UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF LEGAL STUDIES , PANJAB UNIVERSITY, CHANDIGARH

TRESPASS TO PERSON
AND PROPERTY
TRESPASS AND RELATED TOPICS

[Pick the date]

This project discusses the tort of trespass to person and trespass to land , with the help of case
laws .

Submitted to: Submitted by :

M/s Sugandha Passi Vrinda Sarin

Roll No: 153/18

B.COM LLB, SECTION C

 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The success and the final outcome of this project required a lot of guidance and assistance and I
thank to people who have helped me throughout this project the supervision and guidance is
appreciable.

I thank Mrs Sugandha Passi mam that she presented me with the project of the contracts that need
not be performed this project has given me a lot of knowledge about the subject.

I also thanks to librarian who helped me to find the necessary books that were required the books
are certainly of use and they provide a better picture of the whole scenario.

I am grateful for such a project and I really look forward to making more projects.

Regards

Vrinda Sarin
 CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that this project of the topic “ TRESPASS TO PERSON AND PROPERTY ” has wholly
been researched , typed and compiled by me that is Vrinda Sarin ; with the help of my teachers ,
books from the library and the necessary websites. I sure it’s full validation and authenticity.
INDEX
 TABLE OF CASES

Case Citation Page number

Entic Vs. Carrington (1765) 19 Tr 1066
Graham versus peat [1801] 1 East 244

Joliffe vs. Willmett & Co. (1971) 1 All ER 478

Bulli Coal Mining Co v Osborne [1899] AC 351

madhav vithal kudwa v. madhavdas AIR 1979 BOM 49
vallabhdas
Elias vs. Pasmore (1934) 2KB 174

Six carpenter’s case (1610) 1 SMLC 134

Hurst v. Picture Thealres Ltd [1915]1K.B. 1.

In Wood v. Leadbitter [1845] 12 m & w 838

Cole v. Turner 6, MOD.149:87 E.R. 907
R v. Cotesworth 6,MOD.172
Innes v. Wylie [1844]1C&K 275
leigh v. Gladstone [1909]26 T.L.R. 139
Stanley v. Powell [1891] 1 BOM 52
Haystead v. Cheif constable of [2000] 3 ALL ER 890. Div Ct
Derbyshire

Freeman v. Home office[no.2] [1983] all E.R. 589, at 594-5;affd

[1984]QB 524 CA
Stephens v. Myers [1830] 4 C and P.349:172 E.R. 735
Thomas v. NUM [1985] 2 all ER 1, at 24

Bird v. Jones [1845] 7 QB 742

Herring-v. Boyle 149 E.R. 1126:[1834] 91 Cr M. AND R. 377
Meering v Grahame White Aviation Co [1920] 121 L.T. 44
Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar A.I.R. 1983 SC 1086
Bhim Singh v. State of J. & K. A.I.R. 1963 SC. 496
Robinson v Balmain New ferry Co. Ltd [1954] 56 P.L.R. 331
John Lewis & Co. v. Tims [1952]1 all E.R. 1203
R. V. Governer of brockhill prison, ex [2001] 2 AC 19
p evans (no. 2)
 INTRODUCTION

 WHAT IS TRESPASS?

According to famous Indian writer “Ratanlal & Dhirajlal” Trespass in its widest sense, signifies any
transgression or any offense against the law of nature of society, or of the country, whether relating
to a man’s person or to his property.So we can say that, every invasion of private property be it ever
so minute is a trespass.

In English common law trespass was of three kinds:

1. Trespass quare clausum freight. (Trespass of the Land)

2. Trespass viet armis. (Trespass of the Person)

3. Trespass de bonis asportatis. (Trespass of the Goods)

I. TRESPASS TO LAND

 DEFINITION OF TRESPASS TO LAND:

Trespass to land means interference with the possession of land Without lawful justification. the
term trespass used to have a wider meaning and a writ of trespass was available to cover any direct
the term trespass used to have a wider meaning and a writ of trespass was available to cover any
direct injury to a person is good or his immovable property.

 NATURE
i. Trespass is a wrong against possession rather than ownership .therefore a person in
actual possession can bring an action even though against the true ownership his
possession was wrong full.

ii. Every invasion of private property be it ever so minute is trespass.[case: Entic Vs.
Carrington1]

Winfield: “If I plant a tree in your land that is trespass. But if the roots or
branches of a tree on my land project into or over your land, that is a nuisance.”

iii. Trespasser is not allowed to take the defense of jus terti 2. In other words the trespasser
cannot plead that as between some third party and person in possession the title of the
third party is better a person can succeed on the strength of his own title rather than on

1
(1765) 19 Tr 1066
2
Third party rights
 the weakness of the third party. A person in self is not the owner of the property can as
well bring a Suit against the trespasser like in the case of Graham versus peat3.
iv. Interference with the possession should be direct and through Some tangible object and
if it is not direct but consequential, the wrong maybe nuisance.

Example

Trespass : if you throw stones up on one neighbours premises it is a wrong of trespass

Nuisance : if you allow stones from a ruinous Chimney to fall upon those premises is a wrong of
nuisance

 HOW TRESPASS IS COMMITTED: Trespass to land may be committed by the

following three ways.

1. Entry is essential to commit a trespass. (Trespass by wrongful Entry)

 A man is not liable for a trespass committed involuntarily, but he is liable if the entry
is intentional, even though made under a mistake.

 Joliffe vs. Willmett & Co. 4

 “An entry upon the lands of another constitutes trespass to land whether or not
the entrant knows that he is trespassing.” But a person is not liable if his
entrance is involuntary.
 Aerial trespass:  Trespass in the airspace above land.
o “Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum”: Whose is the soil his is
also that which is above it.
o This maxim does not means any ownership over the infinite space but
only means that if  one owns portion of the earths surface, one also
owns anything below or above that portion which is capable of being
reduced into private ownership.
o Bulli Coal Mining Co v Osborne5, the Ds mined from their land
through to the P's land. This was held to be trespass to the subsoil.

2. By remaining there. (Remaining on Land)

 A person who has lawfully entered into on land in the possession of another
commits a trespass if he remains there after his right of entry has ceased. A license
whose license has been terminated or is extinguished by expiry can be sued as a
trespasser if he does not vacate after request and laps of a reasonable time.

3. By doing an act affecting the sole possession of the land. (Placing thing on Land)

3
[1801] 1 East 244
4
(1971) 1 All ER 478
5
[1899] AC 351
  Every interference with the land of another, throwing stones or materials over
a neighbours land is deemed constructive entry and amounts to trespass.
 Constructive entry: Planting trees to others land. Placing any animal on
others land.

 WHAT IS NOT TRESPASS

 If a person is invited lawfully to an area and the one which is prohibited area has not been
properly marked a person does not become a trespasser merely by his action of going
beyond the area of invitation 6
 If there is justification to enter the premises of another person it has no trespass . e.g. in
the case of madhav vithal kudwa v. madhavdas vallabhdas7, defendant was plaintiff’s
tenant. He lived on the first floor and used to park his car in the compound of P’s building .
plaintiff said that this amounts to trespass. It was held that in a multistory building this right
can be exercised without the permission of the landlord. There was no trespass.
 When the occupier of land acquiesces in frequent acts of trespass the visitor’s me no more
remain trespassers8
 If there is no interference with the possession of and the defendant has been deprived of
certain facilities like gas and electricity .

Trespass to land is further divided into more categories:

TRESPASS TO LAND

TRESPASS AB INITIIO ENTRY WITH

LICENSE

NON FEASANCE MISFEASANCE

6
Pearson v. Coleman brothers,[1948] 2 KB 359
7
AIR 1979 BOM 49
8
Lowrey v. Walker , [1911] a.c. 10
  TRESPASS AB INITIO

If one who is entitled by law to do an act abuses his authority to do it he is said to be

trespass ab initio. His act is reckoned as unlawful from the very beginning however innocent
his conduct may have been up to the moment of his abuse.

LIABLE:-

Elias vs. Pasmore 9

Two policeman lawfully entered premises to arrest one of the plaintiffs to make a lawful
arrest ,and whilst on the premises took possession of a large number of documents.this
removal of documents was considered as misfeasance .but by their act of misfeasance their
presence did not become wholly unjustifiable ; as the purpose of arrest was yet to be
completed.. They were liable as trespass ab initio with respect to the documents but not
arrest.

NOT LIABLE:-

Six Carpenters Case 10

Six carpenters entered a tavern asked for wine and paid for it. After wards they asked a
second supply, but refuse to pay for it. Held that mere non payment was a misfeasance which
was not sufficient to render them trespasser ab initio.

 ENTRY WITH LICENCE

Entering certain premises with authority of the person in possession amounts to license and the
defendant cannot be made liable for trespass. The licenser has power to cancel the licence and after
the licence has been cancelled, the licensee becomes a trespasser there and he must quit that place
within a reasonable time.

The licences are of two kinds:

1. Bare licence

2. Licence coupled with a grant

A bare licence can be revoked, whereas a licence coupled with a grant cannot be revoked. A licence
to see a picture is a licence coupled with a grant and the cinema authorities cannot revoke such a
licence If such a licensee is forcibly made to leave the theatre before the cinema show is over, he can
bring an action for assault and battery.

9
(1934) 2KB 174
10
(1610) 1 SMLC 134
In Hurst v. Picture Thealres Ltd.11 , the plaintiff after due payment purchased a ticket at the
defendant’s theatre. He was suspected of not having ticket was asked by the management to
leave the hall . on refusal by plaintiff , the gatekeeper of the defendant physically lifted him
out of his seat after that he walked out by himself. Plaintiff sued for assault and false
imprisonment. It was held that the plaintiff had license and the same could not be revoked ,
since the revocation was invalid , the plaintiff was not a trespasser. He was given
compensation.

In Wood v. Leadbitter12 plaintiff went to see a horse race with the relevant ticket. the
defendants were occupiers of the horse race and asked the plaintiff to leave , on his refusal to
comely ,the defendants called their servants to throw him out. The plaintiff brought an action
for assault . it was held that the revocation was effectual. And after revocation the plaintiff
was a trespasser, thus it was not actionable.

 REMEDIES

1. Re-entry
If a person's possession has been disturbed by a trespasser he to use reasonable force to get
the trespass vacated. A trespasser who use of a reasonable force, is made to leave the
premises, cannot bring an action against the person who was lawfully entitled to his
land.Hemmings v. Stoke Poges Golf Club)

2. Action for ejectment.

Sec. 6, Specific Relief Act, 1963 gives a speedy remedy whereby a person, who had been
dispossessed of certain immovable property, without due course of law, will recover back
the property without establishing any title. The plaintiff has to prove that he was in
possession of certain immovable property, he was evicted out of that by the defendant
without due course of law and that the suit for regaining the possession has been brought
within six months of his dispossession.

3. Action for mesne profits.

Apart from the right of recovery of land by getting the trespasser ejected, a person who was
wrongly dispossessed of his land may also claim compensation for the loss which he has
suffered during the period of dispossession. Such an action is known as an action for mesne
profits.

4. . Distress damaged feasant

This right authorizes a person in possession of land to seize the trespass cattle or other
chattels. He can detain them until compensation has been paid to himfor the damage done.
The idea is to force the owner to pay the compensation and after the compensation has
been paid the chattel must be to returned.

11
[1915]1K.B. 1.
12
[1845] 12 m & w 838
 II. TRESPASS TO PERSON

 Definition
Trespass to the person means a direct or an intentional interference with a person's body or
liberty.

 NATURE
o Any direct invasion of a protected interest from a positive act was actionable subject
to justification.
o If the invasion was indirect, though foreseeable, or if the invasion was from an
omission as distinguished from a positive act, there could be no liability in trespass
though the wrong-doer might have been liable in some other form of action.
o The principal use today of these torts relates not so much to the recovery of
compensation but rather to the establishment of a right, or a recognition that the
defendant acted unlawfully.
o These torts are actionable without proof of damage (or actionable per se), they can
be used to protect civil rights, and also will protect a person's dignity, even if no
physical injury has occurred (for example the taking of finger prints).

it can be divided into the following categories:

TRESPASS TO
PERSON

BATTERY ASSAULT
FALSE
CONFINEMENT

USE OF FORCE WITHOUT REASONABLE INFLICTION OF

LAWFUL APPREHENSION BATTERY
JUSTIFICATION
  BATTERY
The wrong of battery consists in intentional application of force to another person without any
lawful justification.

Its essentials are:

a. There should be use of force
b. The same should be without any lawful justification

There are several key elements in the tort of battery that are evident from the following working
definition of the tort:

“battery is an act of the defendant that directly and intentionally (or possibly negligently 13)causes
some physical contact with the person of the claimant without claimant’s consent.”

A. USE OF FORCE

Even though the force used is very trivial and does not cause any harm , the wrong is still
constituted. Physical hurt need not be there . least touching of of another in anger is battery as seen
in the case of Cole v. turner14. The force may be used even without a bodily contact with the
aggressor. use of a stick , bullet or any other missile or throwing water or spitting in a man ‘ s face ( R
v. Cotesworth15)or making a person fall by pulling his chair by force. Infliction of any kind of bodily
harm or personal discomfort is battery.

Mere passive obstruction, however cannot be considered as use of force. In Innes v. Wylie 16 a police
man unlawfully prevented the plaintiff from entering the club premises. It was held that “if the
policeman was entirely passive like a door or a wall put to prevent from entering the room” there
was no assault.

B. WITHOUT LAWFUL JUSTIFICATION.

It is essential that the use of force should be intentional and without any lawful justification. It was
stated by Holt, C.J. that if two or more persons meet in a narrow passage and without any violence
or design of harm , the one touches the other gently, it will be no battery. But if either of them uses
violence against the other, to force his way in a rude or inordinate manner, it will be a battery. Harm
voluntarily suffered is no battery. The use of force may also be justified in pulling a drowning man
out of water, forcibly feeding hunger-striking prisoner to save his life like in the case of leigh v.
gladstone,190917 or performance of operation of an unconscious person by a competent surgeon to
save the former's life.

13
Historically negligent trespass was sufficient basis of liability. Whether that is still the case following the
decision in letang v. Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232 CA is a moot : see ch 2.
14
6, MOD.149:87 E.R. 907
15
6,MOD.172
16
[1844]1C&K 275
17
[1909]26 T.L.R. 139
Harm which is unintentional or caused by pure accident is also not actionable. In Stanley v. Powell18,
Powell, who was the member of a shooting party, fired at a pheasant but the pellet from his gun
glanced off a tree and accidentally wounded Stanley, another member of the party. It was held that
Powell was not liable. If the act is wilful or negligent, the defendant would be liable.

THINGS TO BE OBSERVED :

i. DEFENDANT’S STATE OF MIND

Today , whatever the historical scope for the negligent infliction of battery may be , most modern
suits are likely to be based on an intentional act of the defendant . what is crucial , then is to define
what is meant by intentional act in this context. There are two broad possibilities

 D intended only to act in the way he did

 D both intended to act in the way that he did and the resulting contact with C

For example if D points his riffle at C , there is no doubt that he intends to shoot C but if D points the
gun at a tree to shoot a shooting object , but the bullet reflects and shoots C . it is clear that D
intended to shoot but the outcome wasn’t intended[C’s injury]. In such circumstances it would be
stretching the tort far too much to hold D liable. But if D aimed his gun at A and it misses A and hits
C then D can be held liable.

In the case of Haystead v. Cheif constable of Derbyshire19, there the defendant punched a woman in
the face as a result of which she dropped the baby in her hands. He was charged with criminal
assault in relation to the baby . clearly the tortuous counterpart in this crime is battery . court did
not even consider the application for transfer intent doctrine 20 but said merely that:

“there is no difference between logic and good sence between the facts of this case and the one
where a defendant might have used a weapon to fell the baby to the floor , save only that in a case
of reckless and not intentional battery.”

ii. NO CONSENT BY CLAIMANT

The absence of consent is so inherent in the notion of tortuous invasion of interests in the person
that the absence of consensus must be established by the claimant. This might a first seem rather
odd, but any lingering doubt that any onus of proving absence of consent lies on the claimant was
laid to rest in Freeman v. Home office[no.2]21. A prisoner alleged that he had been administered a
very powerful mood changing drug against his will the judge held that since the essence of battery is
a specific and unpermitted intrusion on the claimant’s body ;it was for the claimant to establish that
the intrusion was unpermitted intrusion. This he failed to do so .

iii. THE CHARACTER OF THE DEFENDANT’S ACT

There is no battery unless there is an act by the defendant. Merely to obstruct the entrance to a
room by standing still is not of itself enough. No battery is committed if there is an incident over

18
[1891] 1 BOM 52
19
[2000] 3 ALL ER 890. Div Ct
20
legal principle which makes a person who intends to harm a second person
21
[1983] all E.R. 589, at 594-5;affd [1984]QB 524 CA
which the defendant has no control. There can be no battery unless there is contact with the
claimant.

iv. DAMAGES

Battery, like all suits in trespass is actionable per se - that is without proof of damage. It seems also
that once the tort is proved, consequential loss in respect of good, as well as personal damage
sustained can be recovered. Furthermore the courts can award additional damages on account of
insult, injury to feelings in respect of a battery they has caused harm.

 ASSAULT

Assault is an act of the defendant which causes to the plaintiff reasonable apprehension of the
infliction of a battery on him by the defendant 22. When the defendant by his act creates án
apprehension in the mind of the plaintiff that he is going to commit battery against the plaintiff, the
wrong of assault is completed. The wrong consists in an attempt to do the harm rather than the
harm being caused thereby.

ESSENTIALS:

i. No knowledge by claimant
ii. Ability to do harm
iii. creates reasonable apprehension in the plaintiff's mind

Pointing a loaded pistol at another is an assault. If the pistol is not loaded, then even it may be an
assault, if pointed at such a distance that, if loaded, it may cause injury like in the case of
R v. S. George .The test is whether an apprehension has been created in the mind of the plaintiff
that battery is going to be committed against him. If the plaintiff knows that the pistol is unloaded
there is no assault.

There should be ability do the harm. If the fist or the cane is shown from such a distance that the
threat cannot be executed, e.g., by a person from a moving train to another standing away on a
platform, there is no assault, similarly, mere verbal threat is no assault unless it creates reasonable
apprehension in the plaintiff's mind that immediate force will also-be used. If a person advances in a
threatening manner to use force, there is assault. In Stephens v. Myers23, plaintiff was the chairman
at a Parish meeting, between defendant and the plaintiff there were six or seven persons. In the
course of some angry discussion, the defendant had been vociferous and he interrupted the
proceedings of the meeting. Majority decided that the defendant be expelled from the meeting. The
defendant then advanced towards the Chairman with a clenched fist saying that he would rather pull
the Chairman out of the chair than be turned out of the room, but was stopped by the
churchwarden, who sat next but one to the Chairman. He was held liable for assault.

22
Winfield,tort 7th ed.,at 150
23
[1830] 4 C and P.349:172 E.R. 735
 i. THE CHARACTER OF DEFENDANT’S CONDUCT

The conduct of the defendant is essential in determining whether assault was there or not. The
commission of assault occurs before the commission of a battery, it makes sense to deal with assault
second because the tort s definition refers to battery. But it is not necessary as if a person is hit from
behind we can see battery but then there is intension of assault. Physical contact is necessary;
photographing a person against his will is intrusion to his privacy but not actionable assault. Also
where there is an intervention of the police, or other protective measures, ensure that the
defendant cannot carry out threats of violence and abuse, there is no assault committed. So, where
working miners were driven on buses by their collieries with police guards the threats yelled at them
by strikers were not assault. It was seen in the case of Thomas v. NUM24. Assault provides limited
protection from the infliction of mental anxiety.

 FALSE IMPRISONMENT

When a person is deprived of his personal liberty whether by being confined within the four walls or
by being prevented from leaving the place where he is, it is false imprisonment. If a man is
restrained, by a threat of force, from leaving his own house or an open field, there is false
imprisonment.

The essentials required to constitute this wrong are:

(i) There should be total restraint on the liberty of a person

(ii) It should be without any lawful justification.

Total Restraint

 Criminal law:

Restraint whether it is total or partial is actionable. When the restraint is total and a person is
prevented from going out of certain circumscribed limits, the offence is that of 'wrongful
confinement as defined in Sec. 340, I.P.C. on the other hand, when the restraint is not total but it is
only partial, and a person is prevented merely from going to a particular direction where he has a
right to go, it is 'wrongful restraint', according to Sec. 339. IPC.

 Civil law :

The tort of false imprisonment is constituted when there is a total restraint. It is no imprisonment if
a man is prevented from going to a particular direction, but he is free to go to any other direction. To
constitute this wrong, a person must have been completely deprived of his liberty to move beyond
certain limits. If a man is prevented from going to a particular direction but is allowed to go back,
there is no false imprisonment.

24
[1985] 2 all ER 1, at 24
 In Bird v. Jones25, a part of the public footway, as opposed to carriage way, on Hammer Smith bridge
was wrongfully enclosed by the defendant. Seats were put there and entry. Allowed only to those
who made the payment to watch the rowing there. The Plaintiff asserted his right of using this
footway, climbed over the fence of the enclosure but was prevented to go forward. He remained
there for about half an hour and subsequently brought an action for false imprisonment Held, that
there was no false imprisonment as there was no total restraint on the plaintiff's liberty; the plaintiff
being free to go back or even to cross the bridge way through the carriage

Means of Escape

Means of escape eradicates the idea of false imprisonment from existing. For instance, if the captive
is a blind man or a child, he should be in a position to locate the means that also provides a
reasonable way of getting out of detention. If a window providing escape is so high that there is
likelihood of injury to the escaping person, or even if an outlet is there but there is a threat of
violence to the escaping person, such means of escape are of no significance, and the detention
amounts to false imprisonment.

Knowledge of the plaintiff

There has been a difference of opinion on the point whether the knowledge of the plaintiff, that
there has been restraint on his freedom, is essential to constitute the wrong of false imprisonment.
In Herring-v. Boyle26 it has been held that such knowledge is essential. In that case a schoolmaster
wrongfully refused to permit a schoolboy to go with his mother unless the mother paid an amount
allegedly due to him. The conversation between the mother and the schoolmaster was made in the
absence of the boy and he was not cognizant of the restraint. It was held that the refusal to the
mother in the boy's absence, and without his being cognizant of the restraint, could not amount to
false imprisonment .

In Meering v Grahame White Aviation Co27. it has been held that the knowledge of imprisonment is
an essential element for bringing an action for false imprisonment because the wrong could be
constituted even without person having the knowledge of the same . In Meering's case, the plaintiff,
an employee of the defendant company was suspected of having stolen the company's property. He
was called to the company's office and was asked to stay in the waiting room. He was told that
presence there was required for investigation in connection with the property which had been
stolen. One or two employees remained outside the room where the plaintiff had been made to sit.
In the meantime the police was called and the plaintiff was arrested on the charge of theft. He was
acquitted and then he sued the defendant for false imprisonment. It was held that the policemen
were not acting as the company agent and arrest of the plaintiff by them, on sufficient reasonable
grounds of suspecting theft, was not wrongful it was however, also held that the detention of the
plaintiff by the officers of company before the policemen had arrived was wrongful and that
amounted to false imprisonment.
25
[1845] 7 QB 742
26
149 E.R. 1126:[1834] 91 Cr M. AND R. 377
27
[1920] 121 L.T. 44
UNLAWFUL DETENTION

In order to constitute the wrong of false imprisonment, it is necessary that the restraint should be
unlawful or without any justification If a person is not released from jail after his acquittal but is
continued be detained thereafter, the detention cannot be considered to be lawful .In Rudul Sah v.
State of Bihar28, the petitioner was acquitted by the Court in 1968 but was released from the jail in
1982, i.e., 14 years thereafter. The State tried to justify the detention by pleading that the detention
was for the medical treatment of the petitioner for his mental imbalance. The plea was rejected As
an ancillary relief, in a writ of habeas corpus by the petitioner, a sum of Rs 35,000 was granted as
compensation as an interim measure by the Supreme Court, without precluding the petitioner from
claiming further compensation

Similarly, in Bhim Singh v. State of J. & K., 29the detention was unjustified In this case, the petitioner,
an M.L.A. of the j& K Assembly was wrongfully detained by the police in order to prevent him from
attending the assembly session. The act of arrest was considered to be mischievous and malicious an
the Supreme Court considered it to be an-appropriate case for granting exemplary damages
amounting to Rs. 50,000

LAWFUL DETENSION

When there is some justification for detaining a person, there is no false imprisonment. In Robinson
v Balmain New ferry Co. Ltd30, the plaintiff entered the defendant's wharf with an idea to cross the
river by one of the defendant's ferry boats. No boat was available for another twenty minutes, he
wanted to go out of the wharf. The plaintiff had paid a penny for entry but refused to pay another
penny, which was chargeable for exit, according to the rules of the defendant as displayed on the
notice board. The defendants disallowed him to leave the wharf unless payment for exit was made.
In an action for false imprisonment, it was held that the defendants were not liable as the charges
were reasonable.

Law permits the arrest of a person when he has committed some offence. Such arrest may be made
by a magistrate, a police officer or a private individual according to the circumstances mentioned in
Chapter V Criminal Procedure code,1973 . A private person may arrest any person who :

1. in his view has committed a non-bailable and cognizable offence

2. is a proclaimed offender.

After making such an arrest, he should, without unnecessary delay make over the arrested person
to a police officer of the nearest police station. arresting a person, when the same is neither
permitted by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code nor otherwise justified, will amount to
false imprisonment.

28
A.I.R. 1983 SC 1086
29
A.I.R. 1963 SC. 496
30
[1954] 56 P.L.R. 331
 In John Lewis & Co. v. Tims31, plaintiff and her daughter went to a shop, where the daughter
committed theft and put four calendars into her mother's bag Both the plaintiff and her daughter
were detained in the office and were told to wait for the managing director's decision, where they
remained for about an hour. They were handed over to the police. On trial ,daughter was found
guilty of theft , the charge against the mother was dropped. The mother sued for false
imprisonment. The defendants were held not liable. It may be noted here that it is not for the
plaintiff to prove that the imprisonment had been without justification. The plaintiff's case is
complete when he proves that he had been detained by the defendant or his agent. In case the
defendant wants to avoid the liability, he has to prove some lawful justification for the detention.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Judicial Officers' Protection Act, 1850 (Indian) grants protection to judicial officers for anything done
or ordered to be done by them in discharge of their judicial duty. A person arrested by the orders of
a judicial officer cannot sue the judicial officer for false imprisonment or for any other wrong. The
protection is granted even if the judicial officer exceeds his jurisdiction provided that he honestly
believed himself to be having jurisdiction to do that act. Such a protection is not available if the
magistrate, acting mala fide exceeds his jurisdiction. Thus, a magistrate, if acting mala fide, illegally
and outside jurisdiction, orders an arrest, he is not entitled to the protection granted by Judicial
Officers Protection Act, 1850 and would be liable for false imprisonment . The protection of judicial
privilege is available only if the officer is acting judicially. In case an officer wrongfully orders the
arrest while acting in his ministerial or administrative capacity he would be liable for false
imprisonment

THINGS TO BE NOTED:

i. STATE OF MIND

This tort is intentional in the sense that the defendant must intend to do an act which is at least
substantially certain to effect the confinement. There is no need to show malice. Case- R. V.
Governer of brockhill prison, ex p evans (no. 2) 32a prison governor who calculated the claimants
date of release in accordance with the law as understood at the time of the conviction was held
liable as she should have been released 59 days earlier due to subsequent change in law.

ii. CHARACTER OF THE ACT

Like other torts it is actionable per se but the courts have insisted upon total restraint of the
persons.

iii. WHO S LIABLE FOR FALSE IMPRISONMENT

The usual question to be asked when deciding who can be sued for false imprisonment is who was
active in promoting and causing the confinement? 33

31
[1952]1 all E.R. 1203
32
[2001] 2 AC 19
33
Atiken v. Bedwell [1827] mood & m 68
Thus , a store detective was not liable when the claimant was arrested on the basis of information
which she gave to police officers, even though her information proved to be erroneous 34. If the
defendant wrongfully gives the claimant into custody and then the magistrate remands the claimant,
the defendant is answerable in false imprisonment from damages only up to the time of the judicial
remand. If A wrongfully prefers a complaint against B before a magistrate who then issues a warrant
or tries him forth with or remands him, A has not committed the tort if false imprisonment 35 even if
the magistrate has no jurisdiction.

iv. DAMAGES

Like the other trespass torts, false imprisonment is actionable without proof of damage in
addition of damages for loss of liberty the court may compensate for injury to feelings and loss
of reputation36

 REMEDIES

i. Action for damages

Whenever the plaintiff has been wrongfully detained, he can always bring an action to
claim damages. Compensation may be claimed not only for injury to the liberty but also
for disgrace.

ii. Self-help
This is the remedy which is available to a person while he is under detention. A person is
authorized to use reasonable force in order to escape from detention instead of waling
for a legal action and procuring release there by.

iii. Habeas Corpus

It is a speedier remedy for procuring the release of a person wrongfully detained. Such a
writ-may be issued either by the Supreme Court under Article 32 or by a High Court
under Article 226 of our constitution. By this writ the person detaining is required to
produce the detained person before the Court and justify the detention. If the court
finds that the detention is without any just or reasonable ground. It will order the
person detained should be immediately released.

34
Davidson v. Cheif constable of north wales [1994] 2 all ER 597, CA.
35
Brown v. Capman {1848} 6 CB 365
36
Hook v. Cunard steam ship co.ltd [1953] 1 all ER 1021
CONCLUSION
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Acts
a. Judicial Officers' Protection Act, 1850
b. Chapter V Criminal Procedure code,1973
c. Sec. 6, Specific Relief Act, 1963
d. Indian penal code (s. 339 , s. 340)

2. Secondary data
a. BOOKS
i. “law of Torts” R.K. Bangia ;24th ed. 2017
ii. “Street on Torts” John Murphy ; 11th ed. 2006
b. Websites
i. All Answers ltd, 'Trespass To Land Lecture' (Lawteacher.net, November
2018) <https://www.lawteacher.net/lecture-notes/trespass-to-land.php?
vref=1> accessed 10 November 2018
ii. All Answers ltd, 'Trespass to person' (Lawteacher.net, November 2018)
<https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/jurisprudence/trespass-to-
person.php?vref=1> accessed 10 November 2018