a.

Administrative Due Process and Exception to Notice & Hearing

Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations & National Labor Union, Inc.
[No. 46496. February 27, 1940]
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and proprietor, and NATIONAL
WORKERS'BROTHERHOOD, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OFINDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and
NATIONAL LABORUNION, INC., respondents.
DOCTRINE:
Administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are unfettered by the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements, subject to the observance of fundamental and essential requirements of
due process in justiciable cases presented before them. Nevertheless, It is essential that due process
must be observed for the requirements of fair play are not applicable to judicial proceedings only.

FACTS:
Toribio Teodoro is the manager and owner of Ang Tibay, a leather company which has a contract
with the Philippine Army. On September 26, 1938 he temporarily laid off members of the
National Labor Union Inc. (NLU), working in his company due to a shortage of leather soles which
resulted in the delay in the fulfilment of his contract with the Army.

The Court of Industrial Relations forwarded a motion for reconsideration with the Supreme Court.

The NLU in pursuit of a retrial in the Court of Industrial Relations averred that:
1. The shortage of soles has no factual basis
2. The scheme was to prevent the forfeiture of his bond to cover the breach of obligation with the
Army
3. The letter he sent to the army was part of this scheme
4. The company union was an employer dominated one.
5. laborers rights to CBA is indispensable.
6. Civil code shouldn’t be used to interpret a legislation of American industrial origins.
7. Toribio was guilty of unfair labor practice for favoring his union.
8. Exhibits are inaccessible to respondents.
9. The exhibits can reverse the judgment.

The petitioner Ang Tibay has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc.

ISSUE:
WON special courts like Court of Industrial Relations should observe due process. (YES)
RULING:
We shall proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of therespondent labor union. Before doing
this, however, wedeem it necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure incases of this nature, to
make several observations regarding the nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial
Relations (CIR) and emphasize certain guiding principles which should be observed in the trial of
cases brought before it. We have re-examined the entire record of the proceedings had before the
Court of IndustriaR elations in this case, and the SC have found no substantial evidence to indicate
that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity. Thewhole
transcript taken contains what transpired during thehearing and is more of a record of contradictory
andconflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadicconclusion drawn to suit their own
views. It is evident thatthese statements and expressions of views of counsel haveno evidentiary
value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the
law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of
the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the
Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction
is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the
CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It
not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between
employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question,
matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting, employers and employees or
laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulate the relationsbetween them,
subject to, and in accordance with, theprovisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1).

Itshall take cognizance for purposes of prevention,arbitration, decision and settlement, of any
industrial oragricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike orlockout, arising from differences
as regards wages, sharesor compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy oremployment,
between employers and employees or laborersand between landlords and tenants or farm-
laborers,provided that the number of employees, laborers or tenantsor farm-laborers involved
exceeds thirty, and suchindustrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of
Labor or by any or both of the parties tothe controversy and certified by the Secretary of Labor as
existing and proper to be dealth with by the Court for thesake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It
shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties
and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section4, ibid.) When
directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all pertinent facts related
tothe industry concerned or to the industries established in adesignated locality, with a view to
determining thenecessity and fairness of fixing and adopting f or suchindustry or locality a minimum
wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum"canon" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or
tenantsor lessees to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it mayappeal to voluntary arbitration in the
settlement ofindustrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliationfor that purpose, or recur to
the more effective system ofofficial investigation and compulsory arbitration in order todetermine
specific controversies between labor and capitalin industry and in agriculture. There is in reality
here aming ling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid
doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.

The CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to
"act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall notbe bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but
mayinform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20,
Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands
made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, orderor
decision any matter or determination which may bedeemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of
settlingthe dispute or of preventing f urther industrial oragricultural disputes. (Section 13, ibid.) And
in the light ofthis legislative policy, appeals to this Court have beenespecially regulated by the rules
recently promulgated bythis Court to carry into effect the avowed legislativepurpose. The fact,
however, that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character.

There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his
own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A
decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must
be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.

By and large, after considerablediscussion, we have come to the conclusion that the interestof justice
would be better served if the movant is givenopportunity to present at the hearing the
documentsreferred to in his motion and such other evidence as may berelevant to the main issue
involved. The legislation whichcreated the Court of Industrial Relations and under whichit acts is
new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issueinvolved is not entirely attributable to the
partiesadversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion fora new trial should be, and the
same is hereby granted, andthe entire record of this case shall be remanded to theCourt of Industrial
Relations, with instruction that itreopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be
relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with therequirements set forth hereinabove. So
ordered.
Acuzar vs. Jorolan
G.R. No. 177878. April 7, 2010.*
SPO1 LEONITO ACUZAR, petitioner, vs. APRONIANOJOROLAN and HON. EDUARDO A.
APRESA, PEOPLE’SLAW ENFORCEMENT BOARD (PLEB) Chairman, NewCorella, Davao del
Norte, respondents.

DOCTRINE:
Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in
courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings
is accorded, there is no denial of due process.
FACTS:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, filed by petitioner SPO1 Leonito Acuzar assailingthe March 23, 2007
Decision1 of the CA. The assailed decision reversedand set aside the October 15, 2002 Decision 2 of
theRegional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagum City, Branch 31, which had annulled the Decision 3 of the
People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) of the Municipality of NewCorella, Davao del Norte,
finding petitioner guilty of GraveMisconduct and ordering his dismissal from service.
On May 2, 2000, respondent Aproniano Jorolan filedAdministrative Case No. 2000-01 4 against
petitioner beforethe PLEB charging the latter of Grave Misconduct for allegedly having an illicit
relationship with respondent’s minordaughter.
Respondent also instituted a criminalcase against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court ofNew
Corella forViolation of Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No.7610, otherwise known as the
Child Abuse Act.

Petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit 5before the PLEB vehemently denying all the
accusationsleveled against him. In support thereof, petitioner attachedthe affidavit of complainant’s
daughter, Rigma A. Jorolan,who denied having any relationship with the petitioner orhaving kissed
him despite knowing him to be a marriedperson.

Petitioner filed a motion to suspendthe proceedings before the PLEB pending resolution of
thecriminal case filed before the regular court. The PLEBdenied his motion for lack of merit and a
hearing of thecase was conducted. The PLEB also denied petitioner’smotion for reconsideration on
August 9, 2000 for allegedlybeing dilatory.
After due proceedings, the PLEBissued a decision finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct
(child abuse) and penalized petitioner with dismissal effective immediately.

Immediately upon receipt of the decision, petitioner fileda Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for
PreliminaryMandatory Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order 7with the RTC. Petitioner alleged
that the subject decision wasissued without giving him an opportunity to be heard. Helikewise
averred that the respondent Board acted withoutjurisdiction in proceeding with the case without
thepetitioner having been first convicted in the criminal casebefore the regular court. Petitioner
pointed out that underthe PLEB Rules of Procedure, prior conviction was requiredbefore the Board
may act on the administrative caseconsidering that the charge was actually for violation oflaw,
although denominated as one (1) for grave misconduct.

Petitioner was ordereddismissed from the Philippine National Police (PNP) by theChief Regional
Directorial Staff of the PNP, Police RegionalOffice 11, effective September 7, 2000.

The RTC rendered a Decision annulling the Decision of the PLEB.

Respondent thereafter elevated the case to the CA. The CA rendered its Decision reversing and
setting aside the RTC’s decision.

The CA found merit in respondent’s argument that thepetition for certiorari filed by petitioner before
the RTC wasnot the proper remedy because (1) appeal was availableand (2) the issues raised were
not pure questions of law butboth questions of law and fact. According to the CA, theexistence and
availability of the right of appeal proscribesresort to certiorari because one (1) of the requirements
forits availment is the absence of the remedy of appeal or anyother plain, speedy or adequate remedy.
The CA ruled thatpetitioner should have appealed the decision of the PLEBto the regional appellate
board of the PNP before resortingto certiorari before the court. The CA added that while it istrue that
there are instances where the extraordinaryremedy of certiorari may be resorted to despite
theavailability of an appeal, petitioner, however, failed todemonstrate any ground to warrant
immediate resort to it.Thus, it held that the trial court erred in giving due courseto the petition.

Petitioner now assails the Decision of the CA.

Petitioner’s contention
Petitioner contends that the petition he filed before thetrial court was appropriate because the instant
case fallsunder the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion ofadministrative remedies, the decision being
patentlyillegal. Petitioner maintains that a conviction should havebeen first obtained in the criminal
case filed against himfor child abuse before the PLEB can acquire jurisdictionover his administrative
case. He also maintains that theBoard’s decision was reached without giving him anopportunity to be
heard and his right to due process wasviolated. The Board’s decision having been renderedwithout
jurisdiction, appeal was not an appropriateremedy.

ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in ruling that petitioner’s resort to certiorari was not warranted as the remedy of
appeal from the decision of thePLEB was available to him.
RULING:
NO, the SC affirmed the CA’s ruling.

To reiterate, petitioner opted to file a petition for certiorari before the trial court on the pretext that
the PLEB had no jurisdiction to hear the administrative case until petitioner is convicted before the
regular court. According to petitioner, although the case filed before the PLEB was captioned as
“Grave Misconduct,” the offense charged was actually for “Violation of Law,” which requires prior
conviction before a hearing on the administrative case can proceed. Thus, petitioner insists that the
PLEB shouldhave awaited the resolu tion of the criminal case before conducting a hearing on
theadministrative charge against him. The contention however is untenable.

A careful perusalof respondent’s affidavit-complaint against petitionerwould show that petitioner

was charged with grave misconduct for engaging in an illicit affair with respondent’s minor
daughter, he being a married man, and not for violation of law, as petitioner would like to
convincethis Court. Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct,
motivated by premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.10 It usually refers totransgression of
some established and definite rule ofaction, where no discretion is left except what necessitymay
demand; it does not necessarily imply corruption orcriminal intention but implies wrongful intention
and notto mere error of judgment.11 On the other hand, “violation of law” presupposes final
conviction in court of any crime or offense penalized under the Revised Penal Code or any
special law or ordinance.

The settled rule is that criminal and administrative cases are separate and distinct from each
other.13 In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed whereas in administrative
proceedings,only substantial evidence is required. Verily, administrative cases may proceed
independently of criminal proceedings. The PLEB, being the administrative disciplinary body
tasked to hear complaints against erring members of the PNP, has jurisdiction over the case.
Moreover, Section 43 (e) of Republic Act No. 6975,15 is explicit, thus:

“SEC. 43. People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB).—x x x

xxxx
(e) Decisions—The decision of the PLEB shall become finaland executory: Provided, That a decision
involving demotion ordismissal from the service may be appealed by either party with the regional appellate
board within ten (10) days from receipt ofthe copy of the decision.”

It is apparent from the foregoing provision that theremedy of appeal from the decision of the PLEB
to theRegional Appellate Board was available to petitioner. Sinceappeal was available, filing a
petition for certiorari wasinapt. The existence and availability of the right of appealare antithetical to
the availment of the special civil actionof certiorari.16 Corollarily, the principle of exhaustion
ofadministrative remedies requires that before a party isallowed to seek the intervention of the court,
it is aprecondition that he should have availed of the means ofadministrative processes afforded to
him. If a remedy isavailable within the administrative machinery of theadministrative agency, then
this alternative should first beutilized before resort can be made to the courts. This is toenable such
body to review and correct any mistakeswithout the intervention of the court.

Procedural Due Process in administrative proceedings

Contrary to petitioner’s claim that he has not beenafforded all the opportunity to present his side, our
ownreview of the records of the proceedings before the PLEBreveals otherwise.

In administrative proceedings, procedural due processhas been recognized to include the following:
(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a
respondent’s legal rights;(2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of
counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal
vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a
reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is
supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the
records or made known to the parties affected.

In the instant case, petitioner was notified of thecomplaint against him and in fact, he had submitted
hiscounter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses. Heattended the
hearings together with his counsel and even asked forseveral postponements. Petitioner therefore
cannot claimthat he had been denied of due process. Due process in an administrative context does
not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be
heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due
process.

The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explaintheir side of the controversy. In other words, it is notlegally objectionable for being violative
of due process foran administrative agency to resolve a case based solely onposition papers,
affidavits or documentary evidencesubmitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses maytake the
place of direct testimony. Here, we note thatpetitioner had more than enough opportunity to present
hisside and adduce evidence in support of his defense; thus, hecannot claim that his right to due
process has beenviolated.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decisiondated March 23, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R.SP No. 77110 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Carbonel vs. Civil Service Commission

G.R. No. 187689. September 7, 2010.

CLARITA J. CARBONEL, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICECOMMISSION, respondent.

DOCTRINE:
Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the
exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions
made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.

FACTS:
Petitioner Clarita J. Carbonel was an employee of theBureau of Jail Management and Penology
(BJMP), Makati City.She was formally charged with Dishonesty, GraveMisconduct, and
Falsification of Official Documents by theCivil Service Commission.
Petitioner went to the CSCRO IV tosecure a copy of the result of the Computer Assisted Test(CATS)
Career Service Professional Examination given on March 14, 1999, because she lost the original
copy of herCareer Service Professional Certificate of Rating (hereafterreferred to as certificate of
rating).3 Petitioner was directedto accomplish a verification slip. The ExaminationPlacement and
Service Division noticed that petitioner’spersonal and physical appearance was entirely differentfrom
the picture of the examinee attached to theapplication form and the picture seat plan. It was
alsodiscovered that the signature affixed on the applicationform was different from that appearing on
the verificationslip.4 Because of these discrepancies, the Legal AffairsDivision of the CSCRO IV
conducted an investigation.
In the course of the investigation, petitioner voluntarilymade a statement before Atty. Rosalinda
S.M. Gepigon,admitting that, sometime in March 1999, she accepted theproposal of a certain Bettina
J. Navarro (Navarro) for thelatter to obtain for petitioner a Career Service ProfessionalEligibility by
merely accomplishing an application formand paying the amount of P10,000.00. Petitioner
thusaccomplished an application form to take the CATS CareerService Professional Examination and
gave NavarroP5,000.00 as down payment. Upon receipt of the originalcopy of the certificate of
rating from Navarro, petitionergave the latter the remaining P5,000.00. Petitioner,however,
misplaced the certificate of rating. This promptedher to secure another copy from the CSCRO IV.
Hence, the formal charge against petitioner.
Denying her admissions in her voluntary statementbefore the CSCRO IV, petitioner, in her Answer,6
traversedthe charges against her. She explained that after filling upthe application form for the civil
service examination, sheasked Navarro to submit the same to the CSC. She,however, admitted that
she failed to take the examination as she had toattend to her ailing mother. Thus, when she received
acertificate of eligibility despite her failure to take the test,she was anxious to know the mystery
behind it. Sheclaimed that she went to the CSCRO IV not to get a copy ofthe certificate of rating but
to check the veracity of thecertificate. More importantly, she questioned the use of hervoluntary
statement as the basis of the formal chargeagainst her inasmuch as the same was made without
theassistance of counsel.
After the formal investigation, the CSCRO IV finds petitioner guilty of dishonesty, grave
misconduct, and falsification of official documents. The penalty of dismissal from the service, with
all its accessory penalties, was imposed onher. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by
CSCRO IV
Petitioner appealed, but the CSC dismissed the same for having been filed almost three years from
receipt of the CSCRO IV decision. The CSC did not give credence to petitioner’s explanation that
she failed to timely appeal thecase because of the death of her counsel. The CSC opined that
notwithstanding the death of one lawyer, the othermembers of the law firm, petitioner’s counsel of
record,could have timely appealed the decision.10 Petitioner’smotion for reconsideration was denied.
Unsatisfied, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA.On November 24, 2008, the CA rendered the
assaileddecision affirming the decisions and resolutions of theCSCRO IV and the CSC. Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA.

ISSUE:
WON petitioner’s right to due process was violated because she was not afforded the right to counsel
when her statement was taken hence she should not be liable
for the charge of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and falsification of official document.
RULING:
The petition is without merit.
It is undisputed that petitioner appealed the CSCROIV’s decision almost three years from receipt
thereof. Undoubtedly, the appeal was filed way beyond thereglementary period when the decision
had long becomefinal and executory.
This notwithstanding, on petition before the CA, the appellate court reviewed the case and disposed
of it on the merits, not on pure technicality.

It is true that the CSCRO IV, the CSC, and the CA gave credence to petitioner’s uncounseled
statements and, partly on the basis thereof, uniformly found petitioner liable for the charge of
dishonesty, grave misconduct, and falsification of official document. However, it must be
remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a
suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section
12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to
those made in an administrative investigation.

While investigations conducted by an administrativebody may at times be akin to a criminal

proceeding, thefact remains that, under existing laws, a party in anadministrative inquiry may or may
not be assisted bycounsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and ofpetitioner’s capacity to
represent herself, and no duty restson such body to furnish the person being investigated
withcounsel.18 The right to counsel is not always imperative inadministrative investigations because
such inquiries areconducted merely to determine whether there are facts thatmerit the imposition of
disciplinary measures againsterring public officers and employees, with the purpose ofmaintaining
the dignity of government service.

As such, the admissions made by petitioner during theinvestigation may be used as evidence to
justify herdismissal.20 We have carefully scrutinized the records ofthe case below and we find no
compelling reason to deviatefrom the findings of the CSC and the CA. The writtenadmission of
petitioner is replete with details that couldhave been known only to her. 21 Besides, petitioner’s
writtenstatement was not the only basis of her dismissal from theservice. Records show that the
CSCRO IV’s conclusion wasreached after consideration of all the documentary andtestimonial
evidence submitted by the parties during theformal investigation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition isDENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated November 24, 2008 and Resolution dated April 29,2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 101599
are AFFIRMED.

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
Globe Telecom, Inc. vs. National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)

G.R. No. 143964. July 26, 2004.*

GLOBE TELECOM, INC., petitioner, vs. THE NATIONALTELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION,COMMISSIONER JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO, DEPUTYCOMMISSIONERS AURELIO
M. UMALI and NESTORDACANAY, and SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., respondents.
FACTS:
Smart filed a complaint with NTC praying that the latter order the immediate interconnect of Smart
and Globes GSM networks for texting services. The Complaint arose from the inability of the two
leading Cellular Mobile Telephone Systems CMTS providers to effect interconnection. Smart alleged
that Globe, with bad faith and malice, refused to grant Smarts request for the interconnection of
SMS, in violation of RA 7925, EO No. 39, and their Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).

Thus NTC issued the Order now subject of the present petition. In the Order, after noting that both
Smart and Globe were “equally blameworthy” for their lack of cooperation in the submission of the
documentation required for interconnection and for having “unduly maneuvered the situation into the
present impasse,” NTC held that since SMS falls squarely within the definition of “value-added
service” or “enhanced-service” given in NTC Memorandum Circular No. 8-9-95 (MC No. 8-9-95)
the implementation of SMS interconnection is mandatory pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) No. 59
and that Smart and Globe have been providing SMS with authority from it, in violation of MC No. 8-
9-95.

Globe filed a Petition for Certiorary and Prohibition with the CA to nullify the NTC Order alleging
that the latter acted without jurisdiction, and that the said Order imposed an administrative penalty
upon it nor Smart for an offense, which the latter was not sufficiently charged nor heard, in violation
of the right to due process.
ISSUE:
WON the Order of the NTC is valid
RULING:
No. There are cardinal primary rights, which must be respected even in proceedings of this character.
The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be
given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights, which
he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does not
impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
that of having something to support its decision. Not only must there be some evidence to support a
finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected.
In the present case, the NTC Order was not supported by substantial evidence nor does it sufficiently
explain the reasons for which the decision was rendered. The very rationale adopted by the NTC in
its Order holding that SMS is value-added-service (VAS) is short and shoddy. The Court usually
accords great respect to the technical findings of administrative agencies in the fields of their
expertise, even if they are infelicitously worded. However, the above-quoted "finding" is nothing
more than bare assertions, unsupported by substantial evidence.76 The Order reveals that no deep
inquiry was made as to the nature of SMS or what its provisioning entails.
Secondly, Smart and Globe were denied an opportunity to present evidence on the issues relation to
the nature of VAS and prior approval. Moreover, in the assailed Order, Globe and Smart were never
informed of the fact that their operation of SMS without prior authority was at all an issue for
consideration.
It is essential that there is a need for a hearing before a fine may be imposed, as it is clearly a punitive
measure undertaken by an administrative agency in exercise of its quasi-judicial function. Inherently,
notice and hearing are indispensible for the valid exercise of an administrative agency of its quasi-
judicial functions.
Conclusion
In summary: (i) there is no legal basis under the Public Telecommunications Act (PTA) or the
memorandum circulars promulgated by the NTC to denominate SMS as VAS, and any subsequent
determination by the NTC on whether SMS is VAS should be made with proper regard for due
process and inconformity with the PTA; (ii) the assailed Order violates due process for failure to
sufficiently explain the reason for the decision rendered, for being unsupported by substantial
evidence, and for imputing violation to, and issuing a corresponding fine on, Globe despite the
absence of due notice and hearing which would have afforded Globe the right to present evidence on
its behalf.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 22
November 1999, as well as its Resolution dated 29 July 2000, and the assailed Order of the NTC
dated 19 July 1999 are hereby SET ASIDE. No cost.
SO ORDERED.

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:

FACTS:

ISSUE:
RULING:

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:

b. Incidental Powers and Res Judicata

Pascual, Jr. vs. Board of Medical Examiners

No. L-25018. May 26, 1969.

ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR., petitioner-appellee, vs. BOARDOF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, respondent-
appellant, SALVADOR GATBONTON and ENRIQUETAGATBONTON, intervenors-appellants.
FACTS:
Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the Board of Medical
Examiners. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged
immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness the
petitioner, who was the respondent in such malpractice charge.

Thereupon, petitioner, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional
right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Petitioner then alleged that to compel him to
take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of
discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner to the
witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only when a
question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that the
right against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.
Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the first
witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an administrative charge for
malpractice. Hence, this appeal by respondent Board.
ISSUE:
Is compelling the petitioner to be the witness of the complainants in violation of the Self-
Incrimination Clause?
RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for
alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-
incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his
consent. The Court found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the
accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take
the witness stand." If petitioner would be compelled to testify against himself, he could suffer not the
forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. The constitutional
guarantee protects as well the right to silence: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and
his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." It is the right of a defendant "to forego
testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered
exercise of his own free genuine will."
The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a
belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable
objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of
respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the
deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due
weight. The constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must
accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.

In the light of the above, it could thus clearly appear that no possible objection could be legitimately
raised against the correctness of the decision now on appeal. We hold that in an administrative
hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical
Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded
against to take the witness stand without his consent.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of August2, 1965 is affirmed. Without
pronouncement as to costs.

Dumarpa vs. Dimaporo

G.R. Nos. 87014-16.September 13, 1989.*

SALIC B. DUMARPA, MARANAO C. DANGANAN andSAADUDDIN ALAUYA,
petitioners, vs. JAMILDIMAPORO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondents.
FACTS:
On February 3,1988, Datu Jamil Dimaporo was proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers Mayor-elect
of Marogong, Lanao del Sur. The annulment of the proclamation and the canvass on which it was
based was sought in two (2) separate petitions filed by defeated mayoralty candidates. While these
petitions were pending, the Secretary of Local Governments issued on May 1-.9, 1988 a
memorandum addressed to the Regional Director, Region XII of the Department of Local
Governments, designating Maclis Balt "Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Mayor of Marogong, Lanao
del Sur vice Abdullah Imam." The petitions seeking annulment of Datu Dimaporo's proclamation
were ultimately dismissed by the First Division of the COMELEC. Motions for reconsideration
thereof were seasonably presented by both petitioners. These were brought up to the Commission en
banc for resolution.
Datu Dimaporo lost no time in seeking official recognition of his status as mayor-elect of Marogong,
as confirmed by the First Division's Decision of July 11, 1988. Under date of July 18, 1988, his
counsel, Mangurun Batuampar sent a formal communication to Provincial Governor Saidamen B.
Pangarungan, "transmitting .. the 'RESOLUTION' of the Honorable First Division of the
Commission on Elections ..," and praying "that communications and other official matters involving
the affairs of the Municipality of Marogong, Lanao del Sur be accorded to DATU JAMIL DATU
MULOK DIMAPORO whose proclamation was aimed by the Commission on Elections as
aforestated." This letter, and other related documents collated by the Office of the Governor, were
later referred to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur. The Provincial Fiscal acted promptly on the
request. The opinion sought was communicated to the Vice Governor. It was signed by 3rd Assistant
Provincial Fiscal Maranao C. Danganan, with the conformity ("conforme") of Provincial Fiscal Salic
B. Dumarpa. The indorsement reads as follows:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable Vice Governor-OIC Governor, with the legal opinion that
Datu Maclis Balt is still the Mayor of the Municipality of Marogong, Lanao del Sur, pursuant to Sec.
3, paragraph C, Article IX of the Constitution which mandates that motions for reconsideration from
a decision of a Division of the Commission on Elections shall be decided En Banc by the
Commission. Considering that a injunction for reconsideration was timely filed by the OIC 8 the
decision of the Division is not final and executory. The decision of the Commission En Banc is not
yet even final until and after 5 days whenever no restraining order is issued by the Supreme Court.
On learning of this legal opinion, Datu Dimaporo filed with the COMELEC en banc a motion to
hold Fiscals Dumarpa and Danganan, as well as Vice-Governor Alauya, in contempt. In its
Resolution of October 28, 1988 anent the contempt incident, the Commission en banc condemned the
fiscal's conception of "the First Division's jurisdiction of the pre- proclamation controversy" as a
"distortion of the law and jurisprudence." Stressing that under the law "it is solely the Commission
that can suspend or annul any proclamation made," the Resolution pointed out that the respondents
Alauya, Dumarpa and Danganan in effect did was to suspend the effects of the proclamation of
intervenor Dimaporo made by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Marogong, to prevent him from
discharging the duties of his office, and pave the way for the appointment of or assumption to office
by an Officer-in-Charge, who is the wife of one of the parties to the instant petitions' which are acts
constituting 'unauthorized and illegal assumption of powers that pertain exclusively to the
Commission, an unlawful interference with its processes and proceedings, and improper conduct that
tends directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice in this case."
The convicted contemners have instituted the instantspecial civil action of certiorari in this Court to
bring aboutthe nullification of the Resolution of October 28, 1988 “asregards the findings for
contempt.”
ISSUE:
WON COMELEC’s conviction of petitioners for contempt is valid?
RULING:
No. Upon the facts above narrated at some length, the Court isconstrained to nullify and set aside the
conviction by theCOMELEC en banc of the petitioners for contempt. It appears that the Fiscals are
being sanctioned for rendering an opinion that in the view of the COMELEC en banc was "a
distortion of law and jurisprudence." That opinion was rendered in answer to the inquiry of the
Acting Governor as to whether or not, in view of the judgment by the 1ST Division of the
COMELEC upholding the proclamation by the Board of Canvassers of Datu Dimaporo as Mayor-
Elect of Marogong, the duly designated OIC Mayor, therefore acting as such, Datu Maclis Balt,
could still be recognized as the Mayor of the Municipality. The inquiry had been made necessary in
view of the conflict in claims to the mayoralty then being asserted by both Datu Dimaporo and Datu
Balt, which conflict had to be swiftly and legally resolved to prevent its resolution by arms and
bloodshed. Nor may the Acting Governor be faulted for consulting the lawyers of the province as to
the effects of a judgment on the authority and actuations of municipal or provincial officials, or the
fiscals for advising him on such matters. The power to hold in contempt, it has time and again been
held, must be exercised, not on the vindictive, but on the preservative principle. In a word, petitioners
have been found in contempt because, to put it baldly, their opinion did not sit well with the
Commission and failed to conform to its own views. All things considered, the contempt ruling here
cannot be justified on the preservative principle, there being no clear showing, either in the terms of
the allegedly contumacious opinion or from the circumstances that led to its issuance, of any intent to
denigrate the authority of the respondent Commission or erode the faith and respect due its decisions,
orders or other actuations.

Said ruling is, therefore, REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioners are absolved of the contempt
charge. No costs.
SO ORDERED.