ethics made

easy
Mel Thompson
Hodder Education
338 Euston Road, London NW1 3BH.
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Contents
1 Introduction 2
2 What do we mean? 14
3 Is it natural? 24
4 Looking for results 34
5 The experience of moral choice 46
6 Personal development and virtue 54
7 Scepticism and relativism 64
8 Applied ethics 74
Some conclusions 92
introduction
1

2 ethics made easy

Ethics, or ‘moral philosophy’, is about thinking
through issues of right or wrong. It examines
the moral choices that people make, what they
are based on and how they may be justified.
Unlike ‘descriptive ethics’, which simply looks
at how people actually behave, ‘normative
ethics’ (with which this book is concerned)
considers the norms and principles that
guide – or should guide – action.

When applied to society as a whole, ethics

moves into the sphere of political philosophy
and law, but this book concentrates on moral
arguments that apply to the actions of
individuals and the choices they make.

We start by recognizing that facts alone

are not enough to distinguish right from
wrong – just because everybody does
something, that doesn’t make it right – and
that, in order to be morally responsible for
our actions, we have to have a measure of
freedom, for it makes no sense to be blamed
for something about which we have no choice.

1 introduction 3
 ‘What should I do?’
‘How do I know what is right?’

These basic questions are the starting point for ethical debate,
for ethics is about moral choices. It is about the values that lie
behind them, the reasons people give for them and the language
they use to describe them. It is about innocence and guilt, right and
wrong, and what it means to live a good or bad life. It is about the
dilemmas of life, death, sex, violence and money. It explores human
virtues and vices, rights and duties.
Babies are lucky. They feel hungry, or dirty, or wet, and just
scream until someone figures out what is wrong and gives them
what they need. They do not have the intellectual ability to
question how they got into their particular mess, or the steps they
need to take to get out of it. They are not morally responsible.
One essential difference between a baby and a mature adult is
that the adult recognizes when there is a problem to be overcome,
or a difficult choice to be made, takes action and then accepts
responsibility. Ethics is the rational discussion of that process.

What makes something moral?

Many choices are a straightforward matter of personal
preference, and the actions that spring from them are neither moral
nor immoral. They only become the subject of moral debate because
of the intentions behind them, their results, and the values – of
society or of the individual – that they reflect.
Actions can be divided into three categories:
* moral – if they reflect a person’s values and those of society
* immoral – if they go against a person’s (or society’s) values
* amoral – if they do not reflect choices based on values or
social norms.
Of course, an individual may think that something is moral
even if the rest of society thinks it immoral. Doing something
immoral is not the same thing as breaking the law. Actions can be
moral but illegal, or immoral but legal.

4 ethics made easy

 Whether you think an action is moral or immoral will depend
on your values and the ethical arguments you use to decide what
is right. How many actions or choices are moral and how many
relegated to the general ‘amoral’ category, will depend on your
moral sensitivity, the range of values to which you consciously
subscribe, and whether you belong to a society which operates by
definite rules and values.
Issues that are morally significant usually have to do with
relationships, agreements between parties, intentions and possible
outcomes. The moral status of an action may therefore depend less
on what actually happens than on the intention of the person who
performs it and the appropriateness of what is done.

Example
A masked stranger makes you lie on a table, drugs you into
unconsciousness, takes out a sharp knife and slices into your naked
body. Is the action moral, immoral or amoral?

At this point you might well want to know if the person with
the knife is a competent surgeon or a student of the Marquis
de Sade!

A description of the action itself is not necessarily the best guide

to its moral consequences. You might therefore ask:
* Is this a qualified surgeon?
* Have I consented to this operation?
* Is it likely to benefit me?
* Have the implications of it been explained to me?
* If the person is not a surgeon, do I want him or her to
continue? (It might, after all, be an emergency, and an
unqualified surgeon might be better than none.)
* What are his or her motives for doing this operation?
(Money? Genuine altruism?)
* If for motives other than these (e.g. sexual gratification),
would I still want him or her to continue, if I believed that
it would benefit me?

1 introduction 5
 Facts alone do not decide whether something is right or wrong:
‘People are dying of starvation’ is not a moral statement. But if you add
‘… and you are doing nothing to help’, then it becomes a moral issue if
the person addressed is in a position to help, but does not do so.
In other words, for an issue or an action to be described as moral, it
needs to take into consideration human choices and intentions and the
values that lie behind them. Simply presenting facts, however important
they may be, is not the same thing as framing an ethical argument.
In practical terms, the study of ethics can offer two things.
First of all, it helps one to appreciate the moral choices that people
make, and to evaluate the justification they give for those choices.
But secondly, it involves a reflective sharpening of one’s own moral
awareness – a conscious examination of values and principles, of
how these have influenced one’s life, and (more importantly) of
how they can be used to shape the future.

Free to choose?
Nobody is completely free to do anything that he or she may
wish. Freedom is limited in different ways:
* I may decide that I would like to launch myself into the air,
spread my arms and fly. I may have dreamed of doing so.
I may have a passion for Superman films, and feel certain
that in some way it should be possible. But my physical
body is, and will always be, incapable of unaided flight.
To overcome that limitation, I must resort to technology.
* I may wish to be a famous and highly talented artist,
musician or gymnast, but my freedom is again limited.
It may not be physically impossible for me to achieve these
things, but it requires such a level of experience, training
and natural ability, that my chances of achieving what
I want are severely restricted.
* I may wish to go to London and parade myself naked
before Buckingham Palace. There is no physical limitation
to inhibit me and no great skill required, but I am likely
to be arrested if I do so.

6 ethics made easy

 These are examples of limitation to actual freedom. Whether
by physical laws, natural abilities, or legal or social restraints, we are
all limited in what we can do.
If I am to make a moral choice, I must be free to do, or not
to do, the thing in question. It cannot be morally wrong not to fly,
because I am unable to do so. On the other hand, walking about
naked in public could become a moral issue – if it were argued that
I would give offence by doing so – because it would be something
that I had chosen to do and could have refused to do had I
considered it wrong.

Determinism
Science is based on the observation of natural events and
their causes, and from the resulting information is able to develop
theories by which events may be predicted.
You look up and say ‘I think it is going to rain.’ You do not
thereby imply that the weather has a personality, and that you
guess that it has decided to enjoy a little precipitation. Rather,
you make a comment based on the clouds, wind, dampness in the
air, and on your observation of similar things leading to rain on
previous occasions.
* The falling of rain is determined absolutely by certain
atmospheric conditions.
* The fact that you may be inaccurate in predicting those
conditions, and therefore the coming of rain, does not
detract from the fundamentally determined nature of
that event.
* Given certain conditions, it will rain; without them, it will
not: the weather is determined. Its absolute prediction is
theoretically possible, even if practically difficult.
The prediction of rain is possible because it is recognized
that all physical phenomena are causally connected. Everything
from the weather to the electrical impulses within human
brains can be explained in terms of physical laws. This is
determinism.

1 introduction 7
 There is a general acceptance that all events (including human
action) may be explained in terms of prior events, which are
considered to have caused them. And in the case of human action,
this may be explained (at least to some extent) in terms of the
effect of environment or upbringing on the individual, along with all
the other physical constraints that limit our action.

Example
A car swerves across the road and collides with a tree, killing the
driver.

Why did the car swerve? Did a tyre burst? If so, how worn was it?
Was there a fault in its manufacture? Was there a steering fault
in the car? If so, was there a design fault? (Accidents in which the
harm done is made worse through a design fault can lead to the
manufacturer being prosecuted, as having contributed to that
overall harm.)

What if you trace everything back, from the skill of the driver, to
the food that he or she has been eating (was the driver faint? sick?
drunk?), to whether the tree should have been planted so close
to the road? The driver may have had control over some of these
things, but not over others. Yet everything that has ever happened
contributes in some way to each event. Is anyone to blame? What
if the road had not been built? What if cars had not been invented?

If we had total knowledge, everything would be seen to fit a

seamless pattern of cause and effect. But those experiencing that
event (the driver before dying; those who knew him, or witnessed
the crash) will see it differently. They may wish that other decisions
had been made. They may feel guilty, saying ‘if only …’. There is
an inescapable sense that events are influenced by human choice.
Without that sense, the issue of moral responsibility would not arise.

We may be socially or psychologically predisposed to act

in a certain way, as a result of upbringing or environment. Our
genetic make-up may give a predisposition to violence, depression,

8 ethics made easy

schizophrenia or our particular sexual orientation. Does that imply
that we should take no responsibility for these things?
If a direct causal link could be shown, then the case for
determinism in these areas of life would be strengthened.
On the other hand, whereas physical traits (e.g. the colour of
one’s eyes) are 100 per cent due to heredity, studies of twins have
suggested that behavioural factors, such as homosexuality, can
have a heredity factor as low as 31 per cent. This illustrates what
common sense would suggest, that there are other factors as well
as our genes that influence our behaviour. This does not, however,
disprove a claim that everything is determined. It merely shows
that no one factor alone can be shown to determine the final result,
but taken together they do so, each contributing something to the
determinist equation.
These things may influence our freedom, but not necessarily
the freedom of our will. We may believe we are free to choose, even
if the psychologist, sociologist or behavioural geneticist claims to
know better.

Freedom and the State

In the discussion so far, we have been looking in a rather
abstract way at whether or not a person is free to decide how to
act. But in practical terms, even if we feel that we are free, we are
actually constrained by the legal and social rules of the society
within which we live.
If we are caught breaking a law, we are punished. If we are not
caught, we may still feel guilty. Freedom is not simply a matter
of biology, but of social and political life. If a person joins in a
demonstration in favour of greater freedom, he or she is unlikely to
be concerned about whether there can be a scientific explanation
for each muscular action as he or she walks forward; but more likely
to be campaigning for social or political freedom and restoration to
the individual of choices presently prohibited by some authority.
But should every individual be free to choose exactly how
he or she should live? In any particular country, people need to

1 introduction 9
decide whether they will all drive on the right or the left, otherwise
there will be chaos on the roads. Common sense dictates that an
individual should not have the freedom to drive on the other side.
But should everyone automatically have a right to take part in the
democratic process to select a government? The answer to this is
not so clear, because the results are less obvious.
Plato, for example, (in The Republic book IX) argued that
most ordinary people did not have a strongly rational nature, and
therefore needed to be constrained in what they did by being ruled
by those who were naturally more rational. Philosophers alone,
he thought, would have sufficient detachment to be able to
legislate for the good of society as a whole. In that book, Plato
presents the different arguments in the form of a debate between
individuals. One of these, Thrasymachus, argues that laws are
always made in the interests of the ruling class, and Glaucon
comments that basically everyone would like to act from purely
selfish motives, although all would suffer as a result of the ensuing
chaos. Both of these views of human and social motives find echoes
throughout the history of ethics.

How much freedom does morality

need?
* It does not need us to be absolutely free.
* It does not even need us to be free of things that influence
our moral choice (indeed, the more sensitive a person is,
the more he or she is aware of such influences).
However, morality requires that:
* Whatever may happen in terms of the mechanical side of
life, we experience ourselves as free agents who can make
genuine choices.
* Even if I admit the existence of external moral pressure to
conform to some rule, I am acting morally only if I am in a
position to think about and either conform to or reject the
pressures on me.

10 ethics made easy

 * Other people, observing my behaviour, may come to
conclusions about my personality and general attitude
towards life. Having done so, they may predict accurately
what I will do in any given circumstance. That element
of prediction, however accurate, does not in itself
prevent me from experiencing myself as making a
free choice.

Free will
It is important to make the distinction between freedom in
general and freedom of the will. I may look at various options,
and think that I am free to choose between them. Someone who
knows me well may, on hearing my decision, say ‘I just knew you
would choose to do that!’ Is it possible for my will to be free, for
it to be possible for me to weigh up all the factors involved and
come to a genuinely free choice, and yet for someone else to be
able to predict accurately what I will do? (And it will not be any use
changing my mind at the last minute, or acting out of character,
because those things too could be predicted.)
There is something intensely irritating about people saying
that they know exactly what you will freely choose to do. This is
because, in the moment of choice, we experience freedom. Robots
and computers may be totally predictable, but most humans are
convinced that they themselves are not.
Consider the following cases of murder:
1 A thief shoots and kills a bank clerk in the course of a raid.
2 A husband or wife kills his or her partner after years of
provocation and unhappiness.
3 A young man rapes and kills a girl whom he has not met
before, on account of his particularly violent sexual urges.
4 A psychopath, unwisely released from a secure hospital to
live in the community, kills someone for no apparent reason,
does not attempt to conceal the crime, and shows no remorse
when apprehended and charged with murder.
All four have killed another human being. But are they all
equally guilty in a moral sense? Do any of them have genuine

1 introduction 11
grounds for having the charge of murder reduced to that of
manslaughter, for example?
1 It is assumed that the bank robber freely chooses to carry
a weapon. Even if the actual shot were the result of being
startled by a sudden movement, for example, that does not
detract significantly from the general view that his act was
murder, because he exercised freedom of the will in deciding
to carry a loaded weapon.
2 With domestic murder, there may be a significant element of
provocation. In that case, especially if the murder takes place
in the course of a heated argument, it might be argued that
the victim contributed to the situation that brought about
the crime, or that (if sufficiently provoked) the murder took
place while the person concerned was temporarily deranged.
He or she might be charged with manslaughter on the
grounds of diminished responsibility.
3 The issue in the case of the sexual murder is one of the
freedom of the murderer to decide whether or not to act on
his sexual impulses. If it can be shown that the condition is
such that the person is not in control of himself or herself in
certain situations, then psychiatric reports would be relevant
evidence to bring before the court.
4 The psychopath is not in control of his or her actions, and
does not respond to the normal inhibitions and rational
constraints that apply to those who are sane.
The psychopath is certainly not free to choose how to act.
But what of the person with an uncontrollable sexual urge?
Or the provoked wife? In each case we have to examine personal,
psychological and social factors.
Suppose it is shown that there is more vandalism in areas
of high unemployment. Does that imply that those who are
unemployed are less able to choose freely what they do? Are social
pressures enough to justify actions that can be regarded by other
people as morally wrong?
In extreme situations, the pressure on a person is so great,
that he or she feels that all freedom to choose what to do has been

12 ethics made easy

taken away. Unlike the psychopath, he or she is fully aware of the
implications of what is done, but the need to act in that particular
way is overwhelming. This is loss of freedom, but not freedom of
the will. An extreme example of this is where death is the only
alternative to a particular course of action.
Overall, we need to be aware that nobody is completely free,
for we all act within physical, emotional, social, legal or political
constraints. On the other hand, such constraints still leave scope
for freedom of the will; if we make choices, if we decide whether
or not to obey a rule, we are exercising what feels like personal
freedom. The key question is whether that experience of freedom
is real or illusory. And if it is illusory – if it can be shown that
everything is determined and explicable – does that take away all
personal responsibility?

1 introduction 13
 2
what do
we mean?

14 ethics made easy

To make moral statements, or engage in
ethical debate, we need to use language.
This chapter therefore explores the different
forms of ethical language, in order to clarify
what part each has to play.

We shall look at descriptive, normative and

meta-ethics, noting what they do and their
limitations, before moving on to examine two
ethical theories that attempted to respond
to the challenge of those who claimed that
moral language was meaningless because it
was not based on evidence – emotivism and
prescriptivism.

Yet philosophers from Plato and Aristotle

onwards have sought to find an objective
and universal basis for moral claims, based
on features of social or natural life. So we are
still left with the question of how to relate
such facts of life (the ‘is’) with our sense of
morality (the ‘ought’). We therefore take a
look at David Hume’s warning about moving
from the one to the other.

2 what do we mean? 15
 In ethics, three different kinds of language are used. We need
to distinguish them carefully, and know which we are using at any
one time, if we are not to become confused.

Descriptive ethics
This is the most straightforward form of ethics. It consists
of descriptions of the way in which people live, and the moral
choices they make. It simply presents facts. Two simple examples
of descriptive ethics follow.

Most car crime is carried out by young men in areas of high

unemployment.

The actual information may be correct or incorrect. It can be

checked by referring to police records and employment statistics.
But notice that the statement does not make any moral claim
about youth and crime, nor does it say whether unemployment
is a good or bad thing. It does not even make (although it may be
taken to imply) a connection between crime and unemployment.
Muslim men may marry up to four wives, provided that
they are able to provide for them and treat them
equally.

Again, this makes no moral judgement, nor does it enquire

whether it is possible to treat wives equally. It simply states the
fact about what is permitted within a certain religious and cultural
setting.

Normative ethics
Ethics is concerned with ideas about what is right, about
justice, about how people should live. It examines the choices
people make, and the values and reasoning that lie behind them.
This is sometimes called ‘substantive’ or ‘normative’ ethics. Almost
all moral argument, when it is concerned with the rights or wrongs
of particular issues, is of this kind.

It is always wrong to steal.

16 ethics made easy

 This is a normative statement. It can be challenged by using
another normative statement, for example, ‘No, I think it is right
to steal on some occasions.’ What you cannot do is challenge a
normative statement by using a descriptive one. So a person who
responds by saying ‘but everyone around here steals if they get a
chance’ is not actually countering the claim that it is wrong to steal.
Everyone may do something, but that does not make it right.
Descriptive ethics is about facts, normative ethics is about
values. Both are needed, but it is essential to realize that you
cannot argue directly from the one to the other: you cannot get an
‘ought’ from an ‘is’.

Meta-ethics
It is also possible to stand back from moral statements and ask:
* What does it mean to say that something is right or
wrong?
* Are there any objective criteria by which I can assess moral
statements?
* What is moral language? Is it a statement about facts of
any kind?
* Does a moral statement simply express a person’s wishes
or hopes about what should happen?
* In what sense can a moral statement be said to be either
true or false?
Questions like these are not concerned with the content of
moral discourse, but with its meaning. This fits in very closely with
much twentieth-century philosophy, which explored the nature of
language and the way in which statements can be shown to be true or
false. Looking at moral statements in this way is called meta-ethics.
Notice that each kind of ethical language has its dangers:
* The danger of descriptive ethics is that facts will be
mistaken for values.
* The danger of normative ethics is that, in arguing that
something is right or wrong, one may end up preaching
rather than informing, recommending one particular
course of action rather than setting out all the possibilities,

2 what do we mean? 17
 consequences and values, and then allowing a person to
make an informed and thoughtful choice.
* The danger of meta-ethics is that one may become so
obsessed with the issue of meaning that it becomes
impossible to offer any practical guidance for the difficult
choices that people have to make.

Defining key terms

Moral language uses certain words, without which normative
ethics would not make sense. One of these is the word ought –
expressing a sense of moral obligation. Another is justice – examining
the rights of individuals in society and the way in which they ‘ought’
to treat one another. The most basic word, however, is good. An
action is judged ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ depending on whether or not it is a
‘good’ or ‘bad’ thing to do. Before we can talk about moral values we
need to know what we mean by this term. Actions cannot be right
or wrong unless we know what we mean by goodness. But can it be
defined?
You could try to define ‘good’ in absolute terms (that something
is good in itself) or in relative terms (that it is good in its particular
context). You can also define it in terms of what it can achieve – so an
action is ‘good’ (and right) if the results of that action are ‘good’. This
would be a utilitarian assessment, as we shall see later. But we are
still using the word ‘good’ and are therefore no nearer a definition.
Aristotle argued that something was ‘good’ if it fulfilled its
purpose. On this theory, a good knife is one that cuts well; a good
plant is one that grows strong and healthy. This formed the basis
of what is called the natural law approach to ethics. According to
this, everything has a natural purpose in life, and actions are right or
wrong depending on whether or not they contribute to the fulfilling
of that purpose.
A religious believer may say that ‘good’ is what God approves,
and take a particular revelation (e.g. the Bible) as the norm for
understanding goodness. Another may take a particular experience,
or the life of a religious leader, as the starting point for understanding

18 ethics made easy

the ‘good’ life. The meaning of the word good will therefore depend,
in part, on the source of the values that are called ‘good’, and that is
not something on which everyone will automatically agree.

Some theories
Ethics is concerned with what moral language means, what it
does, and how it may be verified. We shall therefore look briefly at
some theories about moral language.

Emotivism
In the early part of the twentieth century there developed an
approach to language that is generally known as logical positivism.
It was an attempt to break down language into its simplest
components and examine their meaning. This movement, inspired
by the early work of Wittgenstein (as seen in his Tractatus Logico
Philosophicus), is represented by the Vienna Circle of philosophers
(including, for example, Carnap and Schlick) and became widely
known through the publication in 1936 of A. J. Ayer’s controversial
book Language Truth and Logic.
The details of this approach need not detain us, except to
say that it held that all meaningful propositions could be divided
into two categories – tautologies (statements that are true
by definition, e.g. all bachelors are unmarried) and empirical
statements of fact, verified by observation. If a statement was not
a tautology, and could not be shown to relate to externally perceived
facts, then it was said to be meaningless. Now, on that basis, moral
statements are meaningless, as they are neither statements of
fact nor definitions. If my saying that you ‘should’ do something is
neither a statement of fact nor a tautology, what is it? One answer
to this is termed emotivism.
Ayer suggested that a moral statement is a kind of command:
The exhortations to moral virtue are not propositions at all,
but ejaculations or commands which are designed to provoke
the reader to action of a certain sort. Accordingly, they do not
belong to any branch of philosophy or science.

2 what do we mean? 19
 For Ayer, moral judgements expressed the feelings of the
speaker. Carnap (a member of the Vienna Circle) also thought that
moral statements were commands (if I say ‘This is the right thing
to do, I really mean ‘do this!’) while Schlick thought that they
were rules. Bertrand Russell argued that differences in values
(and therefore differences in the moral statements that are based
on them) are not a matter of facts, but of taste.
C. L. Stevenson, in Ethics and Language, 1947, claimed that,
once you strip the supposed facts away from moral statements,
they are revealed for what they really are: expressions of a person’s
own preferences and emotions. To say that something is right is
really just another way of saying that I approve of it. Stevenson
therefore argued that ‘good’ was a persuasive definition. He was
less concerned with what moral statements meant in themselves,
and more with what they were for. A statement has an emotive
meaning if it is intended to produce a response in the person
who hears it.
There are two main criticisms of this approach:
* A moral argument is not really judged according to the
response it evokes, but on whether its claims are valid.
Morality is not just about emotions, but may be discussed
rationally.
* To claim something is right or wrong is to make a policy
statement. If I claim my moral judgements are universal
(they should apply to everyone) they cannot be based on
feelings, for I cannot say what others should feel, nor can
I know what I will feel on other occasions.

Prescriptivism
Whereas the emotivist asks what sort of effect a moral
statement aims to have, a prescriptivist is more concerned about
what is happening when someone actually makes a moral statement.
R. M. Hare (in The Language of Morals, 1952, and Freedom
and Reason, 1963) is the best-known representative of this
approach. He asks about what a moral statement is meant to do,
and concludes that a moral statement is ‘prescribing’ a course of

20 ethics made easy

action – recommending that something should be done, rather
than just expressing the feelings of the speaker.
This may sound similar in practice to a command, but there
is a difference. If I see someone about to steal a car and I shout
out ‘Stop that!’ I am referring to that single incident. I am not
suggesting that stopping doing things is a general principle on
which I expect the person to base his life! On the other hand,
if I say ‘It is wrong to steal!’ I am giving a piece of advice that can
apply to future situations as well.

Naturalism and metaphysical ethics

Reading Plato’s Republic, or Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, we
get the very definite idea that, in spite of the various views that are
put forward and examined, there is ultimately a rational basis for
the idea of goodness and justice – arising from the nature of human
life, or the needs of a society to organize itself in a harmonious way.
The implication of this is that there is an objective basis for
ethics. On the other hand, some of the theories put forward in this
chapter may suggest that there is no objective truth in ethics, but
that everything centres on the wishes or feelings of the person who
makes the moral statement. This ‘ethical subjectivism’ may seem
appropriate for a society that has no single religious, social, political
or cultural base, for people differ from one another so greatly that it
is unlikely that they would share the same values, or choose to act
in the same way.
However, when it comes to moral issues, people try to
persuade others about how they should behave. They argue as
though there were some objective truth about which different
people could in principle agree.
This situation gives rise to two other theories about ethical
language. Naturalistic ethics is the term used for the attempt
to explain a set of moral terms from the facts of human life. It is
the positive side of what G. E. Moore criticized as the ‘naturalistic
fallacy’ – the attempt to derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. By contrast,
metaphysical ethics insists that morality should be valued in itself,
and should be related to our understanding of the world and of our

2 what do we mean? 21
place within it. It points out that moral choices are related to our
general understanding of life, and the value that we find in it: in
other words, to our ‘metaphysics’.
An interesting exposition of this approach was given by Iris
Murdoch in her book Metaphysics and a Guide to Morals (Penguin,
1994), where she points out that the moral choices people make in
times of crisis are based on the values that they gradually build up
in their habitual way of dealing with the world. Hence, we should
not separate off the moment of moral choice from the rest of our
experience of life and our interpretation of it. We make ourselves
what we are, and our choices follow from that.

Summary of theories
* Intuitionism – one just instinctively knows when
something is right!
* Emotivism – one uses moral statements to express
feelings, and influence the feelings of others.
* Prescriptivism – one uses moral statements to
‘prescribe’ a general course of action.
* Naturalism – relating moral statements to particular
features of the world and of social relationships.
* Metaphysical ethics – relating moral statements to a general
understanding of the world, its meaning and its values.

Now it is clear that, when we use moral language, we may be

doing a combination of some or all of these things. We may speak
about something being ‘good’ without knowing how to define
what we mean by that word. We may speak out because we want
to express our emotions. We may want to recommend a course of
action. We may also feel convinced that there are objective grounds
for saying that something is right or wrong.

‘Is’ and ‘ought’

David Hume pointed out that those who write on religion or
morality tend to slip from matters of fact to matters of value:

22 ethics made easy

 In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with,
I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some
time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the
being of a God, or makes observations concerning human
affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead
of the usual copulations of propositions, is and is not, I meet
with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or
an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however
of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not,
expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary
that is should be observed and explained; and at the same
time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether
inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from
others, which are entirely different from it.
(A Treatise on Human Nature, 1738)

Hume, here as elsewhere, delights in debunking traditional

religious and moral arguments. But he highlights a feature of
moral argument that is absolutely crucial, and which links with our
discussion of the nature of religious language.
The logical positivists argued that moral statements were
meaningless, since they were neither tautologies nor matters
that could be proved true or false with reference to evidence.
We looked at the reactions to this claim – principally in pointing to
the emotive and prescriptive approaches to understanding what
moral language was about. In effect, the logical positivists were
restating Hume’s point. Although based on facts, moral language
goes beyond them. In the crudest sense this is simply the ‘just
because everyone else does it, does not make it right’ argument.
To what extent, then, can moral judgements be based on facts?
If facts have to be interpreted, or if something more is needed
before we can move from saying ‘is’ to saying ‘ought’, then we need
to make clear what that extra is. This issue is illustrated most clearly
by the ‘natural law’ approach to ethics, to which we now turn.

2 what do we mean? 23
 3
is it
natural?

24 ethics made easy

So far we have considered what it means for
something to be moral, whether we have
sufficient freedom to take responsibility
for what we do, and what it means to make
a moral statement. But moral statements,
even if they express a personal preference or
recommend a course of action, make claims
about ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. How can these be
justified?

In this and the following three chapters we

shall be looking attempts to find a rational
and objective basis for moral judgements.
The first of these – the theory of natural
law – claims that nature, interpreted by
human reason, shows that everything has a
particular essence or purpose, the fulfilling of
which is the ‘good’ to which it should aim.

Developed in the thirteenth century by

Aquinas, and central to much Catholic moral
thinking, the natural law argument can be
traced back to the work of the ancient Greek
philosopher Aristotle.

3 is it natural? 25
 Aristotle distinguished between efficient causes and final
causes: an efficient cause is what gets things done, a final cause
is the purpose or intended end product. A child grows up to be
an adult. Aristotle would say that an efficient cause of the child’s
growth is food and drink, but the final cause is the adult into which
the child is growing. Similarly, if I take a piece of wood and carve it
into a statue, the efficient cause is the knife that I use, but the final
cause is the image that I seek to create.
On this theory, everything (both every object and every
action) has some final meaning and purpose (its ‘final cause’) – its
essential nature and place within the overall scheme of things – and
this is what determines its ‘good’.
Aquinas used Aristotle’s ideas to argue that the world was
created by God, and that everything should therefore have God’s
ultimate purpose as its final ‘end’ or ‘good’. To understand God’s will
for it, and therefore what is ‘right’ for it, you only have to look at the
purpose for which it has been made. A good knife is one that cuts
well: that is what it is designed to do. But how do you decide what
is a good human life?
Aquinas argued that everything had its proper ‘end’, as part
of God’s providential ordering of the world, but humankind was
special in that it was also given reason and freedom. Humans could
therefore understand and choose whether or not to follow their
proper ‘end’. This he called ‘natural law’ – the rational understanding
and following of God’s final purpose.

Some features of ‘natural law’

* The term ‘natural law’ should not be used simply to refer to
the laws of nature, which form the basis of science. It is the
result of applying reason to what happens in nature.
* As traditionally presented, the ‘natural law’ theory of ethics
is based on the idea that God creates everything with a
particular purpose in mind, and that people are therefore
required to understand it and act accordingly. Hence, its
authority tends to be religious.

26 ethics made easy

 * ‘Natural law’ can be examined quite apart from its religious
interpretation, as a rational theory relating behaviour to the
basic features of human life, its place within the world, and
the basic requirements for its survival.
* It has the advantage that, once a ‘final cause’ is established,
it may be applied to all people at all times. A natural
law theory need take little account of prevailing social
attitudes.
* It is not based on personal preferences, nor on guessing
what the results of an action might be in terms of the
happiness or otherwise of those involved – it is simply
based on an examination of rational purpose. Potentially,
it is a very ‘clear-cut’ ethical theory.
Natural law supports other general views of moral behaviour.
Aquinas (in Summa Theologiae) presented the four cardinal virtues –
prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance (which had been used
as a basis for morality by the Stoics) – as fundamental qualities of
the moral life. The opposite of these virtues are the seven capital
vices (often called the ‘seven deadly sins’), which are pride, avarice,
lust, envy, gluttony, anger and sloth. From a traditional standpoint
of belief in God, one might say that the former allow a human
being to fulfil his or her potential as a human being as intended by
God, whereas the latter frustrate that intention.
But the issue of what is ‘natural’ is wider than Aquinas’ theory,
for ‘natural law’ is essentially about finding the rational principles
on which the world is made and which may therefore guide action.
But many actions that may be described as natural are irrational
and destructive, so further questions need to be asked.

How do you decide what is ‘natural’?

Science bases its ‘laws of nature’ on observation, and they
claim to be no more than an interpretation of the best available
evidence. If something is observed that does not fit in with an
established law, then either the observation is inaccurate, or
another (as yet unknown) law has unexpectedly come into operation.

3 is it natural? 27
Our understanding of the way in which nature works is therefore
constantly being modified.
If this also applies to ‘natural law’ as an ethical theory,
then we cannot establish fixed criteria for right and wrong – which
was the aim of Aquinas and others who followed this line of
thought – because our concept of what is natural, and therefore
of ‘final causes’, will always be open to modification.

Example
Natural law is about what life should be like, given a rational and
purposeful creation, but that may not be what life is actually like.
It is natural for someone who is seriously ill to die. Does that mean
that one should not interfere with the natural course of a disease
by giving medicine?
In the natural world, the strongest animals often mate with as many
sexual partners as they can, fighting off weaker rivals. Should there
be selective breeding among humans? Is monogamy unnatural?

These examples suggest that there is no easy way to establish

the ‘final cause’ that will enable us to say with certainty that we
know exactly what every thing or action is for, or what part it has
to play in an overall purposeful scheme of the universe.
The idea that the universe as a whole has a purpose and
direction, and that it (and everything in it) has been created for a
specific reason, is not a matter for scientific examination, but for
religious belief. Those without such belief will not necessarily see a
rationally justified ‘final cause’. Indeed, one of the main arguments
against belief in God has been the apparent pointlessness of suffering.
Once pointlessness replaces purpose as a general view of the natural
world, then the ‘natural law’ argument starts to break down.
Moral statements cannot be established by the observation of
facts; you cannot argue from what ‘is’ to what ‘ought to be’ the case.
When you record facts, you do just that; facts are neutral in terms
of ethics. Once you make a moral statement, however, you bring in
values and wishes, you recommend that something should be done,

28 ethics made easy

or you express feelings. These things are over and above the facts to
which they are applied.
At first sight, the ‘natural law’ argument seems to argue from
something that ‘is’ (the nature of the world) to what ‘ought’ to
be done. It does this on the basis of belief in a creator God who
guarantees that things have a purpose which suits their nature, and
to which they can freely respond in a positive and creative way.

A situation
Two adults of the same sex are attracted to one another. They wish
to express that attraction physically, to live together with the same
legal and social support that they would receive as a heterosexual
couple, to adopt children, and to bring them up in a family home.
Is what they wish to do morally right?
* Until the 1967 Sexual Offences Act, homosexual acts
between consenting male adults were regarded as crimes
in Britain. They were then made legal for those who had
reached the age of 21 (as opposed to heterosexual acts,
which are legal from the age of 16). In some Muslim
countries, following strict Shari’ah laws, homosexuality
is punishable by death. By contrast, in Classical Greece,
homosexual love was widely practised, and socially
acceptable. There is therefore no universally held view
about homosexuality and its place in society.
* Since homosexuality involves what used to be called
‘unnatural acts’, it is a particularly suitable situation
against which to test ‘natural law’ as an ethical theory.
This is how a ‘natural law’ argument might view that homosexual
partnership:
* According to natural law, the purpose of sex is procreation.
Since homosexual acts cannot lead to conception, they are
‘unnatural’ and therefore wrong.
* On this basis, heterosexual acts within a stable relationship
(i.e. one that will enable children to be nurtured) or celibacy
are the only morally acceptable sexual choices.

3 is it natural? 29
 * Because of this, there is no moral objection, according to
natural law principles, to the couple living together, or feeling
attracted towards one another. The only objection is to any
physical sexual acts that may take place between them.
* Because they cannot form a ‘natural’ family group, a natural
law argument would suggest that homosexual couples should
not be allowed to adopt children, who ‘naturally’ thrive only
with the benefit of both mother and father role models.
Against this line of argument:
* One might argue that the presence of sexual organs in a
human being implies that he or she is designed for sexual
activity and the conception of children – in which case,
celibacy is as unnatural as homosexuality, since it is a
denial of the complete natural function of procreation.
If this is established, then it is illogical to accept a celibate
partnership between those who are sexually attracted.
* Some people are naturally attracted by members of the
same sex. They experience their feelings as completely
natural. Any difficulties that arise are the result of social
conditioning, not nature.
* Sexuality can be said to achieve three ends:
1 physical pleasure
2 the deepening of a relationship
3 the conception of children
* Only the third end is precluded by homosexual
relationships. But is not the search for pleasure and for
deep relationships as natural as the conception of children?
If a marriage is known to be infertile, are heterosexual acts
between its partners therefore immoral simply because
conception is impossible?
* Marriage is a social function, and promiscuity can be
practised equally by homosexuals and heterosexuals.
The fact that homosexual couples cannot marry does not
preclude deep and permanent relationships.

30 ethics made easy

 * If a homosexual couple form a stable relationship, they
may be able to offer children a home that is, at the very
least, as valuable to their upbringing as one in which
there is either a single parent, or a heterosexual couple
with a bad relationship. Hence, it would seem illogical to
discriminate in this matter.
The introduction of civil partnerships in the UK, in December 2005,
was recognition that stable homosexual relationships deserved
the same legal and financial protection enjoyed by heterosexual
couples who marry.

In pointing out some of the ways in which the ‘natural law’

view of the homosexual couple’s situation might be challenged, it
is not intended to undermine the principle of natural law as such,
but to show that there are some areas of morality – particularly
where relationships are concerned – where it is difficult to consider
morality mainly in terms of specific actions.

Insight
Although in this section we focus on Aristotle’s contribution to the
‘natural law’ approach to ethics, there is another important aspect
to his ethics: paying attention. The virtuous person is one who
pays thoughtful attention to everything that he or she does, acting
thoughtfully. Thought attention to food, for example, will avoid
either starvation or gluttony, but will tend to eat moderately – an
example of Aristotle’s famous ‘mean’ between extremes. That’s an
essential part of the ethical life; simply to pay attention to what we
are doing and why we are doing it.

Are we naturally good or bad?

The philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), in his book
Leviathan, saw the life of man in a natural state as ‘solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish and short’. He took the view that, left to their own devices,
people are naturally greedy. They want freedom, but also power (which

3 is it natural? 31
included riches, reputation, success, nobility and eloquence – all that
might give one person an advantage over others), and the inevitable
result of this is that they would struggle against one another in order
to gain it. In such a society, everyone is judged by his or her power:

The value, or WORTH of a man, is as of all other things, his

price; that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his
power: and therefore is not absolute, but a thing dependent on
the need and judgement of another.

Unbridled competition, allied to seeing everyone in terms of his

or her power, may lead to social anarchy. Hobbes therefore argued
that it was in the self-interest of all, for people to set aside their claim
to total power in order that they might live peacefully with others, for
otherwise there will be constant danger of losing everything. In effect,
he came down to a form of the ‘golden rule’ – do as you would be
done to. He applied reason to human society, pointing out what was
needed for society to function – but recognized that, without reason,
people would be in a state of self-destructive greed and anarchy.
Such anarchy would not have been tolerated for long by
Niccolo Machiavelli (1469–1527), who (in The Prince) argues that
a ruler must know how to use his power and needs to be feared as
well as respected by his people. His views on political power, and
the measures that a person should be prepared to employ in order
to gain and maintain it, suggest that in a natural state, humankind
is ruthless and competitive. Both Hobbes and Machiavelli see
natural life as essentially a struggle for power and survival.
By contrast, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–78) thought that
people were born essentially good – as was everything that came
directly from nature. He argued that, if the conditions are right,
people will flourish and be morally good. Human nature is fine in
itself; the trouble is with the way in which society is organized. If
temptation is put in people’s way, a certain number of them are
going to fall for it. This way of thinking led many twentieth-century
socialists to assume that, once the dictatorship of the proletariat
arrived, a just society would be established and all would be well.
It also finds expression in the caricature of the social worker who,

32 ethics made easy

defending a criminal, lays all the blame on the circumstances of his
or her upbringing, thereby diminishing moral responsibility.
Another example of this positive attitude to the natural is
Henry David Thoreau (1817–62). In Walden, or Life in the Woods,
he saw God within all nature and everything as therefore inherently
good. He argued that people spent too much time worrying
about earning a living, and seeking for things they do not really
need – leading lives of ‘quiet desperation’. By contrast, he sought
a far simpler and more natural way of living.
For now we need only recognize that human life is complex,
and that it is seldom possible to see what it would be like without
the constraints of society. Opinion is divided:
* Are human beings fundamentally ruthless and savage,
restrained and tamed by society, but liable at times to
revert to their ‘natural’ behaviour?
* Or are human beings fundamentally good and caring, made
antisocial and brutalized by society, but, given the right
environment, capable of reverting to their gentler nature?

Points for reflection

* Looking at items in any newspaper, consider whether you
believe humankind to be more ‘Hobbes’ or more ‘Rousseau’
(to use an extreme form: more ‘savages tamed by society’
or more ‘angels corrupted by society’).
* What do these views suggest about punishment and reform?
* Should society have more rules or fewer?
* Should morality be left to the conscience of the individual,
or imposed by society?
* Aristotle saw reason as the distinctive human quality.
Was he right?
* John Stuart Mill pointed out that most of the things people
are punished for doing (e.g. murder, rape) are common
occurrences in nature. Should ethics be seen therefore as a
distinctively human step away from the natural order?
* Watch a cat ‘play’ with a mouse.

3 is it natural? 33
 4
looking for
results

34 ethics made easy

It is generally agreed that, in acting morally,
people seek to achieve some benefit, either
for themselves or others. It would therefore
seem reasonable to judge actions right or
wrong in terms of the benefits achieved: it is
wrong to cause harm, right to give happiness
or alleviate suffering.

There is a long tradition of ethical thinking that

seeks to make overall benefit or happiness the
goal of the ethical life – including, particularly,
the Epicureans in Ancient Greece – but we shall
focus in this chapter on the most influential
of such approaches, and probably the most
popular and widely accepted of all moral
arguments: utilitarianism.

In general, utilitarianism claims that the right

thing to do in any given situation is that which
is likely to produce the greatest happiness
(or benefit) to the greatest number of people
involved. Developed by Jeremy Bentham and
J.S. Mill, it is central to the work of probably the
best-known ethical thinker today, Peter Singer.

4 looking for results 35

 Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) argued for the Principle
of Utility, by which he meant that an action should be judged
according to the results it achieved. This approach to ethics is called
utilitarianism. It has been one of the most influential of ethical
theories, and the one most widely used in ordinary ‘common sense’
decisions.
Bentham argued that an action should be judged
according to its ability to offer happiness or benefit to everyone
involved, or to avoid unhappiness and pain. He thought that
all should be treated equally, and did not consider one form of
happiness to be more important than another, although he took
such things as the intensity and duration of happiness into
account.
In his book Utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill (1806–73) further
developed this theory, allowing that the effect of rules should
also be taken into account, where their observance would benefit
society as a whole. He also denied that all forms of happiness were
of equal status, distinguishing higher (e.g. intellectual or cultural)
and lower (e.g. sensual) pleasures.
In its simplest form, utilitarianism states that, in any
situation where there is a moral choice, the right thing to
do is that which is likely to produce the greatest happiness
for the greatest number of people – a formula that had
been proposed in 1725 by Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746)
as a way of assessing political regimes, the best nation being
that which produced the most happiness, or benefit, for the most
people.
This seems a very straightforward approach to ethical
decisions. But it raises two important points:
1 How do you evaluate the results of an action?
* Is happiness or benefit to be judged entirely by the
individuals concerned, or is there some more objective
way of assessing it?
* In other words, what are your criteria for saying that a
result is ‘good’?

36 ethics made easy

Example
In December 2009, there was a debate in the UK about whether
there should be minimum price for a unit of alcohol, in an attempt
to discourage the growth in consumption and consequent increase
in alcohol-related illness and death. Against this, it was argued
that it is wrong to punish a responsible majority because of the
foolishness of a minority. Some blamed the extension of licensing
hours, others criticized supermarkets for offering cheap drink. But
supermarkets work in a competitive environment, and the increase
in licensing hours was intended to bring about more civilized
drinking and avoid a rush before ‘closing time’.
In these and many other situations, action is taken on the basis of a
predicted result which may prove to be quite false. Longer opening
hours or an increase in the cost of alcohol may or may not change
drinking habits. You may fix one problem only to create another, or
offer benefits to some at the cost of harming others.
The aim may indeed be to produce the greatest benefit for the
greatest number, but there can be many different routes to that
end, and deciding between them may not be easy.

2 What if the results of an action are ambiguous?

* How do you balance the unhappiness caused to one person
against the happiness of many?
* Is immediate happiness the criterion, or is it the longer-term
benefit?
For example, some would recommend that young offenders
should be given a prison sentence, in the hope that it would
encourage them to reform and thus not re-offend. This could imply
that – although it is not experienced as such – the punishment may
be regarded as increasing the happiness of the offender in the long
term, as well as offering added happiness to those in society that he
or she will not offend against in the future.
* By what criteria do you judge what leads to happiness in
this case? If you act against someone’s wishes, claiming

4 looking for results 37

 that it is ‘really’ for their greater happiness, you presumably
do so on the basis of your idea of what constitutes the
good life. On what is that idea based?
The smiling headmaster of old who brandished a cane saying
‘It’s for your own good!’ may have believed just that. But could it
be proved? More and more evidence could be brought, and yet
there would never be certainty. Some would point to occasions of
genuine reform, others to establishing a cult of brutality.

Forms of utilitarianism
Act utilitarianism
Act utilitarianism looks for the results of an individual act in
order to assess whether that act is right or wrong. In this form,
utilitarianism accepts no general rules except the rule that one
should seek the greatest happiness (or benefit – remember this is
not a matter of emotions but of welfare) of the greatest number.
Act utilitarianism requires an assessment about pain or
happiness that is related to each individual action. But the
perceived results of an action may be explicable only in terms
of social convention, not in terms of actual pain inflicted. People
may choose to suffer – it is their happiness – but this may not be
perceived by the external observer.

Example
You observe a scene of extreme suffering. A crowd of people
hobbling, shuffling and obviously in pain run between lines of
onlookers. You observe their exhaustion, and learn that they have
run 26 miles and, in doing so, have suffered blisters, cramp and other
aches and pains. Suppose you see one of them, at the limit of his or
her endurance, slow to a walking pace, but the crowd of onlookers
shouts that he or she should continue running.
Such action could be regarded as cruelty on a mass scale, yet
thousands of people the world over will choose to go through
just such an ordeal, pushing themselves to the limit. Voluntary

38 ethics made easy

 suffering may be idiotic, but it is not immoral unless, by accepting
it, genuine harm is done to others. A person who is determined to
run a marathon in spite of medical warnings to the contrary, risks
his or her life and all the suffering that their death could cause their
family, so that might be regarded as immoral. Otherwise, running a
marathon is an example of the acceptance of pain for no obvious
result (other than that of personal satisfaction).
Pleasure and pain are therefore to be set in a social context, and
may be misunderstood. It might be possible, for example, by
arguing that it inspires others to get fit, to justify a marathon in
strictly utilitarian terms, but it is by no means the straightforward
assessment of pain or pleasure that act utilitarianism assumes.

Rule utilitarianism
This rather more sophisticated approach to utilitarianism was
put forward by John Stuart Mill, as follows.
* Intellectual pleasures should be preferred to immediate
physical pleasures, and one should assess the quality of the
pleasure anticipated as well as the quantity.
(In this he followed the Epicurean tradition.)
* People may sacrifice themselves (e.g. losing their life in
the attempt to save others), but that such sacrifice is not
of value in itself, only in terms of what it achieves.
He took an important step in allowing a utilitarian assessment
to take into account those rules that benefit society as a whole.
So, for example, the rule that it is wrong to take innocent human
life is of general benefit to society, and should therefore not be
broken, even if, in a particular case, killing an innocent person might
seem to benefit other people. Thus the utilitarian can use general
rules and principles, on the grounds that those principles have
themselves been framed on utilitarian grounds.
As it has developed, those who take this line of argument have
divided between:
* strong rule utilitarians, who hold that one should not break
one of these general rules to fit individual situations, and

4 looking for results 39

 * weak rule utilitarians, who would allow the pleasure or pain
involved in a particular situation to take precedence over
the general rule, while still allowing the general rule and its
benefits to be taken into consideration.

Fluoride in water
Fluoride, a substance found naturally in water supplies in some
places, is good for teeth. Hence it would seem that a utilitarian
argument should be in favour of introducing fluoride into water
everywhere, so that all may benefit.

However, it can also be argued that people should be free to decide

whether or not they accept treatment, and that it is generally wrong
to impose a remedy, even if it is known to be of benefit. A strong
rule utilitarian argument might therefore oppose the universal
introduction of fluoride (on the grounds that it would go against the
beneficial rule that people should be free to choose) whereas a weak
rule utilitarian argument would try to achieve a balance between
known benefits and the modest loss of personal freedom of choice.

Preference utilitarianism
Preference utilitariarism says that you should take into
account the preferences of the person concerned in each case,
unless those preferences are outweighed by the preferences of
other people. In other words, this form allows people to say what
for them constitutes pleasure or pain. It does not allow one person
to impose his or her own criterion of pleasure on others, nor to
make a utilitarian assessment on that basis.
Preference utilitarianism has become probably the most widely
used ethical theory in areas of applied and professional ethics, largely
due to the work of Peter Singer, whose books (especially Practical
Ethics, published in 1979) have been immensely influential. Singer’s
work has been widely criticized by those seeking a traditional and
absolutist approach. His basic principle is that one should seek an
‘equal consideration of interests’. That does not mean that all have
equal rights or should be treated equally, but that each should be

40 ethics made easy

treated in a way that is appropriate. Consideration will be given to
the interests of animals, for example, but not by treating them as
though they were people. Equally, someone who has been brain
damaged and is in a persistent vegetative state does not have
interests identical to those of someone who is conscious.

Singer’s work
Peter Singer’s work on ethics goes far beyond a simply case for
preference utilitarianism. He argues, for example, that there are
two things that make life worthwhile: the reduction in the amount
of pain in the universe; and commitment to a cause that is beyond
oneself. These, which provide a starting point for the ethical
life, bring a sense of fulfilment and meaning. In other words, life
becomes meaningful if you try to make the world a better place.
Singer’s work in ethics is challenging, in that it goes beyond simple
utilitarianism, and touches the fundamental question about what
it means to live an ethical life.

Starting with the situation …

Utilitarianism works in a way that is the opposite to that of
natural law: natural law starts with theories about the nature of the
world and the purpose in life. From those general theories, it looks at
each and every action and object and asks about its purpose. Once
that is known, it claims that the right thing to do is that which fulfils
the natural purpose, and the wrong thing is that which frustrates it.
You start from principles, and apply them to individual situations.
With utilitarianism, the opposite is the case. You start with the
pain or pleasure involved in individual situations and then take into
account the wider pain or pleasure involved by the application of
general rules, or the preferences of the people involved. The starting
point, however, is with the immediate situation.
What the two approaches have in common is their desire to
find some external, objective criterion (whether the pleasure or
pain involved, or the purpose to be fulfilled) by which to show that
an action is right or wrong.

4 looking for results 41

 In theory, using either of these approaches, it should be
possible to present a case for morality which is convincing to other
people, for it can be set out and demonstrated.
The limitation of the utilitarian approach, as we have
seen, is that there is never enough evidence to provide
certainty. It is always possible that the future will not turn out as
we expect, and that our intention to maximize benefit will actually
increase harm.

General criticisms of utilitarianism

Society is complex. It does not consist of uniform people, all
wanting the same things or expressing the same preferences. There
will always be conflict of interests, divergence of views. Utilitarianism
has taken this into account to a certain extent by allowing for
‘preferences’ to be expressed, rather than imposing on others what
we consider to be for their greatest happiness. Nevertheless, the
final decision is made in the interests of the majority, thus making it
difficult to justify action on behalf of an individual or minority group.
Any sense of social justice seems to demand that there should be
cases where the majority freely give up something to their benefit
for the sake of a minority or an individual.

Example
Sometimes, as a result of an appeal on television, the attention
of a whole nation is focused on the plight of an individual. This is
made especially poignant if the individual is a child desperate for a
life-saving operation, or a local hero who is injured in the course of
helping others. In these circumstances, offers of help are given that
are out of all proportion to what would be allocated on a strictly
utilitarian assessment of need.
* Are these the result of emotional indulgence rather than
rational assessment of need?
* If so, is it wrong to give help to an individual in these
circumstances?

42 ethics made easy

 A narrowly utilitarian assessment may preclude action being
taken on behalf of an individual, on the grounds that it is not in the
interests of the majority that so much relief should be expended
on a single person. On the other hand, if the majority are presented
with the facts in a way that engages them emotionally, they may
well freely give up something (generally money, offered to the
needy cause) in order that the individual may benefit. In this case,
although the end result is an unequal sharing of resources, the
preference of a majority of those involved – that they wish to give
money – is satisfied. On strictly utilitarian terms, it would be wrong
only if the preferences of the donors were outweighed by the
preferences of those opposed to the donations being given.
As always, the utilitarian assessment remains inconclusive.
Utilitarianism deflects our attention from the personal
convictions and values that lie at the heart of moral choices,
and makes the decision one that requires external assessment
and calculation. But moral responses are not always a matter of
conforming to what is reasonable, but of following convictions
about what is ‘right’ even if it does not obviously lead to an
increase in happiness.
Often, when a moral choice has to be made, there is no time
to calculate who will benefit and by how much. One has to act
without knowing all the consequences. In such situations, my
choice of action, often spontaneous, is based on convictions, not
calculations.

A situation
A mother, walking along a river bank, hears a shout from behind
her and turns to see her child topple off a bicycle into the raging
torrent. She plunges into the water, but is swept to her death,
along with her child.
A utilitarian, confronted with information about the woman’s
remaining five, now motherless, children, and her work as a doctor,
saving the lives of many, might say that she should not, on balance,
have plunged into the water.

4 looking for results 43

 But is it possible, in all honesty, to say that she was not acting
morally in attempting that hopeless rescue? And who, listening to
the oration at such a person’s funeral, would not wish, if put to a
similar test, to have similar courage?

I am not arguing that a person who did not attempt the rescue
could not perfectly well have justified his or her decision to stand
by and watch the child drown. Indeed, it might take great courage
to do that. But is it the only morally correct option?
Perhaps a situation that illustrates this in its starkest form is given
in William Styron’s novel Sophie’s Choice. It explores the guilt of a
woman, living in the USA, who had survived a Nazi concentration
camp. Gradually the source of her terrible sense of guilt is revealed:
she was held in the camp with her two children and was told that
one could be saved but the other would be sent to die. But she must
choose which: if not, both would die. She made the choice – knowing
that, by doing so, she has condemned the other. She is haunted by
that choice.
* From a utilitarian point of view, she did the right thing.
To have refused to make a choice would have made it
certain that both children would die.
* Equally, she is not to blame, because she did not actually
choose that either child should die – she was not directly
the agent of their deaths.
* But is it possible to live with such a choice? Does a
utilitarian justification make the decision any more
bearable?

There would seem to be two major limitations to the

utilitarian standpoint:
1 Utilitarianism, because it focuses on results, which are external
to the person making the moral choice, does not adequately
take into account the motive for making a choice – and yet
it is motivation which would seem to be important in the
assessment of whether a person was behaving in a moral way.

44 ethics made easy

 2 Utilitarianism does not explain why people sometimes
feel that there are moral rules that should not be broken,
irrespective of the consequences. This is a feature of moral
dilemmas, and it is one to which we shall turn in the next
chapter.
There is one final thing to be said about utilitarianism.
It is a popular approach, which appears to offer clear-cut ways
of assessing what is right. The problem is that life is seldom so
straightforward. Few would argue that utilitarianism is not a
valuable rule of thumb for assessing what a reasonable person
might choose to do. The question is whether (taken in isolation
from all the other reasons why people choose to do one thing
rather than another) it is adequate as an ethical theory. Human
motivation is subtle, and people may justify their actions by
reference to ideology, religion, ambition, personal need and so on.
It is seldom simply a matter of weighing up the likely results and
then making a choice – although such assessment may be a useful
tool for a subsequent justification of a choice made instinctively, or
from confused motivation.

4 looking for results 45

 5
the
experience
of moral
choice

46 ethics made easy

Whereas the Natural Law and Utilitarian
approaches to ethics sought to ground
morality objectively, either in a sense of
natural purpose or in anticipated results,
Immanuel Kant – a hugely influential
eighteenth-century philosopher – took as his
starting point the experience of a sense of
duty and an unconditional moral ‘ought’.

In what is described as his ‘categorical

imperative’ he sets out three very general,
rational bases for testing out moral claims:
that one should be prepared for everyone to
act on the same moral principle as oneself;
that people should be treated as ends rather
than means; that one should act as thought
legislating for a situation where everyone is
treated as a free and autonomous individual.

He also argued that, even if our actions are

predictable from an objective, scientific point
of view, we still experience ourselves as free
agents, and therefore both experience the
moral ‘ought’ and are required to accept moral
responsibility.

5 the experience of moral choice 47

 Whether through conscience or through thinking about right
and wrong, the experience of moral choice comes in the form of
a sense that there is something I ‘ought’ to do regardless of the
consequences. This is sometimes called a categorical imperative.
Notice this distinction:
* A hypothetical imperative takes the form ‘If you want to
achieve X then do Y.’
* A categorical imperative takes the form ‘You should
do Y.’ It is absolute, having no conditions attached
to it.
The thinker most associated with this ‘categorical imperative’
is Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). Being an eighteenth-century
German Protestant, he was very much concerned with the sense of
duty. You do your duty (what you understand to be right) without
regard to consequences. His main work on this is Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Morals (1785).
Kant held that the categories we use to understand the
world – categories like space, time and causality – are not
to be found in the data of our experience but are imposed on
our experience by our own minds. We cannot prove that
everything has a cause, but our minds automatically look for
causes. The mind plays an active part in shaping and ordering
experience; it is not merely a passive recipient of what is
‘out there’. This is sometimes referred to as Kant’s ‘Copernican
Revolution’: just as Copernicus showed that the Earth revolved
round the Sun, and not vice versa, so Kant showed that our minds
determine the way in which we experience things.
In the same way, Kant argued that we would never be able
to show conclusively that a certain action was right or wrong by
reference to its expected results, because we would never have
enough evidence, and might disagree about how to interpret it.
The starting point for morals cannot therefore be something
‘out there’ among the data interpreted by our senses, but should
be the actual experience of moral obligation – the feeling that
there is something we ‘ought’ to do.

48 ethics made easy

 In other words, you do not first find out what is ‘right’ and then feel
that you ought to do it; rather, that which you feel you ought to do
is what you mean by ‘right’.

Kant argued that to do your duty you have to exclude two other
considerations: effects (or results) and inclinations. If you decide
to do something, expecting that you will benefit by it, that is not a
moral choice. Equally, if you decide to do something because you
enjoy doing it, that is not a moral choice either. Kant also rejected
external moral authority where it conflicted with personal moral
conviction. Unthinking obedience is not a valid moral position – one
should act out of a personal sense of what is right. His starting
point is the ‘good will’, aided by the pure practical reason.
Kant therefore sought to set out in the general principles of
morality, the absolute and rational requirements of the categorical
imperative (the unconditioned ‘ought’), which might be applied to
all moral issues. What is more, he sought to do this ‘a priori’ – based
on reason alone, not on the evidence about how people actually
behave or the results of their actions. There are three main forms
of his categorical imperative:
1 Act only on that maxim (or principle) which you can, at the
same time, wish to make a universal law.
2 Act in such a way as to treat people as ends and never as
means.
3 Act as though a legislating member of the kingdom of ends.
The implication of the first, and major, form is that I should
only do something if I am prepared for everyone else to be free
to act according to that same moral principle. This does not mean
that I can only do something if I imagine everyone else doing it as
well (that might well cause practical chaos), but I must be prepared
for everyone else to follow the same logical principle. I should not
consider myself to be a unique or special case.
Notice what this does not tell you. It does not tell you what
the content of your moral decision should be; it does not say that

5 the experience of moral choice 49

this or that action is always right or wrong. Rather it provides a
general principle – our willingness to see the basis of our action
become a universal law.
There is a general question to ask of a theory such as Kant’s:
is it possible to give a general rule that can be applied to each and
every particular act, or is it essential to know the particular purpose
and context of that act, before deciding on its moral status?

Example
Breaking a promise
Is it ever morally right to make a promise knowing that one has
no intention of keeping it? If I consider, at the moment when I
make a promise, that I shall be free to break it, then – according to
Kant’s first form of the categorical imperative – I should be willing
everyone else to be free to make and break their promises. But
Kant argues that this would make nonsense of the whole idea of
making a promise, and it is therefore illogical to say that it is right
to make a promise that one does not intend to keep.

The second form of the categorical imperative follows from

the first. If you are prepared to universalize the principles on which
you act, it implies that you are prepared to consider everyone else as
an autonomous moral agent, also free to act on their freely chosen
maxims. And that, of course, implies that they should be treated as
ends in themselves, never as means to your own end. This aspect of
Kant meets with almost universal approval. Most people would see any
treatment of people as though they were ‘things’, disposable or merely
there for our own personal convenience, as fundamentally wrong.
Relationships in which one person exploits another are generally
regarded as morally wrong, whatever the particular circumstances.

Insight
Recognition of the right of each person to be treated as a full,
autonomous human agent is fundamental to Kant, but is also
implied by the other ethical arguments considered in this book.

50 ethics made easy

 The third form follows from the second. Kant argues that you
should always imagine yourself as being in the position of someone
who is responsible for legislating for a society in which everyone
is to be treated as an ‘end’, an autonomous individual. What is the
right thing to do in such a society?
Notice that Kant sees the important touchstones as rationality
(can you justify it in a rational way?) and universality (can you
apply it to everyone?). The implication of this is that each individual
constructs, and takes responsibility for, his or her own set of moral
values, based on duty and the good will.
This is very different from the natural law or utilitarian
approaches, and sometimes their priorities conflict, as in the
following situation.

The cost of truth

You are held by a terrorist gang, who demand to know the
whereabouts of a close friend or relative whom they clearly wish
to kill. You know that the person concerned is in hiding. Do you tell
the truth and admit that you know where they are, or do you tell
a lie, either by giving the wrong location, or by saying that you do
not know where they are?

Here the dilemma is between anticipating the harm that will be

done if you tell the truth and your friend is killed, and the general
moral principle that you should tell the truth.

You might want to argue that anyone, confronted similarly by the

prospect of the death of an innocent person, should lie. In this case,
although the rule about telling the truth could be universalized,
so also could the rule about doing anything necessary in order to
prevent innocent suffering.

The dilemma is caused by a clash between a utilitarian

assessment (that telling the truth will end up causing suffering)
and obeying a general principle of truth telling, established
rationally.

5 the experience of moral choice 51

 Kant also suggested that, if you respond to an unconditional
moral ‘ought’, doing so presupposes three things, which he termed
the postulates of the pure practical reason:
* God – because there must be a sense that, by doing one’s
duty, happiness will follow, and that is something that
could only be possible in a world ordered by God.
* Freedom – because, unless you experience yourself as
free, you will have no sense of being able to make a moral
choice.
* Immortality – because you know that you might not
see the results of all that you do in this life, and therefore
presuppose that there is some future in which the present
imbalance of actions and rewards will be rectified.
Kant does not mean that you have to believe in these three
things in order to respond to an ‘ought’ but that, once you do
acknowledge the unconditional nature of that ‘ought’, it implies
that you believe in them.
Not everyone would accept this, for it is based on the idea
that there is a rational structure to our thought that underlies our
instinctive reactions. This may not be so. We may feel an obligation
for the worst of motives, or from unconscious needs.
This highlights a major problem with Kant’s ethics. It is
designed for a world where people act out of good will and moral
duty. In the real world people are far more complex, seldom
completely rational in their moral and personal choices, and
sometimes act out of plain hatred or ill will. Is it wise, in such a
world, to remain a moral innocent?

Determined and yet free?

Kant argued that our minds impose space, time and causality
on the phenomena that they encounter. From an external point
of view, everything is conditioned. When I observe someone else
making a choice, my mind naturally seeks out the causes that led to
that particular choice. In the world of phenomena, there can be no
freedom. But Kant held that all we know about are the phenomena

52 ethics made easy

that come through our senses. We know things as they appear
to us, not things as they are in themselves. (Things-in-themselves
Kant calls noumena, our perception of them phenomena.)
On this basis, Kant is able to say that we are at one and the
same time phenomenally conditioned (perceived from the outside,
I have no freedom), and noumenally free (I experience my freedom
to act – something that I know, but nobody else can observe). There
are therefore two ways of understanding the moral act:
* from the standpoint of one who observes the choices that
are made, with their consequences and the implications
they have for an understanding of humankind
* from the standpoint of the person who is actually
confronted with a choice and who, in a moment of creative
action, actually responds on the basis of his or her values
and convictions.
This distinction is of crucial importance for ethics. When the
logical positivists argued that the meaning of a statement was
its method of verification, they dismissed ethics as meaningless,
because it could not be verified by experience, in other words,
by phenomena. And yet – as we saw in the reaction against that
position – people continue to find moral statements meaningful.
This highlights the division of perspective between a person who
observes and analyses the phenomenon of human activity, and
what it is to experience a moral ‘ought’. As we are in ourselves, we
can act morally, and no amount of analysis and observation is going
to be able to remove either the experience of freedom and choice,
or its moral significance.

5 the experience of moral choice 53

 personal
6
development
and virtue

54 ethics made easy

Before the sixteenth century, moral thinking
was dominated by Aristotle’s idea of Natural
Law (as interpreted through Christian
theologians) and the authority of religion.
With the Reformation and the intellectual
upheavals that followed, this was replaced by
attempts to find a rational basis for morality,
of which we have looked at utilitarianism and
Kantian ethics.

But instead of seeking a rational or objective

basis for morality, can we simply create our
own values? Can we stop asking what is right
and start deciding what will be right? In this
chapter we look at Nietzsche’s attempt to do
just that.

We shall do so in the context of asking whether

it is possible or right to make our own personal
development a basis for ethics, whether people
are inherently selfish or whether they can be
genuinely altruistic, and what it means to seek
human flourishing by cultivating the virtues.

6 personal development and virtue 55

Altruism?
Can human beings act genuinely for the benefit of others?
Thomas Hobbes, in Leviathan (1651), argued that, if people
voluntarily give up their rights for the benefit of others, they do
so in order to achieve something good for themselves. Indeed,
he claimed that every voluntary act had as its aim some good to
be obtained for the person performing it. On this basis, although
the benefit done to oneself may be less tangible than the benefit
offered to the other person (e.g. feeling good for having been
charitable), nevertheless in some way, even if we appear to be
helping others, we are actually acting in a way that benefits
ourselves.
By contrast, Hume’s Enquiry Concerning the Principles of
Morals (1751) takes the view that people do actually experience
‘sympathy’ – that is, they respond when they see the suffering or
the joy of others. He makes this experience basic to his ethics, in
that if there were no sympathy there would be no development of
altruistic qualities.
This does not mean that people respond to the sufferings of
others in a generous way all the time, rather that everyone can
experience some degree of sympathy. A psychopath, for example, is
someone who has no sense of right or wrong, and who is not going
to be persuaded by reason, but who has urges (to kill, for example)
that are totally devoid of any sense of sympathy for his or her
victim. In other words, for the psychopath, other people are ‘things’,
not fellow human beings who have feelings and to whom one
might want to relate in a personal way. In this case, the exception
illustrates the general rule – that people are capable of responding
to the sufferings of others.
Hume also holds that people can exhibit qualities that give
happiness to themselves as well as being useful to others. These
‘virtues’ include justice, faithfulness and politeness, which are
not directly related to self-development or happiness, but to
the interests of others. In fact, Hume regards benevolence as the
highest quality of which human nature is capable.

56 ethics made easy

 In section 9 of the Enquiry … Hume seems to step back from
saying that sympathy is always its own justification. He points out
that, even if someone appears to lose out personally because of
some action for the benefit of others, he or she will feel inner peace
of mind and satisfaction – which lead to personal happiness.
Notice that Hume is not saying that one should show
sympathy because it leads to peace of mind, but that peace of
mind happens to be a result of the genuine response of sympathy
(unlike Hobbes, who seems to be saying that sympathy is merely
disguised self-love).
So, in assessing personal development as a feature of morality
we need to reflect on three possibilities:
* That people are basically selfish, and if they are honest they
will admit it.
* That people think they are unselfish and considerate to
others but, in fact, they are really just satisfying their own
deeper needs.
* That people can genuinely feel and respond to the situations
of others, and can show honest altruism.
There is one other important feature of Hume’s idea of
‘sympathy’ to keep in mind. When we looked at Aristotle in Chapter 3,
we saw that he attempted to get some objective criterion for moral
statements. His idea of what was right stemmed from reason, and
an intellectual conception about the purpose of human existence.
Hume, by contrast, sees reason as taking a secondary role to the
emotions. It is the latter that provide us with the values we need for
directing our action; reason is their handmaid, selecting options and
possibilities to enable them to be expressed in practical action.
If a person is to develop, that development takes place within
a social context. In other words, personal development implies
personal worth in terms of relationships. It would be difficult to
develop personally in total isolation from others, and if a person
could achieve a high degree of personal growth in isolation (for
example, through some form of religious asceticism), it would still
depend on the religious and social ideas that set up the conditions
for that growth in the first place. This social context was emphasized

6 personal development and virtue 57

by F.H. Bradley in an essay called ‘My station and its duties’
(in Ethical Studies, 1876). Bradley argued that self-realization
was the basis of ethics, and he followed the philosopher Hegel in
pointing out that people need both self-expression and recognition
if they are to enjoy the good life. That recognition can come
through family relationships, through local society or through the
state, because (according to Hegel) these are the basic spheres of
influence.
Central to Bradley (and Hegel) is the idea that self-realization
(achieving one’s full potential as a unique human being) takes
place in society, not in isolation. If freedom is needed to allow for
the personal development and autonomy of an individual, we need
to remember that it comes with a price, and that one person’s
freedom may well curtail that of another.

Nietzsche
The thinker who most radically challenged traditional moral
thinking and placed human development at the centre of a value
creating system of thought was Friedrich Nietzsche.
It is often valuable to consider a thinker’s work against the
background of his or her personal circumstances – although with
many philosophers this is discouraged by the way that they present
ideas in a cogent fashion, inviting logical comment only. Nietzsche
is different. His writing is vivid, and his ideas are sometimes
presented as images. It may be worth reflecting therefore that he
was born in 1844, the son of a Lutheran pastor and of the daughter
of a country vicar, and that as a young man he was a lover of
solitude, enthusiastically religious, and also highly talented.
We shall approach Nietzsche’s work through four key features.

‘God is dead’
The first of these is the idea that God is dead. This is not a
casual comment from one who has not taken religious seriously;
it is a conclusion about the state of things as Nietzsche saw them
in the 1880s. In The Joyous Science he has the image of a madman

58 ethics made easy

who comes into the town with the message that ‘God is dead’: not
that God had never existed, but that people had killed him. The
character asks if his hearers do not sense that it is growing darker,
that they need lamps, even at noon. He tries to explain that people
have cut the world loose, and that (without God) it is wandering
without fixed values and without direction.
This is perhaps the starkest recognition of what had taken
place, almost since the Reformation – the replacement of an
authoritarian and metaphysical structure of thought, believed to
have been given by God, by human reason. His point was that,
whatever they may claim to believe, people in fact create values
based on themselves, not on God. They are the centre and measure
of life. Without God, humankind is forced to take responsibility and
establish its own values.

‘Superman’
The next feature is the superman (a rather poor translation
of Übermensch, which means something that goes over or beyond
man). In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the sage Zarathustra comes down
his mountain. He opens his teaching by saying:
I teach you the Superman. Man is something that should be
overcome. What have you done to overcome him? All creatures
hitherto have created something beyond themselves: and do
you want to be the ebb of this great tide, and return to the
animals rather than overcoming man?
(translated by Hollingdale, Penguin, p. 41)

Here the context is evolution. As the ape is to humans, so

humans will be to the superman. He then takes an important step:
‘The Superman is the meaning of the earth. Let your will say: The
Superman shall be the meaning of the earth!’ In other words, from
this moment on humanity is to choose its values and its direction by
an act of will. We humans are to be the creators of value. Nietzsche
is critical of those who sought some heavenly goal, accusing them
of being poisoners, weakening humankind. Instead, the true goal is
to be found in the future – the Übermensch. It is an affirmation of

6 personal development and virtue 59

life, and of the human will that shapes and determines that life.
In other words, you are free to define your world!

‘The will to power’

The third feature is the will to power – which is the force
behind Nietzsche’s moral thinking. It does not mean a crude
attempt to get power, but the affirmation of life, and the will to
develop and move forward. It is the will to power that, for Nietzsche,
is the source of all values and therefore the source of morality.
Nietzsche’s thought is highly individualistic. Wanting to be
equal with others and showing humility – key features of democracy
and Christianity, as he sees them – are signs of decadence and
weakness. They sap the will to power and desire for personal
development. For this reason, Nietzsche opposed both democracy
and Christianity. According to Nietzsche, exploitation is one of
the basic features of life, and self-development is fundamental.
Therefore we should be free to adopt whatever means we need in
order to secure that power. In Beyond Good and Evil, he sees the
world as divided into masters and slaves, and he holds that the
morality that suits the one will not suit the other. Masters are free to
do what their own creative development requires. Nietzsche rejects
both democracy and Christianity because they are associated with
slave values, not with master values, and cause the decay of the
state because they are based on the false assumption that all are
equal. He also attacks Christianity because it allows people to deny
themselves on Earth for the sake of God and a heavenly reward.

‘The eternal recurrence’

Finally, there is the eternal recurrence. This is a difficult and
complex idea. Perhaps it may be approached by contrasting it with the
ideas of Aristotle or traditional Christian views. To Aristotle, everything
has an end or a purpose. It achieves its goal once it fulfils that end.
In the traditional Christian scheme, the world looks to something
outside itself to justify its existence – God. But for Nietzsche,
God is dead. There is no way that this present life can be simply
tolerated because it leads to or points to something beyond itself.

60 ethics made easy

Nietzsche therefore held that one should be prepared to accept life as
it is; to affirm it and work with it.
His graphic way of presenting this is to pose the challenge
of accepting that everything that happens will be repeated over
and over again. Can you look at such an endlessly repeating life
and still affirm it? Can you enjoy it just as it is, without asking for
some external compensation or explanation? Nietzsche presents a
challenge – a necessary challenge in any world that has consciously
or unconsciously discarded religious belief and the old metaphysics
that went with it. The challenge of ‘the eternal recurrence’ is to
accept life as it is.
Nietzsche’s writings are a challenge, and these notes hardly
touch the surface of what he has to say on the topic of morality.
They are included here because Nietzsche looks at morality in a way
that is very different from the older ‘natural law’ and ‘utilitarian’
arguments – in place of a fixed purpose or happiness, the key to
Nietzsche’s morality is a commitment to the future of humankind.

A point for reflection

Through the ‘will to power’, one should ‘give style’ to one’s
character and the greatest enjoyment is ‘to live dangerously!’ In
Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche said of morality: ‘Every morality is
a rationalization of fear, a set of safety instructions on how to live
at peace with the most dangerous aspects of one’s self.’
* What might a modern psychologist make of this?
* How is it possible to be afraid of aspects of oneself, or to
regard oneself as dangerous?
* What might be the ethical implication of admitting that,
consciously or unconsciously, we have a ‘will to power’ and
that it is the source of our values?

Virtue ethics
Rather than starting with questions about whether a particular
action is right or wrong, it is equally possible to approach ethics by

6 personal development and virtue 61

asking what it means to be a ‘good’ person. In other words, we ask
what virtues or qualities a person should possess if they are to live
the good life.
This virtue ethics approach goes back to Aristotle, who was
concerned to understand what constituted the good life. Virtues
are those qualities that can enable someone to live well and fulfil
themselves as a human being. There are various lists of virtues, but
the cardinal virtues listed by the Ancient Greeks were temperance,
justice, courage and prudence.
If these qualities enable a person to express and live out his or
her true – or essential – nature, then there will be parallels between
virtue ethics and the natural law approach that we examined in
Chapter 3. Natural law understood morality in terms of conforming
to one’s essential nature; the virtues summarize the personal
qualities that enable that to happen.
With the rise of utilitarianism and Kantian ethics, alongside
the older Natural Law approach, the virtues had not featured much
in ethical debates until the 1950s, when virtue ethics was examined
again, particularly associated with the work of Phillipa Foot and
Elizabeth Anscombe. Although the basic argument – seeing
virtues as dispositions to act in a particular way, and as a means
of self-fulfilment – was not new, what was new was that it shifted
moral debate away from general rules and principles of behaviour
and towards more general questions about value and meaning in
life, and the qualities that were worth developing and encouraging.
In particular this appealed to feminist thinkers, who had seen
the rationalism of other ethical theories as being influenced by
particularly male ways of approaching life, based on rights and
duties, whereas they sought a more ‘feminine’ approach that
included a recognition of the value of relationships and intimacy.
It also had the advantage of being a naturalistic ethic, in
that it moved away from the idea of simply obeying rules, to an
appreciation of how one might express one’s fundamental nature
and thus fulfil one’s potential as a human being. That had a great
appeal to those who were critical of the narrowness of ethical

62 ethics made easy

debate, and who wanted to explore human potential in a much
broader context.
There are important questions raised by virtue ethics:
* Do we have a fixed essence? Are there, for example,
particular feminine qualities that all women should seek to
express, and which constitute feminine virtues? Or is our
nature dependent on our surroundings and upbringing?
* If there are different ways of expressing the same virtue
(e.g. out of love, one person might seek euthanasia, another
seek to prolong life), how should you choose between
them? At that point, is it necessary to fall back on one of
the other ethical theories?

Example
Consider the difference between murder, committed in the course
of a robbery, and killing a loved one who is seriously ill, in order
to prevent further suffering. The latter – euthanasia – is treated
differently, because the intention of the person doing the killing is
quite different. In the first example the vice displayed is greed, in
the second, the virtue displayed is compassion, and that makes a
fundamental difference to the moral significance of the act itself.

Notice here that moral praise of blame focuses on the virtues

or vices of the people concerned, not on the absolute legality or
results of their actions.

6 personal development and virtue 63

 7
scepticism
and
relativism

64 ethics made easy

So far we have been examining ethical
theories that seek to establish a basis upon
which one can make a rational decision about
matters of right and wrong. But this whole
enterprise may be challenged from two points
of view: scepticism and relativism.

A sceptic – as the name implies – doubts

our ability to establish a universal or general
principle by which we can settle moral issues.
Sometimes people take this view because the
complex reality of life and the demands of
particular situations do not seem compatible
with any one clear, rational ethical system.
We shall look at the political advice given by
Machiavelli to illustrate this.

Equally, it is possible to argue that all moral

norms are socially established, and therefore
that different societies may have mutually
incompatible sets of moral values between
which that there is no rational way to decide
whether any one is better than any other.

7 scepticism and relativism 65

 In the context of ethics, scepticism is the view that there are
no solid foundations for ethical theories or principles. It may take the
form of a scientific argument for a determinist position – thereby
suggesting that freedom of choice is an illusion, and therefore that
moral responsibility is also illusory. It may equally take the form of
a logical argument that questions each assumption and attempts
to show that there is no foundation for morality that cannot be
challenged. It may even be expressed in the assumption that,
whatever they may claim, people are only motivated by their own
self-interest.
We shall look at one exponent of a political philosophy that
comes as near as one might choose to scepticism, namely that of
Machiavelli. Whether The Prince was taken to be serious advice for
the aspiring ruler, or written with the wry smile of one who has long
observed how people actually survive in the political jungle, need
not greatly concern us. It does, however, offer a moral scepticism
that verges on the cynical.
An equal threat to those who would espouse absolute moral
principles is relativism. All ethical theories are relativist to some
extent – in the sense that it is widely accepted that moral rules
should be applied in a way that is sensitive to the particular
situation and context. However, relativism can be pursued to the
point of saying that all moral norms and principles originate within
a social context. Hence they are not autonomous and cannot be
applied universally. Society decides what is right or wrong, and may
be free to change its mind.
Because relativism appears to be sensitive to the autonomy of
the individual and the cultural context of human action, it tends to
be more ‘reasonable’ and perhaps even more moral that scepticism.
However, a thoroughgoing relativism makes moral debate very
difficult, for debate depends on agreed principles and norms, and
if these are culturally conditioned then they too can be challenged
and dismissed.
Perhaps the question to ask in this chapter is whether the
combined influence of scepticism and relativism invalidates the
ethical arguments and theories that we have been considering

66 ethics made easy

so far, or whether they are simply a restraining influence on those
who would define morality too narrowly.

Philosophers or politicians?
Kant was a professional philosopher, and by all accounts his
life was regular and carefully ordered. His thought is precise and
logical, as we saw in the examination of his ‘categorical imperative’
(see Chapter 5).
* He presents us with three simple rules – that we should
be prepared to universalize the principles on which we act,
that we should treat people as ends in themselves and not
merely as means to our own ends, and we should act as
though taking responsibility for legislating for a kingdom of
ends. All three are eminently sensible criteria by which to
assess our moral choices.
* He does not offer practical advice for specific situations,
but the most general of guidelines.
Why then might one hesitate to accept Kant as the ultimate
judge of acceptable action? Perhaps because in the actual world
of crises and moral decisions, life is seldom as straightforward as it
would seem from Kant’s standpoint.
To get a realistic view of moral choices we need to balance
what we feel ‘ought’ to happen by a study of what does actually
happen. From Kant’s perspective, much of what happens (especially,
perhaps, in the world of politics) might be regarded as immoral.
But is that fair? Should we not look carefully at the actual choices
that people make if they are to rule? Should we not balance the
innocent simplicity of the categorical imperative against the
experience of one who sees the consequence of always acting
innocently?
For a very different perspective we shall therefore turn to a
politician – a fifteenth-century Italian from Florence, a diplomat
and shrewd (if cynical) observer of the realities of political life.
His maxims are rather different from those of Kant, and he treats
morality with a good degree of scepticism!

7 scepticism and relativism 67

 Machiavelli
Machiavelli was essentially a practical man. His book The Prince
gives advice to one who would seek to rule a principality, and it is
set against the political intrigues of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century
Italy. It looks at the realities of political life, the need for stern action,
the need to use power in a way that is effective, the need to act
creatively and decisively, breaking all the conventional moral rules if
necessary in order to deal in a pragmatic way with the demands of
high office.
Machiavelli’s views are suitable to balance against Kant’s for
three reasons:
* Kant is concerned with the ‘categorical imperative’ – the
‘ought’ that does not depend on conditions. Machiavelli is
concerned almost all the time with ‘hypothetical imperatives’,
such as what you need to do in order to retain power. The
implication of this is that, in most practical situations, it is the
hypothetical rather than the categorical that constitutes the
normal sphere of ‘moral’ (to Machiavelli) operations.
* Kant argues that you should always treat people as ends,
not as means. Machiavelli recognizes that there are
occasions when a ruler must act cruelly against one person
or group of people in order to establish fear as a deterrent
against lawlessness, for example.
* Kant thinks one should legislate for a kingdom of ends.
Machiavelli knows that treating people as ends in
themselves might well lead to anarchy and chaos.
Let us look at just a little of Machiavelli’s advice. Here, for
example, are his words to a ruler who has taken over a state, but it
might equally apply to a managing director who has taken over an
ailing company, or a politician inheriting a new ministry.
So it should be noted that when he seizes a state the new ruler
ought to determine all the injuries that he will need to inflict.
He should inflict them once for all, and not have to renew
them every day, and in that way he will be able to set men’s
minds at rest, and win them over to him when he confers
benefits. Whoever acts otherwise, either through timidity

68 ethics made easy

 or bad advice, is always forced to have the knife ready in his
hand and he can never depend on his subjects because they,
suffering fresh and continuous violence, can never feel secure
with regard to him. Violence should be inflicted once for
all; people will then forget what it tastes like and so be less
resentful. Benefits should be conferred gradually; and in that
way they will taste better.
(The Prince, section VIII)

Like a surgeon, forced in some extreme circumstances to

operate without anaesthetic, one is sometimes in a position where
the inflicting of pain is inevitable and ultimately beneficial.
It might seem irrelevant to ask ‘Am I prepared for everyone to
operate without anaesthetics?’ because clearly the actual decision
is not based on a general theory but on the immediate and unique
situation. The surgeon might say ‘This is not how I would choose
to act, but in the circumstances it is right for me to do so.’ What
Machiavelli is saying (and using a utilitarian argument to justify
it) is that less harm will be done by decisive action, than by a
compassionate but indecisive muddle.
And here the advice to a ruler might be adapted for a new
teacher, taking over an unruly class:
So a prince should not worry if he incurs reproach for his
cruelty so long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal. By
making an example or two he will prove more compassionate
than those who, being too compassionate, allow disorders
which lead to murder and rapine. These nearly always harm
the whole community, whereas executions ordered by a
prince only affect individuals.
(The Prince, section XVIII)

He acknowledges the traditional virtues, but comments:

… taking everything into account, he (the prince) will find
that some of the things that appear to be virtues will, if he
practises them, ruin him, and some of the things that appear
to be wicked will bring him security and prosperity.
(The Prince, section XV)

7 scepticism and relativism 69

 Now this is not to dismiss entirely the idea that a ruler should
do good, merely that a ruler should be flexible enough to recognize
that it is not always prudent.

… he should have a flexible disposition, varying as fortune and

circumstances dictate. As I said above, he should not deviate
from what is good, if that is possible, but he should know how
to do evil, if that is necessary.
(The Prince, section XVIII)

For our purposes, there are four features of Machiavelli’s advice

that we may need to take into account:
* In many situations, traditional virtues may be set aside,
and actions judged on a utilitarian basis. Keeping order and
minimizing pain take precedence over traditional moral
principles.
* Actions depend on the duties and responsibilities of the
position you hold in society. A prince might be justified,
therefore, in doing something that would not be acceptable
in one of his subjects. Once you have accepted the position
of ruler, you are obliged to seek the benefit and integrity of
the state – your morality in other respects being subsumed
beneath that overall obligation. Morality is therefore related
to social position.
* In practical terms, one needs to be flexible, adapting moral
principles to suit particular situations.
* What we do should depend on our awareness of the likely
actions and attitudes of those around us. If everyone else
were good, there would be no problem – but they are not,
and so we remain naively innocent at our own peril.
There is, of course, an answer to Machiavelli, but it is not
an easy one. One could say: ‘I will do what I know to be right, no
matter what the consequences, to myself, my family and friends,
my country. I will not compromise my integrity, however much
pain that might cause.’ That is a valid moral position to take, for
someone who holds his or her principles very dear. Martyrs take
such a stand.

70 ethics made easy

 Let Machiavelli stand for those who are sceptical about
the application of moral principles. This is not a total scepticism
about moral values – which implies that there are no values other
than those that individuals choose to impose on life – it is just
scepticism about the application of general rules to individual
situations.

Situation ethics
In the 1960s, largely as a reaction against what he saw as
a paternalistic and imposed morality of traditional Christianity,
Joseph Fletcher developed situation ethics.
He argued against the deductive method of ethics (in which
you start with a rule or principle, and then apply it to various
particular cases), and suggested that the individual situation should
be paramount. He believed that there should be a single moral
principle – that you should do whatever is the most loving
thing. Ethical rules were of secondary importance; they might
guide a person, but should not dictate right and wrong.
The requirement to do the most loving thing is not a rule
or law – it does not say what you should do in any particular
situation – it merely gives a motive and attitude that can inform
moral choice. Of course, a person may act foolishly out of love,
with disastrous consequences, but nevertheless, from a strictly
situationist ethical perspective, it is still morally right. Each
situation is taken and judged by what love requires, and if that
means breaking some conventional moral rule, it is right to do so.
Situation ethics, in putting individual circumstances before
fixed moral rules, nevertheless accepted one absolute principle:
love. But what if there is no absolute principle that can be applied
to all situations? This leads us to the general issue of relativism.

Relativism and moral absolutes

Any absolutist approach to ethics is going to argue that it is
possible to find a basic feature of the world, human nature, biology

7 scepticism and relativism 71

or pure reason on which a system of ethics can be built. Once that
foundation is established, moral principles and the right or wrong
of particular actions can follow by logical deduction and practical
application.
That is not to imply that absolutist ethics is inflexible; all moral
systems need to take some account of particular circumstances,
intentions and so on. However, every absolutist ethic is based on
something other than itself, some reality or shared value, by which it
is justified. Looking at the ethical theories we have considered so far:
* Natural law ethics is based on a rational interpretation of
purpose within a rationally comprehensible universe.
* Virtue ethics is based on an understanding of the essence
of what it is to be a mature human being, and the virtues
that spring from that.
* Utilitarianism is based on the assumption that a rational
person (whether from altruism or enlightened self-interest)
will want a democratic sharing out of benefits.
* Kant based his ethics on the pure practical reason and the
logical application of his categorical imperative.
* Even where personal development, whether with a fixed
idea of the self or an evolutionary one, is used as a basis for
ethics, it is based on an ideal of what a person can become
and understands morality in the light of that.
This does not imply that any of these are ‘absolutist’ in any
narrow sense, but it does show that they all depend on some prior
commitment or understanding, by which right and wrong can be
judged.
Relativism also starts with a couple of basic assumptions, but
they are very different from any of those listed above. It assumes:
* that the only absolute rule is that there are no absolute
rules
* that nobody should impose his or her morality on
anyone else.
Early in this book (see Chapter 2) we made the distinction
between descriptive and normative ethics. The former simply
described what people do in particular situations, without

72 ethics made easy

attempting to label that behaviour either right or wrong.
The latter – which then became the subject matter of all that
followed, was concerned with defining and understanding moral
norms. Descriptive ethics is relativist. In other words, if you say
‘people in such and such a tribe practise cannibalism’ you are not
making a judgement about whether cannibalism is right or wrong,
you are simply noting that it is socially acceptable in that tribe.
What a relativist approach to ethics is doing is extending
descriptive ethics into the territory that was previously held by
normative ethics. In other words, it argues that all issues of right
and wrong should be seen as culturally, socially and temporally
conditioned. We should not take moral norms or rules from one
society and impose them on another; nor should we assume that
the rules that applied in one era can be continued into another.
Those who argue for any of the traditional ethical systems
tend to regard relativism as a dangerous medicine; taken in small
quantities it is useful (in warning against too rigid an application of
ethical maxims), but overdoses can be fatal – in the sense that they
tend to preclude the rational discussion of genuine differences of
opinion.

7 scepticism and relativism 73

 8
applied
ethics

74 ethics made easy

During the first half of the twentieth century,
philosophers were mainly concerned with
meta-ethics, exploring what it meant to make
a moral statement, but were not expected to
engage directly in debating moral issues. That
situation has changed dramatically during the
last fifty years. The anti-war movements of the
1960s and 1970s, the contraceptive pill, the
sexual revolution, feminism, environmental
issues, global warming, terrorism and financial
crises have all thrust ethics to the fore.

Ethical theories only come alive when they

are applied to real-life situations and used
to inform moral choice. The range of applied
ethics today is huge: environmental ethics,
gender issues, sexuality, equality and fairness
across economic, racial or religious divides,
business ethics, medical and nursing ethics,
professional ethics, media ethics.

In this chapter we select just four topics – the

natural environment, animal rights, warfare and
abortion – in order to show something of the
way in which ethical theories may be applied.

8 applied ethics 75
The natural environment
We have to recognize that the human species, both by
its numbers and its technology, has a massive impact on the
environment. Yet, until recently, almost all moral thinking focused on
human happiness of benefit; directly so in the case of utilitarianism,
indirectly in the natural law arguments or the categorical
imperative. The tendency has been to seek human flourishing first
of all, and to consider other species or other elements in the natural
environment only insofar as they impact on humans.
A stone cannot feel pain, or express a preference; therefore, it
has traditionally been ignored in moral debates. From a utilitarian
point of view, the environment (and other species living within it)
has too often only been seen as a moral issue when its destruction
threatens to harm humankind.
This approach tends to be short sighted, however, since we are
not able to assess the full impact of, for example, climate change
on the human species, quite apart from the question of any moral
responsibility towards other species or the natural environment for
its own sake.

Example
If rainforests are destroyed, we may be concerned because:
* climate change will affect us all
* many medicines are discovered through analysis of rare
plant species, many of which are still to be found in the
rainforests.
In both cases, this reflects a narrowly utilitarian argument. It does
not imply any responsibility towards the rainforest in itself, nor to
the other species who live in it.

A second approach is implied by what has already been said

about the ‘natural law’ argument. Whether backed by religious
convictions or not, there may be a sense that everything – humans,
other species, the planet itself – has its place within an overall
scheme of things, a ‘final cause’ that is its natural destiny. This

76 ethics made easy

approach is based on metaphysics, in that it goes beyond descriptions
of the physical environment to consider issues of value, meaning and
the fundamental structures of reality. It may conclude that the world
and its many species should be valued, quite apart from any specific
or demonstrable benefit to humankind.

For reflection
The human population is about 6.8 billion and is set to rise to more
than 9 billion by 2050. The planet cannot sustain such growth in
a species that has such a significant impact on the environment.
Whatever is done by way of ethically responsible lifestyle changes
in order to reduce the ‘human environmental footprint’ (in other
words, the impact of each person on the planet) it remains true
that the only way to reduce a person’s footprint to zero is for
him or her not to be born! We immediately move on to issues of
contraception, population control, social provision, education and
so on – all of which impact on the birth rate. And once you do
that, moral arguments from a ‘natural law’ perspective (opposing
contraception, for example) start to come into play, to be balanced
against a utilitarian assessment of future suffering due to an
unsustainable population.

Whether arguing from a utilitarian or natural law basis, it is

clear that lifestyle options have a direct impact on the environment.
Those concerned to preserve the ecosystems on which life depends,
need to make a case for changes in our attitudes to those things
that most people take for granted as part of an affluent lifestyle.

Action on climate change

The climate change summit held in Copenhagen in December 2009
failed to achieve any legally binding agreements to lower carbon
emissions, to the frustration of most of those involved. While
accepting the scientific evidence for the impact of global warming
on the future of the planet, and recognizing that something needs

8 applied ethics 77
 to be done to restrain the rise in temperatures, all that the summit
achieved was a general statement of intent.

There were many complex political and economic issues standing

in the way of an agreement, but in terms of ethics, the problem
lay in conflicting utilitarian calculations. On the one hand, there
is the long-term benefit to the planet of binding agreements to
ensure the reduction of the human contribution to climate change.
On the other, is the need for political leaders to calculate the
benefits sought by their people in a world where nations compete
against one another. In the end, national self-interest (and thus
the satisfaction of the preferences of a majority of people in each
country) seemed to take precedence over the preference of the
global community.

When Rawls argued for justice as fairness he required those who

came to decide on the principles of justice to forget who they were.
The problem is, in the real world, those who come together to take
decisions that affect the whole globe simply cannot forget where
they come from or whom they represent.

Animal rights
So far, everything we have been considering has been
concerned with the way in which human beings treat one another,
but humankind is just one of many species on this planet, so we need
to ask if the sort of moral considerations that have been applied to
the treatment of other human beings should be extended to include
other species.
This does not imply that animals should behave
morally – without reason, morality makes no sense. A cat,
offered the prospect of killing a mouse, acts instinctively,
but (as we shall consider in a moment) humans can choose
how they will behave towards other species.
But do we as a species have any moral obligations towards
other species? Do animals have rights – and, if so, how are those

78 ethics made easy

rights assessed? Let us look at the way in which some ethical
arguments might be applied to animals.
In practical terms, we may want to ask:
* Is it right to keep wild animals caged in zoos?
* Is the concept of making an animal into a ‘pet’ one that
damages its original nature?
* Should we breed favourite species on grounds of aesthetic
appeal?

Fairness
Ethical theories that are based on the idea of a social contract
drawn up between people are concerned with the fairness within
a relationship. Each party accepts responsibilities and in return
receives rights. Can this sort of theory be applied to other
species?
A pet is accepted into a human social setting for the benefit of
the humans. For example, looking after a pet hamster may be a way
of encouraging children to take responsibility generally, as well as
giving them pleasure. A dog or cat may be good company, especially
for people living on their own. A family pet may be thought to offer
something positive to the life and atmosphere of a family home.
A relationship develops between the pet animal and the humans,
through expressions of affection and shared enjoyments (like dog
and owner taking walks together).
In what way does the animal benefit from this arrangement?
By being given food and shelter, veterinary care and all else needed,
to enable it to live out its natural lifespan in a measure of comfort
seldom offered in its natural habitat?
Where animals are treated cruelly, once accepted into the
human environment, then it is clear that the humans have not
acted fairly in terms of the implied contract between themselves
and the animal.
In other words, if you accept a pet, you have a moral
responsibility to care for it in a way that is appropriate to its needs.
That is only fair, according to the implied contract you have with it.
You may be prosecuted for inhumane treatment on that basis.

8 applied ethics 79
 Natural law
It might be argued that humans have no right to be entering
into such implied contracts with animals. The Islamic view of life,
for example, is that animals should not be kept as pets or put
into zoos. It regards this as basically unnatural, and therefore as
violating the natural life and instincts of the animal. In this case,
the argument being used is one of ‘natural law’; that animals
have their natural place within the scheme of things, and are
not to be treated as pets. Respect for the animal demands that it
should be treated as an animal, not as a quasi-human, manicured,
clipped and paraded!
On the other hand, animals in the wild feed on one another.
Humans are omnivorous, and therefore have a choice – they can
either eat animals or remain vegetarian. A natural law argument
might well accept that there is a place for the eating of meat, and
therefore also for the farming of animals. But if the eating of meat
in order to sustain life is justified under natural law, what about
the conditions in which the farming of animals takes place? Most
species do not have any choice about their feeding habits; they
simply catch what they can. The human species, on the other
hand, controls the production of animals for food. Does such
control imply moral responsibility?

Example
A cat will play with, kill and eat a mouse. The sight of this might
be extremely distasteful, but it is a cat’s nature to do so. However
much the cat may have been domesticated, it is still a natural
hunter with killer instincts. On the other hand, if I decide to take a
pet mouse out of its cage, set it free in a room and then chase after
it, biting it from time to time before killing and eating it, I would be
considered to be acting in a way that is unnatural, and the morality
of having such a supper would be questioned. My feeding habits
might feature in a tabloid newspaper, and I might find myself under
pressure to accept psychotherapy. I would certainly be banned
from keeping pet mice.

80 ethics made easy

 * What distinguishes me from the cat in this respect?
* Does my rationality and ability to choose other sources of food
mean that I have a moral responsibility towards the mouse?
If I were starving, would I be morally justified in eating the mouse?

The treatment of animals is connected with questions about

diet and standards of living. If fresh meat is enjoyed occasionally,
and a roast chicken is regarded as a delicacy, it becomes more
possible to breed chickens in humane circumstances – fewer are
needed and people will pay more for what is considered a delicacy.
On the other hand, if people expect to eat meat every day, the
demand goes up and artificial methods are found to maximize
the efficiency of meat production. A change in eating habits and
expectations therefore implies a change in attitude to animals, even
aside from the issue of vegetarianism.

How do you assess the fairness of an implied contract in which a

member of one species is born, reared and fattened, and then killed
to feed members of another species? All the gains would seem to
be on one side. The animal used for food is not considered as an
individual member of a species, but simply as a source of protein.

Natural law sees everything – and therefore every species –

as having a place within the overall scheme of things within the
universe. Hence animals are regarded as having significance,
but not the same significance as human beings, since they have
a very different essence. Where a metaphysics is evolutionary,
or emphasizes the interrelationship between all life forms – for
example within Buddhism – the welfare of one species is bound
up with the welfare of others, and the treatment of animals is
therefore most definitely a moral concern.

Experiments on animals
Animal rights activists target laboratories that conduct
experiments on animals – and tend to do so irrespective of the

8 applied ethics 81
purpose of the research being undertaken. In other words, they
oppose the use of animals in this way, whether the aim is to find a
cure for a serious human disease or whether it is to test cosmetics.
In this, they are rejecting a utilitarian approach.
Using a utilitarian argument, the gains to be anticipated must
outweigh the pain inflicted. Thus, if it is possible to use an animal
in a test that might result in a cure for a serious disease, then many
people would judge that a morally acceptable thing to do. Of course,
it would need to be shown that as little suffering as possible was
inflicted on the animals concerned. On the other hand, the testing of
cosmetics on animals does not yield life-saving benefits. Cosmetics
are not essential to life. The use of cosmetics that have been tested
on animals is therefore optional, a matter of personal moral choice.
One teenager, campaigning for the use of cruelty-free cosmetics,
used the slogan ‘Make up your mind before you make up your face’
to highlight the nature of the choice involved.
Therefore, using a combination of a natural respect for the
life of animals and a utilitarian approach to the expected gains
from experimentation, the main moral questions about animal
experimentation may be set out as:
* Is it necessary to use animals in these tests, or is there
some other way to obtain the same information?
* Are the tests carried out in such a way as to minimize the
pain caused?
* Are the anticipated results of the tests of sufficient
importance to justify the suffering involved?

The rights and needs of animals

The Australian philosopher Peter Singer is particularly well known
for his work on the ethics of our treatment of animals – although he
is influential across the whole area of applied ethics. His approach
is utilitarian, in other words he wants to consider the happiness or
benefit of all concerned. Unlike earlier utilitarians, however, he sees no
reason why the argument should be limited to humans. Just because
animals cannot express their preferences, it does not follow that the
benefit or harm caused to them should not be taken into account in

82 ethics made easy

a utilitarian assessment. In his view, any creature that is capable of
feeling pain deserves to have its needs taken into consideration.

Singer argues that, just as we now recognize that sexism and racism
are wrong, so we should avoid ‘speciesism’ – giving privileged or
exclusive consideration to the needs or preferences of the human
species to the exclusion of all others.

In general, the argument of the animal rights movement –

and others who want to consider the welfare of animals without
considering themselves to be part of a campaign or movement – is
that other species should be considered as worthy of consideration
in themselves, and not used as the property of human beings.
Hence, for example, some would argue that just as liberty and
protection from the threat of cruel treatment is regarded as basic to
the rights of a human being, so they should be extended to animals.
Just as, in any preference utilitarian argument, we need to
look at the particular situation and needs of the people involved,
so we may need to consider what rights are appropriate for each
particular species. Part of that may be a consideration of those
things that animals seek in order to live and reproduce. An example
(given by James Rachels in Can Ethics Provide Answers?) is that of
a bird building a nest. Clearly, if we watch a bird build a nest and
then take that nest away, or deliberately destroy it, we are depriving
that bird of something that it needs, and it will have to start
building all over again. Similarly, if another bird takes over a nest
that is already built, we might tend to see that as unjust. Hence, by
looking at the needs of a bird, we might conclude that the right to
gain benefit from a nest that it has built would seem to be a fairly
clear right. And that amounts to giving property rights to the bird,
since the bird has invested effort in taking twigs (nominally the
property of nobody and everybody) and investing energy and skill
in constructing a property out of them.
This is further reflected in the fact that it is illegal to steal and
sell rare birds eggs. A species of bird is deemed to have the right to
reproduce itself, and that right is taken away if its eggs are stolen.

8 applied ethics 83
 In this way, one can build up a case for some basic rights, appropriate
to the essential needs of each species, the upholding of which will
allow that species to survive and have the opportunity to flourish.
Unfortunately for those concerned about animal welfare,
there are some today who might still follow the line taken by the
eighteenth-century philosopher Immanuel Kant, who said:
But so far as animals are concerned, we have no direct duties.
Animals are not self-conscious, and they are merely as means
to an end. That end is man.
(from Lectures on Ethics, quoted by Rachels
in Can Ethics Provide Answers?, p. 100)

That is a classic example of what Singer calls ‘speciesism’, but it

is in line with Kant’s moral theory – namely that he wants to consider
human beings as autonomous and rational ends in themselves. We
have already seen the difficulty of applying Kant’s principles in a world
where people do not behave rationally. That applies equally to a world
in which sentient and sensitive beings happen to belong to other
species and are therefore unable to have a rational discussion with us!

War and peace

War is the most destructive of all human activities – not just in
terms of the loss of life and the damage done to the infrastructure
of a country, but in the broader sense that war takes away the
basic security that enables civilization to continue, for civilization
depends on security and peace. Ethical issues arise whenever peace
is threatened by an act of aggression, and, in general, actions are
deemed ‘just’ or ‘right’ if they aim to re-establish peace and justice.
But if a just peace can only be secured by the use or threat of
violence, does that make it right?
It is not surprising then that there is an ongoing debate about
the ethics of war, and this section will try to outline just a few of
the key issues. The debate centres on a number of questions:
* When, if at all, is it right to go to war?
* Who has the right to declare war? A single nation? The UN?
* How should wars be fought, if they cannot be avoided?

84 ethics made easy

 * Is any one form of weapon inherently morally better than
another?
* Is the use (or even the possession) of weapons of mass
destruction ever justified ethically?
* How do you distinguish terrorism from warfare?
* Is it possible to guard against terrorism and warfare
without eroding either civil liberties or the right of nations
to self-determination?
And behind these questions are others relating to the relationship
between individuals, minority groups and nations, where these give
rise to conflicting loyalties. There is also the question of religion,
and how that relates to the divisions between or within nations.

The ‘just war’ theory

The starting point here is whether, and in what circumstances,
a war can be considered just. There are two categories of issues here:
* Those concerned with the right to go to war (jus ad bellum).
* Those concerned with the way in which a war should be
fought (jus in bello).
The principles for this were set out by Thomas Aquinas in
the thirteenth century, but with later developments. A just war
approach would argue that:
1 It may be just to go to war if:
* It is done by proper authority (e.g. by a nation, not by an
individual. Can a terrorist group be a ‘proper authority’?
And what of ‘state-sponsored’ terrorism – if the group has
the backing of one or more sovereign states, would that
make the act a valid act of war?)
* There is a good reason to go to war (e.g. in self-defence.
But does that give a nation the right to a pre-emptive strike
against another, for example on the basis of intelligence
that suggests the other is in possession of weapons of mass
destruction?)
* The intention of going to war is to establish peace and
justice (in other words, war should not become an end in
itself, but only a means of restoring justice).

8 applied ethics 85
 2 The conduct of war is considered right only if:
* It is waged against military personnel, not against
civilians. (But is it ever possible to wage war without
civilian casualties, either directly or indirectly? Can ‘smart
weapons’, which claim to minimize ‘collateral’ damage,
be seen as more acceptable morally? What about the
economic harm and further suffering that civilians face
even when the war is over?)
* The force used is proportional. (In other words, the harm
likely to be caused by an action should not outweigh what
that action sets out to gain. It is very difficult to judge
this, but an example of its failure might be the huge loss
of life in some of the battles of the First World War, for a
negligible gain.)
* Minimum force is used in order to achieve one’s end
(which would preclude the use of all weapons of mass
destruction, or excessive conventional force against a
lightly defended target).
Those who go against the accepted norms of warfare may
be accused of crimes against humanity if, for example, they
deliberately set out to kill civilians. Here the issue is intention; was
that killing the accidental consequence of military action or its
deliberate aim? In other words, if civilians are killed because a bomb
fails to hit its intended military target, does this have the same
moral force as the deliberate disregard for civilian life? In weighing
up such things, we need to ask if sufficient care was taken by those
planning the attack, and so on.
In terms of the ethical principles that underlie the conduct of
war, there are two basic lines of argument. One is conformity to
agreed statements about rights and responsibilities in the conduct
of war. An example of this would be the Geneva Conventions about
the treatment of those military personnel who are captured in
war, prohibiting torture and so on. The other approach is to use a
utilitarian assessment – whether it is the overall aim of a war, or the
use of a particular weapon, there is a balance between what it is
hoped to gain (e.g. ending the war sooner, restoring justice, saving

86 ethics made easy

the lives of other military or civilians) against the destruction and
loss of life involved.

Terrorism
In general, acts of terrorism are condemned on a ‘just war’
theory, even if those carrying them out claim that their cause is
just, because:
* They are not backed by legitimate authority. (But should
a nation state constitute that authority, or the United
Nations? Can a religion constitute valid authority?)
* They are generally (but not always) aimed at causing
civilian casualties as a means of influencing public and
political opinion.
In a war situation, the invading nation has a responsibility to
restore peace to the country it invades. Failure to take proper steps
to manage the aftermath of war detracts from any moral validity in
conducting that war in the first place. With terrorism, this is simply
not possible.
There is a fundamental problem with historical perspectives
on this. Yesterday’s terrorist may, in retrospect, be seen as a
freedom fighter and become an ally. This is particularly significant
where terrorism has been limited (or has attempted to limit itself)
to attacks on military personnel or other representatives of the
state, rather than on the civilian population. Hence, the terrorist of
today may see his or her action as an expression of a struggle that
will one day vindicate the acts of terror.
The standard counter to such an argument is that all other
methods to restore justice should have been exhausted before
resorting to violence, which is seldom the case. However, it is asking
a great deal of people who are being oppressed that they should
continue indefinitely to press for peaceful means of change.
But even if all other means of bringing about change have been
tried and failed, it is still far from clear how you establish a utilitarian
justification of violence in terms of its long-term results. The terrorist
might claim that his or her action will, in the long run, contribute to
an overall justice and will therefore be justified. Others will argue

8 applied ethics 87
that the intended end result, however just in itself, cannot be used to
justify acts that deliberately cause suffering to the innocent.

Weaponry
All weapons which by their nature and method of use are
likely to cause civilian casualties, are not a proportionate response
to a threat or do not represent minimum necessary force, may
be deemed wrong. In the extreme case, the use of weapons of
mass destruction (i.e. nuclear, chemical and biological weapons),
which by their nature cause widespread damage and loss of life,
cannot be justified. The only justification for holding such weapons
is deterrence. On the other hand, conventional weapons, used
inappropriately (e.g. the systematic bombing of cities) can have the
same devastating effect as weapons of mass destruction, and can
therefore be condemned on the same basis.
Smart weapons are designed to destroy their pre-selected
targets and minimize collateral damage. Is a smart weapon
inherently more moral than one that kills in a less well targeted way,
or that causes more civilian casualties? Clearly, from a utilitarian
standpoint it is, since it aims to minimise suffering. But that does not
imply that the use of the weapon is right in itself – the situation may
be one in which it is wrong to use any weapon, smart or otherwise.

The beginning and end of life

If ethics is concerned with examining moral issues that relate
to the rights and responsibilities of individuals and to the value of
human life that are implied by them, it is understandable that all
matters related to choosing when life should begin and when it
should end, are going to be of particular importance. Ethics is most
sharply focused when it is a matter of life or death, whether that is
at the beginning or end of the human lifespan.

Abortion
Of all the ethical issues people face today, abortion is probably
the one that most clearly illustrates the contrasting bases on

88 ethics made easy

which moral judgements are made. The facts are not in doubt, the
arguments have been presented time and again, and yet there is no
consensus view.
The issue of abortion can be approached logically,
pragmatically, or from the standpoint of the personal, physical and
emotional needs of the woman who seeks the abortion. It can be
seen as an intensely personal issue, or one that is a touchstone
for the protection of human rights throughout society. Abortion
may be seen on one side as a woman’s right, and on the other as
the first step towards compulsory euthanasia, selective breeding
and wholesale denial of the uniqueness and rights of each human
person.
British law requires that the agreement of two doctors be
given for a pregnancy to be terminated. Abortion can be legally
permitted if the foetus is seriously defective, if the risk to the health
of the mother from having the child is considered greater than
the risk of the termination, and if the birth of the child would have
a seriously damaging effect on the mother, taking into account
the psychological and social situation of the mother and other
members of the family.
Abortions can take place (according to British law) up to
24 weeks after conception. However, they can be performed after
that if there is a risk that the mother will be permanently injured
by continuing with the pregnancy, or if the child is seriously
handicapped.

An anti-abortion argument
Both the ancient Greeks and Romans killed weak or deformed
babies by exposing them to the elements. This was justified
ethically by both Plato and Aristotle, on the grounds that death was
to be preferred to a stunted life.
Christianity opposed this, on the grounds that each person had
an eternal soul, and was made in the image of God. The decision
about when a person should die was to be left to God alone. The
crucial question is: When does human life start? If the foetus has a
‘soul’ then it should be protected.

8 applied ethics 89
 St Augustine thought that the foetus was ‘animated’
(received its soul) 60 or 80 days after conception. English law
originally followed this principle, and distinguished between
abortions before and after ‘quickening’ – the time when a mother
might feel the movement of the child within her.
In the UK (following the 1990 Human Fertilization and
Embryology Act), the age limit for abortions was lowered to
24 weeks (except in exceptional circumstances, where the health of
the mother is seriously threatened). In the USA, the Supreme Court
decision of 1973 set the time limit for abortions at six months.
The general recognition here is that it is wrong to kill a foetus
if it is capable of surviving independently. At this point, it receives
the right of protection as a separate human being. The point made
by the anti-abortionists is that such right of protection should be
extended back to the earliest stages of conception.
It could be argued that many pregnancies are terminated
naturally, which might make an abortion an ‘elected miscarriage’, and
that therefore there is no reason why an individual foetus should be
protected. But this argument is not logical. Human beings are being
killed naturally all the time. If I stab someone through the heart,
I cannot plead in my defence that many people suffer sudden cardiac
arrest, and that I am simply electing that the person should die in
that particular way. To induce a cardiac arrest is an action for which
I would be morally responsible. To terminate the life of a foetus is also
an action for which moral responsibility should be taken, irrespective
of whether or not nature might have done the same thing.
Those who oppose abortion also point out that, once life is
devalued at one particular point, then all life is under threat. They
may present abortion as a touchstone for assessing issues like
involuntary euthanasia, or even eugenics (selective breeding). Once
the principle is established that it is legally and morally acceptable to
destroy life in one particular case, then life in general is threatened.

The pro-freedom argument

This argument is not presented as pro-abortion, because
very few people would actually choose to have an abortion. It is

90 ethics made easy

not regarded as a ‘good’ to be sought, but rather as the lesser of
two evils. The argument is about who should decide whether an
abortion is to be carried out.
Those who say that a woman should be free to decide whether
or not to have an abortion generally do so on two grounds:
* That the foetus is essentially part of a woman’s body
until it is capable of independent life, and that the
potential mother herefore has total moral right to do
what she wishes with her potential offspring, simply
because, at this stage, the life is seen as potential, rather
than actual.
* That giving birth to children should be seen in terms of the
overall situation in which a woman finds herself. She should
be free to decide that her own personal development will
be stunted by continuing with the pregnancy, or that the
financial and social circumstances into which the child
would be born would be such, that perhaps the whole
family might suffer as a result.
In part, this argument is utilitarian – weighing the loss of
the potential life now against the benefits to the mother and
others. In utilitarian terms, those who justify abortion generally
use an act utilitarian approach, whereas the anti-abortionists use
a rule utilitarian approach. Even where benefits in this particular
situation appear to go in favour of abortion, a rule utilitarian view
might be that the right to destroy life in one situation threatens
life everywhere, and that the greater good is achieved by giving all
life a chance to develop.
Arguments about abortion may therefore involve all the forms
of ethical justification so far outlined. Natural law is used to protect
the unborn child; utilitarianism in both forms is used to assess the
result of the abortion, personal development and the freedom of an
individual in a ‘right to choose’ argument.
Because women are so intimately involved with the process
of conception, pregnancy, birth and child-rearing, the ethical
discussion of abortion tends to highlight other issues in terms of
women’s rights and their role in society.

8 applied ethics 91
Some conclusions
Moral progress: illusion or
necessary hope?
We live in a world of change; everything evolves, nothing is
fixed. Whether we look at the evolution of species or the changes
happening in society, we try to make sense of change as though
it were a story, and ask about the ending. Faced with change or
development we tend to ask ‘Where is it going?’ Progress – as
opposed to random or circular change – implies a direction and an
end point.
History is always a story told from a particular perspective;
facts in themselves do not make history. In the same way,
descriptive ethics – the catalogue of who does what in what
society and during what era – does not touch on the fundamental
issues of normative ethics. It does not ask if society is ‘better’
now than in Greek, Roman or Medieval times. We may not burn
witches, but do we still torture? Is the freedom to be openly
homosexual a return to the enlightened times of the Greek city
state, recovering from a temporary period of unfair repression?
Is there a new world order emerging, or is universal communication
merely giving the opportunity for people to exploit more
widely?
If facts alone cannot make a normative moral argument, then
facts alone cannot prove that there is moral progress. Hence, any
attempt to prove moral progress will hit the same problem that
utilitarianism finds – that there is no end point at which all the
evidence is in and we can make a definitive judgement. At that level,
moral progress remains an illusion, never unambiguously proved or
demonstrated.
And yet … If there were no sense of progress, of trying to
improve a situation or cultivate a virtue, would the sense of right
and wrong continue? Is having a conscience compatible with an
absence of hope or any sense of what a better life could be?

92 ethics made easy

Insight
The art of living as a human being involves thinking, creating,
hoping, willing; it is always oriented towards the future. We may
look back, but we live forwards.

Without any hope that morality makes sense, the very

experience of morality becomes nonsense. In this sense, moral
progress is a necessary hope – for without it, the rest of moral
discussion loses its significance. There may be no evidence
whatsoever that things are improving. But in the face of that
bleakness, the moral impulse is to want to make it so – to construct
a life according to our intuitions of what is right.
Progress is therefore a bit like freedom; analyse it empirically
and it vanishes. I am utterly determined by events beyond my
control, and yet I sense that I am free to choose what to do. In the
same way, I have no evidence of progress, but the experience of
morality is of constructing a better situation and therefore of
willing progress.

So where does this leave us?

The moral choices people make are based on many things, but
they are rooted in an understanding of the nature of the world, and
the values that arise from that understanding. For some people this
is well thought out and rational; for others it is provided by a religion
and accepted ready made; others act instinctively, their understanding
and valuation of the world working through their unconscious.
In the broadest sense, this is metaphysics: the quest to understand
the meaning and value of the world as a whole. This is the process that
lay behind the ‘natural law’ arguments, but it can be broader than the
world view of Aristotle on which that theory was based.
The moment of moral choice is therefore informed by the
way in which we generally understand and value life. Iris Murdoch
expressed it in this way:
We act rightly ‘When the time comes’ not out of strength of
will but out of a quality of our usual attachments and with the

some conclusions 93
 kind of energy and discernment which we have available. And
to this the whole activity of our consciousness is relevant.
(Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 1970, p. 53)

To ask ‘What should I do?’ implies the question ‘What is life

for?’ Life is constantly changing; nothing, not even our galaxy,
remains fixed. We can try to run from this truth – craving absolutes
that will justify our decisions for all time – but it is an illusion.
Constant change is a reality, and it affects not just the world around
us, but ourselves. We are not fixed as individuals, our minds shape
the future; the choices we make today define the sort of people we
become tomorrow.
We also have to accept that life, however much we shape it
to suit our own ends, involves suffering and death. We can work to
minimize suffering and promote happiness, but we cannot remove
the fact that humans are limited and fragile creatures. Fallibility and
failure are not just accidental features of life that should be quickly
removed and forgotten; they are a feature of living in this sort of
world, in which human aspirations outstrip human abilities.
Every choice we make is informed by many things – hopes,
fears, the things we value and the understanding of life that we
have gathered through education, the influence of others and
personal experience. Whether we recognize this consciously or not,
the act of making a moral choice sums up all that we have become.
The relationship between ethical arguments and the moral life
is rather like that between literary theory and the creative writer,
or between musical theory and the act of composition. Writer and
composer use all their feelings, intuitions, values and insights to
produce a work of art that is unique. Later, the theorists and critics
may analyse it, place it in within categories or the development of
a particular style, or reveal likely influences.
Ethics is rather like that. It analyses moral choices and
devises theories to show how they may be justified. It is a
valuable process, a useful guide for future action, but it can
never fully explain or adequately legislate for the process of
creative living.

94 ethics made easy

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