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Labour Law 1

This case discusses whether an educational institution like the University of Delhi can be considered an "industry" as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Supreme Court analyzed previous cases and ultimately held that the University of Delhi and Miranda College cannot be considered to be carrying out an "industry" as education seeks to develop students' personality and teachers deserve respect. Therefore, the labor disputes of employees cannot be considered under the Act. However, the document notes that the author disagrees with this view as educational institutions follow similar employer-employee guidelines as an industry.

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Anshika Goyal
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
215 views4 pages

Labour Law 1

This case discusses whether an educational institution like the University of Delhi can be considered an "industry" as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Supreme Court analyzed previous cases and ultimately held that the University of Delhi and Miranda College cannot be considered to be carrying out an "industry" as education seeks to develop students' personality and teachers deserve respect. Therefore, the labor disputes of employees cannot be considered under the Act. However, the document notes that the author disagrees with this view as educational institutions follow similar employer-employee guidelines as an industry.

Uploaded by

Anshika Goyal
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© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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ASSIGNMENT OF LABOUR LAW

“CASE ANALYSIS ON UNIVERSITY OF DELHI V. RAM NATH”


UNIVERSITY OF DELHI vs. RAM NATH

PETITIONER: UNIVERSITY OF DELHI & ANR.

RESPONDENT: RAM NATH

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/04/1963

BENCH DISCRIPTION: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.WANCHOO, K.N.GUPTA, K.C. DAS

CITATION: 1963 AIR SC 1873

FACTS OF THE CASE: The University of Delhi and Principal Miranda House,
University College for Women filed a Special Leave petition before the Supreme Court which
was a result of the petitions filed by Ram Nath and Asgar Masih, Respondent 1 and 2
respectively, under Sec, 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The section basically says
that any workmen who is entitled to receive any money from the employer, and there is a conflict
with regards to the money due, shall appear before the Labor Court within a period of three
months. Both the Respondents underwent the same circumstances in the situation. Appellant 2
employed Respondent 1 and 2 on October 1, 1949. Later Appellant 1 discovered the running of
the busses for college girl students was resulting in a loss therefore both the Respondents were
terminated by notice on May 1, 1961 on payment of one month's salary in advance in lieu of
notice. The Respondents through separate petitions applied before the Industrial Tribunal for the
Retrenchment awards. The Tribunal rejected preliminary objections and passed an order in favor
of the Respondents directing the Appellants to pay Rs. 10,50/- to each one of the respondents as
retrenchment compensation. The question that arose before the Hon’ble Court was whether
‘educational institutions’ would come within the ambit of ‘industry’ under Sec. 2(j) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and if the Appellants come within the scope of ‘employers’ within
Sec. 2(g) of the Act.
ANALYSIS: Thus case is based on two themes i.e. employers and industry defined under
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section 2(g) of the act defines employers as

(i) in relation to an industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of  3 the
Central Government or a State Government], the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no
authority is prescribed, the head of the department;

(ii)in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive
officer of that authority; and section 2(j) defines industry. Industry means any business, trade,
undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment,
handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen.
In Federated State School Teachers' Association of Australia v The State of Victoria, it was
held that the occupation of the teachers so employed was not an "industrial" occupation, and that
the dispute existing between the States and the teachers employed by them was, therefore, not an
"industrial dispute". Rich J., who concurred with the majority opinion, observed that "teaching
does not, like banking and insurance, play a part in the scheme of national industrial activity"
and he rejected the view expressed by Isaacs, J., that education played a direct part in the
promotion of industry, because he thought that an industrial system could exist without national
education.

In Corporation of City of Nagpur v Its Employees, it was held that if a service rendered by an
individual or a private person would be an industry, it would equally be an industry in the hands
of a corporation, and it also held that if a department of a municipality discharges many
functions, some pertaining to industry as defined in the Act and other non-industrial activities,
the predominant functions of the department shall be-the criterion for the purposes of the Act.

In the present case it was held that University of Delhi and the Miranda College for Women run
by it cannot be regarded as carrying on an industry. Prior to this case also it was considered that
educational institution was no more an industry. So this case brings no changes regarding
definition of industry given under section 2(j) of the act.

CONCLUSION: It was held that the University of Delhi and the Miranda College for
Women run by it cannot be regarded as carrying on an industry under Sec. 2(j), and so, the
applications made by the respondents against them under s. 33C (2) of the Act must be held to be
incompetent by applying facts, contentions and testes laid down in previous cases. The Supreme
Court observed the issue at great depths and relied upon various precedents to form its opinion.
The Supreme Court on addressing the case of State of Bombay vs. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha
came to the conclusion that the Act should have excluded education from its scope, because the
distinctive purpose and object of education would make it very difficult to assimilate it to the
position of any trade, business or calling or service within the meaning of s. 2(j). Moreover if
educations are included in the ambit of industry, then would the teachers and their work of
imparting education draw a parallel to the workmen. On this the Supreme Court was of the
opinion that education seeks to build up the personality of the pupil by assisting his physical,
intellectual, moral and emotional development. The Court also took the view that teaching and
teachers are assigned a high place of honor and should receive the respect and social justice that
is due to them in the form of proper emoluments and other amenities. However, the remedy
available for their better financial prospects do not fall under the act since under Sec. 2(s) that
defines ‘workmen’, deliberately excludes teachers from its scope. The Court further observed
that any problems connected with teachers and their salaries are outside the purview of the Act,
and since the teachers from the sole class of employees with whose co-operation education is
imparted their exclusion from the purview of the Act necessarily corroborates the conclusion that
education itself is not without its scope and that it could not have been the policy of the Act that
education should be treated as industry for the benefit of a very minor and insignificant number
of persons who may be employed by educational institutions to carry on the duties of the
subordinate staff.

I disagree with the judgement held by the court in the present case because according to me, an
educational institution can be considered as an industry according to the Industrial Dispute Act
because an industry follows certain guidelines and it consists of the employers and the
employees, both co-operate with each other and manufacture the product for the public at large.
As we can see, the same way an educational institute works where the employers were the head
of the school or colleges who appoint teachers to teach students and the employees are the
faculties who provide their services by teaching the students and getting a monthly salary. In
Bangalore Water Supply case it was held that educational institutions are Industry in terms of
sec 2(j) of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947.

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