#35 Civil Procedure (Jurisdiction – Case #35)

APPEARANCE IN PERSON

San Miguel Village School vs. Pundogar and Triño

Failure of Defendant to appear in Brgy. Conciliation proceedings, not fatal to jurisdiction of court

PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS: Lupon Tagapamayapa ng Brgy. Palao – certificate to file action (Triño cannot be contacted) RTC of Lanao (Rasuman) -
SMVS (Breach of Contract with Damages) = ruled in favor of SMVS; Triño in default 4 months RTC of Lanao (Pundogar) - Triño (Relief from
Judgment) = ruled in favor of Triño SC – SMVS (Review).

FACTS: On 2 October 1985, SMVS filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages against Triño, before the RTC, Br. 3, Lanao del Norte. The
alleged breach of contract happened as follows: on 9 May 1985, SMVS entered into a contract of services with Triño. Under that contract, Triño would
teach at SMVS during the school year 1985-1986, which would commence in June 1985 and end in March 1986. She was assigned to take charge of
Grade VI, Intermediate Department. The contract also provided that any party desiring to terminate the contract before its scheduled expiration,
would give the other party at least one month notice of termination in writing. Sometime in August 1985, while the contract was in full force and
effect, and during a final examination period, Triño suddenly stopped teaching at SMVS, without giving notice of termination and thereby causing not
inconsiderable difficulties for the School. SMVS immediately sought the assistance of the Brgy. Captain of Palao and the commencement of conciliation
proceedings. This attempt failed because Triño could not be contacted, she having left Iligan City and having secured a better paying job at the
Philippine Refugee Center based in Manila. A Certificate to File Action, signed by the Brgy. Captain of Brgy. Palao, Iligan City, dated 17 September 1985,
bearing the notation that the "respondent cannot be contacted," was filed along with the complaint.

Summons was served upon Triño through her husband. On 22 November 1985, private respondent having failed to file an answer within the
reglementary period, the petitioner School moved to declare her in default. The trial court granted the motion, declared Triño in default and
designated the Branch Clerk of Court to receive the evidence of the SMVS and thereafter to report back to the court. Thereafter, the RTC, as presided
by Judge Rasuman, rendered a decision ordering Triño to pay SMVS the following: (1) all compensatory damages to SMVS, the amount of P8,400.00;
(2) the amount of P5,000.00, as moral damages; (3) attorney's fees of P5,000.00, and (4) the costs of this suit.

4 months later, Triño filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with the trial court, alleging that the court had no jurisdiction to render its decision
dated 26 January 1986 for failure of SMVS to go through the mandatory conciliation procedure prescribed by Sections 2 and 6 of P.D. No. 1508. Triño
argued that the certification of the Brgy. Captain of Palao was inadequate compliance with P.D. No. 1508, Triño being a resident, not of Barangay Palao,
Iligan City, but rather of Barangay Tomas Cabili, Iligan City.

RTC, now presided by Judge Pundogar, rendered a decision in Triño’s favor, setting aside the earlier judgment of Judge Rasuman, not on the ground
that Triño in entitled to a relief, but because the court that rendered the decision has no jurisdiction.

ISSUE/s: WON Judge Pundogar is correct.

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HELD: NO.

RATIO: It is, however, firmly settled that failure of a plaintiff to comply with the requirements of P.D. No. 1508 does not affect the jurisdiction of the
court that tried the action. In, e.g., Millare v. Hernando, the Court stressed that "the conciliation procedure required under P.D. No. 1508 is not a
jurisdictional requirement in the sense that failure to have prior recourse to such procedure would not deprive a court of its jurisdiction either over the
subject matter or over the person of the defendant." Failure of a plaintiff to go through the conciliation procedure established by P.D. No. 1508 merely
affects the sufficiency, or the maturity or ripeness of the plaintiff’s cause of action and the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss, not
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, but rather for want of cause of action or for prematurity. Respondent Judge was thus in palpable error in holding
his predecessor without jurisdiction to render the assailed decision.

Respondent Judge was equally in error when he either disregarded or misconstrued the Certificate to File Action, dated 17 September 1985, which had
been, issued by the Barangay Captain of Barangay Palao.

Respondent Judge simply said apropos this Certificate to File Action, that no "confrontation" had taken place between petitioner and private
respondent before the Barangay authorities and immediately concluded that the requirements of P.D. No. 1508 had been violated. There is no
question that the "confrontation" or conciliation proceedings did not materialize here, since private respondent did not appear before the Lupon.
Where, however, the defendant in an action fails for one reason or another to respond to a notice to appear before the Lupon, the requirement of
P.D. No. 1508 must be regarded as having been satisfied by the plaintiff. A defendant cannot be allowed to frustrate the requirements of the statute
by her own refusal or failure to appear before the Lupon and then later to assail a judgment rendered in such action by setting up the very ground of
non-compliance with P.D. No. 1508. In simplest terms, a defendant cannot be allowed to profit by her own default.

Furthermore, the alleged failure on the part of a plaintiff to comply with the procedural requirement established by P.D. No. 1508 must be raised in a
timely manner, that is, at the first available opportunity, if such alleged failure is to provide legal basis for dismissal of the complaint. Such failure must
be pleaded, in other words, in a timely motion to dismiss or in the answer. Failure to so set up that defense produces the effect of waiver of such
defense. In the instant case, private respondent was declared in default and that default order was never set aside. Accordingly, private respondent
must be held to have waived whatever right she may have had to raise the defense of failure to comply with the compulsory conciliation procedure
under P.D. No. 1508. Indeed, that was not the only thing she waived; she also waived the right to appear and to file an answer and there to set up that
and other defenses that she might have had. It is simply too late to demand conciliation under P.D. No. 1508 after a judgment on the merits (albeit by
default) has been rendered and become final and executory.

RULING: The Decision of Judge Pundogar is REVERSED. The Decision of the Judge Rasuman is REINSTATED.

- Michael Joseph Nogoy

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