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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL FM 101-31-1
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.! MARINE CORPS FLEET MARINE FORCE MANUAL FMFM 11-4
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STAFF 0FFICERS\ FIELD MANUAL
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DOCTRINE AND PROCEDURES
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ROOM 1 A 518 PENTAGON

DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY A.ND THE NAVY

FEBRUARY 1968
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FM 101-31-1/FMFM

ü Change DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY

C 1

AND THE NAVY

No. 1 WASHINGTON, D.C., 19 December 1969

STAFF OFFICERS’ FIELD MANUAL

NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT
DOCTRINE AND PROCEDURES
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4, 15 February 1968, is changed as follows:

1. Remove old pages and insert new pages as indicated below.

Remoce pages Imert paçet
1- 1-
1 and 1-2
2- 2—
1 and 2-2
2- 2-
15 and 2-16
3- 3-
1 through 3-6
3- 3-
9 through 3-12
4- 4-
7 through 4-14
5- 5-
1 through 5-4
6- 6-
3 and 6-4
B-l through B~4 B-l through B-4
B-ll and B-12 B-ll and B-12
B—23 and B—24 B-23 and B-24
B—31 and B—32 B-31 and B-32

m
i B—43 and B—44 B-43 and B-44
B-55 and B-56 B-55 and B-56
B—59 and B—60 B-59 and B-60
B-65 and B-66 B-65 and B-66
Glossary-1 Glossary-1, Glossary-2

2. A star indicates new or changed material.

3. File this change sheet in front of the manual for reference purposes.

RETURN TO h.,iu LIOiiÂRY

ROOM 1 A 518 PENTAGON
 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4
By Order of the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy: #

W. C. WESTMORELAND, '
General, United States Army,
1
Official : Chief of Staff.
KENNETH G. WICKHAM, 1
Major General, United States Army, i
The Adjutant General.
I

C. B. DRAKE,
Major General, U.S. Marine Corps,
Assistant Chief of Staff G-3

I!
Distribution :
Army :
I'
To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11 requirements for Staff Officers’ Field
Manual, Nuclear Weapons Employment.
MARCO BPS LIST:
1025/2030/2064/2132/2133/2145/4070/4125/4256/
5155/5156/5192/5205/6600/6900/6902/6905/6965/
7220/7230/7373/7380/7615/7620/7655/7717/7783/
7792 (1)
7506 (21)
7615-04/8145 (2)

m
 *FM 101-31-1
FMFM 11-4

FIELD MANUAL
No. 101-31-1 DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY
FLEET MARINE AND THE NAVY
FORCE MANUAL
No. 11-4 WASHINGTON, D.C., 15 February 1968

STAFF OFFICERS1 FIELD MANUAL

NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT
DOCTRINE AND PROCEDURES

Paragraph Page
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1- 1-1
2. INITIAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Section I. General 2- 2-1
II. Blast and shock 2-5—2-11 2-
III. Thermal radiation 2-12—2-16 2-8
IV. Initial nuclear radiation 2-17—2-23 2-11
V. Combined effects and special considerations 2- 2-16
CHAPTER 3. TARGET ANALYSIS
Section I. General 3- 3-
II. Techniques for target analysis 3_4—3-8 3-6
III. Special considerations 3- 3-
CHAPTER 4. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES, STAFF PROCEDURES,
AND TECHNIQUES OF EMPLOYMENT 4- 4-
5. OPERATIONS IN RESIDUAL RADIATION AREAS 5- 5-
6. PROTECTIVE MEASURES
Section I. General 6- 6-
II. Individual protective measures 6-3, 6-4 6-3
III. Unit protective measures 6-5—6-9 6-4
APPENDIX A. REFERENCES A-l
B. TARGET ANALYSIS B-l
Annex B-I. Probability and concept of damage B-ll
B-II. Damage estimation B-16
Tab B-II-1. Index method of damage estimation B-20
B-I 1-2. Visual method of damage estimation B-25
B-II-3. Numerical method of damage estimation B-29
Annex B-III. Limiting requirements B-39
B-IV. Selection of the desired ground zero B-46
B-V. Special considerations B-55
B-VI. Poststrike damage prediction B-62
B-VII. Friendly vulnerability B-65
GLOSSARY Glossary-1

y
INDEX

*fni* mi
manual supersedes FM 101-31-1, 1 February 1963, including all changes.
Index-1
 C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1—1. Purpose ★1-3. Recommended Changes

This manual provides guidance to commanders Users of this manual are encouraged to submit
and staff officers in the operational and logistical recommendations to improve the manual. Com-
aspects of nuclear weapon employment in combat ments should be keyed to the specific page, para-
operations. graph, and line of text in which the change is rec-
ommended. Reasons will be provided for each
1—2. Scope comment to insure understanding and complete
a. The doctrine presented in this manual is evaluation. Comments should be prepared using
basically concerned with nuclear weapon employ- DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publi-
ment within the field army and the Fleet Marine cations) and forwarded direct to the Commanding
Force. When the manual discusses special ammu- Officer, U.S. Army Combat Developments Com-
nition logistics and vulnerability analyses, the mand Institute of Nuclear Studies, Fort Bliss,
scope is extended to include the area of operations. Texas 79916. Originators of proposed changes that
b. Guidance is presented for the employment of would constitute a significant modification of ap-
nuclear weapons in the attack of targets on or proved Army doctrine may send an information
near the earth’s surface. copy, through command channels to the Command-
e. The complete manual series (FM 101-31-1, ing General, U.S. Army Combat Developments
FM 101-31-2, and FM 101-31-3) includes the Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060, to facili-
following information: tate review and followup. Marine Corps users of
(1) The U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine this manual will submit comments to the Com-
Corps doctrine for employment of nuclear manding General Marine Corps Development
weapons. and Education Command (ATTN : 45R) Quan-
(2) The effects expected from nuclear tico, Virginia 22134.
weapons.
(3) Techniques of target analysis. 1—4. Organizations of the Manual Series
(4) Command and staff procedures in nuclear The material is divided into three separate
weapon employment. manuals—
(5) Guidance for conducting tactical opera- a. This manual provides doctrine applicable to
tions in a nuclear environment. active nuclear warfare. It contains the U.S. Army
(6) Defensive measures, individual and unit, and U.S. Marine Corps concepts for nuclear
to reduce the effects of enemy-delivered weapons. weapon employment and the command and staff
(7) Tabular information concerning target actions required to carry out these concepts. Ap-
response and troop safety for a family of hypo- pendix B presents detailed technical procedures
thetical weapons and for stockpile weapons. concerning target analysis.
(8) Pertinent portions of STAN AGs 2083, b. FM 101-31-2 contains classified defense in-
2103, 2104, 2111, SOLOGs 89,- 123, 128, 130 and formation concerning the nuclear weapons in the
SEASTAG 2083. U.S. stockpile. It provides the data necessary for
d. This manual repeats information presented target analysis. It presents items of. information
in other field manuals only as required for clarity concerning technical procedures that are not in-
or consistency. The manual should, therefore, be cluded in this manual because of their security
used in conjunction with other applicable manuals. classification. FM 101-31-2 is designed for use in
For a discussion of the employment of nuclear active nuclear combat, field training exercises
weapons in the air defense role, see FM 44-1A. (FTX), and command post exercises (CPX).
1-1
C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4
FM 101-31-2 (Modified) is intended to be used by
\\
authomtylto employ nuclear weapons is decen-
NATO members in actual combat, FTX, and tralize!. *'i
CPX. d. UMi«a States nuclear weapons may be em-
c. FM 101-31-3 provides data concerning a ployed in support of Allied forces, using either
family of hypothetical nuclear weapons. It pro- United States or Allied delivery means. The
vides the data necessary for target analysis. FM nuclear warhead section (to include artillery pro-
101-31-3 is designed specifically for use in unclas- jectiles) remains under the control of United
sified training of the staff officer, particularly the States military personnel until time of launching
nuclear weapon employment officer. It is not in- or firing.
tended for field exercises or command post exer- e. A commander who plans to employ a nuclear
cises by U.S. Forces, but can be so used by non-U.S. weapon coordinates with any adjacent unit com-
forces. The illustrative problems in appendix B, mander into whose zone, or sector, militarily sig-
this manual, use data from FM 101-31-3. nificant weapon effects are expected to extend.
d. The organization of the material in FM 101- Lacking concurrence, the commander requests
31-2 and FM 101-31-3 is, in most cases, identical. authority to fire from the next higher commander
Differences between the U.S. stockpile weapons who controls both sectors.
and the family of hypothetical weapons exist; /. Nuclear firepower is a form of combat power.
these differences are intentional and are designed Nuclear weapons may, on occasion, be used alone
to protect the security of the actual weapons. Facil- to accomplish tasks that might otherwise require
ity in the use of FM 101-31-3 will insure facility the maneuver of close combat units ; however, most
in the use of FM 101-31-2. tasks require a combination of fire and maneuver.
Plans for the employment of nuclear firepower,
1—5. Concepts for Nuclear Weapons nonnuclear firepower, and maneuver forces are
Employment integrated to provide decisive results.
The doctrine in this manual is based on the follow- g. Nuclear weapons are employed to destroy or
ing basic concepts : degrade enemy combat capaibilities. Consistent
with the requirements imposed by the tactical mis-
a. The U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps are sion, casualties among civilian personnel are held
organized, equipped, and trained to fight in to a minimum. Destruction of manmade structures
nuclear warfare, nonnuclear warfare, or under the or natural terrain features, tree blowdown or fire
threat of nuclear warfare. In the latter case, units areas, and creation of high-intensity residual con-
are prepared to take the actions indicated in this tamination areas may create undesired obstacles to
manual should nuclear warfare begin. movement. Consistent with military objectives, un-
&. Nuclear weapons may be employed within the necessary destruction and contamination should be
area of operations when the theater commander held to a minimum.
announces that their use has been authorized. h. Commanders employ the smallest and
c. Once nuclear warfare has commenced, the most readily available weapon with a suffi-

1-2
 FM 101-31—1/FMFM 11-4

ciently high probability of providing the cov- employment and is not found in the afore-
erage that insures the desired results. mentioned publications. To provide definitions
of terms and phrases peculiar to nuclear
i. Commanders employ surface bursts when
surface bursts accomplish the results desired weapon employment, a glossary is contained
in the back of this manual.
more effectively than do Airbursts. (Factors
to be considered are presented in para 4-10.)
1-7. Nuclear Play
j. Commanders conduct poststrike analysis
as required. For maneuver control, FM 105-5 and the
FM 105-6 Nuclear Play Calculator series of
field manuals has been designed. FM 105-6-1,
1-6. Terms and Definitions FM 105-6-2, and FM 105-6-3, cover the un-
Terms and definitions useful for a better classified and classified portions of nuclear
understanding of this manual may be found gaming and include techniques and tables that
in AR 320-5 and in JCS Pub 1. Certain allow considerations of probabilities to be
terminology is oriented toward nuclear weapon entertained in the gaming.

1-3
's

*
 C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

CHAPTER 2

INITIAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Section I. GENERAL

2-1. General duced by a high-pressure impulse or wave as it

а. The effective employment of nuclear weapons travels outward from the burst.
requires an understanding of the effects produced (2) Thermal radiation. Heating effects result
by these weapons, the response of various target as objects in the surrounding area absorb thermal
elements to these effects, the distance at which energy released by the burst.
damage or casualties may be produced, the methods (3) Nuclear radiation. Ionizing effects are
of estimating the results of nuclear bursts under produced when nuclear radiation emitted by the
various conditions, and the variability of the pre- burst is absorbed.
dicted results. c. Valuation Parameters. The percentage of the
б. This chapter presents a general qualitative total energy emitted, appearing as blast, thermal
discussion of initial nuclear weapon effects and radiation, or nuclear radiation, depends on the al-
their military significance. TM 23-200 presents a titude at which the burst takes place (subsurface,
quantitative discussion of effects, and provides the surface, air) and on the physical design of the
nuclear weapon employment officer with a means weapon.
by which he can determine the distance to which 2-3. Damage Criteria and Radius of
various effects extend.
Damage
2-2. Description of Nuclear Detonations a. General. Two specific types of information
а. Release of Energy. The magnitude of the pertaining to the military use of nuclear weapons
energy released in a nuclear explosion exceeds have been developed through weapon tests. These
enormously the energy released in a nonnuclear ex- specific effects data appear in TM 23-200.
plosion. Two types of nuclear reactions produce (1) The thermal, blast, or nuclear radiation
energy—fission and fusion. A fusion reaction is levels required to cause a particular degree of dam-
approximately three times as efficient per kilogram age to a materiel or a personnel target element.
of fuel as is a fission reaction. The energy released (2) The distance to which the required levels
(yield) by a nuclear detonation is measured in will extend from a given weapon.
thousands of tons of TNT equivalent (kiloton h. Damage Analysis. The nuclear weapon em-
(KT) ), or in millions of tons of TNT equivalent ployment officer uses data derived from effects
(megaton (MT)). As a result of the sudden re- {a above) to estimate the damage that a specific
lease of immense quantities of energy, a fireball is weapon will cause to a target. By knowing the ap-
formed. The fireball rapidly grows in size and proximate damage each weapon will cause, be
rises high into the atmosphere. The initial temper- selects the most appropriate weapon to accomplish
ature of the fireball ranges into millions of degrees, the mission from those available for use.
and the initial pressure ranges to millions of ■jçc. Degrees of Materiel Damage.
atmospheres. (1) Damage to materiel is classified by de-
б. Partition of Energy. Transfer of energy grees as light, moderate, or severe. These degrees
from the weapon to the surrounding media begins of damage are described in (a) through (c) below.
with the actual nuclear explosion and is exhibited (a) Light damage does not prevent the
as three distinct effects. immediate use of an item. Some repair by the user
(1) Blast. may be Mechanical shock full
needed to make effects
use are pro-item.
of the

2-1
C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

(b) Moderate damage prevents use of an have one radius of damage for moderate damage to
item until extensive repairs are made. wheeled vehicles, another radius of damage for
(c) Severe damage prevents use of the item severe damage to wheeled vehicles, and another
permanently. Kepair, in this case, is generally im- for casualties to protected personnel. For purposes
possible or is more costly than replacement. of this discussion, all specified target elements
(2) Moderate damage usually is all that is within the radius of damage are assumed to receive
required to deny the use of equipment. In most the desired degree of damage. Appendix B pre-
situations, this degree of damage will be sufficient sents a more detailed discussion of the concept of
to support tactical operations. There may be situa- radius of damage.
tions, such as the attack of a bridge, in which only
2-4. Types of Burst—Definition and
severe damage will produce the desired results.
Significance
d. Personnel Casualties. Personnel casualties
(combat ineffectives), unlike damage are not clas- Nuclear weapons may be burst at any point from
sified as to degree. Whenever personnel cannot deep below the surface to very high in the air.
perform their duties as a result of the weapon (s) Tactically, nuclear bursts are classified according
employed against them, they are considered casu- to the manner in which they are employed. The
alties. Some personnel will be effective immedi- terms listed below and their associated definitions
ately following attack but will later become combat are used in the remainder of this manual. For
ineffective because of the delayed effects of nuclear technical definitions of the various heights of
radiation. burst, see TM 23-200.
a. Subsurface Burst (less than 0 meter height
e. Personnel Casualties Versus Materiel Dam- '
of burst). This type of burst generally is used to
age. For most tactical targets, it is desirable to
cause damage to underground targets and struc-
base target analysis on casualties rather than on
tures and to cause cratering.
damage to materiel. Exceptions are targets such as
b. Impact or Contact Surface Burst (0 meter
missile launchers, bridges, and other key struc-
height of burst). This type of burst is used to
tures.
cause fallout, ground shock and cratering, and
/. Radius of Damage. The primary tool used may be used against hard underground targets
in estimating damage to the target is referred to located relatively near the surface of the earth.
as the radius of damage (RD). The radius of c. Nuclear-Surface Burst. This type of burst
damage is the distance from the ground zero (GZ) causes fallout because the fireball touches the sur-
at which the probability of an individual target face. Because of this fallout producing aspect,
element receiving a specified degree of damage is employment of this type of burst is limited.
50 percent. Every nuclear burst produces a radius d. Low Airburst. This type of burst is used for
of damage for each associated target element and the most effective coverage of damage to the
a degree of damage. For example, a weapon will great majority of ground targets of inter-

2-2
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

est to troops in the field. As used in this man- and to reduce the intensity of induced radia-
ual, this height of burst will preclude fallout. tion in the vicinity of the ground zero. How-
It is the height of burst most frequently used. ever, this height of burst reduces the radius of
e. High Airburst. A high airburst is used in damage for most target elements and, conse-
special cases for maximum coverage of “soft” quently, receives little attention.
ground targets, such as light frame buildings,

Section II. BLAST AND SHOCK

2-5. Airblast, General ment of the blast wave. Furthermore,

some of the blast energy is used to
a. Airblast is produced by nearly all types
produce a crater, and some of the
of bursts. In general—
blast energy is transmitted as ground
(1) The airburst produces the most dam- shock.
age from the blast effect along the
(3)
ground. When the blast wave from
an airburst strikes the earth, it is produces the least blast damage to
most military targets. Again, there is
reflected by the earth’s surface. The
less reflection and reinforcement of
reflected blast wave then reinforces
the blast wave. Also, more blast
the incident blast wave, producing
energy is used to produce a larger
overpressures higher than those in
the incident wave. This increase in crater, and some of the blast energy
is transmitted as ground shock. The
overpressure results in a greater area
coverage for blast effects since the deeper the weapon is burst, the less
distance to which low magnitude airblast is produced.
overpressures or dynamic pressures b. The pressure is highest at the leading
extend are increased. This increase in edge of a blast wave. As the blast wave
in distance provides an additional moves away from the fireball, the pressure
damage-producing capability for at the leading edge steadily decreases, and
“soft” targets which are destroyed the pressure behind the leading edge drops
or damaged by the relatively low off to normal. Figure 2-1 shows the relative
pressures. pressures behind the blast wave at a short
(2) The surface burst produces less total distance from the burst. After the blast wave
area coverage for blast damage than has traveled a greater distance from the fire-
the airburst to most military targets. ball, the pressure in the air behind the blast
This is because there is less reinforce- wave drops below that of the surrounding

I Whllt I W W W ** I W

edge of blast wave

Pressure at trailing
edge of blast
wave

Distance
Figure 2-1. Variation of pressure within the blast wave.

2-3
 £
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

Peak overpressure

\ Peak overpressure

(+)

Positive^ Negative Positive

sphase-^ phase phase
Normal
atmospheric 0/76

pressure

Í2-
‘Distance
CD ®

(-)

LEGEND
Location of shock fiont.
Pressure curve.

Figure 2-2. Overpressure versus distance from the burst center.

L
 .3*'

FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4
Tima |-*—

Time

»Q>
e-
a>
s

Time

100 500 Tï-o/yj 1000

Relative distance (meters)

Figure 2-S. The duration of the blast wave increases with the distance from the ground zero.

10 KT 50 KT

a-oJV£
Time Time Time

Figure 2-4. The duration of the blast wave increases with the yield at the same distance from GZ.

atmosphere and a “negative phase” is formed. directions, it exerts two types of damaging
Figure 2-2 shows a blast wave at two different pressures on all materiel in its path—
distances from its origin during its expansion.
The negative phase is shown behind the blast a. Static Overpressure. This is a squeezing
wave after it has expanded. or crushing force that surrounds the object
and continues to apply pressure from all sides
c. Both the positive and the negative phases until the pressure returns to normal. During
produce damage ; high pressures in the positive the time that the blast wave passes an object,
phase cause the most damage. In analyzing a a static pressure differential exists. The side
target for probable blast effect, the effects of nearest the burst receives high pressures be-
the negative phase are disregarded. fore the side away from the burst. This pres-
sure differential produces a temporary force
2-6. Damaging Pressures away from the burst that causes damage in
As the blast wave moves outward in all addition to that caused by the squeezing of the

2-5
object At any given point away from the pressures extend. Generally, they decrease the
ground zero, the highest static overpressure distance to which dynamic pressures extend.
reached during passage of the blast wave is c. Topography. Most data concerning blast
called the “peak” static overpressure for that
effects are based on flat or gently rolling ter-
point. Targets that are sensitive to, and are
rain. There is no field method for calculating
damaged primarily by, static overpressures are changes in blast pressures due to hilly or
called diffraction targets.
mountainous terrain. In general, pressures are
b. Dynamic Pressure. As greater on the
the blast forward slopes of steep hills
wave
moves away from the burst point, it is accom- and are diminished on reverse slopes when
panied by high winds. Dynamic pressure is a compared with pressures at the same distance
measure of the forces associated with these on flat terrain. Blast shielding is not dependent
winds. This pressure causes damage by push- on line-of-sight considerations because blast
ing, tumbling, or tearing apart target ele- waves easily bend (refract) around apparent
ments. However, there is no simple correlation obstacles. The influence of small hills or folds
between peak static overpressure and peak dy- in the ground is considered negligible for tar-
namic pressure. Targets that are damaged get analysis procedures. Hills may decrease
primarily by dynamic pressure are called drag- dynamic pressures and offer some local
type targets. Most materiel targets are drag protection from flying debris.
sensitive. Personnel become casualties when d. Cities or Built-Up Areas. These areas are
they are subjected to weapon-produced trans- not expected to have a significant effect on the
lational motion. blast wave. Structures may provide some local
shielding from flying debris. Some local pres-
2-7. ¡Pmpeaegafmin ®<? ASirblgssf Weave sure increases may result from structures
The duration of damaging overpressures is channeling the blast wave. However, the
relatively short as the blast wave passes any general airblast characteristics in cities and
given point. As the blast wave moves away urban areas are considered essentially the
from the ground zero, the duration of the blast same as those for open terrain.
wave, increases; however, the peak overpres- e. Forests. Forests will not have a signifi-
sure decreases (fig. 2-3). The duration of the cant effect on blast wave characteristics,
blast wave also increases (at the same distance which are essentially the same as those for
from the burst point) as the yield increases open terrain.
(fig. 2-4). For a given peak overpressure along
the earth’s surface, the duration of the blast /. Height of Burst. The height of burst de-
wave depends on the height of burst, the termines the extent to which the blast wave
distance from the ground zero, the yield, and is reflected and influences the strength of inci-
the surface conditions. dent and reflected blast waves. In general—
(1) Low heights of burst increase the
2—S. M®dlôffyDBiig IntfliyeinKses ©ira Âîirbl©$î Weave distances at which hard materiel tar-
gets ' will be damaged. Target ele-
а. Weather. Rain and fog may cause attenu- ments in this category include tanks,
ation of the blast wave, because energy is personnel carriers, personnel in fox-
dissipated in evaporating the moisture in the holes, artillery pieces, and missile
atmosphere. launchers.
б. Surface Conditions. The reflecting quality (2) High heights of burst increase the
of the surface over which a weapon is de- distances at which soft targets are
tonated can significantly influence the distance damaged. Target elements in this
to which blast effects extend. Generally, re- category include exposed personnel
flecting surfaces, such as ice, snow, and water, most buildings, and forests.
increase the distance to which static over- (3) Only rarely will it be necessary to
 FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

select a height of burst other than and other types of field fortifications
the impact or low airburst option to may become casualties if the blast
attain maximum results against a pressures build up by multiple reflec-
military target. The precomputed tions within such inclosures.
weapon tables shown in FM 101-31-2 (2) Translation, the process by which
and FM 101-31-3 present to the personnel and materiel objects are
nuclear weapon employment officer picked up and thrown, is the basis
only these burst options. for prediction of blast casualties to
(4) The effects tables in FM 101-31-2 personnel in the open.
and FM 101-31-3 provide data for
target analysis using other heights of /. Indirect effects of blast are not included
burst if tactical considerations war- in the data in this manual, FM 101-31-2, or
rant. (See Annex B-V for details.) FM 101-31-3 because they are unpredictable.
These are considered bonus effects and are
2-9. Ground Target Response to Blast caused by—
(1) Flying debris, stones, and sand being
a. The blast effect of a nuclear weapon is . converted to missiles by the blast
important as a damaging agent against mate- wave and causing damage or casual-
riel and as a casualty producer. In fact, blast ties. Casualties as a result of the mis-
may be the only effective damage or casualty sile effect are unpredictable, because
producer against some types of targets. For of the unpredictability of the protec-
example, troops in a city may have some pro- tion of personnel in the target area.
tection from thermal radiation and initial nu- Sand and dust may limit visibility
clear radiation: most of the immediate casual- and movement in the target area up
ties will probably come from collapsing to several hours after a detonation.
buildings and flying glass and debris caused
by blast. (2) Buildings or fortifications collapsing
on personnel.
b. Most types of military equipment are
drag sensitive and are damaged primarily by 2-10. Obstacles
the dynamic pressures associated with the
passage of the blast wave. Rubble within built-up areas and tree blow-
down from nuclear blast, often extend to con-
c. Parked aircraft, structures, bridges, and siderable distances beyond the primary target
forests are damaged by a combination of area. The resulting obstacles may be of major
static and dynamic pressures. proportions and often may block avenues of
d. Mines may be detonated by static over- approach or hinder the accomplishment of the
pressures. military mission.
o

e. The direct effects of blast against per-

2-11. Cratering and Ground Shock, General
sonnel are from both static overpressures and
dynamic pressures. a. When a nuclear weapon is burst beneath,
(1) High static overpressures are re- on, or near the surface, a portion of the blast
quired to cause immediate deaths, energy, coupled with the vaporizing effect of
provided no translational motion oc- the thermal radiation, scoops up and throws
curs. Lower overpressures may cause out a large quantity of earth, resulting in the
severe internal injuries, especially to formation of a crater. Destruction of deep
the lungs or abdominal organs. Ear- underground targets, the blocking of defiles,
drum rupture, which is painful but and the creation of obstacles may best be
not necessarily disabling, may result accomplished by cratering and ground shock
from still lower overpressures. Per- effects.
sonnel in shelters, gun emplacements, b. The type of soil in the area affects the

2-7

■ r*
 FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

co

Relative volume
of crater O0

(Linear Scale
Relative depth of burst

Figure 2—5. The size of the crater varies with the depth of burst for a given weapon.

size of the crater because different soils have ously prepared positions that maximize their
different densities and cohesive characteris- effectiveness.
tics. As the depth of burst increases, the size c. The shock wave produced by the nuclear
of the crater increases to a maximum, then detonation is transmitted through the sur-
decreases (fig. 2-5). It is normally impractical rounding earth, the degree of transmission
to deliver or emplace weapons deep enough being dependent on the soil characteristics. In
to produce craters significantly larger than general, ground shock is attenuated much more
those produced by a surface burst, unless exist- rapidly than is airblast. As a result, the dis-
ing tunnels or mines can be used for em- tance to which militarily significant damage to
placement of the weapons ; however, even an underground target extends normally is not
shallow burial will enhance crater dimensions great. Because the repair of underground
over those resulting from a surface burst. structures and utilities is difficult, moderate
Atomic demolition munitions (ADM) may, damage may be sufficient to satisfy the tactical
however, be deliberately emplaced in previ- requirement.

Section III. THERMAL RADIATION

2-12. General, Definition and Description b. The first pulse is not militarily significant,
a. Thermal radiation is the because
heat the
and energy
light ofemitted during this time
consists primarily X-ray and ultraviolet
produced by the nuclear explosion. The instan- radiations. These are readily attenuated in air
taneous release of an enormous quantity of
energy in a very small space results in the and do not travel beyond the distances within
attainment of an initial temperature at the which other effects predominate.
center of the fireball that ranges into the c. The energy emitted during the second
millions of degrees. This center temperature pulse is visible light and infrared radiation.
rapidly falls as the fireball expands and energy This energy extends to great distances and is
is transmitted to the surrounding medium. It responsible for most of the thermal damage of
is a phenomenon of nuclear weapons detonated military significance.
in the atmosphere that thermal energy is
emitted in two distinct pulses. Figure 2-6 rep- d. Approximately 20 percent of the total
resents relative rate of delivery of thermal thermal energy is delivered by the time the
energy as a function of time. second thermal pulse reaches its maximum
2-8

L
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

10
1st maximum

maximum

Right
c/î
'1 --GO
a> scale Percentage
-.50 of
total
- -40 energy
~ro emitted
<u
ce 430
Left scale
Minimum

4 5 6 7
Relative time

Figure 2-6. Thermal pulses.

emission rate. From the standpoint of protec- a. Travels at the speed of light.
tion against skin burns, evasive action must be h. Travels in straight lines.
taken prior to this time. The length of time
over which the second pulse is delivered, and c. Can be scattered.
the time at which the second maximum occurs, d. Can be reflected.
increase with weapon yield, as follows:
Yield Time to second maximum e. Can be easily absorbed or attenuated.
(KT) (seconds)
1 0.03 f. Has an emission time that increases with
10 0.10 yield.
50 0.23
100 0.32
500 0.73
2-14. Modifying Influences
1,000 1.00 a. Weather. Any condition that significantly
10,000 3.30 affects visibility or the transparency of the
50,000 7.30
air will significantly affect transmission of
e. It is apparent from the data contained in thermal radiation. Clouds, fog, snow, or rain
d above, that it is virtually impossible to take absorbs thermal energy and causes a reduc-
evasive action to prevent skin burns from the tion in intensity as the thermal radiation
smaller yield weapons. passes through. Artificial smoke, depending on
/. The total quantity of thermal energy the concentration, can stop up to 90 percent of
available is directly proportional to the yield the thermal energy. On the other hand, clouds
for the same type weapon. above the burst may reflect thermal radiation
on the target in addition to that which is re-
2-13. Characteristics ceived directly.
Within the atmosphere, the principal char- b. Terrain. Large hill masses, trees, or any
acteristics of thermal radiation are that it— opaque object along the fireball-to-target line

2-9

f'A
 FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

may provide some protection to a target ele- (2) Second-degree burns—blistering of

ment. Trucks, buildings, or even another indi- the skin.
vidual may protect an individual from thermal (3) Third-degree burns—charring of
radiation. Foxholes provide good protection. skin and tissue beneath the surface
However, personnel protected from direct of the skin.
line-of-sight radiation from the fireball may
receive thermal injury because of reflection c. Castialties. The severity, location, and
from buildings or other objects. Good reflect- size of the burn determine whether personnel
ing surfaces, such as water, snow, or smooth become casualties. Second- and third-degree
sand, may reflect heat on the target and inten-burns are considered to produce casualties ;
sify the thermal radiation effect. Even the first-degree burns do not.
backs and sides of open foxholes will reflect d. Visual Effects. The flash of light pro-
thermal energy. The reflection capability of duced by a nuclear explosion is many times
typical foxhole materials varies from 8 percentbrighter than the sun. This light can dazzle
for wet black soil to 93 percent for snow. Be- personnel or produce permanent retinal burns.
cause of atmospheric scattering and foxhole These effects can be produced at greater dis-
reflections, thermal casualties may be caused tances from the burst than can skin burns.
at a greater range than can be casualties from Sufficient thermal energy arrives so fast that
other effects. It is extremely difficult and un-
reflex actions, such as blinking, give only
reliable to predict enemy casualties from limited protection.
thermal effects. (1) Dazzle (flashblindness) is a tempo-
c. Height of Burst. The amount of thermal rary loss of vision.
energy produced by a nuclear detonation is (a) Dazzle from a burst during day-
essentially the same whether the weapon'is light hours persists for about 2
burst in the air, on the surface, or under- minutes. Only the personnel facing
ground. However, the target area will receive directly toward the burst or a re-
maximum thermal effect from an airburst, flective surface can be dazzled.
provided there is no shielding or attenuation (b) At night, dazzle affects almost all
of the radiation. For surface bursts, the target personnel in the target area. Re-
receives only about one-third the thermal en- covery may be expected within 10
ergy it would receive from an airburst. No minutes in personnel facing the
significant amount is received from a sub- burst and within about 3 minutes
surface burst. in all others.
(2) Loss of night vision persists for
2-15. Target Response to Thermal longer periods. Recovery of night
Radiation adaptation may be experienced in as
little as 15 minutes, depending on the
a. General. Essentially all of the thermal level of visual thermal energy re-
radiation absorbed by a target element is im- ceived.
mediately converted into heat and may cause
injury, damage, or even ignition of combusti- (3) Retinal burns are painless, but they
ble materials. result in permanent blindspots. A
20-kiloton weapon has produced ret-
b. Personnel. Personnel are extremely vul- inal burns 15 kilometers from the
nerable to the effects of thermal radiation. burst. Retinal burns can be sustained
They can be dazzled by the light or burned by only when the fireball is within the
the heat. Burns have greater tactical signifi- field of vision. The chance that in-
cance than does dazzle. Burns are classified dividuals will be looking directly at
as follows: the fireball is small. Thus, retinal
(1) First-degree burns—redness burns areof the
considered tactically in-
skin (like moderate sunburn). significant.
2-10
 FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

e. Forest Fires. g. Secondary Fires. Secondary flame burns

(1) Whether fires of consequence will be may occur from ignition of clothing. In areas
started depends on availability of where fires are likely to result from the detona-
forest fuels, tree canopy, season and tion, large numbers of burn casualties may oc-
recent weather (hot, dry, wet), wind cur among individuals trapped in the wreck-
and humidity, and topography (steep" age of burning buildings or in forest fires.
or level terrain). Individuals in shelters may die of asphyxia-
tion even though otherwise protected from the
(2) Forest fuels are generally a mixture other casualty-producing effects.
of dry (surface litter, fallen
branches, dead leaves, and dry grass)
and green (living branches, green 2-16. Military Significance of Thermal
grass, and other living foliage) fuels. Radiation
Thermal radiation does not normally a. Although personnel can be burned at
ignite green fuels. However, the dry great distances from the burst, thermal radia-
fuels can ignite and cause the burn- tion usually cannot be depended on to produce
ing of the green fuels. the casualties desired on the battlefield.. For
(3) The tree canopy smokes and chars this reason, thermal radiation is not consid-
but does not ordinarily sustain igni- ered in estimating damage to enemy forces.
tion. The tree canopy materially re- b. In considering the safety of friendly
duces or eliminates the exposure of troops, thermal radiation as well as the other
the ground surface to radiant en-
ergy. Ignition occurs on the ground effects must be considered. Second-degree
in open areas. burns will generally produce combat ineffec-
tives.
/. Fires in Urban Areas. There are two gen-
eral ways in which fires can originate in a c. Dazzle during daylight is not generally
city hit by a nuclear weapon— an important consideration. However, at
night, dazzle and loss of night vision may re-
(1) Ignition by direct thermal radiation duce combat effectiveness. Normal limits of
of fuels such as paper, trash, window visibility for three atmospheric conditions are
curtains, dry grass or leaves, and dry- shown below.
rotted wood.
Atmospheric condition Visibility (km)
(2) Indirect effect of the destruction Clear 60
caused by the blast wave. Fires can Haze 10
be started by upset stoves, electrical Fog 2
short circuits, and broken gaslines.

Section IV. INITIAL NUCLEAR RADIATION

2-17. General particles such as neutrons, alpha and beta

a. Initial nuclear radiation is defined as particles, and electromagnetic energy such as
that nuclear radiation which is emitted by a gamma (X-ray) radiations. In the fission and
nuclear explosion within the first minute fusion reactions that lead to a nuclear ex-
after the burst. The nuclear radiation emitted plosion, gamma rays and neutrons are emitted.
after 1 minute is “residual radiation.” A dis- The radioactive decay of the fission products
cussion of residual radiation is contained in commences immediately, producing beta par-
chapter 5. ticles and gamma radiation. Fusion reactions
do not produce appreciable amounts of resid-
b. Nuclear radiation consists of a flow of ual radioactive products in comparison to
2-11
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

those produced by the fission reaction that is emitted in less than 1 second after the burst.
required to initiate the fussion reaction. The The initial gamma radiation is received by a
fission reactions produce large amounts of target over a period of time, depending on
radioactive products. weapon yield. With low-yield weapons, this
time is extremely short. With weapons in the
c. The alpha and beta particles have an ex- megaton range, the time is long enough so
tremely limited range in air, have little ability that it may be possible to avoid some of the
to penetrate, and are of little significance un- radiation. For example, dropping into a fox-
less the emitters come in contact with the hole immediately upon sensing the flash of
skin or are inhaled or ingested. The neutrons light could allow a person to escape up to 50
and initial gamma radiation are highly pene- percent of the initial gamma radiation he
trating. Because of the range to which each would otherwise have received from a high-
of these travels, the neutrons and gamma rays yield burst.
are the chief initial nuclear radiation cas-
ualty producers. Thus, in initial nuclear radia- c.
tion, neutrons and gamma radiation are of straight line. Neutrons and gamma rays col-
concern, and the alpha and beta particles are lide with nuclei of the medium through which
disregarded. they pass and are scattered in different di-
rections. This scattering effect is so great in
2-18. Units of Measurement the target area that nuclear radiation travels
in all directions. Thus it is difficult to get com-
a. For scientific and technical reasons, nu- plete protection from scattered nuclear radia-
clear radiations are measured in a variety of tion.
units, to include the “roentgen” (r), “roentgen
equivalent physical” (rep), “roentgen equiva-
lent man” (rem), and the “rad.” For practical 2-20. Modifying Influences
military use, all types of radiation are meas- The amount of gamma and neutron radia-
ured in “rad.” This unit of measurement is tion received by a target depends primarily
used interchangeably with, and in lieu of, the on the yield of the weapon used. However,
other units previously mentioned. other factors help determine the amount.
b. The rad is a unit of measurement of the a. Weather. For a given weapon, the range
absorbed dose of radiation. for various quantities or doses of initial nu-
clear radiation is affected primarily by the
2-19. Characteristics of Initial Nuclear relative air density. The denser air at sea level
Radiation absorbs more radiation than does the thinner
air at high altitudes. As the altitude of the
a. The principal characteristics of initial burst increases, the relative air density is de-
nuclear radiation are— creased and initial nuclear radiation travels
(1) It travels at about the speed of light. farther. No other atmospheric phenomenon
(2) It travels essentially along straight affects initial nuclear radiation so markedly.
lines, although a major portion of the b. Terrain. Target terrain may significantly
total radiation is scattered within influence initial nuclear radiation. Minor ter-
the ranges normally of interest. rain irregularities, such as ditches, gullies,
and small folds in the ground, offer a little
(3) A portion is absorbed by the atmos- protection. Major terrain features between in-
phere through which it passes. dividuals and the burst, such as large hills
(4) It has high penetrating power. and mountains, provide almost complete pro-
tection from initial nuclear radiation. Forests
b. The gamma rays travel at the speed of provide negligible protection.
light. Neutrons travel more slowly, but still
at an extremely fast rate. Most neutrons are c. Height of Burst and Target Elevation.
2-12
 FM 101-31-1/FN1FM 11-4

(1) Height of burst. See a above. For the shielding material to the outside dose is
surface and subsurface bursts, the called the transmission factor and is used to
initial radiation is sharply attenu- calculate the dose received through the shield-
ated through the absorption of radi- ing material, as follows:
ation energy by the matter nearby Transmission factor = dose inside
or surrounding the burst. dose outside
(2) Target elevation. The radiation re- c. Transmission factor tables contained in
ceived by a target is greater when FM 101-31-2 and chapter 18, FM 101-31-3
it is above the terrain than when it show the approximate transmission factors
is on the surface. Targets such as per- for neutron, initial gamma, and residual radi-
sonnel in aircraft, 100 meters or ation for different conditions of protection.
more above the terrain, may receive These factors represent the percentage of the
as much as 1.5 times the dose they outside dose received by the shielded target.
would receive on the surface at the
same distance from the burst. 2-22. Target Response to Initial Nuclear
d. Weapon Design. In general, the larger Radiation
the yield of the weapon, the larger the dose (This paragraph is based on ST AN AG
of initial nuclear radiation received at a given 2083.)
slant range. Weapon design or configuration
and yield greatly influence the neutron and a. General.
gamma ray portions of the dose. (1) Personnel are most vulnerable to ini-
tial nuclear radiation. The response
2-21. Shielding and Attenuation of an individual to nuclear radiation
depends on several factors, includ-
a. One of the factors influencing the ing—
amount of radiation received by a target is (a) The total dose accumulated from
the shielding that may exist between the det- previous radiation exposure.
onation and the target. Any material will
absorb some nuclear radiation. Because of the (&) The periods over which the doses
high penetrating power of neutrons and gam- are received.
ma rays, considerable thickness of interven- (c) The periods of recuperation be-
ing material or very dense material are re- tween radiological exposure.
quired to provide significant protection to (d) The physical condition, sex and
personnel. Dense materials, such as lead, of- age of the individual at the time
fer excellent protection against gamma rays. of the radiological exposure.
Readily available materials such as water or (e) The presence or absence of any ad-
concrete offer the best protection against ditional injuries.
neutrons. Soil is a fair neutron shield. Gen- (2) The total amount of initial and resid-
erally, sufficient material to protect against ual nuclear radiation received (gam-x
gamma rays will protect against neutrons ma radiation and neutrons) is called
from the same source unless that material is the total dose.
extremely dense.
(3)
b. The dose received by a man inside a ceived all at one time or accumu-
building, a tank, or a foxhole is less than that lated over a short period of time.
which he would receive if he were in the open There is little difference in the effect
at the same distance from the ground zero. on an individual when he receives a
How much less depends on how much radia- total dose all at one time or the same
tion is absorbed or attenuated by the inter- total dose, in small increments, over
vening material. The ratio of the dose inside a period of about 24 hours. For
2-13
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

this reason, any total dose received short-range advantage he may gain
within 24 hours is considered an (para 5-6).
acute dose. It is emphasized that (c) Table 2-1 shows the expected re-
acute dose, as used in this manual, sponse of humans to radiation.
dose not imply severity or criticality; The data in this table are based on
the term is used exclusively to con- the following assumptions:
note the time within which the dose 1. The individuals are healthy,
is received. A “chronic dose” is the rested, and well-fed.
total dose received over a longer
period of time. 2. They have had no previous ex-
posure.
(4) The time it takes for a previously 3. Their whole bodies have been ex-
unexposed individual in good health posed to radiation.
to sicken or to die depends primarily
on the totál dose received and on in- 4. They have received an acute dose
dividual body tolerances. Some in- (either initial or residual).
dividuals are stronger and more re- 5. They have received no other in-
sistant than others, and some will juries.
have partial body shielding. To pro- (2) Casualties. Quantitative total doses
duce the same biological effect on from nuclear radiation have been
these individuals requires a larger given the following qualitative mean-
total dose. ings in the remainder of this man-
(5) Some experimental data indicate that ual:
the human body may be capable of (a.) 5,000 rad. Immediate casualties.
repairing most, but not all, of the (b) 3,000 rad. Casualties within 1
damage resulting from radiation. hour. This criterion was used in
the computation of the coverage
b. Personnel. tables and is referred to as
(1) Biological response of “prompt casualties.”
personnel.
(a) Exposure (c) 650 whole
of the rad. Casualties
body, or ofwithin a few
a large part of it, to sufficient hours. This criterion was used in
amounts of penetrating ionizing the computation of the coverage
radiation causes radiation sickness tables and is referred to as “de-
and death. Because of limited ex- layed casualties.”
perience, and individual body tol- (3) Recovery. Recovery from radiation
erances, it is impossible to predict injury is uncertain for humans. Ex-
the effect on an individual from a perimental evidence indicates that
specified dose of radiation. How- the body recovers very little in the
ever, the average effect on a large first 30 days and damage to blood-
group may be predicted with forming tissues may not be fully re-
enough accuracy for military pur- paired after a year. The consequence
poses. of doses up to a few hundred rad in
(&) All radiation is potentially
a month or less harm-
is not well under-
ful and should be avoided. Tac- stood in terms of how such doses
tically, it may be necessary to ac- might influence a unit’s combat ef-
cept some radiation exposure. fectiveness. Damage to white blood
Nevertheless, the commander cells occurs at very low radiation
should appreciate the significance levels and increases rapidly with in-
of the exposure and weigh this creasing radiation intensity. One re-
carefully against any immediate or sult of low white-blood-cell count is
2-14
 é
Table ¡¡-1 Biological Response lo Nuclear Radiation
Estimated
exposure Onset of Duration of Final
route trade) Initial symptoms symptoms Incapacitation Hoipitalization hospitalization disposition
50 to 200 None to transient Approximately 6 None to slight de- Hospitalization requ- 45 to 60 days in Duty. No deaths
mild headache. hours after ex- crease ability to quired for less upper part of anticipated.
posure. conduct normal than 5 percent in range.
duties. upper part of ex-
posure range.
200 to 500. Headaches, nausea, Approximately 4 to Can perform routine Hospitalization re- 60 to 90 days. Some deaths
and vomiting; 6 hours after ex- tasks. Sustained quired for 90 per- anticipated;
malaise. posure. combat or comp- cent of exposed probably less
Symptoms not re- arable activities personnel in this than 5 percent at
lieved by anti- hampered for range. Hospitali- lower pact of
metics in upper period of 6 to 20 zation follows range, increasing
part of exposure hours. latent period of 17 toward upper end.
range. to 21 days’
duration.
500 to 1,000. Severe and pro- Approximately 1 to Can perform only Hospitalization re- 90 to 120 days for Approximately
longed nausea and 4 hours after ex- simple, routine quired for 100 per- those surviving. 50-percent deaths
vomiting; difficult posure. tasks. Significant cent of exposed at lower part of
to cure. Diarrhia incapacitation in personnel. Latent range, increasing
and fever early in upper part of ex- period short, 7 to toward upper end;
upper part of ex- posure range; 10 days in lower all deaths occur-
posure range. lasts more than range to none in ring within 45
24 hours. upper range. days.
C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

Greater than 1,000. . Severe vomiting, Less than 1 hour Progressive inca- Hospitalization re- 3 to 30 days. 100 percent deaths
diarrhea, and pros- after expousre. pacitation, fol- quired for 100 occurring within
tration. lowing an early percent of exposed 30 days.
capability for personnel. No la-
intermittent tent period.
heroic response.

2-15
I

C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

an increased susceptibility to secondary infection,

which, on the septic battlefield, would greatly com-
plicate treatment of normal injuries. In addition,
certain portions of the radiation damage may be
It Table 2-2. Doge Criteria for Placing Units in Radiation

Radiation status
tcategory
Status Categories

Numerical criteria total cumulative dose (rad)

m
irreparable.
★ (4) Repeated exposure. On a nuclear bat- RS-1
RS-2
Less than 75
75-150
tlefield, units will probably be exposed regularly RS-3 Greater than 150
(i.e., at least several times a month) to some de-
gree of radiation risk from friendly as well as from photographic and X-ray films are rendered useless
enemy nuclear weapons. In view of the regularity by exposure to only small quantities of radiation.
of exposure, the nonrecoverability in the first 30 Some types of communications equipment may be
days, and the slow overall recovery, the com- temporarily or permanently damaged by exposure
mander must also consider the consequences of to relatively large amounts of radiation.
using personnel previously exposed to significant
but nonsymptomatic doses. To assist the com- 2—23. Summary of Military Significance of
mander, friendly units are divided into three cate- Initial Nuclear Radiation
gories based on previous exposure history. Cri- a. Initial nuclear radiation effects may often
teria for each category are given in table 2-2. produce casualties among personnel protected from
(«) Radiation status—1 (RS-l). RS-1 ap- blast and thermal effects.
plies to a unit that has no dose or has a militarily
b. Delay in the onset of the effects from com-
negligible radiation exposure history (total dose
paratively small doses of nuclear radiation may
of less than 75 rad).
permit some personnel to remain effective long
(b) Radiation status—2 (RS-2). RS-2 ap-
enough to influence a specific operation. Neverthe-
plies to a unit that has received a significant but not
less, the delayed effects may significantly reduce
a dangerous dose of radiation. This category may
combat effectiveness for a long period of time.
include a dose range in which most personnel are
just below the sickness threshold (however, some c. Troop safety is a major consideration as far
sickness may be expected). If the situation permits, as nuclear radiation is concerned. Adequate pro-
units in this category should be exposed less fre- tective shielding is difficult to acquire. It is rea-
quently and to smaller doses than RS-1 units. sonable to assume that friendly personnel and the
(c) Radiation status—3 (RJS-3). RS-3 ap- enemy will receive repeated doses of nuclear radia-
plies to a unit that has already received a dose of tion. The size and frequency of doses received in
radiation which makes further exposure danger- past operations, the extent of recovery of damage
ous. In other words, this unit should be exposed (this is an unknown factor and will not be con-
only if unavoidable because additional exposure sidered in assessments of troop radiation status),
in the immediate future would result in sickness and the urgency of the tactical situation will,
and probably some deaths. among other things, determine the degree to which
c. Materials. Most material objects are un- friendly troops can be exposed during a nuclear
affected by initial nuclear radiation. However, attack.

Section V. COMBINED EFFECTS AND SPECIAL CONSIDERATION

2—24. Combined Effects burns and can increase the possibility of
a. A person may receive some injury from blast complications.
or thermal radiation that is insufficient to make b. While there will be many casualties from
him ineffective, and he may receive a dose of nu- combined effects, such as outlined above, es-
clear radiation that, by itself, will not cause ineffec- timating these casualties is difficult. In ar-
tiveness. However, the combina/tion of these effects riving at his recommendation as to the weapon
may cause him to become a casualty. Nuclear and yield to be used, the nuclear weapon em-
radiation can delay the healing of wounds and ployment officer bases his estimation of dam-
2-16
\

1
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

age on the governing casualty-producing (3) Contingent effects. The cratering ef-
effect. When a weapon is employed, contingent fect in ice and frozen soil is similar
effects, such as induced contamination, some to the cratering effect in solid rock,
probability of fallout, smoke, fire tree blow- however the crater size will probably
down, and damage to industrial or urban be larger than that in rock. Crater
areas, are considered. These contingent effects dimensions in soil covered with deep
may be considered as a bonus or they may be snow are reduced.
unacceptable from an operational standpoint. (4) Trafficability. The following consid-
In either event, the commander must be in- erations affect the planning of move-
formed of their existence. ments :
(a) Shock of blast disturbance of per-
2-25. Arctic Environment and Extreme Cold mafrost may reduce trafficability.
a. General. Nuclear weapon effects are al- (b) Nuclear weapon effects may inter-
tered by ice, snow, high winds, and low tem- fere with movement over frozen
peratures. General knowledge of the altera- waterways and, in the spring,
tions to individual effects is essential so that cause a spring breakup.
sound operational decisions may be made. (c) Nuclear weapon effects may pro-
duce avalanches in mountainous
b. Blast. areas in appropriate seasons.
(1) Effect of low températures on blast
radii. At temperatures about —45° C c. Thermal. While thermal effects normally
( — 50° F), damage radii for materiel are not considered in selecting the governing
targets such as tanks, artillery, and effect, a significant adjustment may be re-
military vehicles can increase by as quired in troop safety distances in the arctic.
much as 20 percent. If the tempera- (1) In conditions of extreme reflectivity
ture in the target area is known to (e.g., snow, ice, clouds), coupled
be —45° C ( — 50° F) or colder, the with good visibility, the minimum
validity of the estimate of damage safe distances (para 3-7 and 4-6)
might be increased somewhat by the for unwarned, exposed and for
inclusion of a 20-percent increase in warned, exposed personnel are in-
the radii of effect for drag-type tar- creased by 50 percent.
gets. (2) There will be some increase in the
(2) Surface reflectivity. As indicated in numbers of unwarned personnel suf-
paragraph 2-8b, reflecting surfaces, fering a loss of visual acuity, par-
such as ice, snow, and water, increase ticularly at night.
the distance to which given static (3) Because of the materials habitually
overpressures extend and decrease used for clothing, personnel in the
the distance to which given dynamic arctic environment may. be less vul-
pressures extend. Muskeg and tundra nerable to thermal effects. In addi-
decrease the distances to which given tion, the cold temperatures reduce
overpressures extend, and probably thermal effects to most materials. A
increase the distances to which given frost covering on combustible mate-
dynamic pressures extend. Areas of rials reduces their susceptibility to
extremely irregular and broken ice- thermal damage. Surface fires in dry
caps, even though ice and snow, af- tundra grasses may occur.
fect blast waves in a manner similar
to muskeg and tundra. The effects of d. Nuclear Radiation.
surface reflectivity are not consid- (1) At very low temperatures, the atmos-
ered in target analysis. pheric density increases to such an

2-17
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

extent that as much as a 25-percent (2) Because logistical problems are

reduction can be expected in the dis- greatly increased in the arctic, most
tances to which significant levels of types of supply are critical. Loss of
nuclear radiation extend. If the tem- supplies because of nuclear detona-
perature in the target area is known tions will have a greater impact on
to be -45° C (-50° F) or colder, the arctic operations than will a similar
estimate of casualties among pro- loss in nonarctic areas.
tected personnel is more valid if the
radius of damage for casualties, due (3) The increased susceptibility of per-
to radiation, is reduced by 25 percent. sonnel to injury, with coincident dif-
(2) The seasonal occurrence of extended ficulties of medical care, enhances the
periods of high winds in arctic areas effects of a nuclear detonation in
may greatly extend fallout areas. A arctic operations.
corresponding reduction of dose rates
close to the ground zero may be ex- 2-26. High-Altitude Effects
pected as a result of the increased
distribution. Further, falling or As described in paragraph 2-20, the de-
wind-driven snow may create areas creasing air density associated with increas-
of high concentration. Associated ing altitude provides a burst environment for
with the high concentration, winds nuclear weapons that can greatly alter effects.
may be expected to clear effectively The amount of thermal radiation received by
some areas of fallout contamination. an aircraft varies widely with atmospheric
conditions, orientation of the aircraft with
(3) Where the earth’s surface is covered respect to the burst, the ground-reflecting
with ice or snow, there is some re- surfaces, and the clouds. Scatter and reflec-
duction in the induced radiation ac- tion may result in an aircraft receiving two
tivity in the underlying soil. A det- or three times the thermal radiation received
onation over a thick ice and/or snow by a target on the ground. Conversely, when
cover could result in essentially no a heavy cloud layer is between the burst and
significant induced radiation. the aircraft, the thermal radiation received
(4) Large, poorly drained areas and may be negligible. Nuclear radiation is prop-
frozen soil of low permeability limit agated to greater ranges at higher altitudes.
the natural flushing of radioactive Blast effects are decreased due to the decreased
material. density of the surrounding medium. Nuclear
e. Other Considerations. bursts at high and extremely high altitudes
also cause considerable problems with electro-
(1) The time required wave
magnetic for propagation
subsurface types of communi-
shelter construction and the increased cations (see DA Pam 39-3).
use of above-surface shelters gener-
ally increase the vulnerability of
troops in the field to nuclear weapon 2-27. Validity of Effects Data
effects. When shelters are con- As discussed in paragraph 2-3, nuclear
structed underground, they usually weapon testing has produced the effects data
are more resistant to weapon effects on which target analyses are based. Although
than is similar construction in tem- TM 23-200. presents the validity factors as-
perate climates. However, because sociated with the data for each effect, the
frozen soil and water are excellent validity of effects data is not considered in
transmitters of ground shock, these the target analysis procedures described in
underground structures are more chapter 3, in appendix B, and in tables in this
susceptible to damage than similar manual. The target analyst should realize that
structures in temperate climates. errors in effects data accuracy exist and that
2-18
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

these errors may be quite gross. Refinement environment are not as pronounced as those
of the data, or precision in using the data, caused by an arctic or high altitude environ-
greater than that indicated in the outlined ment, no special discussion of the tropical en-
procedures, is not justified. Since variations vironment modification of the effects is in-
in effects of weapons when used in a tropical cluded in this manual.

2-19
J
 C 1, FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

CHAPTER 3

TARGET ANALYSIS

Section I. GENERAL

3—1. Factors Considered in Target Analysis b. Assumptions. Target analysis is based on

(This paragraph is based on SOLOG No. 89.) the following assumptions :
a. General. (1) Reliability. Casualty and damage es-
timation is predicated on the assumption that a
(1) In the general sense, target analysis is nuclear weapon will arrive at the target area at the
defined as the examination of targets to determine desired time a/nd a nuclear deonation will take
the capabilities of available weapon systems for the place. Because many delivery systems do not pro-
attack of such targets (see AR 310-25 for com- vide a high assurance of successful delivery, it
plete definition). With respect to the employment may be desirable to provide an alternate means
of nuclear weapons, it is the process used to select to attack the target in the event the first weapon
the appropriate weapon system that will meet the fails to function properly. This alternate means
commander’s requirements, within the knowledge may be another nuclear weapon, nonnuclear fire-
available. This chapter discusses, in general terms, power, or maneuver forces, depending on the na-
the procedures for target analysis. Appendix B ture and importance of the target and the alternate
presents detailed techniques for the use of target means available. This is discussed further in para-
analysis. graph 3-10. ’
(2) It is important that an estimate be made ★ (2) Targets. When intelligence indicates the
of the results to be expected from a nuclear attack. size and shape of the target, and the distribution of
Usually, this will include what fraction of the elements within the target, these data are used by
target area is expected to be covered by the weapon the target analyst. Otherwise, the target elements
effects. Nuclear weapons usually are employed on a are assumed to be uniformly distributed, and the
one-shot basis; even if more than one weapon is area is assumed to be circular. The radius of the
used, there is only one weapon for each desired target is based on the best information available.
ground zero. Unlike other fires, in which distribu-
tion over the target area is obtained by firing
many rounds and allowing the inherent delivery
errors to place the rounds randomly throughout
Outer limit of
the target area, the effects of a nuclear weapon on
target
the target will vary, depending on the delivery
errors of the single round. Consequently, it is neces-
sary to make an estimate of the results on the target
based on the relationship among the characteristics
of the target, the effects of the weapon measured
by its radius of damage, and the delivery errors.
The estimation of the results usually is expressed Radius of damage
as a fraction or a percentage of the target. When
30 percent of the target is covered by the particu-
lar radius of damage, it is expected that 30 percent
of the target will be destroyed. Figure 3—1 shows
Figure 8-1. Relationship of target site anti damage radius
this relationship. in damage estimation.

3-1
 1

C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

Should a sizeable error in the target radius exist, Horizontal Plane

a situation similar to that discussed in paragraph
B I1-4, annex B-II could result.
(3) Atmosphe'ric conditions. The effect of
atmospheric conditions on blast and radiation
usually is not considered by the target analyst. In
GD Elliptical
dispersion (Direction Circular
cases of heavy rain or snow in the target area,
pattern of Delivery) dispersion
weapon effects radii will vary slightly from those
pattern
listed in FM 101-31-2 and FM 101-31-3.
(4) Terrain. Nuclear effects may be modified Figure 3-2. Horizontal dispersion patterns.
by terrain extremes such as high mountains. If a
weapon is burst in a valley, shielding of effects
may occur outside the valley, with reinforced ef- In this case, very little of the target is covered.
fects within the valley. No reliable system exists Obviously, the size and shape of the target, the
for modification of analysis in the field of weapon radius of damage, and the size and shape of the
effects due to terrain considerations. dispersion pattern affect the amount 'of the target
that will be damaged by a single burst.
c. System Errors.
3. In considering this, the target analyst as-
(1) General. Dispersion influences the selec-
sumes that the burst will occur near the outer edge
tion of the desired ground zero (DGZ) and the de-
of the dispersion pattern and estimates the frac-
sired height of burst. It also affects such factors as
tion (percentage) of the target covered by the
damage to the target, troop safety, fallout, tree
weapon effect of interest. Under these circum-
blowdown, and induced contamination. Consid-
eration is, therefore, given to delivery errors. stances, there is a high assurance that the weapon
will cause at least that fraction of damage.
(2) Effect of horizontal dispersion.
(3)
(а) There is a dispersion pattern unique
pattern in the air formed by a large number of
to each type of nuclear weapon delivery system.
weapons set with a timer fuze to detonate at the
Cannon and rocket artillery form a generally ellip-
same height of burst, and delivered under nearly
tical pattern, whereas guided-missile rounds and
identical conditions, is ellipsoidal (egg shaped).
air-delivered weapons form a circular pattern (fig.
The height-of-burst distribution pattern extends
3-2). Because nuclear target analysis is premised
above and below the desired height of burst (fig.
on a “single shot,” it is assumed that the distribu-
3-5). It is apparent that a large vertical error may
tion of errors connected with nuclear delivery sys-
result in a burst occurring a significant distance
tems will follow the laws of probability. It is also
assumed that gunnery techniques will place the
center of the “dispersion pattern” at the desired
ground zero.
(б) It is apparent that a burst occurring Outer limit of target
at the outer limits of the dispersion pattern will
cause the center of the weapon effects to be offset
from the desired ground zero. Because the desired DG
ground zero usually is selected at the center of
target, a burst near the outer limits of the dis-
persion pattern may result in a substantial de-
crease in the damage to the target. This emphasizes
the need for post-strike analysis whenever possible.
J. Figure 3-3 shows a burst occurring at the Radius of damage
center of the target. In this case, about 30 percent
of the target is covered by the radius of damage.
#. Figure 3-4 shows a burst occurring at
the outer edge of the elliptical dispersion pattern. Figure 3-3. Burst occurring at the center of the target.

3-2
 C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4
Outer limit of target

Radius of damage
DGZ
Elliptical / N
dispersion pattern . y|GZ

Figure 3-4. Burst occurring at the outer limit of the dispersion pattern.

above or below the desired height. In such cases, tion. For a given target category, yield, and de-
the weapon may detonate close enough to the sur- livery system with a known range and height-of-
face to produce fallout or so high in the air that burst option, the index gives an estimate of the
the effects on the target will be significantly re- damage that can be expected from the attack.
duced. Consequently, vertical dispersion (PEh) is Coverage tables also present the radius of damage
considered in selecting a height of burst. Radar (para 2-3) for each range and height-of-burst
fuzes greatly reduce the problem of vertical dis- option. The indexes and radii of damage have been
persion, as shown in figure 3-6. computed using the casualty- or damage-produc-
★ d. Target Location Errors. Each target ac- ing effect that extends the greatest distance. This
quisition means has an associated target location effect is referred to as the governing effects.
error. This error may vary within the same type of c.
equipment due to operator interpretation of data consider delivery errors and weapon effects in
or to individual equipment variations. The evalua- evaluating thé “limiting requirements” which may
tion of the extent of the error and the gross effect be imposed on the use of nuclear weapons. These
this error has on the analysis of the target can be limiting requirements are imposed to avoid un-
determined only by the target analyst and the in- desirable effects caused by nuclear weapons in the
telligence officer through field experience. This is form of casualties to friendly troops; creation of
discussed further in paragraph B-II-4, annex obstacles to movement, to include fire areas ; dam-
B-II. age to installations desired for the use of friendly
3—2. Data for Target Analysis troops, such as bridges and buildings ; and damage
to friendly light aircraft in flight. The tables give
(This paragraph is based on SOLOG No. 89.) the minimum distances that friendly troops ; light
a. Tables in FM 101-31-2 and FM 101-31-3 aircraft; installations; and, in the case of preclu-
present the data to be used in target analysis. The
sion of obstacles to movement, the critical area
basic tables are referred to as weapon selection
must be separated from the desired ground zero. In
tables (WST). The weapon selection tables consist
of coverage tables, safety distance tables, and ef- the case of troop safety, this distance is called the
fects tables. Examples of these tables are included minimum safe distance (MSD) and is given for
in appendix B. various conditions of risk and vulnerability. In
b. The coverage tables present the information the other cases mentioned, it is called the least
with which to estimate damage. A set of indexes is separation distance (LSD). (Annex B-III, ap-
presented that .simultaneously considers delivery pendix B contains a detailed description of limit-
errors, weapon effects, and target size and composi- ing requirements.)

3-3
C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

Ellipsoidal dispersion pattern

Direction of fire
Desired
height of
burst

Ground
Figure 8-5. Timer fuze vertical dispersion pattern.

Desired
height of
burst

8-0/76

Figure 3-6. Radar fuze vertical dispersion pattern.

(1) In the troop safety portion of the tables, (c) Light aircraft in flight.
these minimum safe distances are shown for each— (3)
(a) Delivery system. the tables, the least separation distances are shown
(&) Yield. for preclusion of obstacles caused by—
(c) Height-of-burst option. (a) Tree blowdown.
(d) Degree of risk to friendly elements. (b) Fires.
(e) Condition of protection (or vulnera- d. The effects tables consider only weapon effects
bility) of friendly troops. and height of burst. For each weapon, radii of
(/) Range increment ( for range-dependent damage for use against various target elements are
systems). shown.
(2) In the preclusion-of-damage portion of
the tables, the least separation distances are shown 3—3. Recommendations
for preclusion of damage to— A target analysis is conducted to select the best
(а) Fixed bridges. weapon for attack of a target. After the target
(б) Buildings. analysis has been completed, a recommendation is

3-4
r

C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

presented to the commander. The recommendation d.

should include the following information : c. Estimated results.
a. Weapon system. f. Troop safety.
b. Height-of-burst option. A detailed description of each of the elements
c. Desired ground zero. above is contained in appendix B.

Section II. TECHNIQUES FOR TARGET ANALYSIS

(This section is based on SOLOG No. 89.)

3-4. General Procedure for Analyzing (1) Damage estimation, to facilitate his
Targets determining whether to use the index method, the
visual method, or the numerical method (fig. 3-7).
The following general procedures are used by the He considers point targets and area targets in
target analyst. The detailed steps, to include ex- damage estimation.
amples, are contained in appendix B. (а) A point target is defined as a target
а. The target analyst identifies the pertinent with a single target element (e.g., a bridge (span)
portions of the organization’s standing operat- or a building).
ing procedure (SOP) and becomes familiar (б) An area target is defined os a target
with the special guidance expressed by the com- with multiple target elements distributed over a
mander. He determines information concerning definable area. (In this context a troop unit, ve-
allocations, authority to expend, and available hicle park, or other such target would not be con-
weapon systems as well as target information, such sidered a target element even though it may be
as shape, vulnerability, size, distance to friendly part of a larger defined target.)
troops and their radiation exposure status, ranges (2) Limiting requirements, as they pertain to
to the available delivery means, and the limiting troop safety and damage and obstacle preclusion.
requirements (app B). (3) The selection of the most beneficial de-
б. He determines data for— sired ground zero, taking into con-

3-5

373-351 0-70-2
 1
C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

Coverage tables
(source of data)

Index Visual Numerical

method method method

used for ' used for' used for

Approximately Irregularly
circular shaped
area Point targets
area
targets with targets
DGZ target
center
Area
targets Targets
requiring requiring
a displaced a displaced
DGZ DGZ
*-Je>

Figure 3-7. Methods of damage estimation-

3-6
 FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

sidération the limitations of (2) Field experience in the actual use of

above. nuclear weapons will further clarify
(4) Final evaluation of coverage of the the application of bonus effects to the
projected target with the weapon overall target analysis. Coverage of
systems available for use. 30 to 50 percent of most combat units
c. He evaluates the coverage of the projected is generally sufficient to destroy the
unit. However, care must be exercised
target with the weapons available for use and
in the use of the 30 percent figure,
the overall tactical situation in the area of
interest. because the posture of the unit, its
mission, and its operational equip-
d. He makes a recommendation for the com- ment may dictate either higher or
mander’s approval. lower coverage figures for target
destruction.
3-5. Expected Coverage for Area Targets (2) A neutralized unit is a unit that has
a. Damage to the target may be estimated, been rendered incapable of interfer-
using any of the three methods mentioned in ing with a particular tactical opera-
paragraph 3-4. If the target is circular, nearly tion. The unit will have lost some key
circular, or can be assumed circular, and the personnel, command facilities, and
desired ground zero used is at the target cen- materiel. The losses should be suffi-
ter, the index method is the most accurate and ciently extensive to require some local
the most meaningful to use. If the target is reorganization, improvisation of com-
irregularly shaped, the visual method is used. mand and control facilities, minor
In other cases, either the visual or the numer- repairs, and limited resupply to make
ical method may be used. A damage estimation the unit combat effective. Effects
chart is included in annex paragraph B-II-3, such as missile effect, thermal effect,
B-II, appendix B. and damage to communications and
supply systems normally are consid-
b. Unit SOP contain information regarding ered bonus effects in the attack of
the extent of damage required for specific-type troop units. The same cautionary
targets. The guidance in the SOP occasionally statements concerning the influence
will be modified by the commander. The follow- of bonus effects on destruction of a
ing information may be used as a guide in unit apply to the expected neutraliza-
developing the SOP: tion of a unit. Coverage of 10 or more
(1) A destroyed unit is a unit that has percent of a unit generally will be
sufficient criterion to consider the
been rendered completely ineffective.
unit neutralized, provided other fac-
The unit will have lost command fa-
tors are not overpowering.
cilities, materiel, and many key per-
sonnel. The loss will be sufficiently
extensive to require withdrawal from 3-6. Probability of Destroying Point Targets
action, complete reorganization, re- Fractional coverage of a point target has no
placement of many personnel, resup- meaning; the target is so small that the tar-
ply, and extensive retraining. Any get will be completely covered or completely
casualties and damage caused by missed by the radius of damage. Estimation of
thermal effect and missile effect are the damage to point targets, therefore, con-
considered bonus effects. Bonus ef- sists of determining the probability of the
fects contribute to the effectiveness target receiving the desired degree of damage
of the attack, but caution should be rather than estimating the fraction of the
exercised in allowing these hoped-for target to be covered. The probability of de-
bonus effects to influence the recom- stroying a point target is a function of weapon
mendation of the target analyst. effects, distance from DGZ to the point target,

3-7
 FM 101—31—Î/FMFM 11-4

and delivery error. The probability of destroy- rad dose and áre completely safe
ing a point target is determined using the from militarily significant thermal
numerical method. This method i uses graphs effects. However they may experi-
provided in FM 101-31-2 and FM 101-31-3. ence a temporary loss of vision
These graphs simultaneously consider weapon (dazzle). A negligible risk from
effect, the displacement (d), and delivery exposure to nuclear radiation is
errors. Appendix B contains detailed instruc- possible only when an individual or
tions for point target analysis. a unit has an insignificant radia-
tion-dose history, which will cause
3-7. Troop Safety no decrement in combat effective-
a. In comparison with the use of nonnuclear ness. An insignificant accumulated
weapons, the use of nuclear weapons in close dose is interpreted to mean that
tactical support involves a much greater de- blood changes probably will not be
gree of risk to the safety of friendly troops. detectable. A negligible risk is ac-
ceptable in any case in which the
b. Troop safety may influence the selection use of nuclear weapons is desir-
of yield, the delivery system, the desired able. Negligible risk should not be
ground zero, the time of burst, and the scheme exceeded unless significant advan-
of maneuver. When the SOP or command tage will be gained.
guidance concerning troop safety cannot be (b) A moderate risk condition normal-
met, the following actions may be taken: ly is used only for those nuclear
(1) Move the desired ground zero. weapon yields where radiation; is
'j
(2) Use a more accurate delivery means. the governing troop safety criteria.
A moderate risk from exposure to
(3) Use lower yield weapons(s). nuclear radiation occurs either
(4) Withdraw troops. when an individual or unit has a
(5) Accept less coverage. significant radiation exposure his-
tory, but has not yet shown symp-
(6) Accept a higher degree of risk of toms of radiation sickness, or when
damaging friendly units. a planned single dose is sufficiently
(7) Increase the protection of friendly high that exposure to up to four or
troops. five doses alone, or in conjunction
(8) Use other forms of combat power, with previous exposures, would
such as nonnuclear fires or maneuver constitute a significant radiation
elements. exposure history. A moderate risk
is considered acceptable in close
c. The nuclear weapon employment officer support operations; for example, to
uses a minimum safe distance to make troop create a gap in enemy forward
safety calculations. The minimum safe dis- positions or to halt an enemy at-
tance considers both delivery error and the tack. A moderate risk should not
distance to which certain weapon effects ex- be exceeded if troops are expected
tend. The following definitions are used in to operate at full efficiency after a
determining the appropriate minimum safe friendly burst.
distance :
(c) For emergency risk conditions, the
(1) There are three degrees of risk asso- anticipated effect on troops from a
ciated with troop safety considera- single exposure to a friendly weap-
tions—negligible, moderate, and on may result in some temporary
emergency. shock, mild burns, and a few
(a) At a negligible risk distance, casualties ; however, casualties

3-8
troops will receive less than a 5- should never be extensive enough

m
 C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

to neutralize a unit. An emergency risk from ex- have been warned, but do not have time to dig
posure to nuclear radiation occurs either when a foxholes.
unit has a radiation-exposure history that is at the (c) Warned, protected persons are assumed
threshold for onset of combat ineffectiveness from to have some protection against heat, blast, and
radiation sickness, or when a planned single dose radiation. The assumed degree of protection is
is sufficiently high that exposure to up to two or that protection offered to personnel who are in
three such doses, alone or in conjunction with “buttoned-up” tanks or crouched in foxholes with
previous exposures, would approach or exceed the improvised overhead thermal shielding. When
threshold for combat ineffectiveness from radia- only a lesser degree of protection is available (e.g.,
tion sickness. An emergency risk should he ac- only tracked carriers are available), personnel can-
cepted only when it is absolutely necessary, and not be considered warned, protected. The target
should be exceeded only in extremely rare situa- analyst would consider such personnel as exposed.
tions that might loosely be called “disaster” situa- A warned, protected condition generally is ex-
tions. No attempt is made to define a disaster situa- pected to prevail when nuclear weapons are used
tion. The commander must determine these ex- in a preparation prior to an attack.
tremely rare situations for himself and decide {d) It should be noted that there is no cate-
which criteria are appropriate to use in attempt- gory for unwarned, protected. Although protection
ing to salvage such a situation. may be available to personnel, it cannot be as-
■^■(2) Closely associated with the degrees of sumed that they will be taking advantage of it
risk is the vulnerability of the individual soldier. unless they are warned of an inpending burst.
The danger to an individual from a nuclear ex- Procedures for warning friendly personnel are dis-
plosion depends principally on the degree to which cussed in paragraph 4-6.
he is protected from the weapon effects. For ex- (3) For each combination of negligible and
ample, a man who is well protected can safely be emergency degree of risk and condition of person-
much closer to the ground zero than can be a man nel vulnerability, there is an associated “risk dis-
in the open. The degree of protection of the unit tance” known as the radius of safety. It is the hori-
is considered in target analysis to be dependent on zontal distance from the actual ground zero
the amount of advance warning the unit has beyond which the weapon effects are acceptable.
received. One or more of the following three condi- Because a round may burst at the end of the
tions of personnel vulnerability can be expected at dispersion pattern nearest to friendly troops, a
the time of burst: unwarned, exposed; warned, buffer distance is added to the radius of safety.
exposed, and warned protected. The buffer distance provides a very high assurance
(a) Unwarned, exposed persons are as- (99 percent) that unacceptable weapon effects will
sumed to be standing in the open at burst time, not reach friendly troops. The size of the buffer
but have dropped to a prone position by the time distance is dependent on the horizontal delivery
the blast wave arrives. They are expected to have error at the applicable range. The sum of the
areas of bare skin exposed to direct thermal radia- radius of safety and the buffer distance is the mini-
tion, and some personnel may suffer dazzle. For mum safe distance shown in the safety distance
example, such a condition can be expected to pre- tables in FM 101-31-2 and FM 101-31-3. Al-
vail in an offensive situation when the majority though these tables contain the minimum safe dis-
of the attacking infantry are in the open and warn- tances for the various stated combinations of risk
ing of the burst has not been disseminated. Table 8—1. Yields for which Radiation is the Governing
(ö) Warned, exposed persons are assumed Troop Safety Criterion
to be prone on open ground, with all skin areas Exposed Protected
Yield
covered and with an overall thermal protection (ET) Unwarmed Warned Warned
at least equal to that provided my a two-layer sum- Less than 8 Yes Yes Yes.
mer uniform. For example, such a condition may 8-15 No Yes Yes.
prevail when a nuclear weapon is employed against 16-200 No No Yes.
More than 200 No No No.
a target of opportunity during an attack and suffi-
cient time exists to broadcast a warning; troops Note. Yee means that radiation is the governing criterion. No means that
radiation is not the governing criterion.

3-9
 and vulnerability, selection of an appropriate be considered. If radiation does govern, the unit’s
MSD is dependent upon whether or not radiation radiation status must be ascertained and the ap-
is the governing criteria. propriate Troop Safety Table consulted. The fol-
d. Depending on weapon yield, the governing lowing procedures apply :
effect in establishing the minimum safe distance ( 1 ) BS-1 (Units with a past cumulative radi-
may be blast, thermal radiation, or initial nuclear ation dose of less than 75 rad). Road direct from
radiation. For weapon yields in which nuclear the safety distance table for the appropriate
radiation is the governing troop safety criterion weapon system contained in FM 101-31-3.
(table 3-1), it is necessary that the unit’s radia- (2) RS-2 (Units with a past cumulative radi-
tion-exposure history be considered. FM 3-12 dis- ation dose of from 75 to 150 rad). For units in
cusses the procedures whereby unit radiation-expo- this category, any future radiation exposure must
sure histories are determined and records be considered a moderate or emergency risk. There
maintained. can be no negligible risk for personnel in this cate-
e. To consider a unit’s radiation-exposure his- gory. When investigating troop safety, the negli-
tory properly, it is important that the quantitative gible risk column and appropriate degree of vul-
meaning of the various minimum safe distances be nerability must be used to determine the MSD for
understood insofar as nuclear radiation troop moderate risk. Similarly, the moderate risk value
safety criteria are concerned. The following dis- must be used for determining emergency risk radii.
cussion refers to figure 3-8 and considers troops (The moderate risk value is obtained by linear
with no previous radiation exposure history. interpolation halfway between the negligible and
(1) Line X represents the emergency risk emergency risk value in the safety distance table.)
MSD. For units located in area A, between the
(3) RS-3 (Units with a past cumulative
DGZ and line X, there is a very high assurance
radiation dose of more than 150 rad). All future
that these units will be exposed to more than 50
radiation exposures must be considered emergency
rad (an emergency risk). The assurance decreases
as the distance from the DGZ to the friendly troops risks for units in this category. There can be no
decreases. Such units are exposed to more than an negligible or moderate risk for personnel in this
category. The negligible risk column and appro-
emergency risk.
priate degree of vulnerability must be used to
(2) There is a very high assurance that units determine the MSD for emergency risk.
located on line X or in area B will receive 50 rad or
less and, therefore, will be exposed to no more C@iralHiifi)gj®irafl iinfedfs
than an emergency risk. Furthermore, units located a. Contingent Effects. The coverage tables are
in area B beyond a line visualized to be about mid-
computed using the governing effect—that effect
way between lines X and Y will receive no more which extends the greatest distance to cause the
than a moderate risk (20 rad or less). desired degree of damage to the principal target
(3) Following the same reasoning, there is elements. Contingent effects are effects other than
a very high assurance that units located on line the governing effect. They are diyided into bonus
Y or beyond will receive 5 rad or less and, there- effects, which are desirable, and limiting effects,
fore, will be exposed to no more than a negligible which are undesirable.
risk. The risk to a unit located beyond line Y b. Bonns Effects. When a nuclear weapon is
decreases with the increase in distance from the used on a target, there will be many effects other
DGZ until at some point, not mathematically de- than the governing effect that will assist in the
fined or tabulated in any manual, there is no longer destruction of enemy elements. These are termed
any risk of radiation exposure. “bonus effects.” Some are predictable, others are
'&/. When examining troop safety in connection not. The desirability of achieving bonus effects on
with target analysis, table 3-1 must be examined the primary target element or on another target
to determine if the weapon field being investigated element may influence the selection of a nuclear
is within the range where radiation is the govern- weapon. The target analyst checks to see whether a
ing troop safety criteria. If radiation does not gov- predictable bonus effect may exist at a certain
ern, the unit’s radiation history does not have to point by obtaining the radius of damage for the
«IWÖ®
 C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

Line Y

Line X

DGZ

LEGEND
Line X-Emergency risk MSD, FM 101-31-2, -3.
Line Y-Negligible risk MSD, FM 101-31-2, -3.
Figure 3-8. Minimum safe distance.

effect from the effects tables. He then estimates the sirable in a given instance are the creation of ob-
effect on the target by considering the effect of stacles to friendly movement as a result of tree
horizontal dispersion. blowdown, rubble, and forest and urban fires. The
c. Limiting Effects. Limiting effects are effects target analyst determines whether undesirable
that are undesirable and, consequently, may place effects will be created. He does this by considering
restrictions on the employment of the weapon. the radius of the limiting effect. He determines the
These restrictions are referred to as limiting re- least separation distance (LSD) from the safety
quirements. Examples of effects that may be unde- distance tables.

Section III. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

3-9. Time of Attack (para 3-10), a backup weapon, if available, should

a. Tactical Considerations. be placed in an on-call status. In planning the nu-
(1) General. A set rule for selecting the time clear attack, time should be allowed for making a
for firing a nuclear preparation should not be tactical damage assessment of the first round to
made. To achieve surprise, it may be desirable to determine whether the backup weapon should be
fire all weapons at the same time or as close fired. This time interval will vary, depending on
together as possible. Because well-trained troops such factors as—the surveillance method used to
may become prone as soon as they observe the flash determine if the first weapon hit the target, if it
of the first burst, surprise may often be achieved detonated, and if the target sustained the desired
by delaying the delivery of subsequent rounds. degree of damage; communications: visibility;
Sometimes better results may be obtained by firing and the maneuver plan (para VI-1, app B).
on targets at irregular time intervals. Weapons &. Preinitiation Considerations. The radiation
supporting a secondary attack may be fired first to from one nuclear weapon may cause a subsequent
assist in locating reserves or to cause the pre- weapon to detonate prematurely. Such an occur-
mature commitment of the enemy’s reserve. rence is called “preinitiation.” If two weapons are
(2) Time for tactical damage assessment.. to be fired so that they may land within 10,500
When a less reliable weapon system is employed meters of each other, the special data provided in

3-11
C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4
FM 101-31-2 and chapter 3, FM 101-31-3 should c.
be used. A more detailed discussion of preinitiation placed in an on-call status when a less reliable
is included in FM101-31-2. weapon system is employed.
3—10. Reliability 3—11. Analysis of the Vulnerability of
a. The reliability of a weapon system is the Friendly Troops
probability that the weapon will get to the target a. Target analysis procedures are used to esti-
area at the desired time and a nuclear detona- mate the possible results of an enemy nuclear at-
tion of the expected order of magnitude will tack on friendly dispositions or installations
take place. Reliability is a function of crew train- (annex B-VII, app B). Based on current intel-
ing, maintenance, communications, command, ligence and the enemy’s past use of nuclear weap-
weather, terrain, delivery system, and weapon de- ons, the yield of the weapon most likely to be
sign. The reliability of any weapon system varies employed against friendly elements is estimated.
to such an extent that fixed values cannot be estab- b. Special tables are presented in figure B-VII-
lished ; experience will dictate the reliability of a 1, FM 101-31-2 and FM 101-31-3 that gives the
given system. radii to be used in analyzing the vulnerability of
b. Reliability is not a consideration in selecting friendly dispositions. The target analyst assumes
a weapon for attack of a target except as follows : that the enemy can deliver a weapon at the point
(1) The most reliable systems are employed , where it will do the greatest damage to the friendly
against the most important targets—those critical installation, disregarding the effect of delivery
to the success of the mission. errors. The target analyst then estimates what
(2) Against other than the most important fraction of friendly dispositions might be endan-
targets, less reliable systems are employed before gered by such an attack.
the more reliable. This permits retention of the c. The analysis of present and planned
more reliable weapon systems for attack of future friendly dispositions is a continuing process.
targets. The commander must be kept informed of
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

vulnerability conditions so that he can make command and on the risk of destruction the
decisions concerning changes in existing or commander is willing to accept. Accomplish-
planned dispositions. While dispersion de- ment of the mission and avoidance of forma-
creases the risk of destruction from nuclear tions that present profitable targets to the
attack, it increases the possibility of defeat in enemy are frequently conflicting requirements.
detail and complicates the problem of control. The commander takes full advantage of all
The degree to which units can be dispersed in characteristics of the battle area that contrib-
any situation will depend on the mission of the ute to the fulfillment of both requirements.

3-13
\

\
 #

«s

I
 FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

CHAPTER 4

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES, STAFF PROCEDURES, AND

TECHNIQUES OF EMPLOYMENT
r

4-1. General forded by nuclear weapons, and their limited

supply, the commander and staff carefully
a. The command actions and staff procedures control the supply, expenditure, and resupply
involved in the employment of nuclear weapons of this type of ammunition.
are an integral part of the normal sequence
of command and staff actions. The command, (1) Nuclear ammunition falls into the
logistical, intelligence, and operational actions category of “.special—ammunition/’
required for effective employment of nuclear Special ammunition is ammunition so
weapons are carried out concurrently rather designated by the Department of the
than sequentially. These concurrent command Army because of requirements for
and staff actions are portrayed graphically in extraordinary control, handling. —or
figure 4-1. security. Special ammunition in-
cludes—
b. Commanders exercise the same thorough- (а) Nuclear and nonnuclear warhead
ness in planning the use of nuclear weapons sections ; atomic demolition muni-
as they do in planning the employment of tions; nuclear projectiles; and as-
their major tactical units. To achieve economy v sociated spotting rounds, propell-
of nuclear firepower, coordination and concur- ing charges, and repair parts.
rent planning of nuclear fires, nonnuclear fires, (б) Missile ..bodies- (less missiles com-
and maneuver are essential. Nuclear fires may
render a ground assault on the target area bining high-density, low mainte-
unnecessary because of damage inflicted, and nance, and conventional ammuni-
tion features), related components
often impracticable because of obstacles cre- of missile bodies (less repair
ated. Often the use of nuclear weapons will
be the decisive element of the attack or the parts), and missile propellants.
defense. Even the threat of use of such weapons (2) A complete round is included within
may inhibit movement or concentration of the meaning of special ammunition^
large forces. Certain items that are closely related
to special ammunition are supplied
c. At a low level of nuclear weapon usage, through special ammunition class Y
fire and maneuver receive equal consideration channels (e.g., associated test and
by the commander in determining the appro- handling equipment and special
priate combat power to be applied. At higher tools).
levels of usage, the effects of these weapons (3) The availability of complete nuclear
saturate the battle area, and maneuver be- rounds will be too limited in the fore-
comes more difficult. In such cases, tactical seeable future to permit them to be
plans are dictated by the capability of nuclear handled by the required supply rate,
weapons to influence the battle. available supply rate, automatic re-
supply, and basic load concepts used
4-2. Control of Nuclear Ammunition with conventional ammunition. The
o. Because of the great combat power af- system for distributing nuclear am-
4-1
o
r

FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

Continuous process of positioning nuclear rounds with delivery units to support planned operations
1 1 "

Continuous process of positioning delivery units where they can support planned operations
!
Continuous process of collecting information
r
PREVIOUS
Mission Target acquisition Tactical damage
assessment
Continuous process of integrating maneuver and firepower
Fire support coordination Exploitation
Commander’s initial guidance
Staff estimates NEXT
Target evaluation MISSION

target analysis
Decision to deliver
Order to deliver
Fragmentary troop warning order Final troop warning
Fragmentary warning order to delivery unit Replenishment of delivery
Computation of delivery data unit special ammunition load
(if applicable) automatic or
Preparation of round for delivery command directed. 9-OTJo

TIME TO DELIVER IME OF BURST

4
Waiting Time

i Figure U-l- Concurrent command and staff actions for nuclear weapon employment.

munition is outlined in paragraph nuclear, a chemical, or a biological round

4-13. unless-he~has been specifically authorized tô'do
so; or unless He~is~disposing of”the roüñd in
b. An allocation of nuclear rounds is a speci-
compliance with emergency denial operating
fied number of complete nuclear rounds that a procedures.
commander may plan to expend during, a
specified-period of time or during a specified c. Both allocations and expenditures are ex-
phase of an~¿perátioñr~ATlocatión of"nuclear
weapons does- not Include the authority—for -iruterms of delivery-system and yield.
their expenditure. The authority to expend . d. The duration of the allocation and author-
nuclear weapons mav he-granted, concurrent ized expenditure periods generally will be dic-
with their allocation or at a later date. This tated by the commander’s visualization of the
authority is subject to normal requirements operation. He retains rounds in reserve for
for warning, coordination, and other restric- those periods that he cannot visualize ; i.e., for
tions imposed by higher authority. A com- employment against targets of opportunity and
mander cannot authorize the expenditure of a for use during later phases of the period. The
4-2
 FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

duration of the period varies at different com- ( 1 ) Missions assigned subordinate—units.

mand levels. The field army commander usual- Consideration is given to which units
ly is provided weapons for a longer period must have weapons for successful ac-
than is the corps commander and the corps complishment of their assigned tasks.
commander for a longer period than is the di- (2) Numbers, types, and yields of
vision commander. weapons available.
e. Reserve maneuver forces may receive an (3) The number, size, location, and com-
allocation of nuclear weapons depending upon position of targets that subordinate
their anticipated employment. units may be expected to acquire and
to engage.
/. The commander who has been authorized (4) The capability of organic or support-
to expend weapons may or may not have the
ing units to deliver the type of weap-
delivery unit under his control; e.g., weapons
ons allocated.
to be delivered by Air Force or Navy com-
ponents in support of the ground battle. In (5) The range, reliability, accuracy, mo-
authorizing expenditure of nuclear rounds to a bility, and responsiveness of available
subordinate commander who does not have the delivery means. Troop safety require-
delivery unit organic or attached to his com- ments may dictate that smaller yields
mand, the authorizing commander specifies any and more accurate delivery systems
special fire request channels to be used. be given to subordinate commanders
for close-in targets, with larger yields
g. A commander who allocates or authorizes being retained by higher echelons for
the expenditure of nuclear rounds to a subor- attack of larger and deeper targets.
dinate commander may withdraw or change (6) The other combat power available to
the allocation in the same manner that he assist in the accomplishment of the
withdraws or attaches troop units. Reduction mission, such as chemical or biologi-
in the allocation is made only when it is ab- cal ammunition, conventional weap-
solutely-essentia.1 anrl-w-ith-as-much prior noti- on systems, and maneuver units.
fipation-as-is possible. Subordinate units develop
tactical plans around the nuclear weapons in (7) The capability of subordinate units to
their allocation and modify the plans as nec- accomplish the coordination necessary
essary when the authority to expend nuclear with other headquarters and with the *
weapons is received or the allocation is Navy or the Air Force.
changed. (8) The degree of susceptibility to coun-
termeasures of the available weapon
h. Each commander who is provided nuclear
systems.
rounds considers—
. (1) Retaining a portion for the attack of (9) The restrictions imposed by higher
targets in support of his own tactical authority on the allocation received.
plan. (10)
(2) Providing a portion to his major sub-
j.
ordinate unit commanders for support
of a unit made up of forces from countries
of their tactical plans.
other than the United States. These weapons
(3) Maintaining a nuclear weapon reserve
may be delivered by either U.S. or non-U.S.
with which to influence the battle as
delivery units. In the latter case, atomic demo-
it progresses, and in anticipation of
lition munitions, missile warhead sections, and
his needs in future phases of the op-
artillery projectiles are retained under the con-
eration.
trol of U.S. personnel in accordance with di-
i. In-allocating and_authorizing the_expendi- rectives of the U.S. commander or with
ture of nuclear rounds, thp rnmmanHpr rnnai- theater directives until time of launching or
ders the following: firing. '

4-3

J
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

4-3. Acquisition of Surface Targets Failure to establish these priorities, or failure

a. Target acquisition is that part of intelli- to concentrate the collection effort on those
gence activities which involves detection, iden- enemy activities which would pose a serious
tification, and location of ground targets. The threat to accomplishment of the mission, risks
information obtained is used for target analy- overextending the capabilities of the collection
sis, target evaluation, and employment of agencies. Such overextension results in inade-
weapons. Information is collected from all quate target acquisition.
sources and agencies. e.
get information is developed and revised con-
b. The effectiveness of a nuclear attack de- tinually throughout an operation (para II-4,
pends, to a great extent, on the accuracy, app B).
completeness, and timeliness of intelligence.
Specific information of target areas, to include (1) An analysis of the terrain, a study
location, size, shape, composition, concentra- of the enemy order of battle, and an
tion, vulnerability, recuperability, and perman- understanding of enemy tactics will
ence or direction and speed of movement, is produce a list of areas in which the
continually sought by all intelligence collection enemy might locate reserves, logis-
agencies. The degree to which this information tical installations, command posts,
is complete and accurate influences the accu- nuclear delivery units, or other pro-
racy of the damage estimation and the validity fitable targets.
of the target analysis. The degree to which the (2) This list is studied to determine
information is timely influences the effective- which areas, if occupied, adversely
ness of the attack. affect the accomplishment of the
mission. The areas on this list are
c. The limited visual field of an observer held to a minimum to avoid over-
frequently restricts his ability to observe in extension of the collection agencies.
its entirety an area target appropriate for at- Also, too large a list may degrade
tack with nuclear weapons. A single observer the capability of the (Army) tactical
seldom has the capability to provide sufficient operations center (TOC) or (Ma-
target information on which to base a target rine) fire support coordination center
analysis and a decision to fire. This limitation (FSCC) to record and to interpret
demands that a detailed collection plan be target information.
developed and that target information be col- (3) When time permits, these prospec-
lected from all available sources. A target suit- tive target areas are subjected to
able for attack with nuclear weapons fre- more intensive surveillance than is
quently may be acquired at a higher echelon the remainder of the battle area. The
of command by the analysis and the integra- items of information collected from
tion of apparently unrelated items of informa- this surveillance are used to deter-
tion received from several sources. mine the characteristics of the tar-
d. Because of the foregoing aspects of tar- get.
get acquisition, the importance of the com- /. A list of prospective target areas forms
mander’s initial staff planning guidance can- the basis for a list of suspected targets. A
not be overemphasized. Such guidance pro- suspected target is one whose existence is
vides the basis for developing the essential known, but whose location is unknown; or it
elements of information and the detailed col- may be a location concerning which there is
lection plan. The commander isolates those doubt whether it is occupied. Suspected tar-
enemy activities which, if they should mate- gets are engaged with nuclear weapons when
rialize, would seriously affect the accomplish- evaluation of the target indicates that a nu-
ment of his mission. He then establishes the clear attack is justified. Target evaluation is
priorities of the intelligence collection effort. discussed in paragraph 4-lla.
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

g. The enemy can be expected to present dures for employing these weapons. However,
targets for only a short period of time. Be- these officers receive technical advice from
tween the time of sighting the target and the the nuclear weapon employment officer on
actual delivery of the weapon, the target may matters incident to the use of such weapons.
change its shape, location, or vulnerability. e.
Information on these targets must be col- falls into the following categories:
lected, and the target must be analyzed and
evaluated in a relatively short period of time. (1) Type of targets to be attacked (sched-
Whenever enemy activity generates a remu- uled or on-call).
nerative target and the target has the capa- (2) General statement concerning num-
bility to move or to dissipate, the target is ber, size, yields, and delivery systems
Engaged as soon as possible. that should be released to subordinate
h. Fixed targets (e.g., bridges, fortifica- commanders for execution.
tions) may be included in a schedule of fires (3) Desired nuclear weapon reserve.
and attacked in a more deliberate manner.
/. The commander’s initial staff planning
guidance for the use of nuclear weapons varies
4-4. Command Guidance in content with the echelon concerned.
a. The magnitude and nature of nuclear (1) At division this guidance normally is
weapon effects have a profound influence on confined to the type of targets to be
ground operations. Therefore, command guid- attacked with nuclear weapons and
ance to the staff before the commencement the weapon reserve desired. The di-
of planning is vital. The commander devotes vision commander may also give
at least the same thought and effort to his guidance concerning weapons to be
development of initial staff planning guidance used in the support of maneuver
concerning nuclear weapon employment as he units. The initial guidance in this re-
does to the employment of maneuver forces gard is usually general until such
and other fires. If there is little time for staff time as the concept of the operation
planning, this guidance may consist of a de- is determined. Because of the im-
cision by the commander at the outset. When mediate and profound impact nu-
more time is available, the guidance may in- clear weapons have on operations at
clude specific courses of action for the staff to the division echelon, the com-
consider during the development of staff es- mander’s guidance normally is quite
timates. detailed in the areas mentioned
b. In developing his initial staff planning above. He frequently indicates spe-
guidance, the commander considers the re- cific weapons that will constitute his
quirements of all elements of the general staff. nuclear weapon reserve. A division
In addition, he provides guidance for the ar- nuclear weapon reserve is retained
tillery commander and, at field army level, for for attack of targets of opportunity
the air defense artillery commander. rather than for future operations.
(2) At corps, initial staff planning guid-
c. The commander provides such additional
ance normally is provided concern-
guidance as may be required throughout the
ing the type of targets to be at-
planning process up to the time nuclear weap-
tacked with nuclear weapons under
ons are fired.
corps control, a general guide as to
d. It is essential that commanders and staff weapons to be released to major
officers understand the effects of nuclear weap- subordinate commanders for execu-
ons, the capabilities and limitations of the tion, and the general nature of the
various delivery systems, the combat service corps nuclear weapon reserve. Be-
support requirements involved, and the proce- cause of the scope and area of

4-5

i
FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

corps operations, the corps is the ance in these respects is appropriate only
lowest echelon that retains a sub- when departures from the SOP are desired.
stantial reserve of nuclear weapons The SOP should state the required coverage
for future phases of an operation. to destroy a target and the required coverage
Because corps possesses the resources to neutralize a target. Based on the SOP, the
for delivering a decisive blow on the nuclear weapon employment officer determines
enemy, command guidance includes the extent and nature of .the damage required
the nuclear fires desired in connec- and recommends the weapon system best
tion with the commitment of the suited for this task. Similarly, the commander
corps reserve maneuver force. will normally, as SOP, desire negligible risk
(3) At field army the commander’s ini- to his own and to adjacent forces. The staff,
tial staff planning guidance is more including the nuclear weapon employment
general than that at lower echelons. officer, automatically takes this into account
Because field army plans an opera- in its analysis and operational planning. If a
tion weeks or even months in advance risk greater than negligible must be taken,
of the event, initial staff planning or if friendly troops must be warned of the
guidance seldom concerns the attack attack, the employment officer so indicates
by field army of specific targets with when he makes his recommendations (para
nuclear weapons. Rather, the field B-2d(7), app B). Creation of obstacles to
army commander provides guidance friendly movement and other undesirable ef-
that permits the staff to develop al- fects are also matters the staff and the nuclear
locations of weapons to major sub- weapon employment officer normally can fore-
ordinate commanders for each future see and minimize without being given specific
phase of the field army operation; to guidance. These limiting requirements may in-
develop the mix of yields and delivery clude one or more of the following:
systems that subordinate com- (1) No significant fallout.
manders will be authorized to fire in
support of their current operations; (2) No damage to a particular installa-
and to provide an appropriate field tion or area.
army reserve of nuclear weapons , (3) Induced contamination near the
for the entire operation or specified ground zero held to a minimum.
period for which an allocation has h. The following is an example of a division
been received. The field army com-
commander’s initial guidance to his staff :
mander also provides guidance on “Use no more than three nuclear weapons to
priorities in the employment of nu- neutralize the Aggressor reserves. Use at least
clear air defense weapons. Because
two weapons to support the brigade making
of his responsibility in regard to nu-
the main attack. Be sure that the available nu-
clear weapon logistical support, the clear weapons are dispersed so that the cav-
field army commander provides guid-
alry squadron and the supporting attack and
ance in this area. Finally, he pro-
reserve brigades can be supported with nu-
vides guidance on his policies (and
clear fire, if necessary. Retain all nuclear
policies imposed by higher head-
weapons, other than those scheduled, in re-
quarters) concerning limiting re-
serve for employment against targets of op-
quirements (g below). This guid- portunity.”
ance may include such areas as
limitations on fallout, protection of i. The following is an example of a corps
friendly civilians, and avoidance of commander’s initial guidance to his staff:
damage to transportation complexes. “Aggressor has organized the area between our
current positions and the Blue River for a de-
g. Damage criteria and trooptermined
safetydefense.
con- The decisive battle during the
siderations are SOP matters. Command guid- coming operation will be fought west of the Blue
 C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4
River. Although vve have a limited number of nuclear the corps are located well forward for this operation,
weapons for this operation, I am willing to expend 30 and that all nuclear delivery units have a maximum
to 40 percent of them in penetrating the Aggressor special ammunition load. If required, give transporta-
main and secondary defensive belts and in advancing : tion priority to movement of nuclear weapons.”
to the Blue River. Corps fires will be used to engage
Aggressor nuclear delivery means and those reserve 4—5. Fire Support Coordination
maneuver forces that have the capability to adversely 'fra. Fire support coordination is the coordi-
affect the outcome of the battle. These fires will be
nated planning and directing of fire support so
delivered as soon as the targets are located. These
fires, together with subordinate unit nuclear fires, will that targets are adequately attacked by appropri-
insure that we inflict maximum casualties and dam- ate means of weapons available. This would in-
age to Aggressor units west of the Blue River and will ; clude all fires on surface targets, whether planned
insure our successful attack to secure crossings over or targets of opportunity, regardless of the source
the Blue River.
of these fires.
“Once we are across the Blue River, we must be
ready to exploit our crossings and to move rapidly b. Proper fire support coordination integrates
through the passes of the Silver Mountains and seize firepower and maneuver. The fire support element
the communications center of Foxville. Be extremely (FSE) of the tactical operations center in the
cautious in planning the employment of nuclear Army and the fire support coordination center
weapon in the Silver Mountains, because I want no
obstacles to our advance created in these critical areas.
(FSCC) in the Marines performs the target
“Retain one-fourth to one-half of our nuclear analyses that result in a recommended plan for the
weapons in reserve for the attack to seize Foxville, employment of nuclear weapons. In the Army, if
because I anticipate a stubborn enemy defense there, these plans involve means other than normal
and for the defense against the Aggressor counter- surface-to-surface delivery units, they are coordi-
attacks that are sure to follow when we seize Foxville.
“Divisions will not be given authority to expend nated as follows:
weapons over 50-kiloton yield.” (1) Atomic demolition munitions with the
j. The following is an example of a field army
engineer element.
commander’s initial guidance to his staff : (2) Air-delivered weapons with the tactical
air support element (TASE).
“The offensive to seize the passes through the Ruff
(3) Air defense weapons employed in a sur-
Mountains is the most critical part of the coming
operation. Once we have seized the passes and repulsed face-to-surface role with the air defense element.
Aggressor counterattacks, we should regroup and c. During the fire support coordination process,
advance rapidly to the northeast to seize the India- measures are taken to insure that predicted effects
Bravo-Mike industrial complex, link-up with elements
of contemplated nuclear fires will not adversely
of the 12th Army Group, and destroy the enemy en-
trapped in the pocket thus formed. affect projected operations. When undesirable ef-
“With the advance to the Ruff Mountains so criti- fects of nuclear fires cannot be prevented, the im-
cal, I am willing to expend one-half of the available plications of these effects are indicated, and al-
nuclear weapons to destroy Aggressor resistance west ternative courses of action are recommended to the
of the mountains and to inflict maximum casualties
commander for decision.
and damage to his reserves in this area. Plan on a
small nuclear weapon expenditure in the exploitation d. During the process of fire support coordina-
from the mountains to seize the India-Bravo-Mike tion, a series of recommendations is developed that
complex. Insure that we retain a reserve of nuclear will produce the following specific results :
weapons for use during the initial attack to seize the
mountain passes, to prevent any sizable reinforcement (1) Dispersal and positioning of nuclear
by reserves now located east of the mountains, and to weapons and release to executing units in a man-
destroy the Aggressor forces entrapped in the pocket. ner that most effectively suports the commander’s
“Surface bursts may be authorized by corps com- concept of operations within his allocation.
manders, provided significant fallout is confined to the
corps zone of action. (2) Establishment of liaison and communica-
“Air defense is SOP. Available nuclear weapons re- tions between nuclear delivery units and supported
leased to air defense units for that purpose will not units.
be employed in a surface-to-surface role without (3) Actions to insure troop safety. The nu-
specific approval by me.
clear weapon employment officer checks for troop
“The success of this offensive depends heavily on
the delivery of nuclear fires when required. Insure
safety as part of each target analysis. To accom-
that the special ammunition supply points supporting plish this check, it is necessary to have data indicat-

4-7
C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

ing the location and radiation exposure history of carefully established and rehearsed. Dissemination
friendly forces. FM 61-100 prescribes procedures of warning earlier than is necessary may permit the
such as the use of phase lines, for the reporting of enemy to learn of the planned strike, with a result-
location and for the control and coordination of ant decrease in the effectiveness of the attack.
movement. During the fire support coordination (2) When there is insufficient time to warn
process, recommendations on the specific proce- personnel within the limits of visibilty, only those
dures to be employed are developed. personnel who might receive tactically significant
e. A detailed discussion of the duties of the fire weapon effects are given a nuclear strike warning.
support coordinator and of fire support coordina- Warning of units not requiring the information
tion procedures is contained in FM 6-20-1 and FM causes them to assume a protective posture that
6-20-2. interferes with the accomplishment of their mis-
sion. There is generally no requirement to warn
★4—6. Warning of Friendly Nuclear Strikes subordinate units when the target analysis indi-
(This paragraph is, based on STANAG No. cates no more than a negligible risk to unwarned,
2104.) exposed troops.
a. Advance warning of a nuclear strike is re- (3) Aircraft, particularly light aircraft, can
quired to insure that friendly forces do not receive be damaged by low overpressures. Likewise, dazzle
casualty-producing weapon effects. For strikes at is more significant to personnel operating aircraft
distant enemy targets, advance warning is required than to personnel on the ground. Because aircraft
only for adjacent units and aircraft likely to be can move rapidly from an area of negligible risk
affected by such strikes. When a nuclear weapon to one where damaging overpressures or dazzle may
is part of a schedule of fires, there is usually ade- be encountered, all aircraft within the area of op-
quate time to alert those personnel in an area where erations are given advance warning during both
significant effects may be received. If it does not day and night operations.
interfere with the mission, troops out to the limits (a) Army aircraft are warned through the
of visibility should be warned. On the other hand, appropriate air traffic control facility or through
when weapons are employed against surface targets the unit command net.
of opportunity, an SOP is required that will (b) Navy and Air Force aircraft are warned
permit rapid notification of personnel who could through Navy and Air Force liaison personnel. At
be affected by the weapons. When very low yield corps and division level, the notification of the
nuclear weapons are employed against targets of planned employment of a weapon is transmitted
opportunity or when nuclear weapons are em- to other Services through the Navy or Air Force
ployed in the air defense role, there may not be liaison officer; at field army level, this notification
sufficient time to warn friendly personnel. The is accomplished through the tactical air control
difficulty of warning all personnel can be appreci- center (TACC).
ated if the various activities in the forward battle (c) Time permitting, air defense artillery
areas are visualized. Messengers, wire crews, litter will report via command and control nets to the
bearers, aid men, and others move about frequently Army Air Defense Command Post (AADCP) the
in the performance of their duties. Often they may intention to engage hostile aircraft with nuclear
not be in the immediate vicinity of troop units weapons, stating estimated time, altitude and
when warning of an impending nuclear attack is GEOREF of the nuclear burst. The AADCP will
disseminated. Small detachments of combat sup- transmit a warning message to its associated TOC
port troops, such as engineers, may be working in and Sector Operation Center/Control and Report-
isolated areas where they may be subjected to ing Center (SOC/CRC), and these agencies may
casualty-producing effects if they are not warned. transmit alerts to their respective airborne
Effects that are completely tolerable to troops in aircraft.
tanks or foxholes can cause considerable casualties ★ (d) Warnings to aircraft in Marine
among those in the open in the same area (para Corps operating areas will be initiated by the
6-3). FSCC which passes the warning to the Tactical
(1) Notification concerning friendly strikes
Air Commander usually via the Tactical Air
is a time-consuming process unless procedures are Command Center (TACC) and/or the Direct Air
4-8
 C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

Support Center (DASC) and/or the Supporting (6) Adjacent headquarters whose units are
Arms Control Center (SACC). likely to be affected by the strike.
(4) When very low yield weapons are em- (c) His next higher headquarters, when
ployed against targets of opportunity, operational units not under the command of the releasing com-
requirements may dictate some relaxation of the mander are likely to be affected by the strike.
requirement for positive warning. ( 3 ) Each headquarters receiving a warning of
b. Nuclear strike warning (STRIKWARN) nuclear attack will warn subordinate elements of
messages are disseminated as rapidly as possible. the safety measures they should take in view of
The requirement for speed frequently will be in their proximity to the desired ground zero.
conflict with a requirement for communications (4) Figure 4—2 shows the zones of warning
security. Authentication procedures and encoding for friendly nuclear strikes. The number of zones
instructions for nuclear strike warning messages shown will be less whenever the data for two or
are included in unit signal operation instructions. more minimum safe distances (MSD) are the same
(1) The amount of information to be encoded (e.g., where MSD 2 is the same as MSD 3, only
is held to a minimum to expedite the dissemination. zones 1 and 2 would apply for the friendly nuclear
(2) Strike warnings are broadcast in the strike.) Table 4—1 explains the protection require-
clear when insufficient time remains for the enemy ments for personnel located in any of the warning
to react prior to the strike. zones.
c. Procedures for warning of friendly nuclear (5) Figure 4—3 shows the format in which all
strikes are included in the subparagraphs below. friendly nulclear strike warnings will be given.
( 1 ) Warning responsibilities are as follows : Figure' 4—4 shows examples of friendly nuclear
(а) Responsibility for issuing the initial strike warning messages. Notification passed to
warning rests with the. requesting commander. those agencies or facilities responsible for dis-
(б) Commanders authorized to release seminating warnings to airborne aircraft will in-
nuclear strikes will insure that strikes affecting the clude the least safe distance for light aircraft in
safety of adjacent and other commands are co- hundreds of meters (four digits) as part of item
ordinated with these commands in sufficient time India following the data for MSD 3. (Examples
to permit dissemination of warning to friendly of MSD determination are presented in annex B-
personnel and the taking of protective measures. III, app B.)
Conflicts must be submitted to the next higher It(6) The STRIKWARN message contains
commander for decision. lines YANKEE and ZULU to transmit fallout
(2) The commander responsible for issuing prediction data from surface bursts for yields of
the warning should inform—' 0.15 KT and higher. However, no formal proce-
{a) Subordinate headquarters whose units dure has been established to transmit fallout pre-
are likely to be affected by the strike. diction data for friendly ADM subsurface bursts

Table 4~1- Protection Requirements for Friendly Nuclear Strikes

Arta • Cmesponiinç to— Zone Requirement
DGZ to MSD 1 1 Evacuation of all
personnel.1
From MSD 1 to MSD 2 Limit of negligible risk to warned, protected 2 Maximum protection.’
personnel.’
From MSD 2 to MSD 3. Limit of negligible risk to warned, exposed 3 Minimum protection.4
personnel.*
MSD 3 and beyond Limit of negligible risk to unwarned, exposed No protective measure,
personnel.’ except.against dazzle.
1 4
If evaculatlon Is not possible, or If a commander elects a higher degree of Minimum protection denotes that personnel are prone on open ground
risfr, maximum protective measures will be required. with all skin areas covered and with an overall thermal protection at least
1
Negligible risk should normally not be exceeded unless significant ad- equal to that provided by a two-layer summer uniform.
vantages will be gained. > Minimum safe distances are increased by 50 percent when conditions of
s
Maximum protection denotes that personnel are in “buttoned-up” tanks extreme reflectivity and good visibility exist. (Seeparagraph 2-25c(l).)
or are crouched in foxholes with improvised overhead shielding. 4
M8D means minimum safe distance. When surface bursts are used» the
fallout hasard will be considered and appropriate buffer distances included.

4-9
 G H, ™ Tl OU-3.11—ï /FM FM Ï1-4

MSD

DGZ
Zone

Zone

ï®

Zone

Figure 4-8. Zones of warning for friendly nuclear strikes.

with yields from 0.01 KT to 100 KT and for sur- should be common understanding as to the mean-
face bursts with yields of 0.1 KT or less. There- ing of the acknowledgment (e.g., all platoon-size
fore, as an interim measure, line ZULU INDIA is units in the affected area have been warned).
added to the STRIKWARN message to cover the d. Normally it is not necessary or desirable to
case of fallout resulting from very low yield nu- transmit the strike warning message in the format
clear detonations. shown in figure 4-3 to company-/battery-size
(7) When nuclear strikes are canceled, units units. Any such unit located in zone 3 (fig. 4-2) or
previously warned will be notified in the clear by closer to the desired ground zero should, by SOP,
the most expeditious means as follows : “Code word receive a message containing specific orders on the
(target number). Canceled.” protective measures to be implemented by that
(8) The amount of information to be encoded unit. The message should include—
is held to a minimum to expedite dissemination. (1) A proword indicating that the message is
Items Delta and Foxtrot (fig. 4-3) will not be sent a nuclear strike warning.
in the clear unless the time will not allow encod- (2) A brief prearranged message that directs
ing and decoding. the unit to observe a specific protective measure
(9) Unit SOP should require that strike (including evacuation to an alternate position if
warning messages be acknowledged, and there within Zone 1 ). The SOP should state the period
 o
C 1, FM 101-31—1 /FMFM 11-4

of time during which the personnel must remain the commander has neither the weapon nor the au-
protected. thority to fire, he may request delivery of nuclear
(3) Expected time of burst. fires from the next higher commander. (Fig. 4-5
e. All available communications means are used shows an example of a division nuclear fire request
to permit rapid dissemination of warnings of the to corps.) Simultaneously, the fire direction cen-
employment of nuclear weapons against targets of ter (FDC) or the tactical air control center is
opportunity. These means include— alerted. Eequests contain sufficient information to
(1) Sole-purpose telephone circuits, wire or permit a complete evaluation of the fire mission.
radio relay. As a minimum, a request contains a description of
(2) FM and AM voice radio nets. the target, the results desired, and the desired time
of burst. The request may contain additional in-
(3) Continuous wave and radioteletypewriter
formation, such as limiting requirements, location
nets.
of the desired ground zero, acceptable risk to
(4) One-way voice radio nets. This commun-
friendly troops, or location and degree of protec-
ication does not give the recipient the capability of
tion of nearest friendly troops. If the target has
acknowledgment ; the recipient may be required to
been analyzed by the requesting agency, the request
acknowledge over a different means of communi-
for fires may specify the desired weapon and yield.
cations. The range and coverage of this net may
6. The next higher releasing commander may
cause the message to be sent to units that do not
approve or disapprove the request. In some cases,
need to be warned.
he may submit a request to his next higher com-
f. A fragmentary warning order may be issued mander for release of a weapon more suitable than
while a fire mission is being processed to alert unit any presently available to him.
personnel that they are in an area in which they c. Upon approval or disapproval of a fire re-
may receive the effects of a weapon being consid- quest, the requesting agency is notified. Whenever
ered for employment. The personnel are cautioned possible, a commander who disapproves a request
to remain alert for a followup message that will
provides the requesting agency with the reason for
cancel, confirm, or alter the warning. The followup
the disapproval and will substitute another type
message is sent whenever the time of burst is de- of fire support whenever possible.
termined or the decision is made not to fire the
weapon. 4—8. Fire Orders
g. While units outside the area in which effects a. Once a fire mission has been approved, fire
may be received normally are not sent a nuclear support agencies are given the necessary orders to
strike warning message, effective liaison may re- cause the weapons to be delivered on the target.
quire that strike data be passed to adjacent units (1) Orders to Army delivery units include—
as a matter of SOP, particularly for those friendly (a) Unit to deliver the weapon.
strikes that are in close proximity to a boundary ( 6 ) Firing site, if applicable.
between major units. Information concerning (c) Delivery system/yield.
these strikes is of operational concern (e.g., infor- (d) Height of burst in meters or height-
mation used to update situation maps in the TOC of-burst option.
that portray areas radiological contamination and (e) When applicable, fuzing option desired
obstacles to maneuver of friendly forces). (e.g., contact backup or contact preclusion).
(/) Desired ground zero.
4—7. Fire Requests
(g) Time of burst/latest time of burst.
a. When a commander has a requirement for (h) Resupply instructions, if applicable.
nuclear fires and has the weapon but not the au- (2) If air-delivered weapons have been pro-
thority to fire, he may request authorization to fire vided an Army unit, the message to the tactical air
from the next senior releasing commander. When control center includes—

4-11

0
 4-12
C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4
STRIKWARN
Alfa : Code word indicating nuclear strike (target number).
Delta : Date-time group for time of burst in Zulu time. The time after which the strike will be canceled (Zulu time).
Foxtrot : D6Z (UTM grid coordinates).
Hotel : Indicate air or surface bursts.
India : For all bursts:
MSD 1 in hundreds of meters (four digits).
MSD 2 in hundreds of meters (four digits).
MSD 3 in hundreds of meters (four digits).
LSD for light aircraft in flight in hundreds of meters (four digits).
Yankee : For all bursts when there is less than a 99-percent assurance of no militarily significant fallout.
Direction measure clockwise from grid north to the left, then right, radial lines (degrees or mils -state
which) (four digits each).
: For all bursts when there is less than a 99-percent assurance of no militarily significant fallout.
Effective windspeed in kilometers per hour (three digits).
Downwind distance of zone I (km) (three digits).
Cloud radius(km) (two digits).
Zulu India : Effective wind speed to the nearest kilometer per hour (three digits).
Downwind distance of zone I to the nearest tenth of a kilometer (four digits).
Downwind distance of zone II to the nearest tenth of a kilometer (four digits).
Cloud radius to the nearest tenth of a kilometer (three digits).

Figure 4-3. Format of STRIKWARN message for friendly nuclear strikes.

 C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

1. Airburst .> 99 percent assurance of no military significant tallout. c. Fire support agencies may be ordered to pre-
STRIKEWARN. ALFA TUBE 0009. DELTA PQWM 0T AR/AS DG WY OF. pare an alternate nuclear weapon system (either of
FOXTROT YM AB IM SK. HOTEL AIR. INDIA 0028 0041 0012 0079.
the same type or of a different type) or to plan
2, All bursts < 99 percent assurance of no military significant fallout.
STRIKEWARN. ALFA TUBE 0001. DELTA PQ WM OT AR/AS DG WY OF. nonnuclear fires in the event the first weapon fails.
FOXTROT YM AB IM SK. HOTEL SURFACE. INDIA 0028 0033 0058
0002. YANKEE 0002 0102 DEGREES. ZULU 016 012 04. 4—9. Employment of Atomic Demolition
Munitions
•^Figure 4-4. Examples of STRIKWARN message.
a. Certain nuclear munitions are designed for
emplacement at the desired ground zero by engi-
(a) Yield.' neer personnel or by other qualified personnel who
(b) Permissible circular error probable. have been specially trained. Nuclear munitions
(CEP).
employed in this manner are called atomic demoli-
(c) Height of burst in meters; or, in the tion munitions. Generally, ADM are employed
case of radar-fuzed weapons, height-of-burst against the same type of targets as are nonnuclear
option.
demolitions. ADM are also used to create large-
(d) When applicable, fuzing option de- scale obstacles and to produce fallout. They have
sired (e.g., contact backup or contact preclusion). the advantage of delaying repair or use of an area
(e) Desired ground zero. because of residual radiation. Once a decision has
(/) Time of burst/latest time of burst. been made to employ ADM, suitable munitions are
(ff) Applicable coordination measures. For made available to the commander within whose
example— area they can be used advantageously. For detailed
J. Special signal procedures, such as description of ADM employment and analysis see
marking of the initial point, and abort signals. FM 5-26.
2. Flak suppression measures. b. An atomic demolition plan includes—
3. Special air defense coordination pro-
(1) Target number and description.
cedures. (2) Type of ADM, yield, depth of burst, and
b. Early notification to the delivery unit reduces location of the desired ground zero.
delays in firing. Advance information with which (3) Designation of emplacing unit.
to occupy firing sites, compute firing data, and (4) Designation of supporting units, with co-
prepare the nuclear round is desirable. On some ordination instructions.
occasions, this information is given to the delivery (5) Methods of firing.
unit prior to the time a decision is made to employ (6) Security instructions, including designa-
the weapon. tion of the unit to furnish se-

4-13

373-351 0 - 70 -3
 FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

CTOC

~z^r
Basic Fire Support
fire Element Corps
request Artillery
division to CTOC
corps

xxxxxx Delivery
Unit
DTOC

Information

Pire Support
Element Division
of Artillery
DTOC

LEGEND
i jS Fire request.
— —Information.
Fragmentary
xxxxxxx^ warning
order.
Organic element.

Figure b-5. Example (Army) of division fire request to corps.

curity and whether mines or (10) Coordination instructions for warn-

antidisturbance devices will be in- ing and evacuating friendly ground,
stalled. air, and naval forces or a civilian
(7) Time of emplacement and final arm- populace.
ing. (11) Tactical coordination among higher,
lower, and adjacent commanders.
(8) Time of detonation or circumstances
under which ADM is to be fired. (12) Logistical coordination.
(13) Special signal requirements.
(9) Authority to abort the mission and/
or to order emergency evacuation or c. During retrograde movements, ADM are
destruction. emplaced in terrain held by friendly elements.
4-15
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

ADM employed in this manner are integrated different from those existing at the time of the
with barrier plans and with denial plans. Pro- original fallout prediction. To preclude inadver-
visions are made for demolition guards and tent fallout on friendly troops, a final fallout
communications in the same manner as that prediction is made immediately prior to de-
outlined in FM 31-10. Procedures to detonate tonation. Results of this fallout prediction may
the ADM are specifically directed by the com- cause the commander to cancel the mission, to
mander who directs the installation of the modify the tactical plan, or to move troops out
ADM ; these procedures identify the comman- of the fallout pattern.
der or other person who is authorized to order
detonation. h. Security of ADM employment plans is es-
sential. Compromise of plans may result in loss
d. When ADM are employed in enemy-held of the emplacement team or in seizure of the
terrain, emplacement teams may be infiltrated munition. See FM 5-26 for details of security.
into the target area, airlifted by helicopter, or
dropped by aircraft. The commander who di- i. Detailed procedures for employment of
rects the employment of the ADM also directs ADM are contained in FM 5-26. Effects tables
the mode of transportation and insures that by target category are included in FM 101-31-
the necessary means of movement and security 2, chapter 10, FM 101-31-3, and TC 3-15.
are provided.
e. Although it is possible to employ ADM 4-10. Use of Fallout
against personnel, it is not a recommended use, (This paragraph is based, in part, on
and it is more appropriate to employ them STAN AG No. 2103.)
against fixed targets because—
a. Intentional surface bursts are employed
(1) Enemy personnel in the target area whenever fallout is desired. Fallout is used as
may intercept the emplacement team the principal desired effect whenever it con-
while the ADM is being emplaced, or tributes to the accomplishment of the mission
may capture or render inoperative the in a better manner than do the initial effects.
ADM prior to detonation.
(2) The time required to emplace ADM b. The lethal area of a weapon is greatly ex-
militates against employing them tended by the production of fallout. Any
against targets that have movement increase in yield produces an increase in initial
capability. effects; a correspondingly greater increase in
the fallout pattern occurs with the same in-
/. Atomic demolition munitions may be em- crease in fission yield. This is portrayed in
ployed to produce fallout; to destroy struc- figure 4-6.
tures; and to produce cratering, fires, and tree
blowdown. They may also be used against in- c. Because of the large area covered by fall-
stallations that are not likely to be moved prior out patterns, authority for the use of surface
to the time the weapon is detonated. They have bursts is held at a higher level than is normal
specific application in destroying hard targets for airbursts.
such as tunnels, dams, airfields, railroad yards,
ports, causeways, major bridges, and under- d. Fallout is employed to restrict the use of
areas to the enemy, as an obstacle to his move-
ground installations ; in denying key terrain or
ment, or as a spoiling attack to throw his
facilities t© the enemy; and in creating obsta-
cles to enemy movement. tactical plans off balance. When target infor-
mation is vague, or when the target area ap-
g. Because ADM produce fallout,
pears to bea fallout
thinly occupied, the large area
prediction is always made. Plans for employ- covered by a fallout pattern gives special ad-
ment of the ADM generally are made far in vantage. As discussed below, present methods
advance of detonation; however, meteorologi- of predicting fallout do not give the capability
cal conditions at the time of burst may be of accurate target coverage estimation.
4-16
 FM 101—31—1 /FMFM 11-4

e. Exploitation of a friendly burst is accom- ical surveys. Procedures for fallout prediction
plished through coordination of firepower and are contained iñ TM 3-210.
maneuver elements. While it is preferable that
friendly units avoid the fallout pattern, the i. Standing operating procedures in all units
units can cross the pattern with reduced risk provide for radiological monitoring whenever
if they move quickly and if they have a good surface bursts are employed. These SOP also
degree of radiation protection while they are establish methods of assembling the informa-
crossing. The protection provided by various tion necessary to make radiological contami-
means of transportation, as well as by various nation charts.
structures, is shown in FM 101-31-2 and chap- j. After radiological contamination charts
ter 18, FM 101-31-3. have been plotted, probable dose-stay time
f. As is the case with other obstacles, a fall-
calculations are performed. Based on the total
out pattern can be crossed by a determined dose expected to be received during movement
enemy. Pattern crossings can be made with through the fallout pattern, the commander
relative impunity by highly mobile, well- estimates the risk involved in executing his
shielded troops, such as personnel in tanks. planned maneuver. As a result of this evalua-
Crossing the pattern can be made more costly tion, the commander may change his maneuver
plan, accept a risk of increased casualties, or
to the enemy—regardless of the crossing means delay his movement until the pattern has de-
used—if the pattern area is covered by fire.
cayed to an acceptable level.
Repeated surface bursts in the same area may
be required to maintain the restricted area at
the desired level of contamination. 4-11. Estimate of the Situation
An estimate of the situation is a logical and
g. The effect of fallout on future operations orderly examination of all factors affecting the
is considered in the planning of surface bursts. accomplishment of the mission. Factors affect-
Fallout assumes great importance if a given ing the decision to employ nuclear weapons
locality is to be used a short time after the are included in a, through d below.
burst, especially if prolonged occupancy is
foreseen. a. Target evaluation is the orderly process of
examining a target to determine its importance
h. A fallout prediction is prepared when and to establish its priority for attack. It en-
friendly surface bursts are employed. The pre- compasses an analysis of the tactical mission
dicted hazard area is larger than the actual and an evaluation of target intelligence.
area on the ground that will be covered by
militarily significant fallout. Because of the un- (1) The first element in target evaluation
certainties of weather and nuclear burst input is a determination of the target’s
data, the precise location of fallout within the relative importance. In this deter-
predicted area of hazard cannot be reliably mination, consideration is given to
predicted but must be ascertained by monitor- the effect attack of the target will
ing and survey after fallout has settled. There have on the accomplishment of the
is, however, a reasonably high assurance that mission. The commander also consi-
the expected fallout will not occur outside the ders the effect of not attacking the
predicted area of hazard. Because of the lack target. Part of this determination of
of precise information on the dose rates inside target importance is accomplished in
the predicted area, and the type of protection determining the priority of target
afforded to enemy troops, no attempt is made surveillance in the development of
to estimate casualties as is done with the ini- the intelligence collection plan.
tial effects of the weapon. The fallout predic- (2) Target intelligence influences the
tion is used to aid in operational planning, to evaluation of the target in the follow-
warn or alert personnel, and to plan radiolog- ing manner:

4-17
FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

650 rad total dose

contour at H+4
for 100-KT weapon

30 km

km

650 rad total dose

contour at H+4
for 10-KT weapon

Initial
effects 12 km
circles SVaikm

13 knot steady wind

13/4 km 650 rad total dose

contour at H+4
km for 1-KT weapon
Scale 1:250,000

Figure U—6. Comparison of initial effects and residual effects from 100-, 10-,
and 1-kiloton surface bursts.

(a) The commander may decide that a capability to provide complete tar-
suspected target is so important get information. Delay of nuclear
that he must attack it even though attacks until detailed intelligence
friendly intelligence agencies may is developed may impede the effec-
not have been able to collect sig- tiveness of the attack. On the other
nificant information on the target. hand, engagement of a target with-
(b) Conversely, the commander may out some indication of its charac-
decide that a target is not of suffi- teristics may cause an unwarranted
cient importance to warrant attack waste of combat power,
unless there is considerable cer- b. Once targets have been evaluated and
tainty that the attack will be re- given a priority for attack, the commander
munerative. In this respect, combat determines whether to engage them with
intelligence will seldom have the nuclear fires, nonnuclear fires, maneuver

4-18
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

forces, or some combination of these means. attack with a particular weapon

The considerations that affect the attack of a are insufficient to warrant the ex-
target with a maneuver force and with non- penditure of that nuclear weapon
nuclear fires ate not discussed in this field If the insufficient results are be-
manual. cause the reliability of the weapon
c. There are many considerations that in- system is low, the commander may
fluence the decision to attack a target with decide that the importance of the
nuclear weapons. target is so great that a more re-
liable means must be used in its
(1) The availability of weapons is con- attack.
sidered in the estimate. This availa- (&) Targets of a magnitude appro-
bility is governed by the authority priate for attack with nuclear
to fire and by the physical location weapons are frequently ill-defined.
by both the delivery unit and the Consequently, predictions of target
weapon(s) to be delivered. coverage should not be given undue
(2) The time available to employ the weight by the commander in mak-
weapon(s) influences the decision. ing his decision.
Targets that are capable of moving (c) Analysis of the target may indicate
may disappear subsequent to acquisi- that a nuclear attack will produce
tion and prior to engagement if the undesirable results. For example,
timelag is significant. the commander may decide that
(a) Time may be required to move the the target is not sufficiently impor-
weapon(s), the delivery unit, or tant to warrant a risk to friendly
both, if they are not in a position troops greater than a negligible
from which the target can be en- risk. Or, target analysis may indi-
gaged. cate that obstacles may be created
(b) Time is required for target evalua- that will impede the accomplish-
tion, target analysis, fire direction, ment of the mission more than the
and preparation of the round for expected results will assist.
firing. (d) When target analysis indicates
(c) Time is required to— that the requirements established
1. Warn subordinate units. in the SOP cannot be met, the
2. Coordinate with adjacent units commander may decide to modify
into whose sector weapons effects or revise the requirements so that
may extend. the weapon (s) can be used. This
S. Notify friendly aircraft. revision of requirements may in-
(3) The capability of the enemy to inter- clude one or more of the following :
fere with the friendly nuclear attack 1. Accepting less damage to the tar-
influences the decision. Means by get.
which the enemy might interfere in- 2. Accepting a higher degree of risk
clude attack of the friendly nuclear for friendly troops.
delivery means with either a maneu- 3. Delaying the nuclear attack to
ver force or firepower, electronic permit friendly troops to acquire
countermeasures, or interference with greater protection.
command and control facilities. 4. Accepting the possibility of ob-
(4) The results of target anajysis affect stacles or induced contamination
the estimate of the situation. in certain areas.
(a) The commander may consider that 5. Accepting the possibility of dam-
the results expected from a nuclear age to industrial complexes, struc-

4-19
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

tures, materiel, or objects that it is taHored fp operate; in different tactical

is desirable to leave undamaged. ' situations, forms of warfare, and operational
6. Accepting a higher probability of environments.. Commanders and. staff officers
fallout. concerhèd with planning and contrölling spe-;
d. As a result of the estimate of the situa- cial ammunition support activities 'consider
tion, the commander decides the proper method the following requirements : .v
of engaging each target. The authority to (1) Continuous nuclear logistical support
engage a target with a nuclear weapon nor- of tactical operations.
mally is retained personally by the comman- (2) Simplicity and uniformity in proce-
der. In appropriate circumstances, the com- dures.
mander delegates this authority to a specific-
ally designated representative. (8) Minimum handling of nuclear ; am-
munition.
4-12. Tactical Damage Evaluation (4) Security of classified or critical ma-
teriel and installations.
a. Tactical plans are based on the condition
of the target area predicted in the target c. The terms “special ammunition load”
analysis. Once the nuclear . attack has been - (SAL), “special ammunition stockage“ (SAS),
made, the primary or an alternate plan is . and “special ammunition supply point"
executed, depending on the results achieved. (SASP) are defined in AR 32(1-5,
In some cases, the decision may be made to d. The tactical commander controls the dis-
fire a backup weapon. The impact of damage, tribution of nuclear ammunition by—
casualties, obstacles, or contaminated areas on
the planned operation is considered prior to (1) Determining the number of nuclear
the commitment of exploiting forces. Situa- rounds that will be carried >s part
tions may arise in which changes of direction of the special ammunition load of
or even cancellation of an attack is possible organic ór attached delivery units
or necessary. that are retained under his control. 1
b. Following a friendly nuclear burst, every (2) Designating any nuclear rounds from
reasonable effort is made to determine the his reserve or the reserve of á higher
damage to enemy forces and their reaction to commander desires to have carried in
the attack and to obtain information concern- the special ammunition load of
ing residual radioactivity, fires, and obstacles. à delivery unit that . is under the
control of a subordinate commander:
Thus, the special ammunition loád of
4—13. Distribution of Nuclear Ammunition / a given delivery unit may include
a. Commanders and staff officers con- those weapons available to the or-
tinuously evaluate the capabilities and limi- ganization : to which the unit is or-
tations of logistical systems to support nuclear ganic or attached, as well as rounds
weapon employment. Because of the decisive tb be delivered in support of higher^
character and limited availability of nuclear lower, or adjacent echelons.
ammunition, the distribution of this ammuni- (8) ‘Arranging for the stockage of nu-
tion is am operational as well as a logistical clear. rounds as part of the special am-
problem. A special ammunition logistic element munition stockage of a special am-
(SALE) is established at the army and corps munition .installation not under his
tactical operations center to logistically assist .control ; directing the stockage of nu-
the tactical commanders in expediting the sup- clear rounds . in special ammunition
ply of special ammunition (see FM 54-8 installations under his control.
(Test) ).
e. The positioning of nuclear rounds for
b. The nuclear ammunition logistical system security and operational purposes may result
4-20
 FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

in a commander having,more or fewen.rounds 4-14. Tactical Accountability

positionedhiß command than he is-author-
ized to, fire.; Jn .the latter case, procedures, are, a. The decisive character of nuclear weapons
and ' their limited availability make detailed
established'Jay. which the additional rounds can'
recordkeeping necessary. Information pertain-
be obtained, or .fired, by another-command.
ing to weapon location, availability, authori-
f. When the availability of nuclear rounds zation to fire,, and expenditure is made availa-
permits, consideration is. given, to placing ble to the membèrs of the tactical operations
rounds in all nuclear delivery. unjts.( This per- center and the artillery fire direction center.
mits dispersal of ammunition. Ammunition is In addition, the. tactical operations center and
usually positioned at some timé during the al- the artillery fire-direction center need informa-
location phase, before authority 'is given to tion on ammunition readiness status, fire cap-
employ ,the¡ weapon. In many,‘cases’, this per- abilities of nuclear delivery units, and the
mits greater responsiveness after'the weapons traveltime between logistical and tactical loca-
are released, to.executing commanders for em- tions. This information is maintained in a
ployment. manner that permits ready display to the
g. Replenishment of the special ammunition commander and staff officers. Suggested forms
load "and. thé', spècial ammunition stockage is or methods by which needed information can
accomplished^ by directed individual issue.’ Be- be kept at various staff agencies are discussed
cause of the " limited súpply of nuclear rounds in b through d below. Similar records are kept
and the requirement for varying the location on other types of special ammunition.
ofl rounds to meet the changing tactical situa- b. Planning information required for em-
tion, directed individual replenishment is most ployment of nuclear ammunition is shown in
feasible. , . . figure 4-7. This is an example of an appro-
h. , The number priate
of record
nuclear and carried
rounds should as
be modified to meet
part , of ‘ ao special-ammunition loád may vary the needs of the commander at each echelon.
among similar types of delivery units in the They demonstrate use of the sample charts by
same command. a corps headquarters. Because fewer types of
nuclear rounds are available to a division, the
i. Distribution of nuclear munitions is af- charts at division level should be considerably
fected by—1 Vi
reduced in size and complexity. Figure 4r-7
(bh Mission; portrays information on allocations, expendi-
(2) Currently réleased weaponà and au- tures, and rounds carried in delivery units and
' thorizations to fire. special ammunition supply points. All entries
’(3) ' Allocation, current and' anticipated. indicate complete-round information, i.e., war-
(4) Aminunition availability. ‘ head section or shell and the associated missile
:
(5) Carrying capacity of the delivery and/or the propellant required to deliver the
?
' units'. Consideration ' is given to the weapon on a target.
other types of ammunition being car- c. Information for use in the tactical opera-
ried;;in the speciál ammunition load. tions center and the artillery fire direction
'(6) Security. center, in addition to the two figures described
(7) Transportation capability of support above, is shown in considerable detail in fig-
units. ; ures 4-8 and 4-9. The charts in these figures
j. Nuclear rounds are stored and issued to may require modification to meet the needs of
delivery units by ordnance special ammunition the commander at each echelon and may, for
units. The complete nuclear round is issued to convenience, be combined to form a single op-
nuclear munition delivery users at special am- erations board. When a large number of
munition supply: points. Thé details of ord- weapons are in the special ammunition load,
nance ammunition support procedures are a separate weapon status chart for each type
contained in FM ; 9-6-1 and ammunition serv- of delivery system available to the commander
ice in FM 54-^8 (Test). (e.g., Honest John, Sergeant, Pershing) should

4-21
FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

be placed on the operations board together readiness status of each round are in-
with the air-delivered weapon status chart. The dicated. The time and date each round
operations board is used in conjunction with is expended are recorded on this
the partial nuclear ammunition summary and form.
fire capabilities overlay to visualize the actual (2) Figure 4-9 indicates the readiness
distribution of nuclear rounds. status of each air-delivered weapon
(1) Figure 4-8 accounts for each indivi- allocated to the command. Time and
dual nuclear round that the head- date of expenditure are recorded on
quarters has retained under its direct this chart.
control (not those allocated to subor- d. Additional information required to carry
dinate commanders). Location and out logistical planning is shown on figure 4-10.

HQ, 1st Corps

NUCLEAR AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE SUMMARY
Posted 121800 Jul
Nuclear ammunition (delivery system/yield)1
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
Air delivered

Remarks

O O

1st Corps 8-18 July 50

Expended to date 15
Unexpended 35

m Corps targets
21st Inf Div For period
11-13 Jul
52d Inf Div (Mech)
28th Armd Div
a
Corps res 17
30th Army Res as of 12 150 21 12 14 11 13 13 For period
Jul through 1 Aug

Distribution of 1st Corps special ammunition load as of 121800 Jul

1st in delivery units 17 1
Corps in SASP 17
21st Inf Div
52d Inf Div (Mech)
28th Armd Div
Total 49 10 526754412

Delivery system and yields correspond to delivery systems shown in FM 101-31-3.

LEGEND
MRC-Medlum-range cannon. MGM-Medium guided missile.
FFR-Free-flight rocket. HGM-Heavy guided missile.
LGM-Light guided missile. ADM-Atomic demolition munition.

Figure U—7. Example of nuclear ammunition expenditure summary.

4-22
 FM 101^31-1/FMFM 11-4

% .WEAPON READINESS STATUS

a IV
e/.
Remarks
Unit Yield

DELIVERY UNIT TRAVEL TIMES (MINIMUM)

NOTE 1. This chart Is maintained on the operations board in the FSE and FDC, together with the air-
delivered weapon status chart (fig. 4-9 ).
2. Under the Unit column, mort?than one delivery unit may be indicated.
3. A separate sheet is used for each delivery system under the operational conbol of the head-
quarters.
4. Under the Time fired column, the actual time-date that the weapon is fired is listed. This
is the official expenditure record for the FSE and the FDC.
5. The four readiness statuses correspond in general to-
a. I (weapon in shipping container).
b. II (weapon assembled in rendezvous area).
c. Ill (weapon assembled, in firing position).
d. IV (weapon assembled, checked out, and firing data computed).
6. Under the appropriate weapon readiness status column, the location of each weapon is shown by
an abbreviated code. For example:
Location Code

SASP 610 S-610

Bn svc area On
Bn rendezvous area C C
Bn firing position 4 FP 4
7. Weapons in transit are carried in the Rema

Figure 4-8. Example of weapon readiness status and expenditure chart.

4-23
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

AIR-DELIVERED WEAPON STATUS

Delivery system/yield Time

Remarks
required
Number

e~0/76

NOTE 1. This chart is maintained in the TASE of the TOC.

2. Under the Delivery system/yield column, list all the air-delivered
weapons available to the headquarters and the number of weapons.
3. Under the Time required column, list the delivery time. This in-
cludes flight time plus the time required for the aircraft to become air-
borne.
4. Expenditures are indicated in the Remarks column.

Figure 4-9. Example of air-delivered weapon statue chart.

4—15. Security of Nuclear Weapons and delivery sites, storage sites, radars, communi-
Delivery Sites cations facilities, guns, launchers, or weapons.
a. Nuclear delivery units and logistical units b. Detailed procedures are established con-
are comparatively small. The austere organiza- cerning actions to be taken by delivery units
tion of the units may not provide sufficient to preclude capture of nuclear weapons. SOP
personnel to perform all of the required se- specify the circumstances under which the
curity missions. The critical primary mission weapon is to be evacuated from the delivery
of these units makes them the target of enemy site or is to be destroyed. Destruction means
attacks. Commanders augment the units with may include firing the weapon into a predeter-
the security forces necessary to safeguard mined disposal area in enemy-held territory or

4-24
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

HQ 1st Corps
LOGISTICAL SUMMARY Posted 1800 D+2

Rockets Missiles Cannon

Total
Free Short Medium in
Light Medium Heavy Atomic demolition munitions Remarks
flight range range SASP
Yield
609
Q_
oo
<C 610
611

970

Overall
total in
SASP and
depots
UNITS SUPPORTED BY EACH SASP OR DEPOT
SASP No. 609 1st Corps HQ, 20th Inf Div, and 102d Abn Div Depot 970 All corps units
SASP No. 610 20th Inf Div Depot
SASP No. 611 55th Inf Div
SASP No.
6-OiTO

NOTE 1. This chart is maintained by agencies that control and coordinate tactical and logistical operations. It
supplements the ammunition expenditure summary shown in figure 4-7. This chart indicates weapons present
in the logistical installations.
2. Weapons in transit are shown in the Remarks column until their arrival at SASP is confirmed.

Figure U-10. Example of nuclear ammunition logistical summary.

destroying the nuclear components by demoli- (6) Prevent the deliberate arming,
tions. launching, firing, or releasing of
weapons, except on execution of
4—16. Nuclear Safety emergency war orders or when di-
a. To preclude an inadvertent burst, detailed rected by competent authority.
technical safety procedures have been estab- (c) Prevent the inadvertent arming,
lished. These safety procedures, established launching, firing, or releasing of
for peacetime operations, apply to wartime weapons.
operations -to the extent practicable. {d) Provide for adequate security.

(1) Positive measures are established for (2) Procedures concerning the handling
peacetime operations to— and storage of nuclear weapons are
(a) Prevent weapons involved in acci- published in the technical manuals
dents or incidents (or jettisoned and the theater commander’s direc-
weapons) from producing a nuclear tives that pertain to each nuclear
yield. weapon system.

4-25
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

(3) Supervision of weapon handlers is re- out will result; a fallout prediction is
quired to insure compliance with es- made and those units affected by the
tablished safety procedures. fallout are directed to take the action
ft. If a nuclear accident occurs, either be- required.
cause of a mistake or because of enemy action, (3) Control points are established to con-
immediate action will reduce the extent of the trol entry into areas of high levels
disaster. SOP specify the actions to be taken of contamination.
by surviving personnel. See- FM 3-15 for
(4) Previously organized salvage parties
details.
are sent into the area. These parties
(1) The accident is reported to the next are trained in decontamination pro-
higher headquarters. This report in- cedures.
cludes the location and the nature of
the accident. c. Enemy duds are reported to the next
(2) If a surface burst has occurred, fall- higher headquarters.

4-26
 C 1, FM 101—31—1 /FMFM 11--*

CHAPTER 5

OPERATIONS IN RESIDUAL RADIATION AREAS

5-1. General (1) Both persist for relatively long periods.

a. Nuclear radiation(2)that
Fallout consists
results from alargely
nuclearof very fine par-
explosion and persists longer than 1 minute after ticles and covers large areas. Induced contamina-
burst is termed “residual radiation.” Residual radi- tion may be found to a depth of about one-half
ation can contaminate the airspace over the area meter. For these reasons, the areas affected by both
of operations, the terrain itself, or both, depending types of radiation are difficult to decontaminate.
primarily on the height of burst of the weapon. (3) The size, shape, and location of fallout
Contamination of the airspace is for a relatively patterns are sensitive primarily to the wind struc-
short period of time, and the radiation hazard to ture. The size and intensity of the area of induced
aircraft flying within the area is minimal. Residual contamination are extremely sensitive to the
radiation consists primarily of gamma and beta variability of the soil composition. For these rea-
radiations, both of which present a serious person- sons, areas affected by both types of radiation are
nel hazard. The gamma radiations are by far the difficult to predict ; However, fallout prediction is
more significant because of their range and pene- by far the more difficult and important problem.
trating power. Residual radiation can appear on c. The large areas contaminated by fallout pose
the ground as induced contamination, which is an operational problem of great importance. Po-
found within a relatively small circular pattern tentially, fallout may extend to greater distances
around the ground zero ; and as fallout, which is and cause more casualties than any other nuclear
found in a large, irregular pattern encompassing weapon effect. It exerts an influence on the battle-
the ground zero and extending for long distances field for a considerable time after a detonation.
downwind from the burst point. Induced contamination is relatively limited in
(1) When a weapon is exploded at a height area, and minor tactical changes normally can be
to preclude damage or casualties to ground targets, made to avoid any serious effects.
neither induced contamination nor fallout of tacti- d. The biological response of humans to residual
cal significance occurs. However, if rain (or snow) radiation is essentially the same as their response
falls through the nuclear cloud, tactically signifi- to initial radiation. The total dose of radiation ab-
cant fallout may result. sorbed by an individual is the sum of the initial
(2) When the height of burst is lowered radiation doses and the residual radiation doses he
below that indicated above to produce damage or has received. Biological response to radiation is
casualties on the ground, but is kept above the fall- discussed in detail in paragraph 2-22.
out-safe height, induced contamination occurs. 5—2. Induced Contamination
Fallout considerations are the same as those in (1)
a. All radioactive materials decay. The rate at
above.
(3) When a surface burst is employed, both which this decay takes place depends on the soil
induced contamination and significant fallout re- elements themselves. Some (e.g., sodium) decay
sult. The fallout pattern can be expected to overlap slowly and others (e.g., aluminum) decay rapidly.
and to mask the entire induced contamination This decay rate, measured in terms of “half-life,”
pattem. and the element’s gamma radiation intensity deter-
(4) Shallow subsurface bursts produce both mine the significance of the induced radiation haz-
induced contamination and fallout patterns on the ard. The distance to which a 2-rad-per-hour dose
ground. rate extends 1 hour after burst is considered the
b. Induced contamination and fallout
limit of significant have cer-
induced activity. Estimates of
tain characteristics in common. the extent of the 2-rad-per-hour contour, are con-

5-1
(C Hf IFAÆ HO Tl “S Tl **11/'(F¿Vi IF ¿Vi T1T1=^1
tained in table B-III-1, FM 101-31-2 and chapter within a few minutes after burst. The lighter par-
18, FM 101-31-3. ticles reach the ground farther downwind at later
b. Whenever a nuclear attack istimes. being Figure 5-1 illustrates how total dose may
planned,
the nuclear weapon employment officer advises the vary with time and distance.
commander and the staff of the possible hazard of (3) The size, shape, and location of the areas
induced contamination. After the attack, a radio- contaminated by fallout depend largely on the
logical contamination chart is made from the re- winds that blow the particles that rise with the
ports of radiological survey teams. In comparison nuclear cloud and then fall back to earth. Chang-
with other nuclear weapon effects, however, in- ing wind directions can subject some locations to
duced radiation does not pose a threat of major long periods of fallout deposition.
military significance. (4) Greatest intensity is usually close to the
( 1 ) It may be extremely hazardous for troops ground zero, but high-intensity “hotspots” and
to enter and to stay in an area of induced contami- low-intensity “areas” may occur throughout the
nation. Because of the great destruction near the pattern because of winds or rain.
ground zero, where induced contamination may be. d. The total radiation dose absorbed by an indi-
found, there is seldom a requirement for troops to vidual is a function of radiation intensity, exposure
enter and stay in the area. In the event occupancy time, and protection.
is necessary, radiation is monitored to insure that e. Residual radiation is absorbed or reflected in
allowable total doses are not exceeded. the same manner as prompt gamma radiation.
(2) Thirty minutes after burst, troops2-212»
See paragraph for shielding considerations.
in vehi-
cles may usually pass through the ground zero /. FM 3-12 provides procedures to compute per-
and foot troops may usually pass within 300 meters missible exposure times and total doses in fallout
of the ground zero without undue radiation risk. areas. The Ml radiac calculator can also be used to
(It is emphasized that this is true only if the burst compute total doses and exposure times in single
was at sufficient altitude to preclude fallout. The weapon fallout areas.
area around GZ 30 minutes after fallout producing
bursts will be subject to extremely high dose 5—4. PiredlîcîDOira ©f Foil!l@yfî Afesis
rates.) (This paragraph is based on STAN AG No.
The area of induced contamination is relatively 2103.)
small, and it should be possible to avoid it or to a. A tactical fallout prediction system must be
traverse it rapidly. a compromise between speed and simplicity, on the
one hand; and the time-consuming complexity
5—3. Fsalltoyff that increases accuracy, on the other. The present
'fea. Radioactive fallout also decays. The decay U.S. Army method of predicting fallout gives only
rate from a single weapon can be determined fairly a warning sector, somewhere within which most of
accurately by using the Ml radiac calculator. For the fallout is expected to occur.
a quick estimate of fallout decay, the intensity can
b. The U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps
be considered to decrease by a factor of ten as the
method of fallout prediction is explained in TM
time after burst increases by multiples of 7. Thus
a 50-rad-per-hour dose rate (measured at H+l 3-210. The prediction results in portrayal of an
hour) decays to a five-rad-per-hour dose rate in area that is expected to contain most of the signifi-
7 hours and to less than one-half rad-per-hour dose cant fallout. A detailed prediction is prepared in
rate at H+49 hours. the tactical operations center, based on the best
b. Use of fallout is discussed in paragraph 4-10. available weather and weapon data. Brigade and
c. Reduced to fundamentals, the major aspects lower units use the M5 fallout predictor and effec-
of fallout deposition are as follows : tive wind message to estimate the hazard area ; the
( 1 ) F all out is formed whenever the nuclear M5 predictor is applied using less precise data.
fireball intersects the ground. Both predictions present a graphical portrayal of
(2) The heavier fallout particles start the expected hazard. The hazard area is subdivided
reaching the ground around the ground zero into—
 C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

1,000
900 60 mm
40 mm
800
mm 20-KT weapon
700 15-knot wind
§ 600
E mm
500
400
300
200 mm
100

Kilomters from GZ
Figure 5-1. Total dose variation as a function of time after bursts and
distance from the burst.

(1) An area within which countermeasures extreme, the demands of the tactical situation are
may have to be taken immediately (divided into clearly dominant.
two separately defined sub-areas) ; and (1) Radiation hazard dominant. In general,
(2) An area in which early, but not immedi- two courses of action are considered : early move-
ate, action may have to be taken to counter the ment from the fallout area and remaining in posi-
threat of unacceptable doses. tion.
c. The basic inaccuracies in fallout prediction (a) Early movement.
permit this method to he used in denictinp suspect, 1. When air or surface transport means
n.rens for early monitoring and survey, as well as_ are available, evacuation from the area as soon as
for planning movement of units, but ?io¿ as a basis possible normally is the best course of action.
fnr p'r.p.fYu.tinn operational moves (para 5—5<z( 1 ) )• 2. When the shielding provided by the
The method also permits prediction of the areas exit means is approximately equal to or better
outside which friendly troops are likely to have than that available in the position (and in the ab-
sence of air evacuation means), movement from
relative immunity from the fallout hazard.
the area is accomplished as soon as the minimum-
<7. In an active nuclear war, it is reasonable to
dose exit route can be determined. (See FM 3-12
expect fallout at a given location occasionally to for details.)
be caused by more than one nuclear burst, thereby 3. Fallout predictions are not sufficiently
causing multiple overlapping fallout patterns. See accurate to be used as a sole basis for such moves.
FM 3-12 and TM 3-210 for the proper technique Therefore, movements normally are based on
to handle such situations. measured dose rates and dosimeter readings ob-
tained after the fallout has begun. From such
'kS-S. Basis for Standing Operating
readings, the direction of decreasing intensities
Procedures for Operations in Fallout and the limits of the fallout pattern nearest the
Areas unit are determined. From this, a minimum-dose
a. Command decisions in any fallout situation exit route is selected. A method for determining
are based on consideration of two opposing factors : the optimum time for exit of fallout areas is given
the demands of the tactical situation and the haz- in FM 3-12.
ards due to radiation. At one extreme, the total 4. All available shielding measures are
energies of the unit are directed toward keeping taken within the position until evacuation or
the radiation exposure at a minimum. At the other movement has begun.
5—3
C 1, FM TOl-ai-l/FMFM 11-4

( 5 ) Reinainirig in position. When, the total sist of decontamination and the use of available
dose expected in the position is significantly less shielding.
than that which would occur by moving, the best (6) Decisions to shift emphasis toward
solution is to remain in position for approximately countermeasures against radiation are dependent
6 hours after the burst, at which time movement on a capability to predict with reasonable accu-
from the pattern can be made or decontamination racy the times at which the crucial radiation doses
will be reached. Such predictions can be made
operations can be begun.
when the peak dose rate and the time to peak (in
(2) Tactical demand dominant.
minutes after burst) are known. When such pre-
(a) When the tactical demand clearly gov- dictions cannot be made because unit survey met-
erns, the unit continues to place primary emphasis ers have gone off scale, it can be assumed that the
on the accomplishment of its mission. The unit unit will be exposed to incapacitating radiation
takes action whenever possible to keep radiation doses within a few minutes unless immediate
exposure to a minimum. These actions usually con- countermeasures are taken.

5-4
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

b. Sample SOP are demonstrate

found in short-term
FM 3-12 and symptoms of radiation
FM 61-100. sickness. However, these personnel may be ex-
pected subsequently to demonstrate lowered
5-6. Exposure of Personnel to Nuclear efficiency and increased susceptibility to long-
Radiation (Based on STANAG 2083) term radiation effects. Additionally, when such
a dose has been accumulated by a group with-
a. Ground forces operating in a nuclear in a short period (e.g., less than 1 week), it
environment must expect exposure of personnel can be expected that significant further short-
to radiation. Operations may dictate such ex- term exposure will lead to early ineffective-
posure as a normal hazard of battle. For ness in even the more resistant individuals
tactical planning purposes, when considering of the group.
troops with no previous radiation exposure
history (RS-1), an acute dose of 5 rad con- c. The recommendation to admit personnel
stitutes a negligible exposure, 50 rad a serious suspected of nuclear radiation injury to medi-
(emergency) exposure. cal channels is made by the unit surgeon, based
on symptoms and physical findings and not on
b. The effect on an exposed individual an actual or calculated physical measure-
depends on the total dose accumulated from ment of exposure.
previous radiation exposures; duration of time
over which the doses were received ; type, ener- d. Commanders consider the potential con-
gy, and geometry of the source of the radiation ; sequences of using personnel exposed to sig-
periods of recuperation between radiological nificant but nonsymptomatic doses, especially
exposure; individual response because of phy- in situations likely to result in further expo-
sical condition, sex and age at time of exposure ; sure to radiation. To arrive at a timely de-
and the presence or absence of any additional cision on whether to continue use of these
injuries or incapacitations. The effect on a sin- personnel, the commander uses all available
gle individual cannot be accurately predicted. means to determine the level of radiation ex-
The average effect on a large group can be posure of his command. FM 3-12 discusses
predicted with sufficient accuracy for military techniques for determining this level and for
purposes. Groups of personnel who have ac- classifying units into categories that relate to
cumulated, in small increments within 1 year, the total cumulative radiation dose received
a total body dose of about 350 rad may not (para 2-22).
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

CHAPTER 6

PROTECTIVE MEASURES

Section I. GENERAL

6-1. General a. Dispersion.

a. This chapter considers those situations (1) For a given weapon, the distance be-
in which personnel and materiel are exposed tween the desired ground zero and
to some degree of nuclear weapon effects friendly troops (and their degree of
against which protection can be provided in protection) determines the risk of
the field. damage to them (para 3-7). The
distances between units and between
b. Training in protective measures to be elements within a unit are a measure
taken and establishment of correct operating of the unit’s vulnerability to nuclear
procedures prepare the individual soldier for attack (para 3-11). The dispersion
survival on the nuclear battlefield. Neither the desired in any given situation is
threat of nor the use of enemy nuclear weapons determined by evaluation of such fac-
can be permitted to interfere with the accom- tors as mission, terrain, enemy tar-
plishment of assigned missions. Forces able to get acquisition and nuclear delivery
protect themselves from nuclear weapon effects capability, and friendly unit disposi-
can maintain their combat capability. tions. Dispersal of friendly forces
c. The degree of protection that an indivi- achieves dual benefits.
dual or a unit is able to achieve in a given situa- (a) A well-dispersed unit that moves
tion is determined by the preparedness of the only under the cover of darkness
unit or the individual at the time of the nuclear and observes rigid camouflage dis-
burst. The preparedness of the unit or the cipline is difficult to detect and to
individual is dependent on such factors as— attack.
(1) Time and materials available for the (b) Even if it is detected and attacked,
individual to prepare shelter. the well-dispersed unit will suffer
fewer casualties than if it were not
(2) Training of the individual in protec- dispersed.
tive measures.
(2) While dispersion is desirable to re-
(3) Sound unit SOP. duce the vulnerability to nuclear at-
d. General guidance on protective measures tack, sufficient troop density must be
is presented in this chapter; details are avail- maintained to accomplish the mission.
able in other publications referenced in this Acceptable degrees of dispersion can-
chapter. Figure 6-1 shows doctrinal threshold not be specified for all situations.
figures regarding troop safety criteria. The commander on the scene deter-
mines the permissible dispersion for
6-2. Principles of Protection each situation, giving primary consi-
deration to the accomplishment of
The principles of protection include disper- the mission.
sion, shielding, minimization of the time of
exposure, and radiological decontamination. b. Shielding. Shielding consists of providing
6-1
 FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

EFFECT VULNERABILITY CATEGORY

RISK LEVEL
UNWARNED EXPOSED WARNED EXPOSED

B ''."M w 0.01 0.1 10 100 1000

Negligible A? / 6.5 4.2 2.8 1.9 1.25
L ER / / / / /
V
A 2.5, ER J
W 0.01 0.1 10 100 1000
Moderate
A P / 5.5 3.5 2.1 1.5
S ER / / / / /

T W 0.01 0.1 10 100 1000

Emergency
p 15 9.2
(psij A 2.75 1.75

1 B lUs
T I 2.5 02.5
Negligible
0.01 0.1 1 10 100 1000
H 1 10 100 1000
Q 0.85 1.0 1.15 1.3 1.5 1.75 Q 3.6 4.5 6.3 8.
E
IB 1 Us
R ®5 ®5
Moderate W 0,01 0.1 1 10 100 1000 W 1 10 100 1000
M 0 .95 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.75 2.0 Q 4 5.2 7.2 10
A
.2B 2Us
L Emergency W 0.01 0.1 1 10 100 1000 W 1 10 100 1000
cal/cm 2 Q 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.2 2.9 Q 4.7 6.1 8.8 12.5
RS-1 RS-2 RS-3
Negligible
5 rad
NUCLEAR Moderate 20 rad 5 rad
single shot
Emergency 50 rad 20 rad 5 rad

W = Yield in kilotons
AP = Incident overpressure
Q2US= Incident thermal flux-2° burns under summer uniform
Q1B= Incident thermal flux-1° burns to bare skin

V = Translational impact injury to prone personnel

ER = Ear drum rupture

RS = Unit radiation exposure category
Subscripts to Q, V,' and ER denote probable percent of command affected by specified level of effect.

Figure 6—1. Troop safety criteria.

6-2
 C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

individuals and equipment with physical protec- c. Minimization of the Time of Exposure. Tech-
tion to reduce weapon effects. The best protection niques for minimization of the time of exposure
is afforded by deep underground shelters. Such to radiation are discussed in chapter 5.
structures are expensive in time and materials; d. Radiological Decontamination. Radiological
their construction on the battlefield usually is not decontamination is the process of reducing to an
feasible. Reliance is placed on hasty field forti- acceptable level the hazard of radioactivity from
fications, such as trenches, foxholes, emplacements, residual contamination. Radioactive contaminants
revetments, bunkers, and simplified underground are fission products, fusion products, unfissioned
shelters. Tanks provide considerable protection active material, and matter in which radioactivity
against the effects of a nuclear explosion. Armored has been induced. Some methods of decontamina-
personnel carriers provide considerable protection tion are surface cleansing or scraping, sealing, and
against blast and thermal effects and some pro- disposal. Decontamination processes do not neu-
tralize or destroy radioactivity. These processes
tection against initial nuclear radiation. Tracked
seek to diffuse and dilute the contamination to a
carriers also provide some protection against re-
safe level. Individual decontamination measures
sidual radiation. Wheeled vehicles provide no pro- reduce radiation hazards that would result from
tection against blast or initial nuclear radiation. ingestion or inhalation of radioactive particles
Vehicle tarpaulins provide considerable protection coming in contact with the skin and clothing. Area
against thermal radiation. Sandbags on the beds decontamination requires organization, supervi-
of trucks provide some protection against residual sion, and considerable time, effort, and materiel.
radiation. See FM 101-31-2 and chapter 18, FM Decontamination procedures are discussed in de-
101-31-3 for appropriate transmission factors. tail in TM 3-220.

Section II. INDIVIDUAL PROTECTIVE MEASURES

6—3. General some chance for survival and early continuation

a. Paragraph 4-6 discusses a warning system of his mission. All personnel are trained to react
that permits timely notification of intended rapidly, as follows:
friendly employment of nuclear weapons. This (1) If exposed, move no more than a few
system is also used to warn friendly troops in the
steps to seek shelter.
isolated cases when enemy nuclear weapon employ-
ment is known in advance. For friendly employ- (2) Drop flat on the ground.
ment, adequate warning is required to allow the (3) Close eyes.
individual to achieve the degree of protection as-
sumed in the target analysis leading to a given (4) Protect exposed skin surfaces.
burst. In the case of possible enemy employment, (5) Remain prone until after the blast wave
each individual observes the best protective pro- has passed or debris has stopped falling.
cedures that his situation permits (table 6-1). b. Enemy nuclear weapons are expected to be
b. Specific references that should be consulted followed by attacks involving enemy infantry,
for more detailed information pertaining to pro-
armor, or both. Individuals and units prepare to
tective measures are FM 21^40 and FM 21-41.
repel enemy followup operations, which may be
6—4. Enemy Employment accompanied by conventional artillery fire and use
a. Proper reaction to attack offers the individual of chemical and biological agents.

6-3
 C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

Section III. UNIT PROTECTIVE MEASURES

6—5. Standing Operating Procedures measure dose rate and dosimeters to measure total
a. For the friendly employment of nuclear dose. Monitoring provides warning of a hazard
weapons, the SOP establishes the normal troop that, except for the use of radiac instruments,
safety criteria, radiation exposure control., pro- would go unmeasured. Monitoring is included in
cedures, maximum and minimum warning times, normal reconnaissance and intelligence activities
warning, system procedures, and fallout prediction and does not appreciably interfere with the pri-
dissemination procedures. mary mission of the monitor or his unit.
b. Radiological survey is the systematic, orga-
b. Damage assessment, control, and repair re-
nized use of survey parties whose mission is to
sponsibilities as well as monitoring and surrey,
determine the location, extent, and dose rate of
decontamination, and reporting responsibilities
residual radiation in an area. When monitoring
are established.
data are insufficient to the needs of brigade, divi-
c. Minimum separation distances between criti- sion, and higher echelons, surveys may be directed
cal installations, such as command posts ; nuclear to obtain essential information upon which to base
delivery means ; and reserve units are specified. tactical and combat service support plans. In the
d. The succession to command, the shift of con- Army, the chemical officer and in the Marines, the
trol among headquarters, and alternate means of NBC defense officer supervise the planning of sur-
communications, transport, supply, and evacuation veys, the processing of survey data, and the mark-
are established. ing of hazardous areas. Commanders at all echelons
e. A complete SOP minimizes the disruption are responsible for the training of survey parties
caused by nuclear attack and establishes suitable and for performing surveys as required or directed.
patterns of action for surviving individuals, units, c. The information gained from the activities
and staff sections. Commanders modify the SOP of radiological monitors and survey parties pro-
on a case-by-case basis as circumstances require. vides a basis for decisions on the requirement for
protection, entry, stay, and departure times from
★6—6. Training contaminated areas and for movement of units and
Individual and unit training emphasizes the pro- supplies.
tective actions leading to survival in nuclear war. d. Detailed procedures for monitoring and
This training embraces a knowledge of weapon survey operations are discussed in FM 3-12.
effects, fallout, evasive actions, decontamination,
6—8. Control and Communications
and relative worth of battlefield shelters. Recovery
plans are rehearsed and integrated into the sce- a. The problems of command and control multi-
narios of field exercises. Training in operations in
ply as tactical units disperse to avoid detection and
areas of residual contamination is tied to instruc-attack. Even in the best trained units, some confu-
tion in monitoring and survey techniques (para sion will follow a nuclear attack because of sur-
6-7). prise, shock, physiological and psychological
causalties, materiel damage, and reduced visibility.
6—7. Monitoring and Survey An important means of maintaining or restoring
a. Radiological monitoring involves the use
command andofcontrol is the communications net-
radiac instruments to detect and to measure ioniz- work, both within and between units.
ing radiation. (The individual who uses these b. Unless units are strictly controlled during
instruments is known as the monitor.) Radiac in- the immediate post attack phase, communica-
struments are of two types : survey meters to tions will be overloaded by reports and requests

6-4
 FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

for information. Communications equipment weapon effects. Terrain interposed between a

is protected from physical damage from weap- nuclear detonation and a unit can protect that
on effects to preserve this vital control element. unit from thermal effects and significantly re-
The SOP specifies the emergency use of all duce the blast and initial nuclear radiation
communications means, restrictions, and alter- effects. The regularity, condition, and nature
nate means. It also specifies the conduct of of the reflecting surface affect the distance to
units in the event all communications are lost. which blast overpressures will extend on the
ground Forests beyond the range of signifi-
6-9. Terrain cant tree blowdown offer protection in the
Gross terrain features, such as hills, ridges, form of thermal shielding to troops deployed
forests, and streambeds, offer protection from therein.

6-5
 r Table 6-1. Types and Degrees of Protection for Personnel Against Nuclear Weapons Effects
FM 101—31—l/FMFM 11-4

Degree of protection
Type of protection Initial effects
Blast Residual radiation
Thermal Initial radiation Induced Fallout
In the open None None to fair. Clothing None None None.
protects against heat,
depending on nature
of material and num-
ber of layers. Air be-
tween layers of cloth-
ing provides insula-
tion.
Stone, brick, or con- Fair, depending on ma- Excellent against direct Some from direct radia- None None.
crete walls. terial, thickness, and rays. None against tion. None from scat-
type of construction. rays reflected to back tered radiation.
side of wall.
Ditches, slit trenches. Good, depending on ori- Good, depending on Good, depending on None None against entry
entation relative to depth and orientation. depth and orientation. of fallout parti-
the ground zero. Rays can be reflected- Radiation can be scat- cles. Fair against
to inside. tered to inside. radiation from
surrounding area.
Decontamination
of ditches is
difficult.
Culverts Good, depending on ori- Excellent, depending on Excellent, depending on Good, depending on Good, provided
entation relative to orientation. Rays can orientation and depth. depth and closing of openings are
the ground zero, be reflected into open- Radiation can be scat- openings with earth, closed with earth
depth, and construc- ings. tered into openings. sandbags, and other or other material
tion. material. and continuous
decontamination
is practiced.
Ravines and gullies _ Fair Excellent against direct Some from direct radia- None to fair None to fair.
rays. Some thermal tion. None from scat-
may be scattered. tered radiation.
Open foxholes and Good Excellent against direct Excellent against direct Questionable. Degree of Excellent, provided
trenches. rays. Thermal can be radiation. None from protection depends on foxhole is covered
reflected into foxhole. scattered radiation. removing radioactive with poncho,
soil from surrounding shelter half, or
area and inside fox- other material to
hole or trench. exclude fallout
and particles; de-
contamination is
continuous after
fallout is com-
plete.

V.
 Covered foxholes Excellent Excellent
• Excellent Protection is better than
#
Excellent, provided
and trenches that in open foxholes. decontamination
( 1-meter earth/ More personnel will is continuous
cover). survive initial effects after fallout is
than those in open complete.
foxholes. Scraping 2
inches from the sur-
face inside foxhole
will drastically reduce
induced contamination
inside foxhole.
Emplacements or Excellent Excellent Excellent Questionable. See above. Excellent.
shelters (1-meter
earth cover).
Built-up areas None to fair. Depends None to excellent, de- None to excellent, de- None to fair None from falling
(outdoors). on distance from the pending on orienta- pending on orientation particles. Fair
ground zero, type of tion with the ground with the ground zero, after cessation of
structure, reflection of zero. fallout.
blast wave, and mis-
siles.
Residential buildings
(one-family
frame) :
Upper floors None to fair Excellent from direct None Fair None to fair.
radiation.
None from secondary
fires.
Basements Good from direct blast. Excellent Good Excellent Excellent.
Hazard of collapse of
upper floors into base-
ment.
Apartments and
office buildings:
FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

Upper floors Pair Excellent None to fair Excellent Excellent.

Basements Good Excellent Good Excellent Excellent.
Light-metal indus- None Good 1- None Fair Fair.
trial buildings.
Tents None Good None None — None.
Forests None Fair to good, depending None None None. Fallout
on canopy cover, den- deposited on
sity of stand, and lo- foliage may in-
cation of individual in crease radiation
respect to edge of for- effects.
est toward the ground
T zero.
FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4 Table 6-1. Types and Degrees of Protection for Personnel Against Nuclear Weapon Effects—Continued
Degree of protection
Type of protection Initial effects Residual radiation
Blast Thermal Initial radiation Induced Fallout
Wheeled vehicles None None to fair None - Shielding is fair. Mobil- Shielding is fair.
ity will reduce expo- Mobility will re-
sure time when leav- duce exposure
ing or crossing the time when leaving
area. or crossing the
area.
Armored carriers __ Good Excellent Fair Shielding is fair. Mobil- Shielding is fair.
ity will reduce expo- Mobility will
sure time when leav- reduce exposure
ing or crossing the time when leaving
area. or crossing the
area.
Tanks Excellent Excellent Excellent Shielding is excellent. Shielding is excel-
Mobility will reduce lent. Mobility will
exposure time when reduce exposure
leaving or crossing time when leav-
the area. ing or crossing
the area.
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

APPENDIX A

REFERENCES

A-l. Army Regulations

AR 40-14 Control and Recording Procedures, Occupational Exposure to Ionizing
Radiation.
AR 50-2: Nuclear Weapon Accident and Incident Control (NAIC).
AR 55-203 Movement of Nuclear Weapons Components and Nuclear Weapons
Material.
AR 95-55 Nuclear Weapon Jettison.
AR 220-58 Organization and Training for Chemical, Biological, and Radiological
(CBR) Operations.
AR 320-5 Dictionary of United States Army Terms (Short Title: AD).
AR 320-50 Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes.
(0) AR 700-65 Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Weapons Material.

A-2. Field Manuals

FM 310 Employment of Chemical and Biological Agents.
(S) FM 3-10A Employment of Biological Agents (U).
(C) FM 3-10B Employment of Chemical Agents (U).
FM 3-12 Operational Aspects of Radiological Defense.
FM 3-15 Nuclear Accident Contamination Control.
FM 5-26 Employment of Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADM)
FM 6-20-1 Field Artillery Tactics.
FM 6-20-2 Field Artillery Techniques.
(S) FM 9-2A Special Ammunition Logistical Data (Classified Data) (U).
FM 9-6-1 Ammunition Service in the Theater of Operations TASTA-70.
(Test)
FM 21-30 Military Symbols.
FM 21-40 Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Defense.
FM 21—41 Soldier’s Handbook for Defense Against Chemical and Biological Opera-
tions and Nuclear Warfare.
FM 31-10 Barriers and Denial Operations.
(S) FM 44-1A U.S. Army Air Defense Employment (U).
FM 54-8 (Test) The Administrative Support Theater Army TASTA-70.
FM 61-100 The Division.
(S) FM 101-31-2 Staff Officers’ Field Manual; Nuclear Weapons Employment Effects Data
(Classified) (U).
FM 101-31-3 Staff Officers’ Field Manual; Nuclear Weapons Employment Effects Data
(Unclassified).
FM 105-5 Maneuver Control.
(C) FM 105-6-1 Nuclear Play Calculator (U).
FM 105-6-2 Nuclear Play Calculator.

A-l
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

FM 105-6-3 Nuclear Play Calculator Aggressor.

A-3. Technical Manuals

TM 3-210 Fallout Prediction.
TM 3-220 Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Decontamination.
TM 5-225 Radiological and Disaster Recovery at Fixed Military Installation.
TM 5-311 Military Protective Construction (Nuclear Warfare and Chemical and
Biological Operations).
(C) TM 23-200 Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons (U).
TM 55-602 Movements of Special Freight.

A—4. Other Publications

DA Pam 39-3 Nuclear Weapons.
JCS Pub 1 Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage (Short Title:
JD).
TB 385-2 Nuclear Weapons Firefighting Procedures.
TB CML 92 Calculator Set, Nuclear M28.
TB CML 120 Area Predictor Radiological Fallout, M5.
TC 3-15 Prediction of Fallout from Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADM).

.A-2
 C 1, FM 101—3.1—1 /FM FM 11-4

APPENDIX B

TARGET ANALYSIS

B—1. General equated to one of the major categories listed in FM

a. Target analysis is a comparison of the charac- 101-31-2 and FM 101-31-3, or when nonstandard
teristics of the target(s) to be attacked with the delivery errors are present in a weapon system.
effects that the available weapon (s) and delivery ★ ( 6 ) Annex B-VI discusses poststrike analy-
system (s) can produce. The analysis results in the sis based on the refinement of damage estimation
selection of the most suitable weapon system for from known data, using the numerical or the
attack and in the prediction of damage that should visual method of damage estimation.
be sustained in the target area as a result of the (7) Annex B-VII discusses friendly vulner-
attack. ability and the procedures used to predict the re-
b. The target analyst must be proficient in sults of an assumed enemy nuclear attack on
analyzing targets for attack with chemical, biologi- friendly troop dispositions and/or installations.
cal, and nuclear weapons. Procedures and data for ★B-2. General Procedures for Performing
use in analyzing targets for attack with chemical
and biological weapons are found in FM 3-10, FM Target Analysis
3-1OA, and FM 3-10B. Figure B-l outlines a four-step procedure for use
c. This appendix outlines the procedures that the as a guide in performing target analysis. Analysts
target analyst follows in analyzing targets suit- will normally develop procedures that best fit their
able for nuclear attack. An understanding of the own experience, ability, and command guidance;
general discussion of target analysis in chapter 3 however, use of the outlined procedure will insure
of this manual will assist the analyst in an under- a complete and correct analysis. An explanation of
standing of the detailed explanations set forth in the information required in performing the steps
this appendix. listed in figure B-l is included in a through d
d. This appendix is organized as follows : below.
(1) Annex B-I discusses probabilities and a Step 1. Identify Pertinent Information. Step
procedures used in computing a probability. An- 1 includes target information, friendly informa-
nex B-I also discusses the concept of damage and tion, and information that normally will be found
defines the terni “radius of damage” (RD). in standing operating procedures and received
(2) Annex B-II discusses the three methods from command guidance.
used to compute damage estimation: index ( 1 ) Target information.
method, visual method, and numerical method. {a) Location, size, and shape of the target.
(3) Annex B-III discusses limiting require- (ô) Category of target element (e.g.,
ments and their influence on nuclear weapon em- personnel).
ployment. The discussion of limiting requirements {c) Distribution of target elements within
is divided into troop safety and preclusion of the target complex and their degree of protection
damage/obstacle considerations. against weapon effects.
(4) Annex B—IV discusses the desired ground (d) Stability of the target.
zero, the effects on target coverage when the de- (2) Friendly information.
sired ground zero is displaced from the target (а) Weapons available.
center, and the procedures used in selecting the (б) Location of available weapons.
desired ground zero. ( c) Location of delivery means.
(5) Annex B-V discusses the special con- (d) Location of firing positions.
siderations necessary when targets cannot be (e) Location of friendly troops in zone(s)

B-l
 C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11^1

TARGET ANALYSIS PROCEDURE

1. Identify Pertinent Information
\
a. Target information.
b. Friendly information.
c. SOP and command guidance. 600
2. Determine Data for-
a. Damage estimation. 500
(1) Index method.
(2) Visual method. RT 000
(3) Numerical method.
b. Limiting requirements.
(1) Troop safety.
(2) Damage and obstacle preclusion.
c. DGZ selection.
cL Final coverage.
3. Evaluate Weapon Systems and the Tactical Situation Figure B-2. Determination of the target radius.
4. Make Recommendation
be circular ; and a radius is determined based on
e-°i7s
the best information available.
Figure B—l. Target analysis procedures.
(b) If the target is circular, or nearly so,
the radius of target (RT) is the radius of the tar-
of planned burst, théir degree of protection from get circle. If the target is more nearly elliptical or
weapon effects, and their radiation exposure status. rectangular in shape, with its major dimension
(/) Location of installations not to be less than twice the length of the minor dimension,
damaged. the radius can be established by drawing a circle
(g) Response times. The state of training that includes an area outside the target equal to
and amount of time required by a unit to deliver the target area outside the circle (fig. B-2). The
its weapon (response time) must be considered radius may also be established by visual inspec-
along with the stability of a target. General plan- tion with a circular map scale. When the major
ning guidance for each weapon system is given in dimension is equal to, or more than, twice the
FM 101-31-2. However, the analyst must acquire length of the minor dimension, the target cannot
more definitive guidance from the units assigned be equated to a circle and the visual method must
to the command. be used.
(3) Standing operating procedures and com- (c) Based on the target information, the
mand guidance. target analyst determines which category of target
(a) Desired damage to the
best fits the target
target.under analysis.
(&) Degree of acceptable risk to preclude 1. For each weapon system and yield,
undesirable effects on friendly units. tables are provided for four target vulnerability
(c) Prohibitions against the creation of categories: exposed personnel (prompt and de-
obstacles. layed casualties) ; protected personnel (prompt
(4) Remarks. and delayed casualties); wheeled vehicles; and
(a) Some of the target information con- tanks and artillery.
tained in (1) above, will frequently be missing. 2. Target vulnerability categories have
Consequently, the target analyst must coordinate been established for the primary types or ground
with the G2 and make assumptions concerning the tactical targets expected. These categories can be
size and composition of the target. When target equated to other types of targets as shown in the
intelligence does not indicate otherwise, the target equivalent target table in FM 101-31-2 and chap-
elements are assumed to be uniformly distributed ter 18, FM 101-31-3. (The equivalent target table
in a random orientation ; the area is assumed to is reproduced as figure B-II-2 in annex B-II to
B-2
 C 1, FM 101-3.1—1/FMFM 11-4

this appendix.) The accuracy of such application (2) Consider limiting requirements.
is usually consistent with target intelligence and (a) Restrictions placed on the employment
knowledge of weapon effects. of nuclear weapons are referred to as “limiting
b. Step 2. Determine Data. requirements,” and are considered in two distinct
(1) areas—troop
Estimate damage to the target. safety and the preclusion of damage
(a) Depending on the characteristics of the and/or obstacles that could interfere with the ac-
target, there are three methods of estimating dam- complishment of the tactical mission.
age : index, visual, and numérica;!. 1. Troop safety. The target analyst
1. Index method. The indexes in the cov- checks the distance that separates friendly troops
erage tables contained in FM 101-31-2 and FM from the desired ground zero to insure that the
101-31-3 are an indication of the suitability of a troops will not be exposed to a risk exceeding that
particular weapon system for attack of a given specified by the commander.
target. Coverage tables have been designed for 2. Preclusion of damagejobstacles. The
targets consisting of exposed personnel, protected target analyst checks to insure that undesirable
personnel, tanks and artillery, and wheeled ve- results are avoided. These undesirable results usu-
hicles. Other targets of similar vulnerability are ally consist of obstacles to movement (tree blow-
equated to one of the four major categories in the down and/or fires), damage to structures (bridges,
equivalent target table (fig. B-II-2, annex B-II supply dumps) or damage to heavily populated
to this app). Using the indexes in the coverage civilian areas.
tables, the analyst can estimate the effectiveness (5) A detailed explanation of limiting re-
of an attack. quirements is contained in annex B-III.
2. Visual method. The radii of damage in (3) Select the desired ground zero. To obtain
the coveragetàBles Rave been precomputed taking the maximum effectiveness of a weapon, the target
into consideration the vertical dispersion associ- center, or the center of mass of a target, is selected
ated with the system at the range of interest. The initially as the desired ground zero. However, lim-
target analyst applies the appropirate radius iting requirements, or the attack of multiple tar-
visually to the target, considering horizontal dis- gets with a single weapon, may require the desired
persion. He then visually estimates how much of ground zero to be displaced. The effects of this
the target area is covered by the radius of damage. displacement and a detailed explanation of the
3. Numerical method^JWß target analyst techniques used in selecting the desired ground
uses the radius of damage, the radius of target, the zero are contained in annex B-IV.
displacement distances, and the characteristics of (4) Predict the final coverage. When dis-
the horizontal dispersion pattern to enter the area placement of the desired ground zero is required,
target graph. The result of this operation presents or when attacking multiple targets, a prediction
the analyst with an estimate of the coverage of the of the final coverage of the target must be made,
target or the probability of destroying it. The es- using either the visual or the numerical method
timate of coverage of a circular area target is of damage estimation (annex B-II). This pre-
more accurate if the index method is used. There- dicted final coverage will be a factor in the selec-
fore, the numerical method is used primarily for tion of a weapon system.
estimating damage to point targets, or when the c. Step 3. Evahiate Weapon Systems amd the
desired ground zero is displaced from the center Tactical Situation. In this step, the most suitable
of a circular area target. weapon system is selected to attack each target;
4. Special methods. Because of certain
the best weapon-target combination must be deter-
differences regarding target analysis when con-
mined. This determination involves consideration
sidering the use of Atomic Demolition Munitions,
the techniques described herein must be modified. of several factors, some of which are as follows :
For analysis of targets with ADM the reader is (1) The highest priority target will receive
referred to the detailed explanation in FM 5-26. first consideration.
(b) A detailed explanation of the tech- (2) The weapons selected must be within the
niques employed in each of the three methods of total number of each type that have been author-
target analysis is contained in annex B—II. ized for expenditure.
B—3
C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4
(3) Based on command guidance, the more minimum yield weapon with a sufficiently high
responsive, reliable, and accurate weapon system probability of providing the coverage that insures
)
may be retained for later employment on targets thé desired results should be selected.
of opportunity. d. Step Make Recommendation.
(4) If all other considerations are equal, the (1) General. After the target analysis has

B—4
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

Airburst

Subsurface (underground)
Surface burst
burst

DGZ DGZ

O
Figure B-S. Desired ground zero.

been completed, a recommendation is (4) Desired ground zero. The desired

presented to the commander. The re- ground zero is the point on the earth’s
commendation should include— surface at, above or below which the
(a) Weapon system. detonation is desired (fig. B-3). It is
(b) Height-of-burst (HOB) option. designated by map coordinates.
(c) Desired ground zero. (5) Time on target. The time of burst is
(d) Time on target (TOT). determined by both tactical and tech-
nical considerations, such as preinit-
(e) Latest time on target. ■ iation, time allowed for casualties
(/) Predicted results. to occur, and the maneuver plan. It is
(g) Troop safety. provided as a date-time group (DTG)
(2) Weapon system. The weapon system (e.g., 240830). The latest acceptable
is shown by both delivery system and time on target must also be shown,
yield (e.g., free-flight rocket/2 KT or because it will be a major factor in
Honest John/ KT). If confusion troop warning considerations.
may arise as to the weapon, the Mark (6) Predicted results. The coverage of
number may also be shown (e.g., area targets or the probability of des-
Honest John/MK / KT). troying a point target is always pro-
(3) Height-of-burst option. The height- vided. The coverage for the primary
of-burst option normally will be indi- target element using the index meth-
cated as low air or impact. The exact od of target analysis normally will
height of burst in meters is required be described as an index-number per-
by delivery units when a timer-fuzed centage, or a probability (e.g., .3/.4
weapon is employed, and it is included for protected personnel). The .3
in the fire order. The recommenda- means that there is a high (90 per-
tion to the commander generally in- cent) assurance of at least 30-percent
cludes only the height-of-burst op- coverage from a single round ; be-
tion, which indicates the significance cause the indexes have been rounded
of possible surface contamination. off to the nearest tenth, the .3 indi-
FM 101-31-2 contains specific infor- cates a probable minimum coverage
mation as to the information included between .25-)- and .35 — . The .4
in the fire order for each weapon sys- means that, on the average, a cover-
tem. age of 40 percent (between .35 + and

B-5
 NUCLEAR TARGET ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
Target No.. DTG of selection -

tr-n mm/i-ie-ioi m
Method of aeaBon selection Analyst Target No.
WEAPON SYSTEM
TARGET INFORMATION
Firing position Description
Category
Range Radius
SO min Location
CD 90
HOOJoption/meters)
Initial coverage
Z z z z z
Coverage desired
TROOP SAFETY
Rad status [RS-1)[RS 2)|RS-3|
(prompt) (delayed)

TROOP SAFETY Rish (neg) (emerg)

Rad govn effect l|yes) (no) (yes) ino) ||yos) (no) (yes) (no) (yes) (no) Vulnerability (unaarned) (exposed)
MSD (named) (protected)
Troop distance to D6Z Distance to DGZ
Displacement
PRECLUSION REOUIREMENTS
PRECLUSION OF Obstacles
Obstacle | Damage
LSD Min dist Fallout (auth)(not auth)
Distance to DGZ Other
Displacement
RD/RT RD/CD 90
RECOMMENDATION / FIRE ORDER
CD 90/RT d/CD 90 Unit Firing Point
d/CD 90 d/OD
d max Tgt No. DGZ Grid Tgt Alt
FINAL DISPLACEMENT Delivery system Warhead Yield
RD/RT RD/CD 90
CO 90/RT d/CD 90 HOB option Backup fuze
d/CD 90 d/RD
Desired TOT Latest TOT
FINAL COVERAGE
POSTRIRE DATA SUPPLEMENTAL DATA REMARKS Predicted coverage
Dazzle dist at TOT
Actual TOT JO. Best troop safety
Actual GZ coord LSD: Army acft in fit
RT unurnd ex tvrnd ex ornd prot
Dist GZ-tgt cen LSD: tree blondonn
_d_ LSD: fire MSD 3
Actual yield MSD 2 MSD 1
RT Radius NEG
Actual HOD Crater Depth
RD EMERG
ICoverage Fallout prediction required (yes) (no)

Figure B-i. Example of target analysis worksheet.

m
 "■1\

SHORT RANGE CANNON

I .0 KT SAFETY DISTANCE TABLE
(Distances in meters)

TROOP SAFETY PRECLUDE DAMAGE PRECLUDE OBSTACLES

RANGE UNWARNED WARNED WARNED MOD LIGHT LIGHT TREE BLOWDOWN FIRES
EXPOSED EXPOSED PROTECTED DAMAGE DAMAGE A/C
TO FIXED TO IN DECIDU- CONIFER- DRY GREEN
NEG EMER NEG EMER NEC EMER BRIDGES BUILDINGS FLIGHT OUS OUS FUEL FUEL
2000 1900 1400 1900 1400 1600 1200 300 1300 2300 400 400 1000 700
3000 1900 1400 1900 1400 1600 1200 300 1400 2300 400 400 1000 700
4000 1900 1500 1900 1500 1600 1200 400 1400 2400 400 400 1000 700
5000 1900 1500 1900 1500 1700 1200 400 1500 2500 400 400 1000 700
6000 2000 1500 2000 1500 1700 1200 400 1500 2500 500 500 1100 700
7000 2000 1500 2000 1500 1700 1300 400 1500 2600 500 500 1100 700
8000 2000 1500 2000 1500 1700 1300 400 1600 2700 500 500 1100 700
9000 2000 1500 2000 1500 1700 1300 400 1600 2700 500 500 1100 700
10000 2000 1600 2000 1600 1700 1300 400 1700 2800 500 500 1100 700
m
101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

B-7
Figure B-5. Example of portions of the safety distance table.
FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4
I

SHORT RANGE CANNON

I .0 KT
PROMPT CASUALTIES TO EXPOSED PERSONNEL
LOW AIRBURST

COVERAGE TABLE
(Distances in meters)

EFFECTIVENESS ACCURACY DATA

PROB.
RANGE MIN.
RADIUS OF TARGET RD CD 90 CEP HOB PEH

600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300

2000 .9/.9 .7/.7 .6/.6 .5/.5 .4/.4 .3/.3 .3/.3 .2/.2 602 25 14 49 5
3000 .9/.9 .7/.7 .6/.6 .5/.5 .4/.4 .3/. 3 .3/.3 .2/.2 601 38 21 55 8
4000 .9/.9 .7/.7 .6/.6 .5/.5 .4/.4 .3/.3 .3/.3 .2/.2 599 51 28 62 10
5000 .9/.9 .7/.7 .6/.6 .5/.5 .4/.4 .3/.3 .3/.3 .2/.2 597 64 35 73 13
6000 .8/.9 .7/.7 .6/.6 .5/.5 .4/.4 .3/.3 .3/.3 .2/.2 595 77 42 80 15
7000 .8/.9 .7/.7 .6/.6 .5/.5 .4/.4 .3/.3 .3/.3 .2/.2 592 90 49 90 18
8000 .8/.9 .7/.7 .6/.6 .5/.5 .4/.4 .3/.3 .3/.3 .2/.2 590 102 56 97 20
9000 .8/.8 .7/.7 .6/.6 .4/.5 .4/.4 .3/.3 .2/. 3 .2/.2 586 116 63 108 23
10000 .8/.8 .7/.7 .6/.6 .4/.5 .4/.4 .3/.3 .2/.3 .2/.2 583 128 70 115 25

Figure B-6. Example of coverage table.

• • •
'r

SHORT RANGE CANNON EFFECTS TABLE

I .0 KT (Distances In meters)

PERSONNEL PERSONNEL PERSONNEL PERSONNEL PERSONNEL SEV MOD SEV SEV SEVERE
CASUALTIES CASUALTIES CASUALTIES CASUALTIES CASUALTIES DAM DAM DAM DAM DAMAGE
IN EM IN IN IN TO TO TO TO TO
HOB A PC'S MDM TANKS EARTH MULTI-STORY FRAME SUP PKD ELEC OPEN BRIDGES
SHELTERS APARTMENTS BUILDINGS DEP HEL EQUIP GRID
RADAR
PRMPT DELAY PRMPT DELAY PRMPT DELAY PRMPT DELAY PRMPT DELAY ANT FIXED FLOAT

550 110 530 0 310 0 0 220 580 260 600 0 1040 0 0 0 0

525 200 560 0 350 0 0 270 600 300 620 0 1070 0 0 0 0
500 250 580 0 380 0 0 320 630 340 640 0 1110 0 0 0 0
475 300 600 0 410 0 0 350 640 380 660 0 1160 0 0 0 0
450 330 620 0 440 0 0 380 660 420 680 0 1330 0 0 0 0
425 360 640 140 460 0 0 410 680 440 690 0 1410 0 0 0 0
400 390 650 200 490 0 130 440 690 520 710 0 1430 0 0 0 0
375 420 670 240 500 0 190 460 710 580 720 0 1420 0 0 0 0
350 440 680 280 520 0 230 480 720 630 730 0 1410 0 0 0 0
325 460 690 310 540 0 270 490 730 660 740 0 1390 0 710 0 0
300 470 700 330 550 0 290 510 740 680 750 0 1360 0 720 0 0
275 490 710 350 570 10 320 540 750 700 760 0 1330 0 710 0 0
250 500 720 370 580 120 340 550 760 700 770 0 1310 40 710 0 0
225 510 730 390 590 160 360 550 770 690 780 0 1280 90 690 0 Ö
200 520 740 400 600 190 370 560 780 670 790 0 1250 130 670 0 0
175 530 740 410 600 210 380 570 780 650 790 0 1210 160 640 0 0
150 540 750 420 610 230 390 570 790 630 800 50 1170 180 620 0 130
125 550 750 430 620 250 400 580 790 600 800 80 1130 190 600 180 140
FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

100 550 760 440 620 260 410 580 790 590 810 100 1090 210 570 180 170
75 560 760 440 620 260 410 590 800 600 810 120 1050 220 540 180 180
50 560 760 440 630 270 420 590 800 600 810 130 1020 230 520 170 170
25 520 720 410 580 240 380 550 760 560 770 130 980 220 490 150 150
0 520 720 410 580 240 380 550 760 560 770 80 930 180 460 140 140

Figure B-7. Example of effects table.

FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

.45—) can be expected. Using the safety distance tables present the distance that
Area Target Analysis method or the desired ground zero must be separated from
Point Target Analysis method give the area of interest to preclude inflicting cas-
a singular percentage figure for ualties on friendly troops; causing damage to
expected coverage or probability of areas and/or structures in which no damage is
destruction. Additional information desired; or causing obstacles (e.g., tree blow-
pertaining to the results of con- down or fire) that will interfere with the
tingent effects in the target area scheme of maneuver.
is provided as part of the recom-
mendation. This may be done by port- b. Figure B-6, Coverage Table. The cover-
raying graphically the area of tree age tables provide information in the form of
blowdown, fire hazard, and/or dam- coverage indexes required by the analyst to
age to various target elements. predict coverage of (damage to) a target. The
computation of the indexes is based on a 90-
(7) Troop safety. The distance to which percent assurance of achieving at least the
the effects for negligible risk to un- amount of coverage shown. The average cov-
warned, exposed personnel extend is erage (second number in each index) is based
portrayed graphically to the comman- on a 50 percent assurance. Data considered in
der. If this distance includes friend- these computations are probable errors (PE)
ly troops, the graphical presentation of the delivery system at target range, radius
also depicts risk involved and pro- of target, weapon yield, weapon height of
tection required. (See table 4-1 and burst, and target category. Data used in the
para 4-6.) Troop safety is discussed computation of the indexes in the coverage
further in annex B-III. tables, as well as the data required to perform
either the visual or the numerical method of
B-3. Target Analysis Worksheet
damage estimation, are found in the accuracy
A target analysis worksheet (fig. B-4) has data columns. These columns provide the ana-
been designed to assist the nuclear weapon em- lyst with the probable mainimum radius of
ployment officer in analyzing targets to be at- damage, the circular distribution 90 (CD90),
tacked. This worksheet systematically leads the circular error probable, the height of burst,
the analyst through the required steps of tar- and the height-of-burst probable error (PEh).
get analysis using nuclear weapon systems. A detailed explanation of each is contained in
annex B-I.
B—4. Tables for Use in Target Analysis
c. Figure B-7, Effects Table. The effects
Figures B-5, B-6, and B-7 are examples of tables provide the analyst with the radii of
the tables that the target analyst will use in damage for each effect of interest at various
analyzing targets. (See also FM 101-31-2 and heights of burst for the four primary target
FM 101-31-3.) categories and for various other targets likely
a. Figure B-5, Safety Distance
to appearTable. Thetactical battlefield.
on the

B-10
 C 1, FM 101—31—1 /FMFM 11-4

ANNEX B-I

PROBABILITY AND CONCEPT OF DAMAGE

(This annex is based on SOLOG No. 89.)

B—1-1. General mately the rated yield within the established ac-
In conventional artillery fires, weapon effects are curacies of the delivery system. This assumption
obtained by firing many rounds and allowing the simplifies target analysis procedures, but the im-
inherent delivery errors to place the rounds ran- plications should be understood. The influence of
domly throughout the target área. In nuclear fires, the reliability of a weapon system (its probability
weapon effects are dependent on the delivery er- of getting the weapon to the target and detonating
rors of a single round. Consequently, it is neces- it) on the overall probability of a successful attack
sary to predict the weapon effects on the target. must be considered. Cannon- and rocket-delivered
This prediction is accomplished based on a com- weajmns have reliabilities of essentially 1.0. The
parison of the weapon effects with the character- more intricate weapon systems (e.g., guided mis-
istics of the target; and includes the effects of the siles) have reliabilities less than those of cannon
weapon, measured by its radius of damage and the and rockets.
delivery errors. To analyze targets properly, a b. Based on the assumption that a nuclear
nuclear weapon employment officer should possess weapon delivery system will perform successfully,
an understanding of probability and concept of probability considerations are applied at the de-
damage as presented in this annex. sired burst point in the target area. The probabil-
ity of success will be affected principally by the
1-2. Definition of Probability delivery accuracy of the system.
Probability may be defined as the chance of a cer-
tain event occurring. It may be expressed as the
B—1-4. Effects of Horizontal and Vertical
ratio, fraction, or percentage of the number of Accuracy
favorable (or unfavorable) events to the total a. General. The assumption is made that many
number of possible events. Thus, probability may rounds are fired from an artillery piece at a given
be expressed in terms of success or failure. For range at the same target under identical condi-
instance, the probability of a coin falling “heads” tions. The rounds falling in the impact area will
is (1 in 2), 0.5, or 50 percent (usually expressed form an elliptical pattern. The mean point of im-
as 0.50). The probability that the coin will fail to pact (MPI) for this pattern can be determined.
fall “heads” is 0.50. The probability that a die will Variation from this mean is called “dispersion,”
stop rolling with the 2 spot up may be stated as and the pattern is referred to as the “normal dis-
% (1 in 6) or 0.167, and the probability that it will tribution pattern.” The shape of the pattern
not show a 2 spot is % or 0.833. The probability formed in the impact area will vary among deliv-
that a nuclear weapon will fall within a given dis- ery systems; but, for damage estimation purposes,
tance of the desired ground zero or will burst with- these dispersion deviations arc mathematically
in a given distance of the desired height of burst converted to circular equivalent patterns, which
may also be determined. The terms “probability,” are called circular errors probable (CEP). In tar-
“assurance” and “chance” are synonymous within get analysis involving the employment of nuclear
this manual. weapons, it is assumed that the distribution of
errors connected with nuclear delivery systems
B-l-3. Assumptions will conform to this normal distribution pattern.
a. Analysis is based on the assumption that a It is also assumed that the mean point of impact
given nuclear weapon will function at approxi- will coincide with the desired ground zero.

B—11
C 1, FM 101—31—1 /FMFM 11-4

b. Horizontal Dispersion. Horizontal dispersion (c)

associated with nuclear target analysis is expressed precomputed for each weapon system and are pro-
in two terms—circular error probable and circular vided in the accuracy data portion of the cover-
distribution 90 ( CD90). age tables in FM 101-31-2 and FM 101-31-3.
(1) Circular error probable. (2) Circular distribution 90.
(a) By definition, 1 CEP represents the {a) By definition, the circular distribution
radius of a circle within which one weapon has 90 represents the radius of a circle around the
a 50-percent probability of arriving. Figure B-I-l desired ground zero within which one weapon has
represents the normal circular distribution pattern a 90-percent probability of arriving. An under-
around the mean point of impact for a large num- standing of the circular distribution 90 is impor-
ber of weapons. A 2-CEP circle, which is twice the tant to the analyst, because it is the circular
radius of a 1-CEP circle, includes approximately
distribution error used in all methods of target
94 percent of the weapons fired or dropped. A
analysis to insure at least a 90-percent probability
4-CEP circle contains essentially all such weapons.
of obtaining a specified amount of coverage.
Some erratic rounds, although very few, may fall
outside the 4-CEP circle. ( b ) Circular distribution 90 data have been
(b) It should be noted that 99 percent of precomputed for each weapon system and are pro-
all rounds fired will fall on one side of the tangent vided in the accuracy data portion of the coverage
to the 2-CEP circle (fig. B-I-2). This factor is a tables in FM 101-31-2 and FM 101-31-3.
consideration in determining troop criteria.
(■^►-5.25% fall this side of line
and outside 2 CEP circle.)

(93 aI
with CEP circle

2 CEP

CEP
50

CEP
93 75°/,
CEP
99 8%

CEP
99 99+7,
1 percent fall 99 percent fall right
left of of tangent
tangent

Figure Normal circular pattern. Figure B-I—2. Tangent to the 2-CEP circle.

B—12
 FM 101-31-1 )FMFM 11-4

c. Vertical Dispersion. means of predicting the j probability

(1) The vertical error for all weapons is that a weapon will function within a
measured in the vertical plane in given number of circular errors prob-
terms of probable error (PE), and is able from a desired point. However,
expressed as the “height-of-burst pro- table B-I-l provides a more conven-
bable error” (PEh). A probable error ient means of determining probabil-
is defined as the error in range that ities associated with distance from
a weapon may be expected to exceed a desired point.
as often as not. It is a distance (3) Each of the fractions in the probabili-
on both sides of the mean within ty (P) column in table B-I-l ex-
which a single round has a 50- presses the probability that a weapon
percent probability of falling. The will burst no farther awajr (in one di-
height-of-burst distribution pattern is rection) from the aiming point ( the
considered in the vertical plane. Fig- desired ground zero or the desired
ure B-I-3 shows the normal distribu- height of burst) than the distance (d)
tion burst points above and below the shown in the multiplying factor (MF)
mean. It is assumed that virtually all column. MF is the distance (d) ex-
weapons will burst within 4 PE pressed in multiples of probable error
above and below the mean.
(PE) ; i.e., MF =
(2) The height-of-burst probable error as-
sociated with each weapon system has
been precomputed for each weapon Table B-I-l. Probability as a Function of Multiples
of Probable Error
system and is included in the accuracy
data portion of the coverage tables PE
= MF
PE
= MF
PE
= MF
in FM 101-31-2 and FM 101-31-3. MF MF MF
0.1 0.03 1.8 0.390 3.5 0.491
d. Probability and Normal Distribution. 0.2 0.05 1.9 0.400 0.492
3.6
(1) A study of normal error distribution 0.3 0.08 2.0 0.410 3.7 0.494
about a reference point (such as the 0.4 0.11 2.1 0.420 3.8 0.495
desired ground zero or the desired 0.5 0.13 2.2 0.430 3.9 0.496
height of burst) provides a means of 0.6 0.16 2.3 0.440 4.0 0.497
0.7 0.18 2.4 0.447 4.1 0.497
predicting where a nuclear weapon 0.8 0.21 2.5 0.450 4.2 0.498
will burst in space in relation to the 0.9 0.23 2.6 0.460 4.3 0.498
target. It can be predicted that 50 1.0 0.25 2.7 0.466 4.4 0.498
percent of the nuclear weapons de- 1.1 0.27 2.8 0.471 4.5 0.499
livered will burst within 1 PE or 1.2 0.29 2.9 0.475 4.6 0.499 +
within 1 CEP of the desired point. 1.3 0.31 3.0 0.479 4.7 0.499 +
In other words, there is a 50- 1.4 0.33 3.1 0.482 4.8 0.499 +
percent probability that a weapon 1.5 0.34 3.2 0.485 4.9 0.499 +
will burst within these limits. Sim- 1.6 0.36 3.3 0.487 5.0 0.499 +
1.7 0.37 3.4 0.489
ilarly, there is a 90-percent probabil-
ity that a weapon will burst within
the circular distribution 90. (a) For example, assume that the air-
burst range probable error (PERr)
(2) Table B-I-l may be used to calculate, is 50 meters and it is desired to
for a distance expressed as a multiple
of probable errors, the associated know the probability of a round
probability that a nuclear weapon landing within 100 meters of the
will function within that distance. desired ground zero. (over and
Similarly, figure B-I-l provides a short).

B-13
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

probability that a round will land

4
within 125 meters of the desired
2% ground zero.
3
7%
2 e. Use of Probability and Target Analysis.
16%
(1) Delivery accuracy and its associated
P Eh 25% probability are reflected in the cov-
MEAN erage tables included in FM 101-32-2
25%
I and 101-31-3.
16% (2) When applied to the employment of
2
7% nuclear weapons, probability calcula-
3 tions provide a reasonable means of
2% predicting the results of a nuclear at-
4
tack on a target. Because of this,
Figure B-I—S. Vertical dispersion. sound tactical plans can be prepared
In this case, to exploit these results.
d 100
2.0 = MF.
PE - 50 B-l-5. Concept of Damage from Initial
Entering the table with MF = 2.0, Effects
read a probability equal to 0.41 a. To predict the results of a nuclear ex-
(41 percent). However, this P = plosion on a target, the nuclear weapon em-
0.41 factor considers only one side ployment officer must visualize the pattern of
of the mean. In other words, there damage or casualties that will be inflicted on
is a 41-percent probability of a a target area by the initial effects of the weap-
round landing beyond the desired on. Assume that figure B-I^l represents a
ground zero no farther away than target consisting of uniformly distributed ve-
2 PE (100 meters). Likewise, there
is a 41-percent probability of a ooooooooooooooooo
round landing short of the desired oooooooooooooooo
ooooooooooooooooo
ground zero no farther away than ooooooo#o#oooooo
0000000000000*000
2 PE. There is, then, an 82-percent o o o o o -e-~Q • o o o o o
(0.41 + 0.41) probability of a 0 0 * 0 0 0, O • • CJ'vP 0*000
o o o • o o o o
round landing within 2 PE of the o o o o 0*00
o o o o o o
desired ground zero. 0 0*0/0 ,o o o o
o o o o o o
(&) As another example, assume that o o o /b o • o o
o o • • • poo
the PER is 50 meters. It is desired o o o/o • o o o
to know the distance from the de- 0*0* o o
o o o • • o o o
sired ground zero (over and short) O O f o • o
o o o o
within which there is 90-percent o o o o
o o o o o o
probability of a round landing. o 0 o • *o***/ooo
There is a 45-percent probability o oo o\ o • ••••o/*ooo
o o • o****X)ooo
that a round will land short of and o o o o • •0*0 X* o o o o
o o o o • • • */6 0*00
a 45-percent probability that it will o o o o • O * • • O O O O
0 0 * 0 0 0 •—e—Tf *ooooo
land beyond the desired ground O O o o o o • 00*0*00000
zero. Entering the table with P = 0 0 0 0 * 0 0 • oooooooo
OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO
0.45, it is seen that MF = 2.5. OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO
OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO
Therefore, d=MF X PE=2.5 X 50 9-0/76
= 125 meters. It can be stated, Figure B-I-i. Relationship of radius of damage to
therefore, that there is a 90-percent damage or casualty pattern.

B-14
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

hieles, with each small circle representing a radius of damage circle with the target area.
vehicle. In this example, only moderate dam- (The relationship of the radius of damage to
age to the vehicles is of interest. the damage pattern is shown in fig. B-I-4.)
b. If a nuclear weapon were burst over the d. The radius of damage is defined as that
center of this target, all the vehicles directly distance from the burst point at which a speci-
under the burst point would be damaged. All fied target element has a 50-percent probabil-
those a short distance from the ground zero ity of receiving the specified degree of damage.
would be at least moderately damaged, and In figure B-I-4y note that within the radius of
some would be severely damaged (represented damage some vehicles escape moderate dam-
by the black circles in fig. B-I-4). As the age, but an approximately equal number are
distance from the ground zero increases, the moderately damaged outside the radius of dam-
number of vehicles escaping moderate (or age. Also, note that approximately one-half
severe) damage would increase, until a dis- of the vehicles at the exact radius of damage
tance is reached at which no vehicles receive distance from the ground zero receive moder-
moderate damage. Of those that escape at ate damage. Actually, about 85 percent of the
least moderate damage, the ones closer to the target elements inside a radius of damage re-
burst point will have a higher probability of ceive at least the degree of damage being con-
receiving at least light damage. However, in sidered. Or, if casualties are being considered,
this case, only moderate damage is of interest. about 85 percent of the personnel inside the
(A light damage pattern from the same size radius of damage who are vulnerable to the
weapon against this target would have this effect being considered become casualties. It
same “shotgun-scatter” appearance, but would is convenient, however, to consider damage or
be considerably larger than the moderate dam- casualties as virtually complete within a radius
age pattern.) of damage. Although some target elements es-
c. Figure B-I-4 shows the damage or cas- cape the desired damage inside the radius of
damage, there is an equal number outside the
ualty pattern produced by a nuclear weapon radius of damage that receive the desired dam-
burst over a target large enough to contain all
age. The important point is that the fraction of
the possible moderate damage. However, before damage or casualties is estimated to be the
this pattern of damage can be used as a men- same as the fraction of the target area covered
tal image of damage distribution, a yardstick, by the radius of damage circle.
or unit of measure, is needed to visualize the
appropriate-size pattern for each yield and e. The radius of damage is a quantity meas-
burst height combination. The radius of dam- ured for every weapon and is dependent on
age, as obtained grom the accuracy data por- the type of target, the yield and the design
tion of the coverage tables in FM 101-31-2 of the weapon, the degree of damage desired,
and FM 101-31-3, fills this requirement for a and the height of burst. The probability of
unit of measure. Once the nuclear weapon em- inflicting the desired damage on a target is
ployment officer has determined the relation- contingent on the shape and size of the target,
ship of the radius of damage to the overall the radius of damage, the location of the de-
damage pattern, he can estimate the amount sired ground zero, and the system delivery
of damage in a target area by comparing the errors.

B-15
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

ANNEX B-II
DAMAGE ESTIMATION
(This annex is based on SOLOG No. 89.)

B—11-1. General the target is, or is equatable to, one of the

a. Estimates of the expected results of an four major target categories. The indexes in
attack by each of the available nuclear weapons the coverage tables contained in FM 101-31-2
is necessary to determine the best weapon to and FM 101-31-3 have been computed using a
use in a particular situation. The estimate con- more precise method than can be used in the
cerning the weapon finally recommended will field. Because of this degree of precision, the
assist the commander in visualizing the con- index method is used whenever the above-men-
dition of the target area after the attack. For tioned target conditions apply. The indexes
example, the plan of maneuver of a unit that have been based on weapon system delivery
expects 10 percent destruction of a target may error data. When delivery errors are discov-
be different from that of a unit which expects ered to vary beyond 25 percent from the data
50 percent destruction of the same target. shown in the accuracy data portion of the
tables, interim procedures are used. These pro-
b. The estimate of the expected results us- cedures are discussed in annex B-V.
ually is expressed as a percentage of the tar-
get covered. For example, if 30 percent of the c. The visual method can be used for any
target is covered by a particular radius of dam- area target, but must be used to estimate dam-
age, it is assumed that 30 percent of the age to an area target when the target is not
target elements of interest will receive the
equatable to a circle. It is also used to analyze
specified level of damage. Thus, the estimate targets for which there are known target ac-
of damage would be expressed as 30-percent quisition errors (para B-II—4).
coverage of the target. d. The numerical method is used to—
c. The unit SOP generally expresses the cov- (1) Estimate the probability of dam-
erage desired by the commander in the attack aging point targets.
of various types of targets. When the situation (2) Estimate damage to circular area
is different from that assumed in the SOP, targets that are not included in one
the commander may modify the guidance for of the four major target categories.
desired coverage. It is easier to cause casual- (3) Determine the maximum distance
ties among personnel than it is to damage that the desired ground zero may be
material. Since casualties among users and displaced from a point target, or from
operators will make material ineffective, the the center of a circular area target,
major criterion for weapon selection is nor- or determine the probability of dam-
mally the estimate of personnel casualties. aging a secondary target located
some distance from GZ as determined
B-II—2. Methods of Damage Estimation for the primary target.
a. Depending on the characteristics of the (4) Estimate damage to circular area tar-
target, there are three methods of estimating gets when the desired ground zero is
damage: the index method, the visual method, displaced from the target center.
and the numerical method:
b. The index method is used to estimate B-ll-3. Damage Estimation Chart
damage to area targets when the target is a. A damage estimation chart (fig. B-II-1)
assumed to be circular ; when the desired has been devised to assist the target analyst
ground zero is at the target center; and when in selecting the proper method of damage esti-
B-16
 FM 101-31—1/FMFM 11-4
ENTRY POINT

this
area target?

Visual

^ Is the target Circular map scale

No
circular? RD; CD90 30%
CD 90 Dimension <2:1

Point target graph extension

No Yes
P=0.90 Numerical
RD
area target

Area target graph

RD Is the target a
No
Yes
CD90
> 0 major category
RD
RT
CD90 : d
RT CD90
or equatable?
P(f)=0.9Q(0.30)

Numerical
point target
Index
Point target graph
DGZ at target center
RD : d P=0.90
(coverage tables)
CD90 CD90
^ 0.3/0.4

No DGZ displaced-

Figure B-II-1. Damage estimation chart.

mation to use in analyzing his target. This b. A detailed explanation of the procedures
chart not only provides the analyst with the used in performing the index method of dam-
method to be used but also with the items age estimation is found in tab B-II-1 the
that are required to perform the analysis by visual method in tab B-II-2, and the numerical
.the indicated method. The Equivalent Target method in tab B-II-3 to this annex.
Table from FM 101-31-2 and FM 101-31-3
has been reproduced as figure B-II-2.

B-17
FM 101—31—l/FMFM 11—4

EQUIVALENT TARGET TABLE

Exposed personnel Protected personnel Wheeled vehicles Tanks and artillery
Primary: Personnel in Primary: Personnel in Primary: Moderate damage Primary: Moderate damage
the open, thermal ef- foxholes. to wheeled vehicles. to tanks and other
fects not considered. tracked combat vehicles
and severe damage to
artillery.
Secondary: Personnel in Secondary: None. Secondary: Moderate dam- Secondary: Prompt casual-
the upper stories of age to amphibious ties to personnel in
frame buildings. vehicles on land, truck- armored vehicles for
mounted engineer equip- yields of 150 KT or
ment, and missile and below.
rocket launchers.
Delayed casualties to
personnel in armored
vehicles for yields of
>150 KT<320 KT.

Moderate damage to
infantry weapons,
Track-mounted engineer
equipment, and railroad
locomotives.

Severe damage to tele-

phones; switchboards;
double-apron barbed
wire; and highway, rail-
road, and floating bridges.
o-orjo

Figure B-II-2. Equivalent target table.

B-ll-4. Target Location Errors acquisition error to the circular distribution

The assumption is made in target analysis 90 and by performing a visual target analysis
that the reported location of the target is (para B-II-2-2e).
correct. All target acquisition means have as-
sociated inaccuracies ; however, these inaccu- B-ll-5. Elimination of Unsuitable Weapons
racies normally are not considered in target Tables are included in FM 101-31-2 and
analysis. The target analyst should be aware FM 101-31-3 to assist the analyst in rapidly
of the ramifications of ignoring a target loca- eliminating obviously unsuitable weapon sys-
tion error, and the impact it will have on the tems. These tables show the maximum target
target analysis and the expected results of the radii associated with each weapon system, as-
nuclear strike (e.g., selection of a weapon yield sociated range, yield, and target vulnerability
too small to achieve desired level of assurance category. The target radii shown are the max-
and/or coverage of the target). When an ana- imum that will permit a minimum coverage
lyst is aware of inaccuracies, he should take of .3. These tables provide a quick means of
them into consideration by adding the target eliminating from consideration those yields
B-18
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

and various delivery systems that are not suffi- analysis. These tables can also be used to
ciently effective against the target under ana- eliminate unsuitable weapons due to the
lysis. It should be noted that these tables can minimum and maximum ranges of the delivery
be used only with the index method of target system.
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

TAB B-II-1
INDEX METHOD OF DAMAGE ESTIMATION

B—II—1—1. General the requirement of a high assurance

The index method of damage estimation is (90 cent) of achieving the desired re-
the fastest and most accurate field method sults. Because of this, the probable
minimum coverage of .3 normally is
available to a target analyst. Whenever the
selected as the minimum acceptable
following four conditions can be met, the in-
dex method of damage estimation should be probable minimum fractional cover-
used : age. This means that for successful
rounds there is a 90-percent assur-
a. The target is an area target. ance of covering at least 25 percent of
the target area. (Note that .3 covers
b. The target is circular, or equatable to a values between .25 and .35.) Because
circle. This assumption should be made unless the probability of assurance is less
there is specific target information to the con- with an average coverage, the average
trary. coverage of a target generally will
c. The target element is, or is equatable to, be greater than the probable mini-
one of the four major target categories. (Fig. mum coverage. Therefore, a value of
B-II-2, FM 101-31-2, and chapter 18, FM .4 has been selected as the lower
101-31-3 define the target elements that are limit. This means that the average
equtable to one or more of the major target coverage of the target will be from
categories. ) 35 to 45 percent for successful rounds.
Thus, .3/.4 is selected as the normal
d. The desired ground zero is located at the lower limit for a suitable destruction
target center. index value. A weapon with an index
greater than .3/.4 should never be
B—11—1—2. Coverage Indexes eliminated as being too large. Elimi-
nation of weapons with excessive
O'. In the coverage tables in FM 101-31-2 coverages should be undertaken only
and FM 101—31—3, for each range and target when a smaller weapon is available
radius two decimal numbers are given, sep- that will produce the desired results.
arated by a divider (e.g., ,3/.4). Together, (Para 3-5 includes a detailed discus-
these numbers comprise an index of weapon sion of destroyed unit.)
coverage. The first number (.3) is the probable
minimum fractional coverage of the target, (2) Suitable neutralization index values.
based on a 90-percent assurance; the second If neutralization rather than destruc-
number (.4) is the average coverage. Figures tion of the target is acceptable, a
B-II-1-1 and B-II-1-2 are examples of these probable minimum coverage as low
coverage tables. as .1, combined with an average cov-
erage of .2 or greater, is normally
b. General rules for the use of coverage in- satisfactory. Thus, .1/.2 is selected as
dexes are included in (1) through (5) below. the normal lower limit for a suitable
(1) Suitable destruction index values. In neutralization index value. Elimina-
analyzing nuclear targets, a 30-per- tion of weapons with excessive cov-
cent fractional coverage of the tar- erage should be done only when a
get area generally is considered the smaller weapon is available that will
minimum coverage acceptable for de- produce the desired results. (Para 3-
struction of a target. Associated with 5 includes a detailed discussion of a
this 30-percent minimum coverage is neutralized unit.)
B—20
 SHORT RANGE CANNON
I .0 KT
PROMPT CASUALTIES TO PROTECTED PERSONNEL
LOW AIRBURST

COVERAGE TABLE
(Distances in meters)

EFFECTIVENESS ACCURACY DATA

PROB.
RANGE MIN.
RADIUS OF TARGET RD CD 90 CEP HOB PEH

400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100

2000 .9/.9 .8/. 8 .6/. 6 .k! .t* .3/.3 .3/.3 .2/.2 .1! .1 450 25 14 49 5
3000 .9/.9 .8/.8 .6/.6 .4/.4 .3/.3 .3/.3 .2/.2 .1! .1 448 38 21 55 8
4000 .9/.9 .8/.8 .6/.6 A!.k .3/.3 .3/.3 .2/.2 .1! .1 446 51 28 62 10
5000 .9/.9 .7/.8 .6/.6 .1*1 .U .3/.3 .3/. 3 .2/.2 .1! .1 443 64 35 73 13
6000 .9/.9 .11.1 .6/.6 .1*1.I* .3/.3 .3/.3 .2/.2 .11.1 441 77 42 80 15
7000 .9/.9 .7/.7 .6/.6 Al.t* .3/.3 .2/.3 .2/.2 .1/.1 436 90 49 90 18
8000 .9/.9 .11.1 .5/.6 .kl.k .3/.3 .2/.3 .2/.2 .1! .1 433 102 56 97 20
9000 .8/.9 .11.1 .5/. 5 .MA .3/.3 .2/.2 .2/.2 .11.1 428 116 63 108 23
10000 .8/.9 .11.1 .5/.5 .4/.4 .3/.3 .11.1 .2/.2 .1! .1 424 128 70 115 25
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

B-21
Figure B-II-1-1. Example of coverage table, prompt casualties to protected personnel.
 B-22
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

SHORT RANGE CANNON

I .0 KT
DELAYED CASUALTIES TO PROTECTED PERSONNEL
LOW AIRBURST

COVERAGE TABLE
(Distances in meters)

EFFECTIVENESS ACCURACY DATA

PROB.
RANGE MIN.
RADIUS OF TARGET RD CD 90 CEP HOB PEH
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
2000 .9/.9 .9/.9 .9/. 9 .67.6 .47.4 .37.3 .27.2 .21.2 635 25 14 49 5
3000 .9/.9 .9/.9 .9/.9 .67.6 .47.4 .37.3 .27.2 .27.2 634 38 21 55 8
4000 .9/.9 .9/.9 .9/.9 .67.6 .47.4 .37.3 .27.2 .27.2 633 51 28 62 10
5000 .97.9 .9/.9 .9/.9 .67.6 .47.4 .37.3 .27.2 .21.2 631 64 35 73 13
6000 .9/. 9 .9/.9 .9/.9 .67.6 .47.4 .37.3 .27.2 .21.2 629 77 42 80 15
7000 .9/.9 .9/.9 .97.9 .67.6 .47.4 .37.3 .27.2 .21.2 626 90 49 90 18
8000 .9/.9 .9/.9 .97.9 .67.6 .47.4 .37.3 .27.2 .21.2 624 102 56 97 20
9000 .9/.9 .9/.9 .97.9 .67.6 .47.4 .37.3 .27.2 .21.2 620 • 116 63 108 23
10000 .9/.9 .9/.9 .87.9 .67.6 .47.4 .37.3 .27.2 .21.2 618 128 70 115 25

Figure B-II—1-2. Example of coverage table, delayed casualties to protected personnel.

 C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

* (3) Unsuitable
index is one in which the index is less than the
non with index a 1-kiloton
values. yield and a low airburst
An unsuitable
option against protected personnel. If the target
range is 8,000 meters and the radius of target is
minimum required. For example, a .l/.l index
would normally be unsuitable for neutralization 600 meters, the following extract of the tables
of a target and therefore is not listed -with those results :
indexes considered suitable. An index in excess of ■jfc'f. If the plan of maneuver requires
the minimum required is never considered unsuit- prompt casualties, the 3,000-rad or the transla-
able, even though indiscriminate use could lead to tional-effect criterion is used : an index of ,5/.6
a waste of combat power. Table B-II-1-1 displays results (fig. B-II-1-1).
the indexes considered suitable when using the 2. If delayed casualties are acceptable,
index method of damage estimation.
the 650-rad criterion is used; an index of ,9/.9 re-
Table B-II-1-1. Index Guidance Criteria sults (fig. B-II-1-2).
Commandcr'i Minimum Maximum Results 3. The estimate of damage, in this case,
guidance coverage coverage
0.1/0.2 0.9/0.9 Neutralization.
indicates that there is—
10
20 0.2/0.3 0.9/0.9 Neutralization. (a) Fifty-percent probable minimum
30 0.3/0.4 0.9/0.9 Destruction. coverage and 60-percent average coverage for
40 0.4/0.5 0.9/0.9 Destruction. prompt casualties to protected personnel; or
50 0.5/0.6 0.9/0.9 Destruction.
60 0.6/0.7 0.9/0.9 Destruction. (b) Ninety-percent probable minimum
70 0.7/0.8 0.9/0.9 Destruction. coverage and 90-percent average coverage for
80 0.8/0.9 0.9/0.9 Destruction. delayed casualties to protected personnel.
(4) Large index-number variations. A wide (d) When it is necessary to interpolate be-
difference (more than .4) between the indexes (e.g., tween target radii in the coverage tables, a
.3/.8) results when a large weapon, with its inher- straight-line interpolation is used, and rounding
ent inaccuracies, is employed against a target. off is always down ward (e.g., .38= .3). An example
(5) Determination of coverage index values. problem is given below.
To determine the coverage index for the target Badius of target
being considered, the target analyst selects the ap-
Data from table: 800 900 1,000 1,200
propriate coverage table.
(а) A coverage table is provided for each ,6/.9 .4/.6 .3/.4 .2/.2
target category, delivery system, yield, and low 1. Given: RT=850 meters.
airbust and surface burst options. 2. Find: The coverage index.
(б) The target analyst enters the appro- 3. Solation:
priate coverage table, using the appropriate radius (a) The 850-meter RT falls exactly
of target and the nearest range. Interpolation be- halfway between two indexes listed in the table;
tween ranges is not required. If the given range is
thus, interpolate halfway between the two indexes,
exactly halfway between two listed ranges, he
considering the number on each side of the divider
enters at the nearest listed range in even-numbered
thousands (e.g., if a given range is 10,500 meters, separately, to obtain .of.75. Round off downward
round off dowmva/rd to 10,000 meters ; if a given to the nearest tenth, or .5/.7.
range is 11,500 meters, round off upivard to 12,000 (b) The same solution can be reached
meters). using the standard interpolation formula, again
(c) Figures B-II-1-1 and B-II-1-2 show considering the number on each side of the index
examples of coverage tables for a short-range can- divider separately, as follows :

* B-23
C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

RT Index
Left Right
“800 JJ.6/0.9,

50
100 -850 0.2 — ?? — 0.3

-900 0.4/0.6

50 x 50 x
Left: Right : 100
100 0.2 0.3

lOOx 0.2(50) lOOx = 0.3(50)

x - 0.1 x = 0.15

0.6 - 0.1 a 0.5 0.9 - 0.15 = 0.75

The interpolated index is .5/.75; round off downward to the nearest

tenth, or .5/.7.
(c) Other interpolations, using the by ï (f-bar). The probability (P) of damaging a
same example problem, are as follows: point target to some desired level and the average
RT Interpolaled index coverage (f) of a small area target have the same
920 .38/.56=.3/.5 meaning. For example, assume that the average
1,100 .25/.3=.2/.3 coverage of a small area target is .60 (T= .60) for
B—II—1 -3. Average Coverage severe damage. This is interpreted to mean that,
on the average, 60 percent of the target will receive
If an attack were directed against a small area
severe damage and the remaining 40 percent will
target, some fraction of the target would be
be damaged to some degree less than severe. This
damaged. If this attack could be repeated many
times, the identical fraction of damage would not ï factor is similar to the average coverage in the
result each time; rather, some distribution of combined coverage index. However, because no
values of fractional damage centered around some assurance (probabihty) is associated with this
particular average value would result. This average average coverage and the radius of damage is so
fractional damage represents the average coverage great in relation to the target, the analyst considers
of this particular area. This damage is symbolized only the probability of destroying the target.

B—24
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

TAB B-II-2
VISUAL METHOD OF DAMAGE ESTIMATION

B—II—2-1. Introduction and surface burst options. He enters the table

a. The visual method of damage estimation at the nearest listed range (interpolation be-
is the only method that can be used to analyze tween ranges is not required; if the given
irregularly shaped area targets. Targets that range is exactly halfway between two listed
are noncircular, or cannot be equated to a cir- ranges, the nearest even range is used). The
cle, are always analyzed using the visual meth- analyst moves across the table to the accuracy
od of damage estimation. A typical example of data column marked Prob. Min. RD and ex-
an irregularly shaped area or linear target tracts the probable minimum radius of dam-
would be a trenchline. age. For visual analysis using ADM see FM
5-26.
b. Whenever the desired ground zero is dis-
(1) Figure B-11-2-1 shows an extract of
placed from the target center for any reason, the accuracy data columns from a
either the visual or the numerical method of coverage table for a short-range can-
damage estimation may be used to analyze the non with a 1-kiloton yield and a low
target. airburst option against exposed per-
sonnel (delayed casualties). If the
B-II-2—2. Visual Method target range of the weapon is 8,000
a. General. The visual method of damage meters, a probable minimum radius
estimation consists of a visualization of the of damage of 804 meters is extracted
fractional target coverage by the expected ra- from the table.
dius of damage of the weapon. To facilitate
this visualization, circular map scales are pro- PROB.
vided in the envelope inside the back cover of RANGE MIN.
this manual. RD CD 90 CEP HOB PEH

b. Circular Map Scale. The circular map 2000 813 25 14 49 5

Scale is a series of concentric circles and arcs 3000
4000
812
811
38
51
21
28
55 8
62 10
drawn at regular intervals on transparent 5000 810 64 35 73 13
material. For the 1:50,000 scale, the interval 6000 808 77 42 80 15
7000 806 90 49 90 18
between each circle and arc is 100 meters up 8000 804 102 56 97 20
to the 1,000-meter circle; thereafter, the in- 9000 802 116 63 108 23
10000 800 128 70
terval is 200 meters. For the 1:100,000 scale, 115 25

the interval is 200 meters up to the 2,000- Figure B-II-2-1. Example of accuracy data columns,
meter circle; thereafter, the interval is 400 (extracted from table for Short Range Cannon, 1 KT,
Low Airburst, delayed casualties against exposed
meters. Visual interpolation can be made when personnel.)
the distance of interest lies between the circles
Figure B-11-2-1. Example of accuracy data columns.'
or the arcs. The numbers on the circles and
the arcs represent hundreds of meters.
(2) If prompt casualties had been de-
c. Radius of Damage. The radius of damage sired, the coverage table for prompt
is determined from the coverage table in the casualties would have been used.
same manner as that for the coverage index However, because delayed casualties
(tab B-II-1). To determine the radius of are acceptable in this example, the
damage for the target being considered, the analyst enters the coverage table for
target analyst selects the appropriate coverage delayed casualties (650 rad) and ex-
table based on the target category, the deliv- tracts a radius of damage of 804
ery system, the yield, and the low airburst meters.

B-25
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

d. Circular Distribution 90. the target. All of the target elements

(1) The circular distribution 90 (CD90) within the RD would receive the
column is located in the coverage expected damage. The fraction of
tables adjacent to the probable mini- damage from such a burst would be
mum radius of damage column (fig. expressed as 30 percent.
B-II-2—1). Circular distribution 90 (4) There is a 90-percent assurance of a
data are extracted in the same man- round falling no farther from the
ner as that described in c above. DGZ than the distance (CD90). It
can be stated, therefore, that 90 per-
(2) There is a high assurance (90 per- cent of the time the burst will cause
cent) of a round bursting within the at least as much damage as the worst-
distance (CD90) of the desired case burst demonstrated above.
ground zero. (5) In the foregoing example, the mini-
e. Procedure for Determining the Damage,
Using the Radius of Damage and the Circular
Distribution 90.
(1) The target analyst draws on the cir-
cular map scale a circle whose radius *0
is CD90 (102 meters in this case) (not to scale)
and a circle whose radius is the RD
(804 meters in this case, since de- s
layed casualties are acceptable) (fig.
B-II-2-2).
(2) The analyst selects a point on the Center of circular
circumference of the CD90 circle and map scale
fixes this point on the DGZ. He ro- Figure B-II-2-2. Radius of damage and circular dis-
tates the CD90 circle around the tribution 90 circles.
selected point and the DGZ to evalu-
ate the effect of horizontal error on
achieving the desired fraction of dam- r
age and makes an estimate of the
amount of the target covered with T (not to scale)
the RD. Figure B-II-2-3 demon-
strates the procedure for accomplish-
O'*
S
ing this operation.
(3) In the upper sketch of figure B-II-2- Center of circular
map scale
3, there is approximately a 50-percent
overlap of the target and the RD. If
the burst were to occur at the loca- Center of circular
map scale
tion of the center of the circular map
scale, all of the target elements with-
in the RD would receive the expected
damage. The fraction of damage from
such a burst would be expressed as
50 percent. If the circular map scale (not to scale)
is offset to the “worst case,” the situa-
tion shown in the lower sketch of p/7«

figure B-II-2-3 results; i.e., the RD

overlaps approximately 30 percent of Figure B-II—2-8. Visual estimate of target coverage.

B-26
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

Center of
circular
/'’b<2 GZ
map scale

(not to scale)
✓

Center of DG

circular map scale

r*

Figure B-11-2-4. Influence of displacing the desired ground zero.

mum expected fraction of damage is pected damage to the primary target elemeiit.
one-third, because 90 percent of the There may be many other target elements
time at least one-third of the target damaged in the target area. Damage to these
will receive the expected coverage. elements is considered a bonus and, thus, is
termed “bonus damage.” \
f. Displaced Desired Ground Zero.
(1) There may be circumstances ini
(1) As discussed in annex B-IV, it may
which damage to a secondary target
be necessary to displace the desired
element is desired. In these instances
ground zero from the target center.
the DGZ may be displaced toward
In such a case, the procedure out-
the secondary target to enhance dam-
lined in e above is followed, using the
age to it provided the commander’s
displaced desired ground zero as the
guidance is still met concerning the
reference point from which to offset
desired degree of damage to the pri-
the circular map scale.
mary target. If the requirement for
(2) The following example portrays the such bonus damage affects the selec-
influence of displacing the desired tion of a weapon, the influence of
ground zero when the RD is 804 me- dispersion must be considered. The
ters and the CD90 is 102 meters procedure for doing this is similar to
(fig. B-II-2-4) : that for estimating the coverage for
(a) In the left-hand sketch of figure the primary target element.
B-II-2-4, the RD covers approxi- (a) For those target categories for
mately-half of the target. This is which coverage tables have been
the optimum coverage that will computed, the estimate of bonus
occur from a burst landing a dis- damage can be made in the same
tance (CD90) from the DGZ. manner as that for the primary
(b) The worst-case burst is shown in target element.
the right-hand sketch of figure (b) For other target categories, the
B-II-2-4. Approximately 25 per- procedure is outlined in annex
cent of the target is covered by the B-V to this appendix.
RD. Ninety percent of the time
(2) An estimate of the area of possible
the coverage will be at least 25
bonus damage to other target ele-
percent. The minimum expected
ments will assist in visualization of
fraction of damage, in this case, is
the condition of the target area after
25 percent.
the burst. In such cases, the in-
g. Bonus Damage. The preceding discussion fluence of delivery errors is not con-
of the visual method of damage estimation sidered. The radii of the effects of
has been primarily concerned with the ex- interest are marked on the circular

B-27
 FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

map scale. The center of the circular employment officer uses this radius
map scale is then placed over the de- on the circular map scale.
sired ground zero. This portrayal (b) If the radius of damage of interest
may accompany the recommendation is shown in the effects table, the
to the commander. nuclear weapon employment officer
enters the table at the desired
(a) If the radius of the effect of in- height of burst for the target ele-
terest is shown in the safety dis- ment of interest. He uses this ra-
tance table, the nuclear weapon dius on the circular map scale.

I
¡
!
I
I

B-28
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

TAB B-II-3
NUMERICAL METHOD OF DAMAGE ESTIMATION

B-ll-3-1. General (1.00 — 0.80=0.20) that it will receive less

The numerical method of damage estima- than moderate damage. It does not mean that
tion involves the use of graphs and tables in if there were 100 targets 80 would be moderate-
conjunction with effects data to provide a ly damaged and 20 would remain untouched.
numerical description of the minimum expected a. Concept of Point Target Damage Esti-
damage that a particular nuclear weapon will mation. The radius of damage is a distance at
inflict on a particular target. It provides an which a single target element (point target) has
estimation of damage to circular area targets a 50-50 chance (P—.50) of being damaged to
and considers system inaccuracies, weapon the desired degree. In estimating the damage
yield, and various burst heights or damage to a single target element (point target analy-
criteria. It is the only method suitable for sis), the analyst is not concerned specifically
analyzing point targets and is particularly with the percentage of the target that will be
suitable for determining maximum possible covered by the damage circle, as defined by the
displacement distance in conjunction with the radius of damage. Rather, he is concerned with
desired results. However, the analyst must not the probability that the level of effects for the
become so impressed with the apparent pre- weapon in question will inflict the desired de-
cision and completeness of a numerical target gree of damage on the target element. The ra-
analysis that he is not cognizant of its short- dius of damage has been computed and is
comings. In general, the probabilities of frac- tabulated in the coverage tables in FM 101-
tional coverages derived from the numerical 31-2 and FM 101-31-3 for most target ele-
method are conservative, because compound ments of interest and normally used degrees of
probabilities are not considered. For numerical damage. The radius of damage is one of the
estimation using ADM see FM 5-26. factors used to determine the probability of a
point target being damaged under various con-
B-ll—3-2. Graphs and Tables ditions of target location with respect to the
Included in FM 101-31-2 and FM 101-31-3 desired ground zero.
are graphs and tables for use in numerical (1) Referring to figure B-II-3-1, it can
damage estimation. Instructions for the use of be determined visually that the prob-
these graphs and tables and selected examples ability (P) of damaging target A
are given in subsequent paragraphs. is .50 when no delivery error is con-
sidered and the distance of the point
B-ll-3-3. Damage Estimation of a Point target from the GZ is equal to the
Target RD. As distance {d) is decreased, P
Single buildings, bridges, and similar tar- increases. For target B, P is greater
gets are treated as point target. However, the than .50. As d increases, P decreases.
size of the point target must be considered in For target C, P is less than .50.
conjunction with the radius of damage of the (2) When a delivery error is interjected,
weapon. Associated with the engagement of the effect of a third variable (CD-
thë point target is the probability of damaging 90) must be considered. In figure
it to a desired degree. For example, assume B-11-3-2, the probability of the weap-
that there is an 80-percent probability of mod- on detonating at GZ1 is the same as
erately damaging a target. The expression the probability of its detonating at
P=0.80 means that there are 80 out of 100 ' GZ2. If it detonates at GZ1, there is
chances that the target will receive moderate more than a 50-percent probability
damage and 20 out of 100 chances that the target element shown will be
B-29
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

RD

GZ
+
Tgt B Tgt A
“h
Tgt C

Figure B-IIS-1. Effect of displacement of the ground zero from a point target.

RD RD

Tgt
+ GZ1
\ GZZ
DGZ

Figure B-II-8-2. Effect of dispersion on the probability of damaging a point target.

damaged to the desired degree. If, on probability that this target will re-
the other hand, the weapon detonates ceive the desired damage. It is diffi-
at GZ2, there is less than a 50-percent cult, if not impossible, to estimate

B-30
 t 10.0
i
9.0
8.0

373-351 0-70
7.0 POINT TARGET GRAPH
6.0
(Variability = 20%)
5.0

4.0

3.0

RD
CD 90
1.0

.80
.70
.60
.50

.40
C 1, FM 101—31—1 /FMFM 11-4

.20

.05

.03 .04 .05 .30 40 .50 1.0 3.0 4.0 5.0

CD 90
■^(Figure B-IIS-3. The point target graph.
 C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4
©
¿9

RH-
1.7

1.6
POINT TARGET
1.5 GRAPH EXTENSION
.4. (Variobility =20%)
1.4

1.3

1.2

1.0

A 0.9
RD
EB
0.8

0.7

0.6

m
0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2
1.5 1 2 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 95 98 99 99.5 99.8

Probability (percentage)

Figure B-H-3-4. The point target graph extension.

t 1
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

visually a meaningful probability of (2)

inflicting a specified degree of dam- extension.
age to a point target. Probability (a) The point target graph extension
charts based on RD, d, and CD90 (fig. B-II-3-4) shows the proba-
have been developed to estimate this bility (P) of achieving the desired
probability. degree of damage to a point target
when the horizontal dispersion is
b. Point Target Graphs. FM 101-31-2 and 0; or when the radius of damage
chapter 18, FM 101-31-3 contain two graphs (RD) or the displacement distance
that are used for estimating damage to point (d) is so large, with respect to the
targets: the point target graph and the point circular distribution 90 (CD90),
target graph extension. These two graphs are that the delivery error will be in-
reproduced in figures B-II-3-3 and B-II-3—4, significant in comparison.
respectively.
(b) The vertical axis represents the
(1) Description of the point target graph.
ratiowhile the horizontal axis
(a) The point target graph (fig. B-II- KU
3-3) contains a family of probabili- shows the percentage of probability
ty (P) contours representing the of achieving the desired degree of
probability of achieving the desired damage.
degree of damage to a point target. (c) Entering the point target graph ex-
The vertical axis represents the tension from the vertical axis with
RD
ratio T/ ’ while the horizontal axis
CD90 the proper ratio, the analyst
RD
represents ^ • For any given con- moves horizontally to the right un-
CD90 til he intersects the diagonal line.
dition of radius of damage (RD), At the point of intersection, he
horizontal dispersion (CD90), and moves down the graph and reads the
displacement distance (d) of the percentage of probability of achiev-
desired ground zero, the probability ing the desired degree of damage to
of achieving the desired degree of the point target.
damage to a point target may be
calculated. c. Use of the Point Target Graph and the
Point Target Graph Extension. The following
(b) The point target graph scale ex- example illustrates the use of figures B-II-3-3
tends along the horizontal axis and B-l 1-3-4. Assume that the target is a
( ^ ratio) and the vertical axis building.
CD90
(1) Given: RD = 1,000 meters (for
(^n. ratio). When the value of severe damage to structures)
CD90 CZ?90 = 200 meters.
either of these ratios exceeds the (2) Find: The probability of achieving
values as shown on the point target severe damage to the building as a point
graph, the point target graph ex- target, when it is —
tension (fig. B-II-3-4) must be (a) 900 meters from the DGZ.
used. (When the values of the ratios (b) 1,600 meters from the DGZ.
on the point target graph exceed
the maximum value, the RD or the (3) Solution:
d is so large with respect to the (a) Refer to figure B-II-3-3.
CD90 that the delivery error will be 1. Step 1. Establish the proper ratios
insignificant in comparison.) for entry into the graph when
B-33
FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

RD 1,000 maximum radius of damage is one that will

= = 5.0 and not be exceeded 90 percent of the time. This
CD90 200 radius of damage is determined from the effects
d 900 table in the same manner as that discussed in
= = 4.5.
CD90 200 annex B-Y. A requirement to avoid the de-
2. Step 2. Enter the graph with these struction of an installation comes under the
ratios and, at the point of intersec- subject of limiting requirements. A discussion
tion, read P = 0.66, or a 66-per- of limiting requirements is included in annex
cent probability of causing severe B-III.
damage^ to the building. e. Criteria for Weapon Selection.
d' 1,600
(b) The ratio is = 8.0, (1) Point target as the primary target
CDM 200 element. Damage to a single target
which is not oh figure B-II-3-3. element (e.g., bridge, missile
Therefore, use figure B-II-3—4. launcher) is expressed as the proba-
(Notice that the ratio on the verti- bility of that target element receiving
cal axis of the graph is -¿r- the damage specified. A high assur-
iiJJ ance (P = 90) of success normally is
the horizontal scale is probability.) sought.
d 1,600 (2) Point target as a secondary target
Determine the ratio = element. Damage to targets, composed
RD 1,000
= 1.6. Entering from the vertical of one or many target elements can
axis of figure B-II-3-4 with this be determined with the desired
ratio value and intersecting the di- ground zero at or displaced from the
agonal line, read from the horizon- center of the primary target. The
tal axis a probability of approxi- ability to increase the probability of
mately 0.2 percent. damage to a point target may be
limited by the specified minimum
d. Probability of Not Damaging a Point limits of target coverage to the pri-
Target. In many instances, the probability mary target. (Annex B-IV dis-
that a point target, such as a bridge or a build- cusses the displacement of the de-
ing, will not be damaged to a severe or a mode- sired ground zero.)
rate degree is of interest. The point target
graphs indicate the probability of achieving a B-M-3-4. Damage Estimation for a Circular
particular degree of damage to a point target, Area Target
depending on the radius of damage used. The The index method of damage estimation is
probability of not damaging a point target to the primary method of predicting damage to
a specified degree is simply 1 — F of damaging circular area targets. However, when a target
it. When it is desired to achieve a specified is not one of the four major target categories
level of damage to a point target, the analyst or when the desired ground zero is displaced
uses the appropriate radius of damage taken from the target center, the numerical method
from the coverage tables in FM 101-31-2 and of damage estimation should be used. The area
FM 101-31-3. It should be remembered that target graph is used in making this estima-
this is a probable minimum radius of damage. tion. This graph is contained in FM 101-31-2
There is a high assurance that the radius of and chapter 18, FM 101-31-3 and is reproduced
damage will be at least this size. When it is in figure B-II-3-5.
desired not to inflict a specified degree of dam- a. Area Target Graph. The primary use of
age on a target, the analyst uses the probable the area target graph (fig. B-II-3-5) is to
maximum radius of damage. The probable estimate the fractional damage to a circular
B-34
 10.0
9.0
8.0
7.0
AREA TARGET GRAPH
6.0
(Variability =20%)'
5.0
+ v +
ÂOvJ

4.0
88
3.0
1.00

2.0

RD 0.95
0.90
RT
1.00 0.80
0.90 SQ
0.60
0.70 0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
ss¡¡:¡¡¡¡::8
0.40

0.10

0.05
Him muni

l
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

lliiii nui mil

i
0.20

LUI
Probability scale ford=0

i
0.10 0.50 1.0 5.0
CD90 — used for ADM and poststrike analysis
RT
RT

Figure B-II-S-5. The area target graph.

FM 101—31—I/FMFM 11-4

area target when the desired ground zero is that coverage. Coverage is expressed
displaced from the target center. The area tar- as .90(.30), which means that there
get graph can also be used to— is a 90-percent assurance of achiev-
( 1 ) Estimate damage to nonequatable tar- ing at least 30-percent coverage.
gets. (8) An example of this procedure is as
(2) Compute the maximum allowable follows :
displacement (dmax) of the desired (а) Given: RD = 1,000 meters
ground zero. RT = 1,000 meters
CD90 = 250 meters
(3) Estimate the expected damage for d = 400 meters.
employment of atomic demolition de- (б) Find: The probable minimum frac-
molitions (ADM). tional coverage.
(4) Perform a poststrike analysis.
(c) Solution: RD 1,000
1.0
(5) Estimate damage for other than a RT 1,000 “

90-percent assurance of success. CD90 250 0.25

RT 1,000 ”
b. Procedure for Damage Estimation When
the Ground Zero Is Displaced. d 400
CD90 ~ 250 ~
(1) Enter the appropriate coverage table
with the proper range and extract Following the steps outlined in (1)
the probable minimum RD and the through (7) above, the minimum
CD90. fractional coverage is determined
to be 64 percent, which is expressed
(2) Compute the ratios RD and CD90 as .90(.64).
RT RT
(3) Enter the area target graph with the c. Procedure for Damage Estimation for
RD Nonequatable Targets. This procedure is ex-
ratio value on the vertical axis plained in detail in annex B-V, paragraph
RT
B-V-3.
and the CD90 value on the hori-
RT
zontal axis. The point at which these d. Procedure for Computation of Maximum
two entry ratios intersect is the ex- Allowable Displacement of the Desired Ground
pected fractional coverage when the Zero.
DGZ is located at the target center. (1) Enter the appropriate coverage table
d with the proper range and extract the
(4) Compute the
CD90 ratio. probable minimum RD and the CD-
(5) With a pair of dividers, measure the 90.
horizontal distance between the ratio RD CD90
value on the vertical axis and the (2) Compute the ratios RT and RT
CD90 ^*sP^ace^ DGZ curve. (3) Enter the area target graph with the
RD
(6) Apply the distance determined in value on the vertical axis and
RT
(5) above, horizontally to the right
of the point of intersection ((3) CD90
the —K1
ññ— value on the horizontal
above) and read the fractional cover-
age. axis. The point at which these two en-
(7) All fractional coverages determined try ratios intersect is the expected
in this manner have an associated fractional coverage when, the DGZ is
90-percent assurance of achieving located at the target center.
B-36
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

(4) With a pair of dividers, measure the bles (FM 101-31-2 and chapter 15, FM 101-
horizontal distance from the inter- 31-3).
section ((3) above) to the damage RD
curve representing the minimum de- (2) Compute the ratio
RT '
sired fractional coverage.
(3) Enter the area target graph with the
(5) Hold the dividers parallel to the hor-
izontal axis and, with one divider leg ratio value on the vertical axis
on the vertical axis, move up the ver-
tical axis until the distance set on the and read the fractional coverage from
divider matches the distance between the left edge of the graph. This is the
coverage expected if the DGZ is lo-
d
the vertical axis and the dis- cated at the target center. Since there
CD90
are no delivery errors associated with
placed DGZ curve. At this point, read the ADM, the fractional coverage ob-
tained is expressed as / = X percent.
d
the ratio value. (4) If the DGZ is displaced from the tar-
CD90
d
(6) Using the ratio value obtained in get center, the ratio -^jr is substi-
(5), above, and the (7090 value,
tuted for -j~—on the area target
solve for the dmax. This value is the
maximum distance that the DGZ can graph. Compute this ratio.
be displaced from the target center
and still have a 90-percent assurance (5) Read the fractional coverage at the
of achieving the desired fractional intersection of the ratio values on the
coverage. area target graph (f = X percent).
(6) An example of this procedure is as
(7) An example of this procedure is as follows :
follows : (a) Given: RD = 200 meters
(a) Given: RD = 1,000 meters RT — 150 meters
RT = 800 meters d -- 200 meters.
(7D90 = 200 meters (&) Find: The probable minimum frac-
Minimum coverage desired tional coverage (/).
—.90 (.60).
RD 200
(&) Find: The dmax. (c) Solution: 1.33
RT 150 -
RD 1,000 d _ 200
(c) Solution : 1.25 1.33.
RT 800 RT 150
CD90 200 Following the steps outlined in (1)
0.25. through (5) above, read the value
RT ~ 800
of / as 42 percent.
Following the steps outlined in (1)
through (6), above, the graphical /. Procedure for a Numerical Poststrike
Analysis. The procedure is explained in detail
solution yields = 3.3 in annex B-VI, paragraph B-VI-2&.
d = 3.3 x 200 -- 660 g. Procedure for Damage Estimation for
dmax = 660 meters. Other Than a 90-Percent Assurance of Success-
(1) The DGZ must be located at the tar-
e. Procedure for Damage Estimation for Em- get center.
ployment of Atomic Demolition Munitions. RD (7D90
(1) Determine the RD from the ADM ta- (2) Compute the ratios and
RT RT
B—37
FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

(3) Enter the area target graph with (5) Apply the distance obtained in (4),
the ratio values determined in (2), above, horizontally and in the same
above. The point at which these two direction, to the point of intersection
entry ratios intersect is the expected
-RD , CD90
of„ the
., .. .
fractional coverage for a 90-percent 57=- and — ratio values.
rCl til
assurance of success.
(4) On the probability scale located in the (6) Read the fractional coverage, which
lower right-hand corner of the graph, will be expressed as a percentage of
measure the distance between the in- coverage for the desired degree of
dex at 90 percent to the desired assurance.
assurance.

B-38
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

ANNEX B-III
LIMITING REQUIREMENTS

B-lll-1. General distance considers both the delivery error and

Restrictions placed on the employment of the distance to which certain weapon effects
nuclear weapons are referred to as “limiting extend. The following definitions are used in
requirements.” These limiting requirements determining the appropriate minimum safe
are imposed to avoid undesirable effects caused distance :
by nuclear weapons in the form of— (1) There are three degrees of risk as-
a. Casualties to friendly troops. sociated with troop safety considera-
tions—negligible, moderate, and
b. Creation of obstacles to movement, to in- emergency.
clude fire areas. (a) At a negligible risk distance, troops
c. Damage to installations desired for the will receive less than a 5-rad dose
use of friendly troops, such as bridges and and are completely safe from mili-
buildings. tarily significant thermal radiation.
However they may experience a
d. Damage to friendly light aircraft in
temporary loss of vision (dazzle).
flight.
A negligible risk is acceptable in all
cases. Negligible risk should not
B-III—2. Troop Safety be exceeded unless significant ad-
(This paragraph is based on SOLOG No. 89.) vantages will be gained.
a. In comparison with the use of nonnuclear (b) A moderate risk condition normally
weapons, the use of nuclear weapons in close is used only for those nuclear
tactical support involves a much greater de- weapon yields where radiation is the
gree of risk to the safety of friendly troops. governing troop safety criteria. A
moderate risk is considered accept-
b. Troop safety may influence the selection able in close support operations;
of the yield, the delivery system, the desired for example, to create a gap in
ground zero, the time of burst, and the scheme enemy forward positions or to halt
of maneuver. When the SOP or command guid- an enemy attack. A moderate risk
ance concerning troop safety cannot be met, should not be exceeded if troops
the following actions may be taken: are expected to operate at full
(1) Move the desired ground zero. efficiency after a friendly burst.
(2) Use a more accurate delivery means.
(3) Use a lower yield weapon (s). (c) At an emergency risk distance, the
(4) Withdraw troops. anticipated effects levels may cause
(5) Accept less coverage. some temporary shock and a few
(6) Accept a higher degree of risk of casualties. A number of long-term
damaging friendly units. casualties may be produced if per-
(7) Increase the protection of friendly sonnel have been previously ex-
troops. posed to nuclear radiation. Person-
(8) Use other forms of combat power, nel may be temporarily incapaci-
such as nonnuclear fires or maneuver tated from the blast wave. Collaps-
elements. ing foxholes may cause some casu-
alties. For these reasons, there may
c. The nuclear weapon employment officer be a decrease in the combat effi-
uses a minimum safe distance (MSD) to make ciency of the unit. An emergency
troop safety calculations. The minimum safe risk should be accepted only when

B-39
FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

it is absolutely necessary to gain sumed to have some protection

a significant military advantage. against heat, blast, and radiation.
(2) Closely associated with the degrees The assumed degree of protection
of risk is the vulnerability of the in- is that protection offered to person-
nel who are in “buttoned-up” tanks
dividual soldier. The danger to an in-
or crouched in foxholes with im-
dividual from a nuclear explosion de-
pends principally on the degree to provised overhead thermal shield-
which he is protected from the weap- ing. When only a lesser degree of
on effects. For example, a man who protection is available (e.g., only
is well protected can safely be much tracked carriers are available), per-
sonnel cannot be considered warned
closer to the ground zero than can
be a man in the open. The degree of protected. The target analyst would
consider such personnel as exposed.
protection of the unit is considered A warned, protected condition is
in target analysis to be dependent
on the amount of advance warning generally expected to prevail when
the unit has received. One or more nuclear weapons are used in a pre-
paration prior to an attack.
of the following three conditions of
(d)
■* personnel vulnerability can be ex- category for unwarned, protected.
pected at the time of burst: unwarn- Although protection may be avail-
ed, exposed ; warned, exposed ; or
able to personnel, it cannot be as-
warned, protected.
sured that they will be taking ad-
(a) Unwarned, exposed persons are as- vantage of it unless they are warn-
sumed to be standing in the open ed of an impending burst.
at burst time, but have dropped to (3) For each combination of degree of risk
a prone position by the time the and condition of personnel vulnera-
blast wave arrives. They are ex- bility, there is an associated “risk
pected to have areas of bare skin distance” known as the radius of
exposed to direct thermal radiation, safety. It is the horizontal distance
and some personnel may suffer daz- from the actual ground zero beyond
zle. For example, such a condition which the weapon effects are accept-
can be expected to prevail in an able. Because a round may burst at
offensive situation when the ma- the end of the dispersion pattern
jority of the attacking infantry are nearest to friendly troops, a buffer
in the open and a warning of the distance is added to the radius of
burst has not been disseminated. safety. The buffer distance provides
(b) Warned, exposed persons are as- a very high assurance (99 percent)
sumed to be prone on open ground, that unacceptable weapon effects will
with all skin areas covered and not reach friendly troops. The size
with an overall thermal protection of the buffer distance is dependent
at least equal to that provided by on the horizontal delivery error at
a two-layer summer uniform. For the applicable range. The sum of the
example, such a condition may pre- radius of safety and the buffer dis-
vail when a nuclear weapon is em- tance is the minimum safe distance
ployed against a target of oppor- shown in the safety distance tables
tunity during an attack and suffi- in FM 101-31-2 and (ch 18) FM
cient time exists to broadcast a 101-31-3. The minimum safe distance
warning; troops have been warned, value listed is the minimum distance
but do not have time to dig foxholes. in meters that must separate friendly
(c) Warned, protected persons are as- troops from the desired ground zero
B—40
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

FREE FLIGHT ROCKET

10.0 KT

TROOP SAFETY

RANGE UNWARNED WARNED WARNED

EXPOSED EXPOSED PROTECTED

NEG EMER NEG EMER NEC EMER

10000 4800 3900 2800 2500 2400 1900

11000 4900 3900 2800 2500 2500 2000
12000 4900 3900 2900 2500 2500 2000
13000 4900 4000 2900 2600 2500 2000
14000 5000 4000 2900 2600 2600 2100
15000 5000 4000 3000 -2600 2600 2100
16000 5000 4100 3000 2700 2600 2100
17000 5100 4100 3000 2700 2700 2200
18000 5100 4100 3100 2700 2700 2200
19000 5100 4200 3100 2800 2700 2200
20000 5200 4200 3100 2800 2800 2300
21000 5200 4200 3200 2800 2800 2300
22000 5200 4300 3200 2900 2800 2300
23000 5300 4300 3200 2900 2900 2300
24000 5300 4300 3300 2900 2900 2400
25000 5300 4400 3300 3000 2900 2400
26000 5400 4400 3300 3000 2900 2400
27000 5400 4400 3300 3000 3000 2500
28000 5400 4500 3400 3000 3000 2500
29000 5500 4500 3400 3100 3000 2500
30000 5500 4500 3400 3100 3100 2500

Figure B—lll—1. Example of troop safety portion (range-dependent system) of safety

distance table.

so that the specified degree of risk the target coverage tables for airburst, under
will not be exceeded. If troops are the appropriate weapon system and yield, in
farther from the desired ground zero FM 101-31-2 and FM 101-31-3. There are
than the distance listed, there is no two types of safety distance tables—range-
troop safety problem. dependent system and range-independent sys-
tem. An example of a range-dependent sys-
d. In determining the expected degree of tem table in the free-flight rocket with a 10-
risk to which troops will be exposed, the tar- kiloton yield (FFR/10 KT). A portion of this
get analyst needs to know the location and table is reproduced in figure B-III-1. An ex-
radiation exposure history of friendly elements ample of a range-independent system table is
and the degree of protection they are expected the light guided missile with a 10-kiloton yield
to have at the time of burst. (LGM/10 KT). A portion of this table is re-
produced in figure B-III-2.
B-lll-3. Determination of Minimum Safe Dis- b. To use figure B-III-1, enter with the tar-
tance for an Airburst get range rounded off to the nearest 1,000
a. The negligible and emergency risk dis- meters. (Do not interpolate. If the target range
tances for the three vulnerability conditions lies exactly halfway between two listed ranges,
(para B-III-2c(2)) are listed in the safety enter at the largest listed range (e.g., if the
distance tables. These tables are located in target range is 10,500 meters, use an entry
&-41
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

LIGHT GUIDED MISSILE

TROOP SAFETY

UNWARNED WARNED WARNED

YIELD EXPOSED EXPOSED PROTECTED

NEC EMER NEC EMER NEO EMER

2 KT 2200 1700 2200 1700 1900 1 500

5 KT 3100 2500 2400 1900 2100 1600
10 KT 4700 3700 2700 2300 2300 1800
20 KT 6900 5400 3700 3200 2500 2000

Figure B-III-2. Example of troop safety portion (range-independent system) of safety

distance table.

range of 11,000 meters). If the target range the troops will be subjected to no
is other than exactly halfway between two more than a negligible risk.
listed ranges, round off upward or downward (2)
to the next higher or lower listed range (e.g., tem). To use figure B-III-2, enter
if the target range is 10,400 meters, use an with the weapon yield (10 KT in this
entry range of 10,000 meters; if the target case) and read the MSD under the
range is 10,600 meters, use an entry range of appropriate column for the vulnera-
11,000 meters).) Read the minimum safe dis- bility condition and the degree of
tance opposite the entry range under the vul- risk specified (4,700 meters in this
nerability condition and degree of risk speci- case).
fied. Examples of the use of the troop safety
portion of the safety distance table are as
follows : B-lll-4. Preclusion of Obstacles
a. The large amount of destructive energy
(1) Example 1 {range-dependent
released from a system).
single nuclear detonation
(a) Given: Delivery system—free- creates serious obstacles to the movement of
flight rocket friendly troops. These obstacles take the form
Yield = 10 KT of neutron-induced gamma activity (NIGA),
Range = 24,600 meters fallout, tree blowdown, and fires.
HOB—low air
Vulnerability condition— b. The preclusion of these obstacles can in-
unwarned, exposed per- fluence the selection of the yield, the delivery
sonnel system, and the desired ground zero. When the
Degree of risk—negligible. SOP or command guidance concerning the pre-
(&) Find: The MSD. clusion of obstacles cannot be met, the follow-
ing actions may be taken:
(c) Solution: Enter figure B-III-1 with
the range of 25,000 meters. Mov- (1) Move the desired ground zero.
ing to the right, under the column (2) Use a more accurate delivery means.
for unwarned, exposed personnel, (3) Use lower yield weapon(s).
negligible risk, read the MSD as
5,300 meters. This is the minimum (4) Accept less coverage.
distance that must separate the (5) Accept a higher probability of pro-
DGZ and friendly troops so that ducing obstacles.
B—42
 C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

(6) Use other forms of combat power, such as crowns, and fallen limbs can present a con-
nonnuclear fires or maneuver elements. siderable obstacle to foot and wheeled- and
c. The nuclear weapon employment officer tracked-vehicle movement. However, the distances
uses a least separation distance (LSD) to make to which tree blowdown will occur is predictable,
preclusion-of-obstacle calculations. Both the de- and these distances are listed in the safety distance
livery error and the distance to which certain tables included in FM 101-31-2 and FM 101-31-3
weapon effects extend are incorporated in the least under the columns for preclusion of obstacles (fig.
separation distance. If the least separation distance B-III-3). These distances are the least separation
extends from the desired ground zero to the point distances required between the desired ground zero
of interest, there is better than a 90-pefcent prob- and the point at which tree blowdown is to be pre-
ability that obstacles will not be produced at that cluded. For the purpose of determining the least
point. separation distance for tree blowdown, trees are
d. A discussion of obstacles to the movement of classified into two groups.
friendly troops is included in (1) through (5) {a) Deciduous. Deciduous trees lose their
below. leaves at the end of the growing season.
(1) Neutron-induced gamma Coniferous
(6) Coniferous. activity. When
trees are of
a nuclear detonation takes place in the proximity the evergreen family.
of the earth’s surface, free neutrons from this deto- Knowing the type of trees in the area of interest,
nation bombard the elements in the soil, making the target analyst can enter the appropriate
some of them radioactive. The subsequent decay of safety distance table for the delivery system and
these radioactive elements produces the residual yield (at the nearest listed range) and extract the
nuclear radiation known as neutron-induced least separation distance from the proper column
gamma activity, and is a definite hazard to troops for tree blowdown. Because the least separation
occupying or passing through the area. The dis- distance is not dependent on the target category,
tance to which this obstacle-producing effect will any of the safety distance tables for the delivery
extend is extremely variable and cannot be pre- system, yield, and height of burst may be used
dicted to within a reasonable degree of accuracy. ((5) below).
Therefore, the areas within the distances shown in (4)
table B-III-1 are considered hazard areas and nuclear detonation is capable of starting fires at
require monitoring for accurate information on considerable distances from the ground zero. These
radiation intensity and size of the pattern. distances are predictable for normal atmospheric
Table B-III-1. Estimated 2-Rad-Per-Hour Radius of
conditions. However, the distance to which these
Induced Contamination fires, once started, will extend is dependent on ter-
Yield Horizontal radius rain, type of fuel, wind velocity, and other param-
(meters) eters and cannot be predicted. The least separa-
1 KT 400
10 KT 700
tion distances required to preclude ignition of fires
100 KT 1,000 are listed in the safety distance tables in FM
1 MT 1,400 101-31-2 and FM 101-31-3 under the columns for
(2) Fallout. Militarily significant fallout preclusion of obstacles (fig. B-III-3). For the
from surface or near-surface bursts is also a nu- purpose of determining the least separation dis-
clear radiation hazard to troops who must occupy tances for fires, fuels are classified into two groups :
or cross these contaminated areas. The distance to dry and green (see descriptions in FM 101-31-2
which fallout will extend can be estimated using and FM 101-31-3). Knowing the type of fuel in
the procedures outlined in TM 3-210. The actual the area of interest, the target analyst can enter the
location of fallout within the predicted area of safety distance table for the appropriate delivery
hazard must be ascertained by radiological moni- system and yield ( at the nearest listed range) and
toring and survey. extract the least separation distance from the
(3) Tree blowdown. Uprooted trees, broken proper column for fires.

B—43
C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

FREE FLIGHT ROCKET

10.0 KT
PRECLUDE DAMAGE PRECLUDE OBSTACLES

MOD LIGHT LIGHT TREE BLOWDOWN FIRES

DAMAGE DAMAGE A/C
RANGE TO FIXED TO IN DECIDU- CONIFER- DRY GREEN
BRIDGES BUILDINGS FLIGHT OUS OUS FUEL FUEL

15000 1100 4000 6700 1400 1300 3200 2100

16000 1100 4100 6800 1400 1300 3200 2100
17000 1100 4200 6900 1400 1300 3200 2100
18000 1100 4200 6900 1400 1400 3200 2200
19000 1200 4300 7000 1500 1400 3300 2200
20000 1200 4400 7100 1500 1400 3300 2200
21000 1200 4400 7200 1500 1400 3300 2200
22000 1200 4500 7300 1500 1400 3300 2200
23000 1200 4500 7300 1500 1500 3300 2200
24000 1200 4600 7400 1500 1500 3300 2200
25000 1200 4600 7500 1600 1500 3400 2300

Figure B-III-3. Example of preclusion-of-damage/-obstacles portions of the safety

distance table.

(5) Example of use of the safety distance (c) Sohition:

table. 1. Step 1. Enter figure B-III-3 with the
{a) Given: Delivery system — freefliglit range of 23,000 meters. (Remember that LSD is
rocket
not dependent on target category.) Moving to the
Yield=10 KT
right, under the column for tree blowdown conif-
Range= 23,400 meters
HOB—low air erous, read the LSD as 1,500 meters. This is the
Type of trees—coniferous least distance that must separate the DGZ and the
Type of fuel—dry. area of interest to preclude tree blowdown.
(ô) Find: The LSD for tree blowdown 2. Step 2. To find the LSD for fire, use
and the LSD for fire. the same procedure as that in
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

1, above, but move to the column (2) Light damage to buildings (1 psi).
for fires, dry fuel, and read the Light damage to buildings is defined
LSD as 3,300 meters. as the blowing in of windows and
doors and the cracking of interior
B-lll-5. Preclusion of Damage partitions. Normally, light damage to
a. Preclusion of damage to bridges or build- frame buildings is associated with
ings is often dictated by the tactical or the 1-psi overpressure. If the desired
political situation. Because of this, the least ground zero and the nearest building
separation distances necessary to preclude are separated by the least separation
damage are listed in the safety distance tables distance, there is a 90-percent prob-
in FM 101-31-2 and FM 101-31-3 under the ability that the building will not re-
columns for preclusion of damage (fig. B- ceive light damage.
III-3). Also listed are the least separation
distances for light aircraft in flight. (3) Light aircraft in flight. The least
separation distances given for light
b. The procedure for extracting the least aircraft in flight include the consid-
separation distances for damage is the same as eration that, if the desired ground
that for obstacles (para B-III-4<i(5) ). The zero and the aircraft are separated by
subheadings under the main heading Preclude the least separation distance, there is
Damage are discussed in (1) through (3) a 99-percent probability that the air-
below. craft will be able to continue its
(1) Moderate damage mission.to fixed bridges.
Moderate damage to a bridge is de-
fined as damage that reduces the c.
load-carrying capability of the bridge termine the preclusion of damage to structures
by 50 percent. If the desired ground and materiel other than those listed in the
zero and the bridge are separated by safety distance tables. In these instances, the
the least separation distance, there is analyst will use the procedures listed in annex
a 90-percent probability that the B-V to this appendix with data extracted
bridge will not be moderately from the effects tables found in FM 101-3Í-2
damaged. and FM 101-31-3.

B-45
FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

ANNEX B-IV
SELECTION OF THE DESIRED
GROUND ZERO

B-IV—1. General ground zero is directly affected by the vulner-

ability of the various target elements. Those
(This paragraph is based on SOLOG No. elements with the least vulnerability require
89.)
the most intense effects that exist around the
In predicting the damage resulting from the ground zero.
detonation of a nuclear weapon, or in predict-
d. Military Importance. The relative military
ing the effect of the burst on limiting require-
importance of targets (or target elements)
ments, calculations are made with reference to
affects the location of the desired ground zero
the desired ground zero (DGZ). Factors that
may affect the selection of the DGZ are dis- by placing it near the most remunerative
target.
cussed in a through g below.
e. Horizontal Error and Weapon Yield. Hori-
a. Maximum Weapon Effectiveness. The zontal error and weapon yield influence the
most important factor in selecting the location selection of the desired ground zero when two
of the desired ground zero is the achievement or more targets are to be attacked with a
of maximum weapon effectiveness; in other single weapon. The fraction of damage to a
words, the delivery of the most intense weapon given target is affected by the horizontal error
effects over the greatest portion of the target. of the delivery system, the weapon yield, and
However, other considerations may require the height of burst. For a given weapon and
that the desired ground zero be displaced from delivery system, the circular map scale, or a
this optimum position. The influence of all con- compass, can be used in locating a desired
tributing factors must be analyzed and evalu- ground zero to achieve the desired target cov-
ated in the process of selecting an appropriate erage. However, if the weapon yield, the
desired ground zero. height of burst, or the delivery means is
b. Size, Shape, and Concentration of the changed during the target analysis, the loca-
Target. Unless known data indicate other- tion of the desired ground zero may also have
wise, all targets are assumed to be circular and to be changed.
all target elements to be evenly distributed in /. Limiting Requirements.
a random orientation throughout the target (1) In the attack of targets close to
area. Except as modified by other considera- friendly units, troop safety require-
tions, the best location for the desired ground
ments may require that the desired
zero is the center of the target. When a large ground zero be displaced from the
area target, or an irregularly shaped target, is point where maximum weapon effec-
to be attacked with a relatively small weapon, tiveness would be achieved. The min-
the desired ground zero should be selected imum safe distance (MSD) required
within that portion of the target in which for troop safety purposes determines
maximum damage is desired. If the distribu- the nearest point to friendly units
tion of target elements is not uniform, the that may be selected as the desired
center of mass of the target elements is the
ground zero. A more detailed discus-
best desired ground zero location. sion of the influence of this consider-
c. Vulnerability. The vulnerability of a tar- ation is contained in annex B-III.
get, or target elements, partially determines (2) The preclusion of damage to key in-
the radius of damage required to produce the stallations and the preclusion of ob-
desired results. The location of the desired stacles that could impede the scheme
B—46
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

of maneuver are also considerations (1) Limiting requirements.

that can require the desired ground (2) Multiple targets.
zero to be displaced from the target
center. (3) A combination of (1) and (2), above.
g. Multiple Bursts. When multiple weapons b. To assist the analyst in selecting the de-
are employed against a large target, the over- sired ground zero, table B-IV-1 has been de-
lap of the damage radii may affect thé selection vised, using a three-step procedure based on
of the desired ground zero. If two or more the three primary reasons for displacement (a
weapons are employed close together so that above). The table is designed to answer the
their damage radii overlap, the actual damage following two questions:
may be greater than that predicted because of (1) What information is required to de-
the reinforced effects. This represents a waste termine the location of the desired
of combat power. Generally, the desired ground zero—
ground zeros in a multiple weapon attack are (2) What method is used to obtain this
sufficiently separated so that there is a mini- information—
mum of overlap of the damage radii. Also
considered in multiple weapon attacks is the c. The following subparagraphs discuss the
possibility of degrading the effects of one composition of table B-IV-1 :
weapon with the effects from another. (1) Under the columnar subheading Lim-
iting requirements are two columns—
B-IV-2. Methods of Selecting the Desired one for a single limiting requirement
Ground Zero (which forces the desired ground
a. In selecting the desired zero in zero,
ground one direction)
con- and one for
sideration is given to the various influencing two or more limiting requirements
factors discussed above. Initially, the target (which forces the desired ground zero
center should be selected as the desired ground in two or more directions). A multi-
zero; however, at times, it will become neces- ple limiting requirement analysis is
sary to displace the desired ground zero to one in which the desired ground zero
accomplish the mission. The primary reasons is forced from the target center(s)
for displacement of the desired ground zero in two or more directions.
include—

Table B-IV-1. Determining the Displacement of the Desired Ground Zero

Reasons for displacement
Multiple targets
Limiting requirements (with one weapon)
Step Two or more One point Combination
targets (all target and of
One Two or more area or all one area reasons
point) target

1. Determine dis- dmax all dmax point Combination of tech-

placement required MSD, LSD targets target niques in other
(distance and direc- (numerical (numerical columns.
tion). method). method).

2. Locate DGZ (plot Step 1 locates. Graphical plot, Graphical plot. Graphical plot.
if required).

3. Determine final Numerical or visual method, Numerical or Numerical or

coverage. visual visual meth-
method. od (area
target only).

B-47
FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

(2) The columnar subheading Multiple Degree of risk and vulnera-

targets (with one weapon) also con- bility condition—no more
tains two columns. The first column than negligible risk to
considers either all area targets or all unwarned, exposed
point targets. The second column con- troops located 1,000 met-
siders the attack on two targets that ers south of the target
are mixed (one area and one point). center; no other limiting
(3) The last column is titled Combination requirements present.
of reasons. Entry into this column (b) Find: The location of the DGZ.
would be applicable when, for exam- (c) Solution:
ple, two or more targets are being 1. Step 1. Determine the displace-
attacked with a single weapon and ment required. Using a target
the desired ground zero is forced analysis worksheet, enter the
from the area of maximum coverage proper safety distance table in
because of limiting requirements. FM 101-31-3 with the range of
7.000 meters. Moving to the right,
d. The analyst enters the table in the ap-
under the column for preclusion
propriate column stating the reason for the
of casualties, negligible risk to un-
displacement of the desired ground zero and warned, exposed personnel, read
follows sequentially the procedures listed in
each of the three steps. the MSD for troop safety as 2,000
meters. Because friendly troops
(1) Step 1. Determine the magnitude of are located 1,000 meters south of
the DGZ displacement (i.e., the dis- the target center, displacement
tance of the displacement required for troop safety is, therefore,
and the direction in which the dis- 1.000 meters north of the target
placement will be made). center. The troop safety calcula-
(2) Step 2. Determine the actual location tions entered in the target anal-
of the new DGZ. Accomplish this ysis worksheet from step 1 are as
mathematically, by using either the follows :
target analysis worksheet, when dis- (a) MSD—2,000 meters.
placement is required in only one di- (b) Troop distance to the DGZ—
rection ; or a graphical plot, when 1,000 meters south.
two or more limiting requirements (c) Displacement—1,000 meters
(and the associated areas) are used. north.
(3) Step 3. Compute the final coverage. 2. Step 2. Locate the DGZ. When
Whenever the DGZ is displaced, use the DGZ is forced from the target
the visual or the numerical method of center by a single limiting re-
damage estimation. quirement, the displacement com-
puted on the target analysis work-
e. Examples of determination of the desired sheet is the distance (d) used in
ground zero, using several techniques and pro- the computation of the final cov-
cedures, are included in (1) through (5) erage.
below. 3. Step 3. Compute the final cover-
(1) Single limiting requirement. age. If the target is determined to
(a) Given: Delivery system—short- be circular, the numerical method
range cannon of damage estimation is used.
Yield = 1 KT TT . RD CD90 d ^
Usmg-^r, and^^QQ to
Range = 7,000 meters
HOB—low air establish the proper ratios, enter
B-48
 FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

the area target graph to determine lations entered in the target anal-
the final coverage. ysis worksheet from step 1 are as
(2) Multiple limiting requirements. follows:
(a)
(a) Given: Delivery system—free-flight (1) MSD—4,900 meters.
rocket (2) Troop distance to the DGZ—
Yield = 10 KT 4,500 meters.
Range = 12,000 meters (3) Displacement—400 meters
HOB—low air north.
Degree of risk and vulnerability (b)
condition—no more than negligi- (1) LSD—1,300 meters.
ble risk to unwarned, exposed (2) Distance to the DGZ—900
personnel located 4,500 meters meters east.
south of the target center (3) Displacement—400 meters
Limiting requirement—n o tree west.
blowdown at the intersection of 2. Step 2. Locate the DGZ. Because
Highways 12 and 14, 900 meters the DGZ is forced in more than
east of the target center one direction by necessary dis-
Type of trees—deciduous. placements, the mathematical
(b) Find: The location of the DGZ. technique is not used in determin-
(c) Solution: ing the DGZ displacement. Locate
1. Step 1. Determine the displace- the DGZ by graphically plotting
ment required. Using a target effects arc. An example of this
analysis worksheet, enter the graphical method is shown in
proper safety distance table in figure B-IV-1.
FM 101-31-3 with the range of (a) Graphically draw a line paral-
12,000 meters. Moving to the lel to the friendly frontlines at
right, under the column for pre- a distance equal to the troop
clusion of casualties, negligible safety distance (4,900 meters
risk to unwarned, exposed person- in this case).
nel, read the MSD for the troop (b) The preclusion - of - obstacles
safety as 4,900 meters. Because portion of the table indicates
friendly troops are located 4,500 that the DGZ must be 1,300
meters south of the target center, meters away to preclude tree
displacement for troop safety is, blowdown. Therefore, draw an
therefore, 400 meters north of the arc, scaled to this 1,300-meter
target center. Now, moving far- distance, from the intersecting
ther to the right (alined on the point of Highway 12 and
12,000-meter range), under th# Highway 14.
column for preclusion of obstacles, (c) Locate the DGZ by selecting a
tree blowdown, deciduous, read point as close as possible to the
the LSD as 1,300 meters. The target center, yet outside the
intersection of Highways 12 and troop safety line and the pre-
14 is 900 meters east of the target clusion-of-obstacle arc. Nor-
center. To preclude tree blowdown mally, this will be found at the
at the intersection, the DGZ is intersection of the line and the
displaced 400 meters west of the arc. Measure the distance from
target center. The troop safety the DGZ to the target center
and preclusion-of-obstacles calcu- to determine the distance (d)
B-49
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

/
/
/
U"
DGZ

MSD for troop safety

Distance
(d)
Poinlof
vÄ'wÄinterest

LSD for tree blowdown ST

• *ß*>

(not to scale)

Figure B—IV—1. Graphical solution of the desired ground zero selection

(multiple limiting requirements).

DGZ

Tgt
Tgt

Distance (d)

i»

dmax dmax
Tgt A Tgt B

(not to scale)

Figure B—IV—2. Graphical solution of the desired ground zero selection (multiple
target attack with one weapon) (all area targets or all point targets).

B-50
 FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

that is used in computing the age. Again, the best location

final coverage. for the DGZ is the closest
3. Step 3. point Compute the of
to each final
the cover-
target cen-
age, using either the numerical or ters. In this example, this
the visual method of damage esti- would be midpoint in the
mation. shaded area on a line drawn
(3) Attack of multiple targets with a between the two target cen-
single weapon (all (urea targets or all ters.
point targets). In analyzing multiple (b) After selecting the DGZ,
targets for attack with a single weap- measure the distance between
on, it may be found that the relative the DGZ and each target cen-
location of one target to another will ter to determine the distance
permit the selection of a DGZ at some (d)
point in between. This will result in the final coverage of each
destruction of more than one target. target.
An example of this is shown in figure 3.
B-IV-2. age for each target individually,
(a) Given: using either the numerical or the
visual method of damage estima-
Target A Target B
tion.
RT = 800 meters RT — 600 meters
RD = 1,900 meters RD — 1,800 meters (d) Consideration of two targets.
CD90 — 250 meters CD90 ~ 250 meters When only two targets are consid-
Distance tgt A to tgt B = 2,200 meters ered, the mathematical process is
Required coverage of each target—.90(.30). an alternate method of selecting
(b) Find: The location of the DGZ and the DGZ. Using figure B-IV-2 as
the final coverage of targets A an example, the following proce-
and B. dure is used:
1. Step 1. Compute the dmax for
(c) Solution:
1. Step 1. Determine the displace- each target.
ment required. In analyzing multi- 2. Step 2. Determine the area-of-
ple targets of the same type, find coverage overlap by adding the
the maximum allowable distance dmax values and subtracting from
(dmax) the DGZ can be displaced the sum the distance separating
from the target center and still the target centers.
provide the necessary coverage. 3. Step 3. Compute the actual dis-
(a) Compute the dmax for target tance (d) by dividing the area-of-
A. coverage overlap by 2 and sub-
(b) Compute the dmax for target tracting the quotient from the
B. dmax associated with each target.
2. Step 2. Locate the DGZ. This difference is the distance (d)
(a) Graphically draw arcs from used in computing the final cov-
target A a distance equal to erage for each target and is also
the computed dmax for target the distance from each target cen-
A and from target B a dis- ter at which the DGZ will be
tance equal to the dmax for plotted.
target B. The area of overlap 4. Step 4- Compute the final cover-
(shaded area) is the area in age.
which a DGZ can be selected 5. Example. The following is an ex-
to provide the required cover- ample of the mathematical proc-

B-51
FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

ess, using figure B-IV-2 and the that which is overlapped by the
target data given in (a), above, dmax of all targets under consider-
(a) Step 1. Compute the dmax for ation. A graphical example is
each target. (Use procedure in shown in figure B-IV-3.
annex B-V.) (4) Attack of multiple targets with a
Target A single weapon {one point target and
CD90 250
= 0.313
one area target).
RT 800 (а) Step 1. Compute the dmax for the
RD _ 1,900 _ 9oo
RT ~ 800 _ ¿ á8
point target only.
(б) Step 2. From the point target, plot
^ = 8.3 (from area target grraph) the DGZ along a line connecting
CD90
dmax = X CD90 = 8.3 x 250 = 2,080
the point target center and the
CD90 area target center at a distance
Target B equal to the dmax (fig. B-IV-4).
Ç09O _ 250 _ 0417 (c) Step 3. Measure the distance (d)
RT ~ 600 -
from the area target center to the
RD 1,800 _ 30
RT 600 DGZ and compute the final cover-
age for the area target only.
7-8
CÈQO ~ ^from area tar
get graph) (d) Remark. In the event the required
dmax = X CB90 = 7.8 X 250 = 1,950 coverage cannot be obtained with
C2J90
a single weapon attack, the dmax
(b) Step 2. Determine the area- should be computed for the target
of-coverage overlap. of highest priority. The displace-
2,080 dmax tgt A ment distance (d) is then meas-
+ 1,950 dmax tgt B ured from the other target, and the
4,030 total dmax final coverage is computed.
4,030 total dmax
(5) Combination of reasons for the selec-
—2,200 d between tgt A and tgt B tion of the desired ground zero.
1,830 (a) When a DGZ is selected because
of a combination of reasons (mul-
(c) Step 3. Compute the actual tiple targets and/or limiting re-
distance (d). quirements), the techniques used
1,830
915 in each step are the same as those
2 discussed in (1) through (4),
Target A Target B above.
2,080 1,950 1. In step 1, compute the distance
- 915 915
1,165 = d (actual) 1,035 = d (actual)
and the direction the DGZ is to be
displaced. (Safety-preclusion dis-
(d) Step U. Compute the final cov- tances are taken directly from the
erage, using either the numer- safety distance tables in FM 101-
ical or the visual method of 31-3, and the dmax is computed.)
damage estimation. 2. In step 2, determine the area-of-
(e) Consideration of more than two coverage overlap for multiple tar-
targets. When more than two tar- gets. However, a limiting require-
gets are being analyzed, the ment may restrict where the DGZ
procedure is identical to that used can be located. Although this may
in the multiple limiting require- not be the location for maximum
ments graphical method ((2), coverage, it will have to be ac-
above). In this case, the overlap cepted because of the limiting re-
area used in selecting the DGZ is quirements. An example is shown
B-52
» Tgt A
Tgt 8
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

DGZ

Tgt C

Tgt D
i-ùirt

(not to scale)

Figure B-IVS. Graphical solution of the desired ground zero selection (multiple targets).

Point
target
center

Area dmax
target center point tgt

DGZ
&

(not to scale)
Figure B-IV-b. Graphical solution of the desired ground zero selection (multiple
target attack with one weapon) (mixed targets).

in figure B-IV-5. In the event a and/or restriction will be changed.

limiting requirement forces the In step 3, measure the distance
DGZ outside the area-of-coverage (d) to the DGZ from each target
overlap, a command decision will center and compute the final cov-
be required on which requirement erage, using either the numerical

B-53
FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

Selected DGZ because of

troop safety
MSD

V2^
&

Tgt
Tgt IX
Optimum DGZ

(not to scale)

Figure B—IV—5. Graphical solution of the desired ground zero selection (combination of reasons).

or the visual method of damage or more of the targets by selecting

, estimation. a new DGZ.
(b) If it is determined from the pro- Use a delivery system with a
cedure in (a) above, that no area- smaller delivery error.
of-coverage overlap exists, or that Change the limiting requirements.
5. Use more than one weapon.
the fraction of damage to the vari-
6. Move an available delivery system
ous targets is not high enough, one closer to the target to reduce the
or more of the following alterna- CD90.
tives can be selected: 7. Request a different, more effec-
1. Use a larger weapon. tive weapon from the next higher
2. Accept less, or no, damage to one headquarters.

B-54
 C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

ANNEX B-V

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

B—V-l. General (1) HOB(fs) is the fallout-safe height of

а. The information presented in the weapon of burst and is shown in the effects tables in FM
selection tables included in EM 101-31-2 and EM 101-31-2 and FM 101-31-3.
101-31-3 has been computed using the best avail- (2) db the buffer distance. The size of the
able accuracy data. Subsequent test firings, buffer distance is dependent on the probability
changes in firing technique, or experience in the required for fallout preclusion.
field may indicate that the accuracy data are not (3) Table B-I-l in annex B-I shows the
correct. Further research or experience in the field various probabilitlies of an event occurring within
may also indicate that it would be desirable to various multiples of probable error (PE). By en-
change a preset height of burst (HOB) to maxi- tering this table with the probability of interest,
mize weapon effects. the buffer distance can be determined as shown
б. A change in the height of burst or the height- below.
of-burst probable error (PEh) may cause signifi- c. The target analyst generally is concerned
cant changes to the probable minimum radii of with using one of the burst options provided in
damage and to the coverage indexes. the weapon selection tables.
c. A change in horizontal delivery errors may (1) Low airburst. This height of burst gen-
cause a significant change in the circular distribu- erally provides the greatest coverage of enemy
tion 90 (t7D90), the coverage index, and the mini- targets and precludes fallout.
mum safe distance.
d. Until new information concerning delivery (a) This height of burst is computed by
adding 3.5 PEh to the fallout-safe height of burst.
accuracy and heights of burst can be distributed
This provides a very high assurance (99 percent)
to the field, the following procedures may be used
of no significant fallout. (HOB (QQ)=HOB (fs)
by nuclear weapon employment officers in target
+ 3.5 PEh.)
analysis. The procedures may also be used when,
for some special reason, a height of burst other (b) Because of the good “across-the-board”
than that shown in the weapon selection tables is effects obtained at HOB=f&(W)ii meters (where
required. W is the weapon yield in kilotons), this height of
burst is used as the lower limit of the low airburst
B-V—2. Height of Burst option. This height of burst is shown as HOBopt
a. The preset heights of burst for some radar- at the bottom of the effects tables.
fuzed weapons can be changed by ordnance per- (c) The higher of the two heights of burst
sonnel in the field. Nuclear weapon employment determined in (a) and (b) above, is used as the
officers and delivery units will be notified of any desired height of burst.
new height of burst and height-of-burst probable (2) High airburst. This height of burst may
error. The heights of burst for time-fuzed weapons be used in special cases for maximum coverage for
can be varied by the nuclear weapon employment damage to “soft” ground targets such as exposed
officer through actions at the delivery unit to vary personnel, most buildings (particularly frame)
the damage to a particular target element ; a new and forests. This height of burst is computed us-
timer height of burst is computed using the proce- ing the equations below. The higher of the two
dure outlined in b and c below. When these new HOBs is used.
required heights of burst have been determined,
the nuclear weapon employment officer follows the HOB=120 (l7))á+3.5 PEh
procedures outlined in this annex. //OB =105 {W)% meters
★A A height of burst to preclude fallout is de- (where W equal the weapon yield in kilotons)
termined by the equation (3) Impact burst. This height-of-burst op-
HOB=HOB(fs)+db. tion is used to cause cratering and fallout. Ob-

B—55
C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

viously, the height of burst is 0. Changes in the B—V-3. Damage Estimation for
height-of-burst probable error will not influence Nonstandard Conditions
the height of burst or the radius of damage.
a. General.
d. If héights of burst other than those shown (1) With the exception of special cases, data
in c above, are desired, they may be computed as to determine the amount of coverage/damage to
indicated below. a specified target element are located in the cov-
★ (1) Figure B-I-3 in annex B-I to this erage tables in FM 101-31-2 and FM 101-31-3.
appendix indicates that 48 percent of the rounds The information in the coverage tables has been
fired will burst within 3 PEh below the desired computed using the best available data; however,
height of burst. Fifty percent will detonate above cases will arise when these data cannot be used
the desired hdight of burst. Therefore, if a buffer for one or more of the reasons listed below.
distance of 3 PEh is added to the fallout-safe {a) The target elements are not equatable
height of burst, there will be a 98-percent (50 to one of the four major target categories.
percent +48 percent) probability of no significant (5) The height of burst is changed to' im-
fallout. =HOB{fs) +3 PEh.) prove or to preclude a specific weapon effect.
(2) A similar calculation using probability (e) The delivery errors used in the com-
data shows that by adding only 1.9 PEh to the fall- putation of the coverage tables are found to be
out-safe height of burst, there will be a 90-percent in error.
probability of no significant fallout. {HOB($0) (2) To assist the nuclear weapon employ-
=HOB{fs)+l.d PEh.) ment officer in computing coverage/damage due
(3) Lowering the height of burst below that to these nonstandard conditions, the procedures
required for a 90-percent probability of no signifi- in b through g below, may be used.
b. Radius of Damage.
cant fallout does not appreciably increase the
(1) Determine the height of burst (para
radius of damage, and the risk of fallout increases
B-V-2) and enter the appropirate column for
rapidly with a decrease in the height of burst. the target element of interest in the effects tables.
Under current doctrine, when a weapon is em- Vertical dispersion may cause the burst to occur
ployed at a height of burst that provides less than at some height other than that desired ; it is nec-
a 99-percent probability of no significant fallout, essary to consider the effect of this dispersion.
a fallout prediction must be made. (2) Probability distribution indicates

B—56
 FM 101-31—1/FMFM 11-4

that 45 percent of the rounds fired lect the larger error—range prob-
will burst within 2.5 PEh above and able error (PER) or deflection
45 percent will burst within 2.5 PEh probable error (PEd) (at range of
below the aiming point. The smallest , interest)—and multiply it by 3.
radius of damage shown in the tables (CD90=3 PER, or CD90=3 PEd,
within 2.5 PEh above or below the whichever is larger.)
selected height of burst is the prob- (ft) To compute the circular distribu-
able minimum radius of damage. tion 90 for impact-fuzed or radar-
Through the use of the 2.5-PEh fac- fuzed weapons, select the larger er-
tor, the analyst insures that at least ror—range probable error or de-
90 percent of the time the prob- flection probable error—and multi-
able minimum radius of damage, as ply it by 3. (CD90=3 PER, or
just determined, is equaled or ex- CD90—S PEd, whichever is larger.)
ceeded.
(2) Aircraft- anchguided-missile-delivered
(3) The procedure to be used for deter- weapons (normally range-independ-
mining the minimum radius of dam- ent systems). Compute the circular
age is as follows: distribution 90 by multiplying the
(a) Determine the desired height of circular error probable (CEP) by 2.
burst. (CD90=2 CEP.)
(b) Multiply 2.5 x PEh (at the range d. Equivalent Circular Distribution 90 for
of interest). Cannon- and Rocket-Delivered Weapons.
(c) Determine the trial heights of Whenever a numerical analysis is required, it
burst. (Trial HOB=desired HOB is necessary to convert horizontal delivery er-
±2.5 PEh.) ror to an equivalent circular distribution 90.
(d) Enter the proper effects table at The graphs in FM 101-31-2 and chapter 18,
the trial heights of burst. Search for FM 101-31-3 should be used to make this con-
the smallest radius of damage oc- version.
curring at or between the trial
heights of burst. (If trial heights e. Damage Estimation Procedures. The prob-
of burst are not listed in the table, able minimum radius of damage and the cir-
enter at the heights of burst near- cular distribution 90, determined in ft and c
est to the trial heights of burst.) above, may be used to estimate damage vis-
ually, as discussed in tab B-II-2 to annex B-
(e) Determine the probable minimum II ; or by the numerical method, as discussed
radius of damage for the target ele- in tab B-II-3 to annex B-II. The index meth-
ment of interest. (The probable od (tab B-II-1 to annex B-II) is not applica-
minimum radius of damage is the ble when delivery errors vary appreciably
smallest radius of damage listed be- from the tactical accuracy data shown in the
tween the two trial heights of weapon selection tables or when targets can-
brust.) not be equated to one of the four major target
c. Circular Distribution categories.
90. The procedure
used in computing the circular distribution 90 f. Determining Coverage of a Nonequatable
is not appropriate for use in the field. For Target. An example iñ determining coverage
interim field use, use 3 horizontal PE or 2 of a nonequatable target is shown below,
CEP for the circular distribution 90. (1) Given: Delivery system—free-flight
(1) Cannon- and rocket-delivered weap- rocket
ons. Yield = 10 KT
(a) To compute the circular distribu- Range = 18,000 meters
tion 90 for timer-fuzed weapons, se- HOB—low air

&-57
FM 10Ï—31—1/FMFM 11-4

RT = 1,400 meters g. Determining Target Coverage When a

Target category—prompt casualties to Height of Burst Other Than HOB99 or HOB-
personnel in multistory apartments opt Is Required. To determine target coverage
Limiting requirement—preclude fall- when a height of other than that listed as HOB
out. 99 or HOBopt is required, the target analyst
(2) Find: The probable fractional cover- uses the following procedure:
age. (Use FM 101-31-3, the coverage (1) For equatable targets—
tables and effects ° tables associated (a) Determine the desired HOB.
with the data in (1) above, and the {b) At the range of interest obtain the
steps outlined in (3) below.) multiplying factor associated with
(3) Solution: Entering the equivalent the probability of interest from
target table (FM 101-31-2; FM 101- table B-I-l and multiply {MF x
31-3; and fig. B-II-2, annex B-II to PEh).
this app), the analyst finds that per- (c) Determine the trial height of burst
sonnel in multistory apartments are {HOB) (Trial HOB = desired HOB
not equatable to one of the four ±2.5 PEh).
major target categories. Because he is {d) Enter the proper effect table at the
unable to use the coverage tables in trial HOB. Search for the smallest
acquiring the necessary data, the RD occurring at or between the up-
analyst reverts to the effects tables. per and lower trial HOB. (If trial
(a) Step 1. Enter the proper coverage HOB are not listed in the table,
table with the range of 18,000 me- enter at the nearest listed HOB.)
ters. Moving to the right, under the (e) Determine the probable minimum
columns for HOB and PEh, extract RD for the target category of in-
an HOB99 of 379 meters, a PEh of terest. (The probable minimum
90 meters, and CD90 of 463 meters. RD is the smallest RD listed be-
(b) Step 2. Determine the trial HOB. tween the two trial HOB.)
{HOB 379±2.5x90 {PEh).) Thus, (/) Using the CD90 associated with the
the trial HOB are 154 and 604 target range and the probable min-
meters. imum RD, compute the target cov-
(c) Step 3. Enter the effects table at erage, using either the visual or nu-
the nearest listed HOB (165 m. and merical method of damage estima-
605 m.) associated with the trial tion.
HOB (154 m. and 604 m.) ; and,
in the column for prompt casual- (2) For nonequatable targets—
(a) Determine the probable minimum
ties, personnel in multistory apart-
radius of damage, using the proce-
ments, extract the smallest RD
dures in p(l) above.
(1,070 m.) occurring at or between
the trial HOB. The probable mini- (f>) Using the circular distribution 90
mum RD (1,070 m.) is the smallest associated with the target range
RD at or between the two trial and the probable minimum radius
HOB. of damage, compute the target cov-
{d) Step U. Using the numerical method erage, using either the visual or the
of damage estimation, enter the area numerical method of damage esti-
mation.
target graph with the ratios
RD
RT=xm
1,070 =016 ^ -nr . CD90 B-V-4. Preclusion of Damage
463 a. Annex B-III discusses in detail the meth-
= 0.33. At the intersection of ods and techniques used to preclude damage to
1,400
the two ratios, read .90 (.52). a specified target element. For preclusion-of-

B-58
 í

C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

damage calculations of target elements listed in (c) Step 3. Enter the effects table at the
the effects tables but not listed in the safety distance nearest listed HOB (165 m. and 605 m.) associated
tables, use the following procedure : with the trial HOB (154 m. and 604 m.) ; and, in
( 1 ) Determine the desired height of burst. the column for severe damage to fixed bridges, ex-
(2) Determine the trial heights of burst. tract the largest RD (490 meters) occurring at or
(Trial #¿>5=desired HOB±2.5 PEh.) between the trail HOB. The probable maximum
(3) Enter the proper effects table at the trial RD (490 meters) is the largest RD at or between
heights of burst. Search for the largest radius of the two trial HOB.
damage occurring at or between the trial heights {d) Step 4. Using the numerical method of
of burst. damage estimation, compute the LSD that the
(4) Determine the probable maximum radius DGZ can be in relation to the bridge. Using the
of damage for the target element of interest. RD
(The probable maximum radius of damage is the ratio enter the point target graph.
largest radius of damage listed at or between the Move horizontally to the 10-percent probability
two trial heights of burst.)
(5) Using the numerical method of damage scale and read the vertical ¿r/jgQ ~
estimation (tab B-II-3 to annex B-II), compute tiply the ratio value by the <7D90 to obtain
the least separation distance the desired ground the LSD (740 meters) that the DGZ must be
zero must be from the target element for a 90-per- separated from the bridge for a 90-percent assur-
cent assurance of not causing the type of specified ance of causing no more than severe damage to the
damage to the target element. bridge. (In this example, a 10-percent probability
&. An example is shown below. of causing severe damage is the same as stating
(1) Given: Delivery system—free-flight that there is a 90-percent assurance of the bridge
rocket not receiving this amount of damage.)
Yield = 10 KT
Bange - 18,000 meters ★B—V—5. Computation of Minimum Safe
HOB—low air Distance (MSD)
Target category—prompt casualties to a. Annex B-III discusses in detail the methods
protected personnel and techniques used to prevent casualties to
Limiting requirements—preclude fallout friendly troops. FM 101-31-2 and FM 101-31-3
and severe damage to the fixed bridge have listed in the safety distance tables, associated
located 750 meters east of the target with each major target category, precomputed
center. MSD based on standard conditions. In the event
(2) Find: The distance the DGZ must be the horizontal or vertical errors {PEh, PER, PEd,
separated from the bridge. or CEP) associated with the weapon system are
(3) Solution: Entering the safety distance found to be in error, the following procedure will
table, the analyst finds no data for preclusion of be used to compute the new MSD.
severe damage to a fixed bridge. Because he is un- ( 1 ) Determine the desired height of burst.
able to use the safety distance table, the analyst (2) Determine the trial heights of burst.
reverts to the effects tables to determine the LSD (Trial I7(9Z?=desired HOB±2.5PEh.) If a cor-
the DGZ must be in relation to the bridge.
rected PEh has been received, this PEh will be
(a) Step 1. Enter the proper coverage table
with the range of 18,000 meters. Moving to the used to compute trial HOB.
right, under the columns for HOB and PEh, ex- (3) Enter the proper effects table at the trial
tract an HOBSS of 379 meters, a PEh of 90 meters, heights of burst. > In the appropriate Radius of
<7/190 of 463 meters and CEP of 254 meters. Safety {RS) column extract the largest RS occur-
(&) Step ing at or between the trial
2. Determine trialheight
HOB.of{HOB
burst.
379±2.5X90 {PEh).) Thus, the trial HOB are (4) To insure, a 99-percent assurance that
154 and 604 meters. friendly troops will not be subjected to greater

B-59
 C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

than the authorized effects, a buffer distance com- the free-flight rocket, 50 KT, and extract the re-
puted by multiplying the corrected PER or PEd quired information from the bottom of the page.
(whichever is the greater) by 3.5, or the corrected
HOBm = HOB ta + 3.5 (PEE)
OEP by 2 is added to the Radius of Safety. The
HOBm= 121 + 3.5(50)
MSD equals the Radius of Safety plus the buffer
HOBm = 296 meters
distance.
b. An example is shown below. In that HOBM (296 meters) is greater than
(1) Given: Delivery system—free-flight HOBopt (195 meters), the desired HOB—V!d§
rocket. meters.
Yield = 50 ATT1 (6) Step 2. Determine the trial HOB.
Range = 20,000 meters
HOB = low air (Trial HOB = desired HOB +2.5 PEh.)
Target Category—prompt casualties to
protected personnel Trial HOB = 296 + 2.5(50) =
Troop Safety—Negligible risk to warned
protected personnel 421
+
(2) As a result of modifications performed on
the free-flight rocket, the following corrected prob-
Desired HOB 296
able errors have been received.
Range 20,000 meters
PEh=m
PER=1W 1 171
PEd= 140
(c) Step 3. Enter the Effects Table for the
(3) Compute the corrected MSD. free-flight rocket, 50 KT, at the trial HOB (or
(4) Solution : In view of the recorded changes nearest listed). In the radius of safety column for
in the free-flight rockets horizontal and vertical negligible risk to warned protected personnel,
dispersion pattern, the analyst is unable to use the search for, and extract the largest radius of safety
precomputed MSD in the Safety Distance Tables (3090 meters) occurring at or between the trial
and is required to use data in the Effects Tables HOB.
to compute a corrected MSD. {d) Step If.. To insure a 99-percent assur-
(a) Step 1. Determine the desired HOB. ance that friendly troops will not be subjected
Compare HOBm to HOB optimum and select that to greater than the authorized effect level, a
with the large HOB. Enter the Effects Table for buffer distance is computed multiplying the

B-60
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

corrected PER(100) or PEd(lAO) PEh.) PEh corresponding with

whichever is greater by 3.5. range of 20,000 meters.
140 X 3.5 =; 490 meters
(e) Step 5. The MSD equals the Radius Trial HOB = 700 ♦ 2.5 (100) =
of Safety plus the horizontal buffer
distance. 950
MSD = 3090 + 490 = 3580 meters
c. Computation of MSD due to changing
desired HOB.
Desired HOB 700
(1) Given: Delivery system—free-flight
rocket.
Yield = 50 KT
Range = 20,000 meters 450
Troop Safety—Negligible risk to
warned protected personnel
(c) Step 3. Enter the Effects Table for
(2) To maximize weapon effects against
the free-flight rocket, 50KT, at the
a target of interest it has been de-
trial HOB (or nearest listed). In
termined that the desired HOB for the radius of safety column for
this target should be changed to 700 negligible risk to warned protected
meters. personnel, search for, and extract
(3) Compute the corrected MSD. the largest Radius of Safety (3080
(4) Solution: Because the radius of safety meters) occurring at or between
changes with changes in HOB, the the trial HOB.
precomputed data listed in the safety (d) Step 4. To insure a 99-percent.as-
distance tables for 20,000 meters in surance, a buffer distance is com-
this example is incorrect, and a cor- puted by multiplying the CEP (cor-
rected MSD should be computed. responding with a range of 20,000
(a) Step 1. Determine the desired HOB. meters) by 2.
In this example, it has been prede- CEP - 282 x 2 = 564 meters
termined that the desired HOB (e) -Step 5. The MSD equals the Radius
should be 700 meters. of Safety (3080) plus the horizon-
(b) Step 2. Determine the trial HOB. tal buffer distance (564).
(Trial #0£ = desired tfO£d=2.5 MSD = 3080 + 564 = 3644 meters.

B-61
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

ANNEX B-VI
POSTSTRIKE DAMAGE PREDICTION

B-VI-1. General B—VI-2. Procedures Used in Poststrike

a. When nuclear weapons are used to attack Damage Estimation
targets, poststrike surveillance is accomplished a. Visual Method.
to ascertain degrees of success. Before this sur- (1) The visual method of poststrike dam-
veillance can be completed, the nuclear weapon age estimation is used to refine dam-
employment officer refines his prediction of age predicted against irregularly
damage by means of a poststrike analysis, shaped targets. To use this method,
based on receipt of the following information: the analyst plots the actual location
(1) The actual location of the ground of the ground zero in relation to the
zero. target. Once the ground zero has
(2) Estimation of the yield. been plotted, the analyst extracts the
(3) The actual height of burst. probable minimum radius of damage
b. In many cases, information required to from the accuracy data columns in
perform a poststrike analysis will be difficult the coverage tables. Using this radius
to obtain. However, to insure receipt of this of damage on the appropriate circular
information, coordination should always be map scale, the analyst places the cen-
made with units in position to observe the ter of the map scale over the ground
nuclear strike, or with units specially equipped zero and visually estimates the frac-
and trained (i.e., target acquisition battal- tional coverage of damage.
ions) to perform this type of observation. FM (2) An example of the visual method of
3—12 provides information concerning nuclear poststrike prediction is shown below.
burst surveillance, data collection, and report- (a) Given: Delivery system—1 i g h t
r>
ing techniques. guided missile
Yield = 10 KT
c. Two methods are used to estimate post- Range = 50,000 meters
strike damage, based on the size and the shape HOB—low air
of the target. These methods are—
Target category—wheeled vehicles.
(1) The visual method. (5) ,Poststrike data: Targe t—figure
(2) The numerical method. B-VI-1
(a) Area targets (when circular). GZ—figure B-VI-1
(&) Point targets. HOB—normal
Yield—normal.
d. Each method requires knowledge of the
(c) Find: The poststrike estimation.
actual location of the ground zero, the realized
yield, and the actual height of burst. (Yield
and height of burst are used only to establish
whether the weapon detonated normally.)
Yield is considered normal if it is within ±10
percent of the designed yield, while the height
DGZ
of burst is considered normal if the detonation
occurred with ±2.5 PEh of the predicted burst
point. If the height of burst occurs beyond
±2.5 PEh, the procedure found in annex B-V Ö'OF7<o

is used. If the yield variation is more than ±10

(scale 1:50,000)
percent of the expected yield, no reliable post-
strike analysis can be completed. Figure B-V 1-1. Example of poststrike analysis.

B-62
 FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

(d) Solution: two ratios, he reads the fractional

1. Step 1. Enter the proper coverage coverage of damage.
table with a yield of 10 KT. Mov- (2) An example of the numerical method
ing to the right, under the column of poststrike prediction against a cir-
for the probable minimum RD, ex- cular area target is shown below.
tract a probable minimum RD of (a) Given: Delivery system—free-flight
780 meters. rocket.
2. Step 2. Draw the RD on the cir- Yield = 10 KT
cular map scale, place the center Range = 20,000 meters
of the map scale over the ground HOB—low air
zero, and visually estimate a frac- RT = 1,000 meters
tional coverage of 20 percent (fig. Target category—prompt casualties to
B-VI-2). Because the weapon has protected personnel.
already detonated, no considera- (5) Poststrike data:
tion need be given to the probable GZ = 200 meters north of the
errors inherent in the delivery target center
system. HOB—normal
Yield—normal.
RD=780 meters (c) Find: The poststrike estimation.
(d) Solution:
1. Step 1. Enter the proper coverage
GZ table with the range of 20,000 me-
ters. Moving to the right, under
the column for probable minimum
RD, extract a probable minimum
DGZ RD of 501 meters.
2. Step 2. Using the numerical meth-
od, enter the area target graph
(scale 1:50,000) «i, the
with ,, ratios
,. RD 501 = °-5c
Figure B-VI-2. Visual poststrike damage estimation. j d 200 . ,,
and A
Hr ~ Xööö ~ °-2- Atthe

b. Numerical Method. The numerical method intersection of the two ratios, read
of poststrike damage estimation is used against the fractional coverage of damage
circular area- and point-type targets. (f = 25 percent). The probable
(1) When this method is used on circular errors inherent in the delivery
area targets, the analyst must know system are not considered in post-
the actual location of the ground zero strike analysis.
(distance) in relation to the target
center, the radius of target, and the (3) The numerical method of poststrike
expected radius of damage. Using the damage estimation is used for point
procedures discussed in tab B-II-3 to targets (bridges, missile launchers,
annex B-II, the analyst enters the . and other similar single-element tar-
area target graph with the ratios gets). Because no delivery error is
associated with the prediction, the
and (note that the ratio analyst enters the point target graph
extension at the left with the proper
has been substituted for the ratio
CD90 ,d
ratio value for RD. He moves hori-
RT ) ; and, at the intersection of the
B—63
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

zontally across the graph until he in- (d)

tersects the diagonal line. Moving 1. Step 1. In the equivalent target
vertically to the bottom of the graph, table (fig. B-II-2, annex B-II),
the analyst reads the probability of equate missile launchers to
the target being destroyed. wheeled vehicles. Then, enter the
(4) An example of the numerical method proper coverage table with the
of poststrike prediction against a range of 15,000 meters. Moving to
point target is shown below. the right, under the column for
probable minimum RD, extract a
(a.) Given: Delivery system—free-flight minimum RD of 549 meters.
rocket
Yield = 10 KT 2. Step 2. Using the point target
Range = 15,000 meters graph extension, enter at the left
HOB—low air _ . d 250 p. AK '
Target category—missile launcher. with the ratio = °-45 -
(b) Poststrike data: Move horizontally across the graph
GZ = 250 meters north of the target until this line intersects with the
center diagonal line. Moving vertically to
HOB—normal the bottom of the graph, read the
Yield—normal. probability of destroying the point
(c) Find: The poststrike estimation. target as 99 percent.

B—64
 I I I
I

C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

ANNEX B-VII

FRIENDLY VULNERABILITY

(This annex is based on SOLOG No. 89.)

B—VII—1. General d. Vulnerability may be reduced through one

a. Target analysis procedures are used to esti- or more of the following means :
mate the possible results of an enemy nuclear at- (1) Dispersion.
tack on friendly dispositions or installations. (2) Depopulated-center disposition.
Based on current intelligence, or the enemy’s past (3) Linear configuration.
use of nuclear weapons, the weapon yield most (4) Increased protection.
likely to be employed against friendly elements B-VII—2. Analysis of Friendly Disposition
is estimated. and Installation Vulnerability
b. The radius of vulnerability (Rv) is the ra-
dius of a circle within which friendly troops will The analysis of the vulnerability of friendly dis-
be exposed to equal to or greater than emergency positions and installations to attack by an enemy-
risk criteria and may become casualties. A vulner- delivered nuclear weapon is performed in the fol-
ability radii (Rv) table is included in FM 101-31- lowing four steps :
2 and FM 101-31-3 that gives the radii to be used a. Step 1. Determine the appropriate yield.
in analyzing the vulnerability of friendly disposi- Based on current intelligence, or the enemy’s past
tions. (This table is reproduced in figure B-VII- use of nuclear weapons, the intelligence officer
1.) For friendly target analysis, an assumption is assumes a weapon yield that the enemy is likely to
made that the enemy can deliver a weapon at the use against friendly dispositions or installations.
point where it will do the greatest damage to a b. Step £. Determine the degree of exposure of
friendly installation, disregarding the effect of friendly units. The assumed conditions of exposure
delivery errors. Then, the analyst estimates what of friendly troops are provided by the G3 (G4
fraction of friendly dispositions would be de- for logistical installations).
stroyed by such an attack.
c. The analysis of present and planned friendly
dispositions is a continuing process. The com- RADII OF VULNERABILITY (meters)
Wheeled Supply
mander must be kept informed of vulnerability Yield Exposed Protected Tanks.
personnel personnel ARC vehicles depots
conditions so that he can make decisions concern- 200
1 KT 1.400 1,100 300 400
ing changes in existing or planned dispositions. 1.500 1.300 300 500 300
2 KT
While dispersion decreases the risk of destruction 5 KT 2,300 1,400 500 800 400
from nuclear attack, it greatly increases the possi- 10 KT 3.500 1,600 600 1,100 500
bility of defeat in detail and complicates the prob- 20 KT 5,200 1,800 900 1,500 700
lem of control. The degree to which units can be 50 KT 7,000 2.600 1,300 2 , 2 0 0^ 1,00 0
2,9 oT 1,3 00 =
dispersed in any situation will depend on the mis- 100 KT 10,500 3,500 1,700
14.100 4,700 2,200 3.800 1,700
sion of the command and on the risk the command- 200 KT
500 KT 20,800 6,900 3.100 5,400 2.400
er is willing to accept. Accomplishment of the 9.300 7,200 3,200
1 MT 28.100 4.100
mission and avoidance of formations that present 30,800 10.300 4,500 7.800 3,500
2 Ml
profitable targets to the enemy are frequently con- 5 MT 41,200 14,000 5,900 10,300 4.400
flicting requirements. The commander should take
NOTE: To obtain a radius of vulnerability, enter the yield
full advantage of all characteristics of the battle
colunn at the nearest listed yield.
area that contribute to the fulfillment of both
requirements. •^Figure B-VII-X. Vulnerability radii table.

B-65
 r

C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

Rv

RD

^Almost j
^complete^
casua Ities,
Casualties decrease
with distance
from GZ !

Rv RD RD Rv

100%

Distance from GZ Distance from GZ

NOTE 1. Not to scale.

2. Vertical axis represents probability of individual becoming a casualty.
Figure B-VI1-2. Relationship of percentage of casualties to the distance from the
ground zero.

c. /Step 3. Determine the vulnerability radii. Ap- center of the greatest concentration. With the
propriate radii from the vulnerability radii table aid of the labeled circles, the area is estimated
are obtained and are marked on the appropriate within which casualties may occur, or within
circular map scale. which materiel’ damage will probably occur, if
d. Stej) I/.. Estimate the results of the enemy nu- the ground zero were at this location. The
clear attack. The circular map scale is super- ground zero for this type of analysis is selected,
imposed on a map representation of the dis- on a worst-case basis, as the point that would
position or installation to be analyzed. The cen- result in the greatest loss to friendly forces.
ter of the circular map scale is placed over the This is the same procedure that is used in the

B—66
 FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

ü
1-67
U
66

(scale 1:50,000)

g.0176

Figure B-VII-8. Vulnerability analysis.

visual method for estimating damage to tar- of damage in the column of interest is used
gets, with the exception that delivery errors as the radius of vulnerability.
are neglected.
c.
damage can be used with the radius of vul-
B-VII-3. Vulnerability Radii nerability to present a more exact portrayal of
a. The personnel radii in the vulnerability vulnerability. The largest radius of damage in
radii table represent the distances at which the effects table is used for the target element
extremely limited effects extend and at which under consideration.
a few casualties may be expected. Inside these
radii, casualty percentages increase rapidly as B—VII—4. Example
the distance to the ground zero decreases.' The
criteria for the personnel radii in the vulnera- a. The 1st Bn, 66th Inf, and the 1st Bn, 67th
bility radii table are the same as those for the Inf, part of the 1st Bde, occupy reserve areas
emergency risk radii of safety for various vul- as shown in figure B-VII-3. The SOP requires
nerability conditions. From the foregoing dis- that analysis be made of these positions to de-
cussion, it can be understood that radius of termine their vulnerability to nuclear attack.
vulnerability for personnel does not have the (1) Step 1. Determine the appropriate
same meaning as radius of damage. The as- yield. Based on the current intelli-
sumption is made that essentially the equiva- gence available, and an analysis of
lent of all personnel within a radius of damage the proximity of enemy forward ele-
will become casualties. As indicated above, per- ments, the G2 estimates that a 10-
sonnel within a radius of vulnerability may kiloton weapon is the largest weapon
become casualties; however, not many person- that the enemy is likely to use against
nel will become casualties (fig. B-VII-2). An these units.
example of this difference is illustrated when (2) Step 2. Determine the degree of ex-
nuclear radiation criteria are considered. Radii posure of friendly units. All personnel
of damage are based on doses of 3,000 and of both units have foxhole protection.
650 rad or translational effects, while vulnera- The G3 estimates that many person-
bility radii are based on 50-rad doses. nel will be in the open at any given
b. Radii for damage to materiel included in time. An assumption is made that
the vulnerability radii table were obtained those friendly troops in the open will
from the effects tables. The maximum radius have some bare skin exposed.

B-67
FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

(3) Step 3. Determine the appropriate a. Given:

vulnerability radii. Refer to the vul- (1) G2 advises that the enemy can em-
nerability radii table (fig. B-VII-1). ploy up to a 10-kiloton weapon
On the 10-kiloton line, the Rv for against friendly positions in a single
troops in the open, no thermal pro- weapon attack.
tection, is 3,480 meters. For troops in (2) G3 states that, although all personnel
foxholes, the Rv is 1,650 meters. Mark have foxhole protection, it is to be as-
and label these radii on the 1:50,000- sumed that the personnel are exposed
scale circular map scale. and without thermal shielding.
(4) Step U. Estimate the results of the (3) The commander desires that no bat-
enemy nuclear attack. With the cen- talion receives more than an emer-
ter of the circular map scale placed gency risk to 50-percent of its per-
over the center of 1st Bn, 66th Inf sonnel or 40-percent loss of wheeled
position, it can be seen that the radius vehicles.
of vulnerability for troops in the open (4) Friendly troop dispositions are as
without thermal protection extends shown in figure B-VII-4.
well beyond the limits of the posi- b. Find: The vulnerability of personnel and
tion (in fact, well into the area of the wheeled vehicles in these positions.
1st Bn, 67th Inf). All of the exposed
personnel may become casualties. The c. Solution:
radius of vulnerability circle for (1) Extract the pertinent Rv from the
troops in foxholes covers nearly all vulnerability radii table. Vulnerabil-
of the area; therefore, it is estimated ity radii for the 10-kiloton weapon
that nearly all of the protected per- are as follows :
sonnel may become casualties. The Exposed personnel.
no thermal shielding
Protected personnel.
tanks or foxholes
Wheeled
vehicles
final estimate concludes that prac- 3,480 meters 1,650 meters 1,060 meters
tically all of the personnel of the 1st (2) Place these radii on the 1:50,000 cir-
Bn, 66th Inf, and about one-third of cular map scale, labeling each for
the exposed (without thermal protec- clarity. Superimpose the circular map
tion) personnel in the 1st Bn, 67th scale over the center of mass of each
Inf, may become casualties if a 10- area and estimate the casualties and
kiloton weapon is burst over the cen- damage that may result.
ter of the 1st Bn, 66th Inf. The analy- (3) Coverages for a hit in the center of
sis of the 1st Bn, 67th Inf, is made in any unit are as follows:
the same manner. Exposed Protected Wheeled
b. In analyzing the two units shown in figure personnel
( percentage)
personnel
( percentage)
vehicles
( percentage)
B-VII-3, a ground zero between the two units 1st Bn, 93d Inf 100 70 20
is also assumed. Placing the circular map scale 1st Bn, 66th Inf 100 90 30
between the two units indicates that essen- 4th Bn, 70th Arty 90 50 20
tially all of the exposed personnel in both (4) It is apparent that a one-weapon at-
units may become casualties. About one-fourth tack against any one of the units in
of the protected personnel in each unit may (3) above, could expose a large per-
become casualties. A ground zero between centage of the unit to emergency risk
these two units, then, is the worst-case ground or higher and may destroy the unit
zero. as an effective fighting force. To re-
duce the vulnerability, each unit must
&-VII-5. Detailed Analysis of a Friendly enlarge its area of occupation, either
Disposition i by expanding the area or by length-
A detailed analysis of a friendly disposition ening the area, as indicated in (a)
is shown in the following example : through (c) below.
B—68
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

a 4-70

N
(scale 1:50,000)

U
1-66

Figure B-VII-lf. Friendly troop dispositions.

(a) 1st Bn, 93d Inf. Expand the area exposed be either in foxholes or in
occupied outward in a circular for- armored vehicles. The occupied
mation so that no personnel are area will then have a depopulated-
closer than 1,650 meters from the center disposition, as shown in fig-
center of the area. Require that all ure B-VII-5, and vulnerability will
personnel who have no need to be be reduced to an acceptable amount.

B—69
 FM 101—31—1 /FMFM 11-4

(b) 1st Bn, 66th Inf. Adopt the same

action as that recommended for the
1st Bn, 93d Inf.
N (c) 4-th Bn, 70th Arty. The artillery
crews must be exposed to serve
their weapons. Notice that the area
Rv now occupied is elongated, almost
650 linear. The vulnerability of this
unit could be reduced by lengthen-
93 ing the area of occupation to at
least 13,920 meters. If this were
done, the vulnerability of exposed
personnel to emergency risk cri-
(not to scale) teria would be no more than 50
8-0/7*
percent, regardless of where a 10-
Figure B—VII—5. Typical depopulated-center troop kiloton round landed in this area
disposition. (fig. B-VII-6).

GZ
GZ
CD

-13 920 m=4x3,480 m -

(Rv exposed personnel)
(not to scale)

Figure B-VII-6. Elongated troop disposition.

(5) In addition to the suggested changes (b) Insure that the artillery perimeter
in (4) above, it must also be insured is no closer than 6,960 meters (2 x
that a 10-kiloton weapon, impacting 3,480) to either infantry perimeter.
between adjacent units, does not (3,480 is the radius of vulnerability
cause excessive loss (fig. B-VII-7). for exposed personnel.)
(a) Insure that the perimeter of one (6) The above courses of action would
infantry position is no closer than adequately meet command guidance.
3,300 meters (2 x 1,650) to the The commander may not be able to
perimeter of the other infantry po- accept the recommendations, but he
sition. (1,650 is the radius of vul- is aware of the restrictions that his
nerability for protected person- guidance imposed. There may be
nel.) many reasons why these recommen-
B—70
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

dations cannot be followed. The rec-

ommendations require that each in-
fantry unit occupy an area four
\ PKI 133 \ times as large as its original area,
causing a large displacement of units
6,960 m that may drastically affect unit mis-
sion accomplishment. However, the
separation distances shown above are
the minimum required to prevent one
weapon from affecting more than one
I • |470 unit.
3,300 m
(7) This requirement demonstrates the
following two methods of reducing
vulnerability :
(a) For a circular area, expansion of
the area and depopulation of the
66
center.
6,960 m
(b) For a linear area, lengthening of
the area.
oO
(not to scale)
Figure B—VII—7. Separated troop disposition areas.

B-71
(á
 C 1, FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

GLOSSARY

This glossary is provided to enable the user to obstacles and/or damage. The LSD is the sum of
have readily available terms peculiar to nuclear the radius of effects and weapon delivery errors.
weapon employment, as used in this manual. Terms Militarily significant weapon effects—Those effects
that appear in JCS PUB 1 and AR 310-25 are that will have a definite influence on the military
not reproduced herein. capabilities or the degree of risk. See also Tac-
Across the board—Used in connection with tically significant weapon effects.
weapon effects curves. It indicates that consider- Minimum-dose exist route—The route of egress
ation is given to all the effects curves that de- from a radioactive-contaminated area that pre-
scribe radiation doses, blast effects on various sents the smallest amount of radiation to the
drag-type targets, thermal effects and over- existing party or parties.
pressures. Neutron—An atomic particle. Neutrons are pro-
Alpha Particle—A particle ejected spontaneously duce in large numbers in the fission and fusion
from the nuclei of some radioactive elements. reactions. Neutrons and gamma radiation con-
It is identified with the helium nucleus, which stitute the military significant nuclear radiation.
has an atomic weight of four and an electric Nonsymptomalic dose—A dose of radiation that
charge of plus two. may not be detected because the recipient does
Atmospheres—A measure of normal atmospheric not display the behavior or physical character-
pressure (e.g., 2 atmospheres indicate two times istics that would normally accompany such a
the normal atmospheric pressure). dose.
Average coverage (/)—The coverage one could Preinitiation—The premature commencement of
expect if a large number of weapons were fired fissioning in the active material of a nuclear
under the same conditions. weapon before the degree of design super-criti-
Beta Particle—A small particle ejected spon- cality is achieved, resulting in a reduced yield.
taneously from a nucleus of either natural or QSTAG—Effective 20 September 1967, ABCA
artificially radioactive elements. It carries a Army materiel and non-materiel agreements
negative charge of one electronic unit and has have been designated Quadripartite Standardi-
an atomic weight of 1/1840. zation Agreements (QSTAGs). The terms
Gircalar distribution 90. (GD90)—The radius of “SOLOG” and “ABCA Army Standard” apply
a circle around the desired ground zero within only to agreements promulgated before that
which one weapon has a 90-percent probability date.
of arriving. Readiness status—Indicate the degree of prepara-
tion of both the weapon and the delivery unit
Fractional coverage (/)—The coverage one could for delivery of nuclear fires (to include air-
expect if a weapon was fired at a small area delivered weapons).
target. Rem {roentgen equivalent, mammal)—Unit of
Gamma Rays—Electromagnetic radiations, sim- absorbed dose used to express biological damage
ilar to X-rays, but of much higher energy, resulting from different types of radiation.
originating from the atomic nucleus. Rep {roentgen equivalent, physical)—Unit of ab-
Graphical portrayal—A two-dimensional repre- sorbed dose from any type of radiation, with a
sentation (generally to scale) of the distance magnitude of about 97 ergs per gram of soft
that the specified effects extend. It is also a visual tissue (muscle).
representation of the results of an analysis. SOLOG—(Standardization of Operations and
Beast separation distance {LSD)—A distance be- Logistics) : A non-materiel agreement among the
tween Desired Ground Zero (DGZ) and a point Armies of the United States, the United King-
of interest at or beyond which there exists at dom, Canada and Australia, the “ABCA”
least a 90-percent assurance of preclusion of nations.
GLOSSARY-1
 C 1, FM 101—31—1 /FMFM 11-4

Soft targets—Those targets that are easily dam- the complete missile, to include the warhead ; for
aged by low-magnitude nuclear weapon effects an air-delivered weapon, the warhead in the
(e.g., exposed personnel, most buildings (par- bomb; and for an atomic demolition munition,
ticularly frame), forest, and crops). the complete munition. See also Weapon system.
Surveying {Radiological)—The directed effort to Weapon system—The complete weapon plus the
determine the extent and dose rates of radiation associated delivery means. See also Weapon.
in an area.
Tactically significant roeapon effects—Those ef- Worst-case burst—In analyzing targets, it indi-
fects that will have a definite influence on the cates the location of the burst that occurs at the
military action currently underway. See also outer limits of the acceptable dispersion in both
Weapon system. range and elevation. In considering the vulner-
Weapon—An assembled and ready-for-delivery ability of friendly forces, it indicates the point
nuclear device in the military configuration. For of maximum damage.
artillery, a weapon is a complete round; for a X-ray—Electromagnetic radiations of extremely
rocket, the motor plus the warhead ; for a missile, short wave length.

GLOSSARY-2
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1970 O - 373-351
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

INDEX

Paragraph Page

Acquisition of targets - _. 4-3 4-

Acute dose 2-22<x ( 3 ), 2-
2-226(1)(c)i
Air defense bursts - — l-2e, 4-56(3) 1-1, 4-7
Airburst 1- 1-
Blast overpressure, airburst .. .- 2-5a ( 1 ), 2-6, 2-8/ 2-3, 2-5,2-6
Residual radiation 2-4d,e, 5-la 2-2, 2-3, 5-1
Aircraft, response to blast -. 2- 2-
Allocations 4-2, 4-146 4-1, 4-21
Alpha particles 2- 2-11, 2-12
Altitude :
Influence 2-26, 2-20c(2), 2-1,2-13,2-18
2-26
Analysis 3- 3-
Concept of damage 2- 2-1
Factors considered 3- 3-1
Friendly dispositions 3- 3-
Methods 3-4 3-6
Own vulnerability 3-11, B-VII 3-12, B-65
Point target 3-6 3-7
Poststrike 3-9a(2), B-VI 3-12, B-62
Reliability 3-10 3-12
Special considerations 3-9, 3-10 3-11,3-12
Troop safety 3-7 3-8
Arctic environment and extreme cold 2-25 2-17
Arrival time, fallout 5-3c(2) 5-
Assumptions :
Target analysis 3-16 3-1
Atomic demolition munition:
Employment 4-9a 4-14
Fallout considerations 4-9/,fir 4-16
Integration with barrier and denial plan 4-9 c 4-15
Plan 4-96 4-14
Risk factor considering 4-9g-h 4-16
Troop safety 4- 4-16
Attenuation :
Nuclear radiation 2-21a 2-13
Transmission factors 2-216,c 2-13
Average coverage B-II-3-3e B-34
Beta particles 2-176, 2-17c, 2-11, 2-12
5- 5-1
Blast 2-26(1) 2-1
Casualties 2-9a,e,/ 2-7
Casualty and damage 2-9, 2-24a 2-7, 2-16
Damage 2-5a,c, 2-3,2-5
2-9, 2-256 2-7, 2-17
Damage estimation 2-36 2-2
Definition 2-26(1) 2-1
Degrees of damage 2-3 c 2-2
Duration '1 2-7 2-6
Influence of height of burst 2-8/ 2-6

Index 1
 FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

Paragraph Page

Blast—Continued.
Influence of terrain 2-7, 2-86,c, 2-6, 2-17
d,e, 2-266
Influence of weather 2-8a, 2-256 2-6, Z-n
■ Missile effect 2-9/ 2-7
Negative phase 2-56,c 2-3, 2-5
Overpressures 2-56, 2-6a, 2-9e 2-3, 2-5
■2-7
Positive phase 2-56,c 2-3, 2-5
Protection 6-26, 6-9 6-1, 6-5
Reflection 2- 2-3
Troop safety criteria 6-ld 6-1
Wave formation 2-5 2-
Bonus effects 2-9/, 3-86, 3-56(1), 2-7, 3-11
3-56(2) 3-
Buffer distance 3-7c(3), B-V-26 (2) 3-10
B-55
Burn criteria 2-156,d,g 2-10, 2-11
Burst 2-4 (o-e), 2-14c, 2-2, 2-10
2-15d(l)l(a),(6), 2-12
2-20c
Air 2-4c,d, 2-5a ( 1 ), 2—2, 2—3, 2—6,
2-8/(1),(2), 2-10, 2-12, 2-18
2-14c, 2-20a, 2-26
Minimum separation 3- 3-12
Multiple 3-96 3-12
Subsurface 2-4a, 2-5a(3), 2-2, 2-3, 2-10
2-14c, 2-lla,6 2-7
Surface 2-46,2-5o(2), 2-2, 2-3, 2-7,
2-116, 2-14c 2-10

Casualties 2-la, 2-3d, 2-3e 2-1, 2-2

Blast 2-9 e 2-7
Civilian l-5fir 1-2
Delayed 2-226(2)(c) 2-14
Immediate _ 2-9«(1), 2-22b 2-7, 2-14
(2) (a)
Nuclear 2-17«, 2-226(2) 2-12, 2-14
Prompt 2-9a,6,c, 2-226 2-7, 2-14
(2)(6)
Casualty criteria 2-66, 2-9/(l), 2-6, 2-7, 2-9,
2-146, 2-15«, 2-10, 2-14
2-22(6-«)
Casualty damage:
Pattern B-I-5« B-15
Radii 2-3 2-1
Tables ' 3-2d 3-5
Chronic dose 2-22a(3) 2-13
Circular distribution 90 (CD90) - B-46,_B-I-46, B-10, B-12
B-I-46(2)
Circular map scale B-2a(4)(6) B-3, B-16
B-II-26
Combined effects 2-24a,6 2-16
Command and staff:
Actions 4-1 4-1
Commander’s estimate 4-11 4-17
Commander’s guidance 4-3d, 4-4 4-4, 4-5

Index 2
 FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

Paragraph Page

Command and staff—Continued.

Army - 4-4/(3), 4-4j 4-6, 4-7
Corps 4-4/(2), 4-4i 4-5, 4-6
Division 4—4/(1), 4-4A 4-5, 4-6
Commander’s responsibility 4-1 4-1
Fire support coordination 4-5 4-7
Policy on fallout 4-4gr 4-6
Warning of friendly nuclear strikes 4-6 4-8
Concept for muclear weapons employment l-5(a-/) 1-2
Concurrent planning 4-lo,c 4-1
Contamination 1-50, 5-2 1-2, 5-2
Contingent effects 2-256 (3), 3-8o 2-
Control of nuclear ammunition l-5d, 4-2 1-2, 4-1
Coordination ¿ 1- 1-
Coverage tables 3-26, B-4 3-
Crater 2-5a(3), 2-lla,6 2-
Damage criteria 2-11c 2-8
Dimensions 2- 2-17
Formation 2-4a 2-2
Modifying influences 2-116,c, 2-256(3) 2-7, 2-8
2-17
Surface burst 2-5o(2), 2-116,2-46 2-3, 2-7, 2-2
Criteria:
Casualties -. 2-3 d 2-2
Blast 2-9e,/ 2-7
Nuclear 2-9 d 2-7
Thermal 2-15c 2-10
Cratering 2-4a,6 .2-2

Damage 2- 2-1
Tree blowdown 2-9 c 2-
Troop safety 3-7, 5-6a, 6-ld, 3-5, 5-5, 6-1,
B-III-2 B-39
Unit destruction 3- 3-
Unit neutralization 3-56(2) 3-7

Damage 2-3c(1), 2-2, 2-3, 2-5

2-
2-3c(2), 2-5c, 2-6
Casualty estimation 2-36 2-2
Casualty radii 2-3 2-1
Criteria 2- 2-1
Degrees ^ . 2-3c 2-2
Evaluation 3-9a(2), 4-13 3-12, 4-20
Estimation B-II B-16
Index method 3- 3-6, 3-7
B-II-26 B-16
Numerical method 3—46 (1), 3-5a, •3-6, 3-7, B-16
Tab B-II-2d
Visual method 3-46 (1), 3-5o, 3-6, 3-7, B-16,
B-II-2C, B-II-3 B-16
Factors governing estimates 3- 3-1
Nonstandard conditions B-V-3 B-56
Poststrike prediction B-VI B-62
Preclusion of B-III-5, B-V-4 B-45, B-58
Data 2-36 2-2
Validity of effects 2-27 2-18

Index 3
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

Paragraph Page
Dazzle 2-156, 2-15d, 2-16c 2-10,2-11
Decay :
Fallout 5-3o 5-2
Induced radiation _ 5- 5-
Decontamination 6- 6-
Delayed casualties 2-226(2) (c) 2-14
Delivery error:
Horizontal 3-lc(2) 3-2
Influence on target analysis 3- 3-2
Vertical 3-lc(3) 3-3
Delivery site security 4- 4-24
Destroyed unit 3-56(1) 3-7
Detonation 2-llc, 2-14c, 2-8, 2-10, 2-11,
2-lhg, 2-21a, 2-13, 2-1,3-12
2-2 (o-c), 2-2a, 3-12
3-10a
DGZ (Desired Ground Zero) 2-216, B-l, 3-3c 2-13, B-l, 3-5
Considerations for selection B-IV-1 B-46
Methods of selection B-IV-2 B-47
Dimensions :
Crater 2-256(3) 2-17
Dispersion :
Horizontal 3-lc(2) 3-2
Pattern 3-1 c 3-2
Tactical 6-2a 6-1
Vertical 3-lc(3) 3-3
Doctrine l-2a 1-5 1-1,1-2
Dose rate 2-226(3), (4) 2-14,2-15
Fallout 5-3 5-2
Induced 5-2 5-2
Dose, total 2-22a(2),(3),(4), 2-13, 2-4, 5-2
5-3
Dynamic pressure 2-66, 2-96,c,e 2-6
2-7
Bonus 2-9/, 3-86 2-7, 3-11
Combined 2-24, 2-256(3) 2-16
2-
Contingent 2-246, 2-256(3), 2-16
3-8a 2-17, 3-11
Data, validity 2-27 2-18
Governing 2- 2-
High altitude 2-26 2-18
Initial 2-26 2-1
Modifying influences . 2-8, 2-14, 2-20 2-6, 2-9, 2-12
Residual 5-1 5-1
Effects table 3-2d, B-4c 3-
Emergency risk 3- 3-
Error :
Circular .. B-I-46(l) B-12
Horizontal and vertical 3-lc(2),(3) 3-2, 3-3
Influence 3-1 c 3-2
Probable B-I-4d B-13
System 3-1 c 3-2
Estimated results 3-3 e 3-5

Index 4
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

Paragraph Page

Estimates :
Commander’s 4-11 4-17
Factor’s governing 4-llc 4-19
Evaluation, tactical damage 4- 4-20

Fallout 2-46,c,d 2-2

Army prediction system 5-4 5-3
Command policy 4- 4-17, 4-19
Decay 5- 5-2
Effect of weather . 5-3c(3),5-la(l), 5-2
5- 5-1
5-
Monitoring 6- 6-
Pattern 4-10/,6 4-17
Prediction 4-106, 5-4, 4-
5-16(3), 4-9£T 5-
Restrictions 4-10d 4-16
Significant 5- 5-
SOP 4-1 Oi, 5-5 4-17, 5-4
Survey 6- 6-
Total dose prediction 5-3d, 5-66, 4-10/ 5-3, 5-5
4-17
Troop safety B-III-4 B—42
Fireball 2-2a, 2-4c, 2-1, 2-2, 2-3,
2-56, 2-12a, 2-8, 2-9, 2-10
2-146, 2-15d(3)
Fire orders 4-8 4-12
Fire requests 4-7 4-12
Fire support coordination 4-5 '4-7
Fires 2-15/(2),2-15ir, 2-11, B-43
B-III-4d(4)
Forest 2-15e, 2-15p 2-1Í
Urban areas 2-15/, 3-8c 2-11,3-11
Fission :
Products 2-176 2-11
Reaction 2-2a, 2-176 2-1, 2-11
Forest 2-206 2-12
Fires 2-15e, 2-15p 2-11
Tree blowdown 3-8c 3-11
Types 2-15e(2) 2-11
Fusion :
Products 2-176 2-11
Reaction 2-2a 2-11
Gamma:
Initial radiation 2-176, 2-17c, 2-11, 2-12, 2-13
2-196,c,
2-20d,'2-21a,c
Personnel hazard 2-17c, 5-la 2-12, 5-1
Residual radiation 5-la, 5-2a 5-1, 5-2
Glossary Glossary-1
Governing effect:
Combined effects 2-24a 2-16
Determination 2-246, 3-26 2-16, 3-5
Guidance, commanders planning 4-3d, 4-4 4—4, 4-5

Index 5
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

Paragraph Page
Height of burst:
Factors affecting 2-4, 2-5, 3-lc(3) 2-2, 2-3, 3-3
High airburst 2-4d 2-2, B-55
Low airburst 2-4c, B-V-2c 2-2, B-55
Subsurface burst 2-4a 2-2
Surface burst 2-46, B-V-2c 2-2, B-55
Selection 2-4 2-2
Special considerations B-V-2 B-55
High altitude effects 2-26 2-18
Hypothetical family of weapons l-4d 1-2
Immediate casualties 2-9«(1), 2-7
2-226(2)(a) 2-14
Induced radiation 5-1, 5-2 5-1, 5-2
Decay 5- 5-
Decontamination 6- 6-
Effect of soil type 5-2a 5-2
Operational significance 5-la(3), 5-lc, 5-1
5-26 5-1, 5-2
Initial effects:
Blast 2-5 2-3
Combined effects 2-24 2-16
Concept of damage 2-3 2-1
Nuclear radiation 2-17 2-11
Thermal radiation 2-12 2-8
Intelligence collection 4-3 4-4
Kiloton 2-2a,2-15d(3) 2-1, 2-10
Limiting requirements 3-8c, 3-46(2), B-III 3-11,.3-6
B-39
Logistics :
Accountability 4-14 4-21
Air-delivery weapon status 4-146 4-21
Allocation 4-2, 4-7a, 4-146 4-1, 4-12
4-21
Considerations 4-136, 4-13Í 4-20, 4-21
Control 4-2, 4-13d 4-1, 4-20
Distribution 4-13 4-20
Nuclear ammunition summary 4-146 4-21
Readiness status and expenditure chart 4-146 4-21
Replenishment 4-130 4-21
Security 4-15 4-24
Special ammunition load _. 4-13a 4-20
Special ammunition stockage 4-13d 4-20
Special ammunition supply point 4-13aJ 4-20, 4-21
Storage 4-13j 4-21
Support units 4-13 j 4-21
Measures :
Individual protective 6-3, 6-4 6-3
Unit protective 6-5 6-4
Megaton 2-2a,2-196 2-1, 2-12
Minimum safe distance 3-2e, B-III-2,3,4, 3-5
B-V-5 B-39, B-41,
B-42, B-59
Missile effects 2-9/(1) 2-7
Monitoring _ _. 6-7 a 6-4

Index 6
 FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

Paragraph Page
Multiple bursts:
Considerations 3-9 3-11
Preinitiation 3-96 3-12
Separation 3- 3-12

Negligible risk 3-7c(l)(a) 3-8

Neutralization of targets 3-66(2) 3-7
Neutron, initial radiation 2-17, 2-196,c, 2-20, 2-11,2-12, 2-13
2-20d, 2-21a,c
Nuclear:
Accident - 4-166 4-26
Ammunition - 4- 4-20
Detonations - - 2-2 (a-c), 2-2a 2-1
Fission — 2-2 a 2-1
Fusion — 2-2a 2-1
Safety 4- 4-24, 4-25
Weapon selection aid (NWSA) 2-20d 2-13
Nuclear radiation 2-26 (3), 2-2c, 2-1, 2-2
2-3a ( 1 ), 2-3(1
Acute doses 2-22a(3), 5-6a 2-13, 5-5
Biological response - - 2-226(l),c, 2-240, 2-14, 2-16, 5-2
5- 5-5
Characteristics 2-19 2-12
Chronic dose 2-22a(3), 5-66 2-13, 5-5
Criteria 2-22c, 6-6 2-16, 5-5
Evacuation criteria 5- 5-5
Fallout -.. 2-25d<2) 2-18
Induced 2-25(1(3) 2-18
Initial 2-17, 2-23 2-11, 2-16
Military significance 2-23,2-25e 2-16,2-18
Measure 2-18 2-12
Modifying influences 2-20 2-12
Protection against -- 2-25e, 5-3(1 2-18, 5-3
Residual 2-25d, 5-1, 5-2, 5-3 2-17, 5-1
5-
Shielding -. . 2-9a, 2-21a-c, 2-7, 2-13, 6-1,
6-26, 6-9 6-
Target response 2-22 2-13
Transmission factors 2-216,c 2-13
Troop safety 2-23c 2-16

Obstacles 2-10,2-ll(i 2-7

Preclusion of B-III-5 B—45
Operational requirements, fallout __ 4-10, 5-6 4-16, 5-5
Operations in fallout areas 5-1 5-1
Overpressure :
Dynamic 2-66 2-6
Static 2-6a, 2-86, 2-8c, 2-5, 2-6, 2-7
2-9d,e,(l)

Prediction :
Fallout 4—9fir, 4-106 4-16, 4-17
Induced radiation 5-2a 5-2
Operational requirements for fallout 4-10 4-16
Poststrike damage B-VI B-62
Prestrike for fallout 4-9flr, 4-106 4-16, 4-17
Preinitiation 3-96 3-12

Index 7
 FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

Paragraph Page

Pressure :
Dynamic 2-66, 2-86, 2-8c, 2-6, 2-7
2-96,c,e
Initial 2-2a 2-1
Static 2-9c, 2-6a 2-7, 2-5
Probability:
Assumptions B-I-3 B-ll
Circular error B-I-4&U) (a) B-12
Definition B-I-2 B-ll
Dispersion patterns B-I-46.C B-12.B-13
Normal distribution B-I-4d B-13
Probable error B-I-4d(2), (3) B-13
Target analysis B-I-4e B-14
Probable minimum Ra B-II-2-2C B-25
Prompt casualties 2-226(2)(6) 2-14
Prospective targets 4-3/,p 4-4, 4-5
Protective measures:
Control and communications 6-8 6-4
Factors 6-1 6-1
Individual •_ 6-3 6-3
Monitoring and survey 6-7 6-4
Principles 6-2 6-1
SOP 6-5 6-4
Terrain 6-9 6-5
Training 6-16, 6-6 6-1, 6-4
Unit 6-5 6-4

Radiation 2-126,c, 2-17a, 2-8, 2-11, 2-16,

2-17, 2-23, 2-21c 2-13
Radii :
Casualty 3-2 c 3-5
Damage 2-3(0-/), 2-3/, 2-1, 2-2, 2-3,
2- 2-17
Multiplying factors 2-256(1),2-25c(l),
2-25d(l) 2-17
Safety 3- 3-5
Target 3-16(2) 3-
Vulnerability 3- 3-5, B-65
Radiological survey 6-76,c,d 6-4
Rain-out : 5-la(l) 5-1
Recommendations 4- 4-
Reliability 3-16(1), 3-9a(2), 3-1, 3-12
3-
Risk, troop safety 3-2c, 3-7, B-III-2 3-5, 3-8, B-39,
Safety distance tables 3-2c, B-4a 3-5, B-10
Security, nuclear weapons and delivery sites 4- 4-24
Shielding:
Nuclear radiation 2-9a, 2-21, Z-25e(l) 2-7, 2-13, 2-18
Principle of protection 6-26 6-1
Thermal radiation 2-9a—/, 2-14a,6, 2-
2-25c
Soil types 5-2a 5-2
SOP, unit 3-56, 4-4p, 4-6d, 3-
4-1 Oi, 4-166, 5-5, 4-17,4-26,
6-5 5-4, 6-4

Index 8
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

# Special ammunition:
Paragraph Page

Accountability 4-14 4-21

Allocations 4-2, 4-7, 4-9a, 4-1, 4-12, 4-14,
4-l3d,f, 4-146 4-20, 4-21
Command control 4—13d 4-20
Local (SAL) 4-13c,d,if, 4-146 4-20, 4-21, 4-21
Logistics l-2a, 4-la, 4-13, 1-1, 4-1, 4-20,
4-14, 4-15 4-21, 4-24
Planning considerations 4-136 4-20
Security 4-15 4-24
Stockage (SAS) 4-13c,sr, 4-146 4-20, 4-21
Supply point (SASP) - 4-13j, 4-146 4-21
Staff record keeping 4-14a 4-21
Static overpressure 2-6a, 2-9c,d,e 2-
Steps in target analysis 3-4, B-2 3-
Subsurface burst 2-4a, 2-14c 2-2, 2-10
Blast overpressure 2-5a(3) 2-3
Residual radiation 2-4a, 5-la(4) 2-2, 5-1
Surface burst 2-46, l-5t, 2-116, 2-2,1-3, 2-7
2-14c 2-10
Blast overpressure 2-5a(2) 2-3
Residual radiation 2-46 2-2
Survey :
Aerial 6-7d 6-4
Ground 6-76,a 6-4
Organization 6-7d 6—4
Tactical damage evaluation - 4-12 4-20
Target acquisition 4-3 4-4
Target analysis 2-5c, 4—11c (4) (c), 2-5, 4-19, B-l,
B-l, B-2, B-3, B-4 B-10
Data 3-2 3-4
Factors considered 3-1 3-1
Index method B-26(l) (a)l B-3
Numerical method B-26(l) (a)3 B-3
Procedure 2-8c, 3-4 2-6, 3-6
Purpose 3-la 3-1
Steps 3-4 3-6
Visual method B-26(l)(a)S B-3
Target :
Area 3-16(2) 3-2
Diffraction 2-6a, 2-9c,d 2-5, 2-7
Drag 2-66, 2-256(1), 2-96 2-6, 2-17, 2-7
Priorities . 4-11 4-17
Radius _ 3-16(2) 3-2
Response 2-22a-c, 2-9 2-13, 2-7
Terrain influence:
Airblast . ___ . 2-8c,d,e, 2-256(2) 2-6, 2-17
Fallout _ _ 2-25d(4) 2-18
Induced radiation 5-2 a 5-2
Initial nuclear radiation 2-206, 2-25d 2-12, 2-17
Thermal radiation 2-146, 2-25c 2-9, 2-17
Thermal radiation _ 2-26(2), 2-2c,2-3a 2-1, 2-8
(1), 2-12 to 2-16
Characteristics 2-lla, 2-12a-/, 2-13 2-7,2-8, 2-9
Data
2-25c 2-17
Factors affecting range 2-14, 2-25c, 2-26 2-9, 2-17, 2-18

Index 9

L .
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

Thermal regulation—Continued.
Military significance
Partition of energy
Paragraph

2-160-c, 2-25c(3)
2-26(2)
Page

2-11, 2-17
2-1
#
Pulses 2-12 2-8
Shielding _ _ .. 2-9a-/, 2-25c(3), 2-7, 2-7, 6-1,
6-26, 6-9 6-5
Target response - . _ 2-15, 2-24a 2-10, 2-16
Troop safety criteria 2-166, 2-25c(l), 2-11, 2-17, 6-1
6-1 d
Time of attack (burst) - - -. 3-9 3-11
Time:
Fallous arrives 5-3c(2) 5-
For casualties 2-22a(4), 2-226,0 2-14, 2-16
Tactical damage assessment 3-9a(2) 3-
Waiting between bursts 3-96
Total dose 2-22a,(2),(3),(4) 2-
Estimates for fallout 4-1 Oí, 5-3d 4-17, 5-3
Prediction 4-10) 4-
Residual radiation 4-10j, 5-3d 4-17, 5-3

Trafficability 2- 2-17

Training 6-6, 6-76 6-

Transmission factor 2-216,c 2-
Tree blowdown B-III-4d(3) B-43

Troop safety B-III-2 B-39

Basic situation 3-2c(2) 3-5
Buffer distance 3-7c(3) 3-
Considerations 3-lc(l) 3-2
Criteria 6-ld 6-1
Degrees of risk 3-7a,3-7c(l), 3-
B-III-2c(l)
Fallout B-III-4 B-42
Minimum safe distance 3-2c, 3-7c, B-III-2, 3-5, 3-8, B-39,
3,4 B-41, B-42
Radii ... . 3-2, 3-7c(3) 3-4, 3-10
Tables 3-2c,'B-4a 3-5, B-10
Vulnerability conditions . ... 3- 3-9
B-HI-2c(2) B-39

Unit:
Logistic support 4-13; 4-21
Protective measures 6-lc, 6-2, 6-3, 6-6, 6-1, 6-3, 6-4,
6-7, 6-8, 6-9 6-4, 6-5
SOP 3-56, 4-4fir, 4-6d, 3-7, 4-6, 4-11,
4-1 Oi, 4-166, 4-17, 4-26,
5-5, 6-5 5-4, 6-4
Urban fires 2-15/, 3-8c 2-
Validity of effects data 2-27 2-18
Vulnerability 3-7c(2)-, B-III-2 3-
Vulnerability analysis l-2a, 3-11, B-VII 1-1, 3-12, B-65

Warning, friendly nuclear strike 4-6 4-8

Wave:
Blast 2-8d,e,/, 2-5 2-6, 2-3
Duration , 2-7 2-6
Reflection 2-5o(l),(2) 2-3

Index 10

i
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

Paragraph Page

Weapon 2-20d 2-
Examples of status 4-14a 4-21
Systems - 3-36 3-5
Systems reliability — . _ 3-10 3-
Weather influence:
Air blast _ - ... 2-5(a-c), 2-7, 2-8 2-3, 2-6, 2-8,
(a-/), 2-llc, 2-256 2-17
Fallout 4- 4-16, 4-17
5- 5-1, 5-2
Nuclear radiation 2-20a, 2-25d 2-12, 2-17
Thermal radiation _ _ ... 2-14a, 2-16c, 2-25c 2-9, 2-11, 2-17

X-ray radiation 2-22c 2-16

Index 11
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

#
HAROLD K. JOHNSON,
General, United States Army,
Official : Chief of Staff.
KENNETH G. WICKHAM,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

R. K. ROTTET,
Lt. General, U.S. Marine Corps,
Deputy Chief of Staff.
(Plans and Program)
Distribution :
Army :
To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11 requirements for Staff Officer Field Manual,
•Nuclear Weapons Employment.
Marine Corps Codes:
1025/2030/2064/2132/2133/2145/4070/4125/4256/5155/5156/5192/5205/6600/6900/6902/6905/6965/7220/
7230/7373/7380/7615/7620/7655/7717/7783/
7792 (1)
7506 (21)
7615-04/8145 (2)”

•¿rU.S. Government Printing Office: 1968 0—291-839

l
fr-Il WJ WJ/I-IC-IOI WJ
 FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1-1. Purpose (8)

2083, 2103, 2104, 2111, SOLOGs 89,
This manual provides guidance to command- 123, 128, 130 and SEASTAG 2083.
ers and staff officers in the operational and
logistical aspects of nuclear weapon employ- d.
ment in combat operations. sented in other field manuals only as required
for clarity or consistency. The manual should,
1-2. Scope therefore, be used in conjunction with other
applicable manuals. For a discussion of the
a. The doctrine presented in this manual is employment of nuclear weapons in the air
basically concerned with nuclear weapon em- defense role, see FM 44-1A.
ployment within the field army and the Fleet
Marine Force. When the manual discusses spe-
cial ammunition logistics and vulnerability 1-3. Recommended Changes
analyses, the scope is extended to include the Users of this manual are encouraged to sub-
area of operations. mit recommendations to improve its clarity or
accuracy. Comments should be keyed to the
b. Guidance is presented for the employment specific page, paragraph, and line of the text
of nuclear weapons in the attack of targets on in which the change is recommended. Reasons
or near the earth’s surface. should be provided for each comment to insure
c. The complete manual series (FM 101-31- understanding and complete evaluation. Com-
1, FM 101-31-2, and FM 101-31-3) includes ments should be forwarded directly to—The
the following information: Commanding General, U.S. Army Combat De-
velopments Command Institute of Combined
(1) The U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Arms and Support, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Corps doctrine for employment of 66027. Originators of proposed changes that
nuclear weapons. would constitute a significant modification of
(2) The effects expected from nuclear approved Army doctrine may send an infor-
weapons. mation copy, through command channels, to—
(3) Techniques of target analysis. The Commanding General, U.S. Army Combat
Developments Command, Fort Bel voir, Vir-
(4) Command' and staff procedures in ginia 22060, to facilitate review and followup.
nuclear weapon employment. Marine Corps users of this manual will submit
(5) Guidance for conducting tactical op- comments to—Coordinator, Marine Corps
erations in a nuclear environment. Landing Force Developments Activities, Ma-
(6) Defensive measures, individual and rine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia 22134.
unit, to reduce the effects of enemy-
delivered weapons. 1-4. Organizations of the Manual Series
(7) Tabular information concerning tar- The material is divided into three separate
get response and troop safety for a manuals—
family of hypothetical weapons and a. This manual provides doptrine applicable
for stockpile weapons. to active nuclear warfare. It contains the U.S.

1-1
 *é *

FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

Army and U.S. Marine Corps concepts for nu- actions indicated in this manual should nu-
clear weapon employment and the command clear warfare begin.
and staff actions required to carry out these
concepts. Appendix B presents detailed techni- b. Nuclear weapons may be employed within
the area of operations when the theater com-
cal procedures concerning target analysis.
mander announces that their use has been
b. FM 101-31-2 contains classified defense authorized.
information concerning the nuclear weapons c. Once nuclear warfare has commenced, the
in the U.S. stockpile. It provides the data authority to employ nuclear weapons is de-
necessary for target analysis. It presents items centralized.
of information concerning technical proce-
dures that are not included in this manual d. United States nuclear weapons may be
because of their security classification. FM employed in support of Allied forces, using
101-31-2 is designed for use in active nuclear either United States or Allied delivery means.
combat, field training exercises(FTX), and The nuclear warhead section (to include artil-
command post exercises (CPX). FM 101-31-2 lery projectiles) remains under the control of
(Modified) is intended to be used by NATO United States military personnel until time of
members in actual combat, FTX, and CPX. launching or firing.
c. FM 101-31-3 provides data concerning a e. A commander who plans to employ a
family of hypothetical nuclear weapons. It nuclear weapon coordinates with any adjacent
provides the data necessary for target analy- unit commander into whose zone, or sector,
sis. FM 101-31-3 is designed specifically for militarily significant weapon effects are ex-
use in unclassified training of the staff officer, pected to extend. Lacking concurrence, the
particularly the nuclear weapon employment commander requests authority to fire from the
officer. It is not intended for field exercises or next higher commander who controls both
command post exercises by U.S. Forces, but sectors.
can be so used by non-U.S. forces. The illustra- /. Nuclear firepower is a form of combat
tive problems in appendix B, this manual, use power. Nuclear weapons may, on occasion, be
data from FM 101-31-3. used alone to accomplish tasks that might
d. The organization of the material in FM otherwise require the maneuver of close com-
bat units; however, most tasks require a com-
101-31-2 and FM 101-31-3 is, in most cases,
bination of fire and maneuver. Plans for the
identical. Differences between the U.S. stock- employment of nuclear firepower, nonnuclear
pile weapons and the family of hypothetical
firepower, and maneuver forces are integrated
weapons exist ; these differences are inten- to provide decisive results.
tional and are designed to protect the security
of the actual weapons. Facility in the use of g. Nuclear weapons are employed to destroy
FM 101-31-3 will insure facility in the use or degrade enemy combat capabilities. Con-
of FM 101-31-2. sistent with the requirements imposed by the
tactical mission, casualties among civilian
1—5. Concepts for Nuclear Weapon personnel are held to a minimum. Destruction
of manmade structures or natural terrain fea-
Employment tures, tree blowdown or fire areas, and creation
The doctrine in this manual is based on the of high-intensity residual contamination areas
following basic concepts : may create undesired obstacles to movement.
a. The U.S. Army and U.S. Consistent with
Corpsmilitary objectives, unneces-
saryMarine
destruction and contamination should be
are organized, equipped, and trained to fight
in nuclear warfare, nonnuclear warfare, or held to a minimum.
under the threat of nuclear warfare. In the h. Commanders employ the smallest and
latter case, units are prepared to take the most readily available weapon with a suffi-
1-2
 1
* ■*

FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

CHAPTER 2

INITIAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Section I. GENERAL

2-1. General b. Partition of Energy. Transfer of energy

from the weapon to the surrounding media
a. The effective employment of nuclear begins with the actual nuclear explosion and
weapons requires an understanding of the ef- is exhibited as three distinct effects.
fects produced by these weapons, the response
of various target elements to these effects, the (1) Blast. Mechanical shock effects are
distance at which damage or casualties may be produced by a high-pressure impulse
produced, the methods of estimating the re- or wave as it travels outward from
sults of nuclear bursts under various condi- the burst.
tions, and the variability of the predicted (2) Thermal radiation. Heating effects
results. result as objects in the surrounding
b. This chapter presents a general qualita- area absorb thermal energy released
tive discussion of initial nuclear weapon ef- by the burst.
fects and their military significance. TM 23- (3) Nuclear radiation. Ionizing effects
200 presents a quantitative discussion of ef- are produced when nuclear radiatio'n
fects, and provides the nuclear weapon em- emitted by the burst is absorbed.
ployment officer with a means by which he can
determine the distance to which various effects c. Variation Parameters. The percentage of
extend. the total energy emitted, appearing as blast,
thermal radiation, or nuclear radiation, de-
2-2. Description of Nuclear Detonations pends on the.altitude at which the burst takes
place (subsurface, surface, air) and on the
a. Release of Energy. The magnitude of the physical design of the weapon.
energy released in a nuclear explosion exceeds
enormously the energy released in a nonnu-
clear explosion. Two types of nuclear reactions 2-3. Damage Criteria and Radius of
produce energy—fission and fusion. A fusion Damage
reaction is approximately three times as a. General. Two specific types of informa-
efficient per kilogram of fuel as is a fission tion pertaining to the military use of nuclear
reaction. The energy released (yield) by a weapons have been developed through weapon
nuclear detonation is measured in thousands tests. These specific effects data appear in TM
of tons of TNT equivalent (kiloton (KT)), or 23-200.
in millions of tons of TNT equivalent (mega-
ton (MT)). As a result of the sudden release (1) The thermal, blast, or nuclear radia-
of immense quantities of energy, a fireball is tion levels required to cause a partic-
formed. The fireball rapidly grows in size and ular degree of damage to a materiel
rises high into the atmosphere. The initial or a personnel target element.
temperature of the fireball ranges into millions (2) The distance to which the required
of degrees, and the initial pressure ranges to levels will extend from a given
millions of atmospheres. weapon.
2-1
m 1011-311-11/FßflFM 11-4

b. Damage Analysis. The nuclear weapon in estimating damage to the target is referred
employment officer uses data derived from ef- to as the radius of damage (RD). The radius
fects (a above) to estimate the damage that a of damage is the distance from the ground
specific weapon will cause to a target. By know- zero (GZ) at which the probability of an indi-
ing the approximate damage each weapon will vidual target element receiving a specified de-
cause, he selects the most appropriate weapon gree of damage is 50 percent. Every nuclear
to accomplish the mission from those available burst produces a radius of damage for each
for use. associated target element and a degree of
c. Degrees of Materiel Damage. damage. For example, a weapon will have one
radius of damage for moderate damage to
(1) Damage to materiel is classified by wheeled vehicles, another radius of damage
degrees as light, moderate, or severe. for severe damage to wheeled vehicles, and
These degrees of damage are de- another for casualties to protected personnel.
scribed in (a) through (ft) below. For purposes of this discussion, all specified
(a) Light damage does not prevent the target elements within the radius of damage
immediate use of an item. Some are assumed to receive the desired degree of
repair by the user may be needed damage. Appendix B presents a more detailed
to make full use of the item. discussion of the concept of radius of damage.
(b) Moderate damage prevents use of
an item until extensive repairs are 2—4. Types off IByirsî—Oefîraffloiri emd
made. Sógniíissairiee
(c) ^Severe damage prevents use of the Nuclear weapons may be burst at any point
J
item permanently. Repair, in this from deep below the surface to very high in
case, is generally impossible or is the air. Tactically, nuclear bursts are classified
more costly than replacement. according to the manner in which they are
(2) Moderate damage is usually all that employed. The terms listed below and their
is required to deny the use of equip- associated definitions are used in the re-
ment. In most situations, this degree mainder of this manual. For technical defini-
of damage will be sufficient to sup- tions of the various heights of burst, see TM
port tactical operations. There may 23-200.
be situations, such as the attack of a
bridge, in which only severe damage a. Subsurface Burst (less than 0 meters
will produce the desired results. height of burst). This type of burst generally
is used to cause damage to underground tar-
d. Personnel Casualties. Personnel casualties gets and structures and to cause cratering.
(combat ineffectives), unlike damage, are not
classified as to degree. Whenever personnel b. Impact or Contact Surface Burst (0
cannot perform their duties as a result of the meters height of burst). This type of burst is
weapon(s) employed against them, they are used to cause fallout, ground shock and crater-
considered casualties. Some personnel will be ing, and may be used against hard under-
effective immediately following attack but will ground targets located relatively near the
later become combat ineffective because of the surface of the earth.
delayed effects of nuclear radiation. c. Nuclear-Surface Burst. This type of burst
e. Personnel Casualties Versus Materiel causes fallout because the fireball touches the
Damage. For most tactical targets, it is desir- surface. Because of this fallout producing
able to base target analysis on casualties aspect, employment of this type of burst is
rather than on damage to materiel. Excep- limited.
tons are targets such as missile launchers, d. Low Airburst. This type of burst is used
bridges, and other key structures. for the most effective coverage of damage to
/. Radius of Damage. The primary tool used the great majority of ground targets of inter-
 Table 12-1. Biological Response to Nuclear Radiation.
Estimated
exposure Initial symptoms Onset of Incapacitation Hospitalization Duration of Final
ranffe (rads) symptoms hospitalization disposition
50 to 200 None to transient mild Approximately None to slight decrease Hospitalization required 45 to 60 days in Duty. No deaths
headache. 6 hours after in ability to conduct for less than 5 percent upper part anticipated.
exposure. normal duties. in upper part of expo- of range.
sure range.
200 to 500 __ Headaches, nausea, and Approximately Can perform routine Hospitalization required 60 to 90 days _ Some deaths
vomiting; malaise. 4 to 6 hours tasks. Sustained com- for 90 percent of exposed anticipated ;
Symptoms not re- after ex- bat or comparable ac- personnel in this range. probably less
lieved by antimetics posure. tivities hampered for Hospitalization follows than 5 per-
in upper part of ex- period of 6 to 20 latent period of 17 to 21 cent at lower
posure range. hours. days’ duration. part of range,
increasing
toward upper
end.
500 to 1,000 _ Severe and prolonged Approximately Can perform only sim- Hospitalization required 90 to 120 days Approximately
nausea and vomiting; 1 to 4 hours ple, routine tasks. for 100 percent of ex- for those 50-percent
difficult to cure. Diar- after ex- Signifícant incapacita- posed personnel. Latent surviving, deaths at
rhea and fever early posure. tion in upper part of period short, 7 to 10 days lower part
in upper part of ex- exposure range; lasts in lower range to none in of range,
posure range. more than 24 hours. upper range. increasing
toward upper
end; all
deaths occur-
ring within
45 days.
m

Greater than Severe vomiting, diar- Less than 1 Progressive incapacita- Hospitalization required 3 to 30 days 100-percent
101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

1,000. rhea, and prostration. hour after tion, following an for 100 percent of ex- deaths occur-
exposure. early capability for posed personnel. No la- ring within
intermittent heroic tent period, 30 days.
response.

2-15
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

an increased susceptibility to sec- insignificant future radiation ex-

ondary infection, which, on the sep- posure dangerous.
tic battlefield, would greatly compli- c. Materials. Most material objects are un-
cate treatment of normal injuries. In affected by initial nuclear radiation. However,
addition, certain portions of the ra- photographic and X-ray films are rendered
diation damage may be irreparable. useless by exposure to only small quantities of
(4) Repeated exposure. On a nuclear radiation. Some types of communications
battlefield, units will probably be ex- equipment may be temporarily or perma-
posed regularly (i.e., at least several nently damaged by exposure to relatively large
times a month) to some degree of amounts of radiation.
radiation risk from friendly as well
as from enemy nuclear weapons. In 2-23. Summary of Military Significance of
view of the regularity of exposure, Initial Nuclear Radiation
the nonrecoverability in the first 30 a. Initial nuclear radiation effects may
days, and the slow overall recovery, often produce casualties among personnel pro-
the commander must also consider tected from blast and thermal effects.
the consequences of using personnel
previously exposed to significant but b. Delay in the onset of the effects from
nonsymptomatic doses. To assist the comparatively small doses of nuclear radiation
commander, friendly units are di- may permit some personnel to remain effec-
vided into three categories based on tive long enough to influence a specific opera-
previous exposure history. FM 3-12 tion. Nevertheless, the delayed effects may
discusses techniques for classifying significantly reduce combat effectiveness for
units. The three categories are— a long period of time.
(a) Radiation Status—1 (RS-1). c. Troop safety is a major consideration as
Units in this category do not far as nuclear radiation is concerned. Ade-
have a significant radiation-expo- quate protective shielding is difficult to ac-
sure history. quire. It is reasonable to assume that friendly
personnel and the enemy will receive repeated
(b) Radiation Status—2 (RS-2). doses of nuclear radiation. The size and fre-
Units in this category have pre- quency of doses received in past operations,
viously received one-time or ac- the extent of recovery of damage (this is an
cumulated doses that are signifi- unknown factor and will not be considered in
cant but not dangerous. assessments of troop radiation status), and
(c) Radiation Status—3 (RS-3). the urgency of the tactical situation will,
Units in this category have re- among other things, determine the degree to
ceived sufficient one-time or accu- which friendly troops can be exposed during
mulated doses to make all except a nuclear attack.

Section V. COMBINED EFFECTS AND SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

2-24. Combined Effects the healing of wounds and burns and can in-
a. A person may receive some the crease possibility
injury from of complications.
blast or thermal radiation that is insufficient b. While there will be many casualties from
to make him ineffective, and he may receive combined effects, such as outlined above, es-
a dose of nuclear radiation that, by itself, will timating these casualties is difficult. In ar-
not cause ineffectiveness. However, the com- riving at his recommendation as to the weapon
bination of these effects may cause him to be- and yield to be used, the nuclear weapon em-
come a casualty. Nuclear radiation can delay ployment officer bases his estimation of dam-
2-16
 *
FM 101-31—1/FMFM 11-4

CHAPTER 3

TARGET ANALYSIS

Section I. GENERAL
3-1. Factors Considered in Target Analysis livery errors of the single round. Con-
(This paragraph is based on SOLOG No. sequently, it is necessary to make an
89.) estimate of the results on the target
based on the relationship among the
a. General. characteristics of the target, the ef-
(1) In the general sense, target analysis fects of the weapon measured by its
is defined as the examination of tar- radius of damage, and the delivery
gets to determine the capabilities of errors. The estimation of the results
available weapon systems for the at- usually is expressed as a fraction or a
tack of such targets (see AR 320-5 percentage of the target. When 30
for complete definition). With res- percent of the target is covered by
spect to the employment of nuclear the particular radius of damage, it
weapons, it is the process used to is expected that 30 percent of the
select the appropriate weapon system target will be destroyed. Figure 3-1
that will meet the commander’s re- shows this relationship.
quirements, within the knowledge
available. This chapter discusses, in
general terms, the procedures for
target analysis. Appendix B presents
detatiled techniques for the use of tar- Outer limit of
get ánalysis.
target
(2) It is important that an estimate be
made of the results to be expected
from a nuclear attack. Usually, this
will include what fraction of the tar-
get area is expected to be covered
by the weapon effects. Nuclear weap-
ons usually are employed on a one- Radius of damage
shot basis ; even if more than one
weapon is used, there is only one
weapon for each desired ground zero.
Unlike other fires, in which distri-
bution over the target area is ob- Figure 3-1. Relationship of target size and damage
tained by firing many rounds and al- radius in damage estimation.
lowing the inherent delivery errors
to place the rounds randomly b. Assumptions. Target analysis is based on
throughout the target area, the ef- the following assumptions:
fects of a nuclear weapon on the tar- (1) Reliability. Casualty and damage es-
get will vary, depending on the de- timation is predicated on the assump-

3-1
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

tion that a nuclear weapon will ar- selection of the desired ground zero
rive at the target area at the desired (DGZ) and the desired height of
time and a nuclear detonation will burst. It also affects such factors as
take place. Because many delivery damage to the target, troop safety,
systems do not provide a high assur- fallout, tree blowdown, and induced
ance of successful delivery, it may be contamination. Consideration is,
desirable to provide an alternate therefore, given to delivery errors.
means to attack the target in the
event the first weapon fails to func- (2) Effect of horizontal dispersion.
tion properly. This alternate means (a) There is a dispersion pattern
may be another nuclear weapon, non- unique to each type of nuclear
nuclear firepower, or maneuver weapon delivery system. Cannon
forces, depending on the nature and and rocket artillery form a gen-
importance of the target and the al- erally elliptical pattern, whereas
ternate means available. This is dis- guided-missile rounds and air-de-
cussed further in paragraph 3-10. livered weapons form a circular
pattern (fig. 3-2). Because nuclear
(2) Targets. When intelligence indicates target analysis is premised on a
the size and shape of the target, and “single shot,” it is assumed that
the distribution of elements within the distribution of errors con-
the target, these data are used by nected with nuclear delivery sys-
the target analyst. Otherwise, the tems will follow the laws of prob-
target elements are assumed to be ability. It is also assumed that gun-
uniformly distributed, and the area nery techniques will place the cen-
is assumed to be circular. The radius ter of the “dispersion pattern”
of the target is based on the best at the desired ground zero.
information available. Should a size-
able error in the target radius exist, (b) It is apparent that a burst occur-
a situation similiar to that discussed ring at the outer limits of the dis-
in appendix B-II-4 could result. persion pattern will cause the cen-
ter of the weapon effects to be off-
(3) Atmospheric conditions. The effect set from the desired ground zero.
of atmospheric conditions on blast Because the desired ground zero
and radiation usually is not consid- usually is selected at the center of
ered by the target analyst. In cases target, a burst near the outer
of heavy rain or snow in the target limits of the dispersion pattern
area, weapon effects radii will vary may result in a substantial de-
slightly from those listed in FM 101- crease in the damage to the target.
31-2 and FM 101-31-3. This emphasizes the need for post-
(4) Terrain. Nuclear effects may be mod- strike analysis whenever possible.
ified by terrain extremes such as
high mountains. If a weapon is burst Horizontal Plane

GD
in a valley, shielding of effects may
occur outside the valley, with rein-
forced effects within the valley. No
reliable system exists for modifica- Elliptical — g-ofJe»
tion of analysis in the field of weapon dispersion (Direction Circular
effects due to terrain considerations. pattern of Delivery) dispersion
c. System Errors. pattern
(1) General. Dispersion influences the Figure S-Z. Horizontal dispersion patterns.

3-2
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

1. Figure 3-3 shows a burst occur- the dispersion pattern affect the
ring at the center of the target. amount of the target that will be
In this case, about 30 percent of damaged by a single burst.
the target is covered by the radi- 3. In considering this, the target
us of damage. analyst assumes that the burst
will occur near the outer edge of
the dispersion pattern and esti-
mates the fraction (percentage)
of the target covered by the weap-
Outer limit of target on effect of interest. Under these
circumstances, there is a high as-
surance that the weapon will
DG cause at least that fraction of
damage.
(3) Effect of vertical dispersion. The
burst pattern in the air formed by a
large number of weapons set with a
Radius of damage timer fuze to detonate at the same
height of burst, and delivered under
nearly identical conditions, is ellip-
soidal (egg shaped). The height-of-
burst distribution pattern extends
Figure 3-S. Buret occurring at the center of the target. above and below the desired height
of burst (fig. 3-5). It is apparent
2. Figure 3-4 shows a burst occur- that a large vertical error may result
ring at the outer edge of the ellip- in a burst occurring a significant
tical dispersion pattern. In this distance above or below the desired
case, very little of the target is height. In such cases, the weapon
covered. Obviously, the size and may detonate close enough to the
shape of the target, the radius of surface to produce fallout or so high
damage, and the size and shape of in the air that the effects on the tar-

Outer limit of target

Radius of damage
DGZ
Elliptical /
dispersion pattern
A GZ

Figure S—U- Buret occurring at the outer limit of the diepereion pattern.

3-3
FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

get will be significantly reduced. analysis of the target can be determined only
Consequently, vertical dispersion by the target analyst and the intelligence
(PEh) is considered in selecting a officer through field experience. This is dis-
height of burst. Radar fuzes greatly cussed further in appendix B-II-4.
reduce the problem of vertical dis-
persion, as shown in figure 3-6. 3-2. Data for Target Analysis
d. Target Location Errors. Each target
(This paragraph is based on SOLOG No.
acquisition means has ah associated target lo- 89.)
cation error. This error may vary within the
same type of equipment due to operator inter- a. Tables in FM 101-31-2 and FM 101-31-3
pretation of data or to individual equipment present the data to be used in target analysis.
variations. The evaluation of the extent of the The basic tables are referred to as weapon
error and the gross effect this error has on the selection tables (WST). The weapon selection

Ellipsoidal dispersion pattern

Direction of fire
Desired
height of
burst

Ground
■■
Figure 3-5. Timer fuze vertical dispersion pattern.

1
Desired
height of
burst

8-0/76

Figure 3—6. Radar fuze vertical dispersion pattern.

3-4
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

tables consist of coverage tables, safety dis- ,(b) Yield.

tance . tables, and effects tables. Examples of (c) Height-of-burst option.
these tables are included in appendix B.
(d) Degree of risk to friendly elements.
b. The coverage tables present the informa- (e) Condition of protection (or vulner-
tion with which to estimate damage. A set of ability) of friendly troops.
indexes is presented that simultaneously con- (/) Range increment (for range-de-
siders delivery errors, weapon effects, and pendent systems).
target size and composition. For a given target
category, yield, and delivery system with a (2) In the preclusion-of-damage portion
known range and height-of-burst option, the of the tables, the least separation dis-
index gives an estimate of the damage that tances are shown for preclusion of
can be expected from the attack. Coverage damage to—
tables also present the radius of damage (para (a) Fixed bridges.
2-3) for each range and height-of-burst op-
tion. The indexes and radii of damage have (b) Buildings.
been computed using the casualty- or damage- (c) Light aircraft in flight.
producing effect that extends the greatest (3) In the preclusion of obstacles portion
distance. This effect is referred to as the of the tables, the least separation
governing effects. distances are shown for preclusion of
obstacles caused by—
c. The safety distance tables simultaneously
consider delivery errors and weapon effects in (a) Tree blowdown.
evaluating the “limiting requirements” which (b) Fires.
may be imposed on the use of nuclear weapons.
These limiting requirements are imposed to d.
avoid undesirable effects caused by nuclear effects and height of burst. For each weapon,
weapons in the form of casualties to friendly radii of damage for use against various target
troops; creation of obstacles to movement, to elements are shown.
include fire areas; damage to installations de-
sired for the use of friendly troops, such as 3-3. Recommendations
bridges and buildings; and damage to friendly
light aircraft in flight. The tables give the A target analysis is conducted to select the
minimum distances that friendly troops ; best weapon for attack of a target. After the
light aircraft; installations; and, in the case target analysis has been completed, a recom-
of preclusion of obstacles to movement, the mendation is presented to the commander.
critical area must be separated from the de- The recommendation should include the fol-
sired ground zero. In the casé of troop safety,
this distance is called the minimum safe dis- lowing information:
tance (MSD) and is given for various condi- a. Weapon system.
tions of risk and vulnerability. In the other
cases mentioned, it is called the least separa- b. Height-of-burst option.
tion distance (LSD). (Annex B—III, appendix c. Desired ground zero.
B contains a detailed description of limiting
requirements.) d. Time of burst.
(1) In the e.troop Estimated
safety results.
portion of the
tables, these minimum safe distances f. Troop safety.
are shown for each—
A detailed description of each of the elements
(a) Delivery system. in appendix B.
above is contained

3-5
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

Section II. TECHNIQUES FOR TARGET ANALYSIS

(This section is based on LOLOG No. 89.) determining whether to use the index
method, the visual method, or the
3-4. General Procedure for Analyzing numberical method (fig. 3-7). He con-
Targets siders point targets and area targets
in damage estimation.
The following general procedures are used (a) A point target is defined as a tar-
by the target analyst. The detailed steps, to get with a single target element
include examples, are contained in appendix B. (e.g., a bridge (span) or a build-
a. The target analyst identifies the pertinent ing).
portions of the organization’s standing operat- (b) An area target is defined as a tar-
ing procedure (SOP) and becomes familiar get with multiple target elements
with the special guidance expressed by the distributed over a definable area.
commander. He determines information con- (In this context a troop unit, ve-
cerning allocations, authority to expend, and hicle park, or other such target
available weapon systems as well as target in- would not be considered a target
formation, such as shape, vulnerability, size, element even though it may be part
distance to friendly troops and their radiation of a larger defined target.)
exposure status, ranges to the available deliv- (2) Limiting requirements, as they per-
ery means, and the limiting requirements tain to troop safety and damage and
(app B). obstacle preclusion.
b. He determines data for— (3) The selection of the most beneficial
(1) Damage estimation, desired ground zero,
to facilitate his taking into con-

Coverage tables
(source of data)

index Visual Numerical

method method method
used for
E
Approximately
used for'

Irregularly
used for

circular shaped
area Point targets
area
targets with targets
DGZ target
center
Area
targets Targets
requiring requiring
a displaced a displaced
DGZ DGZ

Figure 8—7. Methods of damage estimation.

3-6
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

to neutralize a unit. An emergency tion',. and some personnel may

risk from exposure to nuclear radi- suffer .dazzle. For example, such a
ation occurs either when a unit has condition can be expected to prevail
a radiation-exposure history that is in an. offensive situation when the
at the threshold for onset of combat majority of the attacking infantry
ineffectiveness from radiation sick- are in .the open and warning of the
ness, or when a planned single dose burst' has not been disseminated.
is sufficiently high that exposure to (b) Warned, exposed persons are as-
up to two or three such doses, alone sumed to be prone on open ground,
or in conjunction with previous with all skin areas covered and
exposures, would approach or ex- with an overall thermal protection
ceed the threshold for combat in- at least equal to that provided by a
effectiveness from radiation sick- two-layer summer uniform. For ex-
ness. An emergency risk should he ample, such a condition may pre-
accepted only when it is absolutely vail when a nuclear weapon is em-
necessary, and should be exceeded ployed against a target of oppor-
only in extremely rare situations tunity during an attack and
that might loosely be called “dis- sufficient time exists to broadcast a
aster” situations. No attempt is warning; troops have been warned,
made to define a disaster situation. but do not have time to dig fox-
The commander must determine holes.
these extremely rare situations for (c) Warned, protected persons are as-
himself and decide which criteria sumed to have some protection
are appropriate to use in attempt- ^ against heat, blast, and radiation.
ing to salvage such a situation. The assumed degree of protection
(2) Closely associated with the degrees is that protection offered to person-
of risk is the vulnerability of the in- nel who are in “buttoned-up” tanks
dividual soldier. The danger to an or crouched in foxholes with im-
individual from a nuclear explosion provised overhead thermal shield-
depends principally on the degree to ing. When only a lesser degree of
which he is protected from the protection is available (e.g., only
weapon effects. For example, a man tracked carriers are available),
jvho is well protected can safely be personnel cannot be considered
much closer to the ground zero than warned, protected. The target ana-
can be a man in the open. The degree lyst would consider such personnel
of protection of the unit is considered as exposed. A warned, protected
in target analysis to be dependent on condition generally is expected to
the amount of advance warning the prevail when nuclear weapons are
unit has received. One or more of the used in a preparation prior to an
following three conditions of person- attack.
nel vulnerability can be expected at (d) It should be noted that there is no
the time of burst: unwarned, ex- category for unwarned, protected.
posed; or warned, protected. Although protection may be avail-
(a) Unwarned, ableexposed
to personnel,
personsitare
cannot
as- be as-
sumed to be standing in the open sumed that they will be taking
at burst time, but have dropped to advantage of it unless they are
a prone position by the time the warned of an inpending burst.
blast wave arrives. They are ex- Procedures for warning friendly
pected to have areas of bare skin personnel are discussed in para-
exposed to direct thermal radia- graph 4-6. >

3-9
FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

(3) For each combination of negligible e. To consider a unit’s radiation-exposure

and emergency degree of risk and history properly, it is important that the quan-
condition of personnel vulnerability, titative meaning of the various minimum safe
there is an associated “risk distance” distances be understood insofar as nuclear
known as the radius of safety. It is radiation troop safety criteria are concerned.
the horizontal distance from the The following discussion refers to figure 3-8
actval ground zero beyond which the and considers troops with no previous radia-
weapon effects are acceptable. Be- tion exposure history.
cause a round may burst at the end (1) Line X represents the emergency
of the dispersion pattern nearest to risk MSD. For units located in area
friendly troops, a buffer distance is ' A, between the DGZ and line X, there
added to the radius of safety. The is a very high assurance that these
buffer distance provides a very high units will be exposed to more than 50
assurance (99 percent) that unac- rad (an emergency risk). The assur-
ceptable weapon effects will not reach ance decreases as the distance from
friendly troops. The size of the buffer the DGZ to the friendly troops de-
distance is dependent on the horizon- creases. Such units are exposed to
tal delivery error at the applicable more than an emergency risk.
range. The sum of the radius of
safety and the buffer distance is the (2) There is a very high assurance that
minimum safe distance shown in the units located on line X or in area B
safety distance tables in FM 101- will receive 50 rad or less and, there-
31-2 and FM 101-31-3. Although fore, will be exposed to no more than
these tables contain the minimum an emergency risk. Furthermore,
safe distances for the various stated units located in area B beyond a line
combinations of risk and vulnerabil- visualized to be about midway be
ity, selection of an appropriate MSD tween lines X and Y will receive no
is dependent upon whether or not more than a moderate risk (20 rad
radiation is the governing criteria. or less).
(3)
Table 3-1. Yields for which Radiation is the is a very high assurance that units
Governing Troop Safety Criterion located on line Y or beyond will re-
Exposed Protected ceive 5 rad or less and, therefore,
Yxexd
(KT) Unwarned Warned Warned will be exposed to no more than a
Less than 8 Yes Yes Yes. negligible risk. The risk to a unit
8—15 No Yes Yes. located beyond line Y decreases with
16-200 No No Yes. the increase in distance from the
More than 200 No No No.
DGZ until at some point, not mathe-
Note. Yee means that radiation is the governing criterion. No matically defined or tabulated in any
means that radiation is not the governing criterion. manual, there is no longer any risk
of radiation exposure.
d. Depending on weapon yield, the govern-
ing effect in establishing the minimum safe /. When examining troop safety in connec-
distance may be blast, thermal radiation, or tion with a target analysis, table 3-1 must
initial nuclear radiation. For weapon yields in first be consulted to determine whether the
which nuclear radiation is the governing troop weapon yield being investigated falls in the
safety criterion (table 3-1), it is necessary range where radiation is the governing troop
that the unit’s radiation-exposure history be safety criterion. If radiation does not govern,
considered. FM 3-12 discusses the procedures the unit’s radiation history does not have to be
whereby unit radiation-exposure histories are considered, and the minimum safe distance is
determined and records maintained. used without modification. If radiation does
3-10
 FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

Line Y

Line X

DGZ

LEGEND
Line X-Emergency risk MSD, FM 101-31-2, -3.
Line Y-Negligible risk MSD, FM 101-31-2, -3.

Figure S-8. Minimum safe distance.

govern, the procedures outlined in Annex B- ment or on another target element may influ-
III, Appendix B should be used to determine ence the selection of a nuclear weapon. The
the appropriate minimum safe distance. target analyst checks to see whether a pre-
dictable bonus effect may exist at a certain
3-8. Contingent Effects point by obtaining the radius of damage for
the effect from the effects tables. He then
a. Contingent Effects. The coverage tables estimates the effect on the target by consider-
are computed using the governing effect—that ing the effect of horizontal dispersion.
effect which extends the greatest distance to c.
cause the desired degree of damage to the fects that are undesirable and, consequently,
principal target element. Contingent effects may place restrictions on the employment of
are effects other than the governing effect. the weapon. These restrictions are referred to
They are divided into bonus effects, which are as limiting requirements. Examples of effects
desirable, and limiting effects, which are un- that may be undesirable in a given instance
desirable. are the creation of obstacles to friendly
b. Bonus Effects. When a nuclear weapon is movement as a result of tree blowdown, rubble,
used on a target, there will be many effects and forest and urban fires. The target analyst
other than the governing effect that will assist determines whether undesirable effects will be
in the destruction of enemy elements. These created. He does this by considering the radius
are termed “bonus effects.” Some are predicta- of the limiting effect. He determines the least
ble, others are not. The desirability of achiev- separation distance (LSD) from the safety
ing bonus effects on the primary target ele- distance tables.

Section III. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

3-9. Time of Attack (1) General. A set rule for selecting the
time for firing a nuclear preparation
a. Tactical Considerations. should not be made. To achieve sur-

3-11
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

prise, it may be desirable to fire all will take place. Reliability is a function of
weapons at the same time or as close crew training, maintenance, communications,
together as possible. -Because well- command, weather, terrain, delivery system,
trained troops may become prone as and weapon design. The reliability of any
soon as they observe the flash of the weapon system varies to such an extent that
first burst, surprise may often be fixed values cannot be established; experience
achieved by delaying the delivery of will dictate the reliability of a given system.
subsequent rounds. Sometimes better b. Reliability is not a consideration in select-
results may be obtained by firing on ing a weapon for attack of a target except as
targets at irregular time intervals. follows :
Weapons supporting a secondary at-
tack may be fired first to assist in (1) The most reliable systems are em-
locating reserves or to cause the pre- ployed against the most important
mature commitment of the enemy’s targets—those critical to the success
reserve. of the mission.
(2) Time for tactical damage assessment. (2) Against other than the most impor-
When a less reliable weapon system tant targets, less reliable systems are
is employed (para 3-10), a backup employed before the more reliable.
weapon, if available, should be placed This permits retention of the more
in an on-call status. In planning the reliable weapon systems for attack of
nuclear attack, time should be al- future targets.
lowed for making a tactical damage c. A backup weapon, if available, should be
assessment of the first round to de- placed in an on-call status when a less reliable
termine whether the backup weapon weapon system is employed.
should be fired. This time interval
will vary, depending on such factors 3-11. Analysis of the Vulnerability of
as—the surveillance method used to Friendly Troops
determine if the first weapon hit the
target, if it detonated, and if the a. Target analysis procedures are used to
estimate the possible results of an enemy nu-
target sustained the desired degree of
clear attack on friendly dispositions or instal-
damage ; communications ; visibility ;
and the maneuver plan (para VI-1, lations (annex B-VII, app B). Based on cur-
app B). rent intelligence and the enemy’s past use of
nuclear weapons, the yield of the weapon most
b. Preinitiation Considerations. The radia- likely to be employed against friendly elements
tion from one nuclear weapon may cause a sub- is estimated.
sequent weapon to detonate prematurely. Such
an occurrence is called “preinitiation.” If two b. Special tables are presented in figure B-
weapons are to be fired so that they may land VII-1, FM 101-31-2 and FM 101-31-3 that
within 10,500 meters of each other, the special gives the radii to be used in analyzing the
data provided in FM 101-31-2 and chapter 3, vulnerability of friendly dispositions. The tar-
FM 101-31-3 should be used. A more detailed get analyst assumes that the enemy can deliver
discussion of preinitiation is included in FM a weapon at the point where it will do the
101-31-2. greatest damage to the friendly installation,
disregarding the effect of delivery errors. The
target analyst then estimates what fraction of
3—10. Reliability friendly dispositions might be endangered by
a. such
The reliability of a weapon system an attack.
is the
probability that the weapon will get to the c. The analysis of present and planned
target area at the desired time and a nuclear friendly dispositions is a continuing process.
detonation of the expected order of magnitude The commander must be kept informed of
3-12
 FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

River. Although we have a limited number of “Surface bursts may be authorized by corps
nuclear weapons for this operation, I am willing commanders, provided significant fallout is con-
to expend 30 to 40 percent of them in penetrating fined to the corps zone of action.
the Aggressor main and secondary defensive belts “Air defense is SOP. Available nuclear weapons
and in advancing to the Blue River. Corps fires released to air defense units for that purpose will
will be used to engage Aggressor nuclear delivery
not be employed in a surface-to-surface role with-
means and those reserve maneuver forces that have out specific approval by me.
the capability to adversely affect the outcome of
the battle. These fires will be delivered as soon “The success of this offensive depends heavily
as the targets are located. These fires, together on the delivery of nuclear fires when required.
with subordinate unit nuclear fires, will insure Insure that the special ammunition supply, points
that we inflict maximum casualties and damage supporting the corps are located well forward for
to Aggressor units west of the Blue River and this operation, and that all nuclear delivery units
will insure our successful attack to secure cross- have a maximum special ammunition load. If
ings over the Blue River. required, give transportation priority to movement
of nuclear weapons.”
“Once we are across the Blue River, we must
be ready to exploit our crossings and to move
rapidly through the passes of the Silver Moun- 4-5. Fire Support Coordination
tains and seize the communications center of
Foxville. Be extremely cautious in planning the
a. Fire support coordination is the coordi-
employment of nuclear weapons in the Silver nated planning and directing of fire support
Mountains, because I want no obstacles to our so that targets are adequately attached by
advance created in these critical areas. appropriate means of weapons available. This
“Retain one-fourth to one-half of our nuclear would include all fires on surface targets,
weapons in reserve for the attack to seize Fox- whether planned or targets of opportunity, re-
ville, because I anticipate a stubborn enemy de- gardless of the source of these fires.
fense there, and for the defense against the Ag-
gressor counterattacks that are sure to follow b. Proper fire support coordination inte-
when we seize Foxville. grates firepower and maneuver. The fire sup-
“Divisions will not be given authority to expend port element (FSE) of the tactical operations
weapons over 50-kiloton yield.” center in the Army and the fire support co-
j. The following is an example of a field ordination center (FSCC) in the Marines per-
army commander’s initial guidance to his forms the target analyses that result in a rec-
staff : ommended plan for the employment of nuclear
“The offensive to seize the passes through the
weapons. In the Army, if these plans involve
Ruff Mountains is the most critical part of the means other than normal surface-to-surface
coming operation. Once we have seized the passes delivery units, they are coordinated as follows:
and repulsed Aggressor counterattacks, we should (1) Atomic demolition munitions with
regroup and advance rapidly to the northeast to
the engineer element.
seize the India-Bravo-Mike industrial complex,
link-up with elements of the 12th Army Group, (2) Air-delivered weapons with the tac-
and destroy the enemy entrapped in the pocket tical air support element (TASE).
thus formed.
(3) Air defense weapons employed in a
“With the advance to the Ruff Mountains so surface-to-surface role with the air
critical, I am willing to expend one-half of the
available nuclear weapons to destroy Aggressor
defense element.
resistance west of the mountains and to inflict c. During the fire support coordination
maximum casualties and damage to his reserves
in this area. Plan on a small nuclear weapon ex-
process, measures are taken to insure that pre-
penditure in the exploitation from the mountains dicted effects of contemplated nuclear fires
to seize the India-Bravo-Mike complex. Insure that will not adversely affect projected operations.
we retain a reserve of nuclear weapons for use When undesirable effects of nuclear fires can-
during the initial attack to seize the mountain not be prevented, the implications of these
passes, to prevent any sizable reinforcement by
effects are indicated, and alternative courses
reserves now located east of the mountains, and
to destroy the Aggressor forces entrapped in the
of action are recommended to the commander
pocket. for decision.
4-7

I
FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

d. During the process of fire support coor- the other hand, when weapons are employed
dination, a series of recommendations is de- against surface targets of opportunity, an
veloped that will produce the following specific SOP is required that will permit rapid noti-
results : fication of personnel who could be affected by
(1) Dispersal and positioning of nuclear the weapons. When very low yield nuclear
weapons and release to executing weapons are employed against targets of op-
units in a manner that most effec- portunity or when nuclear weapons are em-
tively supports the commander’s con- ployed in the air defense role, there may not
cept of operations within his alloca- be sufficient time to warn friendly personnel.
tion. The difficulty of warning all personnel can be
appreciated if the various activities in the
(2) Establishment of liaison and com- forward battle areas are visualized. Messen-
munications between nuclear deliv- gers, wire crews, litter bearers, aid men, and
ery units and supported units. others move about frequently in the perform-
(3) Actions to insure troop safety. The ance of their duties. Often they may not be
nuclear weapon employment officer in the immediate vicinity of troop units when
checks for troop safety as part of warning of an impending nuclear attack is
each target analysis. To accomplish disseminated. Small detachments of combat
this check, it is necessary to have support troops, such as engineers, may be
data indicating the location and ra- working in isolated areas where they may be
diation exposure history of friendly subjected to casualty-producing effects if
forces. FM 61-100 prescribes proce- they are not warned. Effects that are com-
dures, such as the use of phase lines, pletely tolerable to troops in tanks or foxholes
for the reporting of location and for can cause considerable casualties among those
the control and coordination of move- in-the open in the same area (para 6-3).
ment. During the fire support coordi- (1) Notification concerning friendly
nation process, recommendations on strikes is a time-consuming process
the specific procedures to be employed unless procedures are carefully estab-
are developed. lished and rehearsed. Dissemination
e. A detailed discussion of the duties of the of warning earlier than is necessary
fire support coordinator and of fire support may permit the enemy to learn of
coordination procedures is contained in FM the planned strike, with a resultant
6-20-1 and FM 6-20-2. decrease in the effectiveness of the
attack.
4-6. Warning of Friendly Nuclear Strikes (2) When there is insufficient time to
warn personnel within the limits of
(This paragraph is based on ST AN AG No. visibility, only those personnel who
2104.) might receive tactically significant
a. Advance warning of a nuclear strike is weapon effects are given a nuclear
required to insure that friendly forces do not strike warning. Warning of units
receive casualty-producing weapon effects. For not requiring the information causes
strikes at distant enemy targets, advance them to assume a protective posture
warning is required only for adjacent units that interferes with the accomplish-
and aircraft likely to be affected by such ment of their mission. There is gen-
strikes. When a nuclear weapon is part of a erally no requirement to warn sub-
schedule of fires, there is usually adequate ordinate units when the target analy-
time to alert those personnel in an area where sis indicates no more than a negligi-
significant effects may be received. If it does ble risk to unwarned, exposed troops.
not interfere with the mission, troops out to (3) Aircraft, particularly light aircraft,
the limits of visibility should be warned. On can be damaged by low overpressures.

4-8
 FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

Likewise, dazzle is more significant to Support Center (DASC) and/or

personnel operating aircraft than to the Supporting Army Control Cen-
personnel on the ground. Because air- ter (SACC).
craft can move rapidly from an area
of negligible risk to one where dam- (4) When very low yield weapons are
aging overpressures or dazzle may be employed against targets of oppor-
encountered, all aircraft within the tunity, operational requirements
area of operations are given advance may dictate some relaxation of the
warning during both day and night requirement for positive warning.
operations. b. Nuclear strike warning (STRIKWARN)
(a) Army aircraft are warned through messages are disseminated as rapidly as pos-
the appropriate air traffic control sible. The requirement for speed frequently
facility or through the unit com- will be in conflict with a requirement for
mand net. communications security. Authentication pro-
cedures and encoding instructions for nuclear
(b) Navy and Air Force aircraft are strike warning messages are included in unit
warned through Navy and Air signal operation instructions.
Force liaison personnel. At corps (1) The amount of information to be en-
and division level, the notification coded is held to a minimum to ex-
of the planned employment of a pedite the dissemination.
weapon is transmitted to other
Services through the Navy or Air (2) Strike warnings are broadcast in the
Force liaison officer; at field army clear when insufficient time remains
level, this notification is accom- for the enemy to react prior to the
plished through the tactical air strike.
control center (TACC).
c. Procedures for warning of friendly nu-
(c) Time permitting, air defense ar- clear strikes are included in the subparagraphs
tillery will report via command below.
and control nets to the Army Air
Defense Command Post (AADCP) (1) Warning responsibilities are as fol-
the intention to engage hostile air- lows:
craft with nuclear weapons, stat- (a) Responsibility for issuing the ini-
ing estimated time, altitude and tial warning rests with the re-
GEOREF of the nuclear burst. questing commander.
The AADCP will transmit a warn-
ing message to its associated TOC (b) Commanders authorized to release
and Sector Operation Center/Con- nuclear strikes will insure that
trol and Reporting Center (SOC/ strikes affecting the safety of ad-
CRC), and these agencies may jacent and other commands are co-
transmit alerts to their respective ordinated with these commands in
airborne aircraft. sufficient time to permit dissemi-
nation of warning to friendly
(d) Warnings to aircraft in Marine personnel and the taking of pro-
Corps operating areas will be ini- tective measures. Conflicts must be
tiated by the FSCC which passes submitted to the next higher com-
the warning to the Tactical Air mander for decision.
Commander usually via the Tac-
tical Air Command Center (2) The commander responsible for issu-
(TACC) and/or the Direct Air ing the warning should inform—
4-9
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

(a) Subordinate headquarters whose ures they should take in view of their
units are likely to be affected by proximity to the desired ground zero.
the strike.
(4) Figure 4-2 shows the zones of warn-
(b) Adjacent headquarters whose units ing for friendly nuclear strikes. The
are likely to be affected by the
number of zones shown will be less
strike.
whenever the data for two or more
(c) His next higher headquarters, minimum safe distances (MSD) are
when units not under the command the same (e.g., where MSD 2 is the
of the releasing commander are same as MSD 3, only zones 1 and 2
likely to be affected by the strike.
would apply for the friendly nuclear
(3) Each headquarters receiving a warn- strike.) Table 4-1 explains the pro-
ing of nuclear attack will warn sub- tection requirements for personnel
ordinate elements of the safety meas- located in any of the warning zones.

?”

MSD

DGZ
Zone

Zone

ft*
Zone 3

Figure U-2. Zones of warning for friendly nuclear strikes.

4-10
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

Table U-l. Protection Requirements for Friendly Nüclear Strikes

Area * Corresponding to— Zone Requirement
DGZ to MSD 1 1 Evacuation of 1
all personnel.
From MSD 1 to MSD 2 Limit of negligible risk to warned, protected personnel.” 2 Maximum protec-
tion.”
From MSD 2 to MSD 3. Limit of negligible risk to warned, exposed personnel.” 3 Minimum protec-
tion.”
MSD 3 and beyond. Limit of negligible ri^Cto unwarned, exposed personnel.” No protective
measure, except
against dazzle.
1
If evacuation is not possible, or if a commander elects a higher protection at least equal to that provided by a two-layer summer
degree of risk, maximum protective measures will be required. uniform.
8
Negligible risk should normally not be exceeded unless significant 8
Minimum safe distances are increased by 50 percent when
advantages will be gained.
8
conditions of extreme reflectivity and good visibility exist. (See
Maximum protection denotes that personnel are in “buttoned*
paragraph 2-25c(l).)
up" tanks or are crouched in foxholes with improvised overhead
s
shielding. MSD means minimum safe distance. When surface bursts are
4 used, the fallout hazard will be considered and appropriate buffer
Minimum protection denotes that personnel are prone on open
ground with all skin areas covered and with an overall thermal distances included.

(5) Figure 4-3 shows the format in acknowledgment (e.g., all platoon-
which all friendly nuclear strike size units in the affected area have
warnings will be given. Figure 4-4 been warned).
shows examples of friendly nuclear d. Normally it is not necessary or desirable
strike warning messages. Notifica- to transmit the strike warning message in the
tion passed to those agencies or fa- format shown in figure 4-3 to company-/
cilities responsible for disseminating battery-size units. Any such unit located in
warnings to airborne aircraft will zone 3 (fig. 4-2) or closer to the desired
include the least safe distance for ground zero should, by SOP, receive a message
light aircraft in hundreds of meters containing specific orders on the protective
(four digits) as part of item India measures to be implemented by that unit. The
following the data for MSD 3. (Ex- message should include—
amples of MSD determination are
presented in annex B-III, app B.) (1) A proword indicating that the mes-
sage is a nuclear strike warning.
(6) When nuclear strikes are canceled, (2) A brief prearranged message that
units previously warned will be noti- directs the unit to observe a specific
fied in the clear by the most expedi- protective measure (including evacu-
tious means as follows: “Code word ation to an alternate position if with-
(target number). Canceled.” in Zone 1). The SOP should state the
(7) The amount of information to be en- period of time during which the per-
coded is held to a minimum to ex- sonnel must remain protected.
pedite dissemination. Items Delta and (3) Expected time of burst.
Fpxtrot (fig. 4-3) will not be sent e. All available communications means are
in the clear unless the time will not used to permit rapid dissemination of warn-
allow encoding and decoding. ^ ings of the employment of nuclear weapons
(8) Unit SOP should require that strike against targets of opportunity. These means
warning messages be acknowledged, include—
and there should be common under- (1) Sole-purpose telephone circuits, wire,
standing as to the meaning of the or radio relay.

4-11
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

(2) FM and AM voice radio nets. tion to permit a complete evaluation of the fire
(3) Continuous wave and radioteletype- mission. As a minimum, a request contains a
writer nets. description of the target, the results desired,
and the desired time of burst. The request may
(4) One-way voice radio nets. This com-
contain additional information; such as limit-
munication does not give the reci- ing requirements, location of the desired
pient the capability of acknowledg- ground zero, acceptable risk to friendly troops,,
ment ; the recipient may be required or location and degree of protection of nearest
to acknowledge over a different means friendly troops. If the target has' been analyzed
of communications. The range and by the requesting agency, the request for fires
coverage of this net may cause the may specify the desired weapon and yield. :
message to be sent to units that do
not need to be warned. b. The next higher releasing commander
may approve or disapprove the request. Iii
/. A fragmentary warning order may be' some cases, he may submit a request to his next
issued while a fire mission is being processed- higher commander for release of a weapon
to alert unit personnel that they are in an area more suitable than any presently available tó
in which they may receive the effects of a him.
weapon being considered for employment. The
personnel are cautioned to remain alert for a c. Upon approval or disapproval of a fire re-
quest, the requesting agency is notified. When-
followup message that will cancel, confirm, or"
ever possible, a commander who disapproves a
alter the warning. The followup message is
sent whenever the time of burst is determined request provides the requesting agency with
or the decision is made not to fire the weapon. the reason for the disapproval -and will sul>-
stitute another type of fire support whenever
g. While units outside the area in which possible.
effects may be received normally are not. sent V’ iii

a nuclear strike warning message, effective 4-8. Fire Orders

liaison may require that strike data be passed ; a. Once a fire mission has been apprqyed,
to adjacent units as a matter of SOP, parti- fire support agencies are given the heceäsary
cularly for those friendly strikes that are in orders, to cause the weapons to be delivered on
close proximity to a boundary between major. the target.
units. Information concerning these strikes is ?
(1) Orders to Army delivery units
of operational concern (e.g., information used include— u
to update situation maps in the TOC that por-
tray areas radiological contamination and ob- ; (a) Unit tó' deliver the weapon.
stacles to maneuver of friendly forces). y (b) Firing .site, if applicable.
\(c) Delivery system/yieíd. 7
4-7. Fire Requests (d) Height of burst in meters or
height-of-burst option.
a. When a commander has á requirement for
„(e) When applicable, fuzing option de-
nuclear fires and has the weapon but not the
sired (e.g., contact backup or con-
authority to fire, he may request authorization
■; tact preclusion).
to fire from the next senior releasing comman-
der. When the commander has neither the ' (/) Desired ground zero.
weapon nor the authority to fire, he may re- ’ (ff) Time of burst/latest time,of burst,
quest delivery of nuclear fires from the next (fe) Resupply instructions, if applica-
11
higher commander. (Fig. 4-5 shows an exam- ‘ ble.
pie of a division nuclear fire request to corps.) (2) If air-delivered weapons have been
Simultaneously, the fire direction center. provided an Army unit, the message
(FDC) or the tactical air control center is to the tactical air control center
alerted. Requests contain sufficient informa- includes—; .
4-12
• •
• • STIIRWAIN ^ ■ ' V:-
Alfa : Ciit vtrtf iiiicatiai aicliar strifcÁ (tai^|«t -
Dalta : Data-tiai iraap fir tiai af karst ialala tiaia. Thi fiat aftar vliél 11« strikt vill ki eaacilid
(Ilia tlai). '

Filtrat: A6Z (QTUjrid eaariliatts).

latal : ladicata air ar sirfaca karsts.
■ ; ladia : iar all karsts: . r: :■*
. ISA 1 la kaidrtds if ■«!«» (fair digits). . ~ ;
■SB 2 la kiidnds af matars (fair difits).
■SOI la kaadrads if aatars (fair difits).
Yankee : Far all karsts whan tbera is lass thin s 99-percent issunnca of no militarily significant
fallont.
Direction measured clockwise from grid north to the left, then right, radial lines (degrees or
mils- state which) (four digits each).

Zulu : For all bursts when there is less than a 99-percent assurance of no militarily significant
fallout.
Effective wind speed in km/hr (three digits).
Downwind distance of zone I (km) (three digits).

Cloud radius (km) (two digits).

Figure 4-S. Format of STRIKWARN message for friendly nuclear strikes.

4-13
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

1. Airbursts ^ 99-percent assurance of no militarily significant fallout:

STRIKWARN. ALPHA TUBE SIX. DELTA PQ
WMOTAR/ASDGWYOF. FOXTROT YM AB
IM SK. HOTEL AIR. INDIA 0022 0031
0045. ^
2. All bursts < 99-percent assurance of no militarily significant fallout:
STRIKWARN. ALPHA TUBE SIX. DELTA PQ
WM OT AR/AS DG WY OF. FOXTROT YM AB
IMSK. HOTEL SURFACE. INDIA 0022 0031
^ 0045. YANKEE 0215 0255 DEGREES.
ZULU 025 080 18.
a ' i i. . — i

Figure U-U* Examples of STRIKWARN message.

(a) Yield. 4-9. Employment of Atomic Demolition

(&) Permissible circular error probable Munitions
(CEP).
(c) Height of burst in meters; or, in a. Certain nuclear munitions are designed
the case of radar-fuzed weapons, for emplacement at the desired ground zero by
engineer personnel or by other qualified per-
height-of-burst option. sonnel who have been specially trained. Nuclear
(d) When applicable, fuzing option de- munitions employed in this manner are called
sired (e.g., contact backup or con- atomic demolition munitions. Generally, ADM
tact preclusion). are employed against the same type of targets
(e) Desired ground zero. as are nonnuclear demolitions. ADM are also
(/) Time of burst/latest time of burst. used to create large-scale obstacles and to pro-
(g) Applicable coordination measures. duce fallout. They have the advantage of de-
For example— laying repair or use of an area because of
1. Special signal procedures, such as residual radiation. Once a decision has been
marking of the target, marking of made to employ ADM, suitable munitions are
the initial point, and abort signals. made available to the commander within whose
2. Flak suppression measures. area they can b£ used advantageously. For de-
tailed description of ADM employment and
3. Special air defense coordination analysis see FM 5-26.
procedures.
b. An atomic demolition plan includes—
&. Early notification to the delivery unit
reduces delays in firing. A.dvance information (1) Tárget number and description.
with which to occupÿ'^ring sites, compute (2) Type of ADM, yield, depth of burst,
firing data, and prepare the nuclear round is and location of the desired ground
desirable. On some occasions, this information zero.
is given to, the delivery; unit prior to the time
a decision is made to employ the weapon. (3) Designation of emplacing unit.
(4) Designation of supporting units, with
c. Fire support agencies may be ordered to coordination instructions.
prepare an alternate nuclear weapon system
(either of the same type or of a different type) (5) Methods of firing.
or to plan nonnuclear fires in the event the (6) Security instructions, including de-
first weapon fails. signation of the unit to furnish se-
L
.w-

4-14
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

CHAPTER 5

OPERATIONS IN RESIDUAL RADIATION AREAS

5-1. General nificant fallout result. The fallout pat-

a. Nuclear radiation that tern canfrom
results be expected
a nu- to overlap and
clear explosion and persists longer than 1 to mask the entire induced contami-
minute after burst is termed “residual radia- nation pattern.
tion.” Residual radiation can contaminate the (4)
airspace over the area of operations, the ter- both induced contamination and fall-
rain itself, or both, depending primarily on the out patterns on the ground.
height of burst of the weapon. Contamination
of the airspace is for a relatively short period b. Induced contamination and fallout have
of time, and the radiation hazard to aircraft certain characteristics in common.
flying within the area is minimal. Residual (1) Both persist for relatively long per-
radiation consists primarily of gamma and iods.
beta radiations, both of which present a serious (2) Fallout consists largely of very fine
personnel hazard. The gamma radiations are particles and covers large areas. In-
by far the more significant because of their duced contamination may be found to
range and penetrating power. Residual radia- a depth of about one-half meter. For
tion can appear on the ground as induced these reasons, the areas affected by
contamination, which is found within a rela- both types of radiation are difficult to
tively small circular pattern around the ground decontaminate.
zero; and as fallout, which is found in a large,
irregular pattern encompassing the ground (3) The size, shape, and location of fall-
zero and extending for long distances down- out patterns are sensitive primarily to
wind from the burst point. the wind structure. The size and in-
tensity of the area of induced con-
(1) When a weapon is exploded at tamination are extremely sensitive to
a height to preclude damage or casual- the variability of the soil composition.
ties to ground targets, neither For these reasons, areas affected by
induced contamination nor fallout of both types of radiation are difficult to
tactical significance occurs. However, predict; however, fallout prediction
if rain (or snow) falls through the is by far the more difficult and im-
nuclear cloud, tactically significant portant problem.
fallout may result.
c. The large areas contaminated by fallout
(2) When the height of burst is lowered
pose an operational problem of great impor-
below that indicated above to produce
tance. Potentially, fallout may extend to
dámage or casualties on the ground, greater distances and cause more casualties
but is kept above the fallout-safe
than any other nuclear weapon effect. It exerts
height, induced contamination oc-
an influence on the battlefield for a considera-
curs. Fallout considerations are the
ble time after a detonation. Induced contami-
same as those in (1) above.
nation is relatively limited in area, and minor
(3) When a surface burst is employed, tactical changes normally can be made to
both induced contamination and sig- avoid any serious effects.

5-1
FM HOD—3H—H/FMFM 11-4

d. The biological response of humans to re- ground zero without undue radiation
sidual radiation is essentially the same as risk. (It is emphasized that this is
their response to initial radiation. The total true only if the burst was at suffi-
dose of radiation absorbed by ah individual is cient altitude to preclude fallout. The
the sum of the initial radiation doses and the area around GZ 30 minutes after fall-
residual radiation doses he has received. Bio- out producing bursts will be subject
logical response to radiation is discussed in to extremely high dose rates.)
detail in paragraph 2-22.
The area of induced contamination is rela-
tively small, and it should be possible to avoid
S—2. Biradliyjsedl CointamîirîeiflBOira it or to traverse it rapidly.
a. All radioactive materials decay. The rate
at which this decay takes place depends on the 5-3. [Fid fey î
soil elements themselves. Some (e.g., sodium)
decay slowly and others (e.g., aluminum) a. Radioactive fallout also decays. The decay
decay rapidly. This decay rate, measured in rate from a single weapon can be determined
terms of “half-life,” and the element’s gamma fairly accurately by using the Ml radiac cal-
radiation intensity determine the significance culator. For a quick estimate of fallout decay,
of the induced radiation hazard. The distance the intensity can be considered to decrease ten-
to which a 2-rad-per-hour dose rate extends fold as the time after burst increases by mul-
1 hour after burst is considered the limit of tiples of 7. Thus a 50-rad-per-hour dose rate
significant induced activity. Estimates of the (measured at H+l hour) decays to a five-
extent of the 2-rad-per-hour contour, are con- rad-per-hour dose rate in 7 hours and about
tained in table B-III-1, FM 101-31-2 and one-half rad-per-hour dose rate at H+42 hours.
chapter 18, FM 101-31-3. b. Use of fallout is discussed in paragraph
ft. Whenever a nuclear attack is being 4-10.
planned, the nuclear weapon employment offi- c. Reduced to fundamentals, the major as-
cer advises the commander and the staff of pects of fallout deposition are as follows:
the possible hazard of induced contamination. (1) Fallout is formed whenever the nu-
After the attack, a radiological contamination clear fireball intersects the ground.
chart is made from the reports of radiological
survey teams. In comparison with other nu- (2) The heavier fallout particles start
clear weapon effects, however, induced radia- reaching the ground around the
tion does not pose a threat of major military ground zero within a few minutes
significance. after burst. The lighter particles
reach the ground farther downwind
(1) It may be extremely hazardous
at later times. for
Figure 5-1 illustrates
troops to enter and to stay in an area how total dose may vary with time
of induced contamination. Because of and distance.
the great destruction near the ground
zero, where induced contamination (3) The size, shape, and location of the
may be found, there is seldom a re- areas contaminated by fallout depend
quirement for troops to enter and largely on the winds that blow the
stay in the area. In the event occu- particles that rise with the nuclear
pancy is necessary, radiation is moni- cloud and then fall back to earth.
tored to insure that allowable total Changing wind directions can sub-
doses are not exceeded. ject some locations to long periods of
(2) Thirty minutes after burst, troops in fallout deposition.
vehicles may usually pass through (4)
the ground zero and foot troops may the ground zero, but high-intensity
usually pass within 300 meters of the “hotspots” and low-intensity “areas”
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

may occur throughout the pattern tion. See paragraph 2-2lb for shielding con-
because of winds or rain. siderations.
d. The total radiation dose absorbed by an f.
individual is a function of radiation intensity, permissible exposure times and total doses in
exposure time, and protection. fallout areas. The Ml radiac calculator can
e. Residual radiation is absorbed or reflected also be used to compute total doses and ex-
in the same manner as prompt gamma radia- posure times in single weapon fallout areas.

1.000
900 60 mm
40 mm
800
mm 20-KT weapon
700
15-knot wind
600
mm
500
400
300
200 mm
100

Kilomters from GZ

Figure 5—1. Total dose variation as a function of time after bursts and
distance from the burst.

5-4. Prediction of Fallout Areas to estimate the hazard area; the M5 predictor
is applied using less precise data. Both pre-
(This paragraph is based on ST AN AG No. dictions present a graphical portrayal of the
2103.) expected hazard. The hazard area is subdivided
a. A tactical fallout prediction system must into—
be a compromise between speed and simplicity, (1) An area within which countermeas-
on the one hand ; and the time-consuming com- ures may have to be taken imme-
plexity that increases accuracy, on the other. diately (divided into two separately
The present U.S. Army method of predicting defined sub-areas) ; and
fallout gives only a warning sector, some-
where within which most of the fallout is ex- (2) An area in which early, but not im-
pected to occur. mediate, action may have to be taken
to counter the threat of unacceptable
b. The U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps doses.
method of fallout prediction is explained in
TM 3-210. The prediction results in portrayal c.
of an area that is expected to contain most of tion permit this method to be used in depicting
the significant fallout. A detailed prediction is suspect areas for early monitoring and survey,
prepared in the tactical operations center, as well as for planning movement- of units,
based on the best available weather and weap- but not as a basis for executing operational
on data. Brigade and lower units use the M5 moves (para 5-5a(l)). The method also per-
fallout predictor and effective wind message mits prediction of the areas outside which
5-3
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

friendly troops are likely to have relative im- readings, the direction of decreas-
munity from the fallout hazard. ' ing intensities and the limits of
d. In an active nuclear war, it is reasonable
the fallout pattern nearest the
to expect fallout at a given location occasional- unit are determined. From this, a
ly to be caused by more than one nuclear burst, minimum-dose exit route is select-
thereby causing multiple overlapping fallout ed. A method for determining the
patterns. See FM 3-12 and TM 3-210 for the optimum time for exit of fallout
proper technique to handle such situations. areas is given in FM 3-12.
It. All available shielding measures
5—5. Basis for Standing Operating are taken within the position un-
til evacuation or movement has
Procedures for Operations in Fallout begun.
Areas
(ft) Remaining in position. When the
a. Command decisions in any fallout situa- total dose expected in the position
tion are based on consideration of two oppos- is significantly less than that which
ing factors : the demands of the tactical situa- would occur by moving, the best
tion and the hazards due to radiation. At one solution is the remain in position
extreme, the total energies of the unit are for approximately 6 hours after
directed toward keeping the radiation exposure 1
the burst, at which time movement
at a minimum. At the other extreme, the de- from the pattern can be made or
mands of the tactical situation are clearly decontamination operations can be
dominant. begun.
(1) Radiation hazard dominant. In gener- (2) Tactical demand dominant.
al, two courses of action are consi-
dered : early movement from. the (a) When the tactical demand clearly
fallout area and remaining in posi- governs, the unit continues to place
tion. primary emphasis on the accom-
plishment of its mission. The unit
(a.) Early movement. takes action whenever possible to
1. When air or surface transport keep radiation exposure to a mini-
means are available, evacuation mum. These actions usually consist
from the area as soon as possible of decontamination and the use of
normally is the best course of available shielding.
action. (ft) Decisions to shift emphasis toward
2. When the shielding provided by countermeasures against radiation
the exit means is approximately are dependent on a capability to
equal to or better than that avail- predict with reasonable accuracy
able in the position (and in the the times at which the crucial ra-
absence of air evacuation means), diation doses will be reached. Such
movement from the area is accom- predictions can be made when the
plished as soon as the minimum- peak dose rate and the time to peak
dose exit route can be determined. (in minutes after burst) are
See FM 3-12 for details. known. When such predictions can-
3. Fallout predictions are not suf- not be made because unit survey
ficiently accurate to be used as a meters have gone off scale, it can
sole basis for such moves. There- be assumed that the unit will be
fore, movements normally are exposed to incapacitating radiation
based on measured dose rates and doses within a few minutes un-
dosimeter readings obtained after less immediate countermeasures
the fallout has begun. From such are taken.
5-4

L.
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

individuals and equipment with physical pro- Techniques for minimization of the time of
tection to reduce weapon effects. The best pro- exposure to radiation are discussed in chapter
tection is afforded by deep underground shel- 5.
ters. Such structures are expensive in time
and materials; their construction on the bat- d. Radiological Decontamination. Radiolog-
tlefield usually is not feasible. Reliance is ical decontamination is the process of reduc-
placed on hasty field fortifications, such as ing to an acceptable level the hazard of
trenches, foxholes, emplacements, revetments, radioactivity from residual contamination.
bunkers, and simplified underground shelters. Radioactive contaminants are fission products,
Tanks provide considerable protection against fusion products, unfissioned active material,
the effects of a nuclear explosion. Armored and matter in which radioactivity has been
personnel carriers provide considerable protec- induced. Some methods of decontamination
tion against blast and thermal effects and are surface cleansing or scraping, sealing, and
some protection against initial nuclear radia- disposal. Decontamination processes do not
tion. Tracked carriers also provide some pro- neutralize or destroy radioactivity. These proc-
tection against residual radiation. Wheeled esses seek to diffuse and dilute the contamina-
vehicles provide no protection against blast or tion to a safe level. Individual decontamination
initial nuclear radiation. Vehicle tarpaulins measures reduce radiation hazards that would
provide considerable protection against ther- result from ingestion or inhalation of radioac-
mal radiation. Sandbags on the beds of trucks tive particles coming in contact with the skin
provide some protection against residual radia- and clothing. Area decontamination requires
tion. See FM 101-31-2 and chapter 18, FM organization, supervision, and considerable
101-31-3 for appropriate transmission factors, time, effort, and materiel. Decontamination
c. Minimization of the Time of Exposure. procedures are discussed in detail in TM 3-220.

Section II. INDIVIDUAL PROTECTIVE MEASURES

6-3. General dividual some chance for survival and early

a. Paragraph 4-6 discusses a warning sys- continuation of his mission. All personnel are
tem that permits timely notification of in- trained to react rapidly, as follows:
tended friendly employment of nuclear weap- (1) If exposed, move no more than a few
ons. This system is also used to warn friendly steps to seek shelter.
troops in the isolated cases when enemy nu-
clear weapon employment is known in advance. (2) Drop flat on the ground.
For friendly employment, adequate warning is (3) Close eyes.
required to allow the individual to achieve the
degree of protection assumed in the target (4) Protect exposed skin surfaces.
analysis leading to a given burst. In the case (5) Remain prone until after the blast
of possible enemy employment, each individual wave has passed or debris has stopped
observes the best protective procedures that his falling.
situation permits (table 6-1).
b. Enemy nuclear weapons are expected to
b. Specific references that should be con-
sulted for more detailed information pertain- be followed by attacks involving enemy infan-
ing to protective measures are FM 21-40 and try, armor, or both. Individuals and units
FM 21-41. prepare to repel enemy followup operations,
which may be accompanied by conventional
6-4. Enemy Employment artillery fires and use of chemical and biologi-
a. Proper reaction to attack offers the in- cal agents.
6-3
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

Section III. UNIT PROTECTIVE MEASURES

6-5. Standing Operating Procedures measure total dose. Monitoring provides warn-
a. For the friendly employment of nuclear ing of a hazard that, except for the use of
weapons, the SOP establishes the normal troop radiac instruments, would go unmeasured.
safety criteria, radiation exposure control pro- Monitoring is included in normal reconnais-
cedures, maximum and minimum warning sance and intelligence activities and does not
times, warning system procedures, and fallout appreciably interfere with the primary mis-
prediction dissemination procedures. sion of the monitor or his unit.
b. Damage assessment, control, and repair b. Radiological survey is the systematic,
responsibilities as well as monitoring and organized use of survey parties whose mission
survey, decontamination, and reporting re- is to determine the location, extent, and dose
sponsibilities are established. rate of residual radiation in an area. When
monitoring data are insufficient to the needs
c. Minimum separation distances between of brigade, division, and higher echelons, sur-
critical installations, such as command posts ; veys may be directed to obtain essential infor-
nuclear delivery means; and reserve units are mation upon which to base tactical and combat
specified. service support plans. In the Army, the chemi-
d. The succession to command, the shift of cal officer and in the Marines, the NBC defense
control among headquarters, and alternate officer supervise the planning of surveys, the
means of communications, transport, supply, processing of survey data, and the marking «of
and evacuation are established. hazardous areas. Commanders at all echelons
are responsible for the training of survey
e. A complete SOP minimizes the disruption parties and for performing surveys as required
caused by nuclear attack and establishes suita- or directed.
ble patterns of action for surviving individuals,
units, and staff sections. Commanders modify c. The information gained from the activities
the SOP on a case-by-case basis as circum- of radiological monitors and survey parties
stances require. provides a basis for decisions on the require-
ment for protection, entry, stay, and departure
times from contaminated areas and for move-
6-6. Training
ment of units and supplies.
Individual and unit training emphasizes the
protective actions leading to survival in nuclear d. Detailed procedures for monitoring and
war. This tráining embraces a knowledge of survey operations are discussed in FM 3-12.
weapon effects, fallout, evasive actions, decon-
tamination, and relative worth of battlefield 6-8. Control and Communications
shelters. Recovery plans are rehearsed and in- a. The problems of command and control
tegrated into the scenarios of field exercises.multiply as tactical units disperse to avoid
Training in operations in areas of residual detection and attack. Even in the best trained
contamination is tied to instruction in monitor-
units, some confusion will follow a nuclear at-
ing and survey techniques (para 5-7). tack because of surprise, shock, physiological
and psychological casualties, materiel damage,
6—7. Monitoring and Survey and reduced visibility. An important means of
a. Radiological monitoring maintaining
involves theoruserestoring command and con-
of radiac instruments to detect and to measure trol is the communications network, both with-
ionizing radiation. (The individual who uses in and between units.
these instruments is known as the monitor.) b. Unless units are strictly controlled during
Radiac instruments are of two types: survey the immediate post attack phase, communica-
meters to measure dose rate and dosimeters to tions will be overloaded by reports and requests
6-4
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

APPENDIX B

TARGET ANALYSIS

B-l. General (4) Annex B-IV discusses the desired

a. Target analysis is a comparison of the ground zero, the effects on target
coverage when the desired ground
characteristics of the target(s) to be attacked zero is displaced from the target cen-
with the effects that the available weapon(s) ter, and the procedures used in select-
and delivery system(s) can produce. The ing the desired ground zero.
analysis results in the selection of the most
suitable weapon system for attack and in the (5) Annex B-V discusses the special con-
prediction of damage that should be sustained siderations necessary when targets
in the target area as a result of the attack. cannot be equated to one of the major
categories listed in FM 101-31-2 and
b. The target analyst must be proficient in FM 101-31-3, or when nonstandard
analyzing targets for attack with chemical, delivery errors are present in a weap-
biological, and nuclear weapons. Procedures and on system.
data for use in analyzing targets for attack
with chemical and biological weapons are found (6) Annex B-IV discusses poststrike
in FM 3-10, FM 3-10A, and FM 3-10B. analysis based on the refinement of
damage estimation from known data,
c. This appendix outlines the procedures using the numerical or the visual
that the target analyst follows in analyzing method of damage estimation.
targets suitable for nuclear attack. An under-
standing of the general discussion of target (7) Annex B-VII discusses friendly vul-
analysis in chapter 3 of this manual will assist nerability and the procedures used to
the analyst in an understanding of the detailed predict the results of an assumed
explanations set forth in this appendix. enemy nuclear attack on friendly
troop dispositions and/or install-
d. This appendix is organized as follows: ations.
(1) Annex B-I discusses probabilities and
procedures used in computing a pro- B-2. General Procedures for Performing
bability. Annex B-I also discusses Target Analysis
the concept of damage and defines the
term “radius of damage” (RD). Figure B-l outlines a four-step procedure
for use as a guide in performing target analy-
(2) Annex B-II discusses the three meth- sis. Analysts will normally develop procedures
ods used to compute damage estima- that best fit their own experience, ability, and
tion : index method, visual method, command guidance; however, use of the out-
and numerical method. lined procedure will insure a complete and
(3) Annex B-III discusses limiting re- correct analysis. An explanation of the infor-
quirements and their influence on mation required in performing the steps listed
nuclear weapon employment. The dis- in figure B-l is included in a through d below.
cussion of limiting requirements is
divided into troop safety and preclu- a. Step 1. Identify Pertinent Information.
sion of damage/obstacle considera- Step 1 includes target information, friendly
tions. information, and information that normally
B-l
FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

ing and amount of time required by

TARGET ANALYSIS PROCEDURE a unit to delivery its weapon (re-
1. Identify Pertinent Information sponse time) must be considered
a. Target information. along with the stability of a target.
b. Friendly information. General planning guidance for each
c. SOP and command guidance. weapon system is given in FM
2. Determine Data for- 101-31-2. However, the analyst
a. Damage estimation. must acquire more definitive guid-
(1) Index method. ance from the units assigned to the
(2) Visual method. command.
(3) Numerical method. (3) Standing operating procedures and
b. Limiting requirements. command guidance.
(1) Troop safety. (a) Desired damage to the target.
(2) Damage and obstacle preclusion.
c. DGZ selection. (b) Degree of acceptable risk to pre-
d. Final coverage. clude undesirable effects on friend-
ly units.
3. Evaluate Weapon Systems and the Tactical Situation
(c) Prohibitions against the creation
4. Make Recommendation of obstacles.
9-0174
(4) Remarks.
Figure B—l. Target analysis procedure,
(a) Some of the target information
contained in (1) above, will fre-
will be found in standing operating procedures
quently be missing. Consequently,
and received from command guidance.
the target analyst must coordinate
(1) Target information. with the G2 and make assumptions
(a) Location, size, and shape of the concerning the size and composi-
target. tion of the target. When target
intelligence does not indicate other-
(b) Category of target element (e.g.,
wise, the target elements are as-
personnel).
sumed to be uniformly distributed
(c) Distribution of target elements
in a random orientation; the area
within the target complex and their
degree of protection against weap-
on effects.
(d) Stability of the target.
(2) Friendly information. \
(a) Weapons available.
(b) Location of available weapons. 600
(c) Location of delivery means.
(d) Location of firing positions. 500
(e) Location of friendly troops in
zone(s) of planned burst, their de- RT 000
gree of protection from weapon
effects, and their radiation expo-
sure status.
(/) Location of installations not to be
damaged.
(g) Response times. The state of train- Figure B-2. Determination of the target radius.

B-2
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

is assumed to be circular; and a b. Step 2. Determine Data.

radius is determined based on the
best information available. (1) Estimate damage to the target.
(b) If the target is circular, or nearly (a) Depending on the characteristics
so, the radius of target (RT) is the of the target, there are three meth-
radius of the target circle. If the ods of estimating damage: index,
target is more nearly elliptical or visual, and numerical.
rectangular in shape, with its ma- 1. Index method. The indexes in the
jor dimension less than twice the coverage tables contained in FM
length of the minor dimension, the 101-31-2 and FM 101-31-3 are an
radius can be established by draw- indication of the suitability of a
ing a circle that includes an area particular weapon system for at-
outside the target equal to the tar- tack of a given target. Coverage
get area outside the circle (fig. B- tables have been designed for
2). The radius may also be estab- targets consisting of exposed per-
lished by visual inspection with a sonnel, protected personnel, tanks
circular map scale. When the major and artillery, and wheeled vehi-
dimension is equal to, or more than, cles. Other targets of similar vul-
twice the length of the minor di- nerability are equated to one of the
mension, the target cannot be four major categories in the
equated to a circle and the visual equivalent target table (fig. B-II-
method must be used. 2, annex B-II to this app). Using
(c) Based on the target information, the indexes in the coverage tables,
the target analyst determines the analyst can estimate the effec-
which category of target best fits tiveness of an attack.
the target under analysis. 2. Visual method. The radii of dam-
1. For each weapon system and age in the coverage tables have
yield, tables are provided for four , been precomputed taking into
target vulnerability categories : consideration the vertical disper-
exposed personnel (prompt and sion associated with the system at
delayed casualties) ; protected the range of interest. The target
personnel (prompt and delayed analyst applies the appropriate
casualties) ; wheeled vehicles; and radius visually to the target, con-
tanks and artillery. sidering horizontal dispersion. He
2. Target vulnerability categories then visually estimates how much
have been established for the pri- of the target area is covered by
mary types or ground tactical tar- the radius of damage.
gets expected. These categories 3. Numerical method. The target an-
can be equated to other types of alyst uses the radius of damage,
targets as shown in the equiva- the radius of target, the displace-
lent target table in FM 101-31-2 ment distances, and the character-
and chapter 18, FM 101-31-3. istics of the horizontal dispersion
(The equivalent target table is pattern to enter the area target
reproduced as figure B-II-2 in graph. The result of this opera-
annex B-II to this appendix.) The tion presents the analyst with an
accuracy of such application is estimate of the coverage of the
usually consistent with target in- target or the probability of de-
telligence and knowledge of weap- stroying it. The estimate of cov-
on effects. erage of a circular area target is
B-3
FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

more accurate if the index method (3) Select the desired ground zero. To
is used. Therefore, the numerical obtain the maximum effectiveness of
method is used primarily for est- a weapon, the target center, or the
mating damage to point targets, center of mass of a target, is selected
or when the desired ground zero is initially as the desired ground zero.
displaced from the center of a cir- However, limiting requirements, or
cular area target. the attack of multiple targets with a
U- Special Methods. Because of cer- single weapon, may require the desir-
tain differences regarding target ed ground zero to be displaced. The
analysis when considering the use effects of this displacement and a
of Atomic Demolition Munitions, detailed explanation of the techniques
the techniques described herein used in selecting the desired ground
must be modified. For analysis of zero are contained in annex B-IV.
targets with ADM the reader is (4) Predict the final coverage. When dis-
referred to the detailed explana- placement of the desired ground zero
tion in FM 5-26. is required, or when attacking multi-
(&) A detailed explanation of the ple targets, a prediction of the final
techniques employed in each of the coverage of the target must be made,
three methods of target analysis is using either the visual or the numer-
contained in annex B-II. ical method of damage estimation
(2) Consider limiting requirements.
(annex B-II). This predicted final
coverage will be a factor in the selec-
(a) Restrictions placed on the employ- tion of a weapon system.
ment of nuclear weapons are refer-
red to as “limiting requirements,” c. Step 3. Evaluate Weapon Systems and the
and are considered in two distinct Tactical Situation. In this step, the most
areas—troop safety and the pre- suitable weapon system is selected to attack
clusion of damage and/or obstacles each target; the best weapon-target combina-
that could interfere with the ac- tion must be determined. This determination
complishment of the tactical mis- involves consideration of several factors, some
ion. of wich are as follows :
1. Troop safety. The target analyst
(1) The highest priority target will re-
checks the distance that separates ceive first consideration.
friendly troops from the desired
ground zero to insure that the (2) The weapons selected must be within
troops will not be exposed to a risk the total number of each type that
exceeding that specified by the have been authorized for expenditure.
commander. (3) Based on command guidance, the
2. Preclusion of damage/obstacles. more responsive, reliable, and accu-
The target analyst checks to in- rate weapon system may be retained
sure that undesirable results are for later employment on targets of
avoided. These undesirable results opportunity.
usually consist of obstacles to (4) If all other considerations are equal,
movement (tree blowdown and/or the minimum yield weapon with a
fires), damage to structures (brid- sufficiently high probability of pro-
ges, supply dumps) or damage to viding the coverage that insures the
heavily populated civilian areas. desired results should be selected.
(ft) A detailed explanation of limiting
requirements is contained in annex d. Step 4. Make Recommendation.
B-III. (1) General. After thé target analysis has
 FM 101-31—1/FMFM 11-4

ANNEX B-I
PROBABILITY AND CONCEPT OF DAMAGE i

(This annex is based on SOLOG No. 89.)

B-l-1. General proximately the rated yield within the estab-

In conventional artillery fires, weapon effects lished accuracies of the delivery system. This
are obtained by firing many rounds and allow- assumption simplifies target analysis proce-
ing the inherent delivery errors to place the dures, but the implications should be under-
stood. The influence of the reliability of a
rounds randomly throughout the target area.
In nuclear fires, weapon effects are dependent weapon system (its probability of getting the
on the delivery errors of a single round. Con- weapon to the target and detonating it) on the
sequently, it is necessary to predict the weapon overall probability of a successful attack must
be considered. Cannon- and rocket-delivered
effects on the target. This prediction is ac- weapons have reliabilities of essentially 1.0.
complished based on a comparison of the weap- The more intricate weapon systems (e.g.,
on effects with the characteristics of the tar-
guided missiles) have reliabilities less than
get; and includes the effects of the weapon, those of cannon and rockets.
measured by its radius of damage and the
delivery errors. To analyze targets properly, b. Based on the assumption that a nuclear
a nuclear weapon employment officer should weapon delivery system will perform success-
possess an understanding of probability and fully, probability considerations are applied
concept of damage as presented in this annex. at the desired burst point in the target area.
The probability of success will be affected
B-I—2. Definition of Probability principally by the delivery accuracy of the
Probability may be defined as the chance of system.
a certain event occurring. It may be expressed
at the ratio, fraction, or percentage of the B-I—4. Effects of Horizontal and Vertical
number of favorable (or unfavorable) events Accuracy
to the total number of possible events. Thus,
probability may be expressed in terms of suc- a. General. The assumption is made that
cess or failure. For instance, the probability many rounds are fired from an artillery piece
of a coin falling “heads” is Vâ (1 in 2), 0.5, or at a given range at the same target under
50 percent (usually expressed as 0.50). The identical conditions. The rounds falling in the
probability that the coin will fail to fall “heads” impact area will form an elliptical pattern.
is 0.50. The probability that a die will stop The mean point of impact (MPI) for this pat-
rolling with the 2 spot up may be stated as tern can be determined. Variation from this
1
/e (1 in 6) or 0.167, and the probability that mean is called “dispersion,” and the pattern
it will not show a 2 spot is 5/6 or 0.833. The is referred to as the “normal distribution pat-
probability that a nuclear weapon will fall tern.” The shape of the pattern formed in the
within a given distance of the desired ground impact area will vary among delivery systems ;
zero or will burst within a given distance of the but, for damage estimation purposes, these dis-
desired height of burst may also be determined. persion deviations are mathematically convert-
The terms “probability,” “assurance” and ed to circular equivalent patterns, which are
“chance” are synonymous within this manual. called circular errors.probable (CEP). In tar-
get analysis involving the employment of nu-
clear weapons, it is assumed that the distribu-
B-I—3. Assumptions tion of errors connected with nuclear delivery
a. Analysis is based on the assumption that systems will conform to this normal distribu-
a given nuclear weapon will function at ap- tion pattern. It is also assumed that the mean
B-l 1
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

point of impact will coincide with the desired

►5.25% fall this side of line
ground zero.
and outside 2 CEP circle.)
b. Horizontal Dispersion. Horizontal disper-
sion associated with nuclear target analysis is
expressed in two terms—circular error prob-
able and circular distribution 90 (CD90).
(93 m fall
within CEP ircle
(1) Circular error probable.
{a) By definition, 1 CEP represents the CEP
radius of a circle within which one
weapon has a 50-percent probabil-
ity of arriving. Figure B-I-l re-
presents the normal circular distri-
bution pattern around the mean
point of impact for a large number
of weapons. A 2-CEP circle, which
1 percent fall 99 percent fall right
is twice the radius of a 1-CEP
left of of tangent
circle, includes approximately 94
tangent
percent of the weapons fired or
dropped. A 4-CEP circle contains Figure B—I-2. Tangent to the 2-CEP circle.
essentially all such weapons. Some
erratic rounds, although very few, consideration in determining troop
may fall outside the 4-CEP circle. safety criteria.
(c) Circular error probable data have
been precomputed for each weapon
system and are provided in the ac-
curacy data portion of the coverage
tables in FM 101-31-2 and FM
101-31-3.
(2) Circular distribution 90.
(a) By definition, the circular distribu-
tion 90 represents the radius of a
circle around the desired ground
m zero within which one weapon has
m a 90-percent probability of arriv-
%
93.
ing. An understanding of the cir-
cular distribution 90 is important
3 CEP
99 8%
to the analyst, because it is the
4 CEP
99.99+%
circular distribution error used in
all methods of target analysis to
insure at least a 90-percent proba-
bility of obtaining a specified
amount of coverage.
Figure B-I-l. Normal circular distribution pattern. (b) Circular distribution 90 data have
been precomputed for each weapon
(b) It should be noted that 99 percent system and are provided in the ac-
of all rounds fired will fall on one curacy data portion of the cover-
side of the tangent to the 2-CEP age tables in FM 101-31-2 and
circle (fig. B-I-2). This factor is a FM 101-31-3.

B-12
 FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

(3) Unsuitable index values. An unsuit- numbered thousands (e.g., if a

able index is one in which the index given range is 10,500 meter, round
is less thn the minimum required. off downward to 10,000 meters; if
For example, a .l/.l index normally a given range is 11,500 meters,
would be unsuitable for neutraliza- round off upward to 12,000 meters).
tion of a target and therefore is not (c) Figures B-II-1-1 and B-II-1-2
listed with those indexes considered show examples of coverage tables
suitable. An index in excess of the for a short-range cannon with a 1-
minimum required is never consid- kiloton yield and a low airburst
ered unsuitable, even though indis- option against protected personnel.
criminate use could lead to a waste of If the target range is 8,000 meters
combat power. Table B-II-1-1 dis- and the radius of target is 600
plays the indexes considered suitable meters, the following extract of the
when using the index method of dam- tables results:
age estimation. 1. If the plan of maneuver requires
prompt casualties, the 3,000-rad
Table B-II-1-1. Index Guidance Criteria or the translational-effect criter-
Commander's Minimum Maximum Resulta ion is used: an index of .5/6 re-
Outdance coverage coverage sults (fig. B-II-1-1).
10 0.1/0.2 0.9/0.9 Neutralization. 2. If delayed casualties are accept-
20 0.2/0.3 0.9/0.9 Neutralization. able, the 650-rad criterion is used;
30 0.3/0.4 0.9/0.9 Destruction.
40 0.4/0.5 0.9/0.9 Destruction. an index of .9/.9 results (fig.
50 0.5/0.6 0.9/0.9 Destruction. B-II-1-2).
60 0.6/0.7 0.9/0.9 Destruction. 3. The estimate of damage, in this
70 0.7/0.8 0.9/0.9 Destruction. case, indicates that there is —
80 0.8/0.9 0.9/0.9 Destruction. (a) Fifty-percent probable mini-
(4) Large index-number variations. A mum coverage and 60-percent
wide difference (more than .4) be- average coverage for prompt
tween the indexes (e.g., .3/.8) results casualties to protected person-
when a large weapon, with its inher- nel; or
ent inaccuracies, is employed against (b) Ninety-percent probable mini-
a target. mum coverage and 90-percent
average coverage for delayed
(5) Determination of coverage index val- casualties to protected person-
ues. To determine the coverage index nel.
for the target being considered, the (d) When it is necessary to interpolate
target analyst selects the appropriate between target radii in the cover-
coverage table. age tables, a straight-line interpo-
(a) A coverage table is provided for lation is used, and rounding off is
each target category, delivery sys- always downward (e.g., .38=.3).
tem, yield, and low airburst and An example problem is given below.
surface burst options. Radius of target
(b) The target analyst enters the ap- Data from table: 800 900 1,000 1,200
propriate coverage table, using the .6/.9 .4/.6 ,3/.4 ,2/.2
appropriate radius of target and the 1. Given: RT = 850 meters.
nearest range. Interpolation be- 2. Find: The coverage index.
tween ranges is not required. If the 3. Solution:
given range is exactly halfway be- (a) The 850-meter RT falls exactly
tween to listed ranges, he enters halfway between two indexes
at the nearest listed range in even- listed in the table; thus, inter-

B-23
FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

polate halfway between the (b) The same solution can be

two indexes, considering the reached using the standard in-
number on each side of the di- terpolation formula, again con-
vider separtely, to obtain sidering the number on each
.S/.75. Round off downward to side of the index divider separ-
the nearest tenth, or .5/.7. ately, as follows:

RT Index
Left Right
1800 r0.6/0.9

100
50
-850

900
0.2 90

0.U/0.6
J 0.3

50 . x 50 _ x
Left: Right :
100 " 0.2 100 ~ 0.3

lOOx = 0.2(50) lOOx = 0.3(50)

x - 0.1 x - 0.15

0.6 - 0.1 = 0.5 0.9 - 0.15 = 0.75

The interpolated index is .5/.75; round off downward to the nearest

tenth, or .5/.7.

(c) Other interpolations, using (f-bar). The probability (P) of damaging a

the same example problem, are point target to some desired level and the
as follows : average coverage (f) of a small area target
RT Interpolated index have the same meaning. For example, assume
920 .38/.S6 = .3/.5 that the average coverage of a small area
1,100 .25/.3 = .2/.3 target is .60 (f—.60) for severe damage. This
is interpreted to mean that, on the average,
B—11-1-3. Average Coverage 60 percent of the target will receive severe
If an attack were directed against a small damage and the remaining 40 percent will be
area target, some fraction of the target would damaged to some degree less than severe. This
be damaged. If this attack could be repeated f factor is similar to the average coverage in
many times, the identical fraction of damage the combined coverage index. However, be-
would not result each time; rather, some dis- cause no assurance (probability) is associated
tribution of values of fractional damage cen- with this average coverage and the radius of
tered around some particular average value damage is so great in relation to the target,
would result. This average fractional damage the analyst considers only the probability of
represents the average coverage of this par- destroying the target.
ticular area. This damage is symbolized by f
B-24
r

10.0
9.0
B.O
7.0

6.0 !: POINT TARGET GRAPH

Ê (Variability =20%)
ITÆ'A
5.0

4.0 m

3.0

2.0 -0.99

RD
cm 0.90

.00
=0.80
0.90
0.80 0.70
0.70
0.60

0.50 0.40
mm1-:
0.40 0.30 ¡''“¡■fiüfiü If
=0.20
0.30

- 0.10
0.20

0.05
I
FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

0.03

5.0

CD90

Figure B-11-3-3. The point target graph.

 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4
E

,rr

1.6
PO NT TARGET
1.5 GRAPH EXTENSION
(Variability °20%)
1.4

1.3

1.2

1.1

1.0

± 0.9
RD

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2
0.5 1 2 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 95 98 99 99.5 99.8 99.9 99.99
Probability (percentage)

Figure B-II—S—i. The point target graph extension.

k.
♦ • •
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

(6) Use other forms of combat power, is also a nuclear radiation hazard to
such as nonnuclear fires or maneuver troops who must occupy or cross these
elements. contaminated areas. The distance to
c. The nuclear weapon employment officer which fallout will extend can be esti-
uses a least separation distance (LSD) to make mated using the procedures outlined
in TM 3-210. The actual location of
preclusion-of-obstacle calculations. Both the
delivery error and the distance to which cer- fallout within the predicted area of
tain weapon effects extend are incorporated hazard must be ascertained by radio-
in the least separation distance. If this least logical monitoring and survey.
separation distance extends from the desired (3) Tree blowdown, Uprooted trees, brok-
ground zero to the point of interest, there is en crowns, and fallen limbs can pre-
better than a 95-percent probability that sent a considerable obstacle to foot
obstacles will not be produced at that point. and wheeled- and tracked-vehicle
movement. However, the distances to
d. A discussion of obstacles to the move- which tree blowdown will occur is
ment of friendly troops is included in (1) predictable, and these distances are
through (5) below. listed in the safety distance tables in-
(1) Neutroris-induced gamma, activity. cluded in FM 101-31-2 and FM 101-
When a nuclear detonation takes 31-3 under the columns for preclu-
place in the proximity of the earth’s sion of obstacles (fig. B-III-3). These
surface, free neutrons from this det- distances are the least separation dis-
onation bombard the elements in the tances required between the desired
soil, making some of them radio- ground zero and the point at which
active. The subsequent decay of tree blowdown is to be precluded. For
these radioactive elements produces the purpose of determining the least
the residual nuclear radiation known separation distance for tree blow-
as neutron-induced gamma activity, down, trees are classified into two
and is a definite hazard to troops oc- groups.
cupying or passing through the area. (a) Deciduous. Deciduous trees lose
The distance to which this obstacle- their leaves at the end of the grow-
producing effect will extend is ex- ing season.
tremely variable and cannot be pre- (b) Coniferous. Coniferous trees are of
dicted to within a reasonable degree the evergreen family.
of accuracy. Therefore, the areas Knowing the type of trees in the area
. within the distances shown in table of interest, the target analyst can
B-III-1 are considered hazard areas enter the appropriate safety distance
and require monitoring for accurate table for the delivery system and
information on radiation intensity yield (at the nearest listed range)
and size of the pattern. and extract the least separation dis-
tance from the proper column for
Table B-III-l. Estimated 2-Rad-Per-Hour Radius of
tree blowdown. Because the least sep-
Induced Contamination
aration distance is not dependent on
Horizontal radius
Yield (meterá) the target category, any of the safety
1 KT 400
distance tables for the delivery sys-
10 KT 700 tem, yield, and height of burst may
100 KT 1,000 be used ((5) below).
1 MT 1,400
(4) Fires. The thermal energy emitted
(2) Fallout. Militarily significant fallout from a nuclear detonation is capable
from surface or near-surface bursts of starting fires at considerable dis-
B-43
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

FREE FLIGHT ROCKET

10.0 KT

PRECLUDE DAMAGE PRECLUDE OBSTACLES

MOD LIGHT LIGHT TREE BLOWDOWN FIRES

DAMAGE DAMAGE A/C
RANGE TO FIXED TO IN DECIDU- CONIFER- DRY GREEN
BRIDGES BUILDINGS FLIGHT OUS OUS FUEL FUEL

15000 1100 4000 6700 1400 1300 3200 2100

16000 1100 4100 6800 1400 1300 3200 2100
:
17000 1100 4200 6900 1400 1300 3200 2100
18000 1100 4200 6900 1400 1400 3200 2200
19.000 1200 4300 7000 1500 1400 3300 2200
20000 1200 4400 7100 1500 1400 3300 2200
21000 1200 4400 7200 1500 1400 3300 2200
22000 1200 4500 7300 1500 1400 3300 2200
23000 1200 4500 7300 1500 1500 3300 2200
24000 1200 4600 7400 1500 1500 3300 2200
25000 1200 4600 7 500 1600 1500 3400 2300

Figure B-III-3. Example of preclusion-of-damage/-obstades portions of the safety

distance table.

tances from the ground zero. These (5) Example of use of the safety distance
distances are predictable for normal table.
atmospheric conditions. However, the (a) Given: Delivery system—free-
distance to which these fires, once flight rocket
started, will extend is dependent on Yield = 10 KT
terrain, type of fuel, wind velocity, Range = 23,400 meters
and other parameters and cannot be HOB—low air
predicted. The least separation dis- Type of trees—coniferous
tances required to preclude ignition Type of fuel—dry.
of fires are listed in the safety dis-
(b) Find: The LSD for tree blowdown
tance tables in FM 101-31-2 and
FM 101-31-3 under the columns for and the LSD for fire.
preclusion of obstacles (fig. B-III-3). (c) Solution:
For the purpose of determining the 1. Step 1. Enter figure B-III-3 with
least separation distances for fires, the range of 23,000 meters. (Re-
fuels are classified into two groups: member that LSD is not depend-
dry and green (see descriptions in ent on target category.) Moving
FM 101-31-2 and FM 101-31-3). to the right, under the column for
Knowing the. type of fuel in the area tree blowdown, coniferous, read
of interest, the target analyst can the LSD as 1,500 meters. This is
enter the safety distance table for the least distance that must sepa-
the appropriate delivery system and rate the DGZ and the area of
yield (at the nearest listed range) interest to preclude tree blow- \\
and extract the least separation dis- down. \
tance from the proper column for 2. Step 2. To find the LSD for fire,
fires. use the same procedure as that in
B—44
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

ANNEX B-V
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

B-V-T. General mined, the nuclear weapon employment officer

follows the procedures outlined in this annex.
a. The information presented in the weapon
selection tables included in FM 101-31-2 and b. A desired height of burst is determined
FM 101-31-3 has been computed using the by the equation HOB=HOB(fs)-\-db.
best available accuracy data. Subsequent test (1) HOB(fs) is the fallout-safe height
firings, changes in firing technique, or experi- of burst and is shown in the effects
ence in the field may indicate that the accuracy tables in FM 101-31-2 and FM 101-
data are not correct. Further research or ex- 31-3.
perience in the field may also indicate that it
would be desirable to change a preset height (2) db is the buffer distance. The size of
of burst (HOB) to maximize weapon effects. the buffer distance is dependent on
the probability required for fallout
b. A change in the height of burst or the preclusion.
height-of-burst probable error (PEh) may
cause significant changes to the probable mini- (3) Table B-I-l in annex B-I shows the
mum radii of damage and to the coverage various probabilities of an event oc-
indexes. curring within various multiples of
probable error (PE). By entering this
c. A change in horizontal delivery errors table with the probability of interest,
may cause a significant change in the circular the buffer distance can be determined
distribution 90 (CD90), the coverage index, as shown below.
and the minimum safe distance.
c. The target analyst generally is concerned
d. Until new information concerning deliv- with using one of the burst options provided
ery accuracy and heights of burst can be dis- in the weapon selection tables.
tributed to the field, the following procedures (1) Low airburst. This height of burst
may be used by nuclear weapon employment generally provides the greatest cov-
officers in target analysis. The procedures may erage of enemy targets and precludes
also be used when, for some special reason, a fallout.
height of burst other than that shown in the
weapon selection tables is required. (a) This height of burst is computed
by adding 3.5 PEh to the fallout-
safe height of burst. This provides
B-V—2. Height of Burst a very high assurance (99 percent)
a. The preset heights of of no significant
burst for some fallout. (HOB(99)
radar-fuzed weapons can be changed by ord- —HOB(fs) +3.5 PEh.)
nance personnel in the field. Nuclear weapon (b) Because of the good “across-the-
employment officers and delivery units will be board” effects obtained at HOB=
notified of any new height of burst and height- 53(W)^ meters (where W is the
of-burst probable error. The heights of burst weapon yield in kilotons), this
for timer-fuzed weapons can be varied by the height of bürst is used as the lower
nuclear weapon employment officer through limit of the low airburst option.
actions at the delivery unit to vary the damage This height of burst is shown as
to a particular target element; a new timer HOBopt at the bottom of the effects
height of burst is computed using the proce- tables.
dure outlined in b and c below. When these (c) The higher of the two heights of
new required heights of burst have been deter- burst determined in (a) and (b)

B-55
FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

above, is used as the desired height of damage, and the risk of fallout in-
of burst. creases rapidly with a decrease in the
(2) High airburst. This height of burst height of burst. Under current doc-
may be used in special cases for trine, when a weapon is employed at
maximum coverage for damage to a height of burst that provides less
“soft” ground targets such as exposed than a 99-percent probability of no
personnel, most buildings (particu- significant fallout, a fallout prediction
larly frame) and forests. This height must be made.
of burst is computed using the equa-
tions below. The higher of the two &-V-3. Damage Estimation for
HOBs is used. Nonstandard Conditions
HOB = 120 (WO'A + 3.5 PEh a. General.
HOB = 105 (W)'A meters
(1) With the exception of special cases,
(where W equal the weapon yield in data to determine the amount of cov-
kilotons) erage/damage to a specified target ele-
(3) Impact bur&t. This height-of-burst ment are located in the coverage
option is used to cause cratering and tables in FM 101-31-2 and FM 101-
fallout. Obviously, the height of burst 31-3. The information in the cover-
is 0. Changes in the height-of-burst age tables has been computed using
probable error will not influence the the best available data ; however,
height of burst or the radius of cases will arise when these data can-
damage. not be used for one or more the
reasons listed in (a) through (c)
d. If heights of burst other than those below.
shown in c above, are desired, they may be (a) The target elements are not equata-
computed as indicated below. ble to one of the four major target
(1) Figure B-I-3 in annex B-I indicates categories.
that 48 percent of the rounds fired (b) The height of burst is changed to
will burst within 3 PEh below the improve or to preclude a specific
desired height of burst. Fifty percent weapon effect.
will detonate above the desired height (c) The delivery errors used in the
of burst. Therefore, if a buffer dis- ‘computation of the coverage tables
tance of 3 PEh is added to the are found to be in error.
fallout-safe height of burst, there will (2) To assist the nuclear weapon employ-
be a 98-percent (50 percent-)-48 per- ment officer in computing coverage/
cent) probability of no significant damage due to these nonstandard con-
fallout. (HOB(9S)=HOB(fs)+S ditions, the procedures in b through
PEh.) g below, may be used.
(2) A similar calculation using probabil- b. Radius of Damage.
ity data shows that by adding only
1.9 PEh to the fallout-safe height of (1) Determine the height of burst (para
burst, there will be a 90-percent prob- B-V-2) and enter the appropriate
ability of no significant fallout. column for the target element of in-
(HOB (90) =HOB (fs) -j-1.9 PEh.) terest in the effects tables. Vertical
dispersion may cause the burst to oc-
(3) Lowering the height of burst below cur at some height other than that
that required for a 90-percent prob- desired; it is necessary to consider
ability of no significant fallout does the effect of this dispersion.
not appreciably increase the radius (2) Probability distribution indicates
B-56
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

damage calculations of target elements listed determine the LSD the DGZ must be
in the effects tables but not listed in the safety in relation to the bridge.
distance tables, use the following procedure: (a.) Step 1. Enter the proper coverage
(1) Determine the desired height of table with the range of 18,000 me-
burst. ters. Moving to the right, under the
columns for HOB and PEh, extract
(2) Determine the trial heights of burst. an HOB99 of 379 meters, a PEh
(Trial .ffOB = desired HOB±2.5 of 90 meters, CD90 of 463 meters
PEh.) and CEP of 254 meters.
(3) Enter the proper effects table at the (b) Step 2. Determine trial HOB.
trial heights of burst. Search for the {HOB 379+2.5x90 (PEh).)
largest radius of damage occurring at Thus, the trial HOB are 154 and
or between the trial heights of burst. 604 meters.
(c) Step 3. Enter the effects table at
(4) Determine the probable maximum the nearest listed HOB (165 m. and
radius of damage for the target ele- 605 m.) associated with the trial
ment of interest. (The probable maxi- HOB (154 m. and 604 m.) ; and, in
mum radius of damage is the largest the column for severe damage to
radius of damage listed at or between fixed bridges, extract the largest
the two trial heights of burst.) RD (490 meters) occurring at or
(5) Using the numerical method of dam- between the trial HOB. The prob-
age estimation (tab B-II-3 to annex able maximum RD (490 meters) is
B-II), compute the least separation the largest RD at or between the
distance the desired ground zero must two trial HOB.
be from the target element for a 90- (d) Step 4. Using the numercial method
percent assurance of not causing the of damage estimation, compute the
type of specified damage to the target LSD that the DGZ can be in relation
element. to the bridge. Using the ratio
RD
b. An example is shown below. enter the point target
(1) Given: Delivery system—free-flight graph. Move horizontally to the 10-
rocket percent probability scale and read
Yield = 10 KT d
Range = 18,000 meters the vertical = 1-6. Multiply
HOB—low air
Target category—prompt casualties to the ratio value by the CD90 to
protected personnel obtain the LSD (740 meters)
Limiting requirements—preclude fall- that the DGZ must be separated
out and severe damage to the fixed from the bridge for a 90-percent
bridge located 750 meters east of the assurance of causing no more than
target center. severe damage to the bridge. (In
this example, a 10-percent probabili-
(2) Find: The distance the DGZ must be ty of causing severe damage is the
separated from the bridge. same as stating that there is a 90-
(3) Solution: Entering the safety dis- percent assurance of the bridge not
tance table, the analyst finds no data receiving this amount of damage.
for preclusion of severe damage to a
fixed bridge. Because he is unable to B-V-5. Computation of Minimum Safe
use the safety distance table, the Distance (MSD)
analyst reverts to the effects tables to a. Annex B-III discusses in detail the meth-

B-59
FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

ods and techniques used to prevent casualties (3) Compute the corrected MSD.
to friendly troops. FM 101-31-2 and FM 101- (4) Solution: In view of the recorded
31-3 have listed in the safety distance tables, changes in the free-flight rockets
associated with each major target category, horizontal and vertical dispersion
precomputed MSD based on standard condi- pattern, the analyst is unable to use
tions. In the event the horizontal or vertical the precomputed MSD in the Safety
errors (PEh, PER, PEd, or CEP) associated Distance Tables and is required to use
with the weapon system are found to be in data in the Effects Tables to compute
error, the following procedure will be used to a corrected MSD.
corhpute the new MSD. (a) Step 1. Determine the desired
'XD Determine the desired height of burst. HOB. Compare HOB^ to HOB opti-
mum and select that with the large
(2) Determine the trial heights of burst. HOB. Enter the Effects Table for
(Trial /fOß=desired HOB±2.5
PEh.) If a corrected PEh has been the free-flight rocket, 50 KT, and
extract the required information
received, this PEh will be used to from the bottom of the page.
compute trial HOB. HOB«, = HOB,. + 3.5 (PEh)
(3) Enter the proper effects table at the HOBm = 121 + 3.5(50)
trial heights of ^ burst. In the appro- HOBm = 296 meters
priate Radius of Safety (RS) column In that HOBn (296 meters) is
extract the largest RS occuring at or greater than HOBopt (195 me-
between the trial height of burst. ters), the desired HOB=296 me-
ters.
(4) To insure a 99-percent assurance (b) Step 2. Determine the trial HOB.
that friendly troops will not be sub-
jected to greater than the authorized (Trial HOB = desired HOB + 2.5 PEh.)
effects, a buffer distance computed by
multiplying the corrected PER or Trial HOB = 296 + 2.5(50) =
PEd (whichever is the greater) by
3.5, or the corrected CEP by 2 is add- 421
ed to the Radius of Safety. The MSD +
equals the Radius of Safety plus the
buffer distance. Desired HOB 296
b. An example is shown below.
(1) Given: Delivery system—free-flight 171
rocket.
Yield = 50 KT (c) Step 3. Enter the Effects Table for
Range = 20,000 meters the free-flight rocket, 50 KT, at the
HOB = low air trial HOB (or nearest listed). In
Target Category—prompt casualties the radius of safety column for
to protected personnel negligible risk to warned protected
Troop Safety—Negligible risk to personnel, search for, and extract
warned protected personnel the largest radius of safety (3090
(2) As a result of modifications perform- meters) occurring at or between
ed on the free-flight rocket, the fol- the trial HOB.
lowing corrected probable errors have (d) Step U. To insure a 99-percent as-
been received. surance that friendly troops will
Range 20,000 meters PEH = 50 not be subjected to greater than the
PER = 100 authorized effect level, a buffer dis-
PEd = 140 tance is computed multiplying the
B-60
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

ANNEX B-VII
FRIENDLY VULNERABILITY
(This annex is based on SOLOG No. 89.)

B-VII-1. General friendly dispositions is a continuing process.

The commandèr must be kept informed of vul-
a. Target analysis procedures are used to nerability conditions so that he can; make de-
estimate the possible results of an enemy nu- cisions concerning changes in existing or plan-
clear attack on friendly dispositions or installa- ned dispositions. While dispersion decreases
tions. Based on current intelligence, or the the risk of destruction from nuclear attack, it
enemy’s past use of nuclear weapons, the weap- greatly increases thq possibility of defeat in
on yield most likely to be employed against
detail and complicates the problem of control.
friendly elements is estimated. The degree to which units can be dispersed in
b. The radius of vulnerability (Rv) is the any situation will depend on the mission of
radius of a circle within which friendly troops the command and on the risk the commander
will be exposed to equal to or greater than is willing to accept. Accomplishment of the
emergency risk criteria and may become cas- mission and avoidance of formations that pre-
ualties. A vulnerability radii (Rv) table is in- sent profitable targets to the enemy are fre-
cluded in FM 101-31-2 and FM 101-31-3 that quently conflicting requirements. The com-
gives the radii to be used in analyzing the mander should take full advantage of all char-
vulnerability of friendly dispositions. (This acteristics of the battle area that contribute
table is reproduced in figure B-VII-1.) For to the fulfillment of both requirements.
friendly target analysis, an assumption is made d. Vulnerability may be reduced through one
that the enemy can deliver a weapon at the or more of the following means:
point where it will do the greatest damage to
a friendly installation, disregarding the effect (1) Dispersion.
of delivery errors. Then, the analyst estimates (2) Depopulated-center disposition.
what fraction of friendly dispositions would (3) Linear configuration.
be destroyed by such an attack.
(4) Increased protection.
c. The analysis of present and planned
B-VII-2. Analysis of Friendly Disposition
RADIUS OF VULNERABILITY (meters) and Installation Vulnerability
Exposed Protected Tanks, Wheeled Supply The analysis of the vulnerability of friendly
Yield depots
personnel personnel ARC vehicles
dispositions and installations to attack by an
1 KT 1,460 1,220 240 420 190.
enemy-delivered nuclear weapon is performed
10 KT 3,480 1,650 600 1,060 480. in the following four steps:
50 KT 7,110 2,410 1,150 2,010 910.
100 KT 9,650 3,220 1,510 2,650 1,200. a. Step 1. Determine the appropriate yield.
500 KT 19,220 6,360 2,880 5,040 2,280.
Based on current intelligence, or the enemy’s
1 MT 25,920 8,590 3,800 6,660 3,010.
past use of nuclear weapons, the intelligence
officer assumes a weapon yield that the enemy
5 MT 50,200 16,700 7,200 12,600 5,700
is likely to use against friendly dispositions
or installations.
NOTE: To obtain a radius of vulnerability, enter the
yield column at the appropriate yield if shown, b. Step 2. Determine the degree of exposure
otherwise use linear interpolation. of friendly units. The assumed conditions of
exposure of friendly troops are provided by the
Figure B-VII—1. Vulnerability radii table. G3 (G4 for logistical installations).
B—65
FM 101—31—1/FMFM 11-4

Rv

RD

'Almost j
^complete'
casualties
Casualties decrease
with distance
from GZ

RD Rv

100%

sFoTT?
Distance from GZ Distance from GZ

NOTE 1. Not to scale.

2. Vertical axis represents probability of individual becoming a casualty.

Figure B-VII-2. Relationship of percentage of casualties to the distance from the

ground zero.

c. Step 3. Determine the vulnerability radii. center of the greatest concentration. With the
Appropriate radii from the vulnerability radii aid of the labeled circles, the area is estimated
table are obtained and are marked on the ap- within which casualties-may occur, or within
propriate circular map scale. which materiel damage will probably occur, if
d. Step U. Estimate the results of the enemy the ground zero were at this location. The
nuclear attack. The circular map scale is super- ground zero for this type of analysis is selected,
imposed on a map representation of the dis- on a worst-case basis, as the point that would
position or installation to be analyzed. The1 cen- result in the greatest loss to friendly forces.
ter of the circular map scale is placed over the This is the same procedure that is used in the
B—66
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4

GLOSSARY

This glossary is provided to enable the user physical characteristics that would normally
to have readily available terms peculiar to nu- accompany such a dose.
clear weapon employment, as used in this man- Readiness status—Indicate the degree of prep-
ual. Terms that appear in JCS Pub 1 and AR aration of both the weapon and the delivery
320-5 are not reproduced herein. unit for delivery of nuclear fires (to include
Across the board—Used in connection with airdelivered weapons).
weapon effects curves. It indicates that con- Soft targets—Those targets that are easily
sideration is given to all the effects curves damaged by low-magnitude nuclear weapon
that describe radiation doses, blast effects effects (e.g., exposed personnel, most build-
on various drag-type targets, thermal ef- ings (particularly frame), forest, and crops).
fects, and overpressures. Tactically significant weapon effects—Those
Atmospheres—A measure of normal atmos- effects that will have a definite influence on
pheric pressure (e.g., 2 atmospheres indicate the military action currently underway.
two times the normal atmospheric pressure). See also Militarily significant weapon ef-
Graphical portrayal—A two-dimensional rep- fects.
resentation (generally to scale) of the dis- Weapon—An assembled and ready-for-delivery
tance that the specified effects extend. It is nuclear device in the military configuration.
also a visual representation of the results of For artillery, a weapon is a complete round ;
an analysis. for a rocket, the motor plus the warhead;
Militarily significant weapon effects—Those for a missile, the complete missile, to include
effects that will have a definite influence on the warhead; for an air-delivered weapon,
the military capabilities or the degree of the warhead in the bomb ; and for an atomic
risk. demolition munition, the complete munition.
See also Tactically significant weapon ef- See also Weapon system.
fects. Weapon system—The complete weapon plus
Minimum-dose exit route—The route of egress the associated delivery means.
See also Weapon.
from a radioactive-contaminated area that
Worst-case burst—In analyzing targets, it in-
presents the smallest amount of radiation to dicates the location of the burst that occurs
the exiting party or parties. at the outer limits of the acceptable disper-
Nonsymptomatic dose—A dose of radiation sion in both range and elevation. In consider-
that may not be detected because the re- ing the vulnerability of friendly forces, it in-
cipient does not display the behavior or dicates the point of maximum damage.

GLOSSARY-1
3000031529
 r -¡y

• t
i
ii

i
 ■m
Os
O *o

■ tu
Oll
ro-
to :•<

fl