PHILOSOPHIES AND PEDAGOGIES OF MATHEMATICS

Boris Handal

The University of Sydney

Handal(at)ans.com.au
@ is replaced by (at) to stop the automatic garnering of email addresses by Spam factories - Editor

ABSTRACT

The paper discusses major philosophical stances on the nature of mathematics as held by
foundationalists and quasi-empiricalism supporters. It is argued that the contrasting
philosophical views between the two groups parallels in many respects the pedagogical
debate between behaviourism and socio-constructivism. It is also argued that
behaviourism has been influenced by foundationalist conceptions of mathematics while
socio-constructivism has been influenced by quasi-empirical philosophies.

Introduction

Mathematical beliefs can be studied in the light of major philosophical and pedagogical
stances on the nature, teaching and learning of mathematics. The philosophical and
pedagogical stances portray well-structured representations that have been sometimes the
result of hundreds of years of collective reflection. These macro stances are useful given
their capacity to articulate a background from which other relatively minor issues can be
discussed. On the other hand, each individual holds his or her own conception of
mathematics teaching and learning. These conceptions are unique in that they are the
results of their own formal or informal contemplation of reality. Both macro and micro
conceptions of mathematics are significant because they represent human beliefs that
influence instructional behaviour.

The Philosophy of Mathematics

The philosophy of mathematics, as a discipline, has dealt for many centuries with the
issue of what is the nature of mathematics. This age-old discussion is far from being
conclusive, rather it is evolving as each thinker contributes his or her view of looking at
the different facets which mathematics presents as a discipline. This philosophical debate
is indispensable since teaching and learning mathematics is influenced by the perspective
adopted, and because mathematics has had such a central role in the advancement of
societies that defining its nature, role and methodology has become a central, ideological
and cultural issue.

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Early attempts to develop a methodological foundation of mathematics attempted to
vindicate it as a discipline free of error, that did justice to its arrogant and secular epithets
as the “most perfect of all sciences” (Lakatos, 1986, p.31), the “mother” (Mura, 1995, p.
390), the “queen of all sciences” (McGinnis, Randy, Shama, McDuffie, Huntley, King, &
Watanabe, 1996, p. 17), “a science in its own right” (Mura, 1995, p. 390). Others began
to doubt the dogmatic assumption that mathematics was actually an a priori, infallible
enterprise, whose methodology could be perfectly delineated and whose development
was amenable to being formulated through a formal and universal system. An alternative
conception therefore began to evolve in which mathematics was conceived as a fallible,
empirical or quasi-empirical discipline.

In the last century, the nature of mathematics became a central issue for educationalists as
it had been before for the philosophers. An individual’s philosophy of education was
thought to determine how we live our lives. A personal philosophy of mathematics
education ascertains the way we learn and teach mathematics within the classroom and
the school environment (Southwell, 1999). If mathematics is, as the Platonist tradition
suggested, just an entity out there waiting to be discovered then it will be enough for
schools to present the curriculum instruction as a mere collection of facts, definitions and
algorithms. In that regard, teaching mathematics would be like just transmitting an
immutable body of knowledge that students have to accept as a perennial fact without any
reasoning. However, if mathematics is a cultural, creative and empirical activity then
learners are in the position of constructing their own mathematical knowledge regardless
of how different their methodology may be from the canon of orthodox and classical
mathematics.

We owe the first attempts to secure an error-proof methodology of mathematics to the

Ancient Greeks. It was Euclid (365-275 B.C.) who dared to explain mathematical
reasoning through a consistent network of postulates, corollaries, axioms and theorems.
For nearly two millenniums, the academic community used Euclid’s reasoning model to
advance mathematical knowledge. However, it was mainly Lobatchevsky (1793-1856)
who dethroned Euclid’s infallibility by proving that the fifth of Euclid’s five postulates
was not absolutely true (Baldor, 1984). Subsequent developments in mathematics showed
that conventional methods of mathematical proof led to other paradoxes and therefore the
search for an alternative infallible method became central at the beginning of this century.
Consequently, three paradigms were advanced to secure the foundation of mathematics,
namely, logicism, symbolism and intuitionism, and they become known as the
foundationalist movement.

Logicism is basically a form of Platonist realism in which mathematics is seen as a set of

abstract realms that exist externally to human creation. According to logicists, all
mathematical concepts can be reduced to abstract properties that can be derived through
logical principles. Logicism has been criticised because of its failure to enunciate an
unerring system of mathematical truth, its discourse lacking appropriate discussion of
basic mathematical concepts such as plane, line, sets and so on. Logicism has also been
criticised for its obsession for strict logical reasoning, leaving little room for intuition and
conjecture which many see as powerful generators of creative thinking (Goodman, 1986).

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Formalists share the logicist view that logic is necessary, however they argue that
mathematical knowledge is brought about through the manipulation of symbols that
operate by prescribed rules and formulas and whose understanding should be accepted a
priori. Formalism has been criticised because of the little space left for creative thinking,
the unfeasibility of creating an inclusive mathematical system due to the need for a
concomitant extensive list of definitions, properties, rules and the like, and the reifying of
the mastery of mathematical symbolism over meaningful inference and intuition.

In the intuitionist tradition, mathematics is conceived as an intellectual activity in which

mathematical concepts are seen as mental constructions regulated by natural laws. These
constructions are regarded as abstract objects that do not necessarily depend on proofs.
Brouwer, the founder of Intuitionism, rejects the classical stance of categorising proofs as
either true or false and instead argues that other possibilities for claiming mathematical
truth should be allowed as academically acceptable. For Brouwer, mathematical
induction comes before and it is independent of logic. Likewise, intuition and
imagination are seen as early and necessary psychological stages in the process of
invention. The main critics to intuitionism argue that mathematical constructions are not
only mentally but also socially constructed. These critics also argue that absolute freedom
of thought is detrimental to mathematical rigor. It has also been said that intuitionists’
biggest downfall lies in enunciating their theory using formalist methods (Goodman,
1986).

The crisis and failing of the three traditions described above in securing mathematics as
an abstract, absolutist, universal and infallible system was followed by an increasing
interest in exploring mathematics as an activity which was practical, fallible, situated and
socially and personally constructed. The movement was labelled “quasi-empirical”
because it proposed that mathematics did not actually belong to the category of hard
sciences such as physics in which something out there is to be discovered. Instead,
mathematics is a human creation born of and nurtured from practical experience, always
growing and changing, open to revision and challenge, and whose claims of truth depend
on “guessing by speculation and criticism, by the logic of proofs and refutations…"
(Lakatos, 1976, p. 5). According to Polya (1986), mathematics is both demonstration and
creation. Demonstration is achieved by proofs while creation consists of plausible
reasoning that includes guessing. Mathematical methods therefore are not perfect and
cannot claim absolute truth. Mathematical truth is not absolute but relative because in fact
truth is time dependent (Grabiner, 1986) and space dependent (Wilder, 1986). Time
dependent because what is scientifically true today, might be a falsehood in the future as
theoretical assumptions change, as occurred with the theories of Euclid and Ptolomeus.
Mathematical methods are also space dependent because different peoples and different
cultures have different ways of doing and validating their mathematical knowledge
(Ascher, 1991).

The transition from the foundationalist approach, with its emphasis on pure mathematics,
to the quasi-empirical approach was followed by a renewed interest in the application of
mathematics. As seen above, for the foundationalists the realm of mathematics was made

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of abstract constructs, a fact that took them away from an emphasis on application of
mathematics (Robitaille & Dirks, 1982; Rogerson; 1989). If pure mathematics is to have
any value by itself, however, then it cannot be attained by sacrificing the value of and
engaging in the application of mathematics.

Foundationalists’ overvaluing of pure mathematics neglected the fact that the origin and
goal of mathematics was the search for solutions to humanity’s proximal environment. In
fact, one of the merits of Euclid’s geometry is that he designed his deductive method
from empirical evidence (Baldor, 1984). Mathematics therefore had grown parallel to and
serving the so-called hard sciences and it is this practical and interactive experience to
which mathematics owes most of its greatness (Putnam, 1986). For Putnam (1986), the
greatness of mathematics did not reside only in its ability to go beyond the realm of
concrete entities, nor in the beauty of their proofs, but in its concomitant power in
providing utilitarian solutions to the bewildered homo sapiens in their settlement on
earth.

Influence of the Philosophy of Mathematics on the Pedagogy of Mathematics

The formalist and logicist paradigms, as Hersh (1979) and Rogerson (1994) have argued,
have had a strong influence on mathematics education in this century and therefore have
shaped the way teachers and students have learned what mathematics is. The New
Mathematics wave, set theory, the emphasis on notation, symbolism, functions and
relations, more stress on analytical rather than descriptive geometry, and behaviourist
perspectives on education have certainly been part of the foundationalist legacy which
influenced the school mathematics curriculum and models of teacher education in the
world (Laurenson, 1995; Moreira & Noss, 1995; Robitaille & Dirks, 1982; Thom, 1986).

As the second half of the last century continued to evolve, the international mathematics
education community was keener to consider and adopt the quasi-empirical conception of
mathematics, no matter how eclectic this view was. Major reform documents such as the
U.S. Curriculum and Evaluation Standards for School Mathematics (National Council of
Teachers of Mathematics, NCTM, 1989), Professional Standards for the Teaching of
Mathematics (NCTM, 1991), Assessment Standards for School Mathematics (NCTM,
1995), Principles and Standards for School Mathematics (NCTM, 2000), the U.K.
Cockcroft Report (Cockcroft, 1982), the National Statement on Mathematics for
Australian Schools (Australian Education Council, 1991), the Statement of Principles for
Mathematics K-12 and The Nature of Mathematics Teaching and Learning (Board of
Studies New South Wales, 1996) were inspired in different degrees by the principle of
“knowing mathematics is doing mathematics” (NCTM, 1989, p. 7) thus reflecting the
quasi-empirical approach.

The quasi-empirical approach parallels in many respects the main tenets of the socio-
constructivist theory, although it is worthy to note that while the former constitutes a
philosophical view on the nature of mathematics, the latter focuses its attention on the
psychological underpinnings of teaching and learning mathematics.

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For many years, there has been a debate in education on the advantages and
disadvantages of socio-constructivism and behaviourism. These two philosophies on
teaching and learning mathematics can be depicted as two contrasting views and both
have influenced the way mathematics is being taught in schools (Marland, 1994).

Socio-constructivism, or constructivism in shorter terms, as opposed to behaviorist

models of teaching and learning, claims that knowledge should not be transferred from
one individual to another in educational environments. For constructivist educationalist,
knowledge must be actively constructed as the learner is an entity with previous
experiences that must considered as a “knowing being”. Learning is therefore seen as an
adaptive and experiential process rather than a knowledge transference activity (Candy,
1991). As learners encounter new situations, they look for similarities and differences
against their own cognitive schemata. These contrasts, also called cognitive
perturbations, are the end-product of conflictive knowledge waiting to be resolved
through reorganizing schemes of knowledge (Phillip, 1995).

In constructivist terms, learning depends on the way each individual learner looks at a
particular situation and draws his/her own conclusions. People therefore determine their
own knowledge based on their own way of processing information and according to
his/her own beliefs and attitudes towards learning (Biggs & Moore, 1993).
Constructivism therefore gives recognition and value instructional strategies in which
students are able to learn mathematics by personally and socially constructing
knowledge. Constructivist learning strategies include more reflective oriented learning
activities in mathematics education such as exploratory and generative learning. More
specifically, these activities include problem solving, group learning, discussions and
situated learning (Murphy, 1997; Wood, Cobb, & Yackel, 1991).

According to behaviourism focuses on the manipulation of external conditions to the

learner to modify behaviours that eventually lead to learning. In a behaviourist oriented
environment completion of tasks is seen as ideal learning behaviour and mastering basic
skills require students to move from basic tasks to more advanced tasks. In addition,
learning is considered a function of rewarding and reinforcing student learning. Likewise,
the emphasis is on correct answers rather than of partially correct answers (Elliot,
Kratochwill, & Travers, 1996). Inspired by linear programming theories developed
particularly during the Second World War, learning and teaching in behaviourist terms is
a matter of optimizing and manipulating the instructional environment towards the
fulfilment of rigidly and specifically designed educational objectives.

In addition, behaviourists saw the student’s affective domain as different from the
cognitive domain. The Bloom Taxonomy, for example, classifies educational objectives
in cognitive, affective and psychomotor domains (Krathwohl, Bloom, & Masia, 1964).
They categorised emotions “as imaginary constructs” that are causes of behaviour
(McLeod, 1992). Consequently, behaviourists assume that certain emotions and attitudes
can influence behaviour, although, in general, affective issues are neglected (McLeod,
1992). Teachers’ and students’ minds were seen as “black-boxes” or machines

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(Shavelson & Stern, 1981) in which attitudes and behaviour occur somehow or even are
not relevant (Nespor, 1987).

It has been said that behaviourism emphasizes a process-product and teacher-centredness

model of instructions that have been prevalent in classroom teaching and in teacher
education programs in the twentieth century (Marland, 1994). A behaviourist teaching
style in mathematics education tends to rely on practices that emphasize rote learning and
memorization of formulas, one-way to solve problems, and adherence to procedures and
drill. Repetition is seen as one of the greatest means to skill acquisition. Teaching is
therefore a matter of enunciating objectives and providing the means to reach those
objectives and situated learning is given little value in instruction (Leder, 1994). This
over emphasis on procedures and formulas resembles traditional formalist and logicist
ideas.

It is worthy to add that while most of the literature on mathematics education revolves
around the dialogue between the constructivist and the behaviourist movements, it is
apparent that their differences have been described by educationalists and reform
documents under other educational terms. These terms basically discriminate between the
teaching of specific facts and a type of instruction that fosters independent thought
(Schmidt & Kennedy, 1990). It must be noted that, like any other theoretical model, these
representations are oversimplification of reality and therefore many educational variables
are excluded. Figure 1 shows the different terms used in those discussions.
Figure 1
Divergent Views in Mathematics Education
Behaviourist Constructivist Source
Perspective Perspective
Behaviourism Constructivism Candy (1991)
Traditional Progressive O’Laughlin & Campbell (1988)
Mimetic Transformational Jackson (1986)
Basic skills Higher order thinking Schmidt & Kennedy (1990)
Content Process Schmidt & Kennedy (1990)
Positivist Relativist Laurenson (1995)
Subject-centred Child-centred Sosniak, Ethington, & Varelas (1991)
Transmission of Emphasis on qualitative Sosniak et al. (1991)
factual and procedural transformations in the character and
knowledge outlook of the learner
Euclidean Quasi-empirical Lerman (1983)
Absolutist Fallibilist Lerman (1983)
Technical-Positivism Constructivism Taylor (1990)
Traditional Nontraditional Raymond (1997)
Transmission Child-centredness Perry, Howard, & Tracey (1999)
Transmission Constructivist Nisbet & Warren (2000)

Summary

This paper has reviewed the debate between foundationalism and quasi-empirical
supporters on the nature of mathematics and between constructivist and behaviourist
proponents on the nature of teaching and learning mathematics. Foundationalism is

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represented by the logicism, formalism and intuitionism movements that were very
popular in the first half of the last century. These philosophical and psychological
stances, acting as macro beliefs, have in turn influenced the way students, teachers,
schools and the education system in general have thought about what mathematics is and
how it should be taught and learned. It was also argued that educational processes have
been largely influenced by foundationalist and behaviourist ideas. Consequently, many
teachers may perceive mathematics as a discipline firmly grounded in a world of rules
and procedures and disembodied from personal experience. Such a view, once translated
to the classroom environment, leads the way to a type of instruction that might have little
to do with current constructivist oriented reform principles.

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