Digitally Signed By:DINESH

SINGH NAYAL
Signing Date:31.08.2021 17:04:15

$~3
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 25th August, 2021
+ W.P.(C) 8485/2021 & CM APPL. 26248/2021
GAURAV ENTERPRISES ..... Petitioner
Through: Ms. Maninder Acharya, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Tarkeshwar Nath,
Mr. Rajiv Shukla, Mr. Viplav
Acharya, Mr. Shikhar Kishore, Ms.
Shivani Kapoor and Mr. Sanjay
Kumar, Advocates.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Shivanath Mahanta, Advocate for
R-2 & 3.
Mr. Rizwan, Advocate for R-4 to 9.
CORAM:
JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH

Prathiba M. Singh, J.(Oral)

1. This hearing has been done through video conferencing.

2. The present petition has been filed challenging order dated 3rd August,
2021 passed by the CGIT, by which the CGIT has refused to grant a stay in
respect of the interest component imposed under Section 7Q of the
Employees' Provident Fund & Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952
(hereinafter, “EPF Act”) on the ground that no opinion can be formed at
this stage as to whether the order which was passed by the original authority,
i.e., the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (hereinafter, “RPFC”), is a
composite order under Sections 14B and 7Q of the EPF Act.
3. The brief background to this petition is that vide a common show-
cause notice dated 23rd May, 2019, proceedings were initiated against the
Petitioner under Sections 14B and 7Q of the EPF Act. The said show-cause

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notice relates to alleged defaults occurring during the period from 1st
November, 2013 till 31st March, 2019. The show-cause notice commences
with the title - “Summons to appear for hearing u/s 14B of the EPF and MP
Act, 1952 (and order for payment of interest u/s 7Q for 01/11/2013 to
31/03/2019”. In response to this show-cause notice, a common reply is filed
by the Petitioner on 10th June, 2019. Thereafter, further submissions have
also been made in the form of letters and documents on 11th June,
2019. After receipt of the documents, including challans which showed
some deposits by the Petitioner, a revised notice was issued by the RPFC on
25th September, 2019, which is again a joint notice under Sections 14B and
7Q of the EPF Act. The revised computation is as under:

Account 14B 7Q Total

I 4329204 2843052 7172256
II 278671 179706 458377
X 2184113 1425243 3609356
XXI 127022 82281 209303
XXII 2480 1602 4082
Total 6921490 4531884 11453374

(Rupees One Crore Fourteen Lakh Fifty Thousand Three Hundred

and Seventy Four Only)

4. Common replies to the revised notice were again filed by the

Petitioner on various dates between 2nd January, 2020 to 3rd June,
2021. Hearings have been held before the authority on various occasions. A
perusal of the order sheets shows that they clearly mention that these are
“Proceeding under Section 14B & 7Q of the EPF & MP Act, 1952”. Each
order sheet which has been placed on record, dated 10th June 2019, 1st July,
2019, 9th January, 2020, 24th January 2020 and 10th September, 2020, shows

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SINGH NAYAL
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that a common order has been passed under Sections 14B and 7Q of the EPF
Act.
5. However, thereafter, the RPFC chose to pass separate orders under
Section 14B and Section 7Q. Under Section 14B, the total demand raised
was to the tune of Rs.69,21,490/-. The order under Section 14B is passed on
26th May, 2021 and communicated to the Petitioner on 15th June, 2021. The
order under Section 7Q is also passed on 26th May, 2021 and communicated
to the Petitioner on 15th June, 2021. The total amount computed under
Section 7Q is Rs.40,81,884/-. Thus, both orders bear the same date and have
been communicated to the Petitioner on the same date.
6. Considering the said two orders as composite orders, the Petitioner
approached the CGIT. The CGIT, while admitting the appeal, imposed a
stay on the assessment of damages under Section 14B, subject to pre-deposit
of 10% of the assessed amount of damages. However, insofar as the order
under Section 7Q is concerned, no stay was granted. The operative portion
of the CGIT’s order is extracted herein below:
“Hence in this case it is directed that there should be
an interim stay on the execution of the impugned order
levying damage, pending disposal of the appeal. But
the said interim order cannot be unconditional. The
appellant is directed to deposit 10% of the assessed
amount of damage through challan within four weeks
from the date of communication of this order as a
precondition for stay pending disposal of the appeal. It
is made clear that there would be no stay on the
interest assessed by the commissioner as no opinion
can be formed at this stage whether it is a composite
order or not. Put up after four weeks i.e on 31st
August, 2021 for compliance of the direction. Interim
stay granted earlier shall continue till then.”

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SINGH NAYAL
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It is this order that is under challenge before this Court.

7. The primary submission on behalf of the Petitioner is that the orders
under Sections 14B and 7Q are composite orders as they arise out of the
same show cause notice and the same proceedings. Though they are finally
characterised as separate orders, they should be treated as one composite
order.
8. Ms. Acharya, ld. Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioner submits
that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Arcot Textiles Mills Ltd. v.
Regional Provident Fund Commissioner & Ors., (2013) 16 SCC 1 is quite
clear on two propositions. Firstly, that an order under Section 7Q of the EPF
Act, when passed along with either an order under Section 7A or any other
appealable order under Section 7I, for example an order under Section 14B,
would be appealable under Section 7I. Vehement reliance is placed upon
paragraphs 15 to 18 of the said judgment. Secondly, in the said judgement
the Court holds that as there could be errors in computation under Section
7Q, the Petitioner ought to be heard before levying of interest.
9. Ms. Acharya, ld. Senior counsel also relies upon the practice of other
EPF offices in Gurgaon, Faridabad as also the views taken by the CGIT
(Mumbai) and CGIT (Delhi) to argue that all these offices follow the
discipline of passing common orders. Reliance is placed upon an order
passed by the CGIT, Delhi where an appeal has been admitted in a case
where there are separate orders under Sections 14B and 7Q. However, some
offices of the EPFO (Delhi) pass separate orders even though common
inquiry is held, only in order to inconvenience the employer. She terms such
practice of the EPFO as a `mischief’. Ms. Acharya concludes her
submissions by stating that the order under Section 7Q is not an independent

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SINGH NAYAL
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order in the facts of this case, and hence, the appeal against the order under
Section 7Q ought to be entertained by the CGIT.
10. The question as to whether interest is liable to be paid would be on the
merits of the dispute. This Court put a query to counsels as to why the
Petitioner ought not to be allowed to challenge the impugned demand under
Section 7Q, before the Tribunal itself where the challenge to the Section
14B demand is pending, in view of Arcot Textiles Mills Ltd. v. Regional
Provident Fund Commissioner & Ors., (2013) 16 SCC 1.
11. Mr. Mahanta submits that Arcot Textiles (supra) is clear to the extent
that if the orders are passed separately and are not composite in nature, no
appeal is maintainable against the demand of interest under Section 7Q.
Thus, he submits that in view of Arcot Textiles Mills (supra), the Tribunal
has refused to grant a stay in respect of Section 7Q and has only entertained
the appeal in respect of Section 14B. Mr. Mahanta, ld. counsel, further
submits that the judgment of the ld. Division Bench of this Court in M/s Net
4 India Limited vs. Union of India & Anr. [W.P.(C) 6673/2016, decided on
2nd August, 2016] clearly holds that an appeal would not be maintainable if
an independent order is passed under Section 7Q. The judgement in M/s Net
4 India (supra) has been challenged and the same is pending adjudication
before the Supreme Court. Ld. counsel also places reliance on the judgment
of the Full Bench of this Court in Roma Henny Securities Services Pvt. Ltd.
v. Central Board of Trustees, E.P.F. Organization through Assistant P.F.
Commissioner, Delhi (North) [W.P.(C) 831/2012, decided on 12th
September, 2012], which has been remanded back for adjudication by the
Supreme Court vide order dated 27th February, 2019 in Civil Appeal No.
6592/2014 titled Central Board of Trustees v. Roma Henny Securities

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Services Pvt. Ltd.. Thus, it is submitted that no opinion should be rendered

in the writ petition on the issue of Section 7Q.
12. Finally, reliance is placed by Mr. Mahanta, ld. counsel on a recent
order dated 9th November, 2020 of the CGIT, Delhi in Appeal No. D-
1/28/2020 titled GAPL Automotive Ltd. v. APFC Delhi (East), wherein
pursuant to a remand order dated 1st September, 2020 passed in W.P.(C)
5864/2020 titled GAPL Automotive Pvt. Ltd. v. APFC, the Tribunal has
taken the view that an order under Section 7Q cannot be challenged before
the Tribunal. He also relies upon the judgment of the Guahati High Court in
W.P. No. 30(K) of 2016 titled Shri Lhousakhotuo Vimero v. The State of
Nagaland & Ors. where the High Court has held that if a Tribunal lacks
inherent jurisdiction, it cannot be bestowed with jurisdiction by any other
mechanism. Mr. Mahanta, ld. counsel also relies upon paragraph 17 of the
Arcot Textiles Mills (supra) to argue that if the order under Section 7Q is a
separate order, it is not appealable under Section 7I.
13. The question that arises at this stage, at the outset is as to whether the
order passed under Section 7Q ought to be treated as a composite order with
the order passed under Section 14B of the EPF Act, in terms of the judgment
of the Supreme Court in Arcot Textiles Mills Ltd. (supra).
14. As per the scheme of the EPF Act, the EPF Authority passes an order
under Section 7A, after holding an inquiry, if it is found that the employer
has not deposited the amounts in terms of the Act. The order passed under
Section 7A is appealable under Section 7I. In order to ensure compliance by
employers with the provisions of the EPF Act in depositing the provident
fund amounts for the welfare of their employees, there are certain stringent
provisions that were introduced. These provisions were meant to dissuade

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employers from not making/delaying deposits on behalf of employees. Two

such provisions are Section 7Q and Section 14B.
15. Once the amount due by the employer is determined under Section
7A, the authority commences an inquiry under Section 7Q to determine as to
whether interest would be liable to be paid on the belated or non-deposit of
EPF dues. In addition, under Section 14, various penalties can be imposed
on the employer. Under Section 14B, penalty can be levied on the employer,
in the form of damages not exceeding the amount of arrears, for default in
contributing to the provident fund. The question as to whether interest under
Section 7Q would be liable to be paid once penalty by way of damages has
been imposed under Section 14B is not the subject matter of this petition.
The said issue is stated to be pending before a Full Bench of this Court in
Roma Henney (supra).
16. The EPF Authority, while determining the amount due under Section
7A, has the option to levy interest at that stage itself under Section 7Q.
However, it is noticed that on most occasions, after the determination under
Section 7A, a fresh inquiry is initiated for demanding interest and for
imposition of penalty in the form of damages under Section 14B. An order
passed under Section 14B is appealable to the Tribunal under Section 7I.
However, no appellate remedy is provided in respect of a demand of interest
raised against the employer under Section 7Q. There are several petitions
filed before various High Courts challenging the demand for payment of
interest imposed in terms of Section 7Q. Therefore, in case of orders passed
under Sections 7Q and 14B, two forums i.e., the Tribunal and the High
Court in a writ petition, adjudicate whether the demand for damages and
interest, respectively, is valid or not.

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17. The question as to whether a demand under Section 7Q is appealable

to the Tribunal or not was considered by the Supreme Court in Arcot
Textiles Mills Ltd. (supra). In the said case, the Supreme Court was dealing
with an appeal from the Madras High Court wherein the High Court had
held that the order of the EPF Authority raising a demand for interest under
Section 7Q would have to first be assailed in appeal before the Tribunal and
not by way of a writ petition. In Arcot Textiles Mills Ltd. (supra), while
dealing with the scheme of the EPF Act and the appealable nature of the said
order, the Supreme Court observed as under:
“12. This court in Maharashtra State Cooperative
Bank Limited v. Assistant provident Fund
Commissioner and others while interpreting the
expression “any amount due from an employer” has
opined as follows:-
“The expression “any amount due from an
employer” appearing in sub-section (2) of
Section 11 has to be interpreted keeping in
view the object of the Act and other
provisions contained therein including sub-
section (1) of Section 11 and Sections 7-A, 7-
Q, 14-b and 15(2) which provide for
determination of the dues payable by the
employer, liability of the employer to pay
interest in case the payment of the amount
due is delayed and also pay damages, if
there is default in making contribution to the
Fund. If any amount payable by the employer
becomes due and the same is not paid within
the stipulated time, then the employer is
required to pay interest in terms of the
mandate of Section 7-Q. Likewise, default on
the employer’s part to pay any contribution
to the Fund can visit him with the

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consequence of levy of damages.”

13. We have referred to the aforesaid decision only for
the purpose of the levy of interest under Section 7Q is a
part of the sum recoverable under Section 11 (2) of the
Act, and it is an insegregable part of the total amount
due from employer.
14. At this juncture, it is relevant to state that the
tribunal was constituted at a later stage. Section 7I
provides for appeals to the tribunal. The said provision
reads as follows:-
“7I. Appeals to Tribunal. – (1) Any person
aggrieved by a notification issued by the
Central Government, or an order passed by
the Central Government or any authority,
under the proviso to sub-section (3), or sub-
section (4) of section 1, or section 3, or sub-
section (1) of section 7A, or section 7B
except an order rejecting an application for
review referred to in sub-section (5) thereof,
or section 7C, or section 14B, may prefer an
appeal to a Tribunal against such
notification or order.
(2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall
be filed in such form and manner, within
such time and be accompanied by such fees,
as may be prescribed.”
15. On a perusal of the aforesaid provision it is evident
that an appeal to the tribunal lies in respect of certain
action of the Central Government or order passed by
the Central Government or any authority on certain
provisions of the Act. We have scanned the anatomy of
the said provisions before. On a studied scrutiny, it is
quite vivid that though an appeal lies against recovery
of damages under Section 14B of the Act, no appeal is
provided for against imposition of interest as stipulated
under Section 7Q. It is seemly to note here that Section
14B has been enacted to penalize the defaulting
employers as also to provide reparation for the amount

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of loss suffered by the employees. It is not only a

warning to employers in general not to commit a
breach of the statutory requirements but at the same
time it is meant to provide compensation or redress to
the beneficiaries, i.e., to recompense the employees for
the loss sustained by them. The entire amount of
damages awarded under Section 14B except for the
amount relatable to administrative charges is to be
transferred to the Employees’ Provident Fund. (see
Organo Chemical Industries and another v. Union of
India and others).
16. Presently we shall refer to 7Q of the Act. It is as
follows:-
“7Q. Interest payable by the employer.- The
employer shall be liable to pay simple
interest at the rate of twelve per cent per
annum or at such higher rate as may be
specified in the Scheme on any amount due
from him under this Act from the date on
which the amount has become so due till the
date of its actual payment:
Provided that higher rate of interest
specified in the Scheme shall not exceed the
lending rate of interest charged by any
scheduled bank.”
17. Ms. Aparna Bhat, learned counsel for the
respondent Nos. 1 to 3 would contend that the payment
of interest by the employer in case of belated payment
is statutorily leviable and a specified rate having been
provided, the authority has no discretion and,
therefore, it is only a matter of computation and there
cannot be any challenge to it. Be it noted, it was
canvassed by the said respondents before the High
Court that an appeal would lie against an order passed
under 7Q. On a scrutiny of Section 7I, we notice that
the language is clear and unambiguous and it does not
provide for an appeal against the determination made
under 7Q. It is well settled in law that right of appeal is

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a creature of statute, for the right of appeal inheres in

no one and, therefore, for maintainability of an appeal
there must be authority of law. This being the position
a provision providing for appeal should neither be
construed too strictly nor too liberally, for if given
either of these extreme interpretations, it is bound to
adversely affect the legislative object as well as
hamper the proceedings before the appropriate forum.
Needless to say, a right of appeal cannot be assumed to
exist unless expressly provided for by the statute and a
remedy of appeal must be legitimately traceable to the
statutory provisions. If the express words employed in
a provision do not provide an appeal from a particular
order, the court is bound to follow the express words.
To put it otherwise, an appeal for its maintainability
must have the clear authority of law and that explains
why the right of appeal is described as a creature of
statute. (See: Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar and others,
Gujarat Agro Industries Co. Ltd. v. Muncipal
Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and Ors., State
of Haryana v. Maruti Udyog Ltd. and others, Super
Cassettes Industries Limited v. State of U.P. and
another, Raj Kumar Shivhare v. Assistant Director,
Directorate of Enforcement and another, Competition
Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India
Limited and another).
18. After recording the legal position and the submissions made, the
Supreme Court held as under:
“18. At this stage, it is necessary to clarify the position
of law which do arise in certain situations. The
competent authority under the Act while determining
the moneys due from the employee shall be required to
conduct an inquiry and pass an order. An order under
Section 7A is an order that determines the liability of
the employer under the provisions of the Act and while
determining the liability the competent authority offers
an opportunity of hearing to the concerned

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establishment. At that stage, the delay in payment of

the dues and component of interest are determined. It
is a composite order. To elaborate, it is an order
passed under Section 7A and 7Q together. Such an
order shall be amenable to appeal under Section 7I.
The same is true of any composite order a facet of
which is amenable to appeal and Section 7I of the
Act. But, if for some reason when the authority chooses
to pass an independent order under Section 7Q the
same is not appealable.”
Thus, as per Arcot Textiles (supra), the position that emerges is:
i. An order passed under Sections 7A and 7Q together, is a composite
order and is appealable under Section 7I;
ii. If any other composite order is passed, one facet of which is
appealable, then even qua the other facet for which appeal is not
provided, the appeal would be maintainable, if the order is
composite;
iii. If an independent order is however passed, no appeal would be
maintainable in respect of the interest component under Section
7Q.
19. In Arcot Textiles Mills Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court was dealing
with a standalone demand under Section 7Q. Thus, if an independent order
is passed under Section 7Q, no appeal would lie and the only remedy that
would then be available is in the form of a writ petition, the scope of which
would be very limited.
20. A perusal of the practice being followed in other EPF offices, as also
in the CGIT, Mumbai, which is reflected in the orders placed on record
clearly shows that usually, common orders are being passed under Sections
7Q and 14B. Even if separate orders under Sections 7Q and 14B are passed,

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the CGIT, Mumbai has taken the view in CGIT-2/EPFA/51 of 2019 titled
M/s Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., Mumbai v. RPFC & Ors. that
the same would be appealable in view of the composite nature of the order.
The CGIT, Delhi too in Gorkha Securities v. RPFC, Delhi North has
admitted an appeal challenging separate orders passed under Sections 7Q
and 14B and observed as under:
“Heard. Validity of the impugned order has been
assailed on several factual and legal grounds which
requires thorough examination of the record. It has
been urged on behalf of the appellant that there was
common proceedings under Section 14-B and 7-Q of
the Act and however the Competent Authority
bifurcated the order two parts, resulting in passing two
orders as aforesaid. It is fairly settled that in case
composite order is passed under Section 14-B and 7-Q
of the Act, in that eventuality appeal under Section 7-1
of the Act is maintainable before this Tribunal. Hence,
same is admitted for hearing subject to all just
exceptions. …”

21. The question that therefore arises in this case is whether the order
under Section 7Q is an independent order or is it a composite order along
with the order under Section 14B. To decide this issue, some facts are
relevant to be noted:
i) The show cause notice which was issued by the Authority was
a common show cause notice with the title “Summons to appear for
hearing u/s 14B of the EPF and MP Act, 1952 (and order for payment
of interest u/s 7Q for 01/11/2013 to 31/03/2019)”.
ii) A common reply was filed by the Petitioner, along with certain
documents.
iii) In light of the reply, a revised notice was sent to the Petitioner,

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which was also a common notice titled “Payment of Damages and

Interest for the belated remittances under Section 14B and 7Q of the
Employee's Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provision Act, 1952-
Regarding.”
iv) The proceedings under Section 7Q and 14B were held together
and the order sheet clearly describes the proceedings as being one
under Sections 7Q and 14B – “Proceeding under Section 14B & 7Q
of the EPF&MP Act, 1952”. Finally, however, two separate orders of
the same date were passed under Sections 7Q and 14B.
22. In this factual background, the CGIT stayed the demand under
Section 14B, subject to certain conditions, but did not render any finding on
the composite nature of the orders or on the amount demanded under
Section 7Q. The present writ petition has therefore been filed before this
Court arguing that this finding of the Tribunal was incorrect.
23. Before adjudicating the issue at hand, it needs to be noted that the
manner in which the EPF Authority firstly determines the amount due under
Section 7A and thereafter, starts a completely new inquiry under Section 7Q
as also under Section 14B, leads to enormous delays for the parties
concerned. However, the journey does not end here. After determination of
the amounts under Section 7Q and Section 14B, if demands are raised, the
employer is to approach the Tribunal to appeal the order under Section 14B
and approach the High Court, by way of a writ petition, to appeal the order
under Section 7Q. Such an approach has various disadvantages. It firstly
leads to multiplicity of proceedings filed before the Tribunal and before the
High Courts. There is duplicity of legal representation in both forums and a
possibility of contradictory findings being rendered. If the High Court’s

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decision is rendered earlier, it influences the decision of the Tribunal under

Section 14B in some way or the other. On the other hand, if the Tribunal
adjudicates on the demand under Section 14B earlier, the same may or may
not be placed before the High Court and will again lead to separate and
independent determinations. Once the Tribunal decides the validity and
legality of the demand under Section 14B, the employer can again challenge
the same under Article 226/227 before the High Court. This entire process
results in enormous confusion, duplicity, inconvenience and harassment to
employers and is counter-productive to the employee’s interest.
24. As the facts of the present case would show, the initial order under
Section 7A was passed on 31st December, 2014 demanding payments in
respect of the period from 1st November, 2013 to 31st March, 2019. The
proceedings under Sections 7Q and 14B have thereafter been commenced
with one single Summons. The initial and revised notice, the replies and the
proceedings conducted before the Authority were the same. There was no
independent inquiry conducted in respect of the demands raised under
Sections 7Q and 14B. In fact, by way of illustration, the revised notice
which was issued on 25th September, 2019 tabulates the amounts due in a
common tabular form, as extracted in paragraph 3 above.
25. Thus, when the inquiry is common, the show cause notice is common,
the reply is common and even the proceedings are common, the mere
passing of two separate orders on the same date would not render the
proceedings under Section 7Q and Section 14B independent of each other.
The entire attempt of the Authority appears to be to somehow ensure that the
employer is not able to avail of the remedy of appeal, as permitted by the
decision of the Supreme Court in Arcot Textiles Mills Ltd. (supra). Such an

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approach cannot be condoned by this Court. In the administration of justice,

it has to be ensured by this Court, both in its power of superintendence and
judicial review, that an Authority operating under a statute conducts itself in
a manner that does not result in multiplicity and duplicity of proceedings
which are likely to result in precious judicial time being expended, both
before the Tribunal and before the Court. The possibility of contradictory
approaches and conflicting findings would also be required to be curtailed.
Thus, after determination of the amounts due under Section 7A, once the
Authority proceeds to raise demands under Sections 7Q and 14B, it would
be in the fitness of things that the employer is not made to face multiple
proceedings and its remedies are not curtailed.
26. In fact, the ld. Division Bench of this Court in M/s Net 4 India
Limited vs. Union of India & Anr. [W.P.(C) 6673/2016, decided on 2nd
August, 2016] clearly holds that when interest under Section 7Q is included
in an order passed under Section 14B, the same could be appealed under
Section 7I. The relevant observation of the ld. Division Bench is set out
below:
“14. The Supreme Court in Arcot Textile Mills
Limited (supra) had examined the scope and ambit of
an order u/s 7Q and 7-I. After exhaustively examining
the said provisions it was held that an appeal would
not be maintainable against an order passed under
Section 7Q, but when interest under Section 7Q is
included in the order passed under Section 7A, 7B or
Section 14B, the same could be made subject matter of
challenge in the appeal, when an appeal is preferred
against an order passed under the said sections.”
27. Both, in the case of proceedings under Section 7Q and Section 14B,
the Authorities are required to hear the employer. In Arcot Textiles Mills

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SINGH NAYAL
Signing Date:31.08.2021 17:04:15

Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court has rejected the submission that
computation of interest is only an arithmetic calculation. Thus, when both
demands under Sections 7Q and 14B require the employer to be heard and
common proceedings are held, the passing of separate orders is completely
avoidable. In fact, for the reasons stated above, the Authority ought to
encourage the passing of composite orders rather than formal independent
orders only to prevent the employer from challenging the order under
Section 7Q before the Tribunal.
28. Insofar as the order dated 9th November, 2020 passed by the CGIT,
Delhi in Appeal No. D-1/28/2020 titled GAPL Automotive Ltd. v. APFC
Delhi (East), is concerned, the said order was pursuant to the order passed
by this Court on 1st September, 2020 in W.P.(C) 5864/2020 titled GAPL
Automotive Pvt. Ltd. v. APFC, wherein a direction was given to the CGIT,
Delhi to pass a comprehensive order on merits. The order passed by the
CGIT, Delhi appears to be on the issue of maintainability rather than on
merits. The same would have no binding effect on the decision in the present
case.
29. In the facts of this case, this Court has no doubt in holding that the
genesis of the demand being a common notice and the proceedings having
been held together, the mere passing of two separate orders would not render
the order under Section 7Q unappealable under Section 7I. In fact, while
considering the appeal filed by the Petitioner, the CGIT ought to have
rendered an opinion in this regard and could not have postponed giving a
finding on whether the two orders would be treated as one composite order.
The order passed by the CGIT clearly shows that the CGIT itself was
unclear as to whether it was a composite order or not and simply postponed

W.P.(C) 8485/2021 Page 17 of 18

 Digitally Signed By:DINESH
SINGH NAYAL
Signing Date:31.08.2021 17:04:15

adjudication of the same, leading to the filing of the present writ petition.
30. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court holds that
the appeal challenging the orders passed under Sections 7Q and 14B is
maintainable before the Tribunal. The proceedings are common and the
orders passed under Sections 7Q and 14B are a composite order, which, as
per the judgment of the Supreme Court in Arcot Textiles Mills Ltd. (supra),
would be amenable to an appeal under Section 7I.
31. The writ petition is allowed in the above terms. All pending
applications are disposed of.
32. Parties to appear before the CGIT on 20th September. 2021. Until
then, no coercive measures shall be taken against the Petitioner in respect of
the interest amount imposed under Section 7Q of the EPF Act.

PRATHIBA M. SINGH
JUDGE
AUGUST 25, 2021
dk/mw/T
(corrected and released on 31st August, 2021)

W.P.(C) 8485/2021 Page 18 of 18