Case: 1:23-cv-02589 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/25/23 Page 1 of 103 PageID #:1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EDWARD CAMARGO, on his own behalf

and on behalf of a similarly situated class, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-02589

Plaintiff,
JURY DEMAND
v.

ABBVIE, INC.,

Defendant.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

I.  INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 1 

II.  PARTIES .............................................................................................................................. 12 

A.  Plaintiff..................................................................................................................... 12 

B.  Defendant ................................................................................................................ 13 

1.  AbbVie, Inc. ................................................................................................. 13 

2.  AbbVie manufactures Humira. ................................................................... 13 

III.  JURISDICTION AND VENUE ......................................................................................... 13 

IV.  DRUG PRICING IN THE UNITED STATES .................................................................. 14 

A.  Entities Involved in Drug Pricing ............................................................................ 14 

B.  The Drug Payment & Distribution Structure ......................................................... 16 

C.  List pricing as a Basis for Reimbursement ............................................................... 17 

D.  Consumer Drug Costs ............................................................................................. 19 

E.  AbbVie Aggressively Raised Prices to Meet Revenue Targets .................................. 28 

F.  Executive Compensation Provides Incentives to Raise Prices ................................. 29 

G.  Drug Companies Target the U.S. Market for Higher Prices and Use
the Medicare Program to Boost Revenue ................................................................ 30 

H.  AbbVie and Other Drug Companies Use Patient Assistance Programs
as a Public Relations Tool to Boost Sales ................................................................ 32 

I.  Research and Manufacturing Costs Do Not Justify Price Increases ........................ 33 

J.  Drug Manufacturer Manipulation of PBM Incentives ............................................ 34 

K.  AbbVie—Humira ...................................................................................................... 37 

V.  EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION CREATED INCENTIVES FOR PRICE

INCREASES ........................................................................................................................ 44 

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VI.  PRICE INCREASES NOT JUSTIFIED BY MANUFACTURING COSTS

AND ARE OUT OF VARIANCE WITH THE COST OF CONSUMER
GOODS ............................................................................................................................... 46 

VII.  IMPACT ON CONSUMERS OF UNFAIR AND UNCONSCIONABLE

LIST PRICES ....................................................................................................................... 47 

VIII.  TOLLING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ......................................................... 48 

A.  Discovery Rule Tolling ............................................................................................. 48 

B.  Fraudulent Concealment Tolling ............................................................................ 49 

C.  Estoppel.................................................................................................................... 49 

IX.  CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS ..................................................................................... 50 

X.  CLAIMS FOR RELIEF ........................................................................................................ 54 

VIOLATION OF THE ILLINOIS CONSUMER FRAUD AND

DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES ACT 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.
505/1, ET SEQ. (BROUGHT ON BEHALF OF A NATIONWIDE CLASS) .................. 54 

VIOLATION OF THE ALASKA UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES

AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT ALASKA STAT. ANN.
§ 45.50.471, ET SEQ............................................................................................................ 56 

VIOLATION OF THE ARIZONA CONSUMER FRAUD ACT

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1521, ET SEQ.................................................................... 58 

VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA LEGAL REMEDIES ACT

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1750, ET SEQ. ................................................................................... 59 

VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA UNFAIR COMPETITION

LAW CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200, ET SEQ. ...................................................... 61 

VIOLATION OF THE COLORADO CONSUMER PROTECTION

ACT COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-101, ET SEQ. ................................................................... 62 

VIOLATION OF THE CONNECTICUT UNFAIR TRADE

PRACTICES ACT CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110A, ET SEQ. ......................................... 63 

VIOLATION OF THE DELAWARE CONSUMER FRAUD

ACT DEL. CODE TIT. 6, § 2513, ET SEQ. ....................................................................... 64 

VIOLATION OF THE FLORIDA UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE

TRADE PRACTICES ACT FLA. STAT. § 501.201, ET SEQ. ........................................... 66 

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VIOLATION OF THE HAWAII UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE

TRADE PRACTICES ACT HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 480-1, ET SEQ. ................................ 67 

VIOLATION OF THE IDAHO CONSUMER PROTECTION

ACT IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-601, ET SEQ. ................................................................. 68 

VIOLATION OF THE ILLINOIS CONSUMER FRAUD AND

DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES ACT 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.
505/1, ET SEQ. .................................................................................................................... 70 

VIOLATION OF THE KANSAS CONSUMER

PROTECTION ACT KAN. STAT. § 50-623, ET SEQ. ...................................................... 71 

VIOLATION OF THE LOUISIANA UNFAIR TRADE

PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW LA. REV. STAT.
§ 51:1401, ET SEQ............................................................................................................... 72 

VIOLATION OF THE MARYLAND CONSUMER

PROTECTION ACT MD. COM. LAW CODE § 13-101, ET SEQ. ................................. 74 

VIOLATION OF THE MISSOURI MERCHANDISING

PRACTICES ACT MO. REV. STAT. § 407.010, ET SEQ................................................. 75 

VIOLATION OF THE MONTANA CONSUMER

PROTECTION ACT MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-101, ET SEQ................................... 76 

VIOLATION OF THE NEBRASKA CONSUMER

PROTECTION ACT NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 59-1601, ET SEQ. ................................ 77 

VIOLATION OF THE NEW HAMPSHIRE CONSUMER

PROTECTION ACT N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:1, ET SEQ. ................................. 78 

VIOLATION OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSUMER FRAUD

ACT N.J.S.A.56:8-1, ET SEQ. .............................................................................................. 79 

VIOLATION OF THE NORTH CAROLINA UNFAIR

AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1,
ET SEQ. ................................................................................................................................ 81 

VIOLATION OF THE NORTH DAKOTA

CONSUMER FRAUD ACT N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-15-02 ........................................... 82 

VIOLATION OF THE OKLAHOMA CONSUMER

PROTECTION ACT OKLA. STAT. TIT. 15, § 751, ET SEQ. .......................................... 83 

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VIOLATION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA UNFAIR

TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW 73 P.S.
§ 201-1, ET SEQ. .................................................................................................................. 85 

VIOLATION OF THE RHODE ISLAND DECEPTIVE

TRADE PRACTICES ACT 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-13.1-1, ET SEQ. ..................... 86 

VIOLATION OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA UNFAIR

TRADE PRACTICES ACT S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-10, ET SEQ. .................................. 87 

VIOLATION OF THE TENNESSEE CONSUMER

PROTECTION ACT TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-101, ET SEQ. ................................... 89 

VIOLATION OF THE TEXAS DECEPTIVE TRADE

PRACTICES CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT TEX. BUS. & COM.
CODE § 17.41, ET SEQ. ..................................................................................................... 90 

VIOLATION OF THE UTAH CONSUMER SALE

PRACTICES ACT UTAH CODE § 13-11-1, ET SEQ. ...................................................... 92 

VIOLATION OF THE VERMONT CONSUMER FRAUD

ACT VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 9, § 2451, ET SEQ. ............................................................... 93 

VIOLATION OF THE WASHINGTON CONSUMER

PROTECTION ACT WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.010, ET SEQ......................... 94 

VIOLATION OF THE WYOMING CONSUMER

PROTECTION ACT WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-101, ET SEQ. ..................................... 95 

DEMAND FOR JUDGMENT ........................................................................................................ 96 

JURY DEMAND .............................................................................................................................. 97 

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The plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, alleges the following for

his complaint against AbbVie, Inc. (AbbVie or defendant), based on (a) his personal knowledge,

(b) the investigation of counsel, and (c) information and belief.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Plaintiff brings this proposed class action against AbbVie, the manufacturer of the

largest selling prescription drug in the world, Humira, indicated for autoimmune, rheumatologic,

and gastrointestinal disease, for the unfair and unconscionable inflation of Humira’s list (or point

of sale) price in the United States. As one news story put it, the price of Humira has “defied

gravity”1 and is now more than $72,000 a year. As set forth below, Humira’s pricing also defies

state laws prohibiting unfair and unreasonable prices. Prices are now so high that despite being

prescribed, many Humira patients simply can’t afford it.

2. As an integral part of the scheme at issue, AbbVie joined with the largest pharmacy

benefit managers (PBMs)—CVS Health, Express Scripts, and OptumRx—to widen a secret spread

between AbbVie’s published list prices and the undisclosed net selling prices for Humira. Knowing

that PBM profits are tied to the size of the spread between list price and net selling price, AbbVie

has offered the PBMs higher spreads in exchange for preferred positions on the PBMs’ drug

formularies. To carry out this scheme, AbbVie artificially inflates the prices it publicly reports—its

list or “sticker” price (called by one court the “sucker price”)—and then secretly offers a far lower

price—the net price—to the largest PBMs. This list-price inflation pads the pockets of PBMs who

retain a percentage of the list price plus and/or some of the rebates. In exchange for AbbVie’s

unfair and unconscionable inflation of its reported list prices (and corresponding spreads between

1
Why Price of Humira Keeps Rising Despite FDA Approval of Generic Competition,
Washington Post 1/8/2020.

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prices), the PBMs promise preferred formulary placement to the winning bidder (i.e., the

manufacturer with the highest spread in this case, AbbVie).

3. Caught in the middle of this unfair and unconscionable list-price reporting are

those who pay for Humira based on list price, including, but not limited to consumers whose

payments for Humira are tied at the point of sale directly to AbbVie’s published list prices. Rather

than pay for Humira based on competitive net prices offered to some intermediaries in the

pharmaceutical supply chain, consumers pay for their drug at the point of sale based on AbbVie’s

list prices—prices that it artificially inflates so that it can pay off the PBMs without lowering its net

prices. These inflated list prices now lack any reasonable relationship to production costs, the

recoupment of research and development costs, or to the cost of other consumer goods, and

impose an unfair and unconscionable price on consumers which cannot be avoided unless they

don’t take Humira as prescribed. AbbVie’s unfair and unconscionable conduct resulted in

damages to plaintiff and class members for out-of-pocket payments for Humira and/or for other

actual damages if they could not afford Humira, including physical suffering and out-of-pocket

payments for drugs that are inferior to physician-prescribed Humira.

4. As shown in the following chart, Humira’s list price doubled in a five-year period

alone (from January 2015 to January 2020), from approximately $1,700 per month to $3,400 per

month without any corresponding material increase in the actual costs of the production.

Members of the proposed class pay for Humira based on the green/top line in the chart below:

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5. As shown below, the price increases for Humira far exceed price increases for other

categories of typical expenses (Humira list prices are the blue/top line:

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6. With respect to Humira, the U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Reform

found that the pricing practices uncovered by the Committee’s investigation are “unsustainable,

unjustified, and unfair to patients and taxpayers.”

7. The House Staff Report made “Key Findings” with respect to Humira that are so

salient they are quoted below:

Humira, a drug used to treat rheumatoid arthritis and other autoimmune diseases,
is the highest grossing drug in the world. In 2020 alone, AbbVie collected $16 billion
in U.S. net revenue for Humira. Today, AbbVie charges approximately $77,000 for
a year’s supply of Humira—470% more than when the drug was launched in 2003.

AbbVie and its partner Janssen Biotech, Inc., a Johnson & Johnson subsidiary, are
the sole U.S. manufacturers of Imbruvica, a drug approved to treat mantle cell
lymphoma and certain other forms of cancer. Under the companies’ collaboration
agreement, AbbVie is responsible for marketing Imbruvica in the United States,
including pricing decisions. Today, AbbVie and Janssen charge over $181,529 for a
year’s supply of Imbruvica-82% more than when the drug was launched in 2013.
Experts estimate that by 2026, Imbruvica will be the fourth highest grossing drug in
the United States, in part because of price increases.

The findings in this report are based on the Committee’s review of more than
170,000 pages of internal documents, communications, and data related to Humira
and Imbruvica from 2009 to the present. The Committee requested these materials
more than two years ago, but AbbVie obstructed the Committee’s investigation. In
September 2020, Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney notified Committee Members
of her intent to issue a subpoena to AbbVie due to the company’s refusal to cooperate
with the Committee’s investigation. After this notice, AbbVie finally began to
produce long overdue materials in response to the Committee’s requests.

The Committee’s investigation uncovered the following key findings:

 Uninhibited Price Increases: Since launching Humira in 2003, AbbVie (and its
predecessor company Abbott Laboratories) have raised the drug’s price 27 times,
including by nearly 30% in one 10-month period. A 40-milligram syringe of
Humira is now priced at $2,984, or $77,586 annually—a 470% increase from the
drug’s launch. AbbVie has also raised the price of Imbruvica by 82% since
launching the drug in 2013. Today, Imbruvica is priced at $181,529 per year for
a patient taking three pills per day, compared to $99,776 per year at launch.

 Price Increases Not Justified by Rebates: Internal data show that AbbVie’s list
price increases for Humira and Imbruvica far outpaced any discounts and rebates

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paid to pharmacy benefit managers and other members of the supply chain.
Humira’s net price—which subtracts discounts and rebates—increased by 110%
between 2009 and 2018, from $16,663 per year to $35,041 per year. For a patient
taking 3 tablets daily, the annual net price of Imbruvica increased from $72,587
in 2013 to $115,533 in 2017 (the last year for which AbbVie provided the
Committee data).

 Record Corporate Revenue Driven by Price Increases: Since 2003, AbbVie has
collected over $107 billion in U.S. net revenue from Humira. AbbVie’s yearly
U.S. net revenue from Humira more than tripled from $5.3 billion in 2013—the
year it separated from Abbott—to $16.1 billion in 2020. Due in large part to
AbbVie’s price increases, Humira is the highest grossing drug in the United
States. U.S. net revenue for Imbruvica has increased from $492 million in 2014
to $4.3 billion in 2020. AbbVie’s U.S. net revenue for both drugs has increased
every year since the drugs entered the market, as shown in the two graphs below.

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 Hundreds of Millions in Executive Compensation and Bonuses: Since

separating from Abbott in 2013, AbbVie has paid its highest-ranking executives
over $480 million in compensation. AbbVie’s CEO Richard Gonzalez alone was
paid nearly $170 million over that period. AbbVie’s internal documents show
that from 2015 to 2018, senior executive bonuses were tied directly to Humira
net revenue, allowing them to profit from AbbVie’s price increases. The first year
this net revenue incentive was added to the calculation coincided with the highest
period of price increases in Humira’s history—over 30% in a 10-month period.

 Targeting the U.S. for Higher Prices: Humira and Imbruvica are much more
expensive in the United States than in other countries that negotiate directly with
drug companies to lower prices. In 2015, a single syringe of Humira cost $1,000
more in the United States than in countries such as Canada, Japan, Korea, and
the United Kingdom. Over time, AbbVie raised the price of Humira in the
United States while being forced to reduce the price internationally.

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Similarly, in 2018, AbbVie charged nearly double for Imbruvica in the United States
as compared to Australia and countries in Europe, such as the United Kingdom and
France. AbbVie’s internal records include hundreds of pages of complaints from U.S.
patients and caretakers who described the tremendous burden Humira’s constantly
increasing price placed on them and their loved ones. One retiree with Crohn’s
disease who could not afford the drug called AbbVie’s pricing “unconscionable.” The
daughter of another patient who relied on Humira wrote to AbbVie that its efforts
to block more affordable alternatives from coming to market were “cold, and
heartless.”

 Shadow Pricing with Amgen: AbbVie’s largest competitor for Humira is Enbrel,
Amgen’s blockbuster biologic treatment for rheumatoid arthritis and other
conditions. Instead of pricing Humira and Enbrel below one another to gain
market share—as expected in a competitive market—AbbVie and Amgen engaged
in a practice known as “shadow pricing,” consistently following the other
company’s price increases. As a result, both companies repeatedly raised the price
of Humira and Enbrel by nearly identical amounts. The graph below shows
AbbVie’s and Amgen’s pricing for Humira and Enbrel from 2003 to 2021.

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 Profit-Driven Research Expenditures: In response to the Committee’s request,

AbbVie identified a total of $5.19 billion in “Humira Research & Development”
expenditures between 2009 and 2018—approximately 4.2% of the company’s
Humira worldwide net revenue over that period.

8. In addition to straining the United States health care system, the House

Committee found that drug companies’ pricing practices, including those of AbbVie, have left

millions of Americans unable to afford lifesaving medications. According to data from the Kaiser

Family Foundation from October 2021, approximately one-quarter of Americans reported having

difficulty affording their medications and three in ten American adults reported not taking their

medicines as prescribed at some point in the year before due to cost.2 Americans rely on the drugs

produced by pharmaceutical companies, but the Committee’s investigation shows that the

industry’s excessive prices and anticompetitive practices are not justified by the need for innovation

and have been used to enrich company executives and shareholders; the pricing of Humira is a

poster child for this problem.

9. Those injured by AbbVie’s pricing practices include consumers who pay for their

drugs based on list prices, a price the House Staff found to be “unfair.” The plaintiff and class

2
Kaiser Family Foundation, Public Opinion on Prescription Drugs and Their Prices (Oct. 18, 2021)
(online at www.kff.org/slideshow/public-opinion-on-prescription-drugs-and-their-prices/).

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members are people living with serious diseases who pay for their Humira based on list prices,

including uninsured patients, patients in high deductible health plans, patients in Medicare Part D

plans, and patients with coinsurance obligations. Their out-of-pocket expenditures at the point of

sale are based on the “unfair” list price. In other words, when consumers go to pharmacies (or use

mail order services) to pick up their Humira, the charges they incur are based on Humira’s list

price, not the net price.3 The price reductions AbbVie offers PBMs are not reflected in price tags the

plaintiff and class members see. And the larger the list price, the larger the consumer’s out-of-pocket

payments. AbbVie, at all times, was aware of the impact its list price increases had on consumers

and was aware that such list price increases adversely impacted cash payers, those with high

deductible health plans and those with a percentage co-pay.

10. AbbVie closely tracked and was aware of the differences between the list price

(WAC plus) and its actual sales price (ASP) and the impact of this price difference on consumers as

depicted in the internal AbbVie document:

3
If the consumer is uninsured, the pharmacy offers the consumer a “usual and customary rate”
based on list price.

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11. AbbVie’s publication and increase of Humira’s list price, while concealing net

price, has caused the plaintiff and class members to make unfair and unconscionable out-of-pocket

payments for their Humira or, if they cannot afford out-of-pocket payments for Humira, has caused

them to suffer other actual damages, including physical suffering and out-of-pocket payments for

drugs that are inferior to their physician-prescribed Humira. AbbVie publicly represents that the

list prices of Humira are just that, list prices—a fair representation of the product’s value in the

market and a reasonable basis for consumer out-of-pocket payments. Thus, by publicizing its unfair

and unconscionable list prices, while keeping its net prices confidential, AbbVie has harmed the

plaintiff and class members by causing them to make out-of-pocket payments for their Humira that

are grossly inflated or, if they cannot afford out-of-pocket payments for Humira, has caused them to

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suffer other actual damages, including physical suffering and out-of-pocket payments for drugs that

are inferior to their physician-prescribed Humira.

12. Nor is this the first time a drug manufacturer has had to defend unlawful pricing.

In a case from nearly 20 years ago, defendant drug manufacturers “repeatedly asserted that they

had no duty to disclose what was publicly known to everyone, that is, that the [drug’s list price] was

a ‘sticker price’ and never intended to reflect the drug’s true average wholesale price.”4 But the

district court saw through this argument: “There is a difference between a sticker price and a

sucker price… .The [plaintiffs] … have it exactly right: ‘[I]f everything [about the drug] was known

to everybody, why did [d]efendants emphasize secrecy?’”5 As the court explained, the “defendants

trumpeted a lie by publishing the inflated [list prices], knowing (and intending) them to be used as

instruments of fraud.”6

13. Had AbbVie published list prices uninflated by the unfair and/or unconscionable

rebate and pricing scheme, Humira would have cost the plaintiff and class members much less

and/or they would be able to take Humira as prescribed by their doctor.

14. This action alleges that AbbVie violated various state consumer protection laws by

publishing unfair and unconscionable list prices for Humira. This scheme directly and foreseeably

caused and continues to cause consumers to overpay for the Humira they need or, if they cannot

afford out-of-pocket payments for Humira, has caused them to suffer other actual damages,

including physical suffering and out-of-pocket payments for drugs that are inferior to their

physician-prescribed Humira.

4
In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 295 F. Supp. 2d 148, 168 n.19 (D. Mass. 2003).
5
Id.
6
Id. at 167 (emphasis added).

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II. PARTIES

A. Plaintiff

15. Plaintiff, Edward Camargo, is a resident of Indiana. From the age of 19 to the age

of 26 (approximately 2013-2018), he took prescription Humira to treat his psoriatic arthritis and

psoriasis as directed by his doctor. At the time, he was on his father’s insurance. When he turned

26, he could no longer be on his father’s insurance, and his new insurance refused to pay for

Humira due to its cost.

16. As a result, he had to quit taking Humira, because he could not afford to pay for it

based on its price for uninsured patients or its cash price. Humira alleviated plaintiff’s pain

associated with psoriatic arthritis and plaque psoriasis and also erased the scaliness that came with

plaque psoriasis. He suffered the worst pain he had ever felt when he stopped taking Humira. The

pain was far worse than any pain he had experienced before he started taking Humira. Before

Humira he had some pain and scaling on his scalp only. After he stopped taking Humira, he had

scaling on his scalp, knees, abdomen, back of arms, forehead, and private area. The scales were

itchy and extremely dry. When he itched the scales, they would get itchier and start bleeding. It was

also painful to touch them because the skin was fragile. His skin would crack and bleed, and no

amount of moisture would help.

17. Approximately a year after he had to stop taking Humira, he was able to obtain

prescription Otezla through his insurance. But Otezla did not work at all.

18. Plaintiff is now taking prescription Tremfya, for which he pays $5 per month.

Tremfya helps alleviate his symptoms somewhat but not nearly as well as Humira. He still has some

pain and some plaque on his scalp and behind his ears. His skin has some dryness. He still has

pain in his fingers.

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19. If plaintiff could afford Humira, he would take it rather than Tremfya, because

Humira is far more effective for him.

B. Defendant

1. AbbVie, Inc.

20. AbbVie’s corporate offices are at 1 North Waukegan Road, North Chicago, Illinois

60064.

2. AbbVie manufactures Humira.

21. Humira (adalimumab) is a biologic therapy administered as a subcutaneous

injection. It is approved to treat the following autoimmune diseases in the United States, Canada,

and Mexico (collectively, North America) and in the European Union:

 Rheumatoid arthritis (moderate to severe)

 Psoriatic arthritis

 Ankylosing spondylitis

 Adult Crohn’s disease (moderate to severe)

 Plaque psoriasis (moderate to severe chronic)

 Juvenile idiopathic arthritis (moderate to severe polyarticular)

 Ulcerative colitis (moderate to severe)

 Pediatric Crohn’s disease (moderate to severe)

 Hidradenitis suppurativa (moderate to severe)

 Non-infectious intermediate, posterior and panuveitis

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

22. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), which

provides original jurisdiction over civil actions in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum

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or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and is a class action in which any member

of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a state different from any defendant.

23. Venue is proper in this judicial district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c) and

18 U.S.C. § 1965, because AbbVie transacts business in, is found in, and/or has agents in the

Northern District of Illinois, which is AbbVie’s principal place of business, and because some of

the actions giving rise to this complaint took place within this district.

24. The Court has general personal jurisdiction over AbbVie, which has admitted in

numerous SEC filings that its principal place of business is 1 N Waukegan Road, North Chicago,

Illinois 60064.7 Moreover, this Court has specific jurisdiction because AbbVie has transacted

business, maintained substantial contacts, and/or committed overt acts in furtherance of the illegal

scheme in this District.

IV. DRUG PRICING IN THE UNITED STATES

A. Entities Involved in Drug Pricing

25. The prescription drug industry consists of an opaque network of entities, including

pharmaceutical companies, wholesalers, pharmacies, health benefit providers (institutional

insurers, self-insured employers, health and welfare plans), pharmacy benefit managers, and

patient-consumers.

26. Pharmaceutical Companies. Pharmaceutical companies (also known as drug

companies or drug manufacturers) own the rights to manufacture and market drugs. This remains

true even if these companies contract out the actual production of their drugs. Pharmaceutical

7
See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (“With respect to a corporation, the
place of incorporation and principal place of business are ‘paradig[m] ... bases for general
jurisdiction.’”) (citation omitted).

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companies typically own or contract with facilities that manufacture drugs and then sell their

products to wholesalers. Critically, pharmaceutical companies set the prices of their drugs and then

those prices are used to calculate payments consumers make. AbbVie here is a pharmaceutical

company.

27. Wholesalers. After production, AbbVie sends its drug to FDA-registered drug

wholesalers for further distribution. Wholesalers purchase inventory and sell pharmaceutical

products to a variety of providers, including retail pharmacy outlets, hospitals, and clinics.

28. Health benefit providers. Health benefit providers include institutional insurers,

self-insured employers, and health and welfare plans. These plans submit payments on behalf of

insured individuals to healthcare providers for services rendered to those individuals. Health

insurers also cover a portion of their beneficiaries’ drugs costs, submitting payments to pharmacies

on behalf of their members. The term “health insurers” includes public and private entities, the

latter of which includes self-insured businesses, insurance companies, union-run health plans, and

private plans that sponsor Medicaid and Medicare drug benefits.

29. Pharmacy Benefit Managers. Pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) effectuate

financial and contractual arrangements between drug manufacturers, pharmacies, and health

insurers. In this role, PBMs perform a variety of services on behalf of their health insurer clients,

including the negotiation of rebates with drug companies, creation of formularies, management of

prescription billing, construction of retail pharmacy networks for insurers, and provision of mail-

order services. Nonetheless, they generally are not a direct link in the physical supply chain for

pharmaceutical products because, in most instances, they do not take possession or control of

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prescription drugs. The largest PBMs are CVS Health, Express Scripts, and OptumRx. Together,

they cover roughly 80 to 85 percent of privately insured Americans.

B. The Drug Payment & Distribution Structure

30. Distribution. Generally speaking, for retail pharmacy channels, branded

prescription drugs are distributed from manufacturer to wholesaler, wholesaler to retail pharmacy

(or mail order), and retailer to patient.

31. Downstream charges. The downstream charges are from manufacturer to

wholesaler, wholesaler to retailer (or mail order), and retailer (or mail order) to the health benefit

providers (in the form of ingredient cost reimbursement and dispensing fees) and consumers (in

the form of coinsurance, copayment, deductible payment, and/or cash).

32. Upstream charges. The upstream charges are from health benefit providers and/or

PBMs directly back to the manufacturer. These upstream charges are price discounts AbbVie offers

PBMs and their health insurer clients in the form of “rebates.” They typically occur well after the

point-of-sale transactions.

33. The figure below illustrates this payment structure. This figure labels certain

payments “payment” and others “negotiated payment.” The term “payment” refers to individual

payments, made at the time of delivery; for example, when a patient walks into a pharmacy and

picks up her prescription. At that moment, her health plan also pays a service fee to its PBM for

dispensing the drug through its network of retail pharmacies. In contrast, a “negotiated payment”

is a payment made under a negotiated contract. For example, a PBM might negotiate a contract

with a drug manufacturer for supply of X drug for $Y per pill for a period of time. The figure also

indicates the flow of products and rebates.

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Figure 1: The U.S. Drug Payment Structure8

34. When an insured consumer buys a medication from a pharmacy (a retailer), her

insurer pays the pharmacy based on the price its PBM negotiated for that medication (the net

price). In addition to her insurer’s payment, the patient usually pays for a portion of the

medication’s cost, out-of-pocket. Importantly, the patient’s payment is typically based on the list

price the drug manufacturer set for that drug.

C. List pricing as a Basis for Reimbursement

35. The prices for the drugs distributed in this chain are different for each participating

entity: different actors pay different prices for the same drugs. In this system, only a drug’s list

8
Allison Tsai, The Rising Cost of Insulin, Diabetes Forecast (Mar. 2016), http://www.diabetes
forecast.org/2016/mar-apr/rising-costs-insulin.html.

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price—known as its Average Wholesale Price (AWP) or the mathematically-related Wholesale

Acquisition Price (WAC)—is publicly available.

36. The prescription drug industry is unusual in that there are stark differences in the

way patients pay for the products versus the ways institutions and health benefit providers pay for

the same products. The beneficiary of this industry’s products (the patient) typically pays in one of

several predictable ways for a single product based on the manufacturer’s published list price. First,

in the case of coinsurance, consumers pay a pre-set percentage of the point-of-sale transaction price,

based on list price. Second, in the case of cash transactions, consumers pay a usual and customary

price, based on list price. The greater the list price, the more cash a consumer pays. And, third, in

the case of deductibles, consumers pay a portion of the point-of-sale transaction price, based on list

price. (Consumers might also pay a tiered or fixed copay.) Consumers make these payments at the

point-of-sale only. In contrast, intermediaries and third-party payers typically determine net costs for

pharmaceuticals based on arrangements that apply to hundreds of products. And these charges occur

not only at the point-of-sale, but also during later, off-invoice transactions.

37. The use of price lists to calculate and communicate reimbursement payments

reflects an efficient method by which to maintain the system’s flexibility, minimize uncertainty

through predictable costs, maximize coverage in a cost-effective manner, and provide a mechanism

for competition among payers. Payers’ reimbursement formulas will often include a series of price

benchmarks and payment caps. The price benchmarks used in payers’ formulas are commonly

adjusted by a percentage that is contractually set (for commercial payers) or established through

regulatory procedures (for public payers). For example, reimbursement could be determined based

on the lower of the drug’s (i) AWP – x%, (ii) WAC + y%, and (iii) payment cap.

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38. Despite multiple modifications to health insurers’ reimbursement policies over

time, the most commonly and continuously used set of reference prices in reimbursement and

provider payment calculations and negotiations for retail channel drug transactions remains WAC.

Crucially, WAC is the basis for consumers’ payments for Humira. Defendant has complete control

over the setting of the WAC for its products.

39. From an administrative perspective, WAC provides a logical starting point for the

calculation and communication of reimbursement to various pharmacy providers for various

drugs. Moreover, given the historical use of WAC (and its mathematically related counterpart,

AWP) by all industry participants, one cannot discount the significance of WAC’s entrenchment in

the complex and highly automated payment system that is used to process billions of payments. As

such, it is widely used as a competitive list and to estimate costs and revenues.

40. This list price serves as the immovable reference point off of which PBMs and drug

manufacturers negotiate rebates. As previously explained, PBMs create formularies for their health

insurer clients, and those formularies significantly influence patients’ drug purchasing behavior.

Health insurers cover all or a portion of their members’ drug costs based on whether and where

the drugs fall on their PBMs’ formularies. Drug companies offer PBMs rebates—discounts off list

prices—to influence the PBMs’ formulary decisions.

41. As explained in the following section, consumer payments are directly based on the

manufacturers’ list prices.

D. Consumer Drug Costs

42. Pharmaceutical companies directly set the prices certain consumers pay by setting

list prices.

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43. When a consumer goes to a retail pharmacy (or the website of a mail order

pharmacy) and requests to buy a drug, the pharmacy’s computer system pulls up AWP, which is the

list price the manufacturer of that drug set and published plus an approximately 15-20% markup.

The basis for that price is not determined by the pharmacy or the wholesaler that brought the drug

to the pharmacy. Rather, the pharmacy’s computer system taps into a database of prices that

manufacturers created and published through third party publishers. The pharmacy’s search for

the drug’s price is akin to stockbroker’s search for the price of a stock; the pharmacy, like the

broker, does not and cannot change or influence the list price. It can only report that price to the

consumer. In short, the prices pharmacies charge consumers are directly computed based on the

manufacturer’s list prices.9

44. Three principal types of consumers pay based on the list prices that drug

manufacturers—and drug manufacturers alone—set: (1) uninsured consumers; (2) consumers in

high deductible plans; and (3) consumers with coinsurance obligations.

45. Uninsured. Uninsured consumers must pay full, point-of-sale prices (based on list

prices) every time they pick up their prescriptions. Despite the Affordable Care Act’s expansion of

Medicaid coverage and establishment of Health Insurance Marketplaces, millions of people—28.5

million in 2015—remain without coverage. This uninsured population is especially concentrated in

states that did not take the Medicaid expansion. Of the 28.5 million uninsured, reports indicate

that 46% tried to get coverage but could not afford it.

46. The uninsured are not the only patients saddled with high out-of-pocket costs.

Despite their monthly insurance premiums, insured consumers often pay a significant portion of a

9
This complaint refers to this price as the full, point-of-sale price (based on list price).

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drug’s list price. Out-of-pocket costs for insured consumers come in three forms: deductibles,

coinsurance requirements, and/or copayment requirements.

47. High deductible Plans. The term “deductible” refers to a set amount of healthcare

cost an insured must shoulder (out-of-pocket) before her plan will begin to contribute to her

healthcare costs. Although most health plans have some form of a deductible, high deductible

health plans are aptly named for their larger-than-average deductibles. And while high deductible

health plans usually boast lower premiums, they are nonetheless more onerous to patients and

families that need expensive care on a regular basis. Insured individuals in high deductible plans

are usually required to pay full, point-of-sale prices (based on list prices) before they reach their

deductibles.

48. The past decade has witnessed a shift away from traditional health plans, which

provide broader coverage, toward high deductible health plans. In their 2016 survey of employer

health benefits, the Kaiser Family Foundation found that 29% of all covered employees are now

enrolled in high deductible health plans, up from 17% in 2011. Although Preferred Provider

Organizations (PPOs) are still the most common plan type (48% of Americans are enrolled in

PPOs), enrollment in PPOs has fallen 10% over the last two years, while enrollment in high

deductible health plans has increased by 8%. Figure 2 illustrates the rising trend in high deductible

plans.

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Figure 2: Percentage of covered workers enrolled in high deductible

health plans from 2006-2016.10

49. Moreover, deductibles themselves have risen. The average annual deductible for an

individual enrolled in a high deductible plan was between $2,031 and $2,295 in 2016, depending

on the exact type of plan.11 The average annual deductible for family coverage was between $4,321

and $4,364 in 2016, again, depending on the type of plan.

50. A recent Kaiser Family Foundation study found that 30% to 40% of U.S.

households with private coverage do not have enough liquid assets to pay the deductible required

by their health plan. Figure 3 below demonstrates this reality.

10
2016 Employer Health Benefits Survey, Kaiser Family Foundation 3 (2016), https://kaiser
familyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/employer-health-benefits-2016-summary-of-
findings.pdf.
11
There are two primary types of high deductible health plans: high deductible plans with
Health Reimbursement Arrangements and high deductible plans with Health Savings Accounts.

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Figure 3: Share of non-elderly households with liquid assets less than their
deductibles among people with private health insurance.12

51. Overall, in the entire employer-based health plan marketplace, deductibles have

risen 12% since 2015—four times faster than premiums increased in the same period. Among all

individuals enrolled in employer health plans (both high deductible plans as well as others), the

average deductible in 2016 was $1,478.

52. The average deductible for individuals working at smaller firms was higher than

that in larger firms ($2,069 v. $1,238 in 2016).

53. Figure 4 shows the increase in health plans with a general annual deductible of

$1,000 or more, broken down by firm size.

12
Drew Altman, The Biggest Health Issue We Aren’t Debating, Axios (Nov. 22, 2017),
https://www.axios.com/the-biggest-health-issue-we-arent-debating-2511098849.html (graphic based
on data from Matthew Rae, Gary Claxton, and Larry Levitt, Do Health Plan Enrollees Have Enough
Money to Pay Cost Sharing, Kaiser Family Foundation (Nov. 23, 2017), https://www.kff.org/health-
costs/issue-brief/do-health-plan-enrollees-have-enough-money-to-pay-cost-sharing/).

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Figure 4: Percentage of covered workers enrolled in a plan with a general annual deductible of
$1000 or more for single coverage, by firm size, from 2006-2016.13

54. The average deductibles for plans available under the Affordable Care Act on the

Marketplace Exchanges are also high. The Marketplace health plans are broken into “metal” tiers:

bronze, silver, gold, and platinum. The cheapest plans—bronze and silver—unsurprisingly come with

very high deductibles. In 2016, the average deductibles in such plans were $5,765 for bronze plans

(up from $5,328 in 2015) and $3,064 for silver plans (up from $2,556 in 2015).

55. High deductible plans are particularly hard on patients with chronic diseases: not

only do patients living with chronic diseases hit their deductibles year after year, but they hit their

deductibles over a shorter period of time, resulting in significant financial burden at the start of

13
2016 Employer Health Benefits Survey, Kaiser Family Foundation 4 (2016), https://kaiser
familyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/employer-health-benefits-2016-summary-of-
findings.pdf.

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each year. Individuals and families who do not have savings or access to credit often take less

medication than prescribed to spread their out-of-pocket payments over a longer period.

56. Coinsurance and Copayments. In addition to their deductibles, individuals with

insurance typically make copayments or coinsurance payments for the healthcare services they

need. A copayment is a fixed or tiered fee that an individual must pay for a healthcare service at

the time of care; for example, when she picks up a prescription. Copayment rates vary depending

on the drug; drugs in preferred formulary positions usually have lower copays, and drugs in

disfavored formulary positions require larger copays.

57. Coinsurance is similar. However, instead of paying a fixed or tiered fee for a

particular service, individuals with coinsurance arrangements are required to pay a fixed percentage

of the cost of the healthcare service provided. For drugs, this means a percentage of the plan’s

point-of-sale price, which is mathematically tied to the drug’s list price. This percentage can vary,

with lower coinsurance rates for preferred drugs and higher coinsurance rates for disfavored drugs.

58. For those in high deductible health plans, copayments and coinsurance obligations

begin after they reach their deductibles. Plans that cover prescription drugs right away, not

requiring patients to reach deductibles first, usually require copayments or coinsurance

contributions for every drug purchase.

59. For covered workers enrolled in health plans with three or more tiers of cost

sharing for prescription drugs, the average coinsurance rates in 2016 were 17% for first-tier drugs,

25% for second-tier drugs, 37% for third-tier drugs, and 29% for fourth-tier drugs (fourth tier

drugs are usually specialty medications, for diseases such as cancer, and are extremely expensive).

Humira is still a branded drug. Therefore, insurance plans generally classify it as a second-tier or

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third-tier drug on their formularies. As a result, coinsurance payments keyed to the list price of

Humira can be quite burdensome.

60. Recently, health plans have been demanding higher and higher coinsurance

contributions from patients. Table 1 shows this trend.

Table 1: Rising Coinsurance Rates

Retail Coinsurance Payment
T2 Brand T3 Brand Flat
1998 24.7% 26.0% 20.7%
1999 24.9% 26.9% 21.0%
2000 26.0% 28.0% 22.0%
2001 24.0% 29.0% 20.0%
2002 24.4% 34.7% 23.0%
2003 24.3% 32.4% 22.0%
2004 25.0% 32.0% 25.0%
2005 26.5% 35.6% 23.0%
2006 26.2% 36.0% 23.0%
2007 26.4% 37.9% 22.0%
2008 26.1% 37.0% 24.0%
2009 26.3% 35.8% 22.0%
2010 25.2% 36.6% 24.0%
2011 25.6% 37.9% 23.0%
2012 26.1% 37.6% 22.0%
2013 25.5% 37.1% 22.0%
2014 24.3% 35.9% 22.0%
2015 27.1% 41.8% 22.0%

61. Over the past decade, out-of-pocket spending for prescription drugs has shifted away

from copayments toward deductibles and coinsurance spending. In 2014, patients paid for 24% of

their out-of-pocket prescription drug expenses through deductibles, compared to just 4% in 2004.

Similarly, patients paid for 20% of their out-of-pocket drug expenses through coinsurance in 2014,

compared to just 3% in 2004.

62. Medicare Part D. Finally, patients in Medicare Part D plans—Medicare’s

prescription drug program—often pay a large portion of their drugs’ list prices. In 2017, the

Medicare Part D standard prescription drug plan had a $400 deductible and a 25% coinsurance

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obligation up to an initial coverage limit of $3,700. This meant patients in Medicare Part D plans

paid full, point-of-sale prices (based on list price) until they spent $400. After they hit this

deductible, they paid 25% of their drugs’ point-of-sale prices (based on list prices) until they,

together with their plans, spent $3,700 on drugs. Once Part D patients met this $3,700 coverage

limit, they fell into the Coverage Gap, more commonly known as the “Donut Hole.” In the Donut

Hole, they were required to pay 40% of their brand-name drugs’ point-of-sale prices. Only once the

patients’ total out-of-pocket spending (both before and in the Donut Hole) reached $4,950 did

their Medicare Part D plans begin to shoulder 95% of their healthcare costs again. Figure 5

demonstrates patient cost-sharing in the standard Medicare Part D plan for 2017.

Figure 5: The standard Medicare prescription drug benefit in 2017.14

14
The Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Benefit, The Kaiser Family Foundation 6 (Sept. 26,
2016), http://kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/the-medicare-prescription-drug-benefit-fact-sheet/.

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E. AbbVie Aggressively Raised Prices to Meet Revenue Targets

63. The House Committee found that drug companies have repeatedly raised prices on

existing drugs, while setting higher launch prices for new drugs.15

Figure 6: Price Increases and Revenue

64. The House Committee also found Internal data obtained by the Committee reveals

that the net prices-the prices manufacturers collect after accounting for rebates, price concessions,

and other discounts of nearly all of the drugs in the investigation increased year over year.16 Net

prices for all of the drugs examined are significantly higher today than at launch. This data, which

has never before been shared with the public, undermines industry claims that price increases are

primarily due to increasing rebates and discounts paid to pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs).

15
Drug Pricing Investigation, Majority Staff Report, Committee on Oversight and Reform,
U.S. House of Representatives, December 2021, at v.
16
In the insulin market, net prices increased steadily from when the drugs entered the market
(1996 for Humalog and 2000 for NovoLog and Lantus) until the mid-2010s. Since the mid-2010s,
competition over formulary placement has led to increasing pharmacy benefit manager rebates and
stabilized net price growth.

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65. These price increases have fueled large corporate revenues. The ten companies in

the Committee’s investigation generated a combined $38.5 billion in U.S. net revenues from the

sales of just 12 drugs in 2019 alone.17

F. Executive Compensation Provides Incentives to Raise Prices

66. The ten companies in the Committee’s investigation paid their top executives more

than $2.2 billion from 2016 to 2020, including $797 million in chief executive officer (CEO)

compensation. All ten companies have compensation structures that tie incentive payments to

revenue and other financial targets, and several companies directly tied incentive compensation to

drug-specific revenue targets. The investigation showed that for at least two companies, the

company would have missed its revenue targets and the executives would not have received bonuses

had they not raised drug prices. AbbVie’s executives topped the compensation list, raking in over

$340 million over a five year period while class members can’t afford their Humira:

17
AbbVie Inc., 2019 Form 10-K (Feb. 21, 2020) (online at https://investors.abbvie.com/sec-
filings/sec-filing/10-k/0001551152-20-000007); Pfizer Inc., 2019 Form 10-K (Feb. 27, 2020) (online
at https://investors.pfizer.com/financials/sec-filings/sec-filings-details/default.aspx? FilingId=
13958533); Eli Lilly and Company, 2019 Form 10-K (Feb. 19, 2020) (online at https://investor.
lilly.com/static-files/34d71960-241f-4160-bd20-86fb85df4def); Novartis Pharmaceuticals
Corporation, 2019 Form 20-F (Jan. 29, 2020) (online at www.sec.gov/edgar/browse/?CIK=-000
1114448&owner=include); Mallinckrodt Pharmaceuticals, 2019 Form 10--K (Feb. 26, 2020) (
online at www.mallinckrodt.com/investors/sec-filings/); Bristol Myers Squibb, 2019 Form 10-K
(Feb. 24, 2020) ( online at https://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0000014272/468bfaba-
6810-4cec-80b5-94aa4c7a523.pdf); Sanofi, 2019 Form 20-F (Mar. 5, 2020) (online at
www.sanofi.com/en/investors/reports-and-publications/financial-and-csr-reports); Novo Nordisk
Inc., 2019 Form 20-F (Feb. 5, 2020) (online at www.sec.gov/edgar/browse/?CIK=0000353278);
Amgen Inc., 2019 Form 10-K (Feb. 12,2020) ( online at
https://investors.amgen.com/financials/sec-filings); Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd., 2019
Form 10-K (Feb. 21, 2020) (online at https://ir.tevapharm.com/financials/sec-filings/default.aspx).
To calculate these figures for companies using foreign companies using foreign currencies,
Committee staff used exchange rates current as of December 31, 2020.

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Figure 7: Executive Committee Compensation, 2016-2020

G. Drug Companies Target the U.S. Market for Higher Prices and Use the Medicare
Program to Boost Revenue

67. The Committee’s investigation uncovered new evidence showing how the

pharmaceutical industry has exploited the federal law prohibiting the Secretary of the Department

of Health and Human Services (HHS) from directly negotiating with drug companies to lower drug

prices in the Medicare Part D program. Internal strategy documents show that drug companies

targeted the U.S. market for price increases—while maintaining or lowering prices in the rest of the

world—in part because Medicare cannot negotiate directly. A draft internal Pfizer presentation

from 2016 explicitly linked Pfizer’s profitability across the globe to its ability to raise prices in the

United States, noting that growth was driven by “price increases in the U.S.” In a 2016 strategy

presentation, executives from Teva, which sells the multiple sclerosis drug Copaxone, described

one of the company’s key strengths as its ability to “increase prices successfully,” which was

“influenced heavily by US [Teva’s U.S. Business] being allowed to hike prices.” A presentation

prepared for Celgene’s pricing committee noted that a key strategy for Celgene to “win” in its

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cancer franchise Revlimid was to “[p]rotect free-market competition-based pricing for Medicare and

commercial insurance” in the United States.

68. The Committee obtained non-public pricing data revealing how the Medicare

program has lost out on savings because Medicare Part D plans have failed to secure the same

generous rebates or discounts as other federal health care programs that negotiate directly with

drug companies. The Committee’s analysis found that taxpayers could have saved more than $25

billion over a five-year period for just seven of the drugs investigated—Humira, Imbruvica, Sensipar,

Enbrel, Lantus, NovoLog, and Lyrica—if private Medicare Part D plans had obtained the same

discounts as other federal health programs that are empowered to negotiate.18 This loss in

discounts is reflected in prices charged class members who are enrolled in Part D.

Figure 8: Lost Medicare Savings for Seven Drugs, 2014–201819

18
These figures include comparisons of rebate data between Medicare and the Department of
Defense (DOD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). For some drugs, including
Imbruvica, Gleevec, and Lyrica, these figures represent the average rebates or discounts offered to
both DOD and the VA. For other drugs, these figures include only rebates or discounts offered to
one agency.
19
For three drugs—Lantus, NovoLog, and Lyrica—this figure represents net Medicare Part D
expenditures. For the other drugs—Humira, Enbrel, Imbruvica, and Sensipar—this figure represents
gross Medicare Part D expenditures.

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H. AbbVie and Other Drug Companies Use Patient Assistance Programs as a Public
Relations Tool to Boost Sales

69. In responding to criticism of their pricing practices, drug companies often highlight

the generosity of their patient assistance programs. However, the Committee’s investigation

uncovered new evidence that companies emphasized the significant returns on investment from

these programs in the form of increased sales, particularly for drugs approaching loss of exclusivity.

The Committee obtained internal discussions and strategy documents in which companies,

including Teva and Novartis, emphasized the rates of return of their copayment assistance

programs for commercial patients. Internal Pfizer documents emphasized that its copayment

program encouraged patients to stay on branded Lyrica even after the entry of generic competition.

Internal documents suggest that companies also used donations to third party foundations that

subsidize copayment and other cost-sharing obligations for Medicare Part D patients as a way to

generate sales. For example, internal documents from both Teva and AbbVie indicate that these

donations were intended to drive sales or attract patients who otherwise might not have used the

companies’ drugs.

70. Although internal documents show that companies view these programs as an

important public relations tool, internal data obtained by the Committee confirms that

companies’ spending on patient assistance programs is minimal compared to the enormous

amount of revenue brought in by these drugs. For example, the total cost of Pfizer’s patient

assistance program expenditures related to Lyrica from 2015 to 2017 was equivalent to less than

one-tenth of one percent of Pfizer’s net U.S. revenue from Lyrica over the same period. These

programs often do not provide sustainable support for patients and do not address the burden that

the company’s pricing practices have placed on the U.S. health care system. The Committee

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obtained hundreds of pages of patient complaints describing how high drug prices have harmed

them and their loved ones.

I. Research and Manufacturing Costs Do Not Justify Price Increases

71. The Committee’s investigation revealed that justifications frequently offered by the

pharmaceutical industry for raising prices—including research and development (R&D),

manufacturing, and other costs—are not supported. The Committee’s investigation found that

revenue gains far outpace companies’ investments in R&D. For example, in response to the

Committee’s request, Humira has the largest discrepancy between revenue and research and

development costs.

Figure 10: Comparison of Net Revenue and R&D Expenditures for Seven Drugs

72. The Committee’s investigation also found that even if the pharmaceutical industry

collected less revenue due to pricing reforms, drug companies could maintain or even exceed their

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current R&D expenditures if they reduced spending on stock buybacks and dividends. From 2016

to 2020, the 14 leading drug companies spent $577 billion on stock buybacks and dividends—$56

billion more than they spent on R&D over the same period.20

J. Drug Manufacturer Manipulation of PBM Incentives

73. PBMs turn a profit in two primary ways relevant here: First, their health insurer

clients pay them service fees for processing prescriptions and operating mail-order pharmacies.

Second, PBMs take a cut of the drug price discounts they negotiate with drug companies (with the

rest sometimes passed on to their health insurer clients). The manufacturers’ “rebate”

arrangements are meant to incentivize PBMs to negotiate lower real drug prices. But the

manufacturers know that this business model can be manipulated such that PBMs no longer have

an incentive to control costs.

74. PBMs have the greatest leverage to negotiate lower prices when drugs are FDA-

approved as bioequivalent or biosimilar, i.e., when a drug “goes generic.” But PBMs also have

leverage when two or more drug companies manufacture drugs that, while not bioequivalent or

biosimilar, are nevertheless in the same therapeutic class and are perceived to have similar efficacy

and risk profiles. In such a scenario, the drug companies should compete for formulary access by

lowering their list prices.

75. But defendant has found a way to game this system. Defendant has realized that the

net and list price spread can be enlarged by raising list prices while holding net prices constant (or

20
Data was compiled based on in formation from annual reports, proxy and other documents
from AbbVie, Amgen, AstraZeneca, Bristol Myers Squibb, Eli Lilly, Gilead, GlaxoSmithKline,
Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Novartis, Novo Nordisk, Pfizer, Roche, and Sanofi. These 14
companies were the largest pharmaceutical companies by market capitalization in Q1 2021. Q1
2021: A Look at Biopharma’s Top 25 Companies by Market Cap, Bio Space (May 3, 2021) (online at
www.biospace.com/article/q1-2021-an-in-depth-look-at-biopharma-s-top-25-/).

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decreasing them slightly). In exchange for this spread enlargement, the PBMs agree with the

manufacturer, either explicitly or implicitly, to favor, or at least not disfavor, the drug with the most

elevated list price. AbbVie knows that when they increase the list prices of its drug, the PBMs can

earn substantially greater revenues so long as net prices remain constant.

76. The perverse, reverse incentives for larger list prices (and consequent consumer

overpayments) were described in a recent report on the drug industry:

At the whole-market level, we sense that the price protection rebate arbitrage game
is driving manufacturers to higher list price increases than would otherwise occur,
particularly on the eve of a general election. Price protection rebates between brand
manufacturers and PBMs are common, as are fixed rebate agreements between
PBMs and a significant portion of their plan sponsors. When brand manufacturers’
[list price] increases exceed the price protection threshold, the manufacturers rebate
the difference to PBMs, who pocket the difference when these price protection
rebates grow faster than the PBMs’ fixed rebate commitments to plan sponsors.
Thus all else equal in a given category, the product with the more rapid list price
increases is more profitable to the PBM. Manufacturers, realizing this, don’t want
their products disadvantaged, and accordingly are driven to keep their rates of list
price inflation at least as high, and ideally just a bit higher, than peers’. Durable list
price inflation is the natural result. Net price inflation is unaffected, but unit
volumes suffer as higher list prices directly impact consumers who have not yet met
their deductibles.[21]

77. This is not the first time that manipulation of the spread between list and net prices

has been the subject of large-scale litigation. In New England Carpenters Health Benefits Fund v. First

DataBank, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 79 (D. Mass. 2007), the District Court for the District of Massachusetts

certified a class alleging that McKesson, a wholesaler, and First Data, a drug price publisher,

engaged in a scheme to inflate the list prices of brand name drugs. McKesson asserted that a class

could not be certified because the PBMs had become aware of the phony increase in the spread,

and promptly acted to offset the spread by vigorously seeking rebates for its health insurer clients.

21
Richard Evans, Scott Hinds, & Ryan Baum, US Rx Net Pricing Trends Thru 2Q16, SSR LLC,
36 (Oct. 5, 2016).

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However, part of the evidence the district court relied upon in rejecting this argument was

evidence showing that the PBMs pocketed a portion of the increase in the spread at the expense of

consumers and health insurers:

Because these PBMs benefited from the increased [list price] spreads perpetuated by
the Scheme, Plaintiffs argue that they had no incentive to inform [third party
payers] of the inflated AWP, let alone fiercely compete to mitigate any damage. As
proof, Plaintiffs quote an April 26, 2002 internal ESI e-mail, sent around the same
time as the ESI letter, that states that “the AWP increases being pushed through by
First Data Bank [are] having a very favorable impact on our mail margins.” The e-
mail goes on to state, “Our clients will not be sympathetic to our financial situation
since we [will have benefited] from the AWP increase in the mail and they hired us
to control drug trend.” The e-mail includes a handwritten note, in response, “Let’s
put a lid on it and not make it a big deal.”[22]

78. Just so, AbbVie has used the phony list prices to its advantage by using unfair and

unconscionable spread between prices to provide kickbacks to PBMs in exchange for formulary

status. Indeed, as the District Court for the District of Massachusetts explained, rebates are really

“direct kickbacks,” “disguised as market-share discounts and rebates.”23 This “rebate” scheme

enables AbbVie to maintain preferred formulary positions without reducing its net prices.

79. And the PBMs benefit from the larger spreads. The PBMs boast of the “increased

rebates” they have achieved, when, in reality, the “discounts” they have obtained are simply

reductions off of artificially-inflated list prices. In other words, these “discounts” are not discounts

at all.

80. The losers in this scheme are Humira consumers. When AbbVie publishes unfair

and unconscionable list prices so that it can offer PBMs larger spreads, it harms: uninsured

22
New England Carpenters Health Benefits Fund v. First Data Bank, Inc., 248 F.R.D. 363, 368 (D.
Mass 2008) (internal citations omitted).
23
United States ex rel. Banigan v. Organon USA Inc., No. CV 07-12153-RWZ, 2016 WL 6571269,
at *1 (D. Mass. Jan. 20, 2016).

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patients, insured consumers in high deductible plans, insured consumers paying coinsurance, and

insured consumers in Medicare Part D plans, especially those who reach the Donut Hole, all who

pay for Humira based on AbbVie’s list prices. Defendant was well aware of the impact of its list

prices on consumers.

K. AbbVie—Humira

81. Humira is a biologic sold by AbbVie for the treatment of rheumatoid arthritis and

other painful inflammatory diseases. Humira is priced at $77,586 for a standard annual course of

treatment and generated $14.9 billion in U.S. net revenue in 2019.24

82. Abbott and AbbVie have raised the price of Humira 27 times since it was brought

to market.

83. In 2003, Abbott Laboratories launched Humira at a price of $522 per 40 mg

syringe, or approximately $12,000 annually. Over the next decade, Abbott raised the drug’s price

13 times, nearly doubling its price to $1,024.31 per syringe, or approximately $24,000 annually, by

the end of 2012.25

84. When AbbVie spun off as its own company in January 2013, it continued to raise

Humira’s price, taking an additional 14 price increases in just over eight years, including a

24
IBM Micromedex Redbook, Wholesale Acquisition Cost and Average Wholesale Price History for
Humira. The annual calculation is for a patient who injects Humira every other week. AbbVie Inc.,
2019 Form 10-K (Feb. 21, 2020) (online at https://investors.abbvie.com/sec-filings/sec-filing/10-
k/0001551152-20-000007).
25
Most patients require one injection of this size on a biweekly basis. AbbVie Inc., Humira
(Adalimumab): Moderate to Severe Rheumatoid Arthritis (online at www.humira.com/rheumatoid-
arthritis/after-starting-treatment) (accessed Nov. 1, 2021); IBM Micromedex Redbook, Wholesale
Acquisition Cost and Average Wholesale Price History for Humira.

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combined 30% increase in one ten-month period.26 Humira is now priced at $2,984 per syringe, or

more than $71,960 annually. The price of Humira has increased by almost 500% since launch.27

85. Figure 12 below shows the price of a 40 mg syringe of Humira from launch to 2021

(with patients typically requiring two syringes per month).

Figure 12: Humira Price Increases

86. As of 2023, the list price for Humira is now approximately $7,000 per month.

87. AbbVie has collected more than $170 billion in worldwide net revenue from

Humira since 2003. Nearly two-thirds, or $107 billion, has come from the U.S. market.28 Since

26
This ten-month period was from March 31, 2015, when the price of one Humira injection
was $1,456, to January 21, 2016, when Humira was priced at $1,898.
27
IBM Micromedex Redbook, Wholesale Acquisition Cost and Average Wholesale Price
History for Humira.
28
Letter from Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher LLP, on behalf of AbbVie Inc., to Chairman Elijah
E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Feb. 4, 2019); Letter from Gibson,
Dunn and Crutcher LLP, on behalf of AbbVie Inc., to Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House

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2014, Humira has been the best-selling drug in the United States. In 2020, AbbVie generated $16.1

billion in net U.S. revenues from Humira.29 This was nearly double the net revenue generated by

the second-best-selling drug in the United States—Keytruda, marketed by Merck & Co.30

88. AbbVie and Amgen also engaged in shadow pricing for their products Humira and

Amgen’s drug, Enbrel. One Amgen pricing committee presentation prepared in May 2016

described Amgen’s pricing strategy for Enbrel: “Price increase strategy is to follow AbbVie’s price

increases.” In December 2017, while approving a planned 4.9% Enbrel price increase for the end

of the year, Amgen’s then-Executive Vice President and Head of Global Commercial Operations

told his team, “[Y]ou have authorization to proceed with a competitive price increase for Enbrel—

should Humira pull the trigger at any point.” This shadow pricing is part of the list price scheme

discussed herein and was internally tracked by AbbVie as shown from an internal AbbVie

document:

Committee on Oversight and Reform (Jan. 14, 2021); Abbott Laboratories, 2003—2013 Form 10-K
(online at www.abbottinvestor.com/financials/sec-filings); AbbVie Inc., 2013—2020 Form 10-K
(online at https://investors.abbvie.com/sec-filings).
29
AbbVie Inc., 2020 Form 10-K (Feb. 3, 2021) (online at abbvie.com/static-files/47512e94-
a9a4-4035-8dbc-6eb59116bb05).
30
Merck & Co., Inc., 2020 Form 10-K Annual Report (Feb, 25, 2021) (online at www.merck.
com/investur-relations/financial-infomation/sec-filings/).

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Figure 9: Comparison of Humira and Enbrel Prices for Annual

Course of Treatment, 2013—2021

89. Another internal chart depicts the shadow pricing strategy:

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90. Figure 13 below reflects AbbVie’s net U.S. revenue for Humira over time as a direct

result of the pricing practices described herein.31

31
Letter from Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher LLP, on behalf of AbbVie Inc., to Chairman Elijah
E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Feb. 4, 2019); Letter from Gibson,
Dunn and Crutcher LLP, on behalf of AbbVie Inc., to Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform (Jan. 14, 2021); Abbott Laboratories, 2003—2013 Form 10-K
(online at www.abbottinvestor.com/financials/sec-filings); AbbVie Inc., 2013—2020 Form 10-K
(online at https://investorsabbvie.com/sec-filings).

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Figure 13: AbbVie’s Net U.S. Revenue for Humira, 2003-2020

91. Figure 15 shows Humira’s overall annual net price across all channels, compared to

the drug’s list price, from 2009 to 2018.32

32
Letter from Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher LLP, on behalf of AbbVie Inc., to Chairwoman
Carolyn B. Maloney, House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Sept. 11, 2020).

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Figure 15: Humira (AbbVie)—Average Net Price of a Bi-Weekly Dose, 2009—2018

92. And, as seen below, Humira’s list price far exceeds price increases of other major

spending categories:

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93. As noted, and further described, AbbVie’s price increase was not only untethered

to costs, and tied to the rebate gain described above, but were also tied to shadow prices. Instead of

pricing below its competitor for arthritis, Enbrel, AbbVie engaged in shadow pricing.

V. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION CREATED

INCENTIVES FOR PRICE INCREASES

94. From 2016 to 2020, the drug companies investigated by the House Committee

spent over $2.2 billion on compensation for their highest-paid executives, reflecting an increase of

20% over that period. Figure 14 shows spending on executive compensation from 2016 to 2020

with AbbVie at the top.

Figure 14: Executive Committee Compensation, 2016—202033

Company 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Total
AbbVie $ 60,882,843 $ 70,379,456 $ 62,100,858 $ 69,440,776 $ 84,893,480 $ 347,697,413
Amgen $ 42,667,038 $ 39,889,202 $ 64,081,235 $ 46,720,094 $ 47,097,177 $ 240,436,746
Celgene/BMS* $ 57,259,531 $ 43,935,336 $ 52,135,701 $ 58,455,527 $ 48,354,847 $ 260,140,942
Eli Lilly $ 42,744,525 $ 47,004,080 $ 43,440,949 $ 49,965,840 $ 50,860,365 $ 234,015,759
Mallinckrodt $ 24,601,580 $ 41,788,828 $ 29,074,987 $ 32,439,953 $ 32,879,095 $ 160,784,443
Novartis $ 59,907,420 $ 51,794,638 $ 72,292,820 $ 72,475,721 $ 64,113,595 $ 320,585,194
NovoNordisk $ 15,041,355 $ 14,576,159 $ 28,283,950 $ 33,106,488 $ 33,804,283 $ 124,812,234
Pfizer $ 49,509,982 $ 64,225,035 $ 50,735,513 $ 63,848,586 $ 59,431,930 $ 287,751,046
Sanofi $ 11,703,467 $ 11,809,802 $ 9,012,420 $ 14,228,276 $ 13,713,319 $ 60,467,284
Teva $ 24,601,580 $ 51,934,561 $ 55,878,722 $ 31,456,387 $ 31,713,550 $ 195,881,480
Total $ 388,919,321 $ 437,337,096 $ 467,037,205 $ 472,137,647 $ 466,843,641 $ 2,232,572,540

* Reflects data from Celgene for 2016, 2017, and 2018, and data from Bristol Myers Squibb from 2019 and 2020. Bristol Myers
Squibb acquired Celgene in 2019.

95. AbbVie paid CEO Richard Gonzalez nearly $170 million between 2013 and 2020,

as AbbVie raised the price of Humira 14 times from approximately $1,000 per syringe to nearly

$3,000 per syringe.34

96. Since separating from Abbott in 2013, AbbVie has paid its highest-ranking

executives over $480 million in compensation, including bonuses tied to revenue targets. For

33
Id.
34
See AbbVie Inc., Proxy Statements (2013-2020) (online at www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?
CIK=1551152); IBM Micromedex Redbook, wholesale Acquisition Cost and Average Wholesale Price
History for Humira.

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example, AbbVie’s 2019 compensation plan tied bonus payments to net revenue and pre-tax

income targets, accounting for as much as 80% of the bonus calculation for AbbVie executives.35

AbbVie barely met its net revenue target of $33.3 billion that year, achieving 101% of its target.

Without raising the prices of Humira and Imbruvica by 6.2% in 2019, the Committee estimates

that AbbVie would have missed this target.36 Because AbbVie met its income and revenue targets,

AbbVie’s senior-most executives were paid $70 million in 2019.37

97. As part of AbbVie’s “short-term incentives,” executives were compensated based on

whether the company achieved predetermined targets for “Humira Sales.”38 In 2014—the year

before this incentive was introduced—Humira’s U.S. net revenue was $6.5 billion.39 The following

year, after the incentive was introduced, AbbVie executives implemented a 9.9% Humira price

increase in April—the largest-ever price increase for the drug—and an additional 7.9% price increase

in August. The period following the introduction of this incentive coincided with AbbVie’s largest

price increase in Humira’s history—over 30% in ten months.40 Humira’s U.S. net revenue increased

to $8.4 billion in 2015, the largest one-year increase to date.41

35
See AbbVie Inc., 2019 Proxy Statement (Mar. 22, 2019) (online at https://investors.abbvie.
com/static-files/a7335bdf-48b2-44a2-b0bd-21 ec26843d05).
36
Committee staff estimate that without these price increases and assuming a corresponding
change in net price of the products, AbbVie worldwide net revenue would have fallen to $32.1
billion, below the company’s target of $33.3 billion. See AbbVie Inc., 2019 Form 10-K (Feb. 21,
2020) (online at https://investors.abbvie.com/sec-filings/sec-filing/10-k/0001551152-20-000007).
37
See AbbVie Inc., 2020 Proxy Statement (Mar. 23, 2020) (online at https://investors.abbvie.
com/secfilings/sec-filing/def-14a/0001047469-20-001710).
38
See AbbVie Inc., 2013-2020 Proxy Statements (online at www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?
CIK=1551152).
39
AbbVie Inc., 2014-Form 10-K (Feb. 20, 2015) (online at https://investors.abbvie.com/static-
files/9553e87d-3b88-4b34-be3d-e1ff94c89bfa).
40
IBM Micromedex Redbook, Wholesale Acquisition Cost and Average Wholesale Price History for
Humira.
41
Id.

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98. In 2018—the final year of the incentive—Mr. Gonzalez was paid $21.2 million in

compensation.

VI. PRICE INCREASES NOT JUSTIFIED BY MANUFACTURING COSTS AND

ARE OUT OF VARIANCE WITH THE COST OF CONSUMER GOODS

99. Pharmaceutical companies cite the cost of manufacturing and other commercial

expenses to justify their pricing practices. The House Committee found that, however, internal

data obtained by the Committee reveal that manufacturing costs for some companies rose at a

significantly slower rate than the companies’ price increases for the drugs. In some instances,

manufacturing costs even declined over the period for which the companies provided data. For all

of the companies, manufacturing costs for their drugs were dwarfed by the drugs’ revenues:

100. AbbVie. From 2009 to 2018, AbbVie collected $121 billion in net worldwide

revenue from Humira.42 AbbVie reported to the Committee that the total cost of producing and

selling Humira between 2009 and 201 8 was $13.9 billion, equivalent to 11% of AbbVie’s revenues

from Humira in the same period.43/44

101. And as noted, AbbVie’s cost increase far exceeds increases in the cost of other

major expense categories:

42
AbbVie Inc., 2019 Form 10-K (Feb. 21, 2020) (online at https://investors.AbbVie.com/sec-
filing/10-k/0001551152-20-000007); AbbVie Inc., 2016 Form 10-K (Feb. 17, 20 17) (online at
https://investors AbbVie.com/node/10016/html); AbbVie Inc., 2015 Form 10-K (Feb. 19, 2016)
(online at https://investors.AbbVie.com/node/9521/html). Committee staff were unable to
provide a similar analysis for Imbruvica because of complexities related to cost sharing and
worldwide revenue due to AbbVie’ s collaboration with Janssen.
43
Letter from Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher LLP, on behalf of AbbVie Inc., to Chairwoman
Carolyn B. Maloney, House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Sept 11, 2020).
44
Id.; IBM Mocromedex Redbook, Wholesale Acquisition Cost and Average Wholesale Price History
for Humira. This calculation is based on the wholesale acquisition cost of a 40mg syringe on
Sept. 2, 2009, ($1,523.97) and Jan. 1, 2018, ($4,872.03).

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VII. IMPACT ON CONSUMERS OF UNFAIR

AND UNCONSCIONABLE LIST PRICES

102. Defendant and its collaborators have exploited the drug pricing and payment

system, forcing patient consumers to pay drastically higher prices for Humira than their insurers (if

they have insurance). If a patient is uninsured, she is required to pay full, point-of-sale prices (based

on list prices); if a patient is responsible for all of her drugs’ costs before she hits her deductible,

she is required to pay full, point-of-sale prices (based on list prices) until she meets her deductible; if

a patient pays coinsurance, she pays for a percentage of her drugs’ point-of-sale prices (based on list

prices); if the patient is in a Medicare Part D plan, she pays based on list price before she meets

her deductible, and then pays between 25% and 40% of point-of-sale prices (based on list prices).

103. In the case of Humira, AbbVie’s publicly reported list prices, used for consumer

transactions, have climbed further and further away from the net prices that institutional payers

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pay. The net prices of Humira to PBMs and insurers are much lower: 35%, 40%, or even 50%

lower than list prices.

104. The impact on class members is illustrated by the fact many patients have to stop

taking Humira because they can’t afford it. The New York Times depicted this as follows:45

Some Medicare patients have been suffering as a result.

Sue Lee, 80, of Crestwood, Ky., had been taking Humira for years to
prevent painful sores caused by a chronic skin condition known as
psoriasis. Her employer’s insurance plan had helped keep her
annual payments to $60. Then she retired. Under Medicare rules,
she would have to pay about $8,000 a year, which she could not
afford.

“I cried a long time,” she said. For months, Lee stopped taking any
medication. The sores “came back with a vengeance,” she said. She
joined a clinical trial to temporarily get access to another
medication. Now she is relying on free samples of another drug
provided by her doctor. She doesn’t know what she’ll do if that
supply runs out.

AbbVie executives have acknowledged that Medicare patients often

pay much more than privately insured people, but they said the
blame lays with Medicare. In 2021 testimony to a congressional
committee investigating drug prices, AbbVie CEO Richard
Gonzalez said the average Medicare patient had to pay $5,800 out of
pocket annually. (AbbVie declined to provide updated figures.) He
said AbbVie provided the drug for virtually nothing to nearly 40%
of Medicare patients.

The drug’s high price is also taxing employers.

VIII. TOLLING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

A. Discovery Rule Tolling

105. The plaintiff and class members had no way of knowing about AbbVie’s scheme

with respect to Humira.

45
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/28/business/humira-abbvie-monopoly.html.

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106. AbbVie and PBMs refuse to disclose the net prices of Humira, labeling them trade

secrets. Hence, a reasonable plaintiff and consumer could not discover the truth.

107. Within the period of any applicable statutes of limitation, the plaintiff and class

members could not have discovered, through reasonable diligence, that AbbVie was concealing the

unfair and unconscionable conduct complained of herein.

108. The plaintiff and the class members did not discover, and did not know of facts

that would have caused a reasonable person to suspect, that AbbVie was engaged in the unfair and

unconscionable scheme and was publishing phony list prices, nor would a reasonable and diligent

investigation have disclosed the truth.

109. For these reasons, all applicable statutes of limitation have been tolled by operation

of the discovery rule with respect to claims identified herein.

B. Fraudulent Concealment Tolling

110. All applicable statutes of limitation have also been tolled by AbbVie’s knowing and

active concealment and denial of the facts alleged herein throughout the period relevant to this

action.

C. Estoppel

111. AbbVie was under a continuous duty to disclose to the plaintiff and class members

the true character, quality, and nature of the list prices upon which their payments for Humira

were based.

112. Based on the foregoing, AbbVie is estopped from relying on any statutes of

limitations in defense of this action.

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IX. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

113. Plaintiff bring this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3), as representative of a class defined as

follows:

All individual persons in the United States and its territories who:
(1) paid any portion of the purchase price for a prescription of
Humira at a price calculated by reference to a list price, AWP
(Average Wholesale Price), and/or WAC (Wholesale Acquisition
Price) for purposes other than resale or (2) stopped taking
prescription Humira after they lost insurance coverage because they
would have had to pay any portion of the purchase price for a
prescription of Humira at a price calculated by reference to a list
price, AWP (Average Wholesale Price), and/or WAC (Wholesale
Acquisition Price) for purposes other than resale.

114. The class period is tolled to the earliest date of AbbVie’s initiation of the scheme

described herein, wherein AbbVie artificially inflated the list prices of Humira to offer PBMs

higher spreads in exchange for preferred formulation status (the spread scheme).

115. Excluded from the class are: (a) the legal representatives, officers, directors,

assignees, and successor of AbbVie and any entity in which it has a controlling interests; and

(b) any co-conspirators of AbbVie and the officers, directors, management, and employees of any

such co-conspirators.

116. There are a number of ways in which an individual person may pay a portion of the

list price of Humira and thereby gain inclusion in the class. First, a person may be uninsured and,

therefore, responsible for paying 100% of the cost of Humira based on AbbVie’s list prices (the

uninsured scenario). Second, a person’s insurance plan may require her to satisfy a deductible

before insurance benefits cover all or a portion of her prescription needs. If so, that person is

paying for 100% of the cost of her Humira based on AbbVie’s list prices before she meets her

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deductible (the deductible scenario). Third, a person may have a coinsurance requirement. If so,

that person is paying a portion of the cost of her Humira based on AbbVie’s list prices (the

coinsurance scenario). Fourth, a person may obtain insurance through a Medicare Part D Plan. If

so, that person is paying a portion of the cost (or 100% of the cost before she meets her deductible)

based on AbbVie’s list prices (the Medicare Part D scenario).

117. In each of these scenarios—the uninsured scenario, the deductible scenario, the

coinsurance scenario, and the Medicare Part D scenario—a person’s out-of-pocket expense for

Humira is determined based on the list prices defendant unilaterally sets for Humira. Accordingly,

each falls within the class definition.

118. Members of the class are so numerous and geographically dispersed that joinder of

all members is impracticable. Hundreds of thousands of prescriptions are written for Humira

throughout the United States every week, and these prescriptions are filled by hundreds of

thousands of individuals. The class is readily identifiable from information and records in the

possession of AbbVie.

119. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the class. Plaintiff and

all members of the class were damaged by the same wrongful conduct of AbbVie—i.e., as a result of

defendant’s misconduct, the plaintiff and class members made unfair and unconscionable out-of-

pocket payments for their Humira or, if they were unable to afford out-of-pocket payments for

Humira, suffered other actual damages, including physical suffering and out-of-pocket payments for

drugs that are inferior to their physician-prescribed Humira.

120. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the class.

His interests are coincident with, and not antagonistic to, those of class members.

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121. Lead counsel that represents the plaintiff are experienced in the prosecution of class

action litigation and have particular experience with class action litigation involving

pharmaceutical products and extensive experience in class actions concerning the use of list

pricing, including two cases in federal district court (AWP and McKesson) that resulted in recoveries

well in excess of $500 million.

122. Questions of law and fact common to the members of the class predominate over

questions that may affect only individual class members because AbbVie has acted on grounds

generally applicable to the entire class, thereby making overcharge damages with respect to the class

as a whole appropriate. Such generally-applicable conduct is inherent in AbbVie’s wrongful

conduct.

123. Questions of law and fact common to the class include, but are not limited to:

i. Whether AbbVie engaged in unfair and/or unconscionable acts and

practices by improperly publishing inflated list prices for Humira;

ii. Whether AbbVie unfairly and/or unconscionably inflated the list price of
Humira;

iii. What the list prices versus net (true average) prices for Humira are;

iv. Whether it was the policy and practice of Humira to prepare marketing and
sales materials for PBMs that contained comparisons of their list prices and
net prices for Humira and the spreads available;

v. Whether Humira engaged in a pattern and practice of paying illegal

kickbacks, disguised as “rebates,” to PBMs, such as CVS Health, Express
Scripts, and OptumRX, that created substantial spreads between the list
and net prices;

vi. Whether the large list-to-net price spreads were intended to induce CVS
Health, Express Scripts, and OptumRX to give Humira placement on the
PBMs’ formularies;

vii. Whether AbbVie used unfairly and/or unconscionably inflated list prices as
a starting point for negotiating these kickbacks or “rebates” for Humira;

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viii. Whether the spread scheme caused plaintiff and class members to make
inflated payments based on the unfair and/or unconscionable list prices for
Humira or, if they are unable to afford out-of-pocket payments for Humira,
caused them to suffer other actual damages, including physical suffering
and out-of-pocket payments for drugs that are inferior to their physician-
prescribed Humira; and

ix. Whether AbbVie is liable to plaintiff and the class members for damages
flowing from its unfair and unconscionable conduct.

124. The plaintiff and class members have all suffered, and will continue to suffer, harm

and damages as a result of AbbVie’s unlawful conduct. A class action is superior to other available

methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy under Rule 23(b)(3). Such

treatment will permit a large number of similarly-situated persons to prosecute their common

claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of

evidence, effort, or expense that numerous individual actions would engender. The benefits of

proceeding through the class mechanism, including providing injured persons or entities a method

for obtaining redress on claims that could not practicably be pursued individually, substantially

outweigh potential difficulties in the management of this class action. Absent a class action,

plaintiff and the class members would find the cost of litigating their claims to be prohibitive and

will have no effective remedy at law. The class treatment of common questions of law and fact is

also superior to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation in that it conserves the

resources of the courts and the litigants and promotes consistency and efficiency of adjudication.

Additionally, defendant has acted and failed to act on grounds generally applicable to plaintiff and

the class, which requires uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the class,

thereby making appropriate equitable relief to the class as a whole within the meaning of Rules

23(b)(2).

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125. Plaintiff knows of no special difficulty to be encountered in the maintenance of this

action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action.

X. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

VIOLATION OF THE ILLINOIS CONSUMER FRAUD

AND DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES ACT
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/1, ET SEQ.
(BROUGHT ON BEHALF OF A NATIONWIDE CLASS)

126. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

127. This claim is brought on behalf of all members of the class under the Illinois

Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (ICFA).

128. The ICFA prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices … in the conduct of any

trade or commerce … whether any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby.”46

129. That section also provides: “In construing this section consideration shall be given

to the interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts relating to Section

5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.”47

130. Defendant is a “person” as that term is defined in 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/1(c).

131. Illinois class members are “consumers” as that term is defined in 815 Ill. Comp.

Stat. 505/1(e).

132. “To determine whether a practice is unfair, Illinois courts consider three factors:

whether it ‘offends public policy’; is ‘immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous’; or ‘causes

46
815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/2.
47
Id.

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substantial injury to consumers.’ … A plaintiff need not satisfy all three factors; ‘[a] practice may be

unfair because of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it

meets all three.’”48 AbbVie’s conduct, as described in this complaint, constitutes “unfair” acts and

practices in violation of the ICFA under all three factors.49 In particular, the plaintiff and class

members suffered substantial injuries that they could not reasonably avoid and that were not

outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.

133. AbbVie’s unfair acts and practices occurred in the conduct of trade or commerce,

within the meaning of 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/1(f).

134. The ICFA applies to all claims by the plaintiff and class members. AbbVie engaged

in the challenged pricing conduct solely from their headquarters (and principal place of business)

in Illinois, where it developed, recommended, and approved the strategies for Humira pricing at

issue in this lawsuit. Moreover, AbbVie did not sell Humira to the plaintiff or class members in

their home states, make any representations to them at the point of sale in their home states, or

have any business contacts with plaintiff and the class members in their home states. Thus, the

conduct challenged in this case took place “primarily and substantially in Illinois,” so that the

ICFA applies to the claims of the plaintiff and class members.50

48
See Vanzant v. Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc., 934 F.3d 730, 738–39 (7th Cir. 2019) (citations
omitted).
49
See Siegel v. Shell Oil Co., 612 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 2010) (“A plaintiff is entitled to
recovery under ICFA when there is unfair or deceptive conduct …. A plaintiff may allege that
conduct is unfair under ICFA without alleging that the conduct is deceptive.”).
50
See Morrison v. YTB Int’l, Inc., 649 F.3d 533, 536 (7th Cir. 2011) (the ICFA “applies to
nonresidents’ claims when ‘the circumstances that relate to the disputed transaction occur
primarily and substantially in Illinois’”) (quoting Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 216 Ill. 2d
100, 187 (2005)). See id. at 538 (reversing dismissal of IFCA claim because “if we can’t say that the
complaint and answer contain enough to point unerringly to Illinois law, we can say that the
complaint does not defeat application of Illinois law”).

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135. The ICFA allows “[a]ny person who suffers actual damage as a result of a violation

of this Act committed by any other person [to] bring an action against such person. The court, in

its discretion may award actual economic damages or any other relief which the court deems

proper … .”51 Under that provision, the plaintiff seeks monetary relief against defendant on his

own and on behalf of all class members in the amount of actual damages, as well as punitive

damages because defendant acted with fraud and/or malice and/or was grossly negligent. Plaintiff

and class members suffered actual damages by paying unfair and unconscionable out-of-pocket

payments for their Humira or, if they were unable to afford out-of-pocket payments for Humira,

suffered other actual damages, including physical suffering and out-of-pocket payments for drugs

that are inferior to their physician-prescribed Humira.

136. The plaintiff also seeks an order on behalf of himself and all class members

enjoining AbbVie’s unfair acts and practices, attorneys’ fees, and any other just and proper relief

available under 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/1, et seq.

VIOLATION OF THE ALASKA UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES

AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 45.50.471, ET SEQ.

137. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

138. This claim is brought on behalf of all Alaska residents who are class members.

51
815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/10a.

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139. The Alaska Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act prohibits “[u]nfair

methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or

commerce….” Alaska Stat. § 45.50.471(a).

140. As alleged in this complaint, AbbVie’s conduct with respect to Humira constitutes

“unfair” acts and practices in violation of the Alaska Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer

Protection Act.52

141. AbbVie’s unfair acts and practices occurred in the conduct of trade or commerce.

142. “A person who suffers an ascertainable loss of money or property as a result of

another person’s act or practice declared unlawful by AS 45.50.471 may bring a civil action to

recover for each unlawful act or practice three times the actual damages or $500, whichever is

greater. The court may provide other relief it considers necessary and proper.” Alaska Stat. §

45.50.531(a).

143. Defendant is a “person” under § 45.50.531(a).

144. The plaintiff seeks damages under § 45.50.531(a) for all ascertainable losses that

Alaska class members suffered as a result of AbbVie’s unfair acts and practices, including three

times their actual damages

145. The plaintiff further seeks injunctive relief under § 45.50.531(a) on behalf of

Alaska residents who are members of the class.

52
See Merdes & Merdes, P.C. v. Leisnoi, Inc., 410 P.3d 398, 412 (Alaska 2017) (“When
determining whether a practice is unfair under the broad prohibition of AS 45.50.471(a), we have
adopted a ‘multi-factored approach’ that considers: ‘(1) whether the practice, without necessarily
having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by
statutes, the common law, or otherwise—whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra
of some common-law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is
immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; [and] (3) whether it causes substantial injury to
consumers....’”) (citation omitted).

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146. On April 19, 2023, the plaintiff sent a demand letter to defendant pursuant to

Alaska Stat. § 45.50.531. Because AbbVie failed to make a written tender of settlement within the

requisite period, the Alaska members of the class are entitled to injunctive relief.

VIOLATION OF THE ARIZONA CONSUMER FRAUD ACT

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1521, ET SEQ.

147. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

148. This claim is brought on behalf of all Arizona residents who are class members.

149. The Arizona Consumer Fraud Act prohibits the “act, use or employment by any

person of any … unfair act or practice … in connection with the sale or advertisement of any

merchandise….” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1522(A).

150. AbbVie, plaintiff, and class members are “persons” within the meaning of Ariz.

Rev. Stat. § 44-1521(6).

151. Humira is “merchandise” within the meaning of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1521(5),

which defines “merchandise” as “means any objects, wares, goods, commodities, intangibles, real

estate or services.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1521.

152. AbbVie’s conduct, as set forth above, occurred in the conduct with the sale of

merchandise.

153. As alleged in this complaint, AbbVie’s conduct with respect to Humira constitutes

“unfair” acts and practices in violation of the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act, which provides that it

“is the intent of the legislature, in construing subsection A, that the courts may use as a guide

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interpretations given by the federal trade commission and the federal courts to 15 United States

Code §§ 45, 52 and 55(a)(1).” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1522(C).53

154. Pursuant to the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act, the plaintiff seeks monetary relief

against defendant for all compensable damages that Arizona class members suffered as a result of

AbbVie’s unfair acts and practices, in an amount to be determined at trial. The plaintiff also seeks

punitive damages because AbbVie has engaged in conduct that is wanton, reckless, or shows spite

or ill-will,54 and/or acted with reckless indifference to the interests of others.55

155. Plaintiff also seeks an order enjoining AbbVie’s unfair acts and practices, attorneys’

fees, and any other just and proper relief available under the Arizona statute.

VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA LEGAL REMEDIES ACT

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1750, ET SEQ.

156. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

157. This claim is brought on behalf of all California residents who are class members.

53
15 U.S.C. § 45(n) provides that an act or practice is “unfair” if it “causes or is likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and
not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition. In determining
whether an act or practice is unfair, the Commission may consider established public policies as
evidence to be considered with all other evidence. Such public policy considerations may not serve
as a primary basis for such determination.”
54
See Sellinger v. Freeway Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 110 Ariz. 573, 577 (1974); Lufty v. R. D. Roper
& Sons Motor Co., 57 Ariz. 495, 115 P.2d 161 (1941).
55
See Sellinger, 110 Ariz. at 577; McNelis v. Bruce, 90 Ariz. 261 (1961).

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158. The California Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or

practices undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to result or that results in the sale or

lease of goods or services to any consumer.”56

159. Defendant is a “person” under Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(c).

160. The California members of the class are “consumers,” as defined by Cal. Civ. Code

§ 1761(d), who purchased Humira.

161. As alleged in this complaint, AbbVie’s conduct with respect to Humira constitutes

“unfair” acts and practices in violation of the CLRA.

162. The plaintiff seeks injunctive relief under the CLRA on behalf of California

members of the class for AbbVie’s violations of Cal. Civ. Code § 1770. On April 19, 2023, the

plaintiff sent a demand letter notifying AbbVie of such claims for relief pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code

§ 1782(d). Because AbbVie failed to remedy its unlawful conduct within the requisite period, the

plaintiff seeks all damages and relief to which they are entitled.

163. Pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 1782, if defendant does not rectify its conduct within

30 days, plaintiff intends to amend this complaint to add claims under the Cal. Civ. Code for:

i. Actual damages;

ii. Restitution of money to plaintiff and class members, and the general public;

iii. Punitive damages;

iv. An additional award of up to $5,000 to plaintiff and any class member who
is a "senior citizen";

v. Attorney’s fees and costs; and

vi. Other relief that this Court deems proper.

56
Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a).

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164. The plaintiff further seeks an order on behalf of California members of the class

enjoining AbbVie’s unfair acts and for costs of court and attorneys’ fees pursuant to Cal. Civ.

Code § 1780(e), and any other just and proper relief available under the CLRA.

VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW

CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200, ET SEQ.

165. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

166. This claim is brought on behalf of all California residents who are class members.

167. California Business and Professions Code § 17200 (UCL) prohibits “unlawful,

unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices.”

168. AbbVie violated the “unlawful” prong of § 17200 by its violations of the CLRA, as

described above.

169. In addition, AbbVie violated the “unfair” prong of § 17200.57

170. The California courts have set out several definitions of unfairness. AbbVie’s

conduct is unfair under each of them:

a. “[T]he consumer injury is substantial, is not outweighed by any

countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition, and is not an injury the consumers

themselves could reasonably have avoided.”58

57
See Rubio v. Capital One Bank, 613 F.3d 1195, 1203 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A business act or
practice may violate the [UCL] if it is either unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent. Each of these three
adjectives captures a separate and distinct theory of liability.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)).
58
See Daugherty v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 824, 839 (2006).

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b. AbbVie’s conduct “offends an established public policy [the FTC Policy

Statement on Unfairness] or is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or

substantially injurious to consumers.”59

c. The plaintiff’s claim is predicated upon public policy which is “‘tethered’ to

specific constitutional, statutory or regulatory provisions.”60

171. AbbVie’s actions, as set forth above, occurred in the conduct of its business.

172. Pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203, the Court may “restore to any person

in interest any money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of” a

violation of the statute.

VIOLATION OF THE COLORADO CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-101, ET SEQ.

173. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

174. This claim is brought on behalf of all Colorado residents who are class members.

175. The Colorado Consumer Protection Act (Colorado CPA) provides that a “person

engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the course of the person’s business, vocation, or

occupation, the person … knowingly or recklessly engages in any unfair [or] unconscionable act or

practice.”61

176. Defendant is a “person” under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-102(6).

59
See West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 214 Cal. App. 4th 780, 806 (2013) (quoting Smith v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 93 Cal. App. 4th 700, 719 (2001)).
60
See West, 214 Cal. App. at 806 (quoting Scripps Clinic v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 4th
917, 940 (2003)).
61
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-105(1)(rrr).

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177. Plaintiff and class members are “consumers” for purposes of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-

113(1)(a).

178. Defendant’s conduct, as set forth above, occurred in the course of its business.

179. As alleged in this complaint, AbbVie’s conduct with respect to Humira constitutes

unfair and unconscionable acts and practices in violation of the Colorado CPA.

180. Under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-113, plaintiff seeks monetary relief against AbbVie on

behalf of the Colorado members of the class, measured as the greater of (a) actual damages in an

amount to be determined at trial and discretionary trebling of such damages and (b) statutory

damages in the amount of $500 for each plaintiff or class member. “In a case certified as a class

action, a successful plaintiff may recover actual damages, injunctive relief allowed by law, and

reasonable attorney fees and costs.” Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-113(2.9).

181. Plaintiff also seeks an order on behalf of Colorado members of the class enjoining

defendant’s unfair and/or unconscionable act or practice, declaratory relief, attorneys’ fees, and

any other just and proper remedy under the Colorado CPA.

VIOLATION OF THE CONNECTICUT UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110A, ET SEQ.

182. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

183. This claim is brought on behalf of all Connecticut residents who are class members.

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184. The Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA) provides: “No person shall

engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct

of any trade or commerce.”62

185. Defendant is a “person” within the meaning of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110a(3).

186. AbbVie’s challenged conduct occurred in the conduct of trade or commerce, within

the meaning of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110a(4).

187. As alleged in this complaint, AbbVie’s conduct with respect to Humira is “unfair”

in violation of the UTPA.

188. The Connecticut class members are entitled to recover their actual damages,

punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g.

189. AbbVie acted with reckless indifference to another’s rights or wanton or intentional

violation of another’s rights and otherwise engaged in conduct amounting to a particularly

aggravated, deliberate disregard for the rights and safety of others. Therefore, punitive damages are

warranted for Connecticut class members.

190. Plaintiff also seeks an order on behalf of Connecticut class members enjoining

AbbVie’s unfair deceptive practices, attorneys’ fees, and any other just and proper relief available

under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g(d).

VIOLATION OF THE DELAWARE CONSUMER FRAUD ACT

DEL. CODE TIT. 6, § 2513, ET SEQ.

191. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

62
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110b(a).

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192. This claim is brought on behalf of all Delaware residents who are class members.

193. The Delaware class members and AbbVie are “persons” within the meaning of Del.

Code tit. 6, § 2511(7).

194. The Delaware Consumer Fraud Act (Delaware CFA) provides that any “unfair

practice” is “unlawful.”63

195. The Delaware CFA defines “unfair practice” as “any act or practice that causes or is

likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers

themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition. In

determining whether an act or practice is unfair, violations of public policy as established by law,

regulation, or judicial decision applicable in this State may be considered as evidence of substantial

injury.”64

196. AbbVie’s conduct with respect to Humira are “unfair” practices under the Delaware

CFA.

197. The plaintiff seeks damages on behalf of Delaware class members under § 2525 of

the Delaware CFA for injury resulting from the direct and natural consequences of AbbVie’s

unlawful conduct. The plaintiff also seeks an order on behalf of Delaware class members enjoining

AbbVie’s unfair acts and practices, declaratory relief, attorneys’ fees, and any other just and proper

relief available under the Delaware CFA.

198. AbbVie engaged in gross, oppressive, or aggravated conduct justifying the

imposition of punitive damages on behalf of Delaware class members.

63
Del. Code tit. 6, § 2513(a).
64
Id. § 2511(9).

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VIOLATION OF THE FLORIDA UNFAIR AND

DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT
FLA. STAT. § 501.201, ET SEQ.

199. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

200. This claim is brought on behalf of all Florida residents who are class members.

201. The Florida Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (FUDTPA) prohibits “unfair

or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.”65

202. FUDTPA provides that “due consideration and great weight shall be given to the

interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts relating to s. 5(a)(1) of the

Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. s. 45(a)(1) as of July 1, 2017.”66 The Legislature

specifically stated that a violation of FUDTPA “may be based upon … [t]he standards of unfairness

… set forth and interpreted by the Federal Trade Commission or the federal courts.”67

203. In addition, AbbVie’s conduct, as described in this complaint, constitutes “unfair”

acts in violation of the FUDTPA.68

65
Fla. Stat. § 501.204(1).
66
Id. § 501.204(2).
67
Id. § 501.203(3)(b). 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) provides that an act or practice is “unfair” if it “causes
or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by
consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to
competition. In determining whether an act or practice is unfair, the Commission may consider
established public policies as evidence to be considered with all other evidence. Such public policy
considerations may not serve as a primary basis for such determination.”
68
PNR, Inc. v. Beacon Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 842 So.2d 773, 777 (Fla. 2003) (defining an “unfair
practice” under the FDUTPA as “one that offends established public policy and one that is
immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers” and noting
a separate definition for “deception” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

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204. The Florida class members are “consumers” within the meaning of Fla. Stat.

§ 501.203(7).

205. AbbVie’s unfair acts and practices occurred in “trade or commerce” within the

meaning of Fla. Stat. § 501.203(8).

206. The Florida Legislature has provided that a person who has suffered a loss as a

result of a violation of FUDTPA may recover actual damages, plus attorneys’ fees and court costs,

all of which the plaintiff seeks in this action. The Florida class members are entitled to recover

actual damages under Fla. Stat. § 501.211(2) and attorneys’ fees under Fla. Stat. § 501.2105(1).

207. FUDTPA provides that “[a]nyone aggrieved by a violation of this part may bring an

action to obtain a declaratory judgment that an act or practice violates this part and to enjoin a

person who has violated, is violating, or is otherwise likely to violate this part.”69 The plaintiff seeks

an order on behalf of Florida class members enjoining AbbVie’s unfair acts and practices,

declaratory relief, and any other just and proper relief available under the FUDTPA.

VIOLATION OF THE HAWAII UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT

HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 480-1, ET SEQ.

208. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

209. This claim is brought on behalf of all Hawaii residents who are class members.

210. Hawaii’s Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices law (Hawaii UDAP) provides that

“unfair … acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are unlawful.”70

69
Fla. Stat. § 501.211(1).
70
Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 480-2(a).

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211. AbbVie’s conduct with respect to Humira constitutes “unfair” acts and practices

within the meaning of the Hawaii UDAP, which “shall be construed in accordance with judicial

interpretations of similar federal antitrust statutes, except that lawsuits by indirect purchasers may

be brought as provided in this chapter.”71

212. AbbVie’s acts and practices, as set forth above, occurred in the conduct of trade or

commerce.

213. Each Hawaii class member is a “consumer,” and the Hawaii class members and

AbbVie are “persons,” within the meaning of the Hawaii UDAP.72

214. Each Hawaii class member is entitled to all monetary and injunctive relief allowed

by the Hawaii UDAP.73

VIOLATION OF THE IDAHO CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-601, ET SEQ.

215. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

216. This claim is brought on behalf of all Idaho residents who are class members.

71
Id. § 480-3. See Hungate v. L. Off. of David B. Rosen, 139 Haw. 394, 411, 391 P.3d 1, 18
(2017) (“A practice ‘is unfair when it [1] offends established public policy and [2] when the practice
is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or [3] substantially injurious to consumers.’ Keka,
94 Hawai’i at 228, 11 P.3d at 16 (citation omitted). Hungate need not allege that Deutsche Bank’s
actions meet all three of these factors to assert an unfair act or practice.”). Accord, Field v. NCAA,
143 Haw. 362, 374, 431 P.3d 735, 747 (2018) (reversing summary judgment for NCAA). See also
State ex rel. Shikada v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. SCAP-21-0000363, 526 P.3d 395, 2023 WL
2519857, at *26 (Haw. Mar. 15, 2023) (“We clarify Hawai’i’s unfair acts or practices UDAP test in
one respect: meeting any one of the three criteria supports an unfair acts or practices UDAP
claim.”).
72
Id. § 480-1.
73
Id. § 480–13.

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217. The Idaho Consumer Protection Act (Idaho Act) provides that “[a]ny

unconscionable method, act or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce violates the

provisions of this chapter whether it occurs before, during, or after the conduct of the trade or

commerce.”74 The Idaho Act specifies what “circumstances shall be taken into consideration by the

court” in determining whether acts or practices are unconscionable.75

218. AbbVie’s conduct with respect to Humira constitutes “unfair” acts and practices

within the meaning of the Act.

219. Idaho class members and AbbVie are “persons” within the meaning of the Idaho

Act.76

220. AbbVie’s acts and practices, as set forth above, occurred in the conduct of trade or

commerce, within the meaning of Idaho Code Ann. § 48-602(2).

221. The Idaho class members are entitled to all monetary damages, restitution, and

injunctive relief allowed by the Act, including penalties payable to elderly and disabled persons.77

74
Idaho Code Ann. § 48-603C(1).
75
Id. § 48-603C(2). Those circumstances are: “(a) Whether the alleged violator knowingly or
with reason to know, took advantage of a consumer reasonably unable to protect his interest
because of physical infirmity, ignorance, illiteracy, inability to understand the language of the
agreement or similar factor; (b) Whether, at the time the consumer transaction was entered into,
the alleged violator knew or had reason to know that the price grossly exceeded the price at which
similar goods or services were readily available in similar transactions by similar persons, although
price alone is insufficient to prove an unconscionable method, act or practice; (c) Whether the
alleged violator knowingly or with reason to know, induced the consumer to enter into a
transaction that was excessively one-sided in favor of the alleged violator; (d) Whether the sales
conduct or pattern of sales conduct would outrage or offend the public conscience, as determined
by the court.” Id.
76
Id. § 48-602.
77
Id. § 48-608.

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VIOLATION OF THE ILLINOIS CONSUMER FRAUD

AND DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES ACT
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/1, ET SEQ.

222. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

223. This claim is brought on behalf of all Illinois residents who are class members.

224. The Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (ICFA)

prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices… in the conduct of any trade or commerce …

whether any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby.”78

225. That section also provides: “In construing this section consideration shall be given

to the interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts relating to Section

5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.”79

226. AbbVie is a “person” as that term is defined in 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/1(c).

227. Illinois class members are “consumers” as that term is defined in 815 Ill. Comp.

Stat. 505/1(e).

228. “To determine whether a practice is unfair, Illinois courts consider three factors:

whether it ‘offends public policy’; is ‘immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous’; or ‘causes

substantial injury to consumers.’ … A plaintiff need not satisfy all three factors; ‘[a] practice may be

unfair because of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it

78
815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/2.
79
Id.

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meets all three.’”80 AbbVie’s conduct, as described in this complaint, constitutes “unfair” acts and

practices in violation of the ICFA under all three factors.81

229. AbbVie’s unfair acts and practices occurred in the conduct of trade or commerce,

within the meaning of 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 505/1(f).

230. The ICFA allows “[a]ny person who suffers actual damage as a result of a violation

of this Act committed by any other person [to] bring an action against such person. The court, in

its discretion may award actual economic damages or any other relief which the court deems

proper … .”82 Pursuant to this provision of the code, the plaintiff seeks monetary relief against

AbbVie on behalf of all Illinois class members for their actual damages, as well as punitive damages

because AbbVie acted with fraud and/or malice and/or was grossly negligent.

231. The plaintiff also seeks an order on behalf of all Illinois class members enjoining

AbbVie’s unfair acts and practices, attorneys’ fees, and any other just and proper relief available

under 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/1, et seq.

VIOLATION OF THE KANSAS CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

KAN. STAT. § 50-623, ET SEQ.

232. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

233. This claim is brought on behalf of all Kansas residents who are class members.

80
Vanzant v. Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc., 934 F.3d 730, 738–39 (7th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).
81
Siegel v. Shell Oil Co., 612 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that “[a] plaintiff is entitled
to recovery under ICFA when there is unfair or deceptive conduct” and “may allege that conduct
is unfair … without alleging that the conduct is deceptive”).
82
815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/10a.

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234. The Kansas Consumer Protection Act (Kansas CPA) states “[n]o supplier shall

engage in any unconscionable act or practice in connection with a consumer transaction. An

unconscionable act or practice violates this act whether it occurs before, during or after the

transaction.”83 “The unconscionability of an act or practice is a question for the court.”84

235. Kansas class members are “consumers,” within the meaning of Kan. Stat. Ann. §

50-624(b), who purchased Humira.

236. The sale of Humira to Kansas class members was a “consumer transaction” within

the meaning of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-624(c).

237. AbbVie’s conduct, as described in this complaint, constitutes “unconscionable” acts

and practices in violation of the Kansas CPA.

238. Under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-634, the plaintiff seeks monetary relief on behalf of

Kansas class members against AbbVie, measured as the greater of (a) actual damages in an amount

to be determined at trial and (b) statutory damages in the amount of $10,000 for each plaintiff.

239. The plaintiff also seeks an order on behalf of Kansas class members enjoining

AbbVie’s unconscionable acts and practices, declaratory relief, attorneys’ fees, and any other just

and proper relief available under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-623, et seq.

VIOLATION OF THE LOUISIANA UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES

AND CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW
LA. REV. STAT. § 51:1401, ET SEQ.

240. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

83
Kan. Stat. § 50-627(a).
84
Id., § 50-627(b).

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241. This claim is brought on behalf of all Louisiana residents who are class members.

242. The Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (Louisiana

CPL) makes unlawful “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or

commerce.”85

243. AbbVie and Louisiana class members are “persons” within the meaning of La. Rev.

Stat. § 51:1402(8).

244. Louisiana class members are “consumers” within the meaning of La. Rev. Stat.

§ 51:1402(1).

245. AbbVie’s unfair acts and practices occurred in the conduct of trade or commerce,

within the meaning of La. Rev. Stat. § 51:1402(10).

246. AbbVie’s conduct, as described in this complaint, constitutes unfair acts and

practices in violation of the Louisiana CPL.86

247. Pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. § 51:1409, plaintiff seeks to recover actual damages on

behalf of Louisiana class members in an amount to be determined at trial; treble damages for

knowing violations of the Louisiana CPL; an order enjoining AbbVie’s unfair acts and practices;

declaratory relief; attorneys’ fees; and any other just and proper relief available under La. Rev. Stat.

§ 51:1409.

85
La. Rev. Stat. § 51:1405(A).
86
See Cheramie Servs., Inc. v. Shell Deepwater Prod., Inc., 35 So. 3d 1053, 1059 (La. 2010) (“The
courts have repeatedly held that, under this statute, the plaintiff must show the alleged conduct
‘offends established public policy and ... is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or
substantially injurious.’”) (citation omitted).

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VIOLATION OF THE MARYLAND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

MD. COM. LAW CODE § 13-101, ET SEQ.

248. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

249. This claim is brought on behalf of all Maryland residents who are class members.

250. The Maryland Consumer Protection Act (Maryland CPA) provides that a person

“may not engage in any unfair, abusive, or deceptive trade practice” in the sale of consumer

goods.87 The statute further provides that a person may not engage in such conduct regardless of

whether the consumer is actually deceived or damaged.88

251. AbbVie and Maryland class members are “persons” within the meaning of Md.

Code, Com. Law § 13-101(h).

252. AbbVie’s conduct, as described in this complaint, constitutes “unfair” acts and

practices in violation of the Maryland CPA.89

253. On behalf of Maryland class members, pursuant to Md. Code, Com. Law § 13-408,

plaintiff seeks actual damages, attorneys’ fees, and any other just and proper relief available under

the Maryland CPA.

87
Md. Code, Com. Law § 13-303.
88
Id. § 13-302.
89
See Sager v. Hous. Comm’n of Anne Arundel Cty., 957 F. Supp. 2d 627, 642 (D. Md. 2013) (“to
be considered unfair under the MCPA, a trade practice must result in a: (1) substantial injury;
(2) that is not outweighed by any countervailing benefits to the consumer or to competition that
the practice produces; and (3) it must not be the type of injury that a consumer could reasonably
have avoided”) (citing Legg v. Castruccio, 100 Md. App. 748, 642 A.2d 906 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App.1994)); accord, Hibdon v. Safeguard Properties, LLC, 2015 WL 4249525, at *4 (D. Md. July 9,
2015).

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254. The plaintiff also seeks an order on behalf of Maryland class members enjoining

AbbVie’s unfair acts and practices, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees, costs, and any other just

and proper relief available under Md. Code, Com. Law § 13-406.

VIOLATION OF THE MISSOURI MERCHANDISING PRACTICES ACT

MO. REV. STAT. § 407.010, ET SEQ.

255. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

256. This claim is brought on behalf of all Missouri residents who are class members.

257. The Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (Missouri MPA) makes unlawful the

“act, use or employment by any person of any … unfair practice … in connection with the sale or

advertisement of any merchandise.”90

258. AbbVie and Missouri class members are “persons” within the meaning of Mo. Rev.

Stat. § 407.010(5).

259. AbbVie’s conduct, as described in this complaint, constitutes “unfair” acts and

practices in violation of the Missouri MPA.91

260. AbbVie’s unfair acts and practices occurred in the conduct of trade or commerce,

within the meaning of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.010(7).

90
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.020.1.
91
See Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 15, § 60-8.020(1) (“An unfair practice is any practice which--
(A) Either--1. Offends any public policy as it has been established by the Constitution, statutes or
common law of this state, or by the Federal Trade Commission, or its interpretive decisions; or
2. Is unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous; and (B) Presents a risk of, or causes, substantial injury
to consumers.”).

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261. AbbVie is liable to the Missouri class members for damages in amounts to be

proven at trial, including attorneys’ fees, costs, and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief

enjoining AbbVie’s unfair act and practices, and any other just and proper relief under Mo. Rev.

Stat. § 407.025.

VIOLATION OF THE MONTANA CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-101, ET SEQ.

262. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

263. This claim is brought on behalf of all Montana residents who are class members.

264. The Montana Consumer Protection Act (Montana Act) provides that “unfair or

deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are unlawful.”92

265. The Montana class members are “consumers” within the meaning of the Montana

Act, and both those class members and AbbVie are “persons” within the meaning of the Montana

Act.93

266. AbbVie’s conduct, as described in this complaint, constitutes “unfair” acts and

practices in violation of the Montana Act.94

267. AbbVie’s unfair acts and practices occurred in the conduct of trade or commerce,

within the meaning of Mont. Code § 30-14-102(8)(a).

92
Mont. Code § 30-1-103.
93
Id. § 30-14-102(1), (6).
94
See Young v. Era Advantage Realty, 409 Mont. 234, 245, 513 P.3d 505, 513 (2022) (“An unfair
trade practice is one that is ‘contrary to established public policy and which is either immoral,
unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.’ Anderson v.
ReconTrust Co., N.A., 2017 MT 313, ¶ 19, 390 Mont. 12, 407 P.3d 692 (emphasis in original)
(citation and quotation omitted).”).

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268. AbbVie is liable to the Montana class members for damages in amounts to be

proven at trial, including attorneys’ fees, costs, and any other just and proper relief under Mont.

Code § 30-14-133.

VIOLATION OF THE NEBRASKA CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 59-1601, ET SEQ.

269. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

270. This claim is brought on behalf of all Nebraska residents who are class members.

271. The Nebraska Consumer Protection Act (Nebraska Act) provides that “unfair or

deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce shall be unlawful.”95

272. The Nebraska class members and AbbVie are “person” within the meaning of the

Nebraska Act.

273. AbbVie’s conduct, as described in this complaint, constitutes “unfair” acts and

practices in violation of the Nebraska Act.96

274. AbbVie’s unfair acts and practices occurred in the conduct of trade or commerce,

within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 59-1601(2).

95
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 59-1602.
96
See Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 59-829 (“When any provision of … Chapter 59 is the same as or
similar to the language of a federal antitrust law, the courts of this state in construing such sections
or chapter shall follow the construction given to the federal law by the federal courts.”). The
language of § 59-1602 is similar to 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1), so the standard in § 45(n), which is
quoted above, applies.

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275. AbbVie is liable to the Nebraska class members for damages in amounts to be

proven at trial, including attorneys’ fees, costs, and any other just and proper relief under Neb.

Rev. Stat. § 59–1609.

VIOLATION OF THE NEW HAMPSHIRE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:1, ET SEQ.

276. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

277. This claim is brought on behalf of all New Hampshire residents who are class

members.

278. The New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act (NH Act) provides that it “shall be

unlawful for any person to use … any unfair or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of any trade

or commerce within this state.”97

279. The New Hampshire class members and AbbVie are “person” within the meaning

of the NH Act.98

280. As alleged in this complaint, AbbVie’s conduct with respect to Humira constitutes

“unfair” acts and practices within the meaning of the NH Act, which provides that it “is the intent

of the legislature that in any action or prosecution under this chapter, the courts may be guided by

the interpretation and construction given Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15

97
N.H. Rev. Stat. § 358-A:2.
98
Id. § 358-A:1.

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U.S.C. 45(a)(1)), by the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts.” N.H. Rev. Stat. § 358-

A:13.99

281. AbbVie’s unfair acts and practices occurred in the conduct of trade or commerce,

within the meaning of N.H. Rev. Stat. § 358-A:1(II).

282. AbbVie is liable to the New Hampshire class members for damages in amounts to

be proven at trial, including attorneys’ fees, costs, and any other just and proper relief under N.H.

Rev. Stat. § 358-A:10, including injunctive relief.

VIOLATION OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSUMER FRAUD ACT

N.J.S.A.56:8-1, ET SEQ.

283. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

284. This claim is brought on behalf of all New Jersey residents who are class members.

285. The New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (NJCFA) makes unlawful “[t]he act, use or

employment by any person of any unconscionable commercial practice … in connection with the

sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate, or with the subsequent performance of

such person as aforesaid, whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged

thereby … .”100

99
15 U.S.C. § 45(n) provides that an act or practice is “unfair” if it “causes or is likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and
not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition. In determining
whether an act or practice is unfair, the Commission may consider established public policies as
evidence to be considered with all other evidence. Such public policy considerations may not serve
as a primary basis for such determination.” See State v. Priceline.com, Inc., 172 N.H. 28, 39, 206
A.3d 333, 343 (2019) (applying § 45(n) test).
100
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2.

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286. AbbVie and the New Jersey class members are “persons” within the meaning of N.J.

Stat. Ann. § 56:8-1(d).

287. AbbVie engaged in “sales” of “merchandise” within the meaning of N.J. Stat. Ann.

§ 56:8-1(c), (d).

288. As described in this complaint, AbbVie’s conduct constitutes “unconscionable” acts

and practices in violation of the NJCFA.

289. This unconscionable conduct by AbbVie, coupled with the damage the New Jersey

class members incurred, entitles New Jersey class members to relief under the NJCFA. Section 19

of the Act provides a private right of action, with damages automatically trebled, to “[a]ny person

who suffers any ascertainable loss of moneys or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or

employment by another person of any method, act, or practice declared unlawful under this

act … .”101 “In any action under this section the court shall, in addition to any other appropriate

legal or equitable relief, award threefold the damages sustained by any person in interest. In all

actions under this section, … the court shall also award reasonable attorneys’ fees, filing fees and

reasonable costs of suit.”102

290. Therefore, the New Jersey class members are entitled to recover legal and/or

equitable relief, including an order enjoining unconscionable conduct, treble damages, costs, and

reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-19, and any other appropriate relief.

101
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-19.
102
Id.

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VIOLATION OF THE NORTH CAROLINA UNFAIR

AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1, ET SEQ.

291. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

292. This claim is brought on behalf of all North Carolina residents who are class

members.

293. North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices Act (NCUDTPA)

broadly prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”103

294. AbbVie’s conduct, as described in this complaint, constitutes “unfair” acts and

practices in violation of the NCUDTPA.104

295. AbbVie’s unfair act and practices were in commerce and affected commerce, within

the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(b).

296. Section 75-16 of the NCUDTPA provides injured persons with a private right of

action and automatic trebling of damages: “If any person shall be injured or the business of any

person, firm or corporation shall be broken up, destroyed or injured by reason of any act or thing

done by any other person, firm or corporation in violation of the provisions of this Chapter, such

person, firm or corporation so injured shall have a right of action on account of such injury done,

103
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a).
104
See Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 367 N.C. 81, 91, 747 S.E.2d 220, 228 (2013) (“‘A
practice is unfair when it offends established public policy as well as when the practice is immoral,
unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers….’”) (quoting Walker
v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., 362 N.C. 63, 72, 653 S.E.2d 393, 399 (2007)).

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and if damages are assessed in such case judgment shall be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and

against AbbVie for treble the amount fixed by the verdict.”105

297. The North Carolina class members are entitled to damages and treble damages, an

order enjoining AbbVie’s unconscionable acts and practices, costs of Court, attorney’s fees, and

any other just and proper relief available under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16.

VIOLATION OF THE NORTH DAKOTA CONSUMER FRAUD ACT

N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-15-02

298. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

299. This claim is brought on behalf of all North Dakota residents who are class

members.

300. The North Dakota Consumer Fraud Act (North Dakota CFA) makes unlawful the

“act, use, or employment by any person of any act or practice, in connection with the sale or

advertisement of any merchandise, which is unconscionable or which causes or is likely to cause

substantial injury to a person which is not reasonably avoidable by the injured person and not

outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition, is declared to be an

unlawful practice.”106

301. AbbVie and North Dakota class members are “persons” within the meaning of

N.D. Cent. Code § 51-15-02(4).

105
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16.
106
Id.

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302. AbbVie engaged in the “sale” of “merchandise” within the meaning of N.D. Cent.

Code § 51-15-02(3), (5).

303. As described in this complaint, AbbVie’s conduct caused North Dakota class

members to suffer substantial injury that they could not reasonably avoid and which was not

outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.

304. AbbVie knowingly committed the conduct described above. As a result, under N.D.

Cent. Code § 51-15-09, it is liable to the North Dakota class members for treble damages in

amounts to be proven at trial, attorneys’ fees, costs, and disbursements. The plaintiff further seeks

an order on behalf of North Dakota class members enjoining AbbVie’s unlawful acts and practices

as well as all other just and proper available relief under the North Dakota CFA.

VIOLATION OF THE OKLAHOMA CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

OKLA. STAT. TIT. 15, § 751, ET SEQ.

305. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

306. This claim is brought on behalf of all Oklahoma residents who are class members.

307. The Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act (Oklahoma CPA) provides that a “person

engages in a practice which is declared to be unlawful under the Oklahoma Consumer Protection

Act when, in the course of the person’s business, the person: … (20) Commits an unfair or

deceptive trade practice as defined in Section 752 of this title … .”107 Under section 752, “‘Unfair

107
Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 753(2).

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trade practice’ means any practice which offends established public policy or if the practice is

immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers….”108

308. The Oklahoma class members are “persons” under Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 752.

309. AbbVie is a “person,” “corporation,” or “association” within the meaning of Okla.

Stat. tit. 15, § 15-751(1).

310. The sale of Humira to the Oklahoma class members was a “consumer transaction”

within the meaning of Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 752, and AbbVie’s actions as set forth herein occurred

in the course of its business.

311. AbbVie’s conduct, as described in this complaint, constitutes an “unfair trade

practice” in violation of the Oklahoma CPA.

312. Because AbbVie’s unfair conduct caused injury to Oklahoma class members, the

plaintiff seeks recovery on behalf of Oklahoma class members of actual damages, discretionary

penalties up to $2,000 per violation, and reasonable attorneys’ fees under Okla. Stat. tit. 15,

§ 761.1. The plaintiff further seeks an order on behalf of Oklahoma class members enjoining

AbbVie’s unfair trade practices and any other just and proper relief available under the Oklahoma

CPA.

313. The plaintiff also seeks punitive damages on behalf of Oklahoma class members

because AbbVie’s conduct was egregious. AbbVie inflated Humira’s list prices and concealed the

reasons for and amount of the rebates offered to PBMs to increase their profits at the expense of

consumers. It manipulated the prices of Humira without regard to the impact of its scheme on

consumers, warranting punitive damages.

108
Id. § 752(14).

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VIOLATION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES

AND CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW
73 P.S. § 201-1, ET SEQ.

314. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

315. This claim is brought on behalf of all Pennsylvania residents who are class

members.

316. The Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL)

provides that “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce as

defined by subclauses (i) through (xxi) of clause (4) of section 21 of this act and regulations

promulgated under section 3.1 of this act are hereby declared unlawful.”109

317. The Pennsylvania class members and AbbVie are “persons” within the meaning of

the UTPCPL.110

318. As alleged in this complaint, AbbVie’s conduct with respect to Humira constitutes

“unfair” acts and practices within the meaning of the UTPCPL.111

109
73 P.S. § 201-3(a).
110
Id., § 201-2.
111
See Telebrands Corp. v. VindEx Sols. LLC, 2022 WL 1062051, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2022)
(in determining whether an act of practice is unfair under Pennsylvania law, “courts consider
factors including “(1) [w]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered
unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or
otherwise – whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common-law,
statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical,
oppressive, or unscrupulous, (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers (or competitors
or other businessmen)’”) (quoting Com. Ex rel. Zimmerman v. Nickel, 26 Pa. D. & C. 3d 115, 120–
21 (C.P. 1983); Westfield Grp. v. Campisi, 2006 WL 328415, at *18 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 2006) (“And
an act or practice need not be proven to be deceptive in order to be declared ‘unfair’—which
necessarily involves consideration of a variety of factors including whether the practice causes
substantial injury to consumers or others.”).

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319. AbbVie’s unfair acts and practices occurred in the conduct of trade or commerce,

within the meaning of 73 P.S. § 201-2(3).

320. AbbVie is liable to the Pennsylvania class members for damages in amounts to be

proven at trial, including attorneys’ fees, costs, and treble damages, along with any other just and

proper relief under 73 P.S. § 201-9.2.

VIOLATION OF THE RHODE ISLAND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT

6 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-13.1-1, ET SEQ.

321. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

322. This claim is brought on behalf of all Rhode Island residents who are class

members.

323. The Rhode Island Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Rhode Island Act) provides that

“unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are declared

unlawful.”112

324. The Rhode Island class members and AbbVie are “persons” within the meaning of

the Rhode Island Act.113

325. As alleged in this complaint, AbbVie’s conduct with respect to Humira constitutes

“unfair” acts and practices within the meaning of the Rhode Island Act.114

112
R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-13.1-2.
113
Id., § 201-2.
114
Long v. Dell, Inc., 93 A.3d 988, 1000 (R.I. 2014) (“To determine whether a trade practice is
‘unfair’ under the DTPA, this Court has stated that the following factors apply: ‘(1) Whether the
practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as
it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise—whether, in other words, it is
within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other established concept of
unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes

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326. AbbVie’s unfair acts and practices occurred in the conduct of trade or commerce,

within the meaning of R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-13.1-1(5).

327. AbbVie is liable to the Rhode Island class members for damages in amounts to be

proven at trial, including attorneys’ fees, costs, and treble damages, along with any other just and

proper relief under R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-13.1–5.2.

VIOLATION OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT

S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-10, ET SEQ.

328. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

329. This claim is brought on behalf of all South Carolina residents who are class

members.

330. The South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (South Carolina UTPA) prohibits

“unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.”115

331. AbbVie is a “person” under S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-10.

332. AbbVie’s conduct, as described in this complaint, constitutes “unfair” acts and

practices in violation of the South Carolina UTPA, which provides that “the courts will be guided

by the interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Courts to Section

substantial injury to consumers (or competitors or other businessmen).’”). See id. at 1000 n.12
(“What effect the FTC’s 1980 policy statement and 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) have on the unfairness
analysis is not before us.”).
115
S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-20(a).

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5(a) (1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)), as from time to time amended.”

S.C. Code § 39-5-20(b).116

333. AbbVie’s unfair acts and practices occurred in the conduct of trade or commerce,

within the meaning of S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-10(b).

334. Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-140(a), the plaintiff seeks monetary relief on

behalf of South Carolina class members to recover their economic losses. Because AbbVie’s actions

were willful and knowing, the damages should be trebled.

335. The plaintiff further alleges on behalf of South Carolina class members that

AbbVie’s malicious and deliberate conduct warrants an assessment of punitive damages because it

carried out despicable conduct with willful and conscious disregard of the rights and safety of

others, subjecting the South Carolina class members to cruel and unjust hardship as a result.

AbbVie unfairly inflated its list prices and concealed the reasons for and amount of the rebates

offered to PBMs to increase its profits at the expense of consumers. And it manipulated the prices

of its product without regard to the impact of its scheme on consumers’ ability to afford medicines.

Its unfair conduct warrants punitive damages.

336. The plaintiff further seeks an order on behalf of South Carolina class members

enjoining AbbVie’s unfair acts and practices.

116
See Upstate Plumbing, Inc. v. AAA Upstate Plumbing of Greenville, LLC, 2018 WL 1471908, at
*6 (D.S.C. Mar. 26, 2018) (in case brought pursuant to South Carolina UTPA, court applied test
under 15 U.S.C. § 45(n)).

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VIOLATION OF THE TENNESSEE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-101, ET SEQ.

337. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

338. This claim is brought on behalf of all Tennessee residents who are class members.

339. Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (Tennessee CPA) prohibits “[u]nfair or

deceptive acts or practices affecting the conduct of any trade or commerce.”117 Moreover, it “is the

intent of the general assembly that this part shall be interpreted and construed consistently with

the interpretations given by the federal trade commission and the federal courts pursuant to §

5(A)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, codified in 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).”118

340. The Tennessee class members are “natural persons” and “consumers” within the

meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-103(2).

341. AbbVie is a “person” within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-103(2).

342. AbbVie’s conduct complained of herein affected “trade,” “commerce,” or

“consumer transactions” within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-103(19).

343. AbbVie’s conduct, as described in this complaint, constitutes “unfair acts” in

violation of the Tennessee CPA.

117
Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-104.
118
Id. § 47-18-115. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) provides that an act or practice is “unfair” if it “causes or
is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers
themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition. In
determining whether an act or practice is unfair, the Commission may consider established public
policies as evidence to be considered with all other evidence. Such public policy considerations
may not serve as a primary basis for such determination.”

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344. On behalf of Tennessee class members, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-

109(a), the plaintiff seeks monetary relief against AbbVie, measured as actual damages in an

amount to be determined at trial, treble damages as a result of AbbVie’s willful or knowing

violations, and any other just and proper relief available under the Tennessee CPA.

VIOLATION OF THE TEXAS DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES

CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.41, ET SEQ.

345. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

346. This claim is brought on behalf of all Texas residents who are class members.

347. Each Texas class member is a “consumer” within the meaning of the Texas

Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (TDTPA).119 AbbVie is a “person” within the

meaning of the TDTPA.120

348. The TDTPA provides that a “consumer may maintain an action where any of the

following constitute a producing cause of economic damages or damages for mental anguish: … (3)

any unconscionable action or course of action by any person….”121

349. The TDTPA defines an “[u]nconscionable action or course of action” as “an act or

practice which, to a consumer’s detriment, takes advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability,

experience, or capacity of the consumer to a grossly unfair degree.”122 The Texas courts further

119
See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.45(4).
120
Id. § 17.45(3).
121
Id. § 17.50(a)(3).
122
Id. § 17.45(5).

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define an unconscionable act as “one that takes advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability,

experience, or capacity of a person to a ‘grossly unfair degree,’ or which results in a gross disparity

between the value received and consideration paid, in a transaction involving transfer of

consideration.”123

350. As alleged in this complaint, AbbVie engaged in unconscionable actions in

violation of the TDTPA.

351. Pursuant to Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.50(a)(1) and (b), the plaintiff seeks

monetary relief against AbbVie on behalf of the Texas class members, measured as actual damages

in an amount to be determined at trial, treble damages for AbbVie’s knowing violations of the

TDTPA, and any other just and proper relief available under the TDTPA.

352. Alternatively, or additionally, pursuant to Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.50(b)(3) &

(4), the Texas class members who purchased Humira are entitled to disgorgement or to rescission

or to any other relief necessary to restore any money or property that was acquired from them

based on AbbVie’s violations of the TDTPA.

353. The Texas class members are also entitled to recover court costs and reasonable and

necessary attorneys’ fees under § 17.50(d) of the TDTPA.

123
Brennan v. Manning, No. 07-06-0041-CV, 2007 WL 1098476, at *5 (Tex. App. Apr. 12,
2007); see also Lon Smith & Assocs., Inc. v. Key, 527 S.W.3d 604, 623, 2017 WL 3298391, at *11
(Tex. Ct. App. Aug 3, 2017) (“The DTPA defines ‘[u]nconscionable action or course of action’ as
‘an act or practice which, to a consumer’s detriment, takes advantage of the lack of knowledge,
ability, experience, or capacity of the consumer to a grossly unfair degree.’” (quoting Tex. Bus. &
Comm. Code Ann. § 17.45(5))); Robinson v. Match.com, L.L.C., 3:10-CV-2651-L, 2012 WL
5007777, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2012), aff’d sub nom. Malsom v. Match.com, L.L.C., 540 F. App’x
412 (5th Cir. 2013); McPeters v. LexisNexis, 910 F. Supp. 2d 981, 988 (S.D. Tex. 2012).

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354. On April 19, 2023, the plaintiff sent a letter to AbbVie, complying g with Tex. Bus.

& Com. Code § 17.505(a). Pursuant to § 17:505(d) suit is filed now to protect any argument

regarding the statute of limitations.

VIOLATION OF THE UTAH CONSUMER SALE PRACTICES ACT

UTAH CODE § 13-11-1, ET SEQ.

355. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

356. This claim is brought on behalf of all Utah residents who are class members.

357. The Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act (Utah CSPA) makes unlawful an

“unconscionable act or practice by a supplier in connection with a consumer transaction.”124 “The

unconscionability of an act or practice is a question of law for the court. If it is claimed or appears

to the court that an act or practice may be unconscionable, the parties shall be given a reasonable

opportunity to present evidence as to its setting, purpose, and effect to aid the court in making its

determination.”125 “In determining whether an act or practice is unconscionable, the court shall

consider circumstances which the supplier knew or had reason to know.”126

358. As alleged in this complaint, AbbVie engaged in unconscionable acts and practices

in violation of the Utah CSPA. Each class member entered into a “consumer transaction”

regarding Humira, as defined by the Utah CSPA.127

124
Utah Code § 13-11-5(1).
125
Id. § 13-11-5(2).
126
Id. § 13-11-5(3).
127
Id. § 13-11-3(2)(a).

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359. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-4, the plaintiff seeks the following relief on

behalf of the Utah class members: monetary relief measured as the greater of (a) actual damages in

an amount to be determined at trial and (b) statutory damages in the amount of $2,000 for each

class member; reasonable attorneys’ fees; and any other just and proper relief available under the

Utah CSPA.

VIOLATION OF THE VERMONT CONSUMER FRAUD ACT

VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 9, § 2451, ET SEQ.

360. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

361. This claim is brought on behalf of all Vermont residents who are class members.

362. The Vermont Consumer Fraud Act (Vermont Act) provides that “unfair or

deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are declared unlawful.”128

363. The Vermont class members and AbbVie are “consumers” within the meaning of

the Vermont Act, and AbbVie is a “seller” within the meaning of that Act.129

364. As alleged in this complaint, AbbVie’s conduct with respect to Humira constitutes

“unfair” acts and practices in commerce within the meaning of the Vermont Act.130

128
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 2453(a).
129
Id., § 2451a.
130
See Christie v. Dalmig, Inc., 136 Vt. 597, 601, 396 A.2d 1385, 1388 (1979) (in assessing
unfairness under Vermont Act, Supreme Court applied test of “‘(1) whether the practice, without
necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been
established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise whether, in other words, it is within at least
the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness;
(2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial
injury to consumers … .’”) (quoting F.T.C. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5
(1972)).

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365. AbbVie is liable to the Vermont class members for damages in amounts to be

proven at trial, including attorneys’ fees, costs, and treble damages, along with any other just and

proper relief under Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 2464c.

VIOLATION OF THE WASHINGTON CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.010, ET SEQ.

366. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

367. This claim is brought on behalf of all Washington residents who are class members.

368. The Washington Consumer Protection Act (Washington Act) provides that “unfair

or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared

unlawful.”131

369. The Washington class members and AbbVie are “persons” within the meaning of

the Vermont Act.132

370. As alleged in this complaint, AbbVie’s conduct with respect to Humira constitutes

“unfair” acts and practices within the meaning of the Washington Act. 133

131
Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.020.
132
Id., § 19.86.010.
133
See Gray v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:22-cv-800-BJR, 2023 WL 1068513, at *7 (W.D. Wash.
Jan. 27, 2023) (“It is possible that an act or practice is ‘unfair without being deceptive.’ Klem v.
Washington Mut. Bank, 176 Wash. 2d 771, 786, 295 P.3d 1179 (2013). To prevail on such a theory,
the plaintiff must establish that the act or practice ‘causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and is not outweighed by
countervailing benefits [to consumers or to competition].’ Alpert v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, No. 15-
cv-1164, 2019 WL 1200541, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 14, 2019) (quoting Klem, 176 Wash. 2d at
786, 295 P.3d 1179).”). Accord, Domain Name Comm’n Ltd. v. DomainTools, LLC, 449 F. Supp. 3d
1024, 1032 (W.D. Wash. 2020).

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371. AbbVie’s unfair acts and practices occurred in the conduct of trade or commerce,

within the meaning of Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.010(2).

372. AbbVie is liable to the Washington class members for damages in amounts to be

proven at trial, including attorneys’ fees, costs, and treble damages, along with any other just and

proper relief under Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.090, including injunctive relief.

VIOLATION OF THE WYOMING CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-101, ET SEQ.

373. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs of this complaint.

374. This claim is brought on behalf of all Wyoming residents who are class members.

375. The Wyoming Consumer Protection Act (WCPA) prohibits, “in the course of [a

person’s] business and in connection with a consumer transaction,” any “unfair or deceptive acts

or practices….”134

376. The Wyoming class members and AbbVie are “persons” within the meaning of the

WCPA.135 And AbbVie’s conduct, as alleged above, was in it the course of its business and in

connection with “consumer transactions” within the meaning of the WCPA.136

377. As alleged in this complaint, AbbVie’s conduct with respect to Humira constitutes

“unfair” acts and practices within the meaning of the WCPA.137

134
Wyo. Stat. § 40-12-105(a)(xv).
135
Id., § 40-12-102(a)(i).
136
Id., § 40-12-102(a)(ii).
137
See WyoLaw, LLC v. Off. of Att’y Gen., Consumer Prot. Unit, 486 P.3d 964, 972 (Wyo. 2021)
(“[The WCPA] includes a general prohibition on ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices.’ § 40-12-
105(a)(xv). ‘Although the WCPA does not define these terms, a “deceptive practice” has broadly
been understood as one that is likely to mislead consumers, and an “unfair practice” as one that

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378. AbbVie is liable to the class members for damages in amounts to be proven at trial,

including attorneys’ fees and costs, along with any other just and proper relief under Wyo. Stat. §

40-12-108.

379. On April 19, 2023, the plaintiff sent a letter to AbbVie, complying with Wyo. Stat.

Ann. § 40-12-109. Because AbbVie failed to remedy its unlawful conduct within the requisite

period, the plaintiff seeks all damages and relief to which Wyoming class members are entitled See

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-12-109 (“No action may be brought under this act, except under W.S. 40-12-

106, unless the consumer bringing the action gives within the following time limits notice in

writing to the alleged violator of the act, (a) within one (1) year after the initial discovery of the

unlawful deceptive trade practice, (b) within two (2) years following such consumer transaction,

whichever occurs first, and unless the unlawful deceptive trade practice becomes an uncured

unlawful deceptive trade practice as defined in this act. The notice required under this section

shall state fully the nature of the alleged unlawful deceptive trade practice and the actual damage

suffered therefrom. No action may be brought under this act, except under W.S. 40-12-106, unless

said action is initiated within one (1) year after the furnishing of notice as required under this

section.”

DEMAND FOR JUDGMENT

WHEREFORE, the plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the proposed class, respectfully

demands that this Court:

offends established public policy or is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or

substantially injurious to consumers.’ Nicklas v. Pro. Assistance, LLC, No. 18-CV-0066-SWS, 2018
WL 8619646, at *3 (D. Wyo. Sept. 26, 2018) (quoting 152 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 409 § 11
(2016))….”).

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A. Determine that this action may be maintained as a class action under Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3), and direct that reasonable notice of this action, as

provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2), be given to any class certified under Rule

23(b)(3), and declare the plaintiff as the representative of the certified class;

B. Enter judgment against AbbVie and in favor of the plaintiff and the class;

C. Award the plaintiff and the class damages, including treble damages and punitive

damages if authorized by law, in an amount to be determined at trial;

D. Award the plaintiff and the class their costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys’

fees as provided by law;

E. Enjoin AbbVie from continuing to report artificially inflated list prices that do not

approximate its true net prices; and

F. Award such further and additional relief as the case may require and the Court may

deem just and proper under the circumstances.

JURY DEMAND

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38, the plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the

proposed class, demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable.

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Dated: April 25, 2023 Respectfully submitted,

HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP

By: /s/ Steve W. Berman

Steve W. Berman (#3126833)
Craig R. Spiegel (#3128238)
HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
1301 Second Ave., Suite 2000
Seattle, WA 98101
Telephone: (206) 623-7292
Facsimile: (206) 623-0594
[email protected]
[email protected]

Mark T. Vazquez (#6310387)

Whitney K. Siehl (#6313995)
455 N. CityFront Plaza Dr., Suite 2410
Chicago, IL 60611
Telephone: (708) 628-4962
Facsimile: (708) 628-4950
[email protected]
[email protected]

Thomas M. Sobol (pro hac vice to be applied for)

Hannah W. Brennan (pro hac vice to be applied for)
HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
55 Cambridge Parkway, Suite 301
Cambridge, MA 02142
Telephone: (617) 482-3700
Facsimile: (617) 482-3003
[email protected]
[email protected]

James E. Cecchi (pro hac vice to be applied for)

Donald A. Ecklund (pro hac vice to be applied for)
CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI BRODY AGNELLO, P.C.
5 Becker Farm Road
Roseland, NJ 07068
Telephone: (973) 994-1700
Facsimile: (973) 994-1744
[email protected]
[email protected]

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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