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MILITARY DECEPTION OPERATIONS

Article · October 2020

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MILITARY DECEPTION OPERATIONS

If you are sure that you are overwhelmingly stronger than the
enemy, by all means engage in an open fight. But if the enemy
is more powerful, with a sound of what is going on in the
enemy’s camp, you may adopt a great variety of ruses. One of
the ways is to deceive the enemy into thinking that your army is
about to break from famine or disaffection and thus induce him
to leave a strong position and attack you where he is at a
disadvantage .
-- Kautilya in Arthashastra

INTRODUCTION

Deception has been an integral part of warfare since warfare came into being .Wise
military planners throughout history have used deception. It is a low cost and effective
way to cause the enemy to waste his efforts. Imaginative use of deception, coupled with
aggressive training, improves combat effectiveness at all levels. It is the desire of every
military commander to achieve victory against the enemy with minimum attrition to own
forces and equipment. Though military commanders are expected to include deception
in their operational planning, they are not taught its principles and methods. Deception
on its own has not been included as a separate entity amongst the principles of war.
However, Deception Operation is being considered as one of the five pillars of Command
and Control Warfare, itself a subset of Information Warfare, along with Operational
Security, Psychological Operation, Electronic Warfare and Physical Destruction.

Deception is rarely an end unto itself. Deception is most often used in coordination with
other methods to create windows of opportunity that expose the enemy. The importance
of deception has surely not diminished over the millennia and, in fact, may be gaining in
importance. Military deception is a proven force multiplier that can shape the battlefield
by providing surprise and security for military operations and forces.

AIM
The aim of this essay is to analyse the concept of Military Deception Operations at the
strategic, operational and tactical level and suggest measures to achieve the same.
SCOPE
The essay will study Military Deception Operations critically at strategic, operational
and tactical levels of war and their interrelation. Keeping in view the battlefield
 316

scenario in the next millennium the measures to carry out deception operations
against the enemy and safeguarding measures against being surprised by the enemy
deception operations would be analysed.
HISTORY
To guess at the intention of the enemy; to divine his opinion of
yourself; to hide from both your intentions and opinion; to
mislead him by feigned maneuvers; to invoke ruses, as well as
digested schemes, so as to fight under the best conditions—
this is and always was the art of war.
- Napoleon

From ancient times surprise and deception have been the most critical features in
winning a battle. In Mahabhararta times, Lord Krishna used deception to darken the
horizon enabling king Jayadratha to come out of his hiding so that Arjun could kill him.
Shukracharya, ancient military writer of Vedic age had written as one of the forms of
warfare are Kuta Yudha i.e. war by Subterfuge and Tusrim Yudha i.e. Silent Warfare
conducted by spreading disaffection in the ranks of enemy forces. During
Mahabharata Kuta Yudha using bluff and conceit was practised. Success of Allied
Egyptian Expedition Force in Palestine(1917 – 1918), Ardennes offensive by the
Germans, Pearl Harbour, Japanese advance in Malaya, success of Operation Fortitude
in the Normandy Invasion, Incheon landing, both 1967 and 73 Arab Israel wars, Battle
of Dien Bien Phu at Indo China and the Gulf War are some of the shining examples of
use of successful deception operations.
Indian Scene. India has a long history of getting surprised by the enemy deception
operations. Babur surprised the then emperor of India by imaginative use of the
canon. In 1962 we were strategically surprised by China. In 1965 Op Gibraltar
launched by Pakistan was a surprise to us and latest is the Kargil episode where
we have been surprised again.
Deception Measures Adopted By Pakistan in Kargil. Apart from keeping the plan
top secret, Pak decided on the following measures of deception:-
 Not to induct any fresh troops into the FCNA for the proposed operation. Any
large scale troop movement (two-three battalions) would have drawn our
attention.
 The artillery which was inducted into the FCNA, during the heavy exchange of
fire in July-September 1998, was not de-inducted. Since firing continued
thereafter, though at a lower scale, this was not considered extraordinary.
 No reserve formations or units were moved into FCNA till after the execution
of the plan.
 The administrative bases for the intrusions were to be catered for from
existing defences.
 Logistic lines of communication were to be along the ridge lines and the
Nullahs, well away from the tracks and positions of own troops.
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BACKGROUND

Although deceit is detestable in all other things, yet in the

conduct of war it is laudable and honorable, and a commander
who vanquishes an enemy by stratagem is equally praised with
one who gains victory by force.
—Niccolo Machiavelli

Deception can be defined as “Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary’s

military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions and operations,
thereby causing the adversary to take specific action (or inaction) that will contribute to
the accomplishment of the friendly mission”. It is often said that skills on deception
have deteriorated over a period of time . Our army has not developed concepts and
doctrine on deception nor has it acquired equipment related to deception. There are
three keys factor that contributed to demise of deception related skills : -

 Developments in technology are perceived to make successful deception

more difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.

 Commanders are reluctant to devote scarce resources, including time, to

tasks that are considered less essential.

 Force modernisation being primarily focused on high cost equipment, low cost
perceived intangibles like deception has been pushed into back ground.

Some unfounded beliefs or myths on deception are :-

 Surprise comes from luck . Not true at all. Deception almost certainly results in
surprise.

 Deception plays a trivial part in warfare and is not for real soldiers. This is
incorrect.

 Tremendous growth in intelligence collection capabilities has destroyed the

possibility of deceiving a sophisticated opponent. The truth is, that greater the
intelligence collection capabilities the greater is the opportunity to feed the
enemy false information.

 Deception is only for combatants. It is not true. In 1973 Arab Israel war, the
Egyptian attack was aided by 150 deception ploys in economic, political and
military forms.

CATEGORIES OF MILITARY DECEPTION

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All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable,

feign incapacity; when active, inactivity. When near, make it
appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near.
Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike
him.
-- Sun Tzu

There are five types of deception operations. The categories of deceptions and their
objectives and characteristics are tabulated below :-

Category Objective Characteristics

 Results in adversary
military policies and  Conducted by and in support
Strategic Military actions that support the of
Deception originator’s strategic senior military commanders
military objectives,
policies and operations
 Designed to protect and  Conducted by the Services
enhance the combat that pertains to service
capabilities of Service support to joint operations.
forces and systems.  Imitates, in any sense, a
person, object or
Service Military  Protects friendly force phenomenon to deceive
Deception personnel,material, adversary surveillance
equipment, and devices or mislead adversary
Information Systems evaluation.
(INFOSYS) nodes from  Targets sensors and weapon
observation and systems.
surveillance using  Employed against systems.
natural or artificial
material.
 Results in adversary
actions favourable to  Conducted in theater of war to
the originator’s support campaigns and
Operational objectives and major operations
Military operations.
Deception  For Army forces, a
subcategory of Service
military deception

 Influence an adversary  Targets adversary

commander to act in a decisionmakers at any level
manner that serves our of command.
 319

Tactical Military tactical objectives.  Supports battles and

Deception  For Army forces, a engagements.
subcategory of Service  Integral to the concept of
military deception operations.
 Requires feedback planning.

 Centrally monitored and

controlled.
 Targets adversary
Military  Degrades adversary intelligence functions.
Deception in capability to discern  Employed against all forms
Support of OPSEC vulnerabilities of ISR operations.
Operational  Supports force protection.
Security
 Derived from the concept of
(OPSEC)
operations.
 Feedback not always
required.
 Decentralized control and
Execution.
Figure 1. Categories of Military Deception Operations

PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY DECEPTION

I make the enemy see my strengths as weaknesses and my

weaknesses as strengths while I cause his strengths to become
weaknesses and discover where he is not strong.
—Sun Tzu, The Art of War
Following the principles of Military Deception (MD) Operations contributes to
successful operations. Applying them consistently and creatively enhances any
deception’s credibility and increases its chances for success. However, they are not a
checklist that guarantees success. Commanders and staffs use judgment to apply
them.
Principles of Military Deception are :-
 Focus on the target.
 Cause the target to act.
 Centralize control.
 Employ variety.
 Enforce strict OPSEC.
 Minimize falsehood/leverage truth.
 Ensure timeliness.
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 Ensure integration.
 Exploit target biases.
 Avoid windfalls.
 Utilize space effectively.
 Work within available competencies and resources.
Deception Means
Deception means are the methods, resources, and techniques that can be used to
convey information to the deception target. It provides false indication to the enemy.
The enemy would collect battlefield information through visuals, olfactory, sonic and
electronic methods There are three categories of deception means: physical,
technical, and administrative.

Physical means. These are activities and resources used to convey or deny selected
information to a foreign power. Physical means provide indicators that adversary ISR
systems report. Physical means include :-
 Reconnaissance unit operations.
 Alert and movement of forces.
 Training, testing, evaluation, and rehearsal activities.
 Dummy and decoy equipment, devices, and displays .
 Smoke and obscurants.
 Logistic, stockpiling, and repair activities.
 Feints, demonstrations, and ruses.
 Sonic indicators, which reproduce common noises of military activity. (Such
noises are directed against adversary sound ranging sensors and the human
ear. Sounds can be real or simulated. The deception plan may also require
that the adversary not hear certain sounds; such instances require strict noise
discipline).
 Olfactory indicators, which project battlefield smells to deceive human and
technical sensors. (Examples of olfactory deception measures are the
creation of odors common to military units and operations, such as those of
food, explosives, and petroleum products).

Camouflage. When employing visual deception we may camouflage all or part of

real or false military objects to project the desired effect. When portraying a particular
unit, the use of camouflage must be consistent with that units prior camouflage
signature. The simple use of camouflage means are very effective to deceive own
intentions. Innovative use of camouflage means together with knowledge of US spy
satellites enabled us to hoodwink US intelligence about our own Pokharn-II blast.
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Technical Means. These are military materiel resources and their associated operating
techniques used to convey or deny selected information to the deception target through
the deliberate radiation, reradiation, alteration, absorption, or reflection of energy; the
emission or suppression of chemical or biological odors; and the emission or
suppression of nuclear particle.

Electronic Deception.
Electromagnetic deception is an important technical means. Electromagnetic
deception includes :-
 Manipulative Electronic Deception. Actions to eliminate revealing, or
convey leading, electromagnetic indicators.
 Simulative Electronic Deception. Actions to simulate friendly, notional or
actual capabilities to mislead adversary forces. After a sixteen – day battle,
many Al Qaeda forces, probably including Osama Bin Laden, escaped across
the Pakistan border. Bin Laden’s bodyguards used his cell phone
transmissions to misdirect the manhunt aimed at capturing the Al Qaeda
Leader.
 Imitative Electronic Deception. The introduction of electromagnetic energy
into adversary systems that imitates adversary emissions.
Administrative Means
These are resources, methods, and techniques to convey or deny oral, pictorial,
documentary or other physical evidence to the deception target. An example of
administrative means is planting bogus material.
Perceptions
Perceptions are mental images the commander wants the deception target to believe
are real. They include the personal conclusions, official estimates, and assumptions
about friendly force intentions, capabilities, and activities that the target uses to make
decisions. There are two types of perceptions: desired and supporting. A desired
perception is what the deception target must believe for it to make the decision that will
achieve the deception objective. Supporting perceptions are mental images that
enhance the likelihood that the deception target will form the desired perceptions and
accept them as true.

PLANNING

It is very important to spread rumors among the enemy that you

are planning one thing; then go and do something else . . .
- Emperor Maurice, The Strategikon
History shows that successful deception plans are executed prior to the start of actual
operations. The actual execution of the deception planning process moves in the
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reverse direction: informational elements being manipulated are transmitted (or

obscured), creating
the story, in the mind of the targets, to achieve the objective. Planning for deception
operations must start prior to the beginning of a conflict. Without a file or data base of
certain information concerning friendly and enemy forces, it is impossible to conduct a
successful deception effort. Deception planners must have detailed information on
what friendly forces look like to the threat, available enemy sensors, and the enemy
commander and his troop control cycle.
Deception Planning Process Means of deception

Objective Target Story

 Camouflage/concealment/cover
 Demonstration/feint/diversion
 Display/decoy/dummy
 Mimicry/spoofing
 Dazzling/sensory saturation
 Disinformation/ruse

Figure 2. The Deception Planning Process

COMPONENTS OF BATTLEFIELD DECEPTION OPERATIONS .

There is no more precious asset for a General than a

knowledge of his opponent’s guiding principles and character,
and anyone who thinks the opposite is at once blind and
foolish… In the same way the commander must train his eye
upon the weak spots in his opponent’s defence, not in his body,
but in his mind.
- Polybius.

The planning for combat operations and battlefield deception is similar. Each
component of the deception plan varies in scope, but is applicable at operational and
tactical levels. The following doctrinal components of deception, are listed in order of
development.

Objective. The deception objective is the ultimate purpose of the deception operation
and is presented as a mission statement. The objective specifies what action or lack of
action the enemy must be made to take at a specific place or time on the battlefield.

Target. The target of battlefield deception operations is the enemy decisionmaker who
exercises the authority to make the decision that will achieve the deception objective
desired
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by the friendly commander. The target for the deception effort at Corps is normally a
formation commander, although in some cases the target might be an Army
commander. What is his personality profile? What is his educational background and
how has he grown up? What sensors does he trust the most? Is he enamoured by high
tech sensors or does he believe reports from scouts or operatives? We must know him
if we want to deceive him!

Story. The deception story is the friendly intention, capability, or disposition which the
enemy is made to believe to be true.

Plan. The deception plan outlines what specific operations, displays, or concealments
must be taken to convey the deception story to the target.

Events. Deception events are friendly indicators/actions that present specific parts of
the total deception story to the enemy's intelligence gathering sources.

Know Yourself . The deception planners at corps and division must have available to
them the profiles of friendly units and installations within their area.

Know the Enemy. A deception plan must be based on detailed knowledge of the
enemy. Most of the knowledge required can be developed in peacetime. We must know
our target -- the specific enemy commanders controlling the forces we want to influence,
the enemy sensors, and how the sensors feed the enemy.

Sensors. We must know the capabilities of enemy sensors. What frequencies do they
operate on? What is their doctrinal mode of operation (day, night, intermittent, or on a
schedule, etc.)? What is their range? Where are they positioned on the battlefield? Are
they in line of sight or non-line of sight? Which ones are organic to the formation and
which ones are controlled by higher headquarters?

Decision Cycles Versus Troop Control Cycles. One problem facing Corps planners
is whether a deception effort, other than higher headquarters directed, is feasible
considering available time. Since the result of deception is action/inaction by enemy
forces, consideration must be given to time available to influence troop control cycles.
The deception plan must be developed, coordinated, executed, sensed by enemy
sensors, input into the enemy's decision cycle, orders promulgated, and actions taken
by enemy forces -- all on a time constrained battlefield.

PLANNING GUIDE. The ability of planners to develop an effective deception effort

within the time constraints of the Corps planning cycle is facilitated by a structured
approach to planning. A sample Deception Planning Guide is given at Appendix.
Though designed for use of a Corps this guide can be modified for any formation.

COORDINATION. There must be close coordination between the deception plan and
the corresponding operations plan. Deception activities must be coordinated with other
agencies and commands that support the operation and/or may be impacted by the
 324

deception. Any unit which could inadvertently compromise an operation through normal
actions must also be contacted or controlled. The commander must decide the trade-off
between a fully coordinated plan and the security/risk associated with full coordination.
Based on his decision, the GS(Ops) Branch is responsible for ensuring that the plan is
coordinated as desired and integrated into the operation.

Hiding Own Operation. For any deception operation to be successful it is essential

that own tactical situation is hidden from the enemy sensor . Enemy sensor can be a
man with a binocular on an observation post or a patrol leader to satellites or Unarmed
Aerial Vehicles. The most commonly used techniques and materials to prevent
deception are :-

 Camouflage.
 Suppressive and absorptive screens.
 Smoke.
 Shielding and/ or making various types of emitters.
 Using terrain to mask units and their movements.
 Signal security procedure.
 Electronic Warfare.

Today our adversaries have acquired state of the art high tech intelligence to snoop on
us. With the proliferation of sophisticated technology on space easily available from
commercial
sources on payment, obtaining real tactical picture has become much simpler. Today
tactical deception should be capable of hoodwinking such high tech intelligence as :-

 High resolution photo satellites.

 Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV).
 MTI Stand -off radars.
 Tactical air reconnaissance.
 Radar and radio locator.
 Magnetic, sonic and heat sensors.
 Imaging radars.
 Infrared.

Deception and Operational Security. Almost all historical examples of operational

deception have concealed both the decision to deceive and the details of the plan from
their own troops. As a high ranking German General wrote, “As a rule, the intention to
deceive the enemy should be concealed from one’s own side. Deceiving one’s own
troops is very often, perhaps even generally, necessary for effective deception.’’ Strict
possible security measures have to be taken for all deception operations. Any leak can
provide the enemy an input which may result in a disastrous twist with deceiver
unwittingly becoming the deceived. If the troops employed in deception operation are
informed about the nature of operation they are taking part, there is every chance that
their actions may undergo some subtle change which can give away the deception plan.
 325

However, there is a paradox here. For good coordination at every level there is
requirement of involving appropriate responsible persons and they would be knowing
the complete plot. So a trade off and fine balance have to be made between the two
conflicting needs of security and coordination. There is probably no better albeit
extreme example of a commander who appreciated the advantages of tight security in
both deception and actual operation than Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. Rommel
assured the security of his plans by a simple expedient : he kept his own counsel,
informing neither his own staff nor the German High Command about the deception
plan.
SOME IMPORTANT ASPECTS

We must be ready to employ trickery, deceit, withholding and

concealing the truth.
- V I Lenin
Legal Considerations

Deception operations are constrained but not forbidden by international agreements.

The line of demarcation between legitimate ruses and forbidden acts is sometimes very
thin. However, since our adversaries are known to be no respecter of internationally
agreed conventions like Geneva Conventions it is necessary to understand the legal
implication of such operations.
Deception is in principle coordinated with Command and Control (C2W) warfare, Civil
Affairs, Psychological Operations and Public Affairs to harmoniously advance own
interests. The generation and dissemination of patently false or misleading
information is a complex, evolving and legally murky issue. It is generally accepted
that deception is employed against hostile forces with impunity (in a legal or ethical
sense). However, we cannot deliberately misinform or mislead public or decision
makers. In between these two poles is a great grey area that may have a significant
impact on military outcomes. What about employing deception against neutral or
unfriendly forces not directly involved is the operations ? Against Who ?
Deception in Low Intensity Conflict Operations(LICO).

Enemy sabotage, espionage, subversive agents, and terrorist activities are major
threats to deception. In LIC, the local civilian population is important because of the
difficulty identifying insurgents and guerrilla forces interspersed throughout the local
population. Coercion, brutal force, and extortion are all used by the insurgents to gain
the cooperation of local citizens. Deception in LIC may be designed as a subtle
disinformation or propaganda campaign designed to enhance secrecy. It may be an
active operation designed to cause the enemy to attack a decoy position or move into a
position where our fire and maneuver can destroy him.
Some methods of disseminating deception information in LIC are uniquely suited
against enemy HUMINT . These methods include--
 326

 Using local newspapers and periodicals to give appropriate information.

 Leaking information to the media.
 Using double agents.
 Deliberately leaking information to known sympathizers or agents.
 Deliberately leaking information to local workers who wittingly or unwittingly
further disseminate the information.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS.

In wartime, the truth is so precious that she should always be

attended by a bodyguard of lies.
- Winston Churchill

Battlefield deception and psychological operations (PSYOP) are both directed toward
the enemy. However, they target different audiences and use different channels to
reach these audiences. Battlefield deception is directed toward the enemy commander
and his staff . It is primarily intended for the attention of the enemy’s intelligence
organization. PSYOP are directed toward enemy forces in general. Propaganda a tool
of PSYOP, is disseminated by such media as leaflets, newspapers, pamphlets,
loudspeakers, radio, television, and rumors. PSYOP support the deception operation by
disseminating information that confirms or supports the deception story presented to
the enemy through his intelligence channels. Prior consideration should be given to the
possibility that such use may degrade or jeopardize the credibility sought or achieved
by PSYOP supporting tactical forces. It is important that PSYOP in support of
deception be thoroughly coordinated at all levels of command during the planning and
execution phases of the operations.

Psyops and Deception. There have been instances where Psyops have been enlisted
to assist deception schemes. There is a fundamental difference between the two. The
underlying principles of good psyops is that to be most effective, they must deal with the
truth and nothing but the truth – although not necessarily the whole truth. Deception
deals with lies and its aims are fundamentally at odds with those of Psyops. The latter
can assist deception by helping to provide it with the “bodyguard of truth necessary to
protect the lie”.

Counter Deception.
Oh, what a tangled web we weave, when first we practice to
deceive!
—Sir Walter Scott, Marmion
Counter measures to deception are necessary and should be treated as seriously by
modern commanders as their own deception schemes. Good intelligence would lead
them some way towards uncovering a deception and intelligence staff should be able
to distinguish deceptive threats from genuine ones. A skillful attacker will tailor his
 327

deception to confirm the view the defender already has of him before doing something
completely different.

Tactics are taught is a way that seek to exploit the best ground, but if the enemy knows
what the best ground is, he is likely to plan accordingly. Choosing second best terrain,
by contrast, creates an opportunity for a deception that may yield enormous results :
Surprise and consequent success at much less cost.

New Technology and Information Warfare.

Modern warfare is seeing enormous increase in the quantity of information, there is also
a marked reduction in the time available to intelligence staff to analyse it and
disseminate the resulting intelligence. Modern deception measures should take
advantage of the targets vulnerability to paralyse through data saturation.
No matter how radical a technological innovation may be, a counter technology will
soon be developed. Infra red sensors designed to detect that can be countered by
something as simple as treated hessian cloth used in conjunction with camouflage net.
Sensors cannot differentiate between a genuine hot engine and simulations made from
a can filled with sand and patrol. Under some circumstances latest technology can
remain vulnerable to surprisingly unsophisticated deception strategies. During Kosovo
conflict very simple decoys and dummy sites led the most powerful Air forces in the
world to overestimate grossly the effectiveness of their campaign against Serb armour,
on ground. Serbs did not possess state of the art camouflage and deception
equipment. Many of the decoy materials were knocked together from local materials.
‘Tanks’ for example, were made from black logs on old lorry wheels. High technology is
not a panacea nor an end in itself; more traditional human intelligence sources may yet
have a significant role to play in the future.

TRAINING

The training of armies is primarily devoted to developing efficiency in

the detailed execution of tactics. The concentration of tactical
techniques tends to obscure the psychological elements. It fosters a
cult of soundness rather than surprise. It breeds commanders who
are so intent not to do anything wrong, according to the ‘book’ that
they forget the necessity of making the enemy do something wrong.

- Liddell Hart

Training in deception involves teaching commanders to make the enemy make

mistakes, a task that requires imagination. Most soldiers tend to consider personal
camouflage as the limit of their deception responsibilities. Deception is given short shrift
in terms of the time soldiers spend learning or practicing the art of the ruse. Deception
techniques should be cultivated with the same level of emphasis we place on basic
firearm skills.
 328

Some of the measure which can be undertaken to develop deception consciousness

are :-

 Exposing the officer cadre to various campaigns in military history where

surprise and deception were a major factor.
 Use of surprise and deception in all training activities. One way of practising
active measures is use of one of the discarded courses of action to be
developed as deception plan.
 Use of wargames and partially controlled exercises to practice surprise and
deception.
 Conduct training exercises in the condition of information void, chaos and
confusion increasing “fog of war”.
 Improve troops performance in dispersion, camouflage and concealment,
night movement and track discipline.

RECOMMENDATIONS

I feel that deception and cover plans are fully justified and that
the employment of cover and deception should be an accepted
and organized procedure for any campaign.

- General George S Patton

Today we do not have our concepts and doctrine on deception. Resources have to be
identified to carry out deception operations. In U S Army there is a 19 men cell at
Divisional level and a 12 men cell at Corps level for deception operations. It is
considered too large for planning and too small for execution of deception operation. In
our context deception operation should be planned at Corps level. To start with an
officer and a clerk should be posted with operations branch with the intelligence branch
providing the necessary input on threat, evaluation and analysis. It is envisaged that not
enough money would be available for procurement of equipment like decoys, dummies
when there is shortage of more important items or equipment. A deception company
can be squeezed out of Corps Engineers resources. Army Training and Doctrine
Command (ARTRAC) may take on the task of making a pamphlet on Deception.
Emphasis should be placed on use of improvised decoys and dummy position at low
cost.

The following measures are recommended :-

 Establish a deception cell at the highest level of Military Operations

directorate. They will coordinate with signal and military intelligence, other two
services, Intelligence Bureau and RAW regarding deception operation.
 Incorporate DRDO in developing decoys and dummies.
 329

 “Camouflage and concealment” para in any order and instruction should be

changed to “Deception Plan”.
 Increase the scope of all arms camouflage course conducted at College of
Military Engineering, Pune to lay much more emphasis on deception.

CONCLUSION

“To achieve victory we must as far as possible make the enemy blind
And deaf by sealing his eyes and ears and drive his commanders to
Distraction by creating confusion in their minds”.

- mao tse tung, on protracted war

Deception has often been termed as the key to success in battle. If employed
carefully it can act as the most powerful force multiplier. Deception can shock and
paralyse the enemy’s mind. This decisive factor in battle can be achieved by
cumulatively exploiting secrecy, boldness, innovation and by misleading the enemy with
careful, timely and thorough preparation, speed in execution and preparing oneself for
the unexpected. The exact success of any given deception operation is often very
difficult to measure. Deception is probably less important than good intelligence and no
war was ever won by either, but only by hard fighting.

We must get down to basics and take measures for making active and passive
deception activities effective. It does not cost huge money, but basic ingredients have
to be made available to troops on ground . Surprise and deception are not lost arts. If
we have to fight with and defeat an increasingly sophisticated intelligence gathering
technology available to our adversaries within the fiscally constrained environment, we
must get the best out of our equipment, manpower and concepts .
 330

APPENDIX

DECEPTION PLANNING GUIDE

1. Current Situation.
 Brief description of enemy situation.
 Brief description of friendly situation.
 What are Corps objectives?
 What is known about the enemy commander? (strength, weaknesses,
information requirements, biases).
 What enemy peculiarities, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities have been
identified?
 What enemy collection assets have been identified?
 What are the enemy's battlefield perceptions of the Corps?
 Are there indications that the enemy expects us to take a certain Course of
Action?
2. Courses of Action.
 Given the present situation, what are the possible courses of action
available to the enemy?
 Which is most likely?
 Which is most dangerous?
 What are the possible courses of action available to friendly forces?
3. Based on the above information, does the enemy appear to be vulnerable to
deception?
 Is there adequate time (Troop Control Cycle) for the enemy to see and react to
the deception? (How much time is available?)
4. What do we want the enemy to do and whom do we want to deceive?
 Deception Objective.
 Deception Target.
 What are feasible courses of action upon which to build a realistic deception?
(possible stories).
 Is there a logical opportunity to implant this deception into the current
situation?
5. What do we need to tell and show the target commander to make him do
what we want?
 331

 Deception Story.
6. What resources are available to convey the deception to the target?
 Units.
 Equipment (real and decoy).
 Time.
7. Operational Security Considerations.
8. How is the enemy likely to react to the deception? (Possible Courses of
Action).
9. What are the risks to own forces?
10. Will compromise of the deception significantly degrade actual operations?
 Can we use the deception as an alternate course of action if the deception is
not successful?
11. Based on the above, is there an opportunity to perform deception?
12. If the opportunity exists:
 Prepare the plan (Annex to the Operational Orders/Instructions).
 Prepare feedback on deception efforts.
 Task units to perform the deception (integration of specific tasks/events into
basic Operational Orders/Instructions and functional annexes).
 Coordinate efforts; manage mission.
 Modify deception based on feedback, if necessary.
 Phase out operations.
 332

BIBLOGRAPHY

1. General Waldemar Erfuth, Surprise, The English Book Depot , Amabala

Cantt.
2. Michael Diwar, The Art of Deception in Warfare, Newton Abbot, Divon , UK,
David and Charles Publishers Pie, 1989.
3. Lieutenant General M Altiqur Rehman, Reflections on the Principles of Surprise
and Deception, New Delhi : Army Publishers.
4 Jon Latimer, Deception in War, John Murray Ltd, London,2001.
5. Biddle, Afganistan and Future of Warfare, Bin Laden Used Ruse to Flee,
Washington Post, 21 Jan 2003.
6. Milan N Vego, Operational Deception in the Information Age, Joint Force
Quarterly, Spring 2002.
7. Maj Jay Lee Halton, USMC, The Role of Preconception in Operational
Deception, First Place Winning Essay in Chairman US Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy
Essay Competition, 1998. available at www.ndu.edu/inss/
8. Col Harjeet Singh, Military Deception : An Analytical Overview, Combat, April
1996.
9 Col A S Bhagat, Relevance of Surprise, Audacity and Unconventionalism,
Combat Journal, August 1995.
10. Col J S Dalal, VSM, Surprise and Deception, Combat Journal, April 1997.
11. Col Ranjit Singh, Surprise and Deception, Combat Journal, August 1994.
12. JA Stream and H S Marsh, Surprise and Deception in Soviet Military Thought,
Military Review, August 82.
13. Dr Bhashyam Kasturi , Deception and Surprise Some Theoretical Precepts,
Combat, April 96 .
14. Major M Haider Rizvi, Deception Has Played A Vital Role in Warfare, Trishul,
Vol IX No 2.
15. Captain Justin L C Eldridgt, The Myth of Army Tactical Deception, Military
Review, August 1990.
16. Lieutenant Colonel Margaret H. Belknap,The CNN Effect: Strategic Enabler or
Operational Risk? Parameters, Autumn 2002.
17. U S Army Field Manual 90 – 2, Deception Operations.
18. US Army Field Manual FM 3-13, Information Operations, Doctrine, Tactics,
Techniques and Procedures.

Published in Infantry India Autumn 2007 issue.

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