Arendt and Conrad on the Banality of Evil: Some Implications for Education

Author(s): Mordechai Gordon

Source: Journal of Thought, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Summer 1999), pp. 15-30
Published by: Caddo Gap Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/42589573
Accessed: 12-05-2016 01:51 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Caddo Gap Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of
Thought

This content downloaded from 128.111.121.42 on Thu, 12 May 2016 01:51:23 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Journal of Thought , Summer 1999 15

Arendt and Conrad

on the Banality of Evil:
Some Implications for Education
Mordechai Gordon
Brooklyn College , City University of New York

In coining the concept "the banality of evil," Hannah Arendt pointed

to a phenomenon unique to twentieth century political life, and espe-
cially to totalitarian regimes. She thus challenged political thinkers to
reflect on the potency of this concept even though she never developed a
theory of evil.1 In describing this phenomenon, Arendt insisted that
banal individuals, who are thoughtless and "remote from reality," can
commit crimes on a mass scale without even realizing that they are doing
wrong: "That such remoteness from reality and such thoughtlessness [as
discovered in Eichmann] can wreak more havoc than all the evil instincts
taken together which, perhaps, are inherent in man - that was, in fact,
the lesson one could learn in Jerusalem."2
Interestingly, in her discussions of the banality of evil, Arendt did not
note that many of the characteristics of such evil had been previously
described by Joseph Conrad, even though he did not use her term. For
example, in the Author's Note to Under Western Eyes , Conrad mentions
regarding Nikita, "what troubled me most in dealing with him was not
his monstrosity but his banality. . . ." Regarding the other characters in the
book, he remarks: "the most terrifying reflection (I am speaking now for
myself) is that all these people are not the product of the exceptional but
of the general - of the normality of their place, and time and race."3 Thus,
Conrad portrayed the banality of evil before Arendt gave it its name.
But there is another fascinating connection between Arendt and
Conrad. Both portrayed the banality of evil emerging in extreme situa-
tions. The Nazi war machine, which combined terrifying racist views

This content downloaded from 128.111.121.42 on Thu, 12 May 2016 01:51:23 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
16 On the Banality of Evil
with the ruthless march toward world conquest, has surprising similari-
ties to the assumptions and aims which motivated The Company in Heart
of Darkness. Arendt noted this fact, even though she often misquoted
Conrad.4 Furthermore, she did not credit Conrad with recognizing the
connection between banality and evil. In The Origins of Totalitarianism
in which she first noted this phenomenon she refers to Conrad only as an
authority on racism.5 While in Eichmann in Jerusalem , where Arendt
discussed the banality of evil in some detail, she does not mention Conrad
at all. This paper will show that major points made by Arendt in her
depiction of the banality of evil were already portrayed in some of
Conrad's stories. More importantly, I argue that Conrad's tales can help
us understand many of the characteristics of this phenomenon which
Arendt describes but does not adequately explain. In the final part of this
paper, I explore the relevance of some of the features of the banality of
evil for the issue of engaged pedagogy.

Banality as Thoughtlessness

In one of his early stories, "An Outpost of Progress," Conrad describes

Kayerts and Carlier, the two white men in charge of the trading station,
in the following way:
They were two perfectly insignificant and incapable individuals, whose
existence is only rendered possible through the high organization of
civilized crowds. ...
Society, not from any tenderness, but because of its strange needs,
had taken care of these two men, forbidding them all independent
thought, all initiative, all departure from routine; and forbidding it
under the pain of death. They could only live on condition of being
machines. ...
They lived like blind men in a large room, aware only of what came
into contact with them (and that only imperfectly), but unable to see the
general aspect of things.6

This description of Kayerts and Carlier is very close to Arendťs depiction

of Eichmann as thoughtless, lacking imagination, and remote from
reality. Her understanding of banality is somewhat different from the
standard definition of this term which is: commonplace, trivial, and
lacking originality. Arendt stresses that Eichmann's behavior was marked
by an absence of independent thought and that this lack is neither
synonymous with stupidity nor commonplace. This absence of indepen-
dent thought is essentially what she means by the word banality.
Arendt and Conrad hold that banal people, apart from being inca-
pable of independent thought, lack any initiative and rarely depart from

This content downloaded from 128.111.121.42 on Thu, 12 May 2016 01:51:23 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Mordechai Gordon 17

routine. Thoughtless individuals behave like machines since they lead

their lives blindly and are easily enslaved to the evil intents of their
superiors. What is striking in Conrad's depiction is the role of society in
the making of these machine-like men. It is not only that Kayerts and
Carlier were insignificant and incapable individuals but that society
designs and fosters such "machines" in order to function properly. In
short, society cultivates thoughtless individuals who in turn thrive only
where life is completely routine, where all initiative is superfluous.
Arendt was aware of the conditioning role of society when she stated
that: "Evil in the Third Reich had lost the quality by which most people
recognize it - the quality of temptation."7 She explained that although
many Germans and Nazis were tempted not to take part in the deporta-
tion and murdering of Jews, they had learned how to resist this tempta-
tion. Giving in to such a temptation, as Conrad suggests in his descrip-
tion of Kayerts and Carlier, would mean to take a stand against the
routine business that the German people had been forced to live with: the
disappearance and murder of their neighbors. But such independent
thought and action was nearly impossible in the Third Reich. For Hitler
and the Nazi leaders had established a society of human robots in which
any departure from routine was strictly forbidden, and forbidden "under
pain of death."
Kayerts and Carlier easily become perpetrators of evil when Makola,
the sly negro on the station staff, suggests "trading" the negro workmen
of the station for some ivory. The two men are banal because they do not
even realize what Makola is hinting at, let alone try to object to his plan.
Even if Kayerts and Carlier were initially inclined to resist evil (they
condemned Makola for this crime and swore to report him to the
manager), they soon resigned themselves to it (they helped him weigh
the ivory). After a few days the two men decided not to disclose the crime
to anybody, thus becoming accomplices in slave dealing. Conrad shares
Arendťs conviction that banal individuals are dangerous since they are
easily enticed to become accomplices in a crime. Because they are
thoughtless, they never seriously question the evil intents of the crimi-
nals; nor are they able to imagine alternative actions.
Before moving to a discussion of the second aspect of banality, I
would like to point to a possible connection between banality and evil.
Conrad suggests that Kayerts' and Carlier's banality leads them to do
evil because their incapability of independent thought impairs all their
other human faculties, namely, the power to choose freely and the
capacity for critical judgment:
And now, released from the fostering care of men with pens behind the
ears, or of men with gold lace on the sleeves, they were like the lifelong

This content downloaded from 128.111.121.42 on Thu, 12 May 2016 01:51:23 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
IS On the Banality of Evil
prisoners who, liberated after many years, do not know what use to
make of their freedom. They did not know what use to make of their
faculties, being both, through want of practice, incapable of indepen-
dent thought.8

His point is that a person who cannot think for oneself can neither choose
between different alternatives nor judge whether a deed is good or evil.
That is, to be able to choose one option over several and to judge the
others as faulty, presupposes that one is able to think about the situation
from a number of perspectives. And this is precisely what banal individu-
als cannot do.
In his depiction of how banality can lead individuals to commit
crimes, Conrad begins to unfold the "strange interdependence" of banal-
ity and evil which Arendt points to but does not explain. Neither in
Eichmann in Jerusalem nor in any of her other major works does she
offer an adequate account of this interdependence.9 In "An Outpost of
Progress," Conrad is going beyond Arendt and attempting to make sense
of the relation of banality and evil. A close reading of this story indicates
that the "interdependence" of banality and evil which Arendt refers to
signifies more precisely that the capability of independent thought is a
precondition for acting freely and ethically. To be able to act freely and
ethically, to take a stand against evil, requires that we think indepen-
dently and critically about the issues we confront. But, as Conrad
suggests, most societies cultivate citizens who are passive and content
rather than independent and critical thinkers. The problem is that an
unreflective existence impairs people's ability to choose and judge and
reduces human beings to the level of machines. These human "machines,"
having no critical awareness of good and evil, are then used by totalitarian
regimes and other criminals to carry our their atrocious deeds.

Thoughtlessness and an Incapability to Speak Coherently

While listening to Eichmann, Arendt discovered a connection be-

tween thoughtlessness and an incapability to speak coherently:
The longer one listened to him, the more obvious it became that his
inability to speak was closely connected with an inability to think ,
namely, to think from the standpoint of somebody else. No communica-
tion was possible with him, not because he lied but because he was
surrounded by the most reliable of all safeguards against the words and
the presence of others, and hence against reality as such.10

Arendt is referring to Eichmann's wide use of clichés and stock phrases

to describe any incident or event of importance to him. These clichés and

This content downloaded from 128.111.121.42 on Thu, 12 May 2016 01:51:23 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Mordechai Gordon 19

stock phrases protected Eichmann from the need to think from a

different perspective and to truly reply to the concerns of others. Her
point is that in order to genuinely communicate with others, one needs
to be able to consider an issue from their point of view and to respond
personally to their words. Such openness to the view of others is also
what enables us to perceive issues and problems from a broader perspec-
tive, thus giving us a clearer and more complete picture of reality.
While Arendt is correct in identifying a connection between speaking
and thinking, her use of the word "inability" is somewhat misleading
since it usually refers to a quality or power that one possesses. I prefer
the word "incapability" because it is a broader term suggesting a lack of
ability, capacity, or competence to perform a task. As we shall soon see,
Conrad's descriptions are helpful in getting a clearer picture of what this
incapability entails and how it comes about.
One of the stories in which Conrad portrays this relation between
banality and an incapability to speak coherently is The Secret Agent.
Think, for example of Mr. Verloc, the main character of this book, who for
years had been an agent of a foreign embassy but had never directly
participated in any terrorist attack. But when he is threatened by the
First Secretary of the embassy about losing his job if he does not produce
results, he is driven to carry out a bomb attack with the help of his
brother-in-law, Stevie, in which the latter is accidentally killed. Leading
a confidential lifestyle, officialese became Mr. Verloc's most familiar
language. Consequently, when Mr. Verloc confides in his wife after the
tragic bomb attack he uses mainly clichés and statements that lack any
personal commitment:
"Can't be helped," he said in a tone of gloomy sympathy. "Come, Winnie,
we've got to think of tomorrow. You'll want all your wits about you after
I am taken away." ...
"You'll have to pull yourself together, my girl," he said, sympatheti-
cally. "What's done can't be undone."11

Conrad points out that Mr. Verloc's incapability to communicate

with his wife is connected to his difficulty in viewing the situation from
her perspective: "The mind of Mr. Verloc lacked profundity. Under the
mistaken impression that the value of individuals consists in what they
are in themselves, he could not possibly comprehend the value of Stevie
in the eyes of Mrs. Verloc."12 While he was rambling endlessly about the
pressures he had endured from the embassy, Mrs. Verloc could only
think about her brother's fears and indignations as well as his tragic
death. Yet Mr. Verloc, confined to his own view point, could not possibly
imagine what his wife was going through let alone try to console her. In

This content downloaded from 128.111.121.42 on Thu, 12 May 2016 01:51:23 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
20 On the Banality of Evil
other words, his speeches and clichés shielded him against his wife's
thoughts and presence and against facing the crime he had committed.
Conrad shares Arendťs view that it is often impossible to communicate
with banal individuals since their manner of expression protects them
against reality, that is, against reality's claim on our thinking attention.
This incapability to communicate with his wife was due, according to
Conrad, to Mr. Verloc's lack of practice in sharing his feelings with her:
How with his want of practice could he tell her what he himself felt but
vaguely: that there are conspiracies of fatal destiny, that a notion grows
in a mind sometimes till it acquires an outward existence, an indepen-
dent power of its own, and even a suggestive voice? He could not inform
her that a man may be haunted by a fat, witty, clean shaved face till the
wildest expedient to get rid of it appears a child of wisdom.13

The point is that Mr. Verloc's secretive lifestyle and diplomatic manner
of speaking prevented him from ever really speaking to his wife about his
involvement in confidential plots, let alone disclosing his fears and
indignations regarding these actions. Conrad holds, and I think cor-
rectly, that this inability to speak does not imply an absence of a certain
power, as Arendt suggests, but rather an incompetence in speaking
coherently and personally due to a secretive, bureaucratic mode of
existence. Think of Kayerts' and Carlier's incompetence in the use of
their faculties stemming from their long years of thoughtlessness and
routine work. Generally speaking, this incapability signifies a lack of
practice or power in the use of a certain faculty;14 it does not mean,
however, that one does not possess this faculty altogether. Conraďs
descriptions of this incapability are faithful to the way human beings
actually behave. His insights help us clarify the connection between
banality and an incapability to speak coherently which Arendt notes but
does not adequately explain.

Monstrosity Versus Blind Devotion

In Eichmann in Jerusalem , Arendt distinguishes the banal evil of

Eichmann from the diabolical evil of Iago, Macbeth, and Richard III.
Eichmann's uncompromising loyalty is compared to Iago's demonic
profundity and to Richard Ill's desire "to prove a villain." The distinction
is between those who plan, initiate the crimes, and have a criminal
motive (Hitler) and others who blindly obey the orders of the monsters
(Eichmann). Arendt insists that Eichmann had no motives, aside from an
extraordinary diligence in looking out for his own personal advance-
ment. Moreover, she remarks that "this diligence in itself was in no way

This content downloaded from 128.111.121.42 on Thu, 12 May 2016 01:51:23 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Mordechai Gordon 2 1

criminal; he certainly would never have murdered his superior in order

to inherit his post."15
In Heart of Darkness, Conrad also describes these two types of evil.
There is no doubt that Kurtz, with his lust for ivory and lack of restraints,
represents the demonic evil. In Conraďs words: "He had taken a high
seat amongst the devils of the land - I mean literally."16 Contrary to
Kurtz's diabolical evil, we find the banal evil of the Russian adventurer
who supports Kurtz by nursing him through two illnesses and doing his
best to keep him alive. The Russian's evil, like Eichmann's, is the evil of
obedience and blind devotion:

For months - for years - his life hadn't been worth a day's purchase;
and there he was gallantly, thoughtlessly alive, to all appearances
indestructible solely by the virtue of his few years and his unreflecting
audacity. ... I did not envy him his devotion to Kurtz, though. He had not
meditated over it. It came to him and he accepted it with a sort of eager
fatalism. I must say that to me it appeared about the most dangerous
thing in every way he had come upon so far.17

The problem with evil leaders or evil regimes, as Arendt and Conrad
clearly show, is that they require devotion and blind faith and discourage
individual thought and meditation. Like every faith, one can either
accept or reject these leaders but one cannot argue with them. As the
Russian exclaimed about Kurtz: "You don't talk with the man - you
listen to him."18 The trouble is that one who accepts any faith with an
eager fatalism ceases to think altogether and thus can easily become
dangerous. This danger that Conrad identifies, of thoughtlessly support-
ing evil, is the same danger that Arendt points to in law-abiding citizens
like Eichmann:

Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that it was nothing more than
misfortune that made you a willing instrument in the organization of
mass murder; there still remains the fact that you have carried out, and
therefore actively supported, a policy of mass murder. For politics is not
like the nursery; in politics obedience and support are the same.19

Thoughtless individuals, therefore, are often supporters of terrible

crimes, even though they may not be their initiators or planners. Both
Conrad and Arendt indicate that thoughtless people are dangerous, not
because they lack restraint (like Kurtz), but because they continue to
perform their duties even when the orders are criminal. Arendt insists
that Eichmann hardly ever made a decision of his own, was extremely
careful to be covered by orders and always required directives. Yet it was
this same Eichmann who carried to an extreme the conviction that one
must continue to obey Hitler's orders even when it was plain that they

This content downloaded from 128.111.121.42 on Thu, 12 May 2016 01:51:23 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 22

were criminal and murderous. The uncompromising loyalty with which

he performed his criminal duties was what damned him most in the eyes
of the judges.
In Conrad's novel Victory we encounter this unreflecting loyalty in
the character of Ricardo. Ricardo had left a steady job as a mate of a
schooner with good wages to join Mr. Jones, a bandit and gambler.
Ricardo's adoration of Mr. Jones was immense and he never realized that
his devotion to this gentleman was a form of slavery. Like Eichmann,
Ricardo almost always obeyed the orders of his superior even though
many times he did not agree with them. When he was tempted to act
impulsively and to kill his skipper or Heyst he restrained himself
because of his loyalty to Mr. Jones. Unlike Eichmann, Ricardo finally
renounces obedience to his superior when he falls in love with a woman:
he gives in to temptation. Yet having obeyed the orders of his gentleman
for so long, Ricardo does not know what use to make of his freedom. When
he is alone with the woman, Lena, he behaves like an animal intoxicated
by his impulses. And shortly after he sets himself free from the hold of
his gentleman, Ricardo is killed by Mr. Jones.
Through the characters of Ricardo, the Russian, and Kayerts and
Carlier, Conrad throws light on the relationship of thoughtlessness and
freedom. Leading an unreflective existence, banal individuals function
much like robots. Even when they are liberated from the hold of their
master (as in the case of Ricardo) or from the constraints of conventions
(Kayerts and Carlier), thoughtless individuals do not know how to use
their freedom. They continue to live under constraint, not the external
constraints of society or a superior authority, but rather limited by their
own lack of imagination and creativity. In Heart of Darkness, the Russian
continued to stick to Kurtz even after the latter threatened to shoot him
because as he says: "No, no. I couldn't leave him."20 Thus the Russian
could not even imagine abandoning Kurtz, let alone attempt to leave
him. Conrad illustrates that banal people are not free in the sense of
being able to choose between different alternatives and take responsibil-
ity for their actions.

An Atmosphere of Lies and Self-Deception

One of the characteristics of the Third Reich that Arendt identifies

is the atmosphere of self-deception, lies, and stupidity that shielded the
German society against reality and factuality:
These lies changed from year to year, and they frequently contradicted
each other; moreover, they were not necessarily the same for the

This content downloaded from 128.111.121.42 on Thu, 12 May 2016 01:51:23 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Mordechai Gordon 23

various branches of the Party hierarchy or the people at large. But the
practice of self-deception had become so common, almost a moral
prerequisite for survival, that even now, eighteen years after the
collapse of the Nazi regime, when most of the specific content of its lies
had been forgotten, it is sometimes difficult not to believe that mendac-
ity has become an integral part of the German national character.21

Arendt holds that this aura of systematic mendacity is expedient for

banal criminals because it not only protects them against the terrifying
reality in which they are living, but also allows them to continue to
function with a clear conscience. Put simply, thoughtlessness thrives in
an atmosphere of self-deception and falsehood.
In The Nigger of the Narcissus , Conrad depicts a similar atmosphere
of falsehood created by the crew of the Narcissus to protect them against
the reality of Jimmy's wickedness and his contempt for them. Jimmy,
who first lies to the crew about being unable to work, later, when the lie
is exposed, deceives himself about his approaching death: "His obstinate
non-recognition of the only certitude whose approach we could watch
from day to day was as disquieting as the failure of some law of nature."22
Although the crew clearly recognize that he is dying, they perpetuate his
lie and thus create a conspiracy based on self-deception. The men choose
to lie to him rather than face the fact that they are the devoted servants
of an habitual deceiver:

We lied to him with gravity, with emotion, with unction, as if perform-

ing some moral trick with a view to an eternal reward. We made a
chorus of affirmation to his wildest assertions, as though he had been
a millionaire, a politician or a reformer - and we a crowd of ambitious
lubbers.23

The potency of this aura of falseness becomes manifest when all the
crew but one (old Singleton) are shocked by Jimmy's death. Only Single-
ton relates to Jimmy without any sentimental delusions and hence only
he foresees the inevitable outcome:

Jimmy's death, after all, came as a tremendous surprise. We did not

know till then how much faith we had put in his delusions. We had
taken his chances of life so much at his own valuation that his death,
like the death of an old belief, shook the foundations of our society. A
common bond was gone; the strong, effective and respectable bond of a
sentimental lie.24

This bond, like the atmosphere of lies and self-deception in the Third
Reich, enabled the men to function with a clear conscience and shielded
them against the reality of Jimmy's death. Conrad and Arendt indicate
that banal criminals frequently operate under an aura of mendacity

This content downloaded from 128.111.121.42 on Thu, 12 May 2016 01:51:23 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 24

which holds them together like a common bond. This bond is strong and
effective as long as people are willing to believe the lies. It is often so
powerful that the criminals find it very difficult to realize that they are
doing anything wrong.
So how can people who are operating under an aura of falsehood
discover that they are perpetrators of a crime? Conrad's depiction of what
happens when this atmosphere of lies and self-deception is uncovered is
illuminating. After Jimmy's death, the crew of the Narcissus begin to
question his sincerity and to doubt each other's truthfulness. Conrad
describes how the men are scandalized with each other, some speaking
unkindly to their best friends, others refusing to speak at all. Only when
the sentimental lie is exposed do the men seek someone to blame; only
then do they suspect that they had done something wrong. That is, when
the lies are revealed there is nothing to hold the conspirators together
and they begin both to blame each other and to question their own
sincerity. Thus, Conrad is suggesting that the common bond of falsehood
has to be broken before the criminals can realize that they are doing evil.
For when a group of criminals suspect one another of deceit, there is a
possibility that each one of them will doubt his or her own truthfulness.
Only then is there a chance that they will face the truth.
Before moving on to explore a number of educational implications of
several aspects of the banality of evil discussed above, I would like to
briefly make two additional points regarding this phenomenon. First,
although both Arendt and Conrad indicate that the banality of evil
flourishes in a context of racism and imperialism, it is by no means the
only environment in which we can find it. Indeed, Conrad has shown in
The Secret Agent and in Under Western Eyes , to take just two examples,
that the banality of evil can arise in various countries with different
regimes. The Secret Agent takes place in London at the turn of the 20th
century, which was under Parliamentary rule. Under Western Eyes is set
in Czarist Russia, which was a tyranny, and in Geneva, the haven of
democratic liberty at the time. Razumov, the main character of this
novel, whom Conrad depicts in the Author's Note as not being monstrous,
thoughtlessly betrays a fellow schoolmate to the Russian police. Yet
Razumov's banality is not only very different from Eichmann's (he was
not the clerk that carried out the murderous orders of his superiors), but
also from the other Conradian characters we have examined. Razumov
is not an insignificant and incapable individual like Kayerts and Carlier.
He is not the shallow, secret agent of Verloc who could not communicate
with his wife. Neither is he, like the Russian or Ricardo, the unreflective,
petty criminal who is blindly devoted to his superior. Razumov is the
proud and lonely philosophy student who finds himself involved in a

This content downloaded from 128.111.121.42 on Thu, 12 May 2016 01:51:23 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Mordechai Gordon 25

political crime he neither planned nor supported. All these characters

are distinct and they illustrate the second point that I wish to make: that
there are different kinds of banal criminals. In short, Conrad shows
through the characters we have examined that there are various types
of banality.

Educational Implications

In the final part of this paper, I would like to closely examine some
of the implications that the phenomenon of the banality of evil has for
education. Specifically, I wish to explore the relevance of a number of
features of the banality of evil discussed above for the issue of engaged
pedagogy. By "engaged pedagogy," I mean, as bell hooks does, an
approach to education which seeks to foster critical awareness and the
active participation of the students in the learning process:
Teaching is a performative act. And it is that aspect of our work that
offers the space for change, invention, spontaneous shifts, that can
serve as a catalyst drawing out the unique elements in each classroom.
To embrace the performative aspect of teaching we are compelled to
engage "audiences," to consider issues of reciprocity. Teachers are not
performers in the traditional sense of the word in that our work is not
meant to be a spectacle. Yet it is meant to serve as a catalyst that calls
everyone to become more and more engaged, to become active partici-
pants in learning.25

This pedagogical approach is influenced by progressive educators such

as Paulo Freire who reject the notion that genuine learning can occur
when students are passive consumers of information. In Freire's view,
teachers need to engage students in a dialogue in order to challenge them
to critically examine their lives and the social, political, and economic
problems which affect them.
Yet those of us educators who are committed to exercising some
version of engaged pedagogy in our classrooms know that this dialogical
learning process is not easy to achieve. Engaged pedagogy requires
teachers to be excited about the ideas that are being discussed in order
to help generate the students' excitement. However, the teachers' excite-
ment about ideas, as hooks correctly argues, is not enough to create an
exciting learning process:
As a classroom community, our capacity to generate excitement is
deeply affected by our interest in one another, in hearing one another's
voices, in recognizing one another's presence. Since the vast majority of
students learn through conservative, traditional educational practices

This content downloaded from 128.111.121.42 on Thu, 12 May 2016 01:51:23 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 26

and concern themselves only with the presence of the professor, any
radical pedagogy must insist that everyone's presence is acknowledged.
That insistence cannot be simply stated. It has to be demonstrated
through pedagogical practices.26

Hooks rightly insists that the contributions of the students can stimulate
great excitement if they are valued by the teacher. This means that the
teacher has to be genuinely interested in and open to the comments and
criticisms of students. Hooks recognizes that excitement is generated
through collective effort and not merely through the individual efforts of
the teacher.
Yet what are some of the other conditions necessary for the success
of engaged pedagogy? I believe that the concept of the banality of evil
discussed above suggests that educators need to take into account three
fundamental conditions. The first condition is that teachers should not
be content with clichés and stock phrases when eliciting student re-
sponses. As we saw in the examples of Eichmann and Mr. Verloc, such
use of clichés and hackneyed phrases usually means that a person is not
thinking critically and personally about a situation. When my college
students use such language, I often find that they have not really
reflected on the meaning of a given cliché before using it. For example,
when I ask my students about the meaning of equality, as one of the
principles of democracy, a common response is that "all humans are
created equal." When I press them to explain in what sense human
beings are, or should be, equal, many of them find it difficult to respond.
My experience indicates that most students have not adequately re-
flected on the difference between universal equality (as an ideal that is
difficult to define) and legal, social, or political equality (which is a
standard that democratic societies strive for).
Moreover, I find that clichés and phrases are frequently used by
students in order to artificially simplify a problem that is complex. Such
language prevents students from viewing a problem from several per-
spectives and hence from gaining a deeper understanding of the issue. To
continue the previous example, most college students who are asked
about the significance of equality in a democratic society are able to point
to principles such as equal rights and equality of opportunity. However,
many of these same students have not critically analyzed the various
meanings of these principles. That is, they have never really thought
about whether equality of opportunity means that everyone should get
the exact same opportunities, regardless of differences of race, gender,
nationality, and so forth. Or does it imply, on the other hand, that the
government needs to intervene to give certain privileges to various
sectors of society which historically have been discriminated against. In

This content downloaded from 128.111.121.42 on Thu, 12 May 2016 01:51:23 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Mordechai Gordon 27

short, my experience with college students indicates that while most of

them are able to identify democratic principles such as equality, diver-
sity, and freedom, they lack a deep understanding of what these prin-
ciples denote and how they are related. I am not suggesting that this lack
of understanding is a problem, but merely that students use clichés and
stock phrases to evade addressing questions critically. Professors need
to be mindful that when students use ready-made, common quotes, they
usually do not have an adequate understanding of the issue.
Another requirement for the success of engaged pedagogy is that
educators should try to avoid inspiring the students' blind devotion and
admiration. This is because blind devotion and admiration stifles the
students' ability to both speak freely and to think independently and
critically. Remember how the Russian's complete loyalty to Kurtz leads
him to support the actions of a monstrous criminal. Remember also how
the Russian renounces his capacity to think critically and to speak openly
because of his devotion to Kurtz. When such devotion exists in the
classroom, the result is almost always that students' voices are not heard
and their ability to reflect on issues is diminished.
More specifically, I would argue that a number of evils typically
result from the wish to inspire the complete devotion of one's students.
First, since such teachers often focus on only one interpretation of a text,
its complexity and richness is significantly reduced, thereby depriving
the students of a more complete picture of the work. Thus Hamlet ,
Macbeth , and Lear , for instance, are taught with the aim of uncovering
the only true meaning that Shakespeare intended. Second, as bell hooks
has recognized, teachers who demand the complete devotion of their
students subscribe to pedagogical approaches that concern themselves
only with the presence of the professor. This means that these professors
do not acknowledge and appreciate the voices and contributions of
students. Consequently, many students in their classes will refrain from
speaking because they are afraid of giving the "wrong" answer. Finally,
since in such a classroom environment there is no room for raising and
evaluating different perspectives, critical and independent thinking
suffers as well. Students in these classrooms are not encouraged to
reflect on and critically respond to the issues and problems raised by the
assigned texts.
In order to prevent students from becoming blindly devoted to their
teachers, engaged pedagogues must relate to their students with humil-
ity. That is, engaged educators must not regard themselves as infallible
and be genuinely open to the contributions and criticisms of their
students. Freire provides a strong case for this point:

This content downloaded from 128.111.121.42 on Thu, 12 May 2016 01:51:23 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
28 On the Banality of Evil
How can I dialogue if I am closed to - and even offended by the
contribution of others? How can I dialogue if I am afraid of being
displaced, the mere possibility causing me torment and weakness? Self-
sufficiency is incompatible with dialogue. Men and women who lack
humility (or have lost it) cannot come to the people, cannot be their
partners in naming the world. Someone who cannot acknowledge
himself to be as mortal as everyone else still has a long way to go before
he can reach the point of encounter. At the point of encounter there are
neither utter ignoramuses nor perfect sages; there are only people who
are attempting together, to learn more than they now know.27

Having humility does not mean that engaged educators do not wish
to be appreciated and respected by their students. Appreciation and
respect is something that all teachers should expect from their students
provided that the teachers themselves are exhibiting these qualities. But
desiring respect is very different from expecting students to relate to
their teachers with complete devotion and admiration. The former
implies that educators long for students who display an interest in
learning and a willingness to grow; it does not suggest, however, that
they want students to become infatuated with them. Unlike the desire
for respect, the demand for devotion is aimed chiefly at the personal
qualities of the teacher. In the latter case, my experience as well as that
of my students' indicates that there is usually no openness for raising and
discussing multiple perspectives and opposing viewpoints. Even when
they elicit students' responses, teachers who wish to inspire complete
devotion are typically interested in presenting a single truth which they
possess.
The final condition for the success of engaged pedagogy derived from
the concept of the banality of evil is that educators should cultivate an
atmosphere of truthfulness and self-awareness in their classrooms. This
is because, as Arendt and Conrad have shown, a climate of falsehood and
self-deception is one in which banality flourishes. It is logical, therefore,
to conclude that thinking thrives in an atmosphere characterized by a
commitment to honesty and self-examination. As opposed to an aura of
falsehood and self-deception which enables people to evade the reality in
which they are living, an atmosphere of truthfulness and self- awareness
forces them to confront this reality. Put differently, in order to foster
critical and independent thinking, it is necessary that both teachers and
students be committed to what Freire calls "naming the world." By
"naming the world," he means calling the world for what it is, or more
precisely, disclosing the horrific, oppressive realities that we live in:
Dialogue is the encounter, mediated by the world, in order to name the
world. Hence, dialogue cannot occur between those who want to name

This content downloaded from 128.111.121.42 on Thu, 12 May 2016 01:51:23 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 the world and those who do not wish this naming - between those who
deny others the right to speak their word and those whose right to speak
has been denied them. Those who have been denied their primordial
right to speak their word must first reclaim this right and prevent the
continuation of this dehumanizing aggression.28

Freire is correct in his assessment that genuine dialogue can only

occur if all the participants in the encounter are committed to expose the
reality for what it is. If some of the participants wish to cover up an aspect
of reality which they find offensive or threatening, it is not likely that
they will be open to the viewpoints of others who want to clearly define
this reality. I would add that thinking too is undermined in a dialogical
situation in which the participants are not committed to critically
examine themselves and their lives. My own experience suggests that
when teachers and students are not willing to interrogate their under-
lying opinions and beliefs, philosophical thinking and discussion can
easily degenerate into a banal conversation. The example of Socrates
also comes to mind. His unrelenting effort to examine his partners' as
well as his own most cherished opinions, enabled him to think clearly and
accurately and not to fall prey to the misconceptions of his peers. His
enthusiasm for philosophical inquiry generated an excitement for learn-
ing in his partners and prevented the dialogue from becoming idle talk.
Engaged educators should learn from the example of Socrates. They
need to vigilantly confront prejudices and false conceptions as they arise
in the classroom so that critical inquiry never turns into demagoguery or
a chat session. They must be willing to question their most basic
assumptions in order to illustrate the act of thinking and to encourage
students to do the same.

Notes

1. Arendt herself makes this claim in Eichmann In Jerusalem (New York:

Penguin Books, 1977), p. 288. See also her The Life Of The Mind (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1978), p. 3.
2. Eichmann In Jerusalem , p. 288.
3. See Joseph Conrad's Under Western Eyes , Intro, by Morton Dauwan Zabel
(New York: New Directions, 1951), pp. ix-x.
4. In The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
Inc., 1979), pp. 189-190, Arendt erroneously attributes the monstrous
qualities of Kurtz to all the superfluous men "who came rushing down the
Cape" during the Imperialist era. She also equates the bandit and gambler
Mr. Jones (whom she calls an "authentic gentleman") of Victory with the
honest and gentlemanly Heyst.
5. Arendt refers to Conrad's Heart of Darkness as the most illuminating work

This content downloaded from 128.111.121.42 on Thu, 12 May 2016 01:51:23 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 30

on actual race experience in Africa." See p. 185.

6. Joseph Conrad, "An Outpost of Progress," from Great Short Works of Joseph
Conrad , Intro, by Jerry Allen (New York: Harper & Row Inc., 1967), pp. 17-19.
7. Eichmann In Jerusalem , p. 150.
8. "An Outpost of Progress," p. 18.
9. As Arendt concedes: "...when I speak of the banality of evil, I do so only on the
strictly factual level, pointing to a phenomenon which stared one in the face
at the trial." See Eichmann In Jerusalem , p. 287. See also The Life of the
Mind , pp. 3-6.
10. Eichmann In Jerusalem , p. 51.
11. Joseph Conrad, The Secret Agent, Intro, by Fredrick R. Karl (New York: New
American Library, 1983), pp. 182, 188.
12. Ibid., p. 183.
13. Ibid ., p. 186.
14. In the "The Grand Inquisitor," Dostoyevsky uses the word capable to describe
how the majority of people do not know how to use the freedom bestowed on
them by Jesus. See Fyodor Dostoyevsky's The Brothers Karamazov , trans,
by Constance Garnett (New York: The New American Library, Inc., 1957),
p. 241.
15. Eichmann In Jerusalem , p. 287.
16. Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness, from Great Short Works of Joseph Conrad ,
Intro, by Jerry Allen (New York: Harper & Row Inc., 1967), p. 262.
17. Ibid., p. 267.
18. Ibid., p. 265.
19. Eichmann in Jerusalem, p. 279.
20. Heart of Darkness, p. 269.
21. Eichmann in Jerusalem, p. 52.
22. Joseph Conrad, The Nigger of the Narcissus, from Great Short Works of
Joseph Conrad, Intro, by Jerry Allen (New York: Harper & Row Inc., 1967).
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., p. 164.
25. See her book Teaching to Transgress: Education as the Practice of Freedom
(New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 11.
26. Ibid., p. 8.
27. Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, (New York: Continuum, 1993), p. 71.
28. Ibid., p. 69.

This content downloaded from 128.111.121.42 on Thu, 12 May 2016 01:51:23 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms