Case: 23-10362 Document: 20 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/10/2023
No. 23-10362
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
ALLIANCE FOR HIPPOCRATIC MEDICINE; AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
PRO-LIFE OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS; AMERICAN COLLEGE OF
PEDIATRICIANS; CHRISTIAN MEDICAL & DENTAL ASSOCIATIONS; SHAUN
JESTER, D.O.; REGINA FROST-CLARK, M.D.; TYLER JOHNSON, D.O.;
GEORGE DELGADO, M.D.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION; ROBERT M. CALIFF, Commissioner
of Food and Drugs; JANET WOODCOOK, M.D., in her official capacity as Principal
Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Food and Drug Administration; PATRIZIA
CAVAZZONI, M.D., in her official capacity as Director, Center for Drug Evaluation
and Research, U.S. Food and Drug Administration; UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; XAVIER BECERRA,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
Defendants-Appellants,
DANCO LABORATORIES, L.L.C.,
Intervenor-Appellant.
EMERGENCY MOTION UNDER CIRCUIT RULE 27.3
FOR A STAY PENDING APPEAL
BRIAN M. BOYNTON
Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General
LEIGHA SIMONTON
United States Attorney
SARAH E. HARRINGTON
Deputy Assistant Attorney
General
MICHAEL S. RAAB
CYNTHIA A. BARMORE
Civil Division, Appellate Staff
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20530
Case: 23-10362 Document: 20 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/10/2023
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS
Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, et al. v. U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, et al.
The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following
listed persons and entities as described in the fourth sentence of Rule
28.2.1 have an interest in the outcome of this case. These
representations are made in order that the judges of this court may
evaluate possible disqualification or recusal.
Plaintiffs-Appellees:
Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine
American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians & Gynecologists
American College of Pediatricians
Christian Medical & Dental Associations
Shaun Jester, D.O.
Regina Frost-Clark, M.D.
Tyler Johnson, D.O.
George Delgado, M.D.
Case: 23-10362 Document: 20 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/10/2023
Defendants-Appellants:
U.S. Food and Drug Administration
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Robert M. Califf, M.D., in his official capacity as
Commissioner of Food and Drugs, U.S. Food and Drug
Administration
Janet Woodcock, M.D., in her official capacity as
Principal Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Food and Drug
Administration
Patrizia Cavazzoni, M.D., in her official capacity as Director,
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, U.S. Food and Drug
Administration
Xavier Becerra, in his official capacity as Secretary,
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Intervenor Defendant-Appellant:
Danco Laboratories LLC
Counsel:
For plaintiffs-appellees:
Erik Christopher Baptist
Alliance Defending Freedom
440 First Street NW
Washington, DC 20001
Christian D Stewart
Morgan Williamson LLP
701 S Taylor Suite 440 Lb 103
Amarillo, TX 79101
Case: 23-10362 Document: 20 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/10/2023
Denise Harle
Alliance Defending Freedom
1000 Hurricane Shoals Rd., NE Ste D1100
Lawrenceville, GA 30043
Erica Steinmiller-Perdomo
Alliance Defending Freedom
440 First Street NW Suite 600
Washington, DC 20001
Erin Morrow Hawley
Alliance Defending Freedom
440 First Street NW Suite 600
Washington, DC 20001
Julie Marie Blake
Alliance Defending Freedom
44180 Riverside Pkwy
Landsdowne, VA 20176
Matthew S Bowman
Alliance Defending Freedom
440 First Street NW Suite 600
Washington, DC 20001
For defendant-appellant:
Brian M. Boynton
Leigha Simonton
Sarah E. Harrington
Michael S. Raab
Cynthia A. Barmore
Noah T. Katzen
Christopher A. Eiswerth
Daniel Schwei
Emily B. Nestler
Julie Straus Harris
Kate Talmor
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For intervenor defendant-appellant Danco Laboratories
Catherine Emily Stetson
Hogan Lovells US LLP
555 13th Street NW
Washington Dc, DC 20004
Jessica Lynn Ellsworth
Hogan Lovells US LLP
555 Thirteenth Street NW
Washington, DC 20004
Kaitlyn Golden
Hogan Lovells US LLP
555 13th St NW
Washington, DC 20004
Lynn Whipkey Mehler
Hogan Lovells US LLP
555 13th Street NW
District Of Columbia, DC 20004
Marlan Golden
Hogan Lovells US LLP
555 13th Street NW
Washington, DC 20004
Philip Katz
Hogan Lovells
555 Thirteenth Street NW
Washington, DC 20004
Ryan Patrick Brown
Ryan Brown Attorney at Law
1222 S Fillmore St
Amarillo, TX 79101
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Amici and Counsel:
The Chattanooga National Memorial for the Unborn
Darald John Schaffer
Samples Jennings Clem & Fields PLLC
130 Jordan Avenue
Chattanooga, TN 37421
Michael S Jennings
Samples Jennings Clem & Fields PLLC
130 Jordan Drive
Chattanooga, TN 37421
Doctors for America
Christopher Morten
Columbia Law School
435 W 116th St (Jerome Greene Hall)
New York, NY 10027
Thomas S Leatherbury
Thomas S Leatherbury Law PLLC
1901 N Akard St
Dallas, TX 75201
American Center for Law and Justice
Edward Lawrence White , III
American Center for Law & Justice
3001 Plymouth Road Suite 203
Ann Arbor, MI 48105
State of Missouri
Joshua Divine
Office of The Missouri Attorney General
207 W High St Po Box 899
Jefferson City, MO 65102
Case: 23-10362 Document: 20 Page: 7 Date Filed: 04/10/2023
Human Coalition
Elissa Michelle Graves
1907 Bonanza Drivce
Sachse, TX 75048
State of Mississippi, State of Alabama, State of Alaska, State of
Arkansas, State of Florida, State of Georgia, State of Idaho, State of
Indiana, State of Iowa, State of Kansas, State of Louisiana, State of
Kentucky, State of Montana, State of Nebraska, State of Ohio, State of
Oklahoma, State of South Carolina, State of South Dakota, State of
Tennessee, State of Texas, State of Utah, State of Wyoming
Justin Lee Matheny
Mississippi Attorney General Office
550 High Street Suite 1200
Jackson, MS 39205
States of New York California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, Wisconsin, Washington DC
Galen Sherwin
NYS Office of The Attorney General
Executive State Capital
Albany, NY 12224
Life Collective Inc
Darren L McCarty
McCarty Law PLLC
1410b W 51st Street
Austin, TX 78756
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Family Research Council
Michael F Smith
The Smith Appellate Law Firm
1717 Pennsylvania Ave NW Suite 1025
Washington, DC 20006
Judicial Watch Inc
Meredith Di Liberto
Judicial Watch Inc
425 Third Street SW, Suite 800
Washington, DC 20024
Advancing American Freedom
John Marc Wheat
Advancing American Freedom
801 Pennsylvania Ave NW Suite 930
Washington, DC 20004
Concerned Women for America
Mario Diaz
Concerned Women for America
Legal 1000 N Payne St
Alexandria, VA 22314
Greer Donley, R. Alta Charo, I. Glenn Cohen, Marsha Cohen, Nathan
Cortez, Rebecca Eisenberg, Henry Greely, George Horvath, Peter
Barton Hutt, Joan Krause, Holly Fernandez Lynch, Elizabeth
McCuskey, Jennifer Oliva, Jordan Paradise, Christopher Robertson,
Joanna Sax, Allison Whelan, Diana Winters, Patricia Zettler
Robert John Winson
Covington & Burling LLP
1999 Avenue Of The Stars
Los Angeles, CA 90067
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Alysia Brianna Cordova
Mullin Hoard & Brown LLP
500 S Taylor Suite 800
Amarillo, TX 79101
Beth E Braiterman
Covington & Burling LLP
850 10th Street NW
Washington, DC 20001
Denise Esposito
Covington and Burling LLP
850 10th Street NW
Washington, DC 20001
Emile Katz
850 10th St NW
Washington, DC 20268
Guillaume Julian
Covington & Burling
850 Tenth Street NW
Washington, DC 20001
Julia F Post
Covington & Burling LLP
850 Tenth Street NW
Washington, DC 20001
Lewis A Grossman
Covington & Burling LLP
850 10th St., NW
Washington, DC 20268
Richard Biggs
Mullin Hoard & Brown LLP
500 S Taylor Suite 800
Amarillo, TX 79109
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Robert A Long , Jr
Covington & Burling LLP
850 Tenth Street NW
Washington, DC 20001
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
Molly A Meegan
ACOG
General Counsel's Office 409 12th Street SW Washington
Washington, DC 20024
Adam Bresler Aukland-Peck
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP
66 Hudson Boulevard
New York, NY 10001
Matthew W Sherwood
McCarn & Weir
905 S. Fillmore Suite 530
Amarillo, TX 79101
Megan McGuiggan
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP
801 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Ste 500
Washington, DC 20004
Shannon Rose Selden
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP
66 Hudson Boulevard
New York, NY 10001
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Susan B. Anthony Pro-Life America, Catholic Health Care Leadership
Alliance, The National Catholic Bioethics Center, Catholic Bar
Association, Catholic Benefits Association, Christ Medicus Foundation
Murphy S Klasing
Weycer, Kaplan, Pulaski & Zuber, P.C.
11 Greenway Plaza Suite 1400
Houston, TX 77046
67 Members of Congress
Fernando M Bustos
Bustos Law Firm PC
P.O. Box 1980
Lubbock, TX 79408-1980
Carolyn McDonnell
Americans United for Life
1150 Connecticut Ave. NW Ste 500
Washington, DC 20036
American Medical Association, Society of Maternal and Fetal Medicine,
American Academy of Family Physicians, American Gynecological &
Obstetrical Society, American Society for Reproductive Medicine,
Council of University Chairs of Obstetrics & Gynecology, North
American Society for Pediatric and Adolescent Gynecology, Nurse
Practitioners in Women's Health, Society of Family Planning, Society of
Gynecologic Oncology, Society of OB/GYN Hospitalists
Adam Bresler Aukland-Peck
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP
66 Hudson Boulevard
New York, NY 10001
Matthew W Sherwood
McCarn & Weir
905 S. Fillmore Suite 530
Amarillo, TX 79101
Case: 23-10362 Document: 20 Page: 12 Date Filed: 04/10/2023
Megan McGuiggan
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP
801 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Ste 500
Washington, DC 20004
Shannon Rose Selden
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP
66 Hudson Boulevard
New York, NY 10001
Ethics and Public Policy Center
M Edward Whelan
1730 M Street NW Suite 910
Washington, DC 20036
Charles W Fillmore
The Fillmore Law Firm LLP
201 Main Street Suite 801
Fort Worth, TX 76102
H Dustin Fillmore , III
The Fillmore Law Firm LLP
201 Main Street Suite 801
Fort Worth, TX 76102
Texas Business Leaders
John Clay Sullivan
S|L Law PLLC
610 Uptown Boulevard, Suite 2000
Cedar Hill, TX 75104
Charlotte Lozier Institute
Cristina Martinez Squiers
Schaerr | Jaffe LLP
1717 K Street NW Suite 900
Washington, DC 20006
Case: 23-10362 Document: 20 Page: 13 Date Filed: 04/10/2023
Gene C Schaerr
Schaerr | Jaffe LLP
1717 K Street NW Suite 900
Washington, DC 20006
Coalition For Jewish Values Healthcare Council
Murphy S Klasing
Weycer, Kaplan, Pulaski & Zuber, P.C.
11 Greenway Plaza Suite 1400
Houston, TX 77046
State of Arizona
Joshua Bendor
Office of the Arizona Attorney General
2005 N Central Avenue
Phoenix, AZ 85004
Objector and Counsel:
News Media Coalition
Peter Blackmer Steffensen
SMU Dedman School of Law
P.O. Box 750116
Dallas, TX 75275-0116
/s/ Cynthia A. Barmore
Cynthia A. Barmore
Counsel for Appellants
Case: 23-10362 Document: 20 Page: 14 Date Filed: 04/10/2023
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 1
STATEMENT ............................................................................................ 3
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................. 6
I. Plaintiffs Lack Standing And Their Central Claims Are
Time-Barred ..................................................................................... 6
II. Plaintiffs’ Claims Lack Merit ......................................................... 14
III. The Government’s Interests And The Public Interest
Overwhelmingly Favor A Stay....................................................... 25
IV. Plaintiffs Will Not Suffer Irreparable Harm ................................. 27
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 29
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Case: 23-10362 Document: 20 Page: 15 Date Filed: 04/10/2023
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Page(s)
Barber v. Bryant,
833 F.3d 510 (5th Cir. 2016) ................................................................ 25
Benisek v. Lamone,
138 S. Ct. 1942 (2018) .......................................................................... 28
Canfield Aviation, Inc. v. NTSB,
854 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1988) .................................................................. 9
Central & S.W. Servs., Inc. v. EPA,
220 F.3d 683 (5th Cir. 2000) ................................................................ 21
City of Dallas v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
847 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2017) ................................................................ 25
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,
568 U.S. 398 (2013) ............................................................................ 6, 8
Dorsey v. United States,
567 U.S. 260 (2012) .............................................................................. 24
FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project,
141 S. Ct. 1150 (2021) .......................................................................... 16
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120 (2000) .............................................................................. 23
Holland v. Florida,
560 U.S. 631 (2010) .............................................................................. 13
Jones v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice,
880 F.3d 756 (5th Cir. 2018) ................................................................ 26
June Med. Servs. LLC v. Russo,
140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) ............................................................................ 9
ii
Case: 23-10362 Document: 20 Page: 16 Date Filed: 04/10/2023
Kowalski v. Tesmer,
543 U.S. 125 (2004) ................................................................................ 9
Louisiana v. Biden,
2023 WL 2780821 (5th Cir. 2023) .......................................................... 6
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555 (1992) ................................................................................ 6
National Biodiesel Bd. v. EPA,
843 F.3d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2016)............................................................. 12
National Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior,
70 F.3d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1995)............................................................... 11
Nken v. Holder,
556 U.S. 418 (2009) .............................................................................. 27
NLRB Union v. FLRA,
834 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1987)............................................................... 12
Sierra Club v. EPA,
551 F.3d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 2008)............................................................. 12
Summers v. Earth Island Inst.,
555 U.S. 488 (2009) ............................................................................ 7, 8
Texas v. Biden,
20 F.4th 928 (5th Cir. 2021), rev’d on other grounds,
142 S. Ct. 2528 (2022) .......................................................................... 10
United States v. Bass,
404 U.S. 336 (1971) .............................................................................. 23
United States v. One Package,
86 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1936) .................................................................... 22
iii
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Statutes:
Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598 ............................................... 22
§ 1.......................................................................................................... 22
§ 2.......................................................................................................... 22
§ 3.......................................................................................................... 22
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007,
Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823, tit. IX ............................................ 19
§ 909(b), 121 Stat. at 950-51 ............................................................. 24
Rev. Stat. § 2491 (1st ed. 1875), 18 Stat. pt. 1, at 460 ........................... 22
5 U.S.C. § 705 ............................................................................................ 5
18 U.S.C. § 1461 ............................................................................ 5, 21, 23
18 U.S.C. § 1462 ............................................................................ 5, 21, 23
21 U.S.C. § 355 ........................................................................................ 19
21 U.S.C. § 355(d) ........................................................................ 14, 17, 21
21 U.S.C. § 355-1 ..................................................................................... 21
21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(1) ............................................................................ 20
21 U.S.C. §§ 841-843 ............................................................................... 22
28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) .................................................................................. 10
Regulations:
21 C.F.R. § 314.500 ................................................................................. 19
21 C.F.R. § 314.520 ................................................................................. 19
Legislative Material:
SF109, § 1, 67th Leg., 2023 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2023) ............................... 26
iv
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Other Authorities:
57 Fed. Reg. 58,942 (Dec. 11, 1992) ........................................................ 20
Lara Marks, Sexual Chemistry: A History of the Contraceptive Pill
(2001) .................................................................................................... 23
Mifepristone Labeling, https://perma.cc/PU3Y-7TSK ............................ 15
Mifepristone U.S. Post-Marketing Adverse Events Summary through
06/30/2022, https://perma.cc/LAM4-KVDZ........................................ 15
Order, Washington v. FDA, No. 23-3026 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 7, 2023)........ 5
Katherine A. Rafferty & Tessa Longbons, #AbortionChangesYou: A
Case Study to Understand the Communicative Tensions in Women’s
Medication Abortion Narratives, 36 Health Comm. 1485 (2021)
https://perma.cc/K69Y-FJXQ ............................................................... 16
REMS Single Shared System for Mifepristone 200 mg (Jan. 2023),
https://perma.cc/MJT5-35LF .................................................................. 4
Transmucosal Immediate Release Fentanyl Shared System REMS
Program (Dec. 2022), https://perma.cc/JK6T-S99C ............................. 22
v
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INTRODUCTION
More than two decades ago, the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) determined that mifepristone is safe and effective to terminate
early pregnancies. FDA has consistently adhered to that judgment
across five presidential administrations. During that time, more than
five million Americans have chosen to end their pregnancies using
mifepristone. Today, more than half of women who terminate their
pregnancies rely on that drug. When mifepristone is used as FDA
directs, serious adverse events are exceedingly rare, just as they are for
many common drugs like ibuprofen.
Rather than preserving the status quo, as preliminary relief is
meant to do, the district court upended decades of reliance by blocking
FDA’s approval of mifepristone and depriving patients of access to this
safe and effective treatment, based on the court’s own misguided
assessment of the drug’s safety. The district court took this
extraordinary step despite the fact that plaintiffs did not seek relief for
many years after mifepristone’s original approval, waited nearly a year
after the most recent FDA actions they seek to challenge, and then
1
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asked the court to defer any relief until after a final resolution of the
case.
The district court’s extraordinary and unprecedented order should
be stayed pending appeal. Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge FDA’s
approval of a drug they neither take nor prescribe; their challenge to
FDA actions dating back to 2000 is manifestly untimely; and they have
provided no basis for second-guessing FDA’s scientific judgment. Those
defects foreclose plaintiffs’ claims, and the court flouted fundamental
principles of Article III and administrative law in holding otherwise.
Indeed, no precedent, from any court, endorses plaintiffs’ standing,
timeliness, or merits theories.
The court’s sweeping nationwide relief was especially
unwarranted given the balance of harms: If allowed to take effect, the
court’s order would thwart FDA’s scientific judgment and severely harm
women, particularly those for whom mifepristone is a medical or
practical necessity. This harm would be felt throughout the country,
given that mifepristone has lawful uses in every State. The order would
undermine healthcare systems and the reliance interests of businesses
and medical providers. In contrast, plaintiffs present no evidence that
2
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they will be injured at all, much less irreparably harmed, by
maintaining the status quo they left unchallenged for years.
The district court granted a seven-day administrative stay. This
Court should extend the administrative stay pending resolution of stay
proceedings in this Court and, if necessary, the Supreme Court. The
Court should then stay the district court’s order pending appeal. The
government requests that this Court enter an administrative stay or
grant a stay pending appeal by noon on April 13, to enable the
government to seek relief in the Supreme Court if necessary. Plaintiffs
oppose a stay pending appeal and an administrative stay, while
Intervenor consents.
STATEMENT
1. In 2000, FDA approved mifepristone as safe and effective to
terminate pregnancy through the first seven weeks of gestation.
Add.181. FDA placed restrictions on the drug’s distribution, known
today as a risk evaluation and mitigation strategy (REMS), to ensure its
safe use. Add.186-91. FDA comprehensively reviewed the scientific
evidence and concluded that, with those restrictions in place, the
benefits of mifepristone outweighed its risks. Add.181-88. In 2002, two
3
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of the plaintiffs in this case petitioned FDA to withdraw the approval,
and FDA denied that petition in March 2016. Add.804-36.
Also in March 2016, FDA modified mifepristone’s approved
conditions of use, including the REMS, in light of evidence showing the
drug’s safety and effectiveness under those modified conditions of use.
Add.768, 777-802. For example, FDA increased the gestational age
limit from seven to ten weeks. Id. In 2019, two of the plaintiffs filed a
petition challenging the 2016 modification. That petition did not ask
FDA to revisit the 2000 approval; instead, it asked FDA to “restore” the
2000 conditions and “retain” a requirement that mifepristone be
dispensed to patients in person. Add.192. In 2021, FDA denied that
petition in relevant part, Add.843-76, and, in 2023, removed the in-
person dispensing requirement, REMS Single Shared System for
Mifepristone 200 mg (Jan. 2023), https://perma.cc/MJT5-35LF.
2. Plaintiffs are physicians and organizations representing
physicians. They sought an injunction ordering FDA to withdraw its
2000 approval of mifepristone, or, alternatively, roll back the 2016
changes and require in-person dispensing. Add.177-78.
4
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On April 7, the court ruled in favor of plaintiffs and issued a stay
under 5 U.S.C. § 705, suspending FDA’s approvals of mifepristone and
thereby effectively prohibiting the sponsors from introducing
mifepristone into interstate commerce. The court rejected the
government’s arguments that plaintiffs lack standing, Add.6-17, and
that many of their claims are untimely, Add.18-25. On the merits, the
court held that FDA’s actions were arbitrary and capricious, largely
based on the court’s own interpretation of extra-record publications
submitted by plaintiffs. Add.49-60. The court also held that FDA’s
2000 approval of mifepristone improperly relied on the agency’s Subpart
H regulations, Add.39-48, and that statutory provisions derived from
the 1873 Comstock Act prohibited FDA from removing the in-person
dispensing requirement, Add.32-38; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1462.
Finally, the court determined that the equities and public interest
favored relief. Add.61-65. The court denied the government’s request
for a stay pending appeal. Add.67, 374.1
1 Shortly after the district court issued its order, another court
enjoined FDA from “altering the status quo” with respect to
mifepristone’s availability in certain States. Washington v. FDA, No.
23-3026 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 7, 2023). FDA has moved to clarify that
injunction in light of the district court’s order in this case.
5
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ARGUMENT
I. Plaintiffs Lack Standing And Their Central Claims Are
Time-Barred
The merits of plaintiffs’ claims are not properly before any court.
A. The district court erred in holding that plaintiffs have
standing. Their asserted injuries rest on a “highly attenuated chain of
possibilities” that falls far short of demonstrating injury-in-fact.
Louisiana v. Biden, 2023 WL 2780821, *4 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 (2013)). Plaintiffs do
not prescribe mifepristone. Instead, they speculate that other doctors
will prescribe mifepristone; that those doctors’ patients will experience
exceedingly rare serious adverse events; that those patients will then
seek out plaintiffs—doctors who oppose mifepristone and abortion—for
care; and that they will do so in sufficient numbers to burden plaintiffs’
medical practices. Such “‘allegations of possible future injury’ are not
sufficient” because a “threatened injury must be certainly impending to
constitute injury in fact.” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409. That is especially
so here, because plaintiffs’ speculative claims of injury “depend[] on the
unfettered choices made by independent actors.” See Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992).
6
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The court concluded that the plaintiff organizations have standing
to sue on behalf of their members “because they allege adverse events
from chemical abortion drugs can overwhelm the medical system.”
Add.7. But plaintiffs rely on only a handful of alleged incidents over
two decades, none of which meaningfully interfered with a member’s
medical practice. Under the court’s approach, doctors would have
standing to challenge FDA approval of any drug; they would likewise
have standing to challenge any other federal action that might injure
third parties. An association of doctors could, for example, challenge
the licensing of federal firearms dealers, or allegedly inadequate
highway safety standards, on the theory that some individuals may be
injured and seek treatment from the association’s members.
Neither plaintiffs nor the district court cited any precedent for
that extravagant position. To the contrary, Supreme Court precedent
forecloses plaintiffs’ attempt to rely on a “statistical probability” that
some member might treat a patient for mifepristone complications—
even if particular members have done so on rare occasions in the past.
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497-99 (2009). Standing
cannot be based on “past injury rather than imminent future injury
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that is sought to be enjoined.” Id. at 495. Isolated past incidents
plainly do not show “certainly impending” future harm to plaintiffs’
medical practices. See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409.
The court also concluded that the associations have organizational
injury because they have spent money “to respond to FDA’s actions.”
Add.13. But plaintiffs “cannot manufacture standing merely by
inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical
future harm that is not certainly impending.” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 416.
The court’s reasoning would entitle any organization to challenge any
governmental policy that it advocates against.2
Finally, the court erred in holding that plaintiffs may assert the
interests of women who might take mifepristone in the future. Add.9-
11. Doctors who are not regulated by a challenged law cannot assert
third-party standing on behalf of hypothetical future patients who
2 The court also concluded that lack of information on adverse
events undermined plaintiffs’ ability to obtain informed consent to
prescribe mifepristone. Add.8-9. But plaintiffs have no intention of
prescribing mifepristone. Relatedly, the court found organizational
standing based on FDA’s requirements for adverse event reporting.
Add.12-13. But these claimed injuries at most would enable plaintiffs
to challenge FDA’s reporting requirements, not the drug approval.
See Add.856 (explaining adverse event reporting changes).
8
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might someday want their services. See Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S.
125, 130-31 (2004) (no third-party standing based on “future attorney-
client relationship with as yet unascertained Michigan criminal
defendants”). Plaintiffs’ interests are also not aligned with their
hypothetical future patients. See Canfield Aviation, Inc. v. NTSB, 854
F.2d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1988). In fact, they are diametrically opposed:
Plaintiffs seek to block access to mifepristone, but the hypothetical
patients they posit are, by definition, women who wish to use the drug.
The court reasoned that if abortion providers have standing to
challenge laws restricting abortion, so too must plaintiffs have standing
here. Add.10. But unlike physicians who regularly provide abortions
and thus have or will have patients harmed by an abortion restriction,
it is wholly speculative that plaintiffs will have patients harmed by
mifepristone. And unlike providers whose conduct is directly regulated
by the challenged restriction, plaintiffs face no “‘threatened imposition
of governmental sanctions’ for noncompliance” with any agency action
related to mifepristone. See June Med. Servs. LLC v. Russo, 140 S. Ct.
2103, 2118-19 (2020).
9
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B. The court also erred by holding that plaintiffs’ claims are
timely. As the court recognized, Add.19, each claim has a six-year
statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). FDA approved mifepristone
in 2000. Add.181. In 2002, plaintiffs filed a petition challenging certain
safety findings and the agency’s use of its Subpart H authority, and
FDA denied that petition in March 2016. Add.804-36. Those actions
occurred more than six years before plaintiffs filed suit. Add.179.
Plaintiffs’ claims challenging the 2000 approval and the 2016 petition
denial are thus time-barred.
The court erred in concluding that FDA reopened those decisions
and thereby restarted the statute of limitations. Add.19-23. The
reopening doctrine does not apply here, where FDA did not undertake
“a serious, substantive reconsideration” of its 2000 approval of
mifepristone. See Texas v. Biden, 20 F.4th 928, 951-52 (5th Cir. 2021),
rev’d on other grounds, 142 S. Ct. 2528 (2022).
First, FDA did nothing to reconsider its approval of mifepristone
when it modified the conditions of use, including the REMS, in 2016. At
that time, FDA relaxed specific REMS conditions. FDA had already
found in 2000 that mifepristone was safe and effective with those
10
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conditions; the question in 2016 was whether mifepristone would
remain safe and effective without them. FDA thus evaluated new
evidence bearing on whether certain conditions were too restrictive.
And FDA did not even mention Subpart H, much less reopen its
analysis of that issue. Nor would FDA have needed to revisit these
issues when it modified the conditions of use, including the REMS,
given that, on the same day, FDA issued a separate decision denying
plaintiffs’ petition raising these arguments. Plaintiffs did not timely
seek review of that decision. They cannot circumvent the statute of
limitations by seeking judicial review of a different agency decision
predicated on the understanding that mifepristone was properly
approved.
Second, FDA did not reopen the approval when it denied plaintiffs’
second petition in 2021. An agency does not “trigger the reopening
doctrine” when it denies a petition and “respond[s] to assertions in the
petition.” National Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 70 F.3d 1345,
1352 (D.C. Cir. 1995). To the contrary, when an agency refuses to
rescind a prior decision, judicial review is strictly “limited to the
‘narrow issues as defined by the denial of the petition’” and does not
11
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reach “the agency’s original action.” NLRB Union v. FLRA, 834 F.2d
191, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Here, FDA simply responded to plaintiffs’
assertions related to in-person dispensing and the 2016 changes.
Revoking the underlying approval was not at issue. Indeed, plaintiffs
themselves took that approval for granted, affirmatively urging FDA to
“restore” the restrictions “approved in 2000” and “retain” the
mifepristone REMS. Add.192.
The court’s reliance on Sierra Club v. EPA, 551 F.3d 1019 (D.C.
Cir. 2008), was misplaced. Sierra Club held that an agency
constructively reopened a rule by “significantly alter[ing] the stakes of
judicial review” when the original rule “may not have been worth
challenging” on its own. Id. at 1025-26. Here, plaintiffs did challenge
mifepristone’s original approval on its own (by filing a citizen petition in
2002); they simply failed to timely seek review of FDA’s denial of that
challenge. In any event, FDA did not effect a “sea change” to
mifepristone’s “basic regulatory scheme” in 2016 and thus did not
constructively reopen the approval even under the Sierra Club
framework. See National Biodiesel Bd. v. EPA, 843 F.3d 1010, 1017
(D.C. Cir. 2016).
12
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The court alternatively concluded that plaintiffs were entitled to
equitable tolling. Add.23-25. But plaintiffs never even asked for
equitable tolling, because they have no plausible claim to it. As the
court acknowledged, equitable tolling is available “only if [a plaintiff]
shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that
some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented
timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). The court
did not find, and could not plausibly have found, that either
requirement was satisfied. FDA’s letter to plaintiffs denying their
petition in 2016 plainly notified them that FDA had denied their
petition. Plaintiffs offer no reason why they waited more than six years
to seek judicial review of that decision and identify no extraordinary
circumstance that prevented them from filing sooner. Nor is there any
merit to the court’s suggestion that FDA’s delay in responding to
plaintiffs’ petition somehow erases the statute of limitations that
Congress established. If anything, that delay extended the deadline for
plaintiffs to bring suit. And if plaintiffs were dissatisfied with the
delay, they could have sued to compel agency action. But nothing that
happened before FDA’s 2016 decision denying plaintiffs’ petition
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justifies their failure to sue within the generous six-year statute of
limitations after FDA’s action.
II. Plaintiffs’ Claims Lack Merit
Even were plaintiffs’ claims properly before the court, they would
be unlikely to succeed.
A. FDA’s approval of mifepristone and subsequent modifications
of the REMS were wholly reasonable. The FDCA requires FDA to
determine whether a drug “is safe for use” under the proposed
conditions of use. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). That is what FDA did with
mifepristone. See Add.181-88, 778-802, 806-35, 842-76. The
Government Accountability Office confirmed that FDA’s 2000 and 2016
decisions followed the agency’s standard processes. Add.377, 432.
The court repeatedly characterizes mifepristone as unsafe. But
over the last two decades, the available evidence conclusively
demonstrates that mifepristone is safe under the approved conditions of
use. More than five million women have used mifepristone to terminate
their pregnancies in the United States. Add.658. Mifepristone is also
approved in dozens of other countries. Add.759 (62 countries as of
2015). The literature reflects “exceedingly rare” rates of serious adverse
14
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events. Add.707. The mifepristone labeling indicates, for example,
sepsis and hemorrhage are each 0.2% or less and transfusions and
hospitalization related to medical abortion are each 0.7% or less. See
Mifepristone Labeling 8, https://perma.cc/PU3Y-7TSK. All drugs can
cause adverse events, including mifepristone. Even ibuprofen, which is
commonly used for pain relief, can infrequently cause serious adverse
events. Add.467. The FDCA does not require FDA to approve drugs
only when they are without risk—no drug is—but to consider a drug’s
risks in relation to its benefits. That is what FDA did here.
Even where a drug may be associated with an adverse event, it
may not have caused that event. Among the more than five million
women who have taken mifepristone since 2000, as of June 30, 2022,
only 28 deaths were reported and some of those deaths were associated
with obvious alternative causes—including homicide, drug overdose,
and other factors entirely unrelated to their use of mifepristone. See
Mifepristone U.S. Post-Marketing Adverse Events Summary through
06/30/2022, https://perma.cc/LAM4-KVDZ. In addition, pregnancy
itself entails a significantly higher risk of serious adverse events,
15
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including a death rate 14 times higher than that associated with legal
abortion. Add.807.
This Court’s role is to “simply ensur[e] that the agency has acted
within a zone of reasonableness.” FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project,
141 S. Ct. 1150, 1158 (2021). The court erred by overriding FDA’s
eminently reasonable scientific judgments based on the court’s own
interpretation of articles and studies, including many submitted by
plaintiffs or their amici to the court but not to FDA. For example, in
concluding that no women should have access to mifepristone because it
is harmful to them, the court relied on an article that was based
entirely on fewer than 100 anonymous blog posts submitted to a website
titled Abortion Changes You, Add.46; the study itself conceded that “the
population of women who write an anonymous post about their abortion
experience may be different from those who do not.” Katherine A.
Rafferty & Tessa Longbons, #AbortionChangesYou: A Case Study to
Understand the Communicative Tensions in Women’s Medication
Abortion Narratives, 36 Health Comm. 1485, 1492 (2021),
https://perma.cc/K69Y-FJXQ.
16
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The court criticized FDA for relying on studies with somewhat
different protocols than the conditions of use approved by the agency,
e.g., Add.49, 59, but an obligation to approve drugs only with conditions
of use identical to the study protocols in supporting clinical trials finds
no support in the FDCA. Congress directed FDA to evaluate drug
safety based on “the information submitted … as part of the
application” and “any other information” before the agency. 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(d). No provision requires FDA to limit approved conditions of use
to the precise protocols in clinical trials. Had Congress wanted to
impose such a requirement, it would have said so, but it instead granted
wide discretion to FDA.
Nor is there any scientific reason to require drug sponsors to
rerun costly clinical trials without the safeguards that proved
unnecessary in previous trials. As FDA explained, “[m]any clinical trial
designs are more restrictive … than will be necessary or recommended
in post[-]approval clinical use; this additional level of caution is
exercised until the safety and efficacy of the product is demonstrated.”
Add.831. FDA thus routinely approves drugs with conditions of use
that differ from clinical trial protocols. For example, routine biopsies
17
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were performed in trials for menopause hormonal therapy drugs to
establish their safety, but FDA did not require biopsies in those drugs’
approved conditions of use. Add.831, 470-73, 517-18; see also, e.g.,
Add.530, 563 (for Aveed, liver function tests required in clinical trials
but not approved conditions of use); Add.599, 632 (for Cialis, same for
electrocardiograms); Add.634, 654 (for Lipitor, same for routine
measurement of creatinine kinase levels). Similarly, here, FDA
thoroughly explained why particular “safeguards” were unnecessary to
include in mifepristone’s approved conditions of use, Add.184-85, 821-
24, and relied on abundant evidence that the court did not address.
The court also faulted FDA for deferring to medical providers on
the appropriate method for dating pregnancies and diagnosing ectopic
pregnancies. Add.51-59. The agency respects that doctors are usually
best positioned to make clinical decisions for their patients, and there
are a variety of ways to date pregnancies and diagnose ectopic
pregnancies. Add.821. FDA’s deference to the doctor-patient
relationship is hardly arbitrary and capricious.3
3The court also mistakenly described FDA as having concluded
that mifepristone was not safe and effective under the approved
18
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B. The court also erred by holding that FDA’s approval of
mifepristone was invalid under Subpart H of its regulations. Add.39-
48.
The court fundamentally misunderstood FDA’s Subpart H
authority. Those regulations apply to drugs that treat “serious or life-
threatening illnesses” and provide meaningful therapeutic benefits over
existing treatments. 21 C.F.R. § 314.500. FDA may restrict the drug’s
distribution under Subpart H, as it did for mifepristone. See id.
§ 314.520. But the drug approval is based on FDA’s statutory authority
under 21 U.S.C. § 355, not Subpart H. And in 2007, Congress created
the new REMS framework and incorporated mifepristone’s restrictions
into that framework. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act
of 2007 (FDAAA), Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823, tit. IX. FDA has
regulated mifepristone under that framework ever since, including by
approving a REMS for mifepristone in 2011 under the new statutory
authority. The FDAAA and FDA’s actions under it supersede and
conditions. Add.50, 55. That was FDA’s evaluation of mifepristone in
February 2000 without distribution restrictions, but seven months later
FDA concluded that “adequate information has been presented to
approve” mifepristone with those restrictions. Add.189.
19
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render irrelevant any issues concerning FDA’s reliance on Subpart H in
approving mifepristone in 2000. Any error from relying on Subpart H
to impose those restrictions was therefore harmless.
In any event, FDA properly invoked Subpart H. FDA found that
pregnancy “can be a serious medical condition in some women,” and
mifepristone avoided a surgical procedure for 92% of patients. Add.186,
806-10. The court reasoned that pregnancy is not an “illness,” but the
preamble to FDA’s final rule explained that Subpart H was available for
drugs that treat serious or life-threatening conditions. Add.807; 57 Fed.
Reg. 58,942, 58,946-48 (Dec. 11, 1992). Congress ratified this
understanding by authorizing FDA to impose similar restrictions under
the REMS framework on drugs intended to treat a “disease or
condition.” 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(1). And while the court disagreed that
avoiding a surgical procedure is a “meaningful therapeutic benefit,”
FDA reasonably determined that it is for many patients. Add.808.
Finally, even if the Subpart H argument had merit, the proper
remedy would be a remand to the agency without vacatur, because
setting aside the 2000 approval would be severely disruptive and FDA
could readily address the concern by re-evaluating the drug under the
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current statutory REMS framework. See Central & S.W. Servs., Inc. v.
EPA, 220 F.3d 683, 692 (5th Cir. 2000).
C. The court also concluded that FDA erred in 2021 in electing
not to enforce and then deciding to remove the in-person dispensing
requirement because of statutory provisions derived from the Comstock
Act, which restrict the importation, mailing, or interstate distribution
by common carrier of drugs “intended for producing abortion,” among
other items. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1462; Add.32-38. The court did not
suggest that the Comstock Act had any bearing on FDA’s original
approval of mifepristone; its holding would at most justify relief related
to in-person dispensing. And the court’s reliance on the Comstock Act
was doubly flawed: The Comstock Act is not relevant to FDA’s exercise
of its authority under the FDCA, and the court misinterpreted the Act
in any event.
1. The FDCA requires FDA to assess safety and effectiveness
when it approves a drug or imposes a REMS. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(d),
355-1. Nothing in the FDCA requires FDA to address in those decisions
the Comstock Act or any of the many other laws that may restrict the
drug’s distribution or use. Instead, the FDCA properly leaves
21
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enforcement of those laws to the agencies charged with their
administration. For example, the Controlled Substances Act restricts
distribution of fentanyl, but FDA has not incorporated those restrictions
in the approval or REMS for certain fentanyl products. Transmucosal
Immediate Release Fentanyl Shared System REMS Program (Dec.
2022), https://perma.cc/JK6T-S99C; 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-843.
2. Regardless, the district court misinterpreted the Comstock Act.
The statute originally prohibited selling drugs for “causing unlawful
abortion” (among other items) in federal territories, Act of Mar. 3, 1873,
ch. 258, § 1, 17 Stat. 598, 598-99; mailing drugs for “procuring of
abortion,” id. § 2; and importing the “hereinbefore-mentioned articles,”
id. § 3. The next year, Congress clarified that the importation
restriction, like the federal territory restriction, was limited to drugs for
“causing unlawful abortion.” Rev. Stat. § 2491 (1st ed. 1875), 18 Stat.
pt. 1, at 460 (emphasis added). Despite “slight distinctions in
expression,” the Act’s restrictions were part of a unified scheme, and
courts and the Postal Service interpreted all of the restrictions as
limited to articles used unlawfully. See, e.g., United States v. One
Package, 86 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1936) (Learned Hand, J.,
22
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concurring); Add.262-73. And, by 1965, FDA had approved at least
seven oral contraceptives, even though contraceptives were still among
the Act’s enumerated items. See Lara Marks, Sexual Chemistry: A
History of the Contraceptive Pill 77-78 (2001). Congress ratified this
understanding by repeatedly amending the Comstock Act and the
FDCA without material change. See, e.g., Add.269-72.
The court ignored this history, emphasizing the Act’s “plain text.”
Add.34-35. But reading the words “in their context and with a view to
their place in the overall statutory scheme,” the Act never prohibited
the distribution of abortion drugs for lawful uses. See FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000). At most, the text
is ambiguous: The statute does not specify whether it applies to drugs
for “any” or only “unlawful” abortion. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1462. Various
provisions used “abortion” and “unlawful abortion” interchangeably.
And the reference to “indecent or immoral” uses suggests it does not
target legitimate medical uses. Thus, at a minimum, the Act does not
speak “clearly” enough to have “significantly changed the federal-state
balance” by applying to drugs used lawfully. See United States v. Bass,
404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971).
23
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In any event, whatever the Act’s application to other abortion
drugs, it cannot criminalize mifepristone’s distribution system, because
Congress affirmatively directed that distribution system to continue by
enacting the FDAAA in 2007. Congress therein “deemed” drugs like
mifepristone to have an enforceable REMS containing “any” existing
conditions. FDAAA § 909(b), 121 Stat. at 950-51; Add.810. The FDAAA
thereby superseded any application of the Comstock Act to
mifepristone. Since mifepristone’s approval in 2000, the drug has been
imported and distributed interstate. See Add.220; e.g., Add.186
(requiring “[s]ecure shipping procedures”). The “plain import” of
Congress’s decision to direct mifepristone’s existing distribution system
to continue is that the Comstock Act does not bar those same activities.
See Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 274-75 (2012). Thus,
although the court declared that “[r]epeals by implication” are
disfavored, Add.36-37, plaintiffs’ reading of the Comstock Act cannot be
reconciled with Congress’s 2007 action, which carried forward the
existing distribution system for mifepristone.
24
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III. The Government’s Interests And The Public Interest
Overwhelmingly Favor A Stay
The purpose of preliminary relief “is to preserve the status quo
and thus prevent irreparable harm” before the merits are decided. See
City of Dallas v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 847 F.3d 279, 285 (5th Cir. 2017).
“[M]aintenance of the status quo” is likewise “an important
consideration in granting a stay.” Barber v. Bryant, 833 F.3d 510, 511
(5th Cir. 2016). The court upended the status quo with its abrupt and
sweeping nationwide order. If allowed to take effect, that order will
irreparably harm patients, healthcare systems, and businesses.
Congress empowered FDA to ensure that drugs are safe and
effective. FDA has done so with respect to mifepristone, both in 2000
and in carefully assessing its distribution conditions in recent years.
The court’s order arrogates that power to the detriment of women
across the country. For many patients, mifepristone is the best method
to lawfully terminate their pregnancies. Add.321-23, 330-37, 350-51.
Surgical abortion can entail greater health risks for some patients, such
as patients allergic to anesthesia. Add.184-86, 808, 319-20, 330, 333,
342, 349-50. Surgical abortion is also often unavailable for practical
reasons even when abortion is lawful, and travel costs could place
25
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abortion entirely out of reach for some patients. Add.334-37 (explaining
that 1 of 18 Maine Family Planning clinics offers surgical abortion).
Deprivation of “necessary medical care” imposes irreparable harm.
Jones v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 880 F.3d 756, 759-60 (5th Cir.
2018) (per curiam). The order also harms patients, their families, and
providers by overburdening healthcare systems, leading to long waits
for care in a system with limited resources. Add.294-303.
Moreover, in every State abortion is lawful under circumstances
where mifepristone may be the best treatment option. See Add.274-77.
The government also understands that mifepristone is used for non-
abortion purposes, including miscarriage management, a reality that
underscores the larger potential effects of the court’s order. For
example, while Wyoming recently passed a law to prohibit
mifepristone’s use in many circumstances, it sought to preserve access
to mifepristone for miscarriage management. SF109, § 1, 67th Leg.,
2023 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2023). The order thus deprives residents in all
States of a treatment option that may best serve their needs.
26
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IV. Plaintiffs Will Not Suffer Irreparable Harm
In contrast, plaintiffs have not shown that a stay would
“substantially injure” their interests. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426
(2009). The court reasoned that plaintiffs would be irreparably harmed
by having to treat patients suffering adverse events from mifepristone.
Add.61. As discussed above, however, serious adverse events are
“exceedingly rare.” Add.707. And plaintiffs’ claims of irreparable
harm—like their standing allegations—rely on speculation that
hypothetical patients suffering rare adverse events will seek plaintiffs’
care. Yet plaintiffs’ own experiences confirm mifepristone’s safety
profile: Despite mifepristone’s widespread use for decades, plaintiffs
describe only a handful of times they or their members ever treated a
patient for alleged complications from mifepristone. See supra pp. 6-8.
It is wholly implausible that their practices will be materially affected
by such cases in the future, particularly for plaintiffs in States where
abortion is largely banned.
In addition, the course of plaintiffs’ litigation vividly demonstrates
the lack of equity in blocking the distribution of a drug that has been
found safe and effective by FDA and available to millions of patients for
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more than two decades. In 2016, FDA denied plaintiffs’ petition
challenging the drug approval, and plaintiffs waited more than six
years to seek judicial review. Their “unnecessary, years-long delay in
asking for preliminary injunctive relief weigh[s] against their request.”
Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942, 1944 (2018) (per curiam). Even the
most recent action plaintiffs challenge occurred eleven months before
they filed suit. Plaintiffs also encouraged the court to consolidate their
preliminary injunction motion with a bench trial, confirming their
interests would not be prejudiced by forgoing preliminary relief and
waiting months for trial. See Add.362. Plaintiffs’ conduct confirms that
there is no basis for extraordinary nationwide relief that would upend a
decades-long status quo and inflict grave harm on women, the medical
system, and the public.
28
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CONCLUSION
The Court should immediately extend the administrative stay and
then stay the district court’s order pending appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
BRIAN M. BOYNTON
Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General
LEIGHA SIMONTON
United States Attorney
SARAH E. HARRINGTON
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
MICHAEL S. RAAB
/s/ Cynthia A. Barmore
CYNTHIA A. BARMORE
Civil Division, Appellate Staff
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20530
(202) 305-1754
APRIL 2023
29
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that, on April 10, 2023, I electronically filed the
foregoing motion with the Clerk of the Court by using the appellate
CM/ECF system. I further certify that the participants in the case are
CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by using the
appellate CM/ECF system.
/s/ Cynthia A. Barmore
Cynthia A. Barmore
Counsel for Appellants
Case: 23-10362 Document: 20 Page: 49 Date Filed: 04/10/2023
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify that this motion complies with the requirements
of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(d) because it has been
prepared in 14-point Century Schoolbook, a proportionally spaced font.
I further certify that this motion complies with the type-volume
limitation of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(d)(2) because it
contains 5,192 words according to the count of Microsoft Word. I
further certify that this emergency motion complies with the
requirements of 5th Cir. R. 27.3 because it was preceded by a telephone
call to the Clerk’s Office on April 10, 2023, and email to opposing
counsel on April 10, 2023, advising of the intent to file this emergency
motion. I further certify that the facts supporting emergency
consideration of this motion are true and complete. I further certify
under 5th Cir. R. 27.4 that appellees oppose this motion and plan to file
a response in opposition.
/s/ Cynthia A. Barmore
Cynthia A. Barmore
Counsel for Appellants