Compilation

Of
DIGESTED
CASES
IN
Indigenous Peoples
AND THE LAW
SUBJECT

Submitted to

Atty. Alfred roderick T. manzano

PROFESSOR

Submitted by

Marizbeth o. bergancia
Juris doctor-1

TABLES OF CONTENT

1
 CASE TITLE CASE PAGES
NUMBER

G.R. No. 180206 3-4

City Government of Baguio vs. Masweng, February 4, 2009

G.R. No. 165003 5-6
City Mayor of Baguio vs. Masweng, February 2, 2010

G.R. No. 135385 7-8

Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
December 6, 2000
G.R. No. 127882
La Bugal Blaan Tribal Association v. Ramos, January 27,
2004
G.R. No. 224469
Diosdado Sama and Bandy Masanglay vs. People, January
5, 2021

G.R. No. 184869

Central Mindanao Univerity vs. Executive Secretary,
September 21, 2010
G.R. No. 181284
Unduran, vs.  Aberasturi, October 20, 2015
G.R. 181284
Unduran vs. Aberasturi, April 18, 2017
212 US 449
Carino vs. The Insular Government, (1909)
G.R. No. 216999
Republic of the Philippines vs. Ronald M. Cosalan, July 4,
2018
G.R. No. 208480
Republic vs. NCIP, Register of Deeds of Baguio City,
September 25, 2019
G.R. No. 165828
National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit
Sangkay, August 24, 2011
G.R. No. 123231
Heirs of Marciano Nagano vs. Court of Appeals, November
17, 1997
G.R. No. 193964
Lim vs. Gamosa, December 2, 2015

Agnes vs. Republic, July 6, 2015 G.R. No. 156022

G.R. No. 189852

Begnaen vs. Spouses Caligtan, August 17, 2016
G.R. No. 166052 
Anak Mindanao Party List vs. Executive Secretary, August
29, 2007
G.R. No. 162243
Alvarez vs. Picop Resources, Inc. December 3, 2009

G.R. No. 162243

Alvarez vs. Picop Resources, Inc. November 29, 2006
2
 G.R. No. 224462
Sanson vs. Indigenous Peoples of Boracay, June 10, 2019

G.R. No. 157485

Republic vs. Lachica, March 26, 2014
G.R. No. 170375
Republic vs. Mangotara, July 7, 2010

3
4
5
6
7
8
 LA BUGAL-B'LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC. ET. AL.,
VS
VICTOR O. RAMOS ET. AL.

(G. R. No. 127882 | 27 January 2004)

FACTS

A petition for prohibition and mandamus was hereby filed by the petitioners
assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of
1995 and its implementing rules and regulations. They also question the Financial
and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with Western Mining Corporation
(Philippines) Inc. that the government entered into contract with.

They strongly believed that the FTAA violated the 1987 Constitution in that it is a
service contract and is opposing to the principle of sovereignty over our  natural
resources, because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of
our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino homeland.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully
foreign-owned corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.

HELD

The petition is granted. The Court declares proviso section 3 (aq), Section 23,
Section 33 to 41, Section 56, the second and third paragraphs of section 81, and section
90 of R.A. 7942 as unconstitutional and void.

The Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign
owned corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources. Article XII, Section 2 of
the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which states that, all lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. The
same section also states that, the exploration and development and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.

DIOSDADO SAMA AND BANDY MASANGLAY

9
 VS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

(G.R. No. 224469|05 January 2021)

FACTS

Petitioners and their companion was caught inflagrante delicto allegedly cutting
trees, without any license at Barangay Calangatan, Municipality of San Teodoro,
Province of Oriental Mindoro. Thereby, an information was filed against them at the
Regional Trial Court of Calapan City and was charged for the crime of Violation of P.D.
705. The said RTC render a decision stating that they are guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for a cutting Dita trees illegally, thus will suffer the punishment and pay the
corresponding amount.

The petitioners filed a petition at the Court of Appeals but was denied on the
ground that they failed to present any license agreement or any proof that they are
allowed to cut such trees and only utilize their rights as IP accordingly on the IPRA law.

Consequently, this petition for review on certiorari was hereby file, petitioners
assailing their conviction. They claim that they just did that because the Iraya-Mangyan
community were they belong to will utilize the said tree for constructing a communal
toilet for them and it is one of their IP rights since the trees were planted within their
ancestral lands.

ISSUE

Whether or not the petitioners in this case at hand has the right to log the Dita
tree for communal toilet use without any license or authority from the government.

Indeed, there is reasonable

doubt as to the existence of
petitioners' IP right to log
the dita tree for the construction
of a communal toilet for the
Iraya- Mangyan ICC. It is

10
engendered by the more
expansive definition of
authority under the law, the
bundle
of petitioners' IP rights both
under the Constitution and
IPRA, and a host of others like
the ones mentioned by Justice
Leonen in his Opinion, the
sundry administrative
regulations which seek to
reconcile the regalian doctrine
and the civilist concept of
ownership with the indigenous
peoples' sui generis ownership
of ancestral domains and
lands, the international
covenants like the United
11
Nations Declaration on the
Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, of which
our country is a signatory, and
Philippine and international
jurisprudence which identifies
the forms and contents of IP
rights. In addition, we have
the ever growing respect,
recognition, protection, and
preservation accorded by the
State to the IPs, including their
rights to cultural heritage and
ancestral domains and
lands
Indeed, there is reasonable
doubt as to the existence of
petitioners' IP right to log
12
the dita tree for the construction
of a communal toilet for the
Iraya- Mangyan ICC. It is
engendered by the more
expansive definition of
authority under the law, the
bundle
of petitioners' IP rights both
under the Constitution and
IPRA, and a host of others like
the ones mentioned by Justice
Leonen in his Opinion, the
sundry administrative
regulations which seek to
reconcile the regalian doctrine
and the civilist concept of

13
ownership with the indigenous
peoples' sui generis ownership
of ancestral domains and
lands, the international
covenants like the United
Nations Declaration on the
Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, of which
our country is a signatory, and
Philippine and international
jurisprudence which identifies
the forms and contents of IP
rights. In addition, we have
the ever growing respect,
recognition, protection, and
preservation accorded by the

14
State to the IPs, including their
rights to cultural heritage and
ancestral domains and
lands
HELD

The petition is granted, the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed and set
aside. Petitioners and their co-accused were acquitted.

Indeed, there is reasonable doubt as to the existence of petitioners' IP right to log

the dita tree for the construction of a communal toilet for the Iraya- Mangyan ICC. It is
engendered by the more expansive definition of authority under the law, the bundle
of petitioners' IP rights both under the Constitution and IPRA, and a host of others like
the ones mentioned by Justice Leonen in his opinion, the sundry administrative
regulations which seek to reconcile the regalian doctrine and the civilist concept of
ownership with the indigenous peoples' sui generis ownership of ancestral domains and
lands, the international covenants like the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, of which our country is a signatory,
and Philippine and international jurisprudence which identifies the forms and contents
of IP rights.

In addition, we have the ever growing respect, recognition, protection, and

preservation accorded by the State to the IPs, including their rights to cultural heritage
and ancestral domains and lands.

15
16
17
 LOLOY UNDURAN ET. AL.,
VS
RAMON ABERASTURI

(G.R. No. 181284 | 20 October 2015)

FACTS

Most of the herein petitioners are members of tribal association called Talaandig
tribe in Barangay Miarayon, Talakag, Bukidnon, Mindanao except Mark Brazil and
Nestor Macapayag. The said tribe claimed that they have been living on their land since
birth since they inherited it from their forefathers.
Respondents, represented by Aberasturi, claimed that they are the lawful owners
and possessor of an unregistered parcel of agricultural land. Whereby, they filed a
Petition for Accion Reivindicatoria before the Regional Trial Court of Manolo Fortich,
Bukidnon, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or preliminary
prohibitory injunction with damages.
The rest of the petitioners filed their motion to dismiss, assailing that the RTC
had no jurisdiction over the case. As awardees of a CADT, petitioners argued that NCIP
has exclusive and original jurisdiction over the case, as the subject matter concerns a
dispute and controversy over an ancestral land/domain of Indigenous Cultural
Communities (ICCs)/Indigenous Peoples (IPs). The NCIP filed a motion to refer the
case to the Regional Hearing Office National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (RHO-
NCIP), alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. 
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the said Regiona Trial Court, thus this
petition is filed.

ISSUE

Whether or not the NCIP or RTC has jurisdiction over the disputes and
controversies in the said ancestral domain wherein the involve parties are both IP and
non -IP.

Indeed, there is reasonable

doubt as to the existence of
petitioners' IP right to log
the dita tree for the construction
of a communal toilet for the
Iraya- Mangyan ICC. It is

18
engendered by the more
expansive definition of
authority under the law, the
bundle
of petitioners' IP rights both
under the Constitution and
IPRA, and a host of others like
the ones mentioned by Justice
Leonen in his Opinion, the
sundry administrative
regulations which seek to
reconcile the regalian doctrine
and the civilist concept of
ownership with the indigenous
peoples' sui generis ownership
of ancestral domains and
lands, the international
covenants like the United
19
Nations Declaration on the
Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, of which
our country is a signatory, and
Philippine and international
jurisprudence which identifies
the forms and contents of IP
rights. In addition, we have
the ever growing respect,
recognition, protection, and
preservation accorded by the
State to the IPs, including their
rights to cultural heritage and
ancestral domains and
lands
Indeed, there is reasonable
doubt as to the existence of
petitioners' IP right to log
20
the dita tree for the construction
of a communal toilet for the
Iraya- Mangyan ICC. It is
engendered by the more
expansive definition of
authority under the law, the
bundle
of petitioners' IP rights both
under the Constitution and
IPRA, and a host of others like
the ones mentioned by Justice
Leonen in his Opinion, the
sundry administrative
regulations which seek to
reconcile the regalian doctrine
and the civilist concept of

21
ownership with the indigenous
peoples' sui generis ownership
of ancestral domains and
lands, the international
covenants like the United
Nations Declaration on the
Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, of which
our country is a signatory, and
Philippine and international
jurisprudence which identifies
the forms and contents of IP
rights. In addition, we have
the ever growing respect,
recognition, protection, and
preservation accorded by the

22
State to the IPs, including their
rights to cultural heritage and
ancestral domains and
lands
HELD

The petition was denied, the decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.

Considering the general rule that the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of
the IPRA covers only disputes and claims between and among members of the same
ICCs/IPs involving their rights under the IPRA, as well as the basic administrative law
principle that an administrative rule or regulation must conform, not contradict the
provisions of the enabling law, the Court declares Rule IX, Section 1 of the IPRA-
IRR,Rule III, Section 524 and Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14 of the NCIP Rules as null and
void insofar as they expand the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA to
include such disputes where the parties do not belong to the same ICC/IP.

As the Court held in Paduran v. DARAB, jurisdiction over a subject matter is

conferred by the Constitution or the law and rules of procedure yield to substantive law.
Otherwise stated, jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law. Only a statute can confer
jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies; rules of procedure cannot. In the
abovesaid exceptional cases where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP or does not belong
to the same ICC/IP, however, Rule IV, Section 14 of the NCIP Rules validly dispenses
with the requirement of certification issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who
participated in the failed attempt to settle the dispute according to the customary laws of
the concerned ICC/IP to the IPs, including their rights to cultural heritage and ancestral
domains and lands.

23
 LOLOY UNDURAN ET. AL.,
VS
RAMON ABERASTURI

(G.R. No. 181284 | 18 April 2017)

FACTS

Since the Supreme Court denied the petition of petitioners Loloy Unduran and
his companion on their decision issued on 20 October 2015 said petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration upholding that it is the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP) which has jurisdiction over disputes and controversies involving
ancestral domain of the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) and Indigenous
Peoples (IPs) regardless of the parties involved. Petitioners insist that claims and
disputes within ICCs/IPs and/or between ICCs/IPs shall be resolved using customary
laws, consistent with the State policy under the Constitution and the IPRA to recognize,
respect and protect the customs, traditions and cultural integrity and institutions of the
ICCs/IPs.
They assail in their Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, that IPRA is a
social legislation that seeks to protect the IPs not so much from themselves or fellow IPs
but more from non-Ips, the IPRA created the NCIP as the agency of government

24
mandated to realize the rights of IPs in the exercise of its mandate, the NCIP was
created as a quasi-judicial body with jurisdiction to resolve claims and disputes
involving the rights of Ips.
The jurisdiction of the NCIP in resolving claims and disputes involving the rights
of IPs is not limited to IPs of the same tribe matching the related provisions of the IPRA
supports the argument that the NCIP has jurisdiction over cases involving IP rights
whether or not the parties are IPs or non-ICCs/IPs the NCIP as quasi-judicial agency
provides IPs mechanisms for access to justice in the fulfillment of the State's obligations
to respect, protect and fulfill IP's human rights.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Court En Banc will consider the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by the petitioner despite the resolution this court issued on 20 October 2015.

Indeed, there is reasonable

doubt as to the existence of
petitioners' IP right to log
the dita tree for the construction
of a communal toilet for the
Iraya- Mangyan ICC. It is
engendered by the more
expansive definition of
authority under the law, the
bundle
of petitioners' IP rights both
under the Constitution and
IPRA, and a host of others like
25
the ones mentioned by Justice
Leonen in his Opinion, the
sundry administrative
regulations which seek to
reconcile the regalian doctrine
and the civilist concept of
ownership with the indigenous
peoples' sui generis ownership
of ancestral domains and
lands, the international
covenants like the United
Nations Declaration on the
Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, of which
our country is a signatory, and
Philippine and international

26
jurisprudence which identifies
the forms and contents of IP
rights. In addition, we have
the ever growing respect,
recognition, protection, and
preservation accorded by the
State to the IPs, including their
rights to cultural heritage and
ancestral domains and
lands
Indeed, there is reasonable
doubt as to the existence of
petitioners' IP right to log
the dita tree for the construction
of a communal toilet for the
Iraya- Mangyan ICC. It is
engendered by the more
expansive definition of
27
authority under the law, the
bundle
of petitioners' IP rights both
under the Constitution and
IPRA, and a host of others like
the ones mentioned by Justice
Leonen in his Opinion, the
sundry administrative
regulations which seek to
reconcile the regalian doctrine
and the civilist concept of
ownership with the indigenous
peoples' sui generis ownership
of ancestral domains and
lands, the international
covenants like the United
Nations Declaration on the
Rights of
28
Indigenous Peoples, of which
our country is a signatory, and
Philippine and international
jurisprudence which identifies
the forms and contents of IP
rights. In addition, we have
the ever growing respect,
recognition, protection, and
preservation accorded by the
State to the IPs, including their
rights to cultural heritage and
ancestral domains and
lands
HELD

The Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for

Reconsideration are denied for lack of merit.

Despite Sections 52(h) and 53, in relation to Section 62 of the IPRA, as well as
Section 54, the NCIP shall have primary jurisdiction over adverse claims and border
disputes arising from the delineation of ancestral domains/lands, and cancellation of
fraudulently-issued CADTs, regardless of whether the parties are non ICCs/IPs, or
members of different ICCs/IPs groups, as well as violations of ICCs/IPs rights under
Section 72 of the IPRA where both parties belong to the same ICC/IP group.

The Court restates that under Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have limited
jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs only when they arise
between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group; but if such claims and

29
disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group,
the proper regular courts shall have jurisdiction.

MATEO CARINO
VS
INSULAR GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

(212 U.S. 449|1909)

FACTS

Petitioner Mateo Cariño, is a native Igorot from the province of Benguet. He and
his family especially his grandfather had lived upon the property for more than 50 years,
and had maintained fences sufficient for their cattle farm. His father had cultivated
parts and had used parts for pasturing cattle, and he had used it for pasture when it was
his turn. They all had been known as owners by the Igorot thereby inheriting the said
land from his father, in accordance with Igorot custom. He applied for the registration
of a certain land. There was no document of title issued for the land when he applied for
registration.
The government claimed that the land in question belonged to the state. Under
the Spanish Law, all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those with permit
private titles. Moreover, there is no prescription against the Crown.
From the year 1893 up until 1897 he tried to apply for title but to no avail.
Thereby, in 1901, the plaintiff filed a petition, alleging ownership, under the mortgage
law, and the lands were registered to him, that process, however, establishing only
possessory title. Even if the applicant have title, he cannot have it registered, because
the Philippine Commission's Act No. 926, of 1903, excempts the Province of Benguet
among others from its operation.

ISSUE

Whether or not Mateo Carino should be granted a title to officially own the
involved land asserting his rights because they have been their since time immemorial
through his forefathers.

HELD

Indeed, there is reasonable

doubt as to the existence of
petitioners' IP right to log

30
the dita tree for the construction
of a communal toilet for the
Iraya- Mangyan ICC. It is
engendered by the more
expansive definition of
authority under the law, the
bundle
of petitioners' IP rights both
under the Constitution and
IPRA, and a host of others like
the ones mentioned by Justice
Leonen in his Opinion, the
sundry administrative
regulations which seek to
reconcile the regalian doctrine
and the civilist concept of

31
ownership with the indigenous
peoples' sui generis ownership
of ancestral domains and
lands, the international
covenants like the United
Nations Declaration on the
Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, of which
our country is a signatory, and
Philippine and international
jurisprudence which identifies
the forms and contents of IP
rights. In addition, we have
the ever growing respect,
recognition, protection, and
preservation accorded by the

32
State to the IPs, including their
rights to cultural heritage and
ancestral domains and
lands
Indeed, there is reasonable
doubt as to the existence of
petitioners' IP right to log
the dita tree for the construction
of a communal toilet for the
Iraya- Mangyan ICC. It is
engendered by the more
expansive definition of
authority under the law, the
bundle
of petitioners' IP rights both
under the Constitution and
IPRA, and a host of others like

33
the ones mentioned by Justice
Leonen in his Opinion, the
sundry administrative
regulations which seek to
reconcile the regalian doctrine
and the civilist concept of
ownership with the indigenous
peoples' sui generis ownership
of ancestral domains and
lands, the international
covenants like the United
Nations Declaration on the
Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, of which
our country is a signatory, and
Philippine and international

34
jurisprudence which identifies
the forms and contents of IP
rights. In addition, we have
the ever growing respect,
recognition, protection, and
preservation accorded by the
State to the IPs, including their
rights to cultural heritage and
ancestral domains a HELD
The U.S. Supreme court granted the petition. Contending that Mr. Carino
through his forefathers have been their since time immemorial thus should be granted
on the registration of title he is pursuing and should not be deprived of it.

Under the Spanish law where a possessor shall not be able to produce title deeds,
it shall be enough if they show that they have been in that possession for 30 years if its
uncultivated and 20 years uninterrupted if it is cultivated as valid title prescription.
Mateo Carino met such requisites so he must be entitled for a title.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

VS
RONALD M. COSALAN

(G.R. No. 216999| 04 July 2018)

FACTS

35
 By virtue of Deed of Absolute Sale of An Unregistered Land executed between the
respondent and his father Andres Cosalan, Ronald M. Cosalan claimed a right over the
subject land, which is located at Sitio Adabong, Barrio Kapunga, Municipality of Tublay,
Benguet, with an area of 98,205 square meters, more or less, under an approved Survey
Plan PSU-204810, issued by the Bureau of Lands on March 12, 1964.

Thereafter, Ronald Cosalan filed an application for registration of title of the said
land. Respondent alleged that he acquired the subject land in open, continuous,
exclusive, peaceful, notorious and adverse occupation, cultivation and actual possession,
in the concept of an owner, by himself and through his predecessors-in-interest since
time immemorial, that he occupied the said land which was an ancestral land, that he
was a member of the cultural minorities belonging to the Ibaloi Tribe and that he took
possession of the subject land and performed acts of dominion over the area.
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Cordillera
Administrative Region (CAR), were in contrast of the said application filed by
respondent on the ground that the subject land was part of the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve established under Proclamation No. 217. The RTC approved respondent's
application for registration, contending that the subject land was owned and possessed
by his ancestors and predecessors even before the land was declared part of the forest
reserve by virtue of Proclamation No. 217.
Due to the unfavorable decision on the part of the petitioner they file a petition
before the CA. However, CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied. Hence filed a petition assailing the decision of CA.

ISSUE

Whether or not the registration of the subject land in favor of Mr. Ronald Cosalan
is correct.

HELD

Indeed, there is reasonable doubt as to the existence of petitioners' IP right to log

the dita tree for the construction of a communal toilet for the Iraya- Mangyan ICC. It is
engendered by the more expansive definition of authority under the law, the bundle
of petitioners' IP rights both under the Constitution and IPRA, and a host of others like
the ones mentioned by Justice Leonen in his Opinion, the sundry administrative
regulations which seek to reconcile the regalian doctrine and the civilist concept of
ownership with the indigenous peoples' sui generis ownership of ancestral domains and
lands, the international covenants like the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, of which our country is a signatory, and Philippine and
international
jurisprudence which identifies the forms and contents of IP rights. In addition, we have
the ever growing respect, recognition, protection, and preservation accorded by the
State to the IPs, including their rights to cultural heritage and ancestral domains and
lands
Indeed, there is reasonable doubt as to the existence of petitioners' IP right to log
the dita tree for the construction of a communal toilet for the Iraya- Mangyan ICC. It is
engendered by the more expansive definition of authority under the law, the bundle
of petitioners' IP rights both under the Constitution and IPRA, and a host of others like
the ones mentioned by Justice Leonen in his Opinion, the sundry administrative
regulations which seek to reconcile the regalian doctrine and the civilist concept of
ownership with the indigenous peoples' sui generis ownership of ancestral domains and
lands, the international covenants like the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, of which our country is a signatory, and Philippine and
international

36
jurisprudence which identifies the forms and contents of IP rights. In addition, we have
the ever growing respect, recognition, protection, and preservation accorded by the
State to the IPs, including their rights to cultural heritage and ancestral domains
aHELD
The petition was denied. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
were affirmed.

Mr. Ronald Cosalans’ application for registration under Section 12 of the IPRA
Law in relation to Section 48 of the CA No. 141 was correct. Section 12, Chapter III of
IPRA Law states that individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in
character and actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture, and tree farming
purposes, including those with a slope of eighteen percent (18%) or more, are hereby
classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands. As stated, respondent and his
witnesses were able to prove that the subject land had been used for agricultural
purposes even prior to its declaration as part of the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve.

Verily, as the IPRA Law expressly provides that ancestral lands are considered
public agricultural lands, the provisions of the Public Land Act or C.A. No. 141 govern
the registration of the subject land. It has been proven that respondent and his
predecessors-in interest had been in open and continuous possession of the subject land
since time immemorial even before it was declared part of the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve under Proclamation No. 217.

As a rule, forest land located within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve cannot
be a subject of private appropriation and registration. Respondent, however, was able to
prove that the subject land was an ancestral land, and had been openly and continuously
occupied by him and his predecessors in-interest, who were members of the ICCs/IPs.
It has been proven that respondent and his predecessors-in- interest had been in
open and continuous possession of the subject land since time immemorial even before
it was declared part of the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No.
217. Thus, the registration of the subject land in favor of respondent is proper.

37
 .

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

VS
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY ET. AL.,

(G.R. No. 208480| 25 September 2019)

FACTS

Private respondents filed at NCIP Baguio an application for the identification,

dealination and recognition of their ancestral land. The National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples recognized the rights of the private respondents over the subject
parcel of lands located at Session Road, Baguio City, after finding out their genealogy,
and proofs wherein it shows that their ancestors continuously occupied that ancestral
land since time immemorial. Due to it, the NCIP ordered the issuance of Certificate of
Ancestral Land Titles (CALT’s) among all the private respondents with different
resolutions.

After two years the Office of the Solicitor General assailed and seeks to annul,
reverse and set aside the said resolutions issued from the NCIP. So they filed a petition
at the Court of Appeals however, CA affirmed the decision and resolution of the NCIP,
which makes the petitioner file this instant petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Baguio townsite reservation, with the exception of existing
property rights recognized or vested before the effectivity of the IPRA is exempt from
the coverage of said law as provided in section 78 thereof.

HELD

The petition was granted and the resolution of the Court of Appeals was reversed
and set aside. The issued resolutions granting CALT from the National Commission of
Indigenous People were declared null and void.

Section 78 of the IPRA is clear that the Charter of Baguio City shall govern the
determination of land rights within Baguio City and not the IPRA. The said declaration
by Congress is conclusive. In fact, a review of the Congressional Deliberations on both
38
the House and Senate bills which gave birth to the IPRA reveal that the clear intent of
the framers is to exempt Baguio City's land areas particularly the Baguio City's Townsite
Reservation from the coverage of the IPRA.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION

VS
HEIRS OF MACABANGKIT SANGKAY

(G.R. No. 165828| 24 August 2011)

FACTS

Heirs of Macabangkit, tried to sell the subject land but all denied after
prospective buyers learned about the underground tunnels of NPC that was built within
their land. Due to it they sued NPC in the RTC for the recovery of damages and of the
property, with the alternative prayer for the payment of just compensation. 

Herein petitioner, claims that pursuant to its legal mandate under RA 6395,
undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project to generate electricity for
Mindanao. The project included the construction of several underground tunnels to be
used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River to the hydroelectric plants.

National Power Corporation also contends that respondents had no right to

compensation under section Section 3 of RA 6395 under which a mere legal easement
on their land was established, and that their cause of action already prescribed. The
Regional Trial Court issued a decision which is favorable to the Heirs of Macabangkit
and demand the NCP to pay just compensation the herein private respondents.

ISSUE

Whether or not the herein respondents have the right to claim just
compensation.

HELD
The Supreme Court affirms the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals,
but such are subject to modifications. 
Respondents are entitled to the payment of just compensation. Notwithstanding
the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay not

39
merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. This is because in this
case, the nature of the easement practically deprives the owners of its normal beneficial
use. Respondents, as the owner of the property thus expropriated, are entitled to a just
compensation which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make
the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property.

There was a full taking on the part of NPC, notwithstanding that the owners were
not completely and actually dispossessed. It is settled that the taking of private property
for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or
appropriation. Indeed, the expropriator’s action may be short of acquisition of title,
physical possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a taking. Compensable taking
includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership
or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner,
lessening or destroying its value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly
deprived of the use of his property, nor material whether the property is removed from
the possession of the owner, or in any respect changes hands.

HEIRS OF MARCIANO NAGAÑO

VS
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES PONCIANO MALLARI and GLORIA
BINUYA, ET. AL.,
(G.R. No. 123231|17 November 1997)

FACTS
A complaint was filed by herein private respondents for the declaration of nullity
of Original Certificate of Title No. P-8265 issued in the name of the Heirs of Marciano
Nagaño and covering Cad. Lot. No. 3275. They alleged that the issuance of the said title
was on account of the fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation committed by a certain
Macario Valerio.
An information for perjury was even filed on November 2, 1983 against Valerio,
who unlawfully attested that Lot No. 3275 was not occupied or being claimed by other
persons. Private respondents alleged that part of the subject property was owned by
their predecessors-in-interest Rufino Mallari and Ferminal Jamlig and that they were in
possession of the said land since 1920.
They recently discovered that their entire Lot No.3275 was registered by
defendant Valerio under Free Patent No. (III-2) 001953 and OCT No. P-8265 in the
name of the heirs of Marciano Nagaño. They allegedly demanded Valerio to execute the
necessary document in order that the 2,250 square meters owned by them be segregated
from the property titled in the name of herein petitioners. Heirs of Marciano Nagano
and Valerio however, refused to grant their demands.
Private Respondents, Mallari’s thereby filed the said complaint, the Regional
Trial Court ruled in favor of herein petitioners, assailing the said decision they filed a
petition at the Court of Appeals but the said court also sustain that the petitoners have
rights on such portion of the assailed land, hence this petition at SC.

ISSUE

40
  Whether or not private respondents do have a claim to the portion of the assailed
land.
HELD
 It is clear from the allegations in the complaint that private respondents claim
ownership to the 2,250 square meter portion for having possessed it in the concept of an
owner, openly, peacefully, publicly, continuously and adversely since 1920. 
This claim is an assertion that the lot is private land, or that even assuming it was
part of the public domain, private respondents had already acquired imperfect title
thereto. Consequently, merely on the basis of the allegations in the complaint, the lot in
question is apparently beyond the jurisdiction of the Director of the Bureau of Lands
and could not be the subject of a Free Patent.
Hence, dismissal of private respondents complaint was premature and trial on
the merits should have been conducted to thresh out evidentiary matters. In light of the
above, and at this time, prescription is unavailing against private respondents action. It
is settled that a Free Patent issued over private land is null and void, and produces no
legal affects whatsoever. Moreover, private respondents claim of open, public, peaceful,
continuous and adverse possession of the 2,250 square meter portion since 1920, and its
illegal inclusion in the Free Patent of petitioners and in their original certificate of title,
gave private respondents a cause of action for quieting of title which is imprescriptible.
ENGINEER BEN Y. LIM, 
VS
HON. SULPICIO G. GAMOSA, ET.AL.,
(G.R. No. 193964 | 2 December 2015)

FACTS
A petition was filed by herein private respondent Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural
Community of Barangay Buenavista, Coron, Palawan, before the National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) against petitioner for "Violation of Rights to Free and
Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) and Unauthorized and Unlawful Intrusion with
Prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.
However, petitioners argue that the NCIP does not have jurisdiction over the
petition filed by private respondents because petitioners are non-IPs/ICCs. Essentially,
they interpret the jurisdiction of the NCIP as limited to claims and disputes involving
rights of IPs/ICCs where both opposing parties are IPs/ICCs.
Thereby, a motion to dismiss was filed by petitioners wherein they argue that
NCIP has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition because petitioners are
not members of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples.
NCIP didn’t grant the motion from the Petitioners so they filed a petition for
certiorari and still upholding their ground that NCIP don’t have a jurisdiction over the
subject. However, court of appeals upheld that when a claim or dispute involves rights of
ICC / IP’s, the NCIP has the jurisdiction over the case regardless of whether the
opposing party is non ICC/IP. The NCIP and the appellate court rely mainly on the
wording of Section 66 of the IPRA and the declared purpose for the law's enactment.

ISSUE
Whether or not the NCIP has jurisdiction over the subject matter.

41
 HELD
No, NCIP has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The Supreme Court ruled that Section 66 of the IPRA, even as it grants
jurisdiction to the NCIP over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs,
requires that the opposing parties are both ICCs/IPs who have exhausted all their
remedies under their customs and customary law before bringing their claim and
dispute to the NCIP. The validity of respondents' claim is another matter and a question
that we need not answer for the moment. Too, we do not resolve herein the other issues
raised by petitioners given that we already declared that the NCIP does not have
jurisdiction over the case of respondents against petitioners.
Wherefore, the appeal is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals and the
Resolution of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples are reversed and set
aside.

AURELLANO AGNES, EDUARDO AGNES ET.AL.,

VS
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 156022 |6 July 2015

FACTS
  Pursuant to the Presidential Decree issued by then President Marcos the place of
herein petitioners at Calauit Island, Busuanga, Palawan was turned into a Game
Preserve and Wildlife Sanctuary. Due to it, an agreement was made between the
petitioners and the resp0ndent wherein, in that agreement, Aurellano Agnes and his
companion was resettled in Halsey and Burabod in Culion. Meanwhile, petitioners
returned to their place and resettled.
Upon knowing of it, respondent, represented by the DENR Secretary, filed a
Complaint for Specific Performance and Recovery of Possession against petitioners
before the RTC. The court ruled in favour of the Republic and ordered petitioners to
vacate the respective areas where they have resettled at Calauit Island.
On petitioners’ appeal, the CA affirmed the assailed ruling of the
RTC. After, pursuant to R.A. 8371, The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997,
a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) was issued by the Office of the
President, through the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), over the
lands comprising the communities of Barangays Calauit and Quezon, Calauit Island, and
Municipality of Busuanga, in favor of the Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Community
(ICC).
In their appeal to the SC, the petitioners claimed that the issuance of the CADT in
favor of the ICC amounts to an affirmation and recognition of the property rights of
their ancestors from whom they traced their present individual claims.
ISSUE

42
 Whether or not the petitioners may be compelled to vacate Calauit by virtue of
the Resettlement Agreements.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that petitioners may not be compelled to vacate Calauit
by virtue of the Resettlement Agreements because of the CADT issued in favor of the
Tagbanua Indigenous People, the early settlers therein.

Under the CADT, the Tagbanua ICC is given authority to have and hold in
ownership, the described ancestral domain as their private but community property,
which belongs to all generations of the said indigenous cultural community/indigenous
peoples; and to develop, control, manage and utilize collectively the said ancestral
domain with all the rights, privileges and responsibilities appurtenant thereto, subject to
the condition that the said ancestral domain shall not be sold, disposed, nor destroyed.
Furthermore, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8371 recognizes that the rights to ancestral
domains carry with it the rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains. It also provides that the right to ancestral domain carries with it the
right to "stay in the territory and not to be removed therefrom." Also, the CADT was
issued notwithstanding the existence of Presidential Proclamation No. 1578.

Begnaen vs. Sps. Caligtan

G.R. No. 189852. August 17, 2016
C. J. Sereno
Facts:
Petitioner, Thomas Begnaen,
filed a Complaint with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction against
respondents for “Land
Dispute and Enforcement of
Rights” before the RHO of the

43
NCIP it thereafter, issued an order
dismissing the complaint
based on the argument that the
case should have gone to the
council of elders and not through
the Brgy. Lupon as mandated
by the IPRA. However, instead of
abiding by the Order of the RHO
Begnaen filed against Sps.
Caligtan a complaint for forcible
entry alleging, that, on two
occasions, respondents — by using
force, intimidation, stealth, and
threat — entered a portion
of the subject property, hurriedly
put up a chicken wire fence, and
started building a shack thereon
without Begnaen’s
knowledge and consent.
Respondents averred that they
44
owned the area in question as part
of the land.
MCTC dismissed the complaint.
RTC reversed the decision, it
reasoned that the provisions of the
IPRA pertaining to
jurisdiction do not espouse
exclusivity and thus cannot divest
the MCTC of its jurisdiction over
forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases as provided by B.P.
Blg. 129. CA reversed the RTC
ruling and stated that the passage
of the IPRA has divested
regular courts of their jurisdiction
when the parties involved are
members of ICCs/IPs and the
disputed property forms part

45
of their ancestral land/domain. MR
was filed but it was denied. Hence,
this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the CA
in upholding the jurisdiction of
the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
committed a reversible error.
Ruling:
No. The NCIP-RHO, being the
agency that first took cognizance
of petitioner-appellant’s complaint,
has jurisdiction
over the same to the exclusion of
the MCTC. To allow the same
complaint to be filed successively
before two or more
investigative bodies would
promote multiplicity of
46
proceedings. It would also cause
undue difficulties to the respondent
who would have to appear and
defend his position before every
agency or body where the same
complaint was filed. This
would leave hapless litigants at a
loss as to where to appear and
plead their cause or defense.
While the doctrine of concurrent
jurisdiction means equal
jurisdiction to deal with the same
subject matter, the
Court have consistently upheld the
settled rule that the body or agency
that first takes cognizance of the
complaint shall
exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the others. It is a
47
hornbook rule that jurisdiction is a
matter of law. Jurisdiction, once
acquired, is not lost upon the
instance of the parties but
continues until the case is
terminated.
Begnaen vs. Sps. Caligtan
G.R. No. 189852. August 17, 2016
C. J. Sereno
Facts:
Petitioner, Thomas Begnaen,
filed a Complaint with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction against
respondents for “Land
Dispute and Enforcement of
Rights” before the RHO of the
NCIP it thereafter, issued an order
dismissing the complaint
based on the argument that the
case should have gone to the
48
council of elders and not through
the Brgy. Lupon as mandated
by the IPRA. However, instead of
abiding by the Order of the RHO
Begnaen filed against Sps.
Caligtan a complaint for forcible
entry alleging, that, on two
occasions, respondents — by using
force, intimidation, stealth, and
threat — entered a portion
of the subject property, hurriedly
put up a chicken wire fence, and
started building a shack thereon
without Begnaen’s
knowledge and consent.
Respondents averred that they
owned the area in question as part
of the land.

49
 MCTC dismissed the complaint.
RTC reversed the decision, it
reasoned that the provisions of the
IPRA pertaining to
jurisdiction do not espouse
exclusivity and thus cannot divest
the MCTC of its jurisdiction over
forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases as provided by B.P.
Blg. 129. CA reversed the RTC
ruling and stated that the passage
of the IPRA has divested
regular courts of their jurisdiction
when the parties involved are
members of ICCs/IPs and the
disputed property forms part
of their ancestral land/domain. MR
was filed but it was denied. Hence,
this petition.

50
Issue: Whether or not the CA
in upholding the jurisdiction of
the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
committed a reversible error.
Ruling:
No. The NCIP-RHO, being the
agency that first took cognizance
of petitioner-appellant’s complaint,
has jurisdiction
over the same to the exclusion of
the MCTC. To allow the same
complaint to be filed successively
before two or more
investigative bodies would
promote multiplicity of
proceedings. It would also cause
undue difficulties to the respondent

51
who would have to appear and
defend his position before every
agency or body where the same
complaint was filed. This
would leave hapless litigants at a
loss as to where to appear and
plead their cause or defense.
While the doctrine of concurrent
jurisdiction means equal
jurisdiction to deal with the same
subject matter, the
Court have consistently upheld the
settled rule that the body or agency
that first takes cognizance of the
complaint shall
exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the others. It is a
hornbook rule that jurisdiction is a
matter of law. Jurisdiction, once
52
acquired, is not lost upon the
instance of the parties but
continues until the case is
terminated.
Begnaen vs. Sps. Caligtan
G.R. No. 189852. August 17, 2016
C. J. Sereno
Facts:
Petitioner, Thomas Begnaen,
filed a Complaint with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction against
respondents for “Land
Dispute and Enforcement of
Rights” before the RHO of the
NCIP it thereafter, issued an order
dismissing the complaint
based on the argument that the
case should have gone to the
council of elders and not through
the Brgy. Lupon as mandated
53
by the IPRA. However, instead of
abiding by the Order of the RHO
Begnaen filed against Sps.
Caligtan a complaint for forcible
entry alleging, that, on two
occasions, respondents — by using
force, intimidation, stealth, and
threat — entered a portion
of the subject property, hurriedly
put up a chicken wire fence, and
started building a shack thereon
without Begnaen’s
knowledge and consent.
Respondents averred that they
owned the area in question as part
of the land.
MCTC dismissed the complaint.
RTC reversed the decision, it

54
reasoned that the provisions of the
IPRA pertaining to
jurisdiction do not espouse
exclusivity and thus cannot divest
the MCTC of its jurisdiction over
forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases as provided by B.P.
Blg. 129. CA reversed the RTC
ruling and stated that the passage
of the IPRA has divested
regular courts of their jurisdiction
when the parties involved are
members of ICCs/IPs and the
disputed property forms part
of their ancestral land/domain. MR
was filed but it was denied. Hence,
this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the CA
in upholding the jurisdiction of
55
the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
committed a reversible error.
Ruling:
No. The NCIP-RHO, being the
agency that first took cognizance
of petitioner-appellant’s complaint,
has jurisdiction
over the same to the exclusion of
the MCTC. To allow the same
complaint to be filed successively
before two or more
investigative bodies would
promote multiplicity of
proceedings. It would also cause
undue difficulties to the respondent
who would have to appear and
defend his position before every

56
agency or body where the same
complaint was filed. This
would leave hapless litigants at a
loss as to where to appear and
plead their cause or defense.
While the doctrine of concurrent
jurisdiction means equal
jurisdiction to deal with the same
subject matter, the
Court have consistently upheld the
settled rule that the body or agency
that first takes cognizance of the
complaint shall
exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the others. It is a
hornbook rule that jurisdiction is a
matter of law. Jurisdiction, once
acquired, is not lost upon the
instance of the parties but
57
continues until the case is
terminated.
THOMAS BEGNAEN
VS
SPOUSES LEO CALIGTAN AND ELMA CALIGTAN

(G.R. No. 189852 | 17 August 2016)

FACTS

Thomas Begnaen is the owner of the subject land situated in Supang, Sabangan,
Mt. Province. Petitioner alleged that the respondents by using force, intimidation,
stealth and threat entered his property and put up a shack bordered with chicken fence
without his consent. On the other hand, the respondents asserted that the area in
question is a land that they had purchased pursuant to age-old customs and traditions
which the father of the petitioner had affirmed when he was still alive.

Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a complaint before the Regional Hearing Office
(RHO) of NCIP at La Trinidad, Benguet. The RHO dismissed the complaint because the
case should have gone to the council of elders and not through the Barangay Lupon, as
mandated by the Indigenous Peoples’ Right Act (IPRA).

However, instead of obeying the orders of NCIP, the petitioner filed another
complaint before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Bauko-Sabangan Mt.
Province. MCTC recognized the original and exclusive jurisdiction of NCIP-RHO
thereby dismissing the ejectment complaint. As the case was elevated, RTC reversed and
set aside the decision of MCTC saying that the latter court had jurisdiction over the case.
The respondents appealed to the CA.

CA reversed and set aside the RTC rulings, and reinstated the Resolution of the
MCTC saying that the provisions of IPRA has divested regular courts of their
jurisdiction when the parties involved are members of ICCs/IPs and the disputed
property forms part of their ancestral domain.

ISSUE

Whether or not NCIP-RHO has jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving
rights of ICCs/IPs that have not been settled under customary laws.

HELD

Yes, the supreme court ruled that NCIP-RHO has jurisdiction over cases and
disputes involving rights of indigenous people that have not been settled under
customary laws. As long as the involved parties both belong to the indigenous people’s
group and the subject property is an ancestral domain or land.

The implementing rules and regulation of the R.A. 8371 cannot extend the law or
expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the

58
legislature. Administrative issuances must not override, but must remain consistent
with the law they seek to apply and implement. They are intended to carry out, not to
supplant or to modify, the law.

59
60
Indeed, there is reasonable
doubt as to the existence of
petitioners' IP right to log
the dita tree for the construction
of a communal toilet for the
Iraya- Mangyan ICC. It is
engendered by the more
expansive definition of
authority under the law, the
bundle
of petitioners' IP rights both
under the Constitution and
IPRA, and a host of others like
the ones mentioned by Justice
Leonen in his Opinion, the
sundry administrative

61
regulations which seek to
reconcile the regalian doctrine
and the civilist concept of
ownership with the indigenous
peoples' sui generis ownership
of ancestral domains and
lands, the international
covenants like the United
Nations Declaration on the
Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, of which
our country is a signatory, and
Philippine and international
jurisprudence which identifies
the forms and contents of IP
rights. In addition, we have

62
the ever growing respect,
recognition, protection, and
preservation accorded by the
State to the IPs, including their
rights to cultural heritage and
ancestral domains and
lands.
Indeed, there is reasonable
doubt as to the existence of
petitioners' IP right to log
the dita tree for the construction
of a communal toilet for the
Iraya- Mangyan ICC. It is
engendered by the more
expansive definition of
authority under the law, the
bundle

63
of petitioners' IP rights both
under the Constitution and
IPRA, and a host of others like
the ones mentioned by Justice
Leonen in his Opinion, the
sundry administrative
regulations which seek to
reconcile the regalian doctrine
and the civilist concept of
ownership with the indigenous
peoples' sui generis ownership
of ancestral domains and
lands, the international
covenants like the United
Nations Declaration on the
Rights of

64
Indigenous Peoples, of which
our country is a signatory, and
Philippine and international
jurisprudence which identifies
the forms and contents of IP
rights. In addition, we have
the ever growing respect,
recognition, protection, and
preservation accorded by the
State to the IPs, including their
rights to cultural heritage and
ancestral domains an

65
66
67
68
69