transposition, and modification.
• Sequence modification: Any modification to a sequence of
messages between parties, including insertion, deletion,
and reordering.

• Timing modification: Delay or replay of messages. In a

connection-oriented application, an entire session or
sequence of messages could be a replay of some previous
valid session, or individual messages in the sequence could
be delayed or replayed. In a connectionless application, an
individual message (e.g., datagram) could be delayed or
replayed.

• Source repudiation: Denial of transmission of message by

source.

• Destination repudiation: Denial of receipt of message by

destination.
 Message Authentication
• Message authentication is concerned with:
– protecting the integrity of a message
– validating identity of originator
– non- repudiation of origin (dispute resolution)
• will consider the security requirements
• then three alternative functions used:
1. Message Encryption
2. Message Authentication Code (MAC)
3. Hash Function
 1. Message Encryption
• Message encryption by itself also provides
a measure of authentication
• if symmetric encryption is used then:
– receiver know sender must have created it
– since only sender and receiver know key used
– if message has suitable structure, redundancy
or a checksum to detect any changes
 Message Encryption
• if public-key encryption is used:
– encryption provides no confidence of sender
– since anyone potentially knows public-key
– however if
• sender signs message using their private-key
• then encrypts with recipients public key
• have both secrecy and authentication
– again need to recognize corrupted messages
– but at cost of two public-key uses on message
 2. Message Authentication Code
(MAC)
• generated by an algorithm that creates a
small fixed-sized block
– depending on both message and some key
– like encryption though need not be reversible
• appended to message as a signature
• receiver performs same computation on
message and checks it matches the MAC
• provides assurance that message is
unaltered and comes from sender
A MAC function is similar to encryption.

One difference is that t

The MAC algorithm need not be reversible, as it must for decryption.

In general, the MAC function is a many-to-one function

Message Authentication Codes
• as shown the MAC provides confidentiality
• can also use encryption for secrecy
– generally use separate keys for each
– can compute MAC either before or after encryption
– is generally regarded as better done before
• why use a MAC?
– sometimes only authentication is needed
– sometimes need authentication to persist longer than
the encryption (eg. archival use)
• note that a MAC is not a digital signature
 MAC Properties
• a MAC is a cryptographic checksum
MAC = CK(M)
– condenses a variable-length message M
– using a secret key K
– to a fixed-sized authenticator
• is a many-to-one function
– potentially many messages have same MAC
– but finding these needs to be very difficult
taking into account the types of attacks
 Requirements for MACs
• need the MAC to satisfy the following:
1. knowing a message and MAC, is infeasible
to find another message with same MAC
2. MACs should be uniformly distributed
3. MAC should depend equally on all bits of the
message
 Three situations in which a MAC is used
1. There are a number of applications in which the same message is
broadcast to a number of destinations. Examples are notification to
users that the network is now unavailable or an alarm signal in a
military control center. It is cheaper and more reliable to have only
one destination responsible for monitoring authenticity. Thus, the
message must be broadcast in plaintext with an associated
message authentication code. The responsible system has the
secret key and performs authentication. If a violation occurs, the
other destination systems are alerted by a general alarm.
2. Another possible scenario is an exchange in which one side has a
heavy load and cannot afford the time to decrypt all incoming
messages. Authentication is carried out on a selective basis,
messages being chosen at random for checking.
3. Authentication of a computer program in plaintext is an attractive
service. The computer program can be executed without having to
decrypt it every time, which would be wasteful of processor
resources. However, if a message authentication code were
attached to the program, it could be checked whenever assurance
was required of the integrity of the program
Using Symmetric Ciphers for MACs
• can use any block cipher chaining mode
and use final block as a MAC
• Data Authentication Algorithm (DAA) is
a widely used MAC based on DES-CBC
– using IV=0 and zero-pad of final block
– encrypt message using DES in CBC mode
– and send just the final block as the MAC
• or the leftmost M bits (16≤M≤64) of final block
• but final MAC is now too small for security
Data Authentication Algorithm
 3. Hash Functions
• condenses arbitrary message to fixed size
• usually assume that the hash function is
public and not keyed
– MAC which is keyed
• hash used to detect changes to message
• can use in various ways with message
• most often to create a digital signature
Hash Functions & Digital Signatures
Hash Functions & Digital
Signatures
Hash Functions & Digital Signatures
 Hash Function Properties
• a Hash Function produces a fingerprint of
some file/message/data
h = H(M)
– condenses a variable-length message M
– to a fixed-sized fingerprint
• assumed to be public
 Requirements for Hash Functions
1. can be applied to any sized message M
2. produces fixed-length output h
3. is easy to compute h=H(M) for any message M
4. given h is infeasible to find x s.t. H(x)=h
• one-way property
5. given x is infeasible to find y s.t. H(y)=H(x)
• weak collision resistance
6. is infeasible to find any x,y s.t. H(y)=H(x)
• strong collision resistance
 Simple Hash Functions
• are several proposals for simple functions
• based on XOR of message blocks
• not secure since can manipulate any
message and either not change hash or
change hash also
• need a stronger cryptographic function
 Birthday Attacks
might think a 64-bit hash is secure
but by Birthday Paradox is not
birthday attack works thus:
m/
opponent generates 2 2 variations of a valid message
all with essentially the same meaning
m/
opponent also generates 2 2 variations of a desired
fraudulent message
two sets of messages are compared to find pair with
same hash (probability > 0.5 by birthday paradox)
have user sign the valid message, then substitute the
forgery which will have a valid signature
conclusion is that need to use larger MAC/hash
 Block Ciphers as Hash Functions
can use block ciphers as hash functions
using H0=0 and zero-pad of final block
compute: Hi = EMi [Hi-1]
and use final block as the hash value
similar to CBC but without a key
resulting hash is too small (64-bit)
both due to direct birthday attack
and to “meet-in-the-middle” attack
other variants also susceptible to attack
Hash Functions & MAC Security
like block ciphers have:
brute-force attacks exploiting
m/
strong collision resistance hash have cost 2 2
have proposal for h/w MD5 cracker
128-bit hash looks vulnerable, 160-bits better
MACs with known message-MAC pairs
can either attack keyspace (cf key search) or MAC
at least 128-bit MAC is needed for security
Hash Functions & MAC Security
cryptanalytic attacks exploit structure
like block ciphers want brute-force attacks to be the best
alternative
have a number of analytic attacks on iterated hash
functions
CVi = f[CVi-1, Mi]; H(M)=CVN
typically focus on collisions in function f
like block ciphers is often composed of rounds
attacks exploit properties of round functions
 Summary
• have considered:
– Message Authentication using
• Message encryption
• MACs
• Hash functions