History of The 99th Infantry Division PDF
History of The 99th Infantry Division PDF
(A2D2)
N1q PHASE 1
FINAL REPORT
VOLUME IV -- US ANTI-TANK DEFENSE AT
KRINKELT-ROCHERATH, BELGIUN (DECEMBER, 1944)
15 FEBRUARY 1991
An Employee-Owned Company
QTIC
ECTE~
I___ II ___ •- 9 1
INaM
SAIC RPT 91-1012
FINAL REPORT
VOLUME IV -- US ANTI-TANK DEFENSE AT
KRINKELT-ROCHERATH, BELGIUM (DECEMBER, 1944)
15 FEBRUARY 1991
Charles M. Baily
Joyce B. Boykin
Lloyd J. Karamales
Victoria I. Young
DTIC
ELECTE
MAR 141991
PREPARED FOR
UNDER
CONTRACT NUMBER DAALO1-90-C-0071
DELIVERY ORDER 3
"The views, opinions, and/or findings contained in this report are those of the
authors and should not be construed as an official Department of the Army
position, policy, or decision unless so designated by other official
documentation. Comments or suggestions should be addressed to Director, US Army
Concepts Analysis Agency, 8120 Woodmont Avenue, Bethesda, MD 20814-2797."
I
McLean, Virginia 22102
EU
W~IU NST A
Approv.d bo public rubpm
bAUMMS.M Uabinhmd
Unclassified
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
Form Approved
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMB No 0704-0188
1 Exp. Date Jun 30, 1986
I&. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION lb. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS
Unclassified None
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY 3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT
N/A
2b. DECLASSIFICATION /DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE Unlimited
N/A
4 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) S. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)
SAIC 91-1012 to be assigned
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 6b. OFFICE SYMBOL 7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
Science Applications Intl Corp (gAfelicable) US Amy Concepts Analysis Agency
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)
1710 Goodridge Dr., McLean, VA 22102 8120 Woodmont Ave.
T1-7-2 Bethesda, MD 20814-2797
Ba. NAME OF FUNDING ISPONSORING 8b. OFFICE SYMBOL 9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
ORGANIZATION (If applicable)
US Army Concepts Analysis Agny CSCA-MVM DAAL01-90-C-0071 D.O. 3
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS
PROGRAM PROJECT TASK WORK UNIT
8120 Woodmont Ave., Bethesda, MD 20814-2797 ELEMENT NO. NO. NO. ACCESSION NO
Anti-Armor Defense Data Study (A2D2), Vol IV-US Anti-Tank Defense At Krinkelt-Rocherath, BE
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)
Young, Victoria; Baily, Charles; Karamales, Lloyd J.; Boykin, Joyce B.
13a. TYPE OF REPORT 13b. TIME COVERED 14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 15. PAGE COUNT
Technical Report FROM 11/90 TO 1/91 15 February 1991
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION
17. COSATI CODES 18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
FIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP Anti-armor, WWII, historical analysis, weapon degradation,
database
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
The objective of the effort was to collect historical data on at least fourteen actions
where the US was in defense of enemy armor. The data will be used in a joint US/UK
analysis of the degradation in anti-armor defense effectiveness under combat conditions.
29 combat actions were described in detail from the engagement at Krinkelt-Rocherath,
Belgium in December 1944. The combat actions are presented in both narrative form and in
data tables with all identified data displayed. A database and hard copy file will also
be delivered as a final product. This volume also contains a "How To Research" Guide
describing the necessary information to successfully conduct research for this study.
INTRODUCTION ................................................ I
APPENDICES
J
Fro
Aoseslon
TABaC
DTTC s
IiT OR
3S
Unannounced 0
justiricatio -
By.. o
e
Distribut o
Avallabillt C0de8
TABLE
Ii
TABLE
Si
INTRODUCTION
The information gathered and compiled in this Volume was part of an effort
performed for the US Army Concepts Analysis Agency under Contract DAALO1-90-C-
0071, Delivery Order Number 3. The objective of the effort was to collect
detailed historical data on at least fourteen combat actions where US forces were
defending against enemy armor attacks. The data set will be used in a joint
US/UK analysis of the degradation in anti-armor defense effectiveness under
combat conditions. The resulting degradation factors will allow projections of
the combat performance of future anti-armor defenses to be based upon a balanced
combination of historical and instrumented field test data.
BACKGROUND
Following the Allied breakout at St. Lo inJuly 1944, the near encirclement
of the German forces near Falaise wrecked the German Army in the West.' Even
though the Allies never completely closed the pocket and many units escaped, the
2
Germans left most of their equipment and thousands of casualties behind.
Allied armies chased the shattered remnants towards the German border, but their
logistics could not sustain this sudden, swift advance. By fall, supply
difficulties and stiffening German resistance, from units which the Germans had
managed to rebuild with prodigious effort, combined to slow the Allied advance.
As the Allies ran into the defenses along the German border, they became locked
into a grinding battle of attrition in terrain where even second-rate German
units could defend effectively. By mid-December 1944, American units were moving
forward slowly. The main objective of General Omar Bradley's 12th Army Group was
the capture of the Roer River dams which, if opened, could flood the river and
prevent its crossing. Since the Roer blocked the approach to the Rhine, it had
to be crossed before Germany could be invaded and defeated.
Even as Allied units raced toward Germany in September, Hitler was already
planning a counteroffensive. On 16 September, gesturing at a map, he announced
to his astonished generals that he would attack, I...here, out of the Ardennes,
with the objective -- Antwerp.03 Hitler was determined to make an attack in the
West. The vastness of the Eastern front and the fact that the Soviets had over
500 division-sized units mant that there was little likelihood for a decisive
ItThe overviem for the Ardow offensive, described in the following fifteen pages, is drawn minly from
Hugh N. Cole, The Ardannes Battle of the Butle (Wash. D.C.: 0CNN, 1965).
2
According to Martin ltumonson, (rWkas.hi
Pursuit, (yahington, PC; OC4N, 1961), pg. 555 and Map I,
only 20,000-40,000 Gerlnrm escaped, of D vi.ens in the pocket on AugUst 6.
I
victory there. But in the West, a hard blow against the forces of what Hitler
always considered decadent democracies seemed to offer some chance of success.
During the months of planning that followed, Hitler's generals tried to persuade
him to adopt a less ambitious plan. An offensive to Antwerp, in their view,
exceeded the combat power and logistics reach of the forces they were able to
rebuild during the fall of 1944. But in the end, the plan was very much the one
that Hitler dictated.
With elaborate secrecy, the Germans assembled forces for their offensive.
For the assault, the Germans were able to gather thirteen infantry and seven
armored divisions. Another five divisions were in reserve. The assault units
had over a thousand tanks or armored assault guns and some 1,900 supporting
artillery pieces. The German plan, shown inFigure 1, was to attack west to the
Meuse River and cross that obstacle in the vicinity of Liege. Then, the Germans
would swing north and capture Antwerp, separating the British from the Americans
and, Hitler hoped, create another Dunkirk. The main attack would be carried out
by Sixth Panzer Army with Fifth Panzer Army attacking to cover the southern
flank. On both sides of the penetration, infantry divisions would attack to
secure the shoulders and defend against allied counterattacks.
Figure 1 also shows the actual German penetration compared to the German
plan. Clearly, the main attack made almost no progress. After the failure of
the main attack to break through, the Germans tried to shift their main effort
to the south. But they lacked sufficient fuel for this more lengthy advance and,
more importantly, had lost the time they needed to overcome a surprised but
swiftly reacting American army. Clearly, the American defenders who held the
northern shoulder were instrumental in defeating the German Army's last major
offensive during World War II.
cce
.R.
FIUR
1.TH EMN'LNAD CULPEERTO
4
strongest of the three armies participating in the offensive. It included nine
divisions in three corps: LXVII Armeekorps (AK), 326th and 246th Volksgrenadier
Divisions (VGD); I SS-Panzerkorps (PzK), 1st and 12th SS-Panzer Divisions, 12th
and 277th VGD, and 3rd Parachute Division; and 1I SS-PzK with 2d and 9th SS-
Panzer Divisions. For its main effort, Sixth Army planned that I SS-PzK would
break through along Rollbahns (Routes) C and D. North of the main attack, at
Monschau, LXVII AK's mission was to break through American lines and block any
thrust from the north (its bloody failure is not described in this narrative).
To exploit I SS-PzK's breakthrough, Dietrich held II SS-PzK in reserve.
To conduct its main attack, Sixth Panzer Army planned to use I SS-PzK's
infantry to break through the defending Americans and open the way for its
armored divisions to exploit towards the West. In the north, 277th
Volksgrenadier Division (VGD) was to seize the twin village Rocherath-Krinkelt
to give 12th SS-PzD access to Route C. To the south, the 3rd Parachute and 12th
Volksgrenadier Divisions were to open Route 0 for 1st SS-PzD. Seizing these
roads was critical to German success. The hilly, forested terrain in the
Ardennes made cross country movement, particularly in the winter, difficult or
impossible. The German attack depended on quickly opening the roads to have any
chance of success. Sixth Amy's timetable allowed one day to break through,
another to clear the Hohes Venn high ground, reaching the Meuse on the third day,
and crossing on the fourth.
AMERICAN POSITIONS
Standing in the way of the German attack was the American 99th Infantry
Division, a new unit being seasoned in what was considered to be a quiet sector
of the front. Inserted in the 99th's sector, the veteran 2nd Infantry Division
was attacking toward the Roer dams. The 99th was stretched over a broad front
with no reserves. From north to south, its 395th, 393rd, and 394th regiments
defended the front. Because it was astride all three routes needed by 12th SS-
Panzer Division, the 394th would be hardest hit.
5
The 99th "Checkerboard" Division was a green unit, having been in Europe
only since 3 November. Being a new unit, the 99th had not had time to accumulate
the extra weapons, vehicles, and equipment commonly found in other units that had
been in action for a while. In addition, its attached tank destroyer battalion
had towed guns, and their lack of mobility was an especially severe problem in
the Ardennes. The Division was occupying a quiet sector of the northern Ardennes
to gain some experience before being committed to offensive operations. The 99th
Division's front stretched 19 miles, from Buchholz Station in the south to
Monschau in the north.
Incontrast to the 99th, the 2d Infantry Division was a very seasoned unit.
After the St. Lo breakout in late July, the 2d Division advanced into Brittany
with the VIII Corps. The division came to the Ardennes in the autumn of 1944 to
rest and absorb replacements. Following this respite, V Corps gave it the
mission of capturing the Roer River dams. The 2d Division launched this attack
on 13 December, meeting stiff resistance. By the beginning of the German
offensive three days later, the 2d Division had already suffered 1,200
casualties.
. Despite its losses, the 2d was still a formidable force, having collected
many extra automatic weapons and vehicles in earlier actions, as well as having
three self-propelled TD battalions attached to it rather than one, the normal
practice in the theater. One of its chief assets was the experienced 741st Tank
Battalion, which on 16 December had 47 Sherman tanks. The division was also
fortunate in having as its commander General Walter M. Robertson, a bold and
skillful commander who was largely responsible for the success of the American
defense around the Elsenborn Ridge. The presence of this seasoned unit in the
Rocherath area came as a complete surprise to the Germans.
At 0530, the German attack opened with a heavy artillery barrage which
lasted until about 0700 (Figure 2) with German searchlights creating artificial
moonlight to aid their advance. Occupying a refused position at the left rear
of the regiment, 3/394 was probably the first unit to encounter the German
attack. At Buchholz Station, L Company had its breakfast interrupted by Germans
inmarch column and drove them back after a stiff fight at close quarters. To the
east, advancing units of the 12th VGD made their first encounter with 1/394 near
Losheimergraben, losing a self-propelled gun [Action 1]. But the 12 VGD was not
able to strike hard at the 1/394 until about noon, after a tortuous approach
march. The battalion held most of the company positions but was badly hurt;
regiment pulled units from the 3rd battalion to reinforce the depleted unit. On
the 1st battalion's right flank the German attack hit the 2/394 which repulsed
infantry and armor assaults with small arms and artillery [Action 2]. By mid
afternoon the battalion had stabilized its front.
At about 0730, on the division's right flank, the 277th VGD struck hard at
the 393rd regiment which defended its front with only two battalions (one
battalion was attached to the 395th). Third battalion in the north lost K
Company in the first rush and by 0930 was holding at the battalion CP with the
remaining two companies. South of 3rd battalion, a heavy German assault pushed
the 1/393 back 300 yards and destroyed most of two companies. Further, German
infantry began to infiltrate through a gap created between the two battalions.
To backstop the heavily pressed regiment, the 99th Division asked for and
received the 2nd Infantry's reserve, the 23rd Infantry Regiment. One battalion,
the 3/23, moved into a position east of Rocherath behind the 393rd.
7
.. .. . .. . . . . . ..
(D . .. . . . . . .
'Cs
C2 0)
,-~ I
Lu
C4 8.
z 9 cr)
cla)
CL co
0 CL
w E
C
LL
* ij
FIUR 2.1DEEBR94
--
c8
Ninety-ninth Division ordered another of 2nd Infantry's reserve
battalions, the 1/23, to move into positions previously prepared by the 99th
south of Hinningen. By nightfall the battalion was in place. The remaining
battalion of the 23rd regiment, the 2nd, remained north of Rocherath. South of
the 99th's sector, the Germans had broken through and could be seen moving west.
But at the end of the day, the 99th still held its line.
After waiting impatiently all day for the 12th VGD to break through the
394, the impetuous commander of Kamfqruooe Peioer of 1st SS Panzer commandeered
some paratroopers to conduct his own penetration. During the night, the
KamofaruDDe overran the defenders of Buchholz, which had been stripped of troops
to reinforce 1st Battalion. By 0500 on the 17th, Pelper began to advance on
Honsfeld.
In the south, the day began ominously when Peiper's battlegroup struck
Honsfeld just before dawn (Figure 3). Occupied by 99th Division rear echelon
troops and a variety of units moving to reinforce the front, the attack achieved
surprise and quickly overran the Americans [Actions 3-4]. Peiper then detoured
from route 0 to BQllingen in order to avoid the poor secondary road leading to
Moderscheid. The Americans at BOllingen, expecting the enemy to move north to
capture major supply dumps, were surprised when the Germans turned south from
B0llingen back toward route D. A small reconnaissance unit sent by Peiper to
B~tgenbach was stopped by an American roadblock.
Because of the now obvious seriousness of the German attack, the 2nd ID's
attack was canceled, and the division commander, MG Robertson, began moving units
south. Peiper's detour was a key to the 2nd ID's scheme for reinforcing the
99th. The threatened German advance from BUllingen might reach the twin villages
of Krinkelt-Rocherath and cut the line of supply and retreat of both 2nd and 99th
Is. Therefore, the first objective was to reinforce near Wirtzfeld to protect
the twin villages. As the remaining uncommitted regiments of the 2nd abandoned
their attack against Wahlerschied and began to move south, the lead unit, 9th
9
.0
cc - U
42L
N/N
.LI * m
EI
c
.~1
__________ cm
0-0
FIGUREN
3. 17DCMBR14
100
Infantry was to move to positions south of Wirtzfeld while the trailing 38th
Infantry would defend the twin villages.
Small German units of infantry and armor reinforced this concern during the
morning by making forays toward the north from BOllingen. With welcome
reinforcement from 1st Platoon, A Co., 801st TD Battalion, which had been in
position east of HOnningen, the 1/23 stopped these German advances [Actions 5-6].
Early on the 17th, the tired 3/393 counterattacked west to clear its rear
and then east to regain the positions lost the previous day. By 1000, they
collided with an attacking German battalion, reinforced by tanks parceled out
from 12th SS to strengthen the attack. The Americans were forced to retreat
through the 3/23, and 1/393 fell back to a position abreast of the 3/23 by 1400.
The 3/393 had barely passed through American lines when the Germans struck hard
at the 3/23 [Actions 7-10], and by dark the shattered battalion had to withdraw.
This action isolated the 1/393, which withdrew cross country to Wirtzfeld the
following day. Wearily, the 3/393 moved forward again to defend Rocherath, and
at the end of the day still held the town.
General Robertson had spent his day shepherding the movement of his
division to the south. When the Germans attacked the 3/23, he recognized the
threat to his flank and diverted K company, 3/9 and then the entire 1/9 to back
up 3/23. By dusk, the 1/9 was in position in front of Rocherath, and the 1/38
established a defense east of Krinkelt (Action 20]. Both of these battalions
were reinforced by tanks and tank destroyers. During the night, German armor and
infantry launched a heavy but poorly coordinated attack against the villages.
Penetrating the infantry's defenses, the Germans were able to get men and tanks
11
into the towns. But after wild fighting during the night, the American defenders
managed to hunt down and eliminate the Germans.
At Krinkelt, German assaults also began Just before dawn. Though repulsing
the main attacks, the Americans could not prevent German tanks from penetrating
as far as the 1/38's command post in Krinkelt (Actions 28-30]. But at day's end,
the German armor was smoking and destroyed. During the night, German infiltra-
tors continued to pressure both villages, but the Americans mopped them up by
dawn.
Failure to capture the twin villages after two days of heavy fighting
convinced the Germans that 12th SS Panzer would have to find another way to route
C. The division began shifting to the south and finally assembled a BOllingen,
days behind schedule, to begin its advance toward BOtgenbach. There it would
find the 1st Infantry Division in position.
12
>A
+°+-Mall
Iii
i-I C,
" i I
71•
13
December 19-20, 1944: Withdrawal to Elsenborn Ridge
For their part, the American mission of protecting the withdrawal of the
99th Infantry was fulfilled during the night of 18-19 December as the last units
of that division withdrew through the 2nd. With sharply weakened armor support,
German infantry continued their assault on the 19th (Actions 26-27] (Figure 5).
A rain of American artillery stopped most of the attacks dead in their tracks.
Although convinced it could hold the twin villages, 2nd ID had accomplished its
mission and ordered a withdrawal to Elsenborn ridge during the night. Beginning
at 1745, the 2nd Division units withdrew. By dawn on the 20th (Figure 6), both
the 99th and 2nd divisions occupied good defensive positions on the ridge from
which they easily repulsed residual German attacks in the days that followed.
14
j~
*r
p I T~
j~" .1
15
V~l
LL.
FIUE5 9DEEBR14
Ii .
ui..j 15
I:::
SE
>
=004
0 C
.00
,,~~... / .
w f1
S
\71.S- \E U!....
E .
U.
0 F IE6.2\EIER14
*116
.. ... ........
CHAPTER 2
ACTIONS FRON THE KRINKELT-ROCHERATH ENGAGEMENT
The combat actions described in this volume come from the defensive
actions of the American 99th Infantry and 2nd Infantry Divisions in December
1944 as they defended the routes needed by the German 12th SS-Panzer Division
in their attempted move toward Antwerp. The fighting in this volume occurred
around and in the twin villages of Krinkelt-Rocherath, Belgium. Historical
records contain sufficient information to isolate, in detail, a number of
distinct actions. For this volume, SAIC has focused on those actions which
involved towed antitank weapons, bazookas, or a mix of weapons where towed
weapons were part of the defensive. Table 1 summarizes these actions:
NUMBER TITLE
1 Assault Gun at Losheimergraben
2 The Sideshow
3 KG Peiper Reaches Honsfeld, Part 2
4 KG Peiper Reaches Honsfeld, Part 1
5 The Defense of H~nningen, Part 1
6 The Defense of Hfnningen, Part 2
7 The Guns Retreat
8 The Forest Battle
9 The Heroism of Sergeant McGarity
10 Last Stand of the 1/23d
11 First Blood at Lausdell
12 The Daisy Chain
13 Four Down
14 Lt. Melesnick Gets a Panzer
15 Jerry Can versus Panzer
16 The Private War of William Soderman, Part 1
17 The A&P Platoon Gets Two
18 Down the Hatch
19 The Private War of William Soderman, Part 2
20 From the Hip
21 Unstoppable Force, Part 1
22 Unstoppable Force, Part 2
23 Salazar's First Kill
24 Salazar's Second Kill
25 Night Disturbance
26 Teawork and Height Advantage
27 The Assist
28 Panthers Three and Four Knocked Out
29 The End of Panther Five's Saga
17
ACTION 1
USA ITO C1t Intaview "99th I, Aidwen. 16-20 DOeser 19"", File #182
18
.41: .....................
.........
.... ...
'w:
...................... .............. I ba
.............. j ::
V. .
. ... .................
....... ................ .. .........
................. ................
...........1 ................ . .. ....... ...
..............................
.....................
. . ............
....... .........................
..... ..............
.. .......I
................. .... .............
...............
......... ..... : .. .
......................................
......................... ........
... ..
....................... ..
......... ......... .......... ..
......
...........I ...... ..
.............. ........ ......
...................... .
...........
.. .......
..............
..... ..................
......................................
........ ...... ....
... ... .. .... ... ... ... .... .. ... .... ... ... .... .. .
....
. .... ... . ....
... ... .... .. .... ... ... ...... ... .... ... .... . . ... .. . .. .... . . .... ... .. ...
.......
.......
....... ..... .
......
..
....
...
................... ...... .
.................
.. ... .
........
............
..
goV:
12 -4 1:
uj
A,
................
...............
X:
.. ........ .... ..
cc CM
wl X b dd-
..........
19
could clearly see the jeep and its occupants, but in their surprise and
uncertainty they hesitated to fire. Turning around, the jeep sped off back
down the slope and into Losheim. A few minutes later it reappeared, leading
what some accounts say was a tank. However, since the 12th Volksgrenadier
Division had no tanks attached to it,the vehicle was instead almost certainly
a sturmgeschQtz (StuG III 75mm self-propelled assault gun) belonging to the
division's organic lO12th StuG Co. 3 Postwar accounts by the commander of the
48th Gren Regt, Col Wilhelm Osterhold, confirm this supposition, and mention
that German infantry were riding on the sturmgeschtz; no such reference is
made in any of the American accounts of the incident.' The American AT gun
crew again let the jeep pass, but fired on the assault gun as it drew up in
front of their gun. The first round struck the vehicle in the right flank,
knocking off a track and immobilizing it. The second and third shots
penetrated the vehicle's starboard hull, with the third shot setting the
assault gun aflame. Some accounts say the only survivor of the crew was the
commander, a lieutenant, who was badly wounded and who staggered from the
wreck. Others say the entire crew bailed out, apparently unhurt, and began
firing small arms at the AT gun crew. Considering the scarcity of flank armor
on the StuG III (only 30mm)5 and the proximity of the AT gun when it fired,
the former outcome seems far more likely. The infantrymen of B Co, farther
up the road toward Losheimergraben, killed the occupants of the captured jeep
with small arms fire at the same time as the assault gun was destroyed.
SNaonatd, A Tim for TriMets, pp. 170-172; Parker, Note from Nitter's Last Goble, pp. 16-17
Letter, osterhotd to ichard Byers, 6 Sep 1986, Enclosure 18 of 26, Fie #213
20
o~~~
0) aa~ V00
-hIVi * cm c- IV0 m n 0- to.~0 C a
%A
4.1 4) 4 0 41 a) C; 4c z ..4) C;
0- 1 DE - - 1-.4 1 a-... . aCc a-4
.O1 4. ua * 4.0.. *o .m-. 0 .T C. .1. aWN .
.9-
La.
(K c
3c 0- a
-
.0c
~d0 4) C
4) be
so5 X 4a 0 0
40 S.0 Un
F-
C19U (a caU
0 i C.
.a
z U (.54-)~
0 M
- ~4- ~C5i
41~a 4a -a
0.
c4. N
C. 41" O
3%4' cc14 03-L A
.0 4 I-W - v =v*
w) 0)z c0ca 21
W C 041 4- 0a-
CL -. c
ZIP i0 iv cov I-- i
-0 c.4 21%10.1-- so
004jI
cv 40, ro a 50uC
.9% t$ 1 -' IV ~ 4
- 4'0 4-1 00CL
SM CLv
OV r-
(A IV
h
CMC*
iv
44.IV4 .
A0
ivp- 4--G
21
a da a" aU a a)( -
Me - .
Mr- .
O- - W.C - W- .
c- = I. LA 0U c=L- c . U r 1-a
.C% m 0 .C -06va W .0 W4
M0 .*0-iv
c 0 " c*-MC" C ft.E0 ~
On :10t
m um P0%. mr- cO:0 :0 I=%. at Z09%
C3 P- at zcmP% a : 0 p.
tWLtj 9- aW a I VU U a aU W U 4Waa
vU "" aa 6vU P
vw *0) CDwO 4.10 .ez6a) CD 41 (U zCD 4- C z 40 4-) w zoC
cc c .a - * C *a C * - c *a
61C%1'~~~~.:..
61. ~
0% ~ 0%W6 ~ ~ 6c'
CL .0 . L o61 r1 .0 0 a
CL 0
of--
0 4-
4 C c
CL.C
4 ) 1L. kW
4-(4
1-C z I
(A 4A
wI 6. VI w
4- 44- J
C9 21( U
61 iW .61 22
w V awc a ao a
* ar alp a- a 0 a a .
*a a C m q a x wa ua a*a *a4 -4 a
w 0W MI w
wf M3%J (3A M @C uivW W
41 .. ;C 4c *D0 4.) cu * z CD D 4 ) *14 41 4
6- 4 ,0- -
0 0 cu
@3. 4j 4D' O - o41' 0c
oL CAWC J2 . IC.C
Wa
If 4LO 0 CL .0 P0 C . C
M C) q CL U co Lfl
V 4CIk0 C Cft0 LW C4 L LU-: L0
3W 4- .0
(A c
4j .-4a CA 926@
4v c u
LLv
ca sCCZk..
0 W0 0
ov=0 4-a xL
C9Va =
.0IV 16W@3
-CL0
to c U
-i C0 .3 1. L - 4A
46.00U-1 00 1 L
*@4- w~ 30 LC
SIRAa CcIU
4-
0 1
.0 .10L
V- 4 4
.0~~ 4.41. 3
Uk. @UkU4- t
U0 oW 0 CL
tfC D i .
La0i4 0 00.
2 16-
.C
CL C 'A
0kU@
0
0 ac C74.0
.0~C w 3 -
. IV* @34 -F
0n -o -0 -
23
IMF alp "a C CDa
.. ~c fJl.c c 4bLc .4
VC-4
4C C
(v ed CL c C
c cW w 4.3 0 4
w4L.m -24..a
0) E IV C4)0 C
w in IV*' (A -4.4
ag L3- U'L&J!
z 4 r-CA )1=
tM S.L u0 C- C
L1 W u-.5 =
0 2civ IV 1.0 = i
C
C9C
US3
CD
41 -C I
r- 00 cc
4- 0.-
cm 0 4a
C
c 0 U,
44-
41
C1
ac *. c
43
-
M E4- ,
LiV4 U o
CL IV 06C
41 4:;4CL C4 CL
C 49 41 z .
9.3 fN .43 Nm#
o )(.q.. *L 24
ACTION 2
The initial German artillery barrage began hitting the positions of the
2/394th Infantry, in the woods along the International Highway west of
Udenbreth, at 0530 on 16 December. The men of the 2/394th had been sleeping
soundly in the log cabins which they had constructed for themselves, but as
the first shells fell they quickly sought shelter in the holes they had dug
outside their cabins. The barrage lasted for 90 minutes and concentrated on
the battalion's left flank, from about midway in the F Co sector, north across
E Co's area, and continuing north into the 393d Infantry's sector (Figure 8).
E Co suffered 12-15 casualties from the bombardment, but F and G Cos were not
significantly damaged. The GIs in their covered foxholes were not terribly
concerned about the Intensity of the German barrage, believing it to be merely
a reaction to the attack of the 2d 10 to the north.6
The area occupied by the 2/394th was part of the attack sector assigned
to the 277th Volksgrenadier Division, a green unit recently reconstructed from
two shattered divisions and composed largely of volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans
from outside Germany) and Alsatians. The division was reputed to have a "poor
fighting spirit." Of the division's two forward regiments, the 989th Grenadier
Regiment, reinforced by a Pionier company and a battalion of jagdpanzers
(self-propelled tank destroyers), was to attack out of Hollerath and seize
Rocherath, securing Rollbahn A for elements of the 12th SS-Panzer Division.
The 990th Gren Regt, supported by a company of fusiliers and a company of
Pioniers, assembled around Udenbreth with the intention of securing the
Weisserstein Trail and thus opening a second route to Krinkelt-Rocherath. The
main body of this force was scheduled to strike to the north of the 2/394th
USA ITO COWbot IntfMvie, "9th 10, Ardinme, 16-20 Doc 194K , Ff e #182
25
..
. ..
..
a3arm
........
.......
L.. .... ..
FIUR 8.TESDSO
I2
Inf, in the zone of the 1/393d. The only force remaining to the 277th VGD
commander, Col Wilhelm Viebig, with which to attack the 2/394th was the
fusilier company attached to the 990th Gren Regt, which he ordered to advance
as soon as the artillery bombardment lifted. However, the fusiliers'
inexperience showed itself in their failure to follow up the barrage closely
enough. The GIs of the 2/394th saw the Germans advancing through the thick
mist at about 0735, more than 30 minutes after the last German shells fell.
American planning paid off as the GIs called down an intense artillery fire
which forced the fusiliers to go to ground even before they could reach the
forest's edge. They vainly tried to continue their advance until about 0800,
but could not expose themselves without being cut to pieces by the accurate
US artillery and automatic weapons fire.8
Seeing his attack in this sector falter, around 0830 Col Viebig sent
forward three armored vehicles and about a platoon of infantry under a
smokescreen in an attempt to regain the initiative. Since the only other
armored vehicles in the 277th VGD belonged to the 277th PzJg Bn, which was
attacking with the 989th Gren Regt farther north, these vehicles must have
been Jagdpanzer 38t Hetzers of the 1277th Sturmgeschitz Company, which had
four vehicles when the attack began." The smokescreen allowed the Hetzers and
their fusilier escort to enter the woods and approach "to within hand-grenade
distance" of the American positions without being spotted. As they reached
the American foxhole line, T/Sgt Fred Wallace of G Co, 2/394th Inf, called the
99th 10's general support artillery battalion and requested fire on his own
position in order to stop the German advance. The response from the artillery
was immediate and devastating, as a heavy concentration of 155mm shells fell
among the advancing Germans. Wallace and his men were spared the effects of
the barrage by the overhead log cover on their foxholes and dugouts. The
Hetzers, however, quickly reversed direction and fled back into Neuhof, while
?Neyer, kria*,dafihte €l
A- 12. -Pntardi ieyon "Nitterhumnd", p. 415, FIto 0198
SUSA ITO Cbt Int,
99Ms I0, Ardmens, 16-20 Oe 19m, F1t 9182; Cole, The Arclavmms The Battle of
the.NOi, p.82; Cavmoh, Krlnkott-Ioderathl The BattLe for the Twin Vilttae, p.al
Parker, Note for 'Mlllers Last IsAteo, p.17; van Snger snd ItterLIn, Germn Tanks of World Vat
i,p. 127
27
the fusiliers made another futile attempt to dislodge the Americans from their
positions. By about 0900, the men of G Co had killed or captured all the
remaining Germans in the area, and the threat to the 2/394th was over.
Jubilant and proud of their performance in repulsing the German attack, the
men of the 2/394th did not know that their action was Just a sideshow, that
the main German attacks were being made to their left and right, and that soon
they would occupy a salient with only tenuous communication to the rear.
Worse still, the battalion commander had been completely unnerved by the
German barrage and attack, and would spend the rest of the day cringing in one
of the log cabins with his head between his knees.10
to USA ITO Cbt Int, 9th ID in the Arduwns, 16-20 Doc 1944" Fito M82
28
a - a" a-IM a a
a~O a a ca 99
(P C 410 1. b41
1 cm 4 m-S
4-1. CM
C.,a4 I I C4 .=-4 c ... *
41 41 9
C 2c4
41 0.
c C C.
*0 ' 0
a, 41C 0 SSS
S~ A,
4A 4
--
L .-
co Z46S
U0 41
La 00C. -2
0) C m 41
4~ V4
c Cc OSJ9%
Cc 4.1
w' 41
64 -. 4- 4-'U CC
m Cj C, 4. '-5
S 4- 0 41 41.
'41- a' -0- CC Q 0 441Z
C. C a~ c . 1.
gCo IV C'. s- NU CO C&
I~
4-U .
64C4 L41 *C 4
29
a- a) = a )= -0aD = a
000= a
at ao %a at c - av h%0m ah C - Aw ao
-41. 201 .' -4.C - . cn 2. n :
4-
4-4 '4 X 0
C W 3
r-
cc
00 0, "a
ag L. IA * ' a. S.
16.'' cm0O~I
a)
(u a)L.a 4
0 0CIO
z 4-A CL c-
4'4a
CD *4'4
0 1a)c= 0 -3
126W f5 4-)4W
4S c0 M r)
41
IV 44- 0
SCL~ 0
CA SA S. *400
20 w ul1'1CU C-3
C1 z -e- 4
2'..t 0401 4- 4.
MO 0 .
2 4'04at
4' 30
F .cC
41 L6 C 41UL6C
ni
4AUL6C
. r-.
= *-ES
41 L-C
'-SCM
tC.E
41 L6C
-.
.C-ES
+A L6 C
..
C-S
41U.&.C
M. 0
0~ V1-0tv
015
T~ .1. c 41
V tS 41 39 S61 61
40 t41 ES
00 4)
W1 FA 61 E 0
S- Ln cCf OcmE i4- .S . -- L~.C
0y) I . 6 1 41610
o~S
Up- ~ .- L. C L. -4G
c64) 0C Ii' CEE
M0 kCc
C 0Cc 064-1
0 .0 4- 0.6 441
mS. W-- EA. C 0. r
c w1 0. .0 2W1.0 C
WA CU >" toS ^640 CLI 1L. a). WCP
wC to~f un
W4 A- S I1 ) L - # A 39
M u
CD.nC =c = 4. p0 V- U 0
Wl 4-a41 4)L.-p 4LfLg, S. -a.E
= vC
z 0 LJOE u V ZEES
m vI L.S. to
c 61
C.Ul* 41
0~~L I-+1-- 61
C0- ES a D6 0
c 0 aL :0%
a 41 iES 0 --
Uc 61 C3 u 41
~
(JCE
'C ES
IV
41
5 --
tv~a
S4.141 1 C ESO
CL.
.,- a C w V
S390 0 Z a. IVC
'4-
00 0
cm 4- (DC 0
C c UC -cWC
S 61 C C 2 C
ES
ad r 4J 41
C .~~~~ ~ .a aC -1
u 44b 1. r-I a-U IV~ ES
ErS
cm a) 44'40
0 V0 J0
I-C 4-U zl%. aC 0c Vm
"a 4-
Qj Lai 4- C 4.19. 4CE CC Il-
F.c a
LIi Lii cEivE tvc 0..
61 -C 61 61 5.. W
CL 311% iv 0. 4A - N L. 41*6N
a iSC 0 =.P. Xu WI,- -. >
=OC 1- 4 WU~ (A
A 0 Z =
a. 1
6L ES 0. 61al0
In- vi r- A G 0 M -1 44 C 2 i c~n
F-~ ~ ~ ) c -C08c
31
ACTIONS 3-4
32
The 2d Platoon of A Company, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion, consisted
of three towed 3-inch guns and the attendant vehicles and crews. Two of these
guns were posted about half a kilometer southeast of Honsfeld to cover the
road from Lanzerath. The third gun, about 700 meters to the southwest,
guarded the road that ran from Holzheim north through the forest belt known
as the Schirr Busch to Honsfeld (Figure 9). At around 0400, the crews of the
two eastern guns reported to the A Co command post that a US M3 light tank
driven by Germans had gotten past them, but that the platoon leader and two
other men had taken a bazooka and set off to intercept and destroy the tank.
As these men reached the Honsfeld-Lanzerath road they saw a whole convoy of
German tanks, half-tracks, and other vehicles, all following the captured US
tank toward Honsfeld. They also observed that the crew of the M3 were
speaking English.13 The three GIs hid by the side of the road as the convoy
halted for a few moments, allowing the Americans to distinguish German
infantry riding on the decks of the panzers. Soon the column started forward
again, and the three Americans made their way back to their two guns. When
he had returned to his platoon position, the 2d Plt leader reported by radio
to the Company CP what they had seen, then with his two men set out for the
platoon command post.
33
.. ....
.....
1. ..
.. I.. .........
... ...
.........
-------------------------
..... ..... .. ... ......
. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .
- "..
. . .
..
..
... .. . . .. . . . . . . .
.. . . ..
.. . .. . . . .. . .
.....-.
... ..... ....
..........
... .... .....
.......
....
/. ....... .
..
..
... .... .
........ ... .. ..
....
....... . . . .. . . .
9.
KG...PE.RECHESH.NFEL
FIGURE....
4. .. .. .
in groups, heading toward Honsfeld to get away from the German advance. But
now, around 0500, they were astonished to see the giant Panther tanks and
half-tracks full of German infantry passing casually by them, guided through
the fog by a soldier walking ahead of the lead vehicle carrying a flashlight.
Recovering from his shock, Creel moved to fire the armored car's small cannon
at the Germans, but found that his shots would be blocked by a trailer that
the car was towing. With Peiper's column stretched out before and behind
them, Creel and his crew realized the futility of resistance and abandoned
their vehicle in an (ultimately unsuccessful) attempt to get into Honsfeld on
foot to warn Lt. Reppa.
By now the lead panzers had reached the small stream which flowed south
of Honsfeld, turning northeast to empty into the Warche River. Behind the
stream was a thin line of American infantry, hastily established the previous
evening by the American captain in charge of the 99th ID rest center in
Honsfeld and increased to about company strength by the constant arrival of
stragglers throughout the night. The infantry opened fire on the approaching
Panthers with their small arms, and their harmless shots were quickly answered
by a hail of fire from the panzers and the grenadiers following in the half-
tracks. KG Pelper's flak tanks (37m guns on Mk IV chassis) and flak wagons
(half-tracks mounting quadruple 20m antiaircraft guns, which had been used
very effectively against the American defenders at Buchholz Station) may also
have had a hand in suppressing the American resistance. After only about a
minute, the US line began to crumble, the GIs running for the shelter of the
buildings in Honsfeld. As they ran, they passed the two towed 3-inch guns
belonging to the 3d Plt of A Co, 801st TO Bn, which had been set up around
1900 the night before among the houses at the edge of town after the platoon
had pulled back from its position in the woods covering the road between
Buchholz Station and Lanzerath. There were also two platoons of towed 3-inch
TOs from the 612th TD Bn in Honsfeld, their crews asleep in some houses in the
village, but their presence in Honsfeld was unplanned (they were en route to
somewhere else and had just stopped for the night) and, consequently, they
were not in position to fire on the Germans.
35
The 3d Plt guns, on the edge of the village on the east side of the
road, heard the sound of tanks moving up the road to their right. A security
patrol reported that the tanks were M3 light tanks, which was not unexpected,
because a few hours earlier, at 0030, an officer from the 18th Cav Rcn Sqdn
had informed one of the 801st's Recon Platoon section leaders that he would
be bringing his tanks through Honsfeld that morning and said that the TO men
should be careful not to fire on them. Soon, however, a second report from
the security patrol said that they could hear English and German being spoken
and that German Mk IV panzers were behind the M3 tanks. Immediately the 3d
Plt commander ordered his crews to swing their guns to the right to fire on
the German column, but the panzergrenadiers and paratroopers with Peiper's
vehicles heard this activity and began firing at the TO crews, pinning them
down before they could finish realigning their guns. As the US gunners
returned fire with their few inherent small arms, the German tanks swung their
turrets to bear and fired their main guns, damaging the 3-inch guns and
wounding several of the crewmen. The 3d Plt commander ordered his men,
outnumbered, outgunned, and unsupported, to fall back to the railroad track
that ran through the northeast edge of Honsfeld. This they did, with each of
the two crews alternately pulling back and then stopping to cover the
withdrawal of the other. After they had reached the comparative safety of the
railway cut, the 3d Plt leader ordered the two gun sergeants to lead their
crews back to the A Co CP, across the Warche River on a hillside west of
HOnningen. [Action 4]
While this was happening, other elements of KG Peiper were attacking the
2d Plt guns southeast of the village. The 2d Platoon commander and his two
aides, on their way back to the platoon CP after identifying the German
column, encountered a German patrol which had infiltrated the area, but the
night was so dark and the visibility so limited by fog that the three were
able to safely evade the Germans. As he finally reached his CP, the platoon
leader could hear the sounds of mortar rounds and small arms fire from the
direction of his guns. Doubling back, he returned to the platoon position
Just in time to see German infantry advancing from the woods to the south,
firing their weapons and throwing hand grenades. The Americans could also
hear German tanks approaching, but could not see them in the darkness. The
36
2d Plt leader was surprised and dismayed, because the direction from which
this attack came was where infantry of the 99th ID was supposed to have been,
and his guns were otherwise unsupported. The platoon leader ordered the two
guns to be destroyed and the crews to head for the company CP outside
H~nningen.14 [Action 3]
4 Most of the detals of these two actions were taken from the 801st TO In After Action Report ,
Oeceser 1944 (Fle 016), with supplementat asteri from NMcDonald, A Tim for irumets, pp. 198-202.
is G[iedens for 1st $S-PiD *Lelbetanderte Adolf Nittern, RN 10/312, Bundesarkiv
Freiburg
is 612th To In A, Doec 1944, Fire 922
37
aCDM' ac a'D d ' CD
~0 1~0 U 4 (
4A
4- I 4)w
00
0 o1 r+ ow+
w o- w
K(0A 0 00
N 004-)
u C;J
cu *o 0
CL C
M~- C) a) a 0 a
(A C3 ' 1-1 0L S
2c 3 -a C 0 z a
I
0 c 0. 30001
LL 0-~ MZZ
LU 3 4- 9C C
Uii 0 -I0 -
=. U
uj 00
aj -c
Io (V CC
.03 *4Cc
= z
LU 0c
ZV 4.v 31
oi m- 00
CCa- c c
diU CL
10 05
43 ~ 41
4- V c ma c- c 0 .- 0 4
43 gL bd 4 4v f-
Cl W
Cc 4-AV) c4 4 43 b.
4- (-
4 44 IV CW 4(A
A C 0.C 1-41' i3 C0
u.. 414-'C 02Z C ca 34%14 -).W
Lai C 0 . 1 - U. C0 = =~ ( C 1- 0
20 0-1a 0 C
a40 I '%q-
W-0 4, CL U 10
o- Uc I-W C
=, 41 2
- 4- 0 0 C 0 4U 0ap 0 AJ 21L. W (4 1
00 4J
C C3 0 vC 0 C C.
4M31- 43M C
-P.2 M S0 L. U
00. cl 3% l Z ivK'1443cC
0.C00U m c
UC . L.
14a N 4.& *CW 4-Y 4--
0. C4,C " 0 0 0 N-4.
CL. Q~
I- 0. 4- %4- cCI.
.433 C *C = "2- * . *3
38
r7 0, 0% 0CA 0 %
a% at % 0%i
CE4 -0 o CE O -0 -40 C-0C .0
4%~~~q Ik7k3k :*k : k : " 4k
w 0 0 0- 06 0 0 0~ 04-
4A I-q -M
4. w
41 q 1 w 1 w 1 w . 0v4104
LL 00w 00) 00 0)04) &M0 00 0)0 00 00 0 0 a
4 .'. 41
M1. 0D r-Cc C .0 V
C) .0) 0 0 C 0 0~ C
z% w6 x z 2c zck C= 2Z
L%1. 0%0 w WC6
C
0a. CL 4a. a t 1 314- C
*-4
a :1a 6.m >' CL M0W1 0C
.j04 4T -0 CM 3.0
C F*'
W U 0 ~ '- .- C.0 S- 4 4
LI. 01 r 0- 0~
0L.4-
C*- 4
aL C 4JL
4W44- C-4
.C In
0I '=u CL Z
CCC (41 .0L. L4
4-0. 3 .
90
C;
~
40 ~ 14 r-£3P
.^.F- W 0 iv i
C1. C
41. 5. r-4t'
Ca 4- 0 V P-04- 4J C
oD 41
C~' 46 0 v I. to
Q% ^- K 0% v L. 0
C4 C *uC. 414 C
11%
0C =~CL 00 .1
14-
41
09 CC 4-
0 -0 40 2 a46 w 01
0 *-L6 C C w0'-1
Cd . 4--f- CrP-C
0V 41 64i
(A 1r
S.1. r- U
- 0 A V 04
m0 41
WA
WA
'-
cm
41
0
C ~ 1
4-0
39 J4-
CU
4.1 S-14-
41 CL t- 41 0 6-
4% 41
U~~ *'C LII
5- 14 C 4.0 "a OC
43 0 0a j 4-1 CO cI
41 m-
"~4. C) C 41 .C I1 4
o .0 41 OC
m1 c' a' % ' .u (A
0 I I K a =- - 0,. LIIU
4C CL W 06-
C% -W
*4 L o * .41 . 4 * .06A
04 -3 "" V" J.% %61
"q 00 CL
P-44 0%4.V
39
-40 OCW
CCP L.. -
LIGo -40
CA'L. 40
P U c"
ia a-4c
LLI 0 0E
L
L L-
C~c
L.-
6 c
CL
LIC
' C o ~ aC
- .~40
0% Ol 0%l 0%i * 0
.a -Q at 1m;
4b~4
4) CLw a 0 0 W
Q~- --
4A C3W W .4.
N 0 4 A
0- CO C14
0o
4.-M
41 4JU
-~C 4 C C
4- 0 a1 4-1 =
L C a
61 'Cn 0 V)
'A IV--V
I 0
16 U
40 u S CV O .
U.
Cm CC
LLI C4 14 C. S..
C CA- a ofvL
(A 4,6 #A 19 (D6
CC- f'A1,4 044C
1
C ow - C
at"r- 20
U C I
4 4-b
C1 4Jba
I1 r- 0 40
41W-
46. 46
a %w t
.
a141
CAO-Z
0 Ov.-
6v- va 4A C C4
V)- w 0.- C 41 -~ Im
-(A Cc
vC' C0 P4N 4-U"C .
a~ AdC It 0.6
WE
2 0 61 15 a,
4, am C. 4 i
CL to31P. 6.% UC~~l C" in Ca2C- .,
a C -- L41 04 . *CS .LS 4-p
8- 0.-a W 4 CA 4- ,1C
-4 -- -v -1L
41
.40 .0
ancn c40 a Ot 0
O at at at at at
Q Q0 . Q0 C0D0
ad- c.- c; "c.-0 4O CQ-
c.- c..Ci c-c.
L L L6 LA LL LL LL.I
Q~ 0 0 D 00 0%. - 0%- 0%. Q0 C2%-
v I- q- IV qw OW q- I-. -
A
to( A ( (4 44 MIl 0 (A (A (A
-u .- E 'U-U wu VU U P- .4u w
~0 CD ol~ CD000
mg 04 (A I-. a
.1- 4 ~ ~ *C I
(A A
#.
(A - .0 P"u
a,~S..cl 9-
us 0
C 41 41
~~L 2.- CUC
co Ad e-.3. vL. a
Wj C4- 0 L4- = (A.
Cm CL a. *. 9.
I~Il
a C M (
4ap 4) -1%
C9C C- 99 0 "
0 - w- 5m
20 c1I 430r-Ca
(A ti " ) P 1.- #A
CC z .o9 0 %Eu
C C C 4 r E0
o4 o 00 W*. % 30 .0 Eu V
sf
C Eva o.4-~ 0) Zo.L
4- c C4-
0 Cc
4j4a
us F- C
4A . 9c EI a, C
I- Iu .. con 0v((
15va %X 0 cv c 3CC
u & .0 0- L a041
C,( .9-
C
&.0 U) E cm L 0CL V
W %.- 41 Eu IV =
a. 4
'-u za Z a,
VA oL 4.' , L M, -
4a EuC
~
W-0- ~ ~ 4v ~ ~ 0~
0;C; 3 ~ . oi. -
Z(A 42
-P -
.40 -0 0 a 4)
C C C -
Cc C-C.-0
L. 0*u- *D 6 ; c-
(A~~411P
4
Lai CDCCR) 4 4 JZ4
meGoc4a' ocIoc .
4J-'1-
4a
0. U0 c
C4 0.
* CC
4.3
00 1. 0 oC.-' 4
2c 4)4- a~ig C
ut CC =
ui U1.0 c 0, ,
a Mc a '4 4%. (
o ',4 41'C6v a n
Cc..U 4)U U
.- 41 48 Ct
c4m"ES C% C
105
CGA at
ii I.- 3
C
oA u.*. .* 4-0a c=
4- b*41 A* *Ci
300.
- C- - I
LAJ IVIc iv
a3
Ii iU
ACTIONS 5-6
That task fell to the 1st Bn of the 23d Inf Regt, formerly the division
reserve of the 2d ID but attached to the 394th Inf since about 2330 the
previous night. The men of the 1/23d had loaded onto trucks at their bivouac
at Camp Elsenborn for the midnight drive to HOnningen, their mission being to
occupy "secondary defensive positions'"17 in support of the 394th Inf. Now,
10 hours later, their defense of the little hilltop village of Honningen would
determine whether or not the Germans could roll up the US flank on the
17USA ETO 2d I Coat Inteview mettte of the lutge, 17-20 Doe 19M, Fit* 0173
44
X
..............
...
...
... . ....... .. .......... : ..
.....x:...
.:...
.....
...... ..... ........
.....
......... ....
.......
........... ....... .
... ...........
... . . . . . . .. . . . .....
...............
....
.... .. .. ... ........
. .. . . . . . . . . . .
...............
...... ........ ..
..
..........
....................
...... ....
.. ............
. .. . . .......
.............. .
.........................
......
..........
xt
. .....................
. ..........
........... .
................
.............
............. .
. ......... ......... .. ......
.. .
........................
..................
S D
m.'s
Is: . . ..........
Is
Al.62
son am
CM go ...............
Was
me .... -- 0 . ..........
c
it.
ofs.on
Vm
...............
..........
Al
45
northern shoulder of the Ardennes penetration.
2 USA ITO 2d ID Corle Interviews, nettte of the lulge, 17-2o Doe i-,* File #173
801st YOon An, Dec 19", FILe 209
46
wounded the TO platoon leader and kept the crew suppressed. Intermittent
artillery fell on the 1/23d's positions around HOnningen for the rest of the
morning.
n Cole, The Arden, p.94; USA ETO 2d I Combat interviews, lattLe of the Bulge, 17-2- Dec 1944, File
173
24Comare US ITO 2d II Combt Interview, *twelve tanks and an unknown number of infantry" with Cote,
p.94 *twelve IskIV tanks had appeared southeast of mfkuiingen" and Cavaneh, pp. 5 6 -57 "twelve Nk IV Panther
ie tanks'.
26The min body of KO Pefier w at that time centered around the vlttlaes
of Nmderscheid and Schoppen.
7-9 km to the met.
47
vehicles attached to it on the 17th: the 12th Panzerjiger Abteilung, whose
lO12th StuG Co had had only six battleworthy StuG III assault guns available
when the attack started on the 16th. Two or three of those had since been
knocked out in the attacks on Losheimergraben, so it seems unlikely that the
dozen vehicles assembling in the Bield were from that unit. The alternative
is that these were not "tanks" at all, but some other sort of large vehicle.
They may have been flakpanzers (37m AA guns on M4k IV tank chassis) or flak
wagons (quadruple 20mm AA guns mounted on half-tracks) which could have come
from the 12th VGD's organic flak unit, or perhaps from the 6th Pz Army's flak
units, which are known to have been in the general vicinity. Given the poor
visibility conditions, what with the fog, the woods, and the American gunners
facing southeast in the general direction of the rising sun, and knowing that
large German armored forces were in the area at the time, it is not impossible
that they mistook the vehicles in the woods for something more threatening
than they really were.
48
- -l -
~41
Mr-o 4-L 00. 1..- 0
.a IV~ I - -I
= M **u4
49C
c 41- 4a cA (A cA(
PA00k 0 00 00 0 10
4-A 3 1- uC I
LAJC 'Dr.c .. 4
00 c0
(A c C
41 tA C - C4
0Im- 0
92
LA
5 01
(A C uL0
La4.CJuE C
rV~~~~~4 ':A CM
U 11.'4i 0101 19b
D CcO4J
too C- u.(
CA
15
oJ 4-IA
4
.. ". I%-
r- c C
w 4. Jj WZ CCC 0CM 0
L~U C 041 C 0 ac L
Eu IQW 4
(1 Oc 4c~ aU , CC--0 a
LI C 4Cnt C-.- N Eu L
4A C P - C .1J .%4
C- - C Cj4 3-a
.. (..
Or-4- - m- ..... ( E.
4-4.1 U 4 C W- C 11 0
CC.Ji
wi 4- A E 40~
C3C9w-
C..J ~~~~~~~~q
C W -u 1-
49- C. ~.
..--- ----- o - -% -
C0 -O .E0 40 a0 0 .0 Q0 a0 a
:oh
4ok W 4 k Ik4b~q If f
4) 4) w a) 4) d) aj (D4
Cil aCr C Cr- Ccc Cr- CI-r- C-
U. U. U. LL. U- U- RO.V U. U. U
0m 0'- 0 0 0%.0 Q%0 3 P-4C 0 0-0 0
4- P- P- qw-~ I-- I...-
W) CAW A El vi VA usl 4A 4
-4 - V-U P- - qU -4 -
-U t - U P"u "u
.0.
1. r=E
C1 C - CA-I
EU; 'a C
411 3 41% 9E
C
.- 41 CL CD ma c
to L. 0 09-.0V
C C .
.6 C w - .)I =-
aU*
= -V- u E C V
1
C7- cm
(D CCr 1c C 000
Ci M CL S
*L
C0-L ' . I 6
C',
4- w41 .C
4-P 10~ in4b L
L0- i-b w 0 - W
ZZ to IZ u0IC
S:..
..- v
IVeO
ul 24
OC.
4-
0
~ a-
c-
.,- La-
on mI4 %'4 W U0
40CO CC 9iv4
4-~U- P4 ~0 41 3 (D~L
CC;a)AE C4 00 4- a) w:0-
U..C0 Xv
cozo P-4 0 "4 0 4
L:14Z
1. 4150
-% - -- W
. .40 .0 a0 ac
Ce-Cr- Cr C- 0.
La.. LA. LA.. L6 41)
'4p 41-
r-4 8C 4J
404 4041 4041 0D4( 0 41 z
C IA
Im M C 4) 4.)
cu 3 V N go C4
t..-
w1 4 C- C
~4-L1 -3v I
V-L 4) 4)A a - z
tv O . 4) r-.W '
O4) EU 4 .- W =
inC (C
)-r c 0Kv
(a 0 41W .(A0= & 1
EEL1 3. C I V( 3
C9 413 .4
0 ~ 'cC VVo
IM CA 0.. I *..E
C..-3.0 IV 'A
0U in =C Lc
*L 4-b
IV4 2 V D4J LES0
l~~4) 0L1 IV C~
Cca 0 0
I Z S.
r--
Uz
C.P
m04a
C cC 0YI'4 K 6
1 C.rU1
4w - ua
4 0 . 00
S. c, cm 4-
U C0 JC C 4-C OC
c 'a aE goE 0a- C
S -C W1 1 . 411
i160 4a - N S4)PG N
o=..- X.W.- aS. ~ *-
C74 EJU a 41
4-*4.4)' % *C .0.
SCLO 04 4 0 .W
Y= n~
100 .04- T- CL -V £40 - *0. EV .0 4- XW .
(. j CL O0 (. CL a a. *a~ CL
= U - 4 U LA. ~ ~ U .I
U' *c U.
C3 .3LE 0.
CM- 0 IVa 0
S.. u S. 4v 4-
V, C14- C
cyir~ ag C -r03C4
0 3
- 1r*L
.w CU
LL. 0-C S.
WI
CDC
400
0 41
4 9
C c
I .p- 0
4.-c
414-
a -EV 4IV
Lai C04.& 4
30 0 -1
LU C 4b 4
CL (A 2 CL L. 0 S
W C r. . l 4-
I-I.- - 4-
C C
52
c a0u0 4.4:0 W c 0.-0
.0 4 - 0 ef 0~ . r -0 CL a-
M 44.J ,- CL 0
14 u ~ Icm
Ca4k hf- 4) cm 45C o " C 4
j*r- Wc
M.- f0 z 4.-Aa r-i a4 0 -a (V-a 4 0.a (- IV
C
* .. 4 4 ) 0i. c 0 1*-1
4-) (D 0 r% 4- al- ccf 41 4) 0 *
.A
0 q
LU. O : S.U
OR an 20 LU.
"k 21r.W . = 4WIO
o-' en ~ %n w -- fn ~ Ln mM" - uM n
La IV - . $ In
IC C
u* 0 0
W~ 0CCC
a = a. 2.
C do
09 C
S 0
41C
cC
eSi
CC CL W (
~
4- ~ 4Am
C I E 0
'Uj
CL(A = (A
no 41 41
0.--
IV 4.0 c
cm ,_ .5. C.21
- a ~ hI53
c 413 Ga c 4.1 IV c 4.b Ga * C 3 G
011 .0 4-- CL. IV .0 4- r- C .0 ..- 4- . EU
4 .0 u-0- .C
c +~ a 8~ .IV. .j Ga z - . -j Ga No .. . a
4j W -a* .3. Wa'. * 41 G-41 IGapt.. Gw4 Lno
*-
PC"..
.. Ga
W 434) P%'.*
LLI .0 LU.. C= qt .0 L. C 14 %D S.L.6 C.C " 4W 4 .0 S...U.C C
99 CI 41 ok at In u cc * f ao W) w am 4.a N at us w go 44k
4a Ch It
C5C
Gu CA4.1
C
4A
SMJ Ga4-
LA. I-
ac a
U'.
0a 0A 0
- L-O
46 41
bl .LS IV
dc 2UU'
-- 0
54.
c *J D * c 41. do * 4 a) C 41 GD
~- ..r- - .0. M .0 1*.,- .0L u
rU
*
- CL E- 4-. - .
c ~E a L. em LD-.~ L6 i.).0D *
GDCa 0;.C.C 03 WG~aCG.C*aD C G..GD*C
=% %D4j 8 "' M 8 011041-- ~ G
-D IVWO
.. w Dc
a 0 P. 4'GDC 0 - 4; G0 C 0 I -410 C
EM cn.DuM aL. -i~LEM iv- aMW iv M M aL fUluJEM
C4 4.C Vk amr 4'I.C 4b~ CO zo I 4j CDk r- > 4j b do r- >
C 4-4- tVD Lf C a eji Il C::: M~ Cf Wi-a M~a
.*.4.;
C 40 f" .. 4'MJ~. *a 4'GL.nD C"V aI 'G M .4 ~%.fn
.L. L .= P-4Et
a. L.. C . U
C I.- L.. C C-' "4 4W. O Uq
09 CL - 4j 4k 0% Un W CC 4A 4k M1In C D j W .a-a 41 nk as In Lj Co %-o4 4 aft
Cn
cm + c
CD 7D
0 0f"
OC C U.ZE
oD x
20
V00
0 CAC
4c4
U .0.
oo I
r '4-
.C .
4 CL
CC
ow GD 40
Lli *
U) GD55
c ..a 0 * bC 1 . C 4j. 0 * C 43 0
E.0 4.' .0 PW.4- E
65 .04-.-- .0. .4-~ 0
u. ca~0CL1 W -- C. W 0;: CL. W 0
0 n%
k j4 a4 0 r-. 4. ow 0 c. Pk~.
-. -4 M M-L *- LJ 0 . - . 010tv Mw. .~ P4 IV w-. v
Eul- CcI ; 4- We--
4bl :10 44 dCe-.
Cc Z flm
We- Ck N
J
.0 L. 6 C 4W 40 .0 L. . C w% .0 S-LL. C ql&% .0 f- U. c.C-4~
41
CL0
a C
01 az
IV
U S CC
Lai
VV
LLI
Go0
4-0
*0
cI- a " C
.4 - 4 0 V
CPa 4A
.4S.
4j 4.
L 3%AC
Z~a CC 0 S..
wo.- S-= C~
LEV~Las cm
- rJC~ 10
c a = .. I,
IV r- - rv" an q
4j 5 .m4j cur%% ..-
CD
Vu V
SI.O- 240
c w
2m 01t
La.L
c Cg
z .0
fAT
CI
. 30, isA
ii
cc -
4. C
0
i57
ACTIONS 7-10
58
...............
.............
..
...
..
....
..
...
.. .
. CY ...............
...
........
......
...
..
.
....
......
..
.IT
..... ...............
.........................
....
...
..... .....................
. ...........
.................... INTERP ONAL HIGHWAY : ::::::::
...
........... ..............
......
....
....... . . .... .
. . . . . . . . . . .....
.................. 1.
...............
....... ...... .........
. .
........ .... ............
...... . ... . .......
CD .... ............
.......
...
............ ............
...........
.. ......
.. ..
.... .......
.. .......
.......
... .......... .
C ............
..........
. ........
................ .
.......... ...... ..... ..
....
........ ..... ..
............
..... .....
. ... ..
..
....
.....
.. ...
.........
...................
.......
.
..
.....
.
.. . .............
..
....
.............
.....
...
..... ::x:t-: LX. ..
.....
.......
...... N-31
... ....... . ...... N.-:
XI.,
...........
...............
.. .......
..
...............
..................... .....
. .....
. .. . ....... .... . .
.6
J.
. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . . .
. .. . .. . . . .. . .. . . .. . . . : .. . .. . ....
.. .....
.. ....
A ..... . ..... . . .. . . .. .. .
.... .....
............. ............................. ... ...... ...... ...
.......
.... ...... ......... ........
..........................
..; . . .....
...........
...........
. ........ ...
A .......... ...
......... .......... ...
..... ........ ....
..........
.......
.............
.... . ...... X4 .............
.. . . .. . .
... . .. . .. . .
. .. . .. .. . . .. .
.................
...........
.7t*
.... ....... ...... . ......
............... .... .
to
-: X
... ..........
...................
.... ........
......
......
.....
.... ....
. ..
............ .. N:
.... ..........
....... .
.............
59
forest, KG Oller of the 12th SS-PzD moved forward. This kampfgruppe included
the 12th SS-PzJg Bn, with 22 PzJg IV/48s; the headquarters of the 25th SS-
PzGren Regt and two battalions (1I and III) of that regiment; a towed flak
company; the II Bn of the 12th SS-Arty Regt with 105mm howitzers; and a
company of Pioniers.2' Like its sister division, the 1st SS-PzD,
"Hitlerjugend" would be forced to create its own breakthrough in order to
reach the Meuse.
While the Germans were marshalling their strength for the next day's
attack, the Americans on the other side of the forest scrambled to establish
another defense line in front of the Germans at the west edge of the woods.
Since there were only two roads that passed through the dense woods, and since
they intersected at the west side of the forest at a place known locally as
the Ruppenvenn, this seemed to Gen Robertson of the 2d ID to be the most
logical place to block the German advance. The only unit available for this
task was the 3/23d Inf, part of the 2d ID's reserve for the Wahlerscheid
attack. As soon as the situation in the Krinkelter Wald became clear at the
2d ID headquarters, Gen Roberts ordered the 3/23d out of its barracks at Camp
Elsenborn and onto trucks bound for the Ruppenvenn. They arrived at that
place at about 1630 hours on the 16th, just as the winter sun was setting
behind them. I Co moved a few hundred yards down the Schwarzenbruch Trail and
established a roadblock. They knew that the remnants of the 3/393d were
somewhere in the dark woods in front of them; they knew the Germans were there
too. L Co dug in on the battalion right, covering the Weisserstein Trail.
K Co filled in the gap between them, and blocked the exit from the forest.29
All three companies were stretched thin, and the thick woods made it almost
impossible for them to coordinate their positions or activities. To make
matters worse, "...[the] battalion was none too well prepared for defense,
having arrived with no mines and very little ammunition. Trucks bringing
60
amunition forward found the road between B~llingen and Krlnkelt barred
by the
Germans and never reached the battalion." 3°
On the extreme left of the 3/23d's position, pointing like a finger down
the trail at the German penetration, was I Co's 1st Platoon, commanded
by ILt
Long H. Goffigon. 1st Plt occupied a line of previously-dug foxholes
which
straddled the trail. Some of those holes even had overhead log cover,
but
"there were not enough holes for the entire platoon and the crews of the
two
heavy machine guns that arrived later..." 31 Those men of 1st
Plt unlucky
enough to have to dig their own foxholes found it a daunting task, equipped
as they were with only personal entrenching tools to use against the
hard-
frozen soil. A load of picks and shovels, along with some rifle and machine
gun ammunition, finally arrived at the company by a roundabout route at
about
2100, but this did little to alleviate either problem, ammunition or
cover.
In addition, Lt Goffigon realized that his 35-man platoon and two machine
gun
crews were occupying a position whose left flank hung in the air and
was
directly athwart the only route through the forest that the German force
in
the northern part of the forest could use to get to the twin villages.
Whether that force would contain tanks or not Goffigon did not know, but
if it did the prospects of 1st Platoon's holding its position were not bright.
As mentioned previously, the 3/23d had left its mines behind at Camp Elsenborn
in its haste to move to the Ruppenvenn (this was a calculated decision,
not
an oversight). In addition, in the entire battalion there were only
seven
bazookas with three rounds apiece.32 When Goffigon's platoon had occupied
its position early in the evening, "there were two 57mm AT guns from the
393d
Infantry [there already], but sometime during the night the crews of those
two
guns hitched up and slipped away. " ' [Action 7]
61
Upon their arrival, the men of the 3/23d had been told that their
mission, come daylight on the 17th, would be to attack to the east to relieve
the surrounded 3/393d in the Krinkelter Wald and to help that battalion
reestablish its former positions along the International Highway.34 However,
radio communication with the surrounded battalion was regained during the
night, and Col Allen said his situation had stabilized, so the 3/23d's mission
was altered to that of merely occupying back-up positions. (The fact that the
Americans in the Krinkelter Wald, a force of less than battalion strength,
thought they had the situation under control when in fact they were surrounded
by the equivalent of three German battalions reinforced by armor, is a classic
example of the fog of war.)
As the cold night wore on, German artillery began a steady pounding of
the Ruppenvenn crossroads, probably firing at map coordinates since there was
no way for them to know that the 3/23d had moved into the area. They may have
been trying to interdict any elements of the 3/393d attempting to infiltrate
through the woods back to Krinkelt-Rocherath. Most of the rounds fell in the
K Co area, but no casualties were recorded.35
Before dawn, a few stragglers from the 3/393d Inf began arriving at the
3/23d position, trying to get out of the forest before the Germans could renew
their attack. By this time, Col Allen's force numbered no more than 475
effective.' Around 0730, just before sunrise, a platoon of two Sherman
tanks from C Co, 741st Tk Bn, commanded by lit Victor Miller, arrived at the
Ruppenvenn and placed themselves at the 3/23d's disposal. They were directed
to positions Just behind Lt Goffigon's 1st Platoon line.37
62
3/23d. The Germans were surprised by the direction of the attack and the
Americans drove them off the Trail. As the GIs turned back east to restore
their previous day's positions, however, they collided with KG I'ller's
renewed attack, consisting of a battalion of the 277th VGD, the 11/25th SS-
PzGren Regt, and a platoon of five PzJg IV/48s from III Platoon, 2d SS-PzJg
Kp. 3" This was at about 1000. The lead jagdpanzer rolled down the trail
toward the 3/393d's CP, but American artillery fire forced its infantry escort
to seek cover. Undeterred, the jagdpanzer continued to the vicinity of the
M Co CP, about 200 yards northwest of the battalion CP, but without its
infantry protection itwas vulnerable to American close combat weapons. Soon,
one of the four US bazooka teams in the area, firing from a ditch at the side
of the trail, immobilized the vehicle by hitting one of its tracks. [Action
8] At least some of the jagdpanzer's weapons were still functional, however,
for it continued to fire its machine guns at the American infantry in the
area, pinning them down and allowing the grenadiers to move closer. Before
long, the remaining four jagdpanzers of the platoon approached down the trail
from Hollerath. One of the GIs from L Co, Sgt Vernon McGarity, who had been
wounded in the previous day's fighting,3' snatched up a bazooka and quickly
knocked out the leading jagdpanzer while his squad drove off the accompanying
SS-panzergrenadiers. The remaining three vehicles withdrew, abandoning the
now-blocked trail in order to work their way forward via the narrow tracks and
firebreaks that criss-crossed the area. [Action 9]
63
cutting off their only escape route. "In a mad rage, "4° McGarity single-
handedly killed the machine gun crew with his rifle, and for a while he and
his men fought off all German attempts to reman the gun. Eventually, however,
the Americans ran out of ammunition and were captured.
About two kilometers to the west, the men of the 3/23d could hear the
battle raging in the forest. Before long they could hear the 3/393d convoy
approaching, jeep-mounted machine guns spraying the woods on either side of
the trail to minimize German interference with the withdrawal. Soon the first
vehicles reached Lt Goffigon's 1st Plt, I Co. As they passed through the
line, the men of the 3/393d gave the 2d ID men the little ammunition they had
left (mostly small arms, few bazooka rounds or grenades). 1 Only two men
stayed to fight with the 3/23d; the rest continued withdrawing to the rally
point near the Lausdell crossroads. As Charles MacDonald, the captain in
command of I Co, put it, "To everybody in the 3/23d, it was obvious that the
Germans would be close behind the withdrawing column. How long the battalion
could hold; how long its ammunition would last; and how well two Shermans
might deal with accompanying German tanks--on all those factors might depend
the fate of those men of the 2d Division who were beginning to withdraw
through the forest from Wahlerscheid to the twin villages and Wirtzfeld.
Indeed, the fate of everybody in the 2d and 99th Divisions might well depend
64
on how long the 3/23d could hold--and when it got right down to it,upon how
long Lt Goffigon and the men of 1st Plt, I Co, could hang on... si42
By noon, no more troops from the 3/393d were arriving at the 3/23d's
lines. Lt Goffigon could see a body of troops gathering downhill from his
position along the banks of the Jans-Bach, but he couldn't tell whether they
were Germans massing for an attack or more retreating Americans. At 1230,
however, the first German attack hit. A force of 40-50 German infantry
attacked the left flank platoon of L Co, near the vertex of the two forest
trails. L Co repulsed this first attack, but more Germans kept arriving until
an estimated company was attacking that point. Meanwhile, on the battalion's
left flank, Lt Goffigon could see tanks on the ridge across the Jans-Bach
creek about 2500 meters northeast of his position, and he could hear several
more that were still hidden by the trees. He radioed in a request for
artillery fire, but as it began to fall on the ridge and scatter the tanks,
the Germans in the Jans-Bach draw advanced up the trail and a heavy infantry
attack erupted on I Co's front and left flank. The American small arms fire
pinned down the Germans to the front, while Goffigon's 1st Platoon checked the
left flank assault with small arms and mortar fire. Capt MacDonald called in
repeated requests for artillery support, but each call was answered only by
a pitiful three rounds. Six successive German attacks, by the II Bn of the
25th SS-PzGr Regt", were repulsed by I Co's small arms, but with each attack
65
MacDonald's company grew weaker. While the German infantry kept the Americans
busy, some of the jagdpanzers of the 12th SS-PzJg Bn were picking their way
down the ridge and through the woods along tracks and firebreaks to positions
from which to enfilade the Americans.'" Other jagdpanzers approached right
down the Schwarzenbruch trail to within 100 yards of Lt Goffigon's platoon and
opened fire on the US foxholes.4" The time was now about 1450." Capt
MacDonald's placement of artillery fire on the jagdpanzers had no effect;
however, the sheer volume of the company's small arms fire kept the vehicles
buttoned up while it decimated the accompanying panzergrenadiers. It was at
this point that Capt MacDonald learned, to his dismay, that Lt Miller's tanks
were unavailable, having withdrawn to the K Co area.
Up to now, except for the initial assault against its left platoon at
about 1230, L Co had had little contact with the enemy. Around 1500, some 60
men from I Co passed through the L Co area, headed for the rear. This was L
"Contrary to acmontdls contention In A TInL fr i that the AT guns from the 393d Inf had f Led
the previous night, the USA ETO 2d I Calbat Intir s "at this tift, according to Capt Mac&onatd... the
AT crew from the 393d abanone their oaw.a
47 741st Tk In AAR, Doe ", Fits 0210
66
Co's first indication that the units to its left were pulling back. 1Lt
Walter E. Eisler, Jr., the L Co commander known as *Chief" to his men, stopped
the I Co stragglers and ordered them to form a secondary defense line behind
L Co. Shortly thereafter, "a number of men dressed in American combat pants,
combat Jackets, and American helmets approached from the direction of K Co.
As they reached the first line of foxholes, they opened fire on the L Co
troops. According to the men of that unit, there is no doubt but that they
were German troops dressed in American uniforms and were trying to infiltrate
behind L Co's position.* " Simultaneously, a strong German infantry attack
hit L Co's front and both flanks. While 1st Plt provided covering fire with
its few remaining rifle and machine gun rounds, L Co fell back about 200
yards. While reorganizing there, Lt Eisler received a message from Col Tuttle
ordering L Co to continue withdrawing all the way into Krinkelt.
67
a fighting withdrawal to a wooded draw near the edge of the woods a few
hundred meters to the northwest of the trail Junction, -here they reformed
their line. About 20 minutes later they were again hit and overrun by the
jagdpanzers. This time, their withdrawal took them out of the forest and in
to the open area east of the Lausdell crossroads area, where the Germans hit
them with an artillery and nebelwerfer barrage which dispersed them. As they
scattered, the men of K Co could see Lt Miller's two Shermans burning a few
yards from the forest edge where they had engaged the leading jagdpanzers as
they emerged from the trees. Miller's tanks had knocked out two of the
jagdpanzers but had been destroyed by return fire from the other German
vehicles. By now it was dusk, and K Co's fighting withdrawal had allowed the
survivors of I and L Companies to escape from the forest and had bought time
for the troops from the 9th and 38th Inf Regiments to arrive and begin
constructing a new line around the Lausdell crossroads. Both I and K Cos had
taken heavy losses and would not be reorganized until 20 December. Meanwhile,
the Germans continued their westward advance, fated to collide next with the
1/9th Bn at the Lausdell crossroads. The outcome of this encounter would
prove crucial, for the 1/gth was the last American unit between the Germans
and the Wahlerscheid road, down which three of the 2d ID's battalions had yet
to pass in their withdrawal to the twin villages.
68
in in In in ULn q0 w0 to q
aL a a
L i a aL
* * *c - _ F-a
3
oO u
0
0
m 0
0
3 0
0
I=
41 1.
0 .0 cc C
4A CPI
CL0 c cC ac a
IW'-~ z ao 0 0 I0 0
4. ~ 0L "a C
c ac * c
q-O U.0 c c
m - 6 4-A n 004 0
SMJ C u . 4) ~ 0C
lt4. n 0CA0
IZI
4. U Cc ccc
44
4j 1 c c1 00 0
C oa - 'AC C
v c
WW 44(AW
04.1 4A4 I Lc4)
W4.0 20 C aU CCI-4a 0 m C 0
C1 41 z c g 0 4J
i c0 4a 0-C 4a =0 L & r
CCC a +a0 0C-
P- C 1 Uh CO 4.10 41
14-A -CV 14 I 4-W 06 C 04-)
C44J
3N C 6V -*-Cif -4 0 WC 0.0
CL4A4 204 ifl C" cc = o 4 ) t
-p U4. 41 P. CC~ C .... 0)
tA 01 C 4 L.
aMC .L 14- U6 al CL fe A (A0o
C t- 41V L
04
.43 C 4 C 4 A!~I 4 LAWC 4Z C 0 2,C 41t
=L 2 OLICI. "1 W 0
44 -a-
L4 N4 -CM 4- a-69.
- m -
a Wa c* a a a a a
m- m- m i (A IV M ~ w- a w-
.ICCC C~ 1 M C 3C
~F hI
.I~0 0I
c a
I-I C CqO
-W w EU
"a M C 0
EU -a 0 C. r-u W 0 o.4A C
U
*I- ~~ 1 z~ I E
L a4 0. 0 01 00
U.I.S-S
w m o-m1
~~~ 4m
c a-
I-W EU- EU.C 6C S. I---
-C
41 41 @1
'A( =0~C I
EU a-4- . 0 I IC C %
39
- -:-~ 4 C -
).0 @1 0 (
EU
~ 1 -C C.
a-W C @1 c" 41 3C Cq 0
0~ z CC r- p* I.. .CE w .
.0ab U. @I0 w-r"-(A @(a u I.- g..
a- C .~ 4-w Er- 0 a-~ 1 C-
U,~~4 U -b L.a 29-
C- .- M@1 W 0 c
4- L wC cs4
I- CC
04EU
43 I. a W~3 4- CC w0 .- E 4CC - 0c
3M 0 *a~ EU 0 3M CE
c 4006 0.-1- C
*a I 34 4A EU +a N I4 N @
-Jz ECa- o= 0a- Z 1=b3UU
; 0.
vIV 0.EU *Cc 0.
U; @1 *@1 W( a; WA C;
70
CLC a t-. CL.
W c
C C
4WCC
4m r C c
4WG= - W
o Coc
CWlJ
CY I Z
4n ~ *.* u%% L& %
COCA
Ca W O ~~~a 4.1..
44a 0 II en " 0
mnnL CL
u'4-A N6 CbL
L caCLS. - IC
14O
4.0 V N
*C'40 U c
C -C le
M
4!c' 0 W 41
(A cc1t z%5 'U 4. A CC0 4j
C Ad-' C 4-4 ftOt. ta of =
o- 4j u.4. of c '4.
w 4 4- 1 CC4
4A5 WSrE
MP 1CC
0-1 4C co IO.-wC w
i~u ...- IS U 4141C At a 4 44
E4d4 0.
IU I.- aC 1 o
(.4,1 c
41 A1
VM '4
cm4 U - 4
C4
a.1
r-
C -r-
.0
E0
.AC ".
N 4-04 0'4L
0 . C L' c
U .C4444- 4.. Cfa IU u-
!~0S C C, 4W0s C.
14 4
5, Y N44 o 3 344 toU 4"-- '4
4JC 00~C *... U)I
71
4.-r
0%L 1. @Uva
at L6.
!h Ch a a
CL a CC
CL
4#1~~~~~- C0v- 4'S .iS0 0 0J
~ CCa4w C0CC~ do ' =v L.
w w J0% E== C Cu- 0cJ%j Cfl w v iv
S4Ja 'a0c 0 C7 t c 4 4 30 z li :1 *. .. .
S- .- CS.- J .- 0 V iv iv-a
IV C3L6
0% IV w
e-4a 01 u-,
C *e.u w...-
01 N0
N 41- .iL- W
C C 0 z (AC0 -4a. in V
C C L.C
a-- 0 0 C
2c aZ 4- u> 016.
a)
*CL.
=I iv
- 3 L. *. 1 0 4. S
SL C V
cA 4-4- C c iv
tv
N 1 S .. ' 4.
.0itv 0S.
11~ .0
co S. 0 01.0 P4 wS -0
-. j2 S S.- SC-4- 01)
mo a) 2 au-Y 4 U CA
U) S
0- .=4-v M Uc
014.' U.C0 S. *-.o 01
cc lmN 4-b
4.1 41' V
Lai P13C C 01 c 0 =A
N go0 .10 Uv cUa)
4.
9L C-4II u 0 L (
-0110 C L. 0D
0 o 0i. 0C ' 0 iv0
021
(A CIO 03 L.=
4-
4C 09 L
4.' 4.)
Civ 0
4A MID. 01
31 ~i , C0Iv
5~ ivU). (A. 2C 4- iv C C
m I 1 ; Lu 4-
0-G1 ivCC
Z.I 0 -P. . ;f 4 n
ao c *o iv *4
*01.
* 0I'I 72 v
4.1
6-6 1.
IF - Go I* I lco Go
~cJ
&V.-I.n.Q1LA 0 04.Q416 m...P 41 L 0.
CCJ 0 J C% 5 (D
CO 1'- CO 41.. . 41 41'=.v-
444 Ob.4~W m
~ EUO.0 41 .0 c 5.5 m .-
4o1a L.JU CL)L 4-b1 41 . U = 1
wf .
ES C- Im vi F- 41 4IMCMo
zo-a *
M . 4 a= = CI
U00'- 4a -P- U 64 0 w I
21- 4-j - -c 1f ci
..
IV C
CIOWI
)a ~
k. 4. ~ cm 4 - (
M- 9-.1 04 3
a Ar UW 5-
0 4 (D 0 CA 4.4 N.
Q 10 c 0mV L 41 0 c =Co4=.b 41 a4b
2ESS0C0 0- MJ41 =4 W c .ES
LL.41 "a~4 m- a41" O~4 - 4.1
W u
41
0 - = ES. - 41 41.
M v.b 41 CO C
Z V-4 IV ES CL S -.
(A00 40
41~~~~~ ) 41C-1-~l0.
LU 04.C.4 aE54E.
0 k-C4 C6
ad cmUES IV0.3
4-0 M Z IM1
4 CC
C ~41
c c. Im.EIS 41 C
id 4140 .0
C4C-00
0.-4- 1. e141 4. -
4 1 VCVC IV C
C o C
4aV L
a;'
C.- 4J4JI- .04
24 E)Smw
5-e0. 73.
-t . w O-
I in ...mn Ln In . Sn
aL a eC OW Ca.
aC C C aL
IV ^ 4v 10 to16
M6E
C L. C cc CC.5 c
0.0
wm 0LC
L a - A r-S.* aa
co en FA- W. S 2I -c C
m WC a In Ij CLr-
L S. NZ. 4 .16 CZ a4P
co S91 C
C 0) P RW en
C16d)
"-aI%%.n
U C
010 1 1
t' 1- 0-4 C)C
.0C C ...1 CL6..
0x w 4-4. 074 u
09 3 L 4.. , p-i
U4.b 4-' to N WC Ia 0 U
hd CC 14 .A ~ U C r2 5.
C ~ ~
~~~C ' ~ I 1 0'~ CLJ~ .
0 Uc
LA( CMA an
C5 05 USC4cIl *. I-V
a6.e-14. 4.9 C
4)
Cr 00 CC C F-
14- 4 u c a 0 4
a ivtv i iv 0 =474
Sn Sn% C
0. 0. 3* 0. L0
c4 -1-
Ol 14 4 0,.; a; ,:
4n4 m4 cm0 0 V w M- c
CL 4) 05u-
(D.-
.9 i
:0U cn 0 C o to 0 Z.1
ci4 %
Go 0
C4 41: .0- -0
c L L .1 a) 6104
8= 2m 41- .0 (A41. 0 =~4
4141 NW 41-
c'5 0. *
CP
*0 0 5 -0
...4 ~1
4
-- .
U
L. 06- 4
S. I
*j c. CD =)0 w a
ga0 m 5O CDE"U' M-
CD Ua 4 -- cc.
a)46 .41 41 C
.b
MM -#-
u1
t!
0
C- -
.-
4
CC.
~
4
U 0519 -'aU C)E.U
U= 03 U 0- ( J .
S- 4-a)E 4a 1 .1 m
. 4UC 1 W 0DS-. 4
41 -r. .~ 4.5
c9 . - 414 0)
L
0.S4 0-4(A
4.14 41
415...04 0
ag E 41acu# 4. N *- 4..-.4
uj = C 0 A4 CD 140 a -c
id .C4 0 a00.
IV 6nCD "41
c- 41
Lin 41 0-U V0 WEUU(Ac# CD
.041 z #A4J L. z r"-a
cu~ U. a)C41 3) a)* 0 C0 -21
= = c W4 31 0 0
U .. 0 40 zip 4 UJ 4 C.
4-
0) ZIP
41 0
04 u 4)
no MEU M 0 0 CC
I- 4V1 1 S-4 IV C- '4-.-'0%
041 EUo1 41 -1j4- U L
r---4 41 C w. -
0 IV 00 cm L. EU in to0
4o ai C;
u- SU.- 0 Cc C a-E
EU
-p 1 U£0* LS - C .0
SM~~~~~4 U0 . 50S CL1a-
41;a- Cn 41* C -* 4 vi aC
cc 14 *- 0" '0
P0.
* a a a4) a;
>.> :1 . . 4
u, MCv I 4 a4
w~ w U to :0
0
.Ou 0
009-a 0
C
iv.
C
4. 4J0
QU 0. C 9-
ac IV0
LL. f id
LUI 00 w c
* 41 0a
1
4- W0 "D-
0.M U CL.0i
1 04a14 b .0 S.
0
CC A V.0 L. 4-
UJ 0.0 > =
u (U- c 0 L
li- (D 41"- S. 0
C 4-GD t
OC
cr 0 - 0*
CAI
39-P 4- 1
4- o- dCLLJ 00
o a
"a Vc
'dLAJl
0
cm 4-
C 1 C C 4-CCI
La ILI *1
CO 00l 0.5 C
Fi 0 41 0.
-*4j' W . 0 *0
4c ca4j 4. 0 Q= P4 I C
76
1'n @1
06 c") EU 1- -4
u"
a ---I u
.~ .IC
= .. Q C. a
EU.1
CL U CM- EU.0EUMJ C LE C c.4 CL CLE
oc IV r-) 0 U- tE C3 to M ~~ MKUU
4- '4-
'4- C c
4, C
IV. 02 U.
M = 4-aCCL
- L -1 4C U 0 LWe)
1. 1CVCS
it L~. W 4 -
2.. 61fl 41 c 0
i .C xf C P720 4
coC C
IN *x C
a C4 RNLN
CA cm 41 1 U 0.
C4 CJ N
:1%c 0 CL. w N
SIC ~ ~ ~ Ce4 j(
w .eJ 414
UJC1 4CC1Vo U ZI o'
Cj Cc 0
ca~*. (D'
41~ 4 "a 41a.a
CC VCV CD
S14- 4c. IU c I-- IC-
£4hc4L 4a N 4 C C - NA
Ill C). eJO.
-p- C 41 0
C-
M £4 6V 4-Al *C
- J, C C 0 .=.
3C. .*C CM *- *n *r * Ca
77
CL
3 %. (U
'o .-
J CUC4-b WW
* .0 L- . .L- v=i .P (AC I (A . S.
=0 UI W 4-)
4W. 0. 1W.- 4.0C.- U)
:b%) W
4-a Cd) V 10 LU
0 (U ;1.% W
4)L 4- CU0ov
c Z.( 0 0.0 . =
a ) . CC L0 .; 4- M "
2.0 2c - U 4A. iv tm
- 39.0 0) C0 p
Wr W NW*
41 4 . 04
La C CA C. 0. O
10u
., UW 0fl 0. (A fA 4 )W
LA W% d)Q C CoE .4
L.C
0)ct :0P L) .C'
9 0 WW9
92 0 U 31- 211 1.-)~f
.OW
0 4-W
'0 1 >%L WI4-
44 4-J
00 0) 0 = J
Z4
>
~~ ~ ~(U4 4
L ) 4C 4'A 4. aP
U)V 0r
NW..-4
10 ( WIo
-V0 0 C
M o v -
ac W UU 0 UO '- 0.-
w CA C LW X 1- 0 N 0-W
u 4W 0 00 .U U
(A.- 4W
#A to C.0
U 0
-1 4- S 3 o=- =.. W- 0 0.aT
Ws-1 0 L- . 1
LAJ~~L Il 0mC0WO
P=4) O
.- 4 39U C3 0)W W 30 3g.)0-
4-
M41 C
IV1 )
Wo 4-C 4W
do
W 4W~~C04A WU )U
C~A w 4A t- 4 zi a)C
2 .. Li 104 o) 0 04 m
0- C a) C; t"
Im- fA 4WA S. - 04- MW C C
.ML ~~i
W WU -0' LU 4
LU C c'- J = .r- 4W W
4W- z4-M
L- WW U) .0S I--
4-8 006U M.
*w *n .4.. m %* 5,
78
-L
-
C. r CLC 3
(0 CM.-,% 0. ivWuM
* % C x ~ 40
tn ft IM V 10 CI.
qk
4-) v' AV cc C C1 10
g a)c z 0 0 04j4
4j > 41..
U Ccrv
LAJ~~~ to Mz
~o 1 .0 %.L.MP4P. cg
vEU
-
iz
g
ZL z wc t
2 - 4-
.0 IA i150 a 4.
-
CA0 L. c 0 ~ C.
O S: COP1. 141- 1.'2i1 (AC 41' Eu
.0 04 = I 3w 4JjW W.- L -4 MC
* ~ ~o 5-C
C ~~ u-0 CC4T
)* "a4-4- 0
c~a
419-q
S.-
tn..0EuC
15;A(
=
C
.L
sE
io
c0 L. 0 CDASG
Or- GD(A
C- 0
ev 4T -0 , uJ
A, M ~'S 1A
41 00
GD 0.' m~
a 0 *.-D w . .
ImGL.- . -..
cM - tv 'S.%cu 0
C9OAw LICL L. 6v 4.O~u 5-. C.,. tD
Li >S. IVCCL. M'S Cn.... 0.)C J2
0 30 WO Z 4 CU C "o -W CM 'a - 4A
CC du
c (A M N
kV.C 4J CL 4J
1-~~I I 5
L. 00-
0.- I c r- 0.01r.
fj.p. - 4 -
CS- W (A *
09 *.1 "0.
IJ C( 0-.- C
0 0 0 (A
Z ~ 4-0-SCn S.
wC-1 C No
CC C0Im- 5-.1
STCr CA (A v P- V t
U S44 S.,Q. U I 11% 15
tA Q 5- 5- a4' 1.4
Ca . 1 4- 01LaC.aJ
- ~1 C0
IV
P 4- 44.. k0C =~ w4-4 v
LUL& -cLiLJ 015CC
0 a) 0 1C=-
4- S c a. a.
41. C* *.c -C CIO
IVs0a - (
0~~~ 2=.-xA.!L -N m
79
ACTIONS 11-19
8o
17th, all the more bitter for the men of that battalion, and Wahlerscheid
became known to them as "Heartbreak Crossroads." According to Robertson's
plan, the 1/9th was to be the last battalion from that regiment to withdraw
from the Wahlerscheid area, moving out on the heels of the 3/9th. The 3/9th
began its withdrawal about 1200 hours. K Co, the last company in the column,
was late getting started and as a result was several hundred yards behind the
rest of the battalion. When K Co reached the Rocherather Baracken crossroads,
about a kilometer north of Rocherath, at 1230, it was met by General
Robertson, who ordered the company commander to move his unit as quickly as
possible to the Lausdell crossroads, "a complex of roads and farm trails near
an isolated farmhouse, just over half way between the woodsline to the east
and Rocherath. "o 2 Once there, K Co was to dig in and await the arrival of the
next battalion, to whom K Co would then be attached. As K Co turned east to
comply with this order, Robertson intercepted the 3/gth's Ammunition and
Pioneer Platoon and 1st Plt of N Co, a heavy machine gun platoon, and gave
them the same mission."
Farther north, the 1/9th started its march to the twin villages, first
regrouping in the low ground 1200 yards south of Wahlerscheid at about 1500,
then proceeding south on the forest road at about 1530. One platoon of A Co
was sent into the woods to the east as flank protection, while a small
rearguard force of one platoon each from B and C Cos covered the rear.5 4 The
column reached the Rocherather Baracken at 1600, where they, too, encountered
Gen Robertson. He loaded as many of the men as would fit onto two trucks he
had commandeered and sent them off to Join the 3/9th at the Lausdell
Crossroads. Gen Robertson and the 1/9th battalion commander, LtCol William
D. McKinley,55 followed the trucks in Robertson's jeep after ordering the
battalion executive officer, Maj William F. Hancock, to follow on foot with
the rest of the 1/9th. Hancock had authorization from Robertson to commandeer
US ITO 2d I CIet Intolfow, Mattte of the luLge. 17-20 Doe 19"., File #173
Ibid.
81
any vehicles that passed him heading west and move the troops to Lausdell on
them.
Robertson was well aware by this time that the 3/23d in the woods at the
Ruppenvenn was fighting for its life against the German attack, and he was
determined to construct a new defense line at Lausdell before the Germans
could break out of the forest. To this end he authorized McKinley to take
command of any troops he could lay his hands on to strengthen his force,
warning him that large numbers of 2d and 99th Division men would probably be
straggling out of the woods into his position in front of the German
advance." For artillery support, Robertson said, McKinley could call on his
usual supporting battalion, the 15th FA Bn, as well as the 924th FA Bn, which
had been supporting the Wahlerscheid attack from positions just northeast of
the Rocherather Baracken.5 7
By 1700, as the sun was setting, the 1/9th had reached the Lausdell area
and was "deployed on a slight rise overlooking a shallow depression from which
a gradual ascent led into the forest. "5 A heavy fog clung to the ground,
which was covered by a layer of snow. Visibility was limited to about 100
yards. As McKinley's men took up their positions, they could see that Gen
Robertson's assessment of the situation had been correct. "Stragglers (from
the 3/23d and 3/393d] with and without arms [hurried] along the roads and
across the fields," retreating before the German advance. Sounds of heavy
fighting emanated from the dark forest. K Co of the 3/9th, which arrived a
few minutes before the 1/9th, dug in north of the Ruppenvenn-Rocherather
Baracken road and was supported in that position by three self-propelled tank
destroyers of the 644th TO Bn. C Co, whose effective numbered less than 50
men,6° arrived and established positions to the left of K Co north of the
6' Ibid.
109
cote. go-au, p.
e Ibid.
82
road, while B Co dug in astride the road itself. A Co assumed positions south
of the road to B Co's right (Figure 12). Like the 3/23d had done when it was
rushed into defensive positions the previous day, the 1/9th had left its AT
mines behind in the interests of saving time, but fortunately for them the TDs
of the 644th TD On had some mines with them, which McKinley's men hurriedly
fashioned into five daisy chains of six mines each.61 The battalion's
ammunition vehicles -rrived before long, carrying 15 extra bazookas, which
were passed out to specially trained teams of bazooka men.62 M Co's machine
gun platoon placed its heavy machine guns on the high ground covering the road
to the southeast in order to interdict any German infantry advance from that
direction. A platoon of four towed 3-inch tank destroyers, the 3d Plt of the
801st TD Bn's B Co, e3 also guarded the area. All told there were about 600
men in McKinley's battalion and its attachments."
About this time, the retreat of the 3/23d from the Ruppenvenn area
caused Gen Lauer of the 99th ID to order the battered 3/393d Inf back into
action to help halt the German advance. The battalion commander, Col Allen,
sent a four-man patrol south to reconnoiter, and they contacted the C Co,
1/9th units at Lausdell. Before long the 3/393d had tied in securely on the
1/gth's left flank."5
USA [TO 2d I Comat Interview, featti. of the BuLge. 17-20 Dec 19"N, Fite 0173
According to the USA UO 2d ID Coat Interview. 3attLe of the Bulge, 17-20 Dec l ". , File 8173,
mcaintey had orgnmiud S teem of riflmam eoclelty trained in bazooka apration In each company when he
realized that the terrain around ahlerecheid was unsuitable for the mploymet of the S?1m AT gun In the
attack. As a result, there were a total of 22 bazooka team in the 1/9th at Lausdelt.
USA ITO 2d I Cae Interview, Mattle of the klute, 17-20 Dec 19440 . File 9173
USA ITO 99th ID Combat Interview. "9th I0. ArdVies 16-20 Doec 19440, File 9182
83
........... ...... .......... .... .. ...................
................... .......
..
...........
........ ....... ... .......
.............
......................
...........
.........
.............
..... ....
......
... ... . ...........
......................
..........
j ig '-;...... ... .. .......
...... . ...
I....... .............
..........
0 -0 e a " .... ::
... ...........
..........
.....
............
...........
.. ... ........ ... .............
.........
........ . ....
.. ......
................
..
..
.... . .......... ........
.. .....
........ .....
...
.% ..
........
.. ... ............ .....
....... ..
.. ....
..........
..........
.....
.....
........ .............
................. ...........
........... .. ..........
... ...
........ .....
............. . ...........
... ... .....
........ . . ........
.....
.............. ....................
. .......
..... .......
....
..... ....... .....
.......
..... ...... ... .... .. .. ... . . . . ......... ....
. ..
.......
............ ..A
... 0::*"""," ""'I"I"
. ... ."
.."
.... ::: ..........
-.*..:-:.:.:.:.:-:.: ..........
..
........ ....... ................
.................... .* .....
....................
.. ..
...........
........
.. ...
...... ........
........................
.......... ...... ....
..... .. ......
.... ..............
.........
.... ........
...... .. ..........
.... .......
......
.. ....
......
.... ........... ..... ..
...
..... ......... ....... .... ....
.... ....
..... .
.. ......... ........ ............ .
....... ......... ...... ..........
............
......
........
........... .
.........
............
....
...........
I r
84
as the battalion adjutant, SS-2Lt Buchmann, and all the technical officers.
Sergeants were commanding companies... ""a As darkness fell and the rest of
A mltrantlatfon has led Zefner to be referred to in sme sources as a LtCol, but his actual rank
WO AUl~~IIL~k (h-ILt). not Oberturdmfror (3-LtCol).
Palmitud, a.it pp.5-94. Other accounts, notably Nacmknad (p.300) and Thmson, say that they wre
reconized as aremen, but that it would have been suicide to angage them and that McKinLey ordered S Co to
tlt thm pase. This would be inc nsistent witN the 1/9th's prformnoe against even greeter odds Later In
the evening. After all, the 1/9th was at Luwadelt to prevent Just such a penetration.
85
road where the vehicles stopped their engines. Perhaps their commander, like
Zeiner, was sending forward infantry to assess the situation. The Americans,
however, hesitated no longer. Lt Granville at the battalion CP called down
artillery fire from the 15th FA Bn on the three jagdpanzers; the A Co
commander, Lt Stephen A. Truppner, adjusted this fire, and one of the vehicles
was hit and set aflame. [Action 11] Lt Roy E. Allen and Sgt Ted Bickerstaff,
both of B Co, pulled the daisy chains across the road while the following
jagdpanzers were still about 400 yards away, and two of the vehicles ran over
them; their tracks were knocked off and they were immobilized. (Action 12]
Some of McKinley's bazooka teams tried to sneak close enough to finish off the
vehicles, but the light from the burning jagdpanzer on the other side of the
US line made this impossible. Other jagdpanzers, following behind that
unlucky pair, veered off the road in an attempt to continue cross-country;
bazooka teams knocked out two of them but the others proceeded to fan out
across the fields, perhaps to provide flank support for the rest of the
attack. The American artillery which was falling was also causing casualties
among the German infantry, as they were caught out in the open when the
barrage began. Either the American artillery or German tanks set fire to the
Palm farm, which occupied the center of the battle area and were some of the
only buildings in the vicinity.
86
back into the forest. Lt Granville brought artillery fire down onto this
column as well. The first salvos impacted right in front of B Co, and
Granville walked the rounds steadily back, working over the column for at
least 10 minutes while B Co raked the column with machine gun fire. "For
minutes after this engagement, the night was filled with the screams of
70
wounded SS men."
Despite their heavy losses, German tanks and jagdpanzers were still
infiltrating through and around McKinley's position. The Americans tried
desperately to cope with the vehicles that had penetrated the line, but their
numbers had been greatly reduced by the size and ferocity of the German
attack. At about 2215, Lt Melesnick of B Co personally destroyed one German
tank with a bazooka.71 [Action 14] Lt Granville told the supporting
artillery battalions to maintain their barrages on the road from the
Ruppenvenn until he told them to stop. US riflemen picked off any of the tank
crew members who emerged from their hatches; nevertheless, a number of panzers
72
were within 50 yards of some of the company CPs.
One of these panzers was hit in the track and disabled by an American
bazooka round. Lt Melesnick and several other bazooka teams fired at it in
order to finish it off, but its armor shrugged off four of their rockets. The
tank was proving to be a nuisance to the defenders, since it was still firing
its machine guns and cannon at the US foxholes (one of its machine gun bursts
wounded Lt Melesnick in the leg), so Cpl Charles Roberts of D Co and Sgt Otis
Bone of B Co teamed up to neutralize it. They filled a five-gallon Jerry can
with gasoline drained from a nearby abandoned American half-track, doused the
panzer with the gasoline after approaching it from a blind side, and lit it
afire with a thermite grenade.73 [Action 15]
7 Ibid.
USA ITO 2d 10 COt Interview oSettle of the suaie, 17-20 Dec 1944" Fil* #173; Cole, op tit, p.110;
Cavamelo, on it, p.6; Th~aqcn, To* Flght at Rocheroth-Krlnkett M#elnium). 17-19 Dec 44", File 9131;
Naconeld, w ii___,
pp.32-
87
Around 2230 the Germans doubled their efforts to break through
McKinley's thin line. Assembling around the Ruppenvenn, they launched
simultaneous tank-infantry assaults down all three trails leading from the
forest. Lt Granville, who was having trouble getting artillery requests
through on his radio because the Germans were using the same frequency,
finally contacted his battalions and requested the heaviest possible fire on
all three routes. Struggling to be heard over the din of battle as the
Germans approached, he shouted into his radio, "If you don't get it
[artillery] out right now, it will be too goddamn late!" Just then his
communications were broken, perhaps by a German transmission, and he never
received acknowledgement of his request. Assuming the worst, that his request
had not been heard, Granville "reached out for God to take him by the hand,"
but three minutes later an astonishingly heavy artillery concentration
blanketed all three Germans advance routes and their attack all but
disintegrated under it. Unknown to Granville at the time, Gen Robertson
considered McKinley's defense of Lausdell so crucial that he had committed all
the artillery under his control, except for any that was engaged in an
emergency mission, to support the 1/9th before all others. As a result, at
least seven battalions of artillery answered Granville's call, including all
four of the 2d ID's organic battalions and three 155mm howitzer battalions of
V Corps.74
"USA [TO 2d 10 Cmbet Intervew Nlettle of the Butge, 17-20 Dec 19440 File
0173; NaOonaLd, op cit,
p.383; Cavanh, cc eft, p.6
88
By 2315 the German attack had run out of steam under the relentless
American artillery fire, and McKinley's force, though badly mauled, "had not
yielded an inch of ground." Only the four jagdpanzers of KG Zeiner had been
able to get all the way into Rocherath,7 and the Germans seemed resigned to
waiting until daylight to resume the attack. Both sides sat back to lick
their wounds and prepare for the renewed fighting that ivery man knew would
come with first light." Meanwhile, a silence that Maj Hancock described as
"almost frightening" descended over the battlefield.
In the early morning hours before dawn on 18 December, Col Boos informed
Col McKinley that he would be able to withdraw as soon as Col Jack Norris'
2/38th Inf was firmly dug in behind him.?' This event was greatly
anticipated by the 1/9th, which hoped to be able to leave the crossroads
without a repeat of the previous night's carnage, but that was not to be. At
0645, at the first lightening of the winter sky, the Germans renewed their
attack with a sudden fury. During the night, about a company of tanks from
I Pz Bn of the 12th SS-Pz Regt7m had apparently crept to within direct fire
distance of the US foxhole line, and these vehicles now fired their cannon and
machine guns to cover the advance of more panzers and a battalion of infantry
from the woods. This tanks of this force were from the 1st and 3d Kompanies
of the I Pz Bn (Mk V Panthers), followed by 5th and 6th Kompanies (Mk IVs);
the infantry were the 11/25th SS-PzGren Regt, which had assembled in the draw
just east of Lausdell; to their left, the 1/25 attacked directly east of
Krinkelt.9 ° The visibility was very poor, for the weather was hazy and
drizzly, "German weather" which forced the GIs to wait until the enemy was
According to Meyer, "parts of the battalion (l1/25th SS-PzGrn Rost] end a few penzerjigers
(of the
12th US-Pzjg IN had taporarlty broken into the village. but had not been able to hold there." (p.425)
"7USA ITO 2d ID Combet Interview, "Sttto of the Bulge, 17-20 Dec 18s," File 0173; Cavaragh, opuc,1.
p.86
"USA TO 2d ID CoMbet Interview, "Settlo of the Bulge, 17-20 Dec 1941 N , Fite #173
7Mfeyer, AnWa,p.430
Ibid.
89
very close before firing, but they ehgaged the Germans with every weapon at
their disposal, including artillery, which the GIs called down virtually on
top of their own positions at times.8 1 Private William K. Soderman of K Co
"began his own private war"02 by leaping into a roadside ditch with a bazooka
and knocking out the lead panzer in full view of the enemy. This blocked the
trail and forced the vehicles following to withdraw. Returning to K Co,
Soderman ran across a platoon of panzergrenadiers in the fog and opened up on
them with his rifle, killing at least three and forcing the rest to flee.
(Action 16]
The tanks and jagdpanzers which had been knocked out on the trails that
morning and the night before compelled most of the vehicles in this attack to
drive across the fields. Five panzers thus approached the A&P Platoon
position, passing the hulks of two tanks destroyed in the night attack. They
fired point-blank into the American foxholes as they passed through, and
although two were knocked out by bazookas, the other three proceeded into
Rocherath.8 [Action 17]
By 0800 the panzers and grenadiers had completely overrun the 1/9th's
front line companies south of the main road, but still the Americans clung
tenaciously to the crossroads. The tanks fired their cannon directly into the
foxholes, and if the GIs tried to run they were mown down by the tanks'
machine guns. One soldier was seen trying to immobilize a panzer by jamming
his rifle between the cleats of its track. When about half a dozen men on B
Co's right flank ran out of bazooka ammunition and headed for the rear, Col
McKinley stepped out of his dugout CP, stopped them, and sent them back to
their platoon. All along the line, the GIs and grenadiers were engaged in
fierce hand-to-hand fighting."
USA ETO 2d I Cmbat Interview, wermmn Breakthrough", 0176; Cote, op et, pp.115-116
Cavamsh, g...
1 p.109
USA ETO 2d ID Combt Interview, "Sttte of the Butle, 17-20 Dec 1940-, Fit@ 0173
90
The dense fog over the crossroads lifted at about 0830, allowing Lt
Stephen Truppner, the A Co commander, to register artillery fire on the
Germans that had overrun his company. An entire US artillery battalion
dropped its shells on the A Co area for 30 minutes; the German attack was
stopped, but only a dozen men from A Co survived. Truppner was not one of
them. K Co of the 3/9th was likewise swamped:
*Frm his CP in the basament of the Patlm famty farmhouse, Capt Garvey, the K Co coimander, could see Germans
prodding those few of his man that were stiLl aLive from their foxholes, while a German tank approached the
house and hatted with its cannon only a few feet from the front door. Aware that it woutd be a matter of
seconds before the tank blasted the houe to placer, Garvey told a men who spoke German to call out that his
company coammnder woutd surrender to a German officer. When a German Lieutenant arrived, Garvey and his
6
commnd post group filed out with their hands above their heads.
By 0900, the firing at Lausdell was beginning to die away, since much
of the German force had now passed south of the remaining 1/9th platoons and
into Rocherath, and since there weren't that many Americans left to fire their
weapons. There were still considerable forces engaging McKinley's line,
however. Around 1000 a second wave of seven German tanks and infantry smashed
91
into the American line, hitting mostly around the 3/9th's A&P Platoon
position. Several US tanks had just come into the area; one of these fired
six shots at the oncoming panzers, all of which missed. The Shermans quickly
retired. American artillery then fell on the panzers, one of which
7
exploded.' [Action 181 The other six tanks swept on into Rocherath while
the grenadiers stayed behind to mop up the A&P Platoon and nearby survivors
of K Co. "The result was a terrific small arms battle,"" during which Pvt
Soderman of K Co continued his "private war" against the Germans. As some
other panzers approached the remnants of his company, Soderman staged a repeat
performance of his action earlier that morning by disabling the lead panzer
with one shot from his bazooka. As he ran for cover after firing the weapon,
however, one of the tanks fired a burst of machine gun fire which tore into
his right shoulder. Soderman fell, severely wounded, but managed to drag
himself back into the ditch, where he was protected from further fire."
[Action 19]
About the same time, Col Boos called Col McKinley and told him that he
could withdraw his battalion from the crossroads beginning at 1300, since the
2/38th should be fully in position behind the 1/9th by then. This was welcome
news to McKinley, but it came almost too late as he did not have much of a
command left by then. As more German tanks and infantry poured into the
Lausdell area from the woods, Lt Granville called for emergency artillery on
the area "and it seemed that all the artillery in the 1st Army responded to
the call. "°° The shells continued to fall for about 30 minutes, allowing the
1/9th and its attachments to fend off the remainder of the German advances.
McKinley told Col Boos that he could not hold out any longer, however, but
that he also could not withdraw without being annihilated because his troops
were too closely engaged and because German tanks were blocking his withdrawal
route. McKinley said he needed a counterattack by tanks or self-propelled Tds
Ibid.
SCavanagh, an cit, p.110
USA ITO 2d I Combet Interview, 0lattle of the Bulge, 17-20 Dec 1944" , File #173
92
to cover his withdrawal. No sooner had he said this than Lt Eugene Hinski,
the 1/9th's AT Platoon leader, spotted four Shermans of A Co, 741st Tk Bn
moving north out of Rocherath on the road to the Rocherather Baracken. Moving
quickly to intercept them, Lt Hinski asked the tank platoon commander, Lt
Gaetano Barcellona, if he and his men wanted to fight. "Hell, yes!" said
Barcellona, so Hinski led the tanks to the 1/9th CP. There, McKinley
explained the situation and told Barcellona that the greatest difficulty
facing the 1/9th was four German tanks located between the Palm farmhouse and
Rocherath, interdicting the battalion's withdrawal route. To counter this,
Barcellona split his command into two pairs; one pair, including Barcellona's
own tank, stayed behind cover from where they could shoot at the panzers,
while the other two moved out into the open to lure the panzers into leaving
their cover in hopes of an easy kill. The plan worked brilliantly. At 1115,
US artillery began firing to cover the withdrawal, and the two decoy Shermans
moved out. The panzers followed. Barcellona knocked out the first panzer
with one shot, and three more rounds finished off the second/ Discerning the
trap too late, the remaining two panzers turned to flee into Rocherath but one
of the other Shermans hit one in the rear, disabling it. The fourth panzer
made it into the comparative safety of the village."1
With the armored threat disposed of, Barcellona's tanks turned back east
to cover McKinley's withdrawal, two Shermans on each flank of the position.
Their machine gun fire kept the Germans' heads down while the GIs pulled back.
"Col McKinley stood at the roadside, grasping the hands of his men as they
passed and thanking them for what they had done to the Germans...Col McKinley
himself was the last to leave the area. As he and his operations officer,
Capt James Harvey, left their command post, they could hear the shouts of
'Hande hochl' coming from the Germans behind the hedgerows. "92
USA ETO 2d 10 Caoat intervitw, *oermn reakthrough. firet176; 741st Tk Bn AAR. DeC 1944. FIre
9210; Thompsn, ag. t, Ffie 9131; NeOoneltd, aeft, pp. 396-397; Cevmnegh, 2.jt, pp.110-111
Name
atd, apct, pp.397-390; Cavaeh, a.fz 1 pp.110-111
93
"WcKinLy and the man of the 1/9th and K Cos 3/9th, had performed an incredible feat. By their stand, they
had enabled two of the bettalions of the 38th Infantry to reach the twin villages for a defense that
otherwise probably could not hae bon mounted. (,You have saved my regiment,, Boos told McKinley.) They
had Left the ground around the cluster of roads and trails and the farmhouse littered with German dead and
the carcasses of 17 tanks and tank destroyers. For Ill the pertinacity and valor displayed by a number of
other battatloe of the 2d Infantry Division during the fight for the twin viLLages, none performed with more
fortitude and sucriffce than the men of Ncaintey'a battalion and K Co. And for the aLL the defenses of many
another American unit during the German counteroffensive, probably none exceeded and few equalled Mcinley's
battalion and K Co in valor and ucrifice."
The 1/9th passed through the 2/38th and headed west to the high ground
just northwest of the Rocherather Baracken. There McKinley was able to see
4
for the first time the true extent of his losses. A Co had 12 men left;9
B Co had 27; C Co had Just over 40; 0 Co, the heavy weapons company, stil had
60 men left; while K Co of the 3/9th had 11 or 12 men, depending on the
source. The 3/9th's A&P Platoon also had only 12 men left. Later in the day,
when the battalion assembled in Rocherath, only 20 officers and 197 men were
present of the 600 that had arrived at the crossroads less than 24 hours
before." There were only enough combat effective left in the battalion to
form six rifle squads." The cost of holding the Lausdell crossroads had
indeed been high, but the cost of failure would have been much higher.
"USA ETO 2d ID Combat Interview, "Battle of the lutge. 17-20 Dec 1944", File #173
94
&V~~ -Cc -
00.
0 *C 0 a a 0
413 3- 01 CIO
.0 0'. .0 LL. aU S. 4~00-' L
Wo- U . CO 3.I~ 0
~ CS S 34 - 1
4C
1 AC 0 .
(D
41OA 0S C 4
V L
W0 0) -r-
c -0. 4.0 4 .0 L
fi *EU 41 @
4A (A C u 40
LLC
L16 C%L- 0Cf u CC 41C
0L -. Q S. 0 u41 C.-. . .
C....JUE4
C.7 LSSCiu
IAoC IW. Go CA
Go N
W10 31#,ra
.C a L. a c
41 a c L lm41
41C C36 p4 C
4- :CA -P-U -0
44-0 VEU
c s C w 41c. 4
441 C r- 0. 4 a
IVS. M I 4 0N
W 4.1 4.141ca m
CA 04-A C ..- i l = = #A %-
00 ad c" *
C 00 0 LJ .4
Q C4a4LIv I.. I.-1 Ca 0 w
0e- 4-I
CPI C- 4-C
0). C 1-4. L t5
w1g
31 0.%d WC *L
44C - 5 4.0 UM 0.Y) C A
0 CL d ( 6 C A 15C 20C £DWIE #A. a
4- -a c L.
I-~~ 0 U cz0 L
"-O I
4 enE w1 4-aUC-E Ci
-W3
w 0=
S-.4 4;0
4a -C CML S--
eaa 0 CDf
IU C
m L-.CL4) L.
C0 N 4)
a -4a' w 4- U
c V3
00
ILA .
4) 12..- 0 E
CZ 0 1.)
lES 4
P.1.0IC
a1- .- 10
04- -
II
1-.
IV 4
2 o0 41E
ES 0 .0 4ES.
U z. L.S C2 0
- C~ 4)
GoIA a;S.
U 1- SE 4 U96
C i. C4 4 41 41 4 14)*
,- a =10 - r- to a C" a- = %
~
UJ.04 ~ 6 4 - .) 6- 1 C..L6 )4 _ L.) CS. L .0 46- C 6L. . L. 4 L).-A
C
S..
4A4
140 CC
SO0. c c
L6 c 1.4.W a4
LU Go = --
im P- z 21
(D C
4A C
cCD
S. 0.4
C
39a
C"CA
140
t1.
0
140 ai
S.
to
Ca-
.
tv
40
L. f
Go 0r- N% -r- I
I -4z.10 za UC
4-
0a1
jai
..-
30 03 V
tC c U
4- -I-L c
L. X(1 w L2
Ci
a) t- 0C; .0
I-~~~ *zoz aI~
0. CL
97
+a1 41 co 44 ch
e .0 r- F- .0 c%
41b Li 41 w 4'0~
413
8 4,13 .1
AS tp--- EU CM% Cc 0%.o-. NU 0n% .. I-% 0L
0w-
4~j LI .. Ca,-
f CZ0I*-P..
A414k4k 41 4J4 4WCA
"1 I C .
4 -EU- 41,
r- EU- 41 r- U-r 4
41
4.j.C C,
634-1C 4a ~4-0
0 -. 4W 4 -) .~
0 41
.1 4-L.C .U .0 4- L. C L.L. .0 4- L6.C L . 04aP
4.) 4-P
C4
C~ IVT 0 0
.0
= W 0 4- I =C
U41 4) (A
M 0Q1U l -
MU "I C w C 41
.0C 0 0 ?A 4) (A : U
.- 4.) CL. V c I CO u CIO
CA c CI
=( 40LC 0 INa)*r
5-L0~:0 0 VL.00E 2cmM C VIO
41 ~4- 0 0.00 LCE
-~- Q CA -0 VI G1d M
Sa
C2
S.
aL 0.EC
430. .0 c;
IL C r L
10A L
U 0 0
0 C -'
OUCC
us11 I C
L414 LV I C
SMI 4-E CV L.4- w C C
000. 4- oLa ~ LA
:UJ 0
00 V 0 09
I-%L
U410.L 41CE
ICoC
C 4- C 4-
CIO
Lai r. CE 111EUI 0. C
~ .- 19 0r L.IE
EC - 41 -N(A1 04
ov L
C' 0w CL
(A 41VW0 *LC .0.
V- ~ P"4b4 CIA cm NclV
98
- -
4J. 41
o U,.
LA. 4. 1 .01 -4z
4- 6M ) CO .- .0O = -10
PU 0 a. -CA o~- 0. o. 0-
-~-00 0U 0w-4..
00 IV Im c a) aUI.41 C-'~(
WO E 4
a~~ 0.0 ad-~e0 cr%
(D%. L
4-;J r- 0 -0 m- 4a -- 4- GO r- 0.
0 4-)-
0 c SE0A c
zo. L 3 0_
0 r- 0.41 .
W-
4-) WV 0
46- 0 U C" 1
L
ini
!-a I 1% i aL
4k U LC
CVua5
U.4
.
4a aC
kU. 0C
LIZ-
4
La
oG V)
cy4CD
ac N
tI 0 C
0l . ae=k4S
.3 AU C .
I.. +& N
0 44b44A
10 Vc 3-)
41 C
isC C (4J. 0 W
4EU C 4-
o) VC3-
ae 414- 4)44' C 4
in" v UZI~I =C. Colp
LL4 0 4 4- C,- C 1-4 .
99EU CC E
4141
.- .0-
.
.0
4) 41 ~ .0 41 1
W.0.
+0 4J.J (. 4.0 wJ
4h a 413
a 4JUN 4.13
kv (D C = i41.-C.C tv 4).C j= kv 4._C.C I
c~ 4. ~ ~c 41 V 41 cC.4) 4a CA L.
*= .)9 M4 CS 3 1 C 4.19 1P4=CCD *~ 19-%
Wn
- J tP-M r-~.i.- M Fv- 4.1 iv- E==C
SM41 . r1e .1 -la4. 4)*- 4 41 "_ 4.1*j 41 , 0
LAJ 4- C 1LMU. .0 4--Lw.. C 1L.., 40 -U. C LUL.. .0t4- L". C S-. .c 0CL
I= 46) C CO CJ C0 -O 9= 4 0~'I-b- 0 C CC-e AC v f
(A
Cc
41
p- 0.
E4-
C 2C 41
cm 4OC c1'
CC
.C410 . ;(A
CLC
IV C (AC
0 0 0
21 :N v . U.1
C -4. a) Cr 6EnS 4
cm" 1- iv1-.
NEC "0 N-
oU UC.W4
a- 41
4J4
r1-
MIN 441
41 4C iv
4-1
c-SnI
iv2 .4i
= ~v,4J I
IN
co2
Wow ~ iv 100
.0 .0 0_.0 .0 ioi .0
413 a 3aa 4.9 a 4.1 3 4h31m
M 4) .- a ~ kEUG.- C= t GD.-C = f 4 ~ a
'VD.a
-CU-.; P-
WAc
D L ~ ~ 4
G Li-4
O 4
V-0
qWq 44
. GD0 -
(D4 ft
qbco +
G Ln
cu .
4bhW.= Ik 4-A
V4 WD L-
4kW.ca W
x MGD C.G 8 4.w C 4) a 4j aGD
=G4w 1 Caol a 4
4.9 4Je EV. .~~ U-"f *0~ U 4J~ 4-) I
U~~L L6 .0'.L.. U-- 4
LA.
LO-. .0~.aCU.. -~~.
09
c q 4jc
0 %06-4cm a Wa cc W a%.Ob Q* 4j % C0
GD
ccaas CL
L. V
4a
a) CL
C0
LAJ 'a
Z Lu-
c0r0
4- w. c
-r 4- 0 c
a GD
L. 0
2. a S. G
d.0 Z' 0 a
C4 a
U, G101
41 ci 4.1 41 41h W 4
41 413a 4- a -,
0 = Pft. r.% = 0 .v = ?ft
Eua)r-
M.j -EuM- 4j r - Eua- M 4- r
41-r 4 () J 0r- - -0
-1(D4 Qcb -P- .1 20 u41
4.1
.0 = W 0 4-EIVCC
,aEuv4-) 4 fA u 0
IV r- .C 0c
C 0 , 41 W =
L50
n 10) ~00 Dw L.c
> i5.0vE 3
0 4- 0 0.0
Ci IO0-0 4T 'a C A I
~4C 0
aE tv
~v.E 0E2m. -Z
W.C 0000'
c
0EuIfV0 5-U W LC AC
0) 1 0 .- IMI
C - Eu
S
UIJ 4. .0 W -C a W 3 (
LL. CAU0 Jc ~C u l041
LLS M U534)01-- 0 r- 0 & W U
ME4) IVC 2 46- UC5 U.0 U
40
ds LION
4
a zu 4) 4- C6
41a 5-L
Ngo = am w
(.1 21 0 V
CC
0 U
0 0 cm CA
4:c a "-ca
((AC 1 -0 -1 M.1 d)
0p41 5--Q.UEu E
La
CA
4-E
~ 3 4-b
cCLI
4.w0
S4-
I C
aC C c
w 0 0 0 w
~-4I.-0L. 4A~
V '01r
4.-
CC '4- C 0"0
P3I r-u Cuu0.
tj102
4- 41
4-) L3 4.) 4W3
4-) LA. C. - 4.U 30U.U U @
4J-)'06- fV *.CC41w*-.C*0* 0
0v La.. W CIO tm 0
IV C - . Cc CIO-%. M
Ca41 L.~ I) =nt%D r-r C" to-oi -
* @.0 C ft f 0P. = P.% 0 '-. C
IA .-r c C 4.1 %ok o =4b 41' Ilk C5 =k 4k
C CD
co ~% do 04.
CL a- 0 4 ' 0
0 0UIA C- 3
4.0
?A, W3 IA~S
*~~~Z4 40U. C@4'
ch eg C _J O 4.) 4..@ d? 41c
'Ao S.= - SC3
S. = 0 tUU0@
as L16 O0 U )4 c)
LL. YoU 00 C-l
g3~ 0W a No~
cc. 0% I
co4 F4i 44
-40 0 C
99 N
0I C@3
4-A~U 0 C>
w es
@a 4'44.
4- C c- 11-0 4
@3% 0 CL W
44- 4-Ci3vU@
00
u 4.11. C. 4.='
4-4'U _V0.C 4' 4-)
000~ .1-E Eu Uyc
.. 4J0
.6 1P-t4 ,CL
cC @3
2~ C04. >.U 4
(Av'
- 51.
Cc
L.40. CDD1E -3 4 a
C .
.r- 0 -A4- C U Ia . . C04
'CIV 4- 42 2C 0H LaL.
lwOWU 0 4
CM
rtm- M VtoCCcvam0,. c I y
1 4kC.0.C4k .4 :oCk = alD.ca 4.a 4k 4-D*1 ~C C 4b OEUMUIV
C di .d
beCiIV Cd
s.Cw (D a01 4.) C di
_ud D I.-*.d=
j~ 4.1
dW
C1
''9d
U
_U 0
Wi
A L.
=4J W J9
4-Ai tv0
wi (D E4 I
fl 41 0
C awj co 0i A
ZI Cb-a CU.C
api4 C M
CD CC
-
4- N iuI
0iA di L4
tqAl CL C
EU.
diJ 0INE
"a
dil- CL C0 3
0
41 M.0
P~j
~il
V N di
I4- CU Cl-
4J4-
I-
CIV 0
a- =-L 1-
EU,. 0.iE
LU iva 16 a--k
( ~ ~ a 0) L
4- a
1041
~4 4a a. . a14 4.)4z 41 a .
.0r- IV. IV * t- W0 C0
EU- a enC. EU1C EU1~. EU1.
SCr, r-- : ar f-'4 i0 uca "" U~ E
En4. 4b C7=4b 4.a 4k to "k q* 4-) 4ft ca "k 4 w .C nh 4.' 4 Ch. M
Ca .4.A toS toI F-. tA 4.b f.3 C44 P4. a Cj *^ V.a
41w 4; Cu ., aE) t 4.1j 4,1 4' 4a CD- 4. 1- 44 4)-
W.0 -LACL. L .0 4- U.c L.. CA .04- ~C LU. .0LCL S.. .0 _L- . L6
cC41 a
C-
u L. C
41 .L. IV
C9. ,- E
LL. Ln W)
LLI-
'4-
c
S.
EU
o 41 S.
.)A>' S. 0.0a
S. 41 - 6 C
41 41 ci
_ _3_ _ _ _ _ 0 _ _
4-.
>41
C IV
EU 1 41
P"cC. EU
-;; .5J- Lc
.0 4.' V.
.5-CL
C4 qp Cnt 1
lal EUO~10.
0)~~ 4.a4.C) a) 4
do 0 ,-=
6v 4)-CM- .^0 i
r a; 3 W n z' %D
EU% ' E
i P- ~0 (U C;
a4; .. a) 6... -00-4 W L..e
-4 -C 44 - 0%%W
C CD) 44 c 0) a 41 c 4 404
41 41 r- iv~t 4.) i 41 r- ^ M r- 4)
z
WJ
40 -1-4-) 0)
.0 4- U C L. La
6-b
.04
~ L.C LL..a')* 41 'r *.4
.0 4-LL. C L~.6C
4)*- 4
041
c c- C0 ) -. mC =a 1
.0.0 4-1Ctoccc
EU - . DWC 0)
CC0 a #A 4-)W m-;.
CA4.C x i c(u ( 0~L. c 0 M) LC4
S XCMS-L C0 0 0) M 01 a4L) C
*0 OJL0
40 r- 4 Cid-0Gc
4- c0 0.0 M)a *u0. 0
0)tC C LAW S~a0) 3a )
4n6 D4.'
0)L.E
'a= L G C UOW C0 4-~ W C C0L
0=
&-C IflC 0
tV1C 0' c EU
r
.CA L0(- ~~~3U a
CA
N.0
4)(E NLV
.0 c
CLLEU.
IV L. L
CAa
*j I cO1 =C-
I~~ Im 4 IAt
CU A *0c
L. I
~=0
w n 0
21, LCC
0 -0 CA
15 0 "- - (A 0 v u 31
f4- P- - 4a' 4' c
0) L -. aU E
mU
106
44A
O0 u4.
4) 4,4'
1) 4.1 do .0
4).- .0 cn . 0 0 U=4-091
4)t~4).r.
4' *-4'4)- ~ 4 *. 4*
la W C- .4-a&S..
c0C 4)4-aCL a.J . C...L~
a) "a' 4 '4h ~-~--
0 c
= 4 4A
o4) 4 ) .C a 0~
w aLj ee
(AEC . . -- UC04
CAU~.IA 'a a)4)V L
L1 0 W -4.-
LL. On S. 0 u i
M u C.0 cc 0
00
9- lII toi cM
4)
(A A u . CLCA
0Y 4C3 *U CC
0 I4-b~ 4-AU
4. VU
.cfd
c) a' U 4'U)
L4CO
4).b O- 10 =-
A u4 4) r-Q CCW
31 0- O4c 0. ( w
-p r, 4m I-
41 a 0 Q La5.
C41
C 4'A C. 0 c E8 0
wM cnE E . 3 N 4U CL
0 r %. v 0CLC
211. 4)14. 4 C" r CO
-04' 4.1C - IC
10- W. 4- 6V 40cS
107
0 410) 4 0 41 0) 4.1
,- - 0 0 . .0a- .0 .w d)
*~ ~ a-~1
10~~ 4)
PI .0 P%. C
4. (i "k.4 4.)
~ 0L.
"k ci k 4a1
~ "q 0L.4 V)Le
4b c " 4.1
^C P-4 0
4h4.D
-L
t
C 44A
a0a Or-
341
aO (D 34a1( a0
34a 0 .4a W L t
1
- IVU 4. r- ^ M r- 4J9r- M- 4a- Mr~- .C C
'-41 a)- *A - .1 0 r-+4) *- 4. W 4-1 4 0.- 0Utr~
c30
L4.1~
c ~4D 0 W
2z Z S.u M 0
G) L.S.
WA EULr 4p1
~.S- 0 .4.
wL f 0CL1. 0 S.0
L. -b LA
03
C m I C=A(
CE
0)
CDi401
C ..0 e '4-
41C W4-
=:6 4-QU
U C0 '4 #A4
W =-E 29-
LA I. IV 'rU A
u 0=3-.A.
'7 =9% =U 4)
0 4- 4.b .0
C~G
Pt. ZIP -'C
108
413
8 3 413) 3 416
a 4a3 3 4.A 8
M -C= tE.C.
4 M 41..C= M --
1.C=
C-
~ W.
Cc 4m-
C.
EU
20 m% CO M cn Cc CP a~ CM- Cc 4m-
*r U1 P- fn ~ -n U r- ~ ~ - 4 . to4 a -
OC 4E0
o jA
4. 0 c I
NE
41 Eua CC
IM 0.0
N9zo .0 3%C" 41
U, ~ .0
f.
.0
i- W
.0 C Z. C
CL .c t'L. t. c
aa ZL 0
CL
C9C
IN C ~ C
u CL
4-
Li 41
.0 C
0 c
m 1-
41 CLA.
4- aEc
a f- .9-
41 Laia.
.CC
EU W 41
Uc ~0
CC4
2
Ii~i C CL-C
W 41 U 0v
.0 1. 109
01 .101 411 41a 4.1 IV 4.1
41 Li 4-b u 4.A W 41 w 4.1 w~
413
a 413
a 3 413
a 4J13 4.13
a
4 0 -- C=C iv IV.- C. tEua).- C MI -u1-C=C 1C=
4 .^
* .- U , % cc.) % . = I..1 CO CP- CMU C-YOI.-k3U .D
41
01 10 t 4 - C
Eu c I - 011S4
.COO- =-f .1 0l
.. 4J CL 41 4JLC
x 4) 41L (Al N-
s l L0~ Eutv0 e .C.- E
c =0 4- 0 .04- 3 Uuiv i
V 100EzC v.1 iv0 C
4- cC to W -r- 41O
CM 1U
4P1 Eu 4nU 01 F-0C C CLEa.
"a0 L. Wc CL e-'-u r
3 *S.0u
> =
tj >-~~
c L. 0 41
w
cj
Eu
Li o L 41.' 0 a4C
IV 0C W041Ca
CL
C C$
c
at 0
La C
CC
d) 4-S
:10 0 u 0 t
%C c, "- .cu id
W) vi 0O4+j C
c c -9 1-1 IS cI-
4- in-. u- Vu
@0.
S 314a 4-a& 00i
W1 0 u 1 0 c
30 C,16 4c4-20
u 41 g. 4a~ CC 4-vCCI
W -0- COIV t0*. - C
2 a-C0
IV 4A - N
5
L.41 0
L. v1E
110
4) 4
a- "0~- W Go u
4)~C - 4-)8 3 0 LA. C a 4a3a
cc 4) L .- en 0
4 4a)5 4a =Oto a -Mr o 4
a 0.090 0l
al' . 4a0 IVA P. = P . a P% c
Omw . CO 4 0D L -I.E M CP L "" - O - 0 L C
o CM
Eu
b-=
= i0.1- - 0 -c0 a )cI
en L. 4 M "L.MM C0
W Pf0 IL-1%% 4. %4 1 4 -
44.
ee Q. cu 4A 0
wwa 4. (A. VIo4 SD
-0 a)w..0( (A
(J 6- 0W4
£W.0
W4 C*
GD 4 4.)4
)
C C6
4- CC0
01
~
C s C
_ . 4- 4 )U
c4 4- M~
Ci 4) -I--C0 .
a)O4
49- V
I- 4)c CC C
0U0
E.0-W4 4- 4
4-.001 *C a*-C
a ia 99 ~ ~ M-v-4 f 04
V 4a 4A 0 = c1CA
441
0 40 1 41 4 41 4 41
*.- LC a 413 3 a1 413a
81L r- 01 %a 9 r- 01 to" .z 4
fA a - C.C wa 41 k ca C "k 41 4b W.C=4b 41 qk Lo= as
5- n L. .- 4C -I ( . V-4 ^CP- . V- C P1 4 .
41D
C 41 Ca 0 aa 41 c - * 4,
2C W - 2c
a ~~Z ca4-
K 01.0
z
U. I
w 410)
In -; -
.OU41
015--0 .-
1N CM Ci
4,~ C N04~041
C
IV .v-0
N C0 C 41
4- cc -#, U K
# 2c C.1- a ~- 2
A2 -1'4- S. 0 2%
1 0 (f.0
4)L . 4.
NC 4a N 4a 0
ca &V 4-4.. -r- -- L.
000. 041.0 39 I
C-
cC c
4A 0 4c
4.
C a 414
,v C Ca-0I
1- 4-0 i v,a
~~~
U~ M5 z- ,70
W 4-U . C 4 I.b
mo 4wC-. 4, C2
uCa
~~~ -Z
Z'. U
0- c a. to c
C0 .i
49-
u'
2c( a)CI .9
o (A 4c
4-
[ IU
112
.-. 0Ja
* ... ~a, 0
4.1a
.0 .-.
4-) * .eA
0 .-. 0
4.) ()c 4.1 w 4J~ W ~ 41 Li
EU
.CC I- L EUCo.~.
'V .-. C.C I
z 0
4-) a.'-
IVE
01 4. 0 0~e
0j 06 4.INE
C U .0 0 (AIEE
V N. W C 0-.00E
LIL6.- IV Qio. .
.- C *0
00
w 4.Jl bu
N C L
0N(A CD0.
LAL
CR L
ov 0 4.1)
4bI IV
0 M;
oc
4J0 C
OLCL
C; 0n
V,4
113
-
1 -
F1 41~ 10 r- +..'- a goF- .4.) r- aF- 41)r- to0.
ag t.) 0 %004 o . C-) 0 . -4C . C..) 0 1 0%. b.) CO % . -04C
cu
0 0 00
C~4 IA4
oa E@UL
2, S0)
a m cCVm) 4-
00 I C S. -0 *a- 0
IL 0)v
"a0 4jd*C0
.0 0.-a) *) *.-.
NWJ
S.' .6)0o =4 WCL
LUAOCt 04. w. 0 ) 0
L. - *1a0) 41 w 2. 1..
U-0L I
"0
INC)
CC
C r C
0) C C o~p
LA. 0 CA0 O )4(A (U
114
4.J 4.
Imv
01 c
-cca
z. 41
W LL. C L. E.
4,
4-0
IV (
.C.9lf 4- 0)
0.00.001a,
*L
=
L= CO
w u- u
W c SC. 41.
.4-J
CL
0
uJ CI
L4
IN 06
~CL
*z
~~115
te-
W1 4) 41
41' .0 1 0 0 02
,-. 1 4 4. I a 0- -4
41) I cC 3 0
co.
4- 06 IL 4)-~ .- C4 G
iv 4 6 ~A CM.0 LCM% *" CL an aL
RA 4.) L. %v r V4. 0 -qD.~
.aO
al CGa P*. 0-f a
CM1p
a1 Cc a0.- V0 0 0-
CA 4- I c =C "k 41 .L mga 41.0
=. .. to4 c4
C- 4-J IV~ W4I
0i = =* = .' - LLE .U 1 V4 v i
0.o
0 c
41 a 4).)
06 (D0u cu = I C
410441 #A Ia
8(A 4.I
W
U O 4-J
L#8
4-I Jt A
uj~~ 41.1%
I. 0.I f41 In - 41.
.W 0J LOCU
IAOD 41
41 U; IV c
L.0 40
z Cn 4.- IV0C0.
'4-~~I . ~~ l14
CL IC3
C~~~L C Ca f (A
41 S. ZI19) 4
COO
I C.0 IUfU
IAJ on. M.0
AV CCW o 41
1-0.- 4-A 4A
4-c 41 " i .3.
- 0-- -
4! 116 Im c
CD
V-1
0 ~41 a
4)
4-) 4J-
0 CD CD
- - U
I- L.
CC
4 A u-4
C a
.C
~4
CL~~a CL %f. -4 CY- C L
-~~4 4- "-.O~.. 01%
z to
C;4i4J 4bL %.WLJ S.4 " . - .
c J W--4a) -E E(D cU cU
~U .41
EU~~4 UU4-.-(~~
6V 'aIn
(AC~ E ) 0IV IV. IV.- cU
V 4 41 0 M
c 4 mIVL
Ln ~ 4
L 4- EU 4-
Cr41 41 4 0 EU
4.1 C N c 41C
v 4- 0LC
IELL41 4- 0 t 4- 4C' 4A -U.C4
It N0 C IV .~C0E
IA 4D-r- EU
im % CJ C 41 * 'E
40 4
EU ZA CC *"- CE*r C-
.0 41
CD W CLe.
U 4j 0 '
LL.f
>- 4.C 4- IV
cn tU-E a. CD*.- M S.Cw.-
- 06-.
.C CA 4NC*- .- 4
cnU C! 0 .'41~.
.0 4J90 t CL c
MC aC
IV J. 0 0 N ) (
CL-N 0 #AN
W EU r- - 0
ag MI .04 .*41 .
=.N C4- C
4D4-b441C EU. 3n 41
I- .CEiU E.-
IVI
dic 0 411 - 0. 0
4-
0
1- 41
CU IV 4.
4 .04-
i 4'
41n
r- Ch
t.4 U E1n I
F-g u. .9-
I ~ W-. 4.
~4 En 0 1EU CE
W-6- 0 C4 41;
C4 EU
4141 4h 3B
En 4.117
-04 m 0 C m -r
L o CL CL 2 a
- =-r -c mc
a a a a a ~ a IV
c cC IU 00 C"-
L
IV m do tv (afvl0
1- C
'0I =I 42b
EUIW 4) E' 0 EU
o 4J (A L. 0
N 4-1 to 4.)
(D ccL 4-A U E
a CA C- .. c
LU . .4) r- = --P*, .0
L. C Z 1 B- 4
0~ UbC 41 u
2C. CA 4- o LL
C0C
WCa- 0. U f0-
.OC r- flCL . w1 Nd0c
U.V (A U-1- P-
LU~~k 0C0DU.h 0- -
C0 C
0 IV 914
01 .0 0 c
0 L.E 0
,- m I -P-.
0 0 C 0n 0 ~ IV
4- W) C
4 V ' . "- C C
0 0 -" WWI.-~ V
O.W 4-4. 4
4a 4-C
.00 4c 1 0 4- <LJ Z L 0c
w-S 4) 0I
IO 4 4) ZN L. 1 C
cCM 4
4)J = c, 15 '1 15C.-
1- EU w~ O4)41 *- )
gU (U $A a;E C4 b- 4. CL
41 C
GD 41
.- CD4
S 0 41 w
GDGD 4 4 -1 9D
C LO aU
Ca-
.4. EU1 =0
GD41 VA
W
t r4- iv a .C GDvaG
ab CJEE4 .-4). GD GD GD)a-
.60 0 4
64 4.1.A0
I--4 J2E S.
P-1 n
ZIG
A~~L I
I
@0
C41c
O
a
(D
c
ELGD
0 0 20 ul
a- 40 Ju L.
4 -A(
cL.' IVU.=
41C a : C. 41
CLNNC L.6NIPP
Uc c
c~E 4-EU VO
CD -p
al CC
CEUE _ ~ x Ca C 14J
to 4.0 t c 1-
o- 6va~ M. a~ 0 CA4.
4A .- 4.1 41 c'ca C uJM
Wuc0 VIE a4 *C.hCA .-=3W ac
0.VI GDLm VI(IC1n AtL 10
0VIj N4a ca' 0C=W3
41l *.c 0 C * * * 4-
4A EU,. U. W4 V4CL
IV *C .DCL
toDG aC
ccJ
2- 0
L( 0C
'ia 0 en nC
SA c 1. a C AJ. .119
*4 *~@1 a~ 4-b 4
a- On to 0 - .ena s.
j~
t-.i
4-
41
wv
c 4.' tj 4.8 4. h(.
coDC~ k aC.~
v~ 44
0-4 1a 4. CS
A .1. At 4)8CD
4-1 -
r- 4.)pM.ivn .u i 41p Ea
6 cL. L..0iG-L .L16. .04-La CSLL. .0 4L.C LU. .
(. 0 O.Oo CJa- C
00n
.6rCC
'4-
4*- V$
t. 0 0 tm
4. 9 4 cc
o~- - IAAI4..
La 4T Q.~-4
Civiv
W~I 05 00O
4 t
I4.C L.
4) O
CL 01
C =~
0- m
12
c 140 4.h * 1 w. .
Eu C C a 4-) 041 a 1
L6 -4J 0.- b"b (D C4. (D-1
__ r a%~i-C4I.C *Eu0
t..C.C Ea,..,.C
CM 1 CIO-%
C 4 4E- 0 .4 . 4 0J 41 .
cm LO..-
14V COt
4E4
a W~ EC
0- "1 to 4b4w4 f-ZI0
-W-
100
Eu
In 0
N to0 0. .0l^C
Eu 0) c 0 &n
0~ goL
.
Lai 01w1
A
U.. Mu wY0 W~
LUO u. CL
C * CL
to CLS. CO
4-C
LU~~t ~.-C ft LC
z mob L 4.
14-
C
-p- i0
IV~
Eu 4-bC
top iv E
CL
Eu IA
wn 09
ii121
a) 4 41 Go 41 4A5 4
4- u0 40 0u-
Li.
4.1
C ~ 41
J 4.1 8 41b (2 4
m . C~
Eu m ev 40 .. wu00O-'.C 00 mu . . Cu O
to~ a. r--aCq
en 4ka e 4 .q A 41 4k C~ en1
4 z
(D1.9 4.-a C U 41
94 59 41 a9-4j c CD 41
9c a)' . a141 S
~
=~~~
4j
~ r- 90 - W0 S)".
M0 j ) -c0 u
4-b ~~ ~41 r- ~ tv r-
r~
4Jr-
0P -- -
-Mr-
0"
4a.-
- .P0- -4a0--
^ivr
4
j -
-4
-M -
C 0C
.0C- C IVSA
CL~( L *11
.0 c cO
mW C 1 41E4v PuV
LA c~ EA E
W CEL a00
@.0 C7eW Eu1
C C
CuAC
Eu~ Uc-
CA0 6VUC 4P
LLI0 0.4
0A of =-41
Eu.- In -p
-r L.0
C.. 4- 0
0 V
(P C a) 0
S.. PAPA
41 u w dc
9c CC IV. L
06. O P CL.-P
4c4
PA U U122
4-bin
w wS. c S
4-) CI S.V" cm C;
CV .) 0~
4a r- -6v- 0
A04-ZLCLL&9 04'b
'4-
IA
W M~
a CI c
Sgo
c
L1 w NO
Ll c t
040
C0C
4-bC
0Go C L
I-CL 01 c4
00
21
Ch(
C0123
r 4a 5 40 41 w. 41 Li
CL .- -
I 40.0 L. a 4.0 m.0. P
4jr c 41 C "k 0.f -A coi C~( = 4k
zJ -CM C 4) a.~ 41 a..C duC
~~~~ 0 .41,
= 1 * 1 E4 ivP-
4a r.- -to -- 41 .v * - (y
4 41 1" 0)a--C 1a C Z 4 ka
C
~.
*0 iv
41
41 41W
0 CL1OVI 41
C.E f 0
-0 41 wC -0
= W u 41 u
99 a -jI o 1 r 4 - 0.41. C c.
La 0~C W WivAc i
fAv4L. L. ) iv 00
a Wiu~
0030.a cac2
LAS
- I.) 0A0.L
.. ad.
.0 ACLN
-4
SE C4
CSL
ivC4A
0 Ad c
Z *1 V1.
(44 .. 1) UcC
C C4- oc -- M Vv
41 4.141 0
1394J 4"p *C 0 .- C
Oivv Api Mv A 'A
14
IA .01.9 41 z c Cc i c
SMJ CO. 41. 0.4 A
4
U.-41 X1~~IU -
6
SM~~rf 0) iv C3 N
t4i 0.
C0"- S. *M 9 '"
11
(A4C Z41C *CSM.
Q CL. 094- 4 ac 4 V c 4
124
GD4aD 4G 4a .. 5 4a
WD 4 4
o- 60 c - =- C = .- 4 C 10 40 C0
Cc Im ImD 41 tp1, tp - Cc Im . 41
c c .%c C I(I.%
~ . v 5~~~~~~~~~c F-. i P..~i~ ~ i
in f ~4b
cm4 4.1 4hW.ca * 4A UbDCb
ftc nk +j 4 oam 4k C~. 4k
c WO 34 C a341 s41 Cl 2u 4 J cO V .41
410 .. 4a* W 1 .. 4 4a .4j . 41 *.41 -. 4j *414
C 4f CA
ZL Z uL
-0C
LLiv iv
410
k0c@c
4JV w-.c U 0D
.0. 79 4.C 0 41a
4- "aWW C
* . 141
C o 06 .6
*0 x = 0) ZiL
c 0 0 1 0 0400
C~ 4L. L.1~L.C
LLL
CivC
41 41
C VDw a
GD i 0
4',-
P__ G 1 40
C'
........
.....
..
...
..
4)a~~~4 1 .. '0 a)14'
4a C= M ( .- 0 C
a 4 4 CPO- cc 4.'- cm-%
C.a do
EU *-0.C 11 = = %a' a4..U =J to
C; C a .0 0 L. .0 03 1* = P aEY10 P.- U l =
4II.J4 6v =1 (D 40 C- 41 a W C -
4J (U~ -9 -CUe *I% d C 1 -W4. 4 .' 4hC AdC 4 a) ida
~U
.=. c' ue"% 10 - 4a .- ~ $1Vr- . - *E..M A "-- -E -
oot~~~
M-. r% jW 01. CD
s 4en 1.-1
.c : 0L. ~4 c - LL. .0 4- ~L".cL. .0 4. . .LL. (n V S LL.
b-.L~~
Ix le qk a cc4ba.w0 CA ( 0 e-a C.0 U
w -
4J4. &
4-
p- LN
L. 4- 6*g - as.
EUS EU
i =C 319;
.0 4A
a .m
PC I=E "4 .
.a Ice
C0
EU00. .01 Z
~ f-I4 Ua i0
-IM-
1261
41
.
.
.0.
4J 1 ~@
41 .0 41
.- - . n .0 r- .0
4.13 4a W3 4.13 4.1 U 4.1b W
c iv 'm
0fs .. c 0
04 0 .- c =~ iv0
0 .- 0 O
r- 4 to R 0 41 a r%f" % Zp V)aF- O
W ID0 0 c -. w -wwC . am W 0 ca
L. 01C0 4.C
V.. i14
IU . 0cI 00 41 4
1 .L vcm.- p
4) al~ U) 44
aa L
IV *-a viWa41
s0
SC ~0 4A L -0c CL
3(0 -P L. 'W WLOp4.1D L.
C wU : N CLL
Lai a 4-a Wto 041
cn.-
ca~ ~ . 4.a1L0414
z ~ ~ ~ ~ . 0L L- .C A4
aL
id4~~ a.I w ) aW0a x(
0c LCL0 I 4-a . AC
z~~~ 4A.4.L
c
a) ., CC
LU 0..- U
bd .0 C
41 Id, 41
V 0 0 0
41 4.-S
L. 0 -r- "-4A )#
r-- L
Zr C a
U. 10
0U 4 148 L. 3iv-..- -a - U
uLa 4.1 4- v. LiJ S-4
LU 4CL 4.- C4J L.-
~~~'~ 0 .4 ~ V~30
4- 0 c 41 40 c 0r
LUI 0 Lu coIV.5I
CL NoIV 4-b 41
C; .0 z .9-.
~ 41 -L
127
Cc .... C % =f-%t
C
C 53 f. P-4
(JCa) 41 1
W
4- LL ~ CSCO
m-U
L.u
I CI
1.
S C
CD
$A
CL. *4ic
0coc o-
(U- 0C
U~ (Aw
d IV In-as
ImIS
4A C-
:I- 'I-40
W 0- C
o =~
128
CC
rZiZ*ai 4 h
41.O-* M- IV 0 C. , 0
iv 0 . cc -. iv t - 0.4
a .0-t Z L. 0
1 &GO (D L.
C- C=D 4J "k9=I
C G)
~
V-4 ~ ow' GDZ-=0dW
a 41t
L
C to .0 Z:U, V;:
4a 4- Cc 4
w.DO 1 . C2
Ml.4 GDGD10 IV
C w L0 wCa~.
.CAWG
doZ 0 zoo
Ml - 0G(D C- .
-i L. C 03.
Wv .vj0
a 0
MIc u D C C5c
4%h
4-1C
Lai CP GI 0
(4.-
.C.0
4-) *W
).C .
o- Ln CV .
W.- v. 4--1I
CivE .. iv ICV I
Ml~~- CO1. 4.- VDC~ ~ G
I- .0 C -o v aD.D i *. C
.C aU 4a0 ~ L
is *C. w. 41 CA~* c- a 4
4T iv 2lb- . C-S
d*U GDL cD 4CA
w 4.1 4 *C1= c *
00
211- CA 0- f(.a-
4- 4- 4c -W CA
GDGD C * C * G0 *i .- 0
C 0*1 c M -0 I.-3 so V 4 0
am- "i - uQ -
129a - i cC
4-
0
-~I
-4 -
=
IV
u
*4-A
- '
41-0-
L
4CI-
I..C V.
C; - 4- Li..
441 C
cm 0 CM~ 4.)
V- cc
tv C a c zWDO m
mV =.c L - IV C"eW th CA 1W
2MCZPc C e - 0S . C
LLM!Ov
t CA M
tj 430L m 4W 4OC"ftC .4- "k cal
C'
ca 4-) 41 00
z t! 4jSL. -
.0 4-C4-t
ca ~~10 M0 c
004.1.1 44 LGD 4j
IV~
41CD
V
0
C
w.6 N ~ W
~ C
V
C4j4q- .
444
I- = o- CD C"V 4 0mmJ4
2 .a S. 'V GD
WI (D-G 0 144U
cu4 to 0
le CI S. -. P- -
I C30
G G 4 0 C )C 041'a-.0 '
W6 N104
:IVC0.toc 0.F- wD 1 gom ofC .
LL M =-o C-4)C- £..0 0
op~4 . t.
D4.1 41
C.- 0 IM r-
C 0.C1 A a Z
410 W 41 ~4 0
GD GD .1 CD
4
*m
GD 410
u.-1 0
C1 W 1
9 b 10.. VI 1.
(J44.0C.M 3
IV4N1 IV0 0
4--(..
00
04 4- IV1cr .C
41P .0 4
IV0. V4
Lai a-I cm
20 (.D M1 w40 0m V
CD = - C c
I- 'AW4~ 0 4- W LCC
ci 1
IV. GD S-. 0 .#- SM
SMA 4.1 L.C I - IV o 41 M
2 V.00 w 14441 IU .
S~ X 4A
GDL
I-- z
1C 07
4-
A
130
40 Co Q 0 0p CD0
.- P- - -4 at.
06 C .C .C .CLC
X; .c; cC;
0U EI EU
cmEU EU
to go =L~
U EU EU EU EU
=C S.
N 41C
EU EU S. C
.cc 63 6 10
LL , C a C
C6 L.U 4C C
30
0
Zc CC2 1 S.4
Z-4 IV w- .r4-0
04 4.1 E AUiCUNZ63
E4I" Ia 0 1 6
u33 (C)
C .0 CC ar Z c s.3,C- 'a
4mC C A 2.0.6 I
I.4. 0~4 EU IMS
ci ivA6 COu LIa-C - 3
S.
~~ S..
EU~~~ S. .331 0,0 U a. C
1.. C
63C (A
.do
a3 c CuLO(
eA a -
"- "1 W Ut Ui EU-
La C' 41 4- Z41 L. t:
414 6
834 4- E C - 54
4c3 z C
U U 63 ~ 0 cc
I-4-63
4-
aM
aC
L&J *.
Ca~ c
d41.41C
AEU
11G
EUEtv 0-
4-CI
c
63 r-CO 63
0. 0 EU
O
2 c.0 0. EUC
to ^N GIV1 N
='.- I(.9. ;; - 3p;
41 0'4 Go&UU CC
131
ACTIONS 20-27
As the 99th ID defense line between Wahlerscheid and the Losheim Gap
crumbled on 17 December, the American commanders hastily issued orders for the
establishment of new defensive positions to halt or at least slow the German
advance. Among the most vital places to defend were the twin villages of
Krinkelt-Rocherath, through which passed the only supply and communications
route for the bulk of the 2d ID at Wahlerscheid. The villages were also the
key to two of the routes the 12th SS-PzD needed to reach the Meuse, so they
were destined to become the center of the fighting that was to rage in front
of the Elsenborn Ridge.
USAIETO 2d ID Coet Interview "Settle of the Bulge, 17-20 Do 1940, FILe 9173
132
At 1230, Gen Robertson ordered the 2/38th Infantry to disengage from the
Wahlerscheid attack and move south to the twin villages. He sent similar
orders to the 1/38th about two and a half hours later. The 1/38th, commanded
by Col Frank T. Mildren, moved out around 1530, its withdrawal covered by an
artillery barrage by the 37th FA Bn and the 2/38th's 81mm mortars. As the
battalion marched down the forest road between Wahlerscheid and Rocherath, a
few kilometers away Col Tuttle's 3/23d was embroiled in the bitter and doomed
defense of the Ruppenvenn, and Col McKinley's 1/9th was hurriedly digging in
at the Lausdell Crossroads. When the 1/38th reached the Rocherather Baracken
about 1630, the Germans began shelling them heavily with artillery and
nebelwerfers. A Co, in the lead, hurried through the crossroads largely
unscathed, but B Co and especially C Co were hit hard by the barrage. C Co
lost 22 men, 17 of them in the 2d Platoon, but perhaps more important, the
companies lost precious time in which to reach the twin villages before the
Germans did.2 By the time the 2d Plt, C Co, commander, 1Lt George Adams, made
sure that his wounded were properly looked after, the rest of C Co had gone
ahead and disappeared from sight. Setting out with the remainder of 2d Plt,
a machine gun section from 0 Co, and part of the Headquarters Co, Adams
eventually reached Rocherath and rejoined the rest of C Co, which at this
point had about 70 men left. Adams' group was joined by several men from 3d
Plt, who had been sent to reinforce the Service Co roadblock at the north-
eastern edge of the village but had retreated when German tanks overran the
roadblock.3
2USA ETO 2d I Comat Interview, "ettle of the Bulge, 17-20 De 1944", FIt 0173;
Naconatd, A Ti
EDLTumizL p.384; Cavanagh, Krinkt-Rherath: The BettLe for the Twin VilLages, p.87; CoLe, Tb
Ardenes:The Battle of the Bulee, pp.110-111
3USA ETO 2d 0 Combet interview "ettle of the lutg., 17-20 Doc 19440 , Fte 0173. These *tanks" were
itdototdLy sme of the Joigpanzers of the 12th S$-PzJg In who got p t the 1/9th at Lausdett but who were
unable to maintain their foothold in the village without infantry suport. See preceding actions, "Ceath of
a lattalion'.
133
to the east side of the street to the home of Johann Rauw at #61.' Rollings'
company CP was in a house a few yards to the northwest of Adams' position.
A couple of houses to the north of #65, Capt Love had established his AT
Company CP. Adams and his platoon were now placed under Love's command.
Their positions along this street in northeastern Rocherath would play a
central role in the next two days' fighting, especially Adams' #65, which
covered one of the two main German entry routes into the twin villages from
the northeast.
During this time, few of the American troops moving into the Belgian
houses had any idea of the military situation beyond the next street.
Everyone had heard conflicting rumors that the 99th IDwas routed, that itwas
holding fast at all costs, or that it was counterattacking. The men could
hear the fighting blazing to the northeast at Lausdell, where McKinley's 1/9th
was then fighting for its life, and they could see flares of all colors
streaking up into the sky to the north and northeast. These flares were
steadily falling closer and closer to the village.'
Around 1800, the Germans attacked the area around Love's AT Co CP.
First they softened up the area "with the most intense concentration of mortar
and artillery fire that Capt Love had so far experienced."a Shortly after the
barrage stopped, German tanks or jagdpanzers ertered the village from the
northeast, using two parallel roads. The first force, using the northern
route, didn't penetrate even as far as the street Love and Adams were on
before pulling back, but the southern branch of the attack pressed on down the
Route vers Udenbreth to the area around the church, where the infantry riding
on the decks of the vehicles dismounted and sought cover in the buildings.
This southern group may have been KG Zelner of the 1st SS-PzJg Bn, which was
the only German force to stay in the village all night, but one source says
the attack was carried out by at least 20 tanks and 500 infantry, which was
Ibid.
134
a far larger force than Zeiner's. During the fighting, the squad of 2d Plt
in #61 was attacked by about half a squad of German infantry. Since it was
now dark outside and since the Rauw house had no windows or doors on the
eastern side from which to take the Germans under fire, Lt Adams ordered the
squad to pull back across the street into #65, where 2d Plt consolidated its
position.7 An excerpt from the 2d ID Combat Interview "Battle of the Bulge,
17-20 December 1944" says:
"All during this attack, in which it seems the Germans had difficulty in getting their
artiLLery fire to Lift, the eneW artillery was falling over the dhat area, including where
their own infantry w operating. Their method of attack seemed to be to ittuminate the
targets and blind the US pewers with momntary flashes frm fLoodLights that were mounted on
the tanks. The effect of the floodlights was terrifying, according to Captain Love. The
blinding Light, fottowed by the inky blackness of the night in which no one couLd see anything,
made the battle sem as uncoordinated as if it had been fought in the Pit. The ene seemed
to depend heavily on the effect on morale of a high percentage of tracer in his ammunition,
and Captain LoVe estimated that most of the fighting that was done that first night to be about
1/3 belt mmunition and the rest tracer."
All that afternoon and evening, stragglers from all units of the 2d and
99th Divisions had been wandering through the twin villages, looking for their
outfits or headed vaguely toward "the rear." During the battle, two American
half-track crews entered #65, seeking shelter from the German attack. Their
half-tracks were nearby, one parked in the street just outside the house and
the other across the street, next to #61, which was now held by the Germans.
Adams was glad of the reinforcements, but the crews weren't inclined to
contribute much to the defense of the position. Instead they spent the whole
night in the cellar with five Belgian civilians who had so far passed most of
the evening praying for deliverance.'
' ibid.
ibid.
135
i 41
]338
side of the house from the panzer, Adams ran to a US self-propelled TD of the
644th TO Bn that he knew was nearby. He tried to persuade the vehicle
commander to move to a position from where he could take out the German tank,
but the commander refused, citing a number of reasons, including that it was
too dark for him to use his telescopic sights. Adams pleaded and argued with
him, even offering to act as gunner himself, but to no avail. Sgt Andrew
Paul, who had accompanied Adams, grew impatient with the TO commander's
hesitation. He removed a .30cal machine gun mounted on a nearby jeep, draped
a belt of ammunition around his neck, and stepped out into the street. He
walked steadily toward the panzer, firing his machine gun from the hip at the
tank as he went. After a few rounds, Paul's machine gun jammed, but Lt
William Trumbley, of D Co's Machine Gun Platoon, emerged from the house, took
the gun from Paul and cleared the stoppage, and then took Paul's place,
spraying the panzer with the machine gun. NA German infantryman from
somewhere in the vicinity fired what was thought to be a rifle grenade at Lt
Trumbley, which hit the wall of the house about six feet from the lieutenant,
wounding him in the right leg with a fragment. The enemy tank, unaffected by
all this, fired about six more rounds at the house and moved away. At this
time the American TO pulled out and was not seen again.09 [ACTION 20]
With the German tank gone and the battle seemingly dying down around
them, Adams redeployed his men at the windows and doors of #65. About ten
minutes later, one of the guards reported a column of twos marching north past
the AT Co CP. Thinking that it might be a group of German infantry, Adams
went outside to a Sherman tank which Capt Rollings had placed north of #65
earlier in the evening.' 0 Adams argued for the commander to fire on the
column, but the tanker was convinced that the column was American and refused,
even when Adams again offered to man the gun himself. The identity of the
troops is not known for certain, but they were probably E Co of the 2/38th
Ibid.
ly Adems did not try to get this uShen to fire on the Goem tank earlier is unknown. Perhaps the
battle situation at the tim would not allow him to reach the Sherman's position.
137
Inf, and it is likely that the Sherman commander "Saved a friendly unit from
unnecessary casualties. "
The Germans regrouped and renewed their attack on the central part of
Rocherath at about 2000. Grenadiers across the street from Capt Love's AT Co
CP were firing rifle grenades at the house, so Love pulled most of the men out
of the building and into a field a little northwest of the house, where they
would be screened from the German fire until the Germans could be driven off.
He left a machine gun and its crew inside the house, and they took the Germans
under fire from their post at an upstairs window. About the same time, the
Sherman tank, whose commander Lt Adams had spoken with earlier, drove out of
its position and toward another part of the town. It is unknown whether the
tank was moving forward to engage the attacking Germans or seeking safer
havens farther to the rear, but shortly after its departure, two German tanks
pulled up within view of Adams' platoon and began firing at #65. While their
situation certainly was not a pleasant one, Adams and his men soon realized
that the danger was not as great as it seemed, for the German HE shells could
do no more to the house's thick stone walls than chip the outside and knock
off plaster from the inside. Seeing their ineffectiveness, the panzers soon
12
moved on to the southwest.
While the battle still flared around him, at about 2030 Capt Love got
a call from Col Boos informing him that the 2/38th was moving into the area
to reinforce him and that the first unit to arrive, E Co, would be under his
control. Capt Love dispatched a guide out to the north road to locate this
company and lead them to positions Love had chosen, but the guide discovered
that E Co had already arrived and was occupying positions east and a little
north of Love's street, in an arc just behind the Service Co roadblock. (As
mentioned above, the column that Lt Adams had wanted to fire on earlier was
probably E Co, moving up to its present position.) Unable to go to E Co's
position to take charge of them personally because of the fighting going on
138
around both them and him, Love accepted their positions as a fait accompli and
turned his attention back to supervising the defense of his own area.'3
The Germans were now on all sides of Love and Adams, having penetrated
down the streets to the north and south, occupied the houses across the
street, and infiltrated behind the position and attacked American strongpoints
in and around the church. When the fighting tapered off again in his area,
Capt Love brought his AT Co men back into the house at #63 and posted guards
around the building. He put the men on a rotating schedule so they could
start to catch up on their sleep. Now that it was relatively safe to travel
ts Ibid.
SIbid. Atso, USA ITO 2d ID Coadt Interview Gcermn srsoithrouh, Fite #176; Cavanagh, ccc.t, p.98 ;
Thopson, *Tank Fight at Rocherath-Krinkett, letium, 16-19 Deceder 1964
toUSA ITO 2d ID Cobat Interview, "Battte of the Butle, 17-20 De 194" Fite #173; Cavanagh.
cc Cit,
p.96
139
the neighborhood as long as one avoided the Germans in the houses across the
street, Love sent the AT Co Assistant Recon Officer, Lt Edward Sweeney, to
effect the overdue contact and coordination with E Co of the 2/38th to the
east. G Co arrived in the area about this time, with orders to tie in on AT
Co's right. "The guard outside the door of the AT Co CP stopped the G Co
column just in time to save them from walking down the road between the
company positions and the enemy houses across the street."'8
Around 2300, after all the German tanks in the area had withdrawn, the
Germans in #61 across from Adams' house began shouting in German. Having
received no response after about five minutes, the Germans switched to
"heavily accented English," calling on the C Co men to surrender. Adams' men
did not answer, but watched silently from the windows and doors of #65, from
where they could not themselves be seen. Then some Germans emerged from the
Rauw house, holding captured Americans in front of them at gunpoint as human
shields. Adams refused the surrender demand that the men in the street
shouted at him; he was unsure whether they were really captured Americans or
not. After a few minutes, Germans and captives both withdrew back into the
basement of #61.17
USA ITO 2d I Clmbst Interview, nettte of the Outge, 17-20 Doc 19 ", FILe 0173
Ibid.
140
11 Bn of the panzer regiment, composed of the 560th Hvy PzJg Bn, would not be
able to finish negotiating the muddy, churned-up trails through the forest
until later on the 18th.)1' On the other side, the Americans consolidated
their positions in Krinkelt-Rocherath and Wirtzfeld, but still did not have
a cohesive front with which to oppose the Germans. According to Cole,
"Most of the 38th Infantry was in and around the two villages, plus about a battalion and a
half of the 9th Infantry and a few platoons of the 23d Infantry. Although these 2d Division
troops had gaping ranks, so had their opponents. Fortunately, in view of the nimIer of tanks
otready in the Gern camp, the American infantry had the m of antitank defense at hand:
the 741st Tk On, 6th TD gn, a company of the 612th TD Bn, and a few guns from the 801st TD
Bn...The flanks of the 2d ID positions at the vitlages were more or tess covered by elements
of the 9th and 23d Inf in Wirtzfotd, to the southwest, and the battalions of the 393d Inf
deptoyed in blocking positions to hold the road not north of Rocherath. As yet, however, there
was no homogeneous line seating the 2d ID front...
Capt Love was awakened at about 0700 on the 18th, Just as the sun was
coming up and the fog was lifting. Some of Adams' men had heard voices coming
from the house across the street, leading them to suspect that the Germans
were still there and were still holding their American prisoners. Some of
Adam's men, stationed in the doorway of #65, "started the battle off right"
by sniping at two or three Germans "who appeared incautiously in the windows"
of the Rauw house. About this time, the C Co commander, Capt Rollings, and
his runner made the dash from the C Co CP to #65, safely avoiding being shot
at by the Germans across the street. When he learned that Adams' squad had
abandoned #61 the night before, he was angry that the house had been given up
without a fight and ordered Adams to recapture and reoccupy the building.
With the rest of 2d Platoon firing covering fire from the widows and
doors of the Drosch home, 2d Squad ran into the street. A wounded SS officer
threw a potato-masher grenade into the street from a basement window of #61,
wounding two of Adams' men, while some Germans behind the house fired two red
flares into the morning sky. This may have been a signal for tank support,
toCole, ca l, pp.113-11s
141
for soon German tanks could be heard approaching from the Lausdell crossroads
area, but they didn't arrive in time to help the defenders of the Rauw house.
Two 2d Squad men threw three hand grenades into the house and the rest of the
squad stormed in,killing 11 Germans, capturing 16, and freeing six American
prisoners. Among these last were Lt Ralph L. Schmidt of B Co, and S/Sgt Ron
Mayer and PFC Henry Hills, machine gunners from Capt Love's 9th Gun Squad.
They had been captured the previous night while manning their machine gun in
a house near the Service Co roadblock. The released Americans picked up
whatever abandoned weapons were lying about, scrounged some ammunition from
the two half-tracks parked in the area, and then dispersed to find their
units. The wounded German prisoners were taken into the Drosch home while
Capt Rollings, who was wounded slightly in the leg by a ricocheting bullet
while observing the fight from the door of #65, and his runner escorted the
others to the rear.1"
Shortly after this action, Capt Love sent a detail to the regimental
ammunition depot in Krinkelt to pick up a resupply of bazooka rounds and K-
rations. They returned by 0900, just as a platoon of I Co, 3/38th, arrived
and took up positions in the house to the north of the AT Co CP. On their
heels was a platoon of K Co, which occupied supporting positions in another
house about 50 yards northwest of Love's CP.
Around 0730, a force of eleven German tanks barrelled down the southern
road past the Drosch house, going so fast that none of the men in Love's CP
had time to bring their weapons to bear. [See Figure 14] Just down the
street, Lt Adams quickly organized two bazooka teams, using one launcher that
his group had since the beginning and another that was scrounged from a jeep
parked outside. These two teams fired numerous rounds at the passing panzers,
scoring "many direct hits" on them but achieving no penetrations. [ACTION 21]
Capt Love was surprised that these panzers could have gotten past his Sth Gun
Squad, which was stationed farther northeast along the road, without at least
being fired at. After calling the 38th Inf Regt CP to warn them of the
armored threat coming their way, he called all three of his platoon leaders
ItUSA ETO 2d ID Ccmmt Interview 4ttte of the Butse, 17-20 Do 19" Fire 9173
142
Yoft
0 - - 4;Wt a=
\ A 38
seeooi
C.0800
143
to see what their situations were. His 2d Plt leader, Lt Marc M. Schowalter,
reported that he could not locate the Sth Gun Squad (unknown to him at the
time, the Germans had overrun the gun the night before and captured the crew).
As the tanks passed the Drosch and Rauw houses, their column began to
"accordion" as the head of the column stopped and the rear vehicles closed up
behind. One of the tanks, a Mk V Panther (presumably at or near the very rear
of the column), was about 200 yards from Love's CP when it stopped, but he had
nothing which could see to hit it because of the intervening buildings. He
left his CP and located two self-propelled TDs of the 644th TO Bn, but they
refused to move to positions from which they could get a shot at the panzer,
saying they had strict orders to stay right where they were "covering critical
positions." Love then found an M-4 Sherman tank nearby, and the commander
followed Love to a firing position about 75 yards to the Panther's right.
"The M-4 finished it off with two rounds, beautiful flanking shots into the
side of the hull. Score: One Mk V tank, no US casualties. The doughboys in
the windows (of Love's CP] enjoyed picking off the [German] tank crew as they
"
abandoned their vehicle. 2
mb1d.
144
Adams and his men dashed out of #65 and took cover In #63 across the cul-de-
sac, into which the C Co CP was just then relocating.
As they did so, another Panther, a little behind the others, continued
southwest toward the one that had just been knocked out by the Sherman.
Private Isabel Salazar, one of Love's AT Co staff members, grabbed a bazooka
and one of the newly-arrived rockets and ran upstairs from the basement to one
of the first-story windows. He fired and knocked out the Panther at 200 yards
with that first shot. The Panther's momentum carried it forward until it came
to rest alongside the Sherman's kill, the two wrecks very effectively blocking
the road.2 1 (ACTION 23]
Within moments after Adams withdrew his platoon from #65, a huge tank
battle between the German Panthers and US Shermans and tank destroyers erupted
in Rocherath. Details of this fight will not be recounted here since they are
not pertinent to the infantry anti-tank defense. Adams and the rest of 2d
Plt, plus the Weapons Platoon, stayed in C Co's new CP for about an hour while
the tank fight raged around them. At about 1300, when the worst part of the
fighting appeared to be over, Capt Rollings returned to the CP from the
battalion aid station (where he had gone to have his leg wound attended to
after dropping off his prisoners) and sent Adams and his group back to #65.
Someone mentioned at the time that 15 German tanks had been destroyed in the
tank battle. During the fighting, L Co of the 3/38th Inf took up positions
to the left (north) of AT Co, using the cellars and basements of ruined houses
as strongpoints.
As they re-entered #65, Adams' 2d Plt realized that they had left their
two wounded German prisoners there during the tank battle. One, the wounded
SS officer who had thrown the hand grenade earlier that morning, was still
there since his leg was too badly injured to walk on; but the other, who also
had a leg wound but less severe, was gone. Adams ran out to the front door
to look for the escaped man, who he figured couldn't have gotten far yet. -He
21 Ibid.
145
was right, for he spotted the man "wobbling down the road toward another house
on the corner.* Since he was too far away and too exposed for Adams to
22
recapture, Adams shot him.
Despite the ferocity of the earlier tank battle, the north-facing panzer
that had menaced the intersection that morning was still in position. Adams'
men could no longer see it since itwas now hidden from their view by the shed
adjacent to the Drosch house, but they could hear itwarming up its motor from
time to time. They could also see, through a gap in a hedge, tankers and
infantrymen running to and fro near the tank. Adams watched this activity for
a little while, then got his carbine, which he had modified to be fully
automatic when desired. Bracing against a ground-floor window sill, Adams
began firing bursts at the Germans who appeared in the gap. Apparently they
never figured out where the firing was coming from because he carried on with
this sniping for some time, and by evening a rather large pile of German dead
had accumulated in the gap and they had stopped using it as an avenue of
approach.23
Around 1600, a German tank approaching from Lausdell stopped on the road
behind #61, using one of the tanks knocked out earlier as cover, and began
firing into #65 to cover for more panzers heading for Krinkelt. Firing from
Capt Love's AT Co CP, Pvt Salazar repeated his morning performance by knocking
out one of these, a PzJg IV from the 560th Hvy PzJg Bn, as it pulled up behind
the two destroyed tanks blocking the southern road.24 [ACTION 24] A few
minutes later, the last tank in the column joined the first in bombarding
Adams' platoon in #65. The sturdy house withstood the pounding until one of
the tank rounds came in through a window or door and exploded inside,
destroying the staircase leading from the basement to the first floor.
NAmidst the choking smoke and dust, Lt Adams ordered his men out of the house"
and into a ditch to the rear of the house. As they did so, the two
Ibid.
" Ibid.
146
overwatching panzers followed their fellows southwest down the road into
Krinkelt. When they had gone, Adams went into the C Co CP to ask permission
to abandon the demolished house, which was proving too easy a target for the
panzers, but Capt Rollings refused, saying the position was vital.
Accordingly, Adams moved the 2d Plt back into the house as soon as the smoke
and dust had cleared enough for them to breathe. He reestablished his guards
at the windows and doors. One of the tank rounds had set the half-track in
front of the Orosch home on fire, and it continued burning into the night.
Since his group was so small and since the Rauw house had no eastward-facing
openings and was therefore indefensible at night, Adams withdrew Shinefelt's
2d Squad into #65 when it got dark. Around 1800, US artillery on Elsenborn
Ridge began firing "in a target area that seemed to enclose Lt Adams and his
group within a semicircular was of fire which was interposed between him and
the enemy. This fire kept up all during the night," and despite the noise,
2
"the men derived a great deal of comfort from it."5
Things were quiet (from a combat standpoint) until about 2200, when a
platoon of four German tanks led by a captured Sherman came up the southern
road from Krinkelt, turned left at the intersection, and passed by the C Co
CP. The tanks had their headlights on, and the Americans along the street
were fooled at first by the Sherman into thinking it was an American column.
They hailed the tankers in English, but when they got no reply and saw that
the subsequent tanks were German, they opened fire with their small arms and
machine guns. The tanks, unaffected, continued to the northern road, where
they turned right and continued north out of the area.2'
At some point during the night, a single German tank drove up and down
the street, spraying its machine guns at the houses on either side. [See
Figure 15] The men in the AT Co CP fired bazookas at it and hit it several
times, but none of the rounds penetrated, and the tank, apparently undamaged,
eventually drove away. [ACTION 25]
2USA ETO Zd ID Combat Interview Saettte of the IuLgo, 17-20 Dcer 1940 FIte 0173
Ibid.
147
FIGURE 15. POCKET OF RESISTANCE, 19 DECEMBER, EARLY MORNING
148
In the pre-dawn hours, another lone panzer came down the Route vers
Udenbreth and stopped between the two knocked-out tanks blocking the road.
There it sat until dawn. At about the same time, a self-propelled tank
destroyer of the 644th TD Bn pulled up behind Adams' position at #65. The
panzer heard the TD moving into position and fired a few blind shots in that
direction, but neither vehicle moved out of its cover to get a better shot for
fear of becoming exposed to the other's fire.
Around 0900, four Belgian civilians picked their way through the rubble
in the foggy half-light of dawn and entered #65, where they joined the other
five civilians who had remained in the basement since the battle began.
Shortly after, Adams' and Love's men spotted a panzer hiding in a wooden
shed about 60 yards north of Love's CP. The panzer had backed into the shed,
apparently intending to ambush any American vehicles that might pass by with
Ibid.
149
a flank shot at point-blank range, but its cannon barrel was too long for its
hiding place and protruded from the shed. One of the 644th TD Bn's tank
destroyers, so far reluctant to move from its covered position during this
battle, was able to fire on the shed without moving. Several rounds
demolished the shed and as the panzer moved out to seek more substantial
cover, the TO knocked it out."
2 Ibid.
n Lt Adm coutd hear, over the shooting, the Aerm tank canodser In the turret shouting orders,
inctuding (prembly In Bermn) NIe, 2001 - Ibid.
150
16
already taken cover. Adams had been injured when the wall fell on him, but
he continued to command his platoon. For the next three hours the two forces
battled across the street as, in between tank rounds, the men of 2d Plt and
AT Co sprang to their windows to return fire as best they could.3 At about
noon, two more panzers entered the intersection and added the weight of their
fire, targeting Adams' #65 and the other houses in the area. Seeing the
little effect their 75mm shells were having against the stone houses, the
panzers switched to spraying the area with their machine guns. A number of
bursts struck the shed adjacent to the Drosch house. This shed had a thatched
roof that was easily ignited by the tracer rounds. Lt Roy E. Mode, one of
the C Co officers in the house with Lt Adams, tried to extinguish the blaze
with two five-gallon Jerry cans of water, but was unsuccessful and the flames
soon spread to the house proper. The Orosch home, #65 Rocherath, which the
2d Plt, C Co, had defended so successfully for two days, finally had to be
abandoned. While one GI ran to the top of what remained of the basement
stairs to warn the civilians, yelling "Home brennt; you must goi, the rest
of the platoon exited the rear of the house and down a track leading past #64
and westward toward Wirtzfeld. 1
3USA ETO CoM.t Intervmiew 'ttl* of the Butoe, 17-20 Dcubew 19440 Fit* #173; Cvmmgh, o cit,
p.127
152
//
F2 38I1
153
the panzer's engine compartment, because even though it saw the maneuvering
TO it couldn't rotate its turret fast enough to get a shot at it. "Because
of the locations of the buildings, the TO had to come up with its gun pointing
to the rear, and while the Mk IV was traversing slowly, as ifby hand, through
900, the TO traversed through about 200, got off three rounds, and took the
turret right off the Hk IV. Another Mk IV that was moving in near the first
one apparently saw what was happening, for he pulled out."3 2 [ACTION 27)
Just before 1700, Capt Love was summoned to attend a meeting at the 38th
Regimental CP a few blocks away. At this meeting, Col Boos issued orders to
his battalion and company commanders to begin the withdrawal to Berg and
Elsenborn at 1730. Love's AT Co was to follow behind L Co, which was attached
to the 2/38th, on the road west through Wirtzfeld. Boos instructed the
commanders to destroy any equipment, German or American, that could not be
carried out. Capt Love returned to his company and got the preparations for
withdrawal underway. Finally, around 1830, a radio message informed him that
L Co had cleared the area, so Love put the remnants of his three gun platoons
and mine platoon on the road. By 2100 the company had reached Elsenborn,
where it was ordered to occupy a section of the new defense line. This was
accomplished by the morning of the 20th.
32 USA ITO CoIbet Interview ftttLe of the BIlge, 17-20 Deeubr 194"" Fire 0173
154
4J P- 4 41JNW4
4D -f 4h w4J )4 - 4 ) "k .4. co = 44%-
w 4-P 4) 4J 41 L. CL M
4)41 414 r-4 W)4 IJ CL.
4) ~ )r-0 ~ . . i 4 4- r-42% u V
(~ Ci JCIV . ( Cal CcU- 0.. 4ICl..
- CCA
U041 041 0 041 0 mc W -r)41
UJ441 1114V4 IVI)4 - >J)444) (AA
41
4A
8-0E LU 4- -r--1 W I
-U caDc C-j
cm iv W a4c CC
r01 EU..-
0 .
%n 0 ~~cc
(A C )L
41C q=
C- - 0411-0.0.
C~41
A 0 P-
tU C
do 4.44.
WA c" 4a 'U C c
4- i -Ew MU.,-
C c
0.-
~C CC9.
41'Lm C a
4 1-. 4- EUc
45'(
16-J *1 c Cr- C 54
W C4a 4-0 u L 04UC
V-I 0 2 aLiZS
c 4c V c 10 6..CC-.
QA CL m ( 1 P4* CLX .0
- EU- 4- '4- mU4) .
li .44 .CC *4=1.0-
155
m4 - - - - - - -
P- r- E
r-a -- Eu.
-a Eu - F~- -- r aue u-Eu
r - aue - rE.a
CC M
0)
W) N
Eu 0 0) h
w W.' qw =~4-
wm
a S. 40t ) A 0 4a1
4- cm
41 5-
CL. = *. 04-0 W11
ag 00 4.1
4-4.
La 0 Nw 4.)
LL. C L.c(A"
e-
C2 CD4-0" .1e
(A 6 1
au 0 v V4)NG
oll' a- 2CQL
N S. N
W N1
4fl~ 4.
IN VU~
a). 4-w
c 4- 4-4.a
44CC
Go 4.1
.9-v
IVV CL
0- C- 09-
u ~ ~ ~41 4 w?1
4w IV
CA
Ut), E& . u-0'-o
I.- =1
0(4 0 4C
156
C 04k C 0 k C 04k C 04k 704k COft C 0 Vk
J2. 9- 4 - .0 4- 4. A4- .0 4- .0 ..
#.JI~- ~ (.JOLA
%L.W %J..W -_0U. .0
%J~ (JO k
401 al 00a41 1 S 05 1 0 01
a <W -- C r-- 4Cv-
9.6 OCm- 4 M"- I-is -
40. iv.-m0
Eu.) CL 4m 41 4-.c$.
= A C = .4a)
39
4-~v.a Wa. E4va 1. 41C It&
I.41 uUSFAa- u W *1 U&-
0 = L. 4- c X(A
1.0 J2 0 W 0
WSA--04 ~
0 S. . L4n LC 0 L- C L.
tC C U
Ar-
01 0C. EuI
Eu ac CI.
2c L
IIn * => L.
L&A c 0-a (A .
S M *a0
U~Q CL~ 41 zn..
w0 Zi%4- M
'4-
1 4- C
V51 0 0n
LA. W V)uC.
44 U .iU E
ku
0
ZO.
ECL
Z
0
,v cS.
V.
A -41 W,.V(Al
I
~ 0
CL W1
= ve
0.
.Eu ..0 .0 .*OA I 'A0. *C .06
LenSfA % G 0O O atI 4a 0241-lO -Eum CV
"41 0 6-0 A
(4 C4 z " (A
- lmmmm
157
4.) 4.1 - 4) P" 4 o; P- 4.1 -4 4.) P ~4-a 1-
C1 4k c 0 " ( b C01k
-I 4b c w C0 "k
c4 C0Mb
@= -=
b." = 0- =C b-4 . 0- C b-4
4.1.F- E r
(L U. 'L4-A 4.1 a A4 &J a L . v L 0 t
4.jU cm 44c .)c-1 m4 0a 4
01
44 EU-4J41
.~ 1 4- L iUf 0 10
CM. 0 ~ C=Cc
0 W bg U ~ 000W
m Rit4-A 4 CL -C
I-S C4 .*j6
= c0 1 L
0- 00 0 0 01J
LI I~ a 01U. I
-,2 CCC C
LA 00. 00
co..
01 0.C
be X L 0 -EU
41C w Wc
'04.0 2.CN
INC 0 . 41 01J CL
00 01 44 U414 4 O 41
-P- 4J4-b CA3EU
IC41 ~ i 14.1 01E
cEE .- E E 01UL 4A
4a .10 01 41. 0C 01a
4-AI
W. '4- 4-4. 0U VI V.1 C
=
I 0 C UM m 0=
#AaJ
U; 4-a 41 C. 0C II U
caLh i- .c
cVIE41EU
*0b.10~
01 i 0 ~
01 V1
C *E
M-E01
'A0Ifl
=4-
E id
C.
*. L.
C
EU
IJ
C1
-r-0C4a 41C CC
00%*. 0 r-- C
~
ug04 m4 EUm N 4 CL,
w0
*0ACC
0 I.4 *pC
N01C;J; (
- -9
158
e V C)e 4') m' CV)
41 41 --
4V-4 4-A 41 4. ) - +j I" - 4.) 4 -4
C 4 I4k C 41.k C W *k 0. C .ZkW 4k C W 4k C. )
4) 4.1a 4a.4 W.a ~a)
41 41 0 41
4 4. - J4.3 r- 41 413 ~413 ~ 41 _-
.)Lb
a 6) 0Ll- 1.0 L6 W CU. (i aLL. W 0 L. UCL.
W (JU 0
%- . o -. 0 - 0 I - . .S 0(AUp 1 -
WL.4a W~4b co 40 U4.0 Low43 cap.3 L1.a
Waa..U
S 41h~
I1 *)a * 0 ;cm41 41c 41
m cm
.0 S
N cc L.Uu
W . 4- C. C 0
.p0 cmO 0 .41*
aS. 1 .. 0:2
C C C"3
41 r% o.j e
* P )41
CY e 2 4. 4
.0 . 0 cL. L
51.5 C CEtC 4A M W
aC
lo N- a rC
LL r-4)40 N iv
Y).L N vcL m4)a4
4 4E M10
C. C
40 4- cu 411 a%
LU VW C. "i 42)
(AC ..- 0 04. M. 43
U~~4J414 P.-C I
OEuE
4@ 4. CD 03c
Wv o II
S. I..I 0
09 WEU 41 . 04.)
w' 0 40e-
L. L low
0.- r- 4 .41..
'4-
4- C
V S..0 c .0
Cv 0
EUa
41 C
41EU a
1
U, 4 a . fa-
w0f 0)Cl Ln
I-.EU )~ .. 014-EoCw
U ~ EU0 u . C Li119
4' -
4b4-D -4 41 - j -Q
c W4k c 0 4b C01 It C0 W c 0 w
4. 1 41 FD 41 941 e .
64
00a 00 0101 0-D
. - 4.15, . 4.15 .0.1-
00 1 a$ 4.) +0 4
.5-IV' 990 L01
VW -1Ce
WCA ID C cc C cca3nc
4.
"a~.- c ~
C . m0) XV S
W =. rU 1.-
= a af~
u 4A04.11 .0 50.. 0v i .
00=1=.0.. c3x01
*.-41
cm.IL L.I CIVL.
;
6 4.0 (D41 r . Vk . C.P
S.O
m 0 4) I . .CA 0
4-4JL of C .L 0.1 L
M~ C
0 CrCLa
c Zo CC or- 0
F-Sa V
-p IL Z
L. 4.1 *
0110 4- C
S.. C
I1 40 .C
a0 I-C w
C- . - U, I--
4.-.- ~ F0
p-
4.'
F0 N1,b
c I-
( 144Mct .64- c
30 41c 0 - PC6 O LL4- *C C
.5
V
a~~- 4-164..v . 0I I
ui CC IV'0 tJC iv - 0
01 C &1 0 1
16
C0 "4 CE"~ C"q CUC"C1k t"I~
c - - s- =-. b. -
4 1b - .4 b 0 . - 4 .) 4.) *0w) .4) 4 G)
4~01 0041 05 003r1 05 001 00A1
.04 0 -t- .I- . . 4-p-.34 .0~ 4-- M1-
(Jo 0LA-
- w W CLA. f-) L W 1. W . C- 0LA
%U %_o -.
a4.)-a p - -
U'i44w Lj4 D LJ4 ) Li . 1U 4w Li4 A 14
o4 1c - n 4aC . m 41w *
cc 0 Cc cccc0 C0x
CC
N C4.'A 4-0100101i0
0 4.' JA oa 50.
4 1 r )U cn c . 0
IV V I4- 44 W~JU06r%0
CJL 0 c CL 0. 0000c
L) mMcC1 04nCoc
a
M
.o '4- C
VL S. E.
. 4=
(D 0a
EL (
NY 00 0 4- C -U
_ 00 iv 4W i-.
XL ) L .. 01u (
0C =C LeC.
W C6.
1Ad
u C 6
C C '4-a .W ~ 'V
01 cc2%c 0 01 CL~. U'
W4 WC c1f0 014
id~ 14- . 1 4- 4.C
kv C r-
u-gq 01 4-C Cr C I-j 40
0 0 4WC 0 4 -W ~ '
W~~C .'v(A4 A E .4 t-U
0 ~~~~I. 0
M-* ~- V0 41W 0. 1.
V C300 0 UJ=L. (A
C4.1
C 4-4 'a~ tlCI- - I a - 0 id
W A tn4 Om 4W EN 4U U* L C
CW 03
C4
CL A 3. S. S. IA C(V;11 i%'nwi-4M OC42
(A41 -- N4- L r.LL %- F 4-
161
4-)a -P-4 4.1 9 4 41 -41
V P" *1 -W" *a 41 -4
cW4 w 74k ~ q c( kc d) 4k C IV k C 4 k C 0 :k c c (D74
4.1Q c1u4 4-V 4104 410d 410IV10
410 r .1 r 4.1 r 4a 4-1 q 4a r- 4a 41 a
0 LL. L. w 0JU LL. u0LL. L-i aLA.L (JOLA. U 0LL = (J L
ca do C = c c a4*4Oz
N~ EU
cc Sl .14.) C U
2c CD EU41
Q c CD 0
1.(Da Lin a-
0D404a1 V -.
IL
w#
I-CL
4.1
v, 31, v
4- 2
SON...N EU
SL.C -4 N
1c -
29 = 4 40 1> - 4a0
.a-
4J 0 0 4 C
LSEa. C
4- C lo Lc am
c w. fA 1 r- 4-a. . -Pa
C L. C41 =W 0 cC
Scc U . 415
'4-
in 4) 24 mo C.
Ia - EUa-v
CE 0 c
i0 41 La..
01441 a -
0.S162
4.1 W" W 4.1 P- 4j 1 P"
C 0 "ft 4b cC4)4 =aIW
C44
.c = P.. . -.
*4 4.1 4a 4j*
w ~0 LL w CU. UOU.6 W.O&
LCL&
U 041
i 0 L141 W01LA 041 40 LJ41
CA am =3 cn am= w 3 = 4n 12 z V)C
a-c ac aCD =a cc ~ ac
z0 Cc3
41 ap = C4
W W0 4a 14a
UI. 0I.C
C 4A
41 a 1c 41 # % SC.h 4-j
c 4 0L. w r-4IV IV
4-44S- W C C~(f 10
0A.00C 41Y.0 4
0 S. 4jI 4.14
410. C fu4
SC 1OL
-M w a W U zv .C-
L6 ~ 40 . 0 4-01
(Ia 4.1M 4a L49 a VC. 4- 0
0) IA0~1E'
or-C
0 Cc
Ca *- V1
s 0W
iv CM C
C.OI 0 0 820
41a
4114 C4
5. C
41 0 IV C
41040
v W.'SI144101 (.11-
41I4 9L.1 CIO
r- C 54)
Wi
I'l *.- CI, 1. 0. C0.0
4 c 4.C 41i 41 dc 0 ac
*.-5 0 0
0'. .49
UU4 #0C ZCC
coa*t4a 10 .0D
= *C e
-a. dc 0- CA az c~ W
163
4. W 41 -1 4)~ 4- 4) ~ - .. 1 p. 4-) -
4-b 4W - 41b r 41 F- 4J r- 4J r 4J r
001
LEA 001 00
LJ41 00W1 00U41 01 )U 0 0) 1
4J
.4.1. 4-U 4a
0 'V 0 C ^.- a
14. - ( 41 4-
C 01U
4. W 4- U , a a a)C
.-. t 401 c0
4..
-~~~~#
.4. 41u
S,,. i
(A4.+A
-
'.-~f
,r-
01 .
4
41 COW. 00
co 4- C-E
V V
cm L., L.Lr- r
aw1. 010 C r- t
LN41c EU1
44 . 4 4- C '4-C
1
1.-4. 4. 4
*~ U'
- cC 4- C ' 'd.
01 0C C 19 144,C V
of . . O IUE~I 'AL COl I-
u'C. 4A 41 *Coa *cUm 14-
C0 41 4-C *. C *..z 0 f.& C
"4Uj1- 12 -vc aU4 L L
*011 Cb C c01- 1. -0A
- -a4j 4 - - -0
164
4. - 4. . - 4. .4-a - 0 ~ 4 - *J -1 b
4.5 4 1 .1l .5 4.-b 4.1 . 4J r-5 4J 4.1
4. -i41Q .1 4-1 . - 40 F -04 a-4 - .1 .4--,a
(JOLL. CLA L0 LL. Lj0U. J0 L. W 0 L6 W 0 U (0 LL (0
L L&- W 0LL.
44 404 cap ow 05 05o ow IV 0w o
I-
l--a I-- -3 Fa I-a-S I- a I- r- -U -- a --
4.o 1 44a 441 41 al 4) 4.1 c 4.0 c 4J C 4.)
INCM - 4CW M OCof O 4Wr- 4C M - 4c tu- o44ifa- < Or- M r-- toW
CA am (A an (A an (A co 2)I = (A go cz CAc Ac o
COC O =xcl zC
sil Cc a- CoaC 8c
N 4 a
=r Z(V
C
B~ C 6.~
I c 4A C" M1
5 41 0k.
.4-
ac aN 00
S. a)C 04
w low
C* 4j C.V
V w
.- of- C
-
LEc
44.9 c c VC
al 4- *. 4706
= IV 4 0 4A1 34-
C L
L. C 4a. 4.1 0.
fiC4a v aJC W 42 c
C *.-O 0
o@4. I4.) 0 41 10
~S. 04-1 rCc
M4 4W 4a- '
Z.0EA -,aN (A 4
~w SN
o (J4 00I-m
o Lv
w 4A
LW .0
2 4WC S
4-CWW 0 F-
M- IV
S.43 0 W~."
Go' .0 U-6.
SEA a- C
U 4
i#; IW-to tt
w 6 moo21 aw W .43
~ ~4WEA 0 165
4.)w1%
1 1 W jo
41
- 41 - 41-b
0-~ L, L a
04WD40 1 4
41 - 4"p 4-a .m 4 61 C
L.~ caa4)
4- # - -
Ad
a E.'4 L. '. a
U 0
C 4)0 0L41
USC i3
CL' 4A-
e us.a .. iv C.
00
c a S I
41 4
w a
%. V
0-- *A
W4-.fU#V
4- ft". I.,Ca
1
414 41 Cb-
s.5.
ICSU 40c SC
IV
41 A4
l MIc .
& 41 M
4. 'A ~ CL ICU
CD =a P"
0.- C
0.1 *0 NM
166
41 - 40 P- 4 .1 -
cs 3GI4k cCS 4 c 4 aV a 0i
4.10b1 4) 40 41 W 5- IV
41 4i. - 41 4' r- * &.
as ~~~.
awa 4. . I4
ft0 .. %..0 ~
Ancc
gw40
41o-- m 4ac 4CC
41 4m 4 o 4
Cc do ~ cc c oa t 1
.50
,- 5. 1 c~UIa
a'-asc 0.l-.
(- 4j
0 W.I-*
414 41
&A W 41 0
L.
LAJ~C u4 4- al
3-A
=~, 0e c c.L
a. C C1
oC c..1UcC c
1e 1C=0 22C
511
IVI Ja C0
4' l~J
D
~~~ CDU0
167
P.- . -l % . - m%l .
U 04a
i 0 Li41AC LJ 041
Lai 0 LJ41 0 410 V0L41 a)0J41 40 41A4
.6a *
41 .4.)Om ' 41 4a1c 41 M 41c 4-)
p.-.c
411 gm.
(D ) (D C0
co 34- C
O 0 0 0 0
L. c0
04-A cm .ba
mi~ 41
L'Wj
NL m1
-0 0 L. 4J4
41 ~ 4 ND 4W
0.W. NJ 4 4
04 004
N 04a
u0E
*&cV )N
4C. IV
S1
P 4C
4. r 41 4A
IV44. -
1. L. P.W IV
- a- 41 41 IC
- n ~~ 4u~
2. . e - (
i~ ~~~c 31U-M~- 4 4 1 .
1- .41*.168
EU
MV en) IV) (n "
P%. P%. I-s
P% P. r-.
4 ." 4 -A - 4. P- 4-) P- 4) - 4-0 -4 4a -0
C 0 " C .C -k
C~ 4k - a# "k.0 .C C - 4k
4-1 a1 4-a ) 4a 0 4 4h) 4a0 .4b0) .)
L 4 4a0
) LJ4
L 1Li41 0 s-b41 ) W.0.1 w .J4.)d
cz CA co
(A S. 4CJ3
L. 4v to w)
0 S..
41 to) =LCcab 0.
o = 4 -0)4l4(A
O N . f0 S. C 3 C -
o. D - Cw4-L .-. Me
I S fL-&
.0
6CUV)4J) CL 0 f .-. CIV
WY 2 4- 4jL.iva 0 c VS
0)
#A4. L.iv15 21
LAS ~~~ Wc = o *LL
sC CC"
% Vo C.-wa
4.1 U
CL00 u
N 0)0
CLF C39-*
ao-= 000c #
1
C" 0. (A 4C
if CS.. "o-l w
CC s
0~
cm 4.1 IV4
W L. - 4A L.0 n
*,-)0E
c V a
W V4v04. Za
-...- 0- w c L.
- 1w
4) N UfCL 40
30C o 0 P-0 X W "
40-
4- 0 C)
C) w 0-wi a
C C IOUC = 6)
Eu C S 4J 4-)
WEu U)U
4-b4.
IC tv ivC10.
La Im 4VcWL- L4-C 4
~ u 0 00 M -04 c AJ ~LA.
cc do0 0 V~ 0
.3 Lu 4.1 GC6 4 s-c
.1..k C - C
Lu 0
ac CSW Euu C.'-(A
30% Goa
rWGO 160 Eu0 . 4
169
M
4-
I.A
CLI
La
cm c C4
CL L.'
CLOD
U 131Z
IV-
e, = q
'YV
417
4j-b
c w 3k
4.) 4-b
C4Uw
4a1
44
41 ~4.) ~4.1
=4~ C414~k=
k C w4t c 4k~
bo -. -Ic -= =. "*.
o4-b
4- 4 C
- S. (ACUC
40
4- 441c4 3
.- )1 w4-) 39 W
I 4-b
41 W.. .4.0 41
Ci4 4J a) . COrl
I- S. V VI Cic
41
a~~~ C CM
a( Ce
L
Iq Ad C.
W
C 414
4. Vcm w4.5
0 ~ 4a 1
_ _ __ w -- -L
LIJ~4
VW W u
CL0 1P S 4C 4 14IV
4c aI(A 4. C
4 . 1P 4 (A IV4 d
44- 4JC - a14
C C 0. - C -. 41 W
I4 c
.. 4W 3B ( inC - t
4J 4 J .10. *171 CC
CV) CV) C
p..
P%- 3. %% P.1. .p-
0j44) 0a - 00
j41 0i41 00 )Li0041 0. 041Udou04-A
W.41 La.41cm e.41cm 4acm41 cmJe.4 alJ434 cmJJ4 4-a4 L.441=
oc 6vE.. ac M - ac.- 4v r- tv,- O, EU.
to ICi M ~ gIV '-
kv
V V
NI
2c atP-- .
zi 4.1
LU "a
4. v C1
'Ua4
*04.) iv
UJ 45 11 - - - uu
4) 41
Ul- 4E -~
or0- N
.CN4-3 *.
r- I W
of cm. 02
IM =U- I='.
4C r- 41 41 IV
4A0 0.
C .1 41 IV
c; c., a ) 1
ci moo 3c
CD
-0 t'
i. 4-a 41.0 W41 .1
u 41 U wC. 43
S-.. 41E * 4
J2 0 4- C)0(DA
40.0J 0 414'V..-0241
c0 cu Cc- .a;r j Dtsu 2
I*1- 4aL.m 41- 4 MC *C S
* 4A 41 CD. *EUE.1IV
IV a 0 s .02
CAJ V) CL L . kU
v 0
0 0
LL. 41Wc 4
a) ) ua
WA 0 .41 CD 0 C4- C L. =c
Ca (A t 4-a Z.
2c 0 M 4j.
S..
z1 410WEU
(D 41
U 41= - ac- ; c
S. 0 4- CM C
M c.C 4141 A
04.1.
d)= c 4) M~04
C
P-t i-I) ZI
491. W- 06 06
No 'a 4AC(A i 41 cU
4) >-~4. 0 I 41
aJ C1 -p4.' C. 1
31-14 (A 1" 0.0 C
410 C.. IA4# 41 "o
-r- C 4
41 L. t'4
4. . 1 4-
4C aCL -- 4C CA
Z. 4
CL.0 v U- 14 CIO
4-.- C0 IVi-t E c
IA
.e.11 4. J0M1
a;14
00. 4-- UUCAJ 00
41C 0 fa 0.
I- 4) .1 #A 444-C 0-
C
4AC 1co .CEU. C = - t 0
*.- 4c 0-0 OOCAW 0. C)
a-C 4 41 173 1
4. - 4J-1 4-) 4.
4i-a ~4 -b
4141k c 414
"k c4k 01"k C 0 4b C W ftk C4)4b
sA~~~lE x-*.
3AJ41 LL 4 . A 1 LJ4 i4 Ck
4J . 41 a) 4 M 4 m4J0 4 M 41I
dc MrCC i -'Vr 41Mr
vr- <t
VO m z E an (A cccc c
,- O1 x cc =s Ca a4O.2Cl aCI
ZE bIDEV ~)2'cE
oI M
c 41
0 u 4a 44-
394 - AEDs
04- C-4-
~
co ~ = CM.
1Cc41 4.1 4.a14.1c
a) J9 6UC 4.A
41 *0j 41 S-4. 41
m- t 0 W ~ CC3CDll
4a 4)
41*w O . - c.m
4- 4- 4j.. &nC 4-
16 O0 0-4. C 39 4)
4A C0. - n 3 .
c U)(-A
w
174
*a -a)4' 4-A "4 4 b - 4.1 -4) 4- 4-) d) 4-1 W4
04' -
0 3
30)
.C*I 0
N 4.) . 4)
L. evN 0) 00
41 .0 .r -- w 0
S.C=4 IV 4w k
(A 2. 4.' .9
IVV c
d) (AC
060 IV
34"--
30 M .
t-4 mVt
s, 4- tv C C
IVA 0 4 IV
4A 060.C1
do. 4. .4W;Iw
E~ i... ...
..
...
...
4-D -1-4 40 4- 0.-. ) 1- 41
C 41 4 C 4)4ft C 404b C44 o C4)"k c 4 f
4p
C; 4
00
4- . 41
IS a .. CL
X0
Z "a a# 4
0- 0
V. p 4.A
c id
c c IM.. L. =OI CL
.9 4141-
41~41 p 0.4.
Lai~~~04 4-I G 4U..4
0~~~ ~ ~ ~ LJ Z.L6 41P4O
4. Vc 11 m 4
0 4 0 40 IVc 4C a
06 iva .
41 Cz - C. .xY
U 4a. LA.- (A
Q. 0 )
00 0i p-1 IV 06
A CL 1.
4A I.0,CL C
U Go 41 44 = U-
4J~~4
CCi 4.0 4-j JJAC4C
W 0L ..- CO 176 0
I- F-..P%. F- %
41 41 P- 4.) - 4-b v- 4-b 4-b P- 44
a 4)4 C 0 ft C 04k = 0 4k C 0 *k C 4k C 0 4k
441 441 41 441Go .6. 4.04a .. la
4J r- 4a r- 4j r- 4j r- 4) 9 4 - 4)0 9-
L a L- Li 0 L6 ~0 L" wJL
0 U.LL. (1OLIL- (.JO0L6
0 G)041 041 041 0 41 04 041 041
4.bJ 4)f Ll )
4)A 41 4)1
4J 0%.- 4~~-Am E u +0U.cmE.- *4E.e . 41-c
cc Ca ca = c c-C c C
15 a
0 oE 0 C -r-O0
34-L. W 41 4J
C 41 WA 4) a a1 041 41
04. 0UI
o AE C C
m-1 S.~ 1LCDCD 0i
40 .-V -a.--1 CD Iq Z Z
EU 0)4 W~4 C 1 .F
M 9 41
a E4-0 -4J CL
V" S IA4.
0 S. -%P-(w Inl 41 W1
I- ~0= C0 CL. COC
0 tE C 0 41 0 2c
41
a Ca C
La .U(A
9-6 4)
W"
CC
u C 4
IV '
I. 4440
4A m4-a s U ~. C
C C 4- - &-
asP iva44U
30% .
CC1 4)
.9.C
4
4.0 W
O =C C .h 41 E
uM C 04J 4- k. .iA =3 z0 C L. aU
4.0 CQ
0 ( 2- U S . .W
I- 4J 4J C I.- 1.- 0 P-JI 0 id l
i L
0A
4A C
V
41
-
c
1.,VV,
. 4A)
IVE
1N4a
C1C FU
*C
U
aU13E
:m
J
N 4 vU
I
C
-
EUcov0
4-a
4-I
C
"- a4. 41 C VC C
.4161LJ
C w*3 C
177
C (D Ik C140 tC0 A 04k C14h 4b CaI k C 04 41i 0.f
4.11 14 44 4-)41L 4.)4W 4141D 4141)
41 e41 41 - 1 41 - 41 r- 41 r- 41 r-
LU W) ao (A CI 4A cc V CO i oc 1c c c n:
c 40
u0 c
L~.a).a1
41 ~ ~41
41
414 x b
&. c c I
0*.cu 0.0
Im a) 41
-4J CL a. N
a;aa
N~ i41 41 j
M0L 4-0*0 4a i
CLIO 4- a m
0N 9 . NC
-
CC 0' 4- . ZO4-
NLI 041 41 4 10
AdON = . 21p (A
0 1.- c 0 low0
4-U
c. Z r-c U-
C 0
zZ%"0 oU0
0=0
- - - -M
41
414
M1 1 .. 0C
P- 0 c-
IC
VA 411 .0
ft.. 4.0
a. If Ao
44C "-
ap , IV1
as-. £ 1e4 0
U j'178
- P% ~ f m. .
-v AV L.C I. C. 01 . 41Ca
c L. -- "a4-a 4A.CC "a 1.3I1a
.04,
ftA 4W
0
0C
IM
CCL ,auF
uS
U 41
i'5
a) c k
~41 It
c L. 010a v0 L. 4- c x W
=a)L. - S. 02 0 0 W "1~- 0 4
O.C-01 0,3 a. cm L. :0 1
L4.40 . .= S. I L. f.u L 0 GoaC C
04) 41 4 a 4 14J C4-A4 *WIL.4
V CL4
EWd 4)c w.n4 0
CCDCL a1,vs1310CU Z
ag
o0 --
N 41
-
c i
ta
* L.-4AVEA -r-4-b r- ' -
('A4106 L0W
.t1' 0 C.0
. Im 41 Go cc) Im L41L
c 4v L. 1-0 =C~L. i014 P-( v -C L
41 1 4-~ 4-C 45 &41ifD 4W 2C a -
LLL
C 01 01c
I0 0 a C
ff W0 4AI a 0
41 -p -p VI ZA
is14
V Cv
in .4 0 14
.0
o 01 4-S C6V4
C C.
C 41 "--p .-01D
LU U~ 41 C(JLnO a4 0
C0 CC. 44. o4'-
CLJ c
co ge0 0; -02 0.
-
LUP C LUC 0- C.
9 -C 0 0179
4aC C
DOLai(%
c _
CY
11 P
IL
CL
so
@18
ACTIONS 28-29
The bulk of the 1/38th Infantry, under LtCol Frank T. Mildren, withdrew
from Wahlerscheid beginning at 1450 on 17 December with orders to assume
defensive positions in the twin villages. Making their way down the forest
road through the Rocherather Baracken and into Rocherath as the Germans
hammered Col McKinley's 1/9th to the east, Mildren's battalion reached its
positions around dusk. C Company, as has already been reported,33 occupied
some houses just southwest of the water tower in Rocherath. A and B Companies
moved east of the villages, but a German tank-infantry attack overran B Co
before it had a chance to dig in and the remnants of the company withdrew into
the village. Sporadic German attacks throughout the evening and early morning
of the 18th resulted in the rather chaotic American defense depicted in Figure
18.
USA ITO Zd 10 Coltt Interview "ettte of the lutle, 1V-20 Dec 194"
Fiet $173
181
Acon occurre We
Rocherother Roeof
Seamcken German
E ttar"
3~* ........ *
Iaokst
oI
182
had no effect on the buttoned-up panzers, which began returning fire with
their cannon. They directed much of this fire at Mildren's CP, where there
were several light machine guns posted in the upper story windows. The
American gunners ran from room to room, staying one step ahead of the shells
that the German tanks were hurling through the windows, all the while keeping
up the stream of fire at the panzers.
While the German tanks were thus engaged, stationary in the middle of
the street, they drew the fire of some Sherman tanks that were stationed in
the outskirts of the village east of the CP. Their fire knocked out the first
two panzers in the column (See Figure 19) and spurred the others into action.
The next two panzers bypassed their stricken comrades and continued southwest
down the road past Nildren's CP. When the first one reached the next
intersection, a bazooka team from the 1/38th's AT Platoon (one of five bazooka
teams from various units in the area) fired and hit it in the track
(presumably in the port side, given the panzer's direction of travel). The
panzer was thus immobilized, but could still pivot in place, and its crew and
weaponry were undamaged. The German crew swung the tank 180" about, spraying
the area with the vehicle's machine guns. They then began firing the tank's
cannon and both machine guns35 to the northeast, past Mildren's CP. Lt
Howard 0. Emerich, the 1/38th's Battalion Motor Officer, was just traveling
to the CP from the northwest when he found the wounded Panther blocking his
path, so he retraced his steps a bit and found a Sherman tank of the 741st Tk
Bn which he guided into a position about 200 yards due north of the CP. From
there it had a clear view of the German tank, and the Sherman's first shot
penetrated the Panther's turret on the port side and silenced the tank 3e
3 The fact that the vehicle is specificatty imntioned firing two machine guns as well as its cannon
is signif icant, in that it helps us narrow the possibilities of wht type of vehicles they really were. we
know from the German 0tiarunmm (TOt.) that there were only four types of pnzars/panzerjigers involved
with the 12th SW-PzD at the twin villages: Nk iV Panzers, Nk V Panthers, Nk IV Jagdpanzers, and Nk V
Jagdenthers. The tatter two vehict types only had one machine gun apiece, so the vehictes in this platoon
mat have been either Nk :do or Nk V tanks. Further, this tells us that they were from the I Pz Bn of the
12th S3-Pztqet, the only German unit in the battle to employ turreted AFVs. Unfortunately, both Nk IVs and
Panthers had either two or three machine gas, so we camot narrow the field of possibilities any further
than this. Nowever, since the American eyewitnass" refer to them repeatedly as Panthers, we shall bow to
their Judgmnt and refer to them likewise for the remainder of this section.
USA ETO 2d ID Combet Interview Mettle of the BuLge: 17-20 Dec 1940 FiLe 9173
183
II
184
Bazooka teams from A Co and the 0 Co 81mm mortar platoon, working in
tandem, fired several shots which destroyed the fourth Panther not far behind
the third (See Figure 20). [ACTION 28]
185
II US tank
Bazooka teams
186
The Panther turned again and entered the alley between the CP building
and the next building to the east. At the other end of the alley, the
commander spotted three American Jeeps parked in front of the CP and drove the
Panther out of the alley and over the jeeps two or three times, smashing them
into unrecognizable piles of wreckage. Still shrugging off the heavy
automatic weapons fire that was hitting it from all sides, the Panther then
moved so that it was able to stick its cannon muzzle through one of the CP's
ground floor windows. To the intense relief and puzzlement of the Americans
inside, however, the tank did not fire, although when backing out of the
position a few minutes later the tank's fender knocked loose a corner of the
building. Apparently satisfied that there were no other targets nearby worthy
of its attention, or perhaps fearful of the American bazooka teams roaming the
area, the Panther roared off down the street, past the wreck of the third
Panther and then northwest. The tank then turned southwest on the Route vers
Udenbreth as if heading for either BOllingen or Wirtzfeld. (See Figure 21)
181
f.........
188
The Panther pressed on toward BOllingen, approaching the L Co CP. Just
as it passed in front of that building, a self-propelled TD from the 644th TO
Bn, which Col Barsanti had placed near the 3/38th CP to guard against a German
attack from Bollingen, fired three rounds in rapid succession into the
Panther's thinner rear armor at a range of 250-300 yards. That finally
stopped the rampaging Panther, and as the crew bailed out of the tank, the L
Co riflemen picked them off. When the panzer's hulk was examined later, it
was found to have 11 bazooka holes in it (none of which apparently penetrated
all the way through the armor), as well as the three TD penetrations in the
rear and whatever mark the AT gun's round had left.
189
. 4 a 4-b F- 4a1 ~ .
.0 .0 4. A ."
oc ow ow aw 6vC
4.)Im I-e- p 4-p- M-- 4a-r .f .4a
= CIDp W),-
anpA0p 4Ad S
mg=a CI =8 a ar CI 4*b be3
c
0
c
o 1.4.1 1.10L
'-~ , 44 8
'e- .o 1o
4D *0- (Ao N
W6 tS.
01.4. " .L .0 4
a 'e 4a c&U.
1640
4 V
U~C CaI
IV 0
C '.Cm.- 0
4C ~ ,!. aO0.
* ~ ~ 1 I .) 41nC
U 4.~C~.
I-~4 INC -P tU0 0 1
c-
0- Ie- 04.1 L
.p f~- 31 16-
ncDI.
44 zo190
41
4 1 -4a 0-4 P" 41. 4a
1 4.0 0- 4a
c6 W c 6b Ac w4 C 0 f C 04 C Of C 04k C W C W WA
416 4101 416 46 41b6 416IV6 4
41b r- 41 P- 4a .- 41 41 r- 41 4a 4- p- 41 9
W OLa. w L. (J
U L.a J LA.. k.iO.
a JOLA
. OULa. (J
W L. uC a..
ow Cal ow0 0 ow ow o w ow
LAJ 41a .aW416I LaJ416 La 41 4 W416 La 4D 0 A.41 W Lj 40 4 j 41 4
g dor rn (A cic cm gn im = n w
- - - - - -- -
S. 04
4a~0 4
OI 0 0 a 41001..
c
U ~41
Wa 0. 03I
aj
I ;41 941
J9.2C. oLO
Z OM.C 6a
0 w (A31 .41
0
01 41
Lb. 0o
C
(A .
41
M L. 43 IV
.'. 4.. we 0P 0.
41~~~r %4W
o4 - 0
=" 4A e- 4 6c.CS
C U S 191
as Caib
wbcokc Ccq 4b c64
Wk c64h c mo
om .c "". C
= C 0-C =
416 0 ) ) ) 416 46 )
4)b )4) 464.p 4
W CU. (J0Sj a L6La W 0JLA. u aOL6. 0 LA. UJ0 U6
~ 06 0 0D 006 o6 0
tU I
t- C aw- I
C4 S S Cf C -
06. CX .6 W 30
30)4 C- 6
C. Os.
I1 L.1 IU16~
W60VCL 6W6
60 26 c 'a r- . z 4A = a
4aC 4as 2 IA - )P- 0 = ew 6 0
y14 aw
c e-i
c 31 AZ4-0 C Z'
0 64)
. j
r- L. 4)4COU4- C
IM VI-U CO C L
C.9- 0.L )£ CL04)
. -r- Q
C~0. u acm C
'4-V
6vI 0 '4v31
C AdE-6r Ua 04-A
aw% C C CIl -. -
C
Im 1 4.- 19 t L- a)
CL 2 4 f ML.4-
00CL
CL A . V C L C
192
V
0 "
0
N
in0
20
I-
6v
D
' L. ..
CL
CL
0a
GD le-193
0% 0% 04% P% L
M ""h M41 0.4 C cG4 0. .
4. r 4 15 44 r 4 14 4. p45 4C1r
W. a LA. U. CII. W. aCU. W. Old- u. 0~ *-LL.3CI~
c 41
S. 4 C CL
34.1.)
4
al,3 OV.r- 1 .1
C I
C C3
44 C.-
LL 0cm O4- C 0 IV W 60
41 -6 -- o -=a Aw
a.J P%4.
coo C1
M S
M~ NV
0 Ci
* 4. V.41.
IM 1 'U cC
* 4- 0 4-b
.
3. 4.(fO
41
am ".- a-. C 41
a~. 4-n. 4 C C 4
hiC 4"4IA CI 0
z.
0 gCC L.41 10c O
. .b 4. N4.
cCa
00.4
C& af4
Id41 .C4.U o
41S '4-
O-- -A;41
194
cQ~qb~ cC@4q tc 4b c oft c w~k cw0qb c on
4a10 4w4.1b 4 4.0 41~ 0 .w 41
oca oW ow ow ow go ow o w
-r r-~ua -u - a I-- -- i-a I-- -
LO 4A 0 LU 4-)41 0 4 UJ4*Aw uL 4-bJ
a).' I~.41 LAJ 4 a)L"441
0 ~ 0 w
c c AC 4 c
o 8 0 6v 4A 40 .C-uc-
S..-49 0
L- a -- - C -(
CL6U 4
C-
4C.Lwu V41
C 41
C E L.
W (A C
. ao~ 0 4 1CG
.
& .C $.(A
a) 41 0) V40 4
w 4. 0.3 4A 4
9L C - -- 13
L. 4A 0 4-21 4
~z
. 44 VI 0
0 1, 4) W '4r- I
U~ ~ 4 c-0 U I
'a *
Io------
419
C 0 ask C W W& C 0 Ok C64W t c 44k
4.11 461 4a 4.J1V.4-a
'-a L.)U. $.
4- U. (J CU. 1O
. 1 .04 -- . 4.b0 .O
W- O 14L61 UC& WC W L. W a6 UL
LL 4.-b~- 1 4A 4- u
4hi 6A - 4)
1.1L - 4-A~6.JE
CM 4a a 4A9 cmU 4-A c
4c to41r- 4' OR-. 1 r- IV P~-
CS -L.U
4 4L
=41 =.. 0 c U ~ 4-.~ w.
60 zip4-b 0 .61a1. We 4-bUI0 4.1
U *i
6.161
U 4 It
4 4j4 E 4C4.C -
i 4.16.
CA
0 p
~.L4.(Db
c-
SC
L9-C CM ; 64-a 61- C~v -V4
M- - 4-'4
44I-- 0 M -40 6CO . 4. C CA 41 141 =
C= 1I.-CM & 64 Lr IV U do.C61. u1-
61CLU.-0 mv 4 cU 64 wCY 0-
SU 440 4L.
kv 4- IV tv . t "
4-a
0'
I 0 - C
a ! ; P-C
I4 411
0 CC4
-0
4-4- 1
Go
5.. , C
C C1 V . m61
W; 61 C 1 .a-
1.4 6464CA414
64
W L. 4*J 0 L -
SIS . a I.- .- a 01 *
L' A 0 LJ4 0 .
CA= c-do
- -- clo I
M, aI
C Z~o
C
-CD
%.a
C= P-
C1 Imr 0
09 a)0I0..
L L An 1 41
LAJ . CL
014 01
Cc a
ov
z co
LCpL
'0CC
C~ 0
4a.1 C I.N-
v 1
1.4 ~
Lai g
9- -
4- CFO- 4
.CL C . M
W" judO 0
1-4.1 ~197
APPENDIX A
BIBLIOGRAPHY
SOURCE MATERIAL EXAMINED FOR KRINKELT-ROCHERATH ENGAGEMENTS
1. Archival Records from National Records Center, Suitland, ND
302-1 2nd Infantry Division G-1 Journal, December 1944 [Box
5978]
302-3 2nd Infantry Division G-3 After Action Report, December
1944 [SAIC File #161]
302-3.2 2nd Infantry Division G-3 Journal, December 1944 [SAIC
File #170]
302-INF(9)-0.3 9th Infantry Regiment (2nd Infantry Division) After
Action Report, December 1944 [Box 6064]
302-INF(9)-0.7 9th Infantry Regiment (2nd Infantry Division) Unit
Journal, December 1944 [SAIC File #177]
302-INF(23)-0.7 23d Infantry Regiment (2nd Infantry Division) Unit
Journal, December 1944 [SAIC File #179]
302-CAV-0.2 2d Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop History, December 1944
[Box 6038]
399-0.3 99th Infantry Division After Action Report, December 1944
[SAIC File #166]
399-3.2 99th Infantry Division G-3 Journal and File, 19 December
1944 [SAIC File #165]
ARBN-741-0.3 741st Tank Battalion After Action Report, December 1944
[SAIC File #210]
ARBN-741-0.7 741st Tank Battalion Unit Journal, December 1944 [SAIC
File #211]
TDBN-644-0.1 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion History, December 1944
[SAIC File #180]
TDBN-644-0.3 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion Operations Report [SAIC
File #181]
TDBN-801-0.3 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report,
December 1944 [SAIC File #209]
2. Archival Records from the Armor School Library, Ft. Knox, KY
612th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, December 1944 [SAIC
File #22]
3. ETO Cobat Interviews, Nationai Records Center, Suitland, NO
Box 24017 File 20 2nd Infantry Division Combat Interviews, "Battle
of the Bulge," 17-20 December 1944 [SAIC File #173]
Box 24017 File 20 2nd Infantry Division Combat Interviews "German
Breakthrough," 14 December 1944 - 16 January 1945
[SAIC File #176]
Box 24017 File 20 "Extract of Personal Journal of HQ Commandant.
Konop, 2nd Infantry Division" in 2nd Infantry
Division Combat Interviews "German Breakthrough,"
14 December 1944 - 16 January 1945 [SAIC File #176]
A-I
Box 24017 File 20 38th Infantry Regiment Appendix to After Action
Report in 2nd Infantry Division Combat Interviews
"German Breakthrough," 14 December 1944 - 16
January 1945 [SAIC File #176]
Box 24017 File 20 38th Infantry Regiment Journal in 2nd Infantry
Division Combat Interviews "German Breakthrough,"
14 December 1944 - 16 January 1945 [SAIC File #176]
Box 24017 File 20 Battalion Citation for 2/23d Infantry in 2nd
Infantry Division Combat Interviews "German
Breakthrough," 14 December 1944 - 16 January 1945
[SAIC File #176]
Box 24017 File 20 Extract from Report "Operations, AT Co, 9th
Infantry," in 2nd Infantry Division Combat
Interviews "German Breakthrough," 14 December 1944
- 16 January 1945 [SAIC File #176]
Box 24017 File 20 Extracts from 23d Infantry Regiment Unit Journal
in2nd Infantry Division Combat Interviews "German
Breakthrough," 14 December 1944 - 16 January 1945
[SAIC File #176]
Box 24017 File 20 G-3 Periodic Report in2nd Infantry Division Combat
Interviews "German Breakthrough," 14 December 1944
- 16 January 1945 [SATC File #176]
Box 24017 File 20 Statement of ILT Roy Allen, B Co, 1/9th Infantry
Regiment in2nd Infantry Division Combat Interviews
"German Breakthrough," 14 December 1944 - 16
January 1945 [SAIC File #176]
Box 24069 File 209 99th Infantry Division Combat Interviews, "Ardennes
16-20 December 1944 [SAIC File #182]
4. Office of the Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.
"Tank Fight of Rocherath-Krinkelt (Belgium) 17-19 December 1944," [SAIC
File #131]
5. Foreign Nilitary Studies, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
MS ETHINT-21 "Sixth Panzer Army, 16 November 1944 - 4 January 1945"
(SAIC File #201]
MS ETHINT-15 "Sixth Panzer Army inthe Ardennes Offensive" [SAIC File
#200]
MS #B-522 "The 12th SS-Panzer Division 'Hitler Jugend' in the
Ardennes Offensive" [SAIC File #199]
MS #A-924 "Commitment of Sixth Panzer Army in the Ardennes 1944
-1945" (SAIC File #202]
A-2
6. Niscellaneous Information
Ardennes Database [Property of US Army Concepts Analysis Agency, Bethesda,
MD]
Miscellaneous letters to and from Mr. Richard H. Byers, 99th Infantry
Division Archives Committee [SAIC File #213]
"Operations of the 612th Tank Destroyer Battalion, 2nd Infantry Division,
in the Battle of the Bulge, Vicinity of Elsenborn Corner, 16-31
December 1944 (Ardennes-Alsace Campaign) (SAIC File #208]
Parker, Danny S., notes to "Hitler's Last Gamble" 3W, Cambria, CA 1989
US Army Field Manual 101-10, 21 December 1944 (Pentagon]
Pallud, Jean-Paul. "The Battle of the Bulge: Then and Now." After The
Battle. London: Battle of Britain Prints International Ltd., 1984. [SAIC File
#203]
von Senger und Etterlin, F.M. German Tanks of World War II. The Complete
Illustrated History of German Armoured Fighting Vehicles 1926-1945. New York
City: Galahad Books, 1969. [Library of Congress]
A-3
APPENDIX B
B-2
15 MacDonald, Charles B. United States Amy in World War
II: The European Theater of Ooerations: The Last
Offensive. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of
Military History United States Army, 1973, pg. 36, 37.
(Pentagon UA 25 U515 V.9]
16 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report,
August 1-19 1944.
(Ft. Knox, KY Call Number 8823 TO 101 823d
TO Rn AAR (AAR #588 U)]
17 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report,
December 17-26 1944.
[Ft. Knox, KY Call Number 8823 TO 101 823d
TO an AAR (AAR #588 U)]
18 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report,
January 14-18 1945.
(Ft. Knox, KY Call Number 8823 TO 101 823d
TO an AAR (AAR #588 U)]
19 607th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, Jun4
1944 - April 1945 (only 8 September 1944 copied).
[Ft. Knox, KY Call Number 8607 TO 101 AAR
#575 U 847.6]
20 609th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report,
October 1944 - January 1945 (only January 1945 copied).
[Ft. Knox, KY Call Number 8609 TD 101 AAR
847.7]
21 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report,
August-September 1944, December 1944.
(Ft. Knox, KY Call Number 8610 TO 101]
22 612th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report,
July-December 1944, February 1945, April-May 1945 (only
December 1944 copied).
(Ft. Knox, KY Call Number 8612 TD 101 AAR
#452 847.9]
23 630th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report,
August-November 1944, January-May 1945 (only January
1945 copied).
[Ft. Knox, KY Call Number 8630 TD 101 AAR
#615 U 847-12]
24 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, July
1944 - 9 May 1945 (only December 1944 copied).
[Ft. Knox, KY Call Number 8644 TO 101]
B-3
25 7th Tank Destroyer Group After Action Report, 19-31
December 1944.
(Ft. Knox, KY Call Number 807 T 502]
26 821st Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report,
January-December 1944, February-April 1945 (only
November 1944 copied).
[Ft. Knox, KY Call Number 8821 TO 101 AAR
#97 847-56]
27 *The Battle For Aachen." After The Battle. Number 42.
London: Battle of Britain Prints International Limited,
1983.
[Ft. Knox, KY]
28 "Battle of the Bulge." After The Battle. Number 4.
London: Battle of Britain Prints International Limited,
1974.
[Ft. Knox, KY]
29 Yonos, John. "Anzio: The Soft Underbelly of Europe."
Part I. AFV.
[Ft. Knox, KY]
30 Yonos, John. "Anzio: The Soft Underbelly of Europe."
Part II.AF.
[Ft. Knox, KY]
31 Yonos, John. "Anzio: The Soft Underbelly of Europe."
Part III. AFM.
[Ft. Knox, KY]
32 Yonos, John. "Anzio: The Soft Underbelly of Europe."
Part Four. M.
[Ft. Knox, KY]
33 Yonos, John. "Anzio: The Soft Underbelly of Europe."
Part Five. A[M.
[Ft. Knox, KY]
34 Yonos, John. "Anzio: The German Offensive Fails!" Part
Six. AFV.
[Ft. Knox, KY]
35 Yonos, John. "Anzio: The 'Lull' Before the Breakout."
Part Seven. M.
[Ft. Knox, KY]
36 Yonos, John. "Anzio: Part Eight: Breakout!" AFV.
[Ft. Knox, KY]
37 Yonos, John. "Anzio: Part Nine: Breakoutl" AFV.
B-4
(Ft. Knox, KY]
38 Green, J.H., COL. "Anzio." After The Battle. Number 52.
London: Battle of Britain Prints International Limited,
1986.
[Ft. Knox, KY]
39 "The Battle of St. Vith." CSI Battlebook 4-A. Ft.
Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, December
1944 (Bibliography only).
[Ft. Knox, KY]
40 "The Battle of Schnee Eifel." CSI Battlebook 10-B. Ft.
Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute,
September 1944 (Bibliography only).
(Ft. Knox, KY]
41 "The Battle of Aachen." CSI Battlebook 13-C. Ft.
Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, October
1944 (Bibliography only).
[Ft. Knox, KY]
42 Destruction of German Armored Vehicles With ARpendices
1-5 Inclusive.
[Ft. Knox, KY 809A7 Ninth Armored Section,
Destruction of German Tanks 29 May 1945]
43 Trials Against Front Armor of German Mark III Tanks.
(Numbered box and folders of "George B.
Jarrett Papers" at Archives, USAMHI,
Carlisle Barracks, PA]
44 Fischer, Kurt. "Individual Anti-Tank Weapons in the
German Wehrmacht." Men Against Tanks.
[Ft. Knox, KY]
45 Young, Robert, W., Capt., Military Monograph, "Armored
Support of Infantry," May 1948.
[Ft. Knox, KY Call Number 41-417]
46 Tank Destroyer Newsletter, Spring 1989, Newsletter No.
25.
(Ft. Knox, KY]
47 US Tank Destroyer Units, WWII, A Working Bibliography.
[USANHI, Librarian File]
48 Tank Destroyer Combat in Tunisia, January 1944.
[USAMHI Archives - Found in Box labeled
"Tank Destroyers - History" Andrew Bruce
Papers]
B-S
49 Dornbusch, C.E. Histories of American Army Units World
Wars I and II and Korean Conflict With Some Earlier
Histories. Washington 25, DC: Department of the Army,
Office of the Adjutant General Special Services
Division, Library and Service Club Branch, April 1956
(Bibliography only).
[Pentagon UX 104 D71]
50 Gabel, Christopher R., Dr. Leavenworth Papers: Seek.
Strike. and Destroy: US Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in
World War II.Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command
and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
September 1985. (Leavenworth Papers No. 12 Series)
(Bibliography only).
[Pentagon D 793.G33 1985]
51 30th Infantry Division G-1 Journal and File, August
1944.
[File 330-1.2 Box 8733, Suitland]
52 30th Infantry Division G-2 Periodic Report, August 1944.
[File 330-2.1 Box 8739, Suitland]
53 30th Infantry Division G-2 Message File and Journal,
August 1944.
[File 330-2.2 Box 8749 Suitland]
54 120th Infantry Regiment "Mortain," August 1944.
[File 330-INF(120) Box 8918 and 24237,
Suitland]
There are 2 documents in this folder. They
are the same but filed differently at
Suitland.
55 119th Infantry Regiment After/After Action Report,
August 1944.
(File 330-INF(119)-0.3 Box 8908, Suitland]
56 120th Infantry Regiment G-3 Supporting Document, August
1944.
[File 330-INF(120) Box 8944, Suitland]
57 94th Infantry Division G-3 After Action Report, January
1945.
[File 394-3 Box 13767, Suitland]
58 117th Infantry Regiment Unit Journal, August 1944.
[File 330-INF(117)-0.7 Box 8995, Suitland]
59 117th Infantry Regiment S-3 Journal and File, August
1944.
B-6
[File 330-INF(117)-3.3 Box 8906, Suitland]
60 117th Infantry Regiment Resume of Operations, August
1944.
[File 330-INF(117)-0.3 Box 8894, Suitland]
61 197th Field Artillery Battalion After Battle Report,
August 1944.
[File 330-FA(197)-0.3 Box 8880, Suitland]
62 230th Field Artillery Battalion "Battle of Mortain,"
August 1944.
[File 330-FA(230)-0.3 Box 8881, Suitland]
63 "Attitude to the Questionnaire Concerning the Commitment
of the 'Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler' in August 1944."
Draft Translation.
[National Archives Manuscript #B-358]
64 Map of Mortain actions.
[National Archives Manuscript #A921-AI]
65 "2d SS-Panzer Division 'Das Reich,' September 1944" (in
German).
[National Archives Manuscript #P-159]
66 "Counterattack against AVRANCHES, August 1944."
[National Archives Manuscript #A-921]
67 "Part I Northern France, 25 July - 26 July 1944."
(German translation)
(National Archives Manuscript #B-179]
68 "Normandy, Cobra and MORTAIN."
[National Archives Manuscript #A-894]
69 "Comments on the Seventh Army Journal August 1944."
[National Archives Manuscript #A-918]
70 629th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report,
August 1944.
[File TDBN-629 Box 23582, Suitland]
71 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, August 1944.
[File TDBN-823 Box 23847, Suitland]
72 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion Year 1944 (only August 6-9
1944 copied).
[File TDBN-823 Box 23847, Suitland]
73 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Report, G-2 Periodic
Report, Messages, August 1-8 1944.
B-7
[File TDBN-823 Box 23850, Suitland]
B-8
[USAMHI]
86 A History of the 823rd Tank Destroyer Battalion, "Battle
of Mortain," Published for the Officers and Men of the
823rd TDBN, 1951.
[From Thomas Rainey 823d Tank Destroyer
Battalion]
90 "German 7th Army, Group "B" War Diary - Phone Calls and
Conversations, 7-12 August 1944, Document IV."
[Box 24237, Suitland]
8-9
97 28th Infantry Division Combat Interviews, "German Winter
Offensive, 16-24 December 1944," Interview with 1st Lt.
Leo A. Kodzerski and 1st Sgt. Joseph W. McKenna.
[File 78, Box 24033, Suitland]
98 110th Infantry Regiment History (28th Infantry
Division), 17 February 1941 - 25 October 1945, The
Ardennes Breakthrough. 16 December 1944 - 15 January
1945.
(File 328-INF(11O)-O.1 Box 8596, Suitland]
99 28th Infantry Division G-2 Journal, July 1944 - April
1945 (only December 1944 copied).
(File 328-2.2 (30549) Box 8487, Suitland]
100 Bennett, Ralph. Ultra in the West: The Normandy
Campaign of 1944-1945. New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1979, pg. 110-127.
[Ft. Belvoir MIL 940.5421 BEN]
101 Ritgen, Helmut. Die Geschichte Der Panzer-Lehr-Dlvi sign
Im Westen 1944-1945. Stuttgart: Motorbuch Verlag, 1979.
(Includes transl ation)
[From the personal library of Albert D.
McJoynt (SAIC Consultant)]
102 Strauss, F.J., et al. Friedens-und Krlegserlebnisse
einer Generation. Ein Kaoitel Weltueschichte aus der
Sicht der Panzer.1&oer-Abteiluna 38 (SF) in der
ehemaligen 2.(Wiener) Panzerdivision. Schweinfurt:
1960. (Includes translation)
(Stuttgart]
103 Lehmann, Rudolf, and Tiemann, Ralf. Die Leibstandarte.
Band IV/1. Osnabruck: Munin Verlag, 1986. (Includes
transl ation)
(Stuttgart]
104 Weldlnger, Otto. Division Das Reich. Der Wea der 2.SS-
Panzer-Division "Das Reich". Die Geschicbte der
Stammdivision der Waffen-SS, Band V: 194 -1945.
Osnabruck: Munln-Verlag, 1982. (Includes translation)
(Stuttgart]
105 Weidinger, Otto, ed. Kameraden bbs zum Ende. DerWe
der SS-Panzerarenadier-Reabments 4 ODFO 1939-1945. Die
Geschichte elner deutsch-osterreichischen
Kamofaemebnschaft. Gottingen: Plesse-Verlag, 1962.
(Includes translation)
(Stuttgart]
B-10
106 Stober, H.-J.E. Die Eiserne Faust. Bildband und Chronik
der 17. SS-Panzerarenadier-Divtsion "Gotz von
Berlichinaen." Neckargemund: Kurt Vowinckel Verlag,
1966). (Includes translation)
[Stuttgart]
107 Stober, Hans. Die Sturmflut und das Ende. Die
Geschlchte der 17. SS-Panzerarenadierdivision "Gotz von
BerlichtnoenN, Band I: Di Invion. Osnabruck: Munin
Verlag, 1976. (Includes translation)
[Stuttgart]
108 Buisson, Gilles. Mortain dans la Bataille de Normandie.
Paris: Presses de la Cite, 1971. (Includes
translation)
[Stuttgart]
109 Kissel, Hans. Gefechte in Russland 1941-1944. Frankfurt
am Main: E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1956. (Includes
translation)
[Stuttgart]
110 Tank and Tank Destroyer Conference, Army War College, 26
January 1945 Subj: US Tank and Anti-tank Weapons
Program [Army Field Forces Development and Testing
Section].
[RG 337 File 470-8/7 Suitland]
111 Tank Destroyer Battalions - Miscellaneous Information on
Unit, Activation Origin, Combat Introduction, etc.
[From Quintus Atkinson Vice President and
Washington Liaison for 610th Tank Destroyer
Battalion]
112 Stanton, Shelby. US Amy Order of Battle in World War
1I. Part IV: Tank Destroyers of the US Army in World
Warl1. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1984.
[Suitland]
113 Blumenson, Martin. "The Mortain Counterattack." United
States Army in World War II: The European Theater of
Operations: Breakout and Pursuit. Washington, DC:
Office of the Chief of Military History, United States
Army, 1961.
[Pentagon UA 25.U515 V.5]
114 Howe, George F. The Battle History of the 1st Armored
Division. "Old Ironsides". Washington: Combat Forces
Press, 1954.
[Pentagon UX 222 no. I H85]
B-11
115 702d Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit History for Year
1944.
[File TDBN-702-0.1 Box 23714, Suitland]
116 702d Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit History for -Year
1945.
[File TDBN-702-0.1 Box 23714, Suitland]
117 Enemy Material Captured and Destroyed, June - December
1944.
[File TDBN-702-2.14 Box 23714, Suitland]
118 609th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report,
September - December 1944 (only December 1944 copied).
[File TDBN-609-O.3 Box 23562, Suitland]
119 Blumenson, Martin. "The Mortain Counterattack: Future
portent?" AM. 8 (July 1958): 30-38.
[From Stephen J. Lofgren, DAC, Historian,
Staff Support Branch to Charles M. Baily
(SAIC)]
120 Staff Group 4B, CGSOC Class of 1986-87. "Operation Cobra
and the Mortain Counterattack." MilitaryReview. July
1988: pg. 58-65.
[From Stephen J. Lofgren, DAC, Historian,
Staff Support Branch to Charles M. Baily
(SAIC)]
121 Letter, Sid Eichen, L'Abbaye Blanche, August 1944.
[From Stephen J. Lofgren, DAC, Historian,
Staff Support Branch to Charles M. Baily
(SAIC)]
122 Miscellaneous documents from Thomas Springfield,
L'Abbaye Blanche, August 1944.
[From Thomas Springfield during interview
at SAIC]
123 Emolovment of Four Tank Destroyer Battalions in the ETO.
Committee 24 Report, A Research Report Prepared at the
Armor School Fort Knox, KY, 1949-1950.
[OCMH U423.5.R3 1950 no. 24]
124 Volz Originals - Battle of Mortain (Originals of
Folders 101 to 109).
125 Letter from Thomas Springfield to Charles M. Baily
(SAIC), February 17, 1990.
There are 5 documents in this folder.
B-12
126 Byrnes, Laurence. History of the 94th Infantry Division
in World War II. Washington, DC: Infantry Journal
Press, 1948, pg. 116-139.
[OCMH 05-94 1948]
140 Cole, Hugh, N. United States Army in World War 11: The
Eurooean Theater of Ooerations: The Ardennes: Battle
of the Bulge. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of
Military History, Department of the Army, 1965, pg. 105-
106.
[Pentagon UA 25.U515.V.8]
141 Cole, Hugh, M. United States Army in World War II: The
European Theater of ODerations: The Ardennes: Battle
ofLthe Bulge. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of
Military History, Department of the Army, 1965, pg. 98-
104.
[Pentagon UA 25.U515.V.8]
142 Cole, Hugh, M. United States Amy in World War II: The
European Theater of Operations: The Ardennes: Battle
ofthBLU . Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of
Military History, Department of the Army, 1965, pg. 107-
115.
[Pentagon UA 25.U515.V.8]
B-16
176 2nd Infantry Division Combat Interviews "German
Breakthrough," 14 December 1944 - 16 January 1945.
[File 20 Box 24017, Suitland]
177 9th Infantry Regiment (2nd Infantry Division) -Unit
Journal, December 1944.
[File 302-INF(9)-0.7 Box 6064, Suitland]
B-17
[File ENBN-254-O.1 (2928) Box 18781,
Suitland]
187 254th Engineer Combat Battalion After Action Report,
July-October, December 1944 (only December 1944 copied).
[File ENBN-254-0.3 (5520) Box 18781,
Suitland]
188 745th Tank Battalion After Action Report, June-December
1944 (only December 1944 copied).
[File ARBN-745-0.3 (5128) Box 16710,
Suitland]
189 745th Tank Battalion Journal, 20 July 1944 - 1 June 1945
(only December 1944 copied).
[File ARBN-745-0.7 Box 16711, Suitland]
190 612th Tank Destroyer Battalion History. 25 June 1942 -
May 1945, pg. 12-15.
[File TDBN-612-0.1 Box 23571, Suitland]
191 612th Tank Destroyer Battalion History Year 1944 (only
December 1944 copied).
(File TDBN-612-0.1 (28652) Box 23571,
Suitland]
192 612th Tank Destroyer Battalion Operations Report,
October 1944 - 6 May 1945 (only December 1944 copied).
[File TDBN-612-0.3 Box 23571, Suitland]
193 612th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, December
1944.
[File TDBN-612-0.7 (47360) Box 23573,
Suitland]
194 Information as part of Unit Citation documentation
gathered by Donald Rivette.
[From Lt. Col. Tom Page 1st BN 26th
Infantry Ft. Dix, NJ 08640-7010]
195 Letter from Derrill Daniel to Donald Rivette, 19 October
1948.
[From Lt. Col. Tom Page 1st BN 26th
Infantry Ft. Dix, NJ 08640-7010]
196 Miscellaneous Certificates of 1st Infantry Division,
26th Infantry Regiment.
[From Lt. Col. Tom Page 1st BN 26th
Infantry Ft. Dix, NJ 08640-7010]
B-18
197 Meyer, Hubert. Krieasaeschichte der 12.SS-Panzerdivision
"Hitler iuend" TT. Munin Verlag GmbH, Osnabruck, 1982.
(Dom Botgenbach)
[LC]
198 Meyer, Hubert. Krieasaeschichte der 12.SS-Panzerdivision
"Hitlertuaend" 1I. Munin Verlag GmbH, Osnabruck, 1982.
(Krinkelt-Rocherath)
[LC]
199 "The 12th SS-Panzer Division 'Hitler Jugend' in the
Ardennes Offensive."
[National Archives Manuscript #8-522]
200 "An Interview with Obstgrf 'Sepp' Dietrich Sixth Panzer
Army in the Ardennes Offensive."
(National Archives Ethint 15]
201 "An Interview with Genmaj (W-SS) Fritz Kraemer Sixth
Panzer Army (16 November 1944 - 4 January 1945)."
[National Archives Ethint 21]
202 "Commitment of Sixth Panzer Army in the Ardennes 1944-
1945."
[National Archives Manuscript #A-924]
203 Pallud, Jean-Paul. "The Battle of the Bulge: Then and
Now." After The Battle. London: Battle of Britain
Prints International Limited, 1984.
[From the personal files of Jay Karamales
(SAIC)]
204 Ooerational Research in North West Europe. The Work of
No 2 Operational Research Section With 21 Army Group,
June 1944 - July 1945.
(From the personal files of Jay Karamales
(SAIC)]
205 Attack and Penetration. Chapter II, "The Northern
Shoulder."
(RG 332, ETO Historical Division, The
History of the Ardennes Campaign, Suitland]
206 First US Army. Report of Operations, 1 August 1944 - 22
February 1945.
(Pentagon]
207 Action of Capt. John J. Kennedy, 612th Tank Destroyer
Battalion, on 17 December 1944 at BOllingen, Belgium.
[From the personal records of Jack Flanagan
612th Tank Destroyer Battalion, xeroxed
from Suitland, MD]
B-19
208 "Operations of the 612th Tank Destroyer Battalion, 2nd
Infantry Division, in the Battle of the Bulge, Vicinity
of Elsenborn Corner, 16-31 December 1944 (Ardennes-
Alsace Campaign)."
(Monograph obtained from Jack Flanagan
612th Tank Destroyer Battalion]
209 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report,
December 1944.
[File TDBN-801-0.3 Box 23745, Suitland]
210 741st Tank Battalion After Action Report, December 1944.
[File ARBN-741-0.3 Box 16703, Suitland]
211 741st Tank Battalion Unit Journal, December 1944.
[File ARBN-741-0.7 Box 16703, Suitland]
212 2nd Infantry Division Krinkelt-Rocherath Map Overlays.
[File 302.3.3 Box 6005, Suitland]
213 Miscellaneous letters to and from Mr. Richard H. Byers,
99th Infantry Division Archives Committee. Also
includes maps.
[From Mr. Richard Byers 99th Infantry
Division Archives Committee, 5884
Thunderbird Drive Mentor on the Lake, OH
44060]
There are 26 documents in this folder.
214 "Commitment of 3 Panzer Grenadier Division in the
Ardennes Offensive." April 1947, Manuscript #B-465.
[From Mr. Richard Byers 99th Infantry
Division Archives Committee, 5884
Thunderbird Drive Mentor on the Lake, OH
44060]
215 MacDonald, Charles B. United States Army in World War
II: The European Theater of Operations: The Last
Offensive. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of
Military History United States Army, 1973, pg. 116-124.
[Pentagon UA 25 USIS V.9]
B-20
Offensive. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of
Military History United States Army, 1973, pg. 350-357.
[Pentagon UA 25 U515 V.9]
B-21
The following documents come at the end.
US Army Military History Institute Special Bibliography 23, American Combat
Divisions, A Comprehensive Bibliography of 1st Infantry Division Materials, Part
II: 1940-1956, Carlisle Barracks, PA. (USANHI Carlisle, PA].
US Army Military History Institute Special Bibliography 16, Volume I, The
Era of World War I, Carlisle Barracks, PA. [USAMHI Carlisle, PA].
US Army Military History Institute Special Bibliography 16, Volume II,The
War in the Pacific, Carlisle Barracks, PA. [USAMHI Carlisle, PA].
US Army Military History Institute Special Bibliography 16, Volume III,
World War II,The Eastern and Balkan Fronts, The Axis Forces in Europe, Carlisle
Barracks, PA. [USANHI Carlisle, PA].
US Army Military History Institute Special Bibliography 16, Volume IV,The
Era of World War II,Mediterranean and Western European Theaters of Operations,
Carlisle Barracks, PA. [USANHI Carlisle, PA].
B-22
APPENDIX C
BIBLIOGRAPHY
i
636th Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-30
638th Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-30
641st Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-31
644th Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-31
645th Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-31
648th Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-32
654th Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-32
656th Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-32
691st Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-32
692nd Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-32
701st Tank Destroyer Battalion ................ C-32
702d Tank Destroyer Battalion ................. C-33
703d Tank Destroyer Battalion ................. C-34
704th Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-34
705th Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-35
741st Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-35
745th Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-35
771st Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-35
772nd Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-35
773d Tank Destroyer Battalion ................... C-35
774th Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-36
776th Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-36
801st Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-37
BO2d Tank Destroyer Battalion ................... C-37
803d Tank Destroyer Battalion ................... C-37
805th Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-38
807th Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-39
808th Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-39
809th Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-39
811th Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-40
813th Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-40
814th Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-40
817th Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-40
818th Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-41
820th Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-41
823d Tank Destroyer Battalion ................... C-41
824th Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-41
825th Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-42
827th Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-42
893d Tank Destroyer Battalion ................... C-42
894th Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-42
899th Tank Destroyer Battalion .................. C-42
3. TDBN Records at Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania (USAMHI) ........................... C-44
C. ETO COMBAT INTERVIEWS RESEARCHED AT SUITLAND, MARYLAND ...... C-44
D. ORAL INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED BY SAIC ........................... C-48
E. MONOGRAPHS/MANUSCRIPTS
1. The Infantry School Library, Fort Benning, Georgia ....C-48
2. The Armor School Library, Fort Knox, Kentucky ......... C-54
3. Office of the Center of Military History,
Washington, DC ........................................ C-55
4. The US Army Pentagon Library, Washington, DC .......... C-56
ti
F. GERMAN RECORDS
Foreign Military Studies, National Archives,
Washington, DC ......................................... C-56
G. MISCELLANEOUS .......................................... C-58
I. SECONDARY SOURCES
A. BOOKS ................................................. C-64
B. BOOKS FROM BIBLIOTHEK FUR ZEITGESCHICHTE,
STUTTGART, GERMANY...................................... C-68
C. PERIODICALS............................................ C-69
D. MISCELLANEOUS .......................................... C-70
BIBLIOGRAPHY
LOCATION ABBREVIATION
The Pentagon Library, Washington, DC Pentagon
Office of the Center of Military History, Washington, DC OCMH
Washington National Records Center, Suitland, MD Suitland
National Archives and Record Service, Washington, DC National Archives
The Armor School Library, Fort Knox, KY Ft. Knox, KY
The Infantry School Library, Fort Benning, GA Ft. Benning, GA
The Library of Congress, Washington, DC LC
US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA USAMHI
Fort Belvoir Library, Fort Belvoir, VA Ft. Belvoir
Bibliothek fOr Zeitgeschichte, Stuttgart, Germany Stuttgart
Unless otherwise stated, all records researched at the National Records Center
in Suitland, Maryland are Record Group 407, Entry 427.
I. PRIMARY SOURCES
A. ARMORED, INFANTRY, AIRBORNE DIVISION, AND ENGINEER COMBET BATTALION RECORDS
EXAMINED AT SUITLAND, MARYLAND
1st Armored Division **** RG 94 (The Adjutant General's Office) *
1st Armored Division G-3 Lessons Learned, June 1943, [File 601-3.01 Box
14802].
1st Armored Division G-3 Operational Summary, 18 June - 13 August 1944,
[File 601-3 Box 14802].
1st Armored Division G-3 Periodic Reports, 20 May - 10 July 1944, [File
601-3.1 Box 14802].
1st Armored Division G-3 Periodic Reports, 29 October 1943 - June 1944,
rFile 601-3.1 Box 14802].
1st Armored Division G-3 Journal, 8 November 1942 - 2 May 1945, [File 601
-3.2 Box 14805].
1st Armored Division G-3 Journal and File, 10 January 1943 - 12 October
1945--missing February 1943 entries, [File 601-3.3 Box 14806].
1st Armored Division, [File 601-3.4, 3.6, 3.7 Box 14807].
1st Armored Division Field Orders, 26 March 1942 and 1942 - 1945. --
missing February 1943, [File 601-3.9 Box 14807].
1st Armored Division Administrative Orders, [File 601-3.1 Box 14808].
C-4
[File 305-2.1].
5th Infantry Division, G-2 Journal and File, September 1944 - May 1945,
[File 305-2.2].
5th Infantry Division, G-3 Maps, August 1944 - May 1945, [File 305-3.7 Box
6815].
10th Infantry Regiment History, July 1944 - September 1945, [File 305
-INF(10)-0.1].
10th Infantry Regiment After Action Report, August 1944 - May 1945, [File
305-INF(10)-0.3].
1/10th Infantry Regiment Journal, 5 July 1944 - 31 May 1945, [File 305
-INF(10)7-0.7 Box 6901].
3/10th Infantry Regiment Unit Journal, 5 July 1944 - 21 October 1944, [File
305-INF(10)7-0.7 Box 6901].
28th Infantry Division
28th Infantry Division G-2 Periodic Report, July-November 1944, [File 328
-2.1, Box 8483].
28th Infantry Division G-2 Journal, July 1944 - April 1945, (File 328-2.2
(30549), Box 8487).
28th Infantry Division G-2 Journal and File, July 1944 - March 1945, [File
328-2.3, Box 8495].
110th Infantry Regiment History (28th Infantry Division), 17 February 1941
- 25 October 1945, The Ardennes Breakthrough. 16 December 1944 - 15
January 1945, [File 328-INF(110)-O.1 Box 8596].
110th Infantry Regiment Diary (28th Infantry Division), March 1944 - June
1945, [File 328-INF(110)-0.3.0 Box 8597].
112th Infantry Regiment (28th Infantry Division) Monthly and Daily
Summaries, September - November 1944, [File 328-INF(112)-0.9].
112th Infantry Regiment (28th Infantry Division) S-2 Journals, November
1944, [File 328-INF(112)-2.2, Box 8608].
112th Infantry Regiment (28th Infantry Division) S-2 and S-3 Journals,
November 1944, [File 328-INF(112)5-3.2, Box 8611].
112th Infantry Regiment (28th Infantry Division) Company "K" Monthly
Historical Reports, November 1944, [File 328-INF(112)9-0.2, Box
8607].
28th Infantry Division, History -- 1st and 2d Battalions, 112th Infantry
C-S
Regiment, [File 328, Box 8607].
28th Infantry Division, Monthly and Daily Summaries -- 112th Infantry
Regiment, [File 328, Box 8607].
112th Infantry Regiment (28th Infantry Division) Company "K" Diary,
November 1944, pp. 27-28, (File 328-INF(112)9-0.3.0, Box 8619].
28th Infantry Division, Division Artillery, Unit Journal, July 1944 - May
1945, (File 328-ART-0.7].
30th Infantry Division
30th Infantry Division G-1 After Action Report, August 1944, [File 330-1].
30th Infantry Division G-1 Journal and File, August 1944, [File 330-1.2 Box
8733].
30th Infantry Division G-2 Periodic Report, August 1944, [File 330-2.1 Box
8739].
30th Infantry Division G-2 Journal, June 1944 - April 1945, [File 330-2.2
Box 8744].
30th Infantry Division G-2 Message File and Journal, August 1944, [File 330
-2.2 Box 8749].
30th Infantry Division Sitreps, June-December 1944, [File 330-2.6 Box
8787].
30th Infantry Division G-3 After Action Report, August 1944, [File 330-3
Box 8788].
30th Infantry Division G-3 Journal, June 1944 - April 1945, [File 330-3.2
Box 8791, 8792].
30th Infantry Division G-3 Journal, 5-7 August 1944, [File 330-3.2 Box
8796].
30th Infantry Division Overlays and Maps, [File 330-3.6].
30th Infantry Division Maps, [File 330-3.7].
30th Infantry Division Field Orders with Supporting Papers, "Vire River,"
7-14 July 1944, [File 330-3.9 Box 8837].
30th Infantry Division G-4 Report, 8-9 August 1944, [File 330-3.2].
30th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) After Action Report, 15 June
- 31 December 1944, [File 330-CAV(0.3) Box 8858].
117th Infantry Regiment History 1944-45, [File 330-INF(117)-0 Box 8894].
C-6
117th Infantry Regiment Resume of Operations, August 1944, [File 330
-INF(117)-0.3 Box 8894].
117th Infantry Regiment Unit Journal,[File 330-INF(117)-0.7 Box 8897].
117th Infantry Regiment River Crossing Operations, 7 July 1944, [File 330
-INF(117)-0.3.0].
C-7
(File 330-FA(113)-0.3 Box 8868].
118th Field Artillery Battalion After Action Report, August 1944, [File
330-FA(118)-0.3 Box 8869].
197th Field Artillery Battalion After Battle Report, August 1944, [File
330-FA(197)-0.3 Box 8880].
230th Field Artillery Battalion "Battle of Mortaln," August 1944, [File
330-FA(230)-0.3 Box 8881].
45th Infantry Division
45th Infantry Division [File 345-0 to 345-0.2 Box 10857].
History - 45th Infantry Division, 1924-1943, [File 345-0.1].
C-8
180th Infantry Regiment S-3 Journal and File, Italian Campaign, [File 345
-INF(180)-3.2 Box 11112].
51st Engineer Combat Battalion
51st Engineer Combat Battalion [File ENBN-51-0.3 to ENBN-51-0.7 Box
18619].
51st Engineer Combat Battalion After Action Report, June-December
1944, [File ENBN-51-0.3 #13101].
51st Engineer Combat Battalion Journal, 30 June - 26 December 1944,
[File ENBN-51-0.7 #23054 ].
82nd Airborne Division
Battle of Belgium Bulge in Siegfried Line and Roer River, [File 382-0.3.0].
After Action Report Central Europe, 17-31 December 1944, [File 382-0.3].
82nd Airborne Division G-3 Journal, Main 18-31 December 1944, [File 382-3.2
(17334) Box 12394].
82nd Airborne Division Journal, Message File: Habiemont, 19-21 December
1944, [File 382-3.2].
82nd Airborne Division Journal, Message File: Lierneux, 21-22 December
1944, [File 382-3.2].
82nd Airborne Division, Stories of Sicilian Invasion by Jack Thompson,
[File 382-29.0 (27678) Box 12423]. (Also found at Ft. Knox, KY)
82nd Airborne Division Overlays and Messages, Belgium, 18-31 December 1944,
[File 382-AA-0.8].
82nd Airborne Division Engineers Unit History, 17-31 December 1944, [File
382-ENG-0.3].
C-9
325th Infantry Regiment Operations Report: Holland/Belgium, 17 December
1944 - 10 January 1945, [File 382-INF(325)-0.3].
504th Infantry Regiment History, 17 December 1944 - 11 January 1945, [File
382-INF(504)-0.3].
505th Parachute Infantry Regiment After Action Report, 17-31 December 1944,
[File 382-INF(505)-0.3].
505th Parachute Infantry Regiment Activities Report Sicily, [File 382
-INF(505)-0.1 to 382-INF(505)-0.3 Folder 13079 Box 12455].
84th Infantry Division
Battle of the Ardennes, December 1944 - January 1945, [File 384-0].
Journal File, November-December 1944, January-May 1945, [File 384-2.3].
After Action Report, 84th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, December 1944 -
February 1945, [File 384-CAV-0.3].
333d Infantry Regiment After Action Report, December 1944, [File 384
-INF(333)-0.3].
2/333d Infantry Regiment S-2 Journal, Headquarters Company, 22 November
1944 - 1 July 1945, [File 384-INF(333)-7.2.2].
334th Infantry Regiment After Action Report, [File 384-INF(334)-0.3].
335th Infantry Regiment After Action Report, November-December 1944,
January-April 1945, [File 384-INF(335)-0.3].
335th Infantry Regiment Historical Data, December 1944, [File 384-INF(335)
-0.2].
335th Infantry Regiment Anti-tank Company Historical Data, December 1944,
[File 384-INF(335)-0.2].
335th Infantry Regiment, 1st, 2nd, 3rd Battalions Historical Data, December
1944, [File 384-INF(335)7-0.2].
335th Infantry Regiment, Companies A-M Historical Data, December 1944,
[File 384-INF(335)9-0.2].
Translation of Captured Documents, December 1944, (File 384-INF(335)-2.9].
History, C Company ("Crackerjack Charley"), 11 September 1944-1945, [File
384-INF(335)-0].
History, F Company (Fox Company), 15 October 1942 - 15 August 1945, [File
384-INF(335)-0.]].
C-10
335th Infantry Regiment After Action Reports, November-December 1944,
1-31 January 1945.
90th Infantry Division
90th Infantry Division Operations Reports, [File 390-0.3 Box 13280].
90th Infantry Division G-3 Journal, [File 390-3.2 Box 45683].
90th Infantry Division Situation Representations, [File 390-3.8 Box
13351].
358th Infantry Regiment, Regiment Reports, [File 390-INF-(358)-0.3 Box
13395].
2/358th Infantry Battalion, Battalion Journal, [File 390-INF-(358)7-0.7
Box 13406].
94th Infantry Division
94th Infantry Division After Action Report, January 1945, [File 394-0.3
Box 13726].
94th Infantry Division, No Information, [File 394-1 to 394-1.7 Box 13730].
94th Infantry Division, Copies of After Action Report, G-1, G-2, G-3, and
G-4 Reports, [File 394-2 to 394-2.1 Box 13735].
94th Infantry Division Maps with Overlays, [File 394-3.1 Box 13767].
94th Infantry Division G-3 After Action Report, January 1945, [File 394
-3 Box 13767].
94th Infantry Division G-3 Periodic Report, [File 394-3.1 Box 13767].
94th Infantry Division, No Information, [File 394-4 to 394-5 Box 13778].
99th Infantry Division G-3 Journal and File, December 1944, [File 399-3.2
Box 14143].
C-11
99th Infantry Division Map Overlays, [File 399-3.7 Box 14160].
99th Infantry Division Operations Memo, [File 399-3.16 Box 14160].
99th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop After Action Report, December 1944 - May
1945, (File 399-CAV-0.3].
393d Infantry Regiment After Action Report, November 1944 - 10 May 1945,
[File 399-INF(393)-0.3].
Lessons Learned in Combat, 3 January - 3 May 1945, [File 399-INF(393)-3.0].
The Story of the 394th Infantry Regiment, 14 November 1944 - 9 May 1945,
[File 399-INF(394)-0].
394th Infantry Regiment, Regiment History, [File 399-INF(394)-0.1 Box
14195].
394th Infantry Regiment After Action Report, (File 399-INF(394)-0.3 Box
14196].
Recommendation for Distinguished Unit Citation, 1/394 Infantry Regiment,
December 1944, [File 399-INF(394)7-1.6].
395th Infantry.Regiment After Action Report, November 1944 - May 1945,
[File 399-INF(395)-0.3].
395th Infantry Regiment Personal Narratives, [File 399-INF(395)-0.6].
C-12
101st Airborne Division, [File 3101-1 to 3101-1.5].
101st Airborne Division Proposed Unit Citation for Action in
Bastogne, Belgium, 18-27 December 1944, [File 3101-1.6].
101st Airborne Division [File 11599 3101-0.3 Box 14335].
Operation "Market" - September to October 1944.
Operation "Invasion of France" - June 1944.
Operation "Noah" - November 1944.
Operation *Neptune" - June 1944.
European Theater of Operations (ETO) 1944-45.
101st Airborne Division (File 3101-0.8 to 3101-0.24 Box 14338].
Journal and File - 101st Airborne Division, 18 December 1944 - April
1945, [File 3101-0.8].
Standards of Procedure (S.O.P.) 101st Airborne Division, 1943-45.
[File 3101-0.24].
History, 2/327 Glider Infantry Regiment, 1944, [File 3101-INF(327)7
-0.2].
History, 3/327 Glider Infantry Regiment, 1944, [File 3101-INF(327)7
-0.2].
327th Glider Infantry Regiment After Action Report, (File 3101
-INF(327)-0.3].
101st Airborne Division, [File 3101-4 to 3101-4.5 Box 14377].
After Action Report 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment, January 1945, [File
3101-INF(502)0.3 #12361 Box 14429].
101st Airborne Division, [File 3101-INF(502)7-3.4 to 3101-INF(502)9-3.9
Box 14436].
After Action Report, Bastogne - Operation Repulse, 17 December 1944 - 20
January 1945, [File 3101-INF(506)-0.3].
101st Airborne Division G-3 Situation Reports #1-31 for Bastogne, 101st
Airborne Division, 19 December 1944 - 19 January 1945, (File 3101-3.8
Box 14369].
101st Airborne Division Counterattack plans for the 101st Airborne
Division, January-February 1945, [File 3101-3.5 Box 14364].
C-13
Division, 4 September 1942 - 10 September 1945, [File 3101-AA
-0].
After Action Report 81st Airborne Anti-Aircraft Battalion, 101st
Airborne Division, December 1944 - February, April-May 1945,
[File 3101-AA-0.3 #14775).
326th Airborne Engineer Regiment After Action Report, 17 December
1944 - 28 February 1945, and Operations Report, 18 December
1944 - 31 Jan' .y 1945, [File 3101-ENG-0.3].
102d Infantry Division
102d Infantry Division G-3 Report Section III, [File 3102-3 1-1-45 to 2
-28-45 Box 14467].
405th Infantry Regiment, No Information, [File 3102-INF(405)-O.1 (5644) Box
14487].
406th Infantry Regiment History, No Information, [File 3102-INF(406)-0.1
(5643) Box 14496].
406th Infantry Regiment History, No Information, [File 3102-INF(406)-0.1
(5643) Box 14497].
406th Infantry Regiment G-2 Periodic Report, 16-28 February 1945, [File
3102-INF(406)-0.7 Box 14505].
407th Infantry Regiment History, [File 3102-INF(407)-0.1 to 0.3 Box 14512].
407th Infantry Regiment After Action Report, February 1945, (File 3102
-INF(407)-0.3 (9925) Box 14512].
407th Infantry Regiment After Action Report, February-April 1945, [File
3102-INF(407)-0.3 (9925) Box 14512].
407th Infantry Regiment Journal and File, [File 3102-INF(407)-0.7 Box
14518].
407th Infantry Regiment S-2 Report, [File 3102-INF(407)-0.7 Box 14518].
407th Infantry Regiment S-3 Report, [File 3102-INF(407)-0.7 Box 14518].
104th Infantry Division
104th Infantry Division After Action Report, [File 3104-0.3 Box 14617].
C-14
2/415th Infantry Battalion, Battalion Journal, [File 3104-INF(415)7-0.7
Box 14708].
254th Engineer Combat Battalion
[Box 18781]
254th Engineer Combat Battalion Journal, June-December 1944, [File
ENBN-254-0.7 (42906)].
254th Engineer Combat Battalion Operations Report, 8 December 1944
- 22 May 1945, [File ENBN-254-0.3 (42896)].
254th Engineer Combat Battalion History Year 1944, [File ENBN-254-0.1
(2928)].
254th Engineer Combat Battalion After Action Report, July-October,
December 1944, [File ENBN-254-0.3 (5520)].
C-15
1st Armored Division, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment Mistakes Made and
Lessons Learned November 1942 - January 1944, June 1944, [Call Number
806 Al 631].
6th Tank Destroyer Group, US Army (13th Corps) - After Action Report, [Call
Number 806 T 503].
7th Army Combat Observer's Report, 1945 AGF Report by Col Clyde E. Steele,
[Call Number 807 A 5].
Corps US Army (7th Corps) - German opposite 7th Corps, September 1944 by
Lucian Heichler - based on German records, to support Charles
MacDonald on Siegfried Line Study, [Call Number 807 C 307].
Corps US Army (7th Corps) - Tank Destroyers in Action 1944, [Call Number
807 C 308].
7th Tank Destroyer Group After Action Report, 19-31 December 1944, [Call
Number 807 T 502].
7th Tank Destroyer Group, Corps, US Army (8th Corps) - After Action Report,
[Call Number 807 T 502].
8th Tank Destroyer Group After Action Report, November 1944, January-May
1945 (ETO), [Call Number 808 T 501].
9th Tank Destroyer Group After Action Report, September-November 1944,
January-May 1945 (ETO), [Call Number 809 T 501].
Corps (12th Corps) - After Action Report 9th Tank Destroyer Group, [Call
Number 809 T 501].
Corps US Army (12th Corps) - German counterattack in Twelfth Corps Section
19 September - 1 October 1944, [Call Number 812 C 307].
Armored Groups, 20th, 24th Corps 20th Armor Group - TFACS Report 314.7
2 August 1945, [Call Number 820 AG 501].
23d Tank Destroyer Group After Action Report, December 1944 - May 1945,
[Call Number 823 T 501].
607th Tank Destroyer Battalion
607th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, June 1944 - April 1945,
[Call Number 8607 TD 101 AAR #575 U 847.6].
609th Tank Destroyer Battalion
609th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, October 1944 - January
1945., [Call Number 8609 TD 101 AAR 847.7].
610th Tank Destroyer Battalion
C-16
610th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, August-September 1944,
C-17
[Call Number 8817 TD 101].
821st Tank Destroyer Battalion
821st Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, January-December 1944,
February-April 1945, [Call Number 8821 TD 101 AAR #97 847-56].
823d Tank Destroyer Battalion
823d Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, January-August 1944,
December 1944-April 1945, [Call Number 8823 TD 101].
823d Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, August 1-19 1944, [Call
Number 8823 TD 101 823d TD Bn AAR (AAR #588 U)].
823d Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, December 17-26 1944,
[Call Number 8823 TD 101 823d TD Bn AAR (AAR #588 U)].
823d Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, January 14-18 1945,
[Call Number 8823 TD 101 823d TD Bn AAR (AAR #588 U)].
824th Tank Destroyer Battalion
824th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, August 1942 - September
1945, [Call Number 8824 TD 101].
C-18
[File TOBN-601-0.3].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, January, February, March
1945, [File TDBN-601-0.3].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion October 1, 1943 to February 29, 1944 [File
TDBN-601-0.7 Box 23544].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, October 1943, [File
TDBN-601-0.7].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, November 1943, [File
TDBN-601-0.7].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, December 1943, [File
TDBN-601-0.7].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, 22-31 January 1944,
[File TDBN-601-0.7].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, February 1944, [File
TDBN-601-0.7].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion March 1, 1944 to May 31, 1944 [File TDBN
-601-0.7 Box 23545].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, March 1944, [File TDBN
-601-0.7].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, April 1944, [File TDBN
-601-0.7].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, May 1944, [File TDBN
-601-0.7].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion June 1, 1944 to October 31, 1944 [File
TDBN-601-0.7 Box 23546].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, June 1944, [File TDBN
-601-0.7].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, July 1944, [File TDBN
-601-0.7].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, August 1944, [File TDBN
-601-0.7].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, September 1944, [File
TDBN-601-0.7].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, October 1944, [File
TDBN-601-0.7].
C-19
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion November 1, 1944 to February 28, 1945 [File
TDBN-601-0.7 Box 23547].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, November 1944, [File
TDBN-601-0.7].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, December 1944, [File
TDBN-601-0.7].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, January 1945, [File
TDBN-601-0.7].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, February 1945, [File
TDBN-601-0.7].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion March 1, 1945 to May 11, 1945 [File TDBN
-601-0.7 Box 23548].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, March and April 1945,
[File TDBN-601-0.7].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion October 1, 1944 to October 18, 1944 (File
TDBN-601-0.12 Box 23549].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Messages, 1-6 October 1944, [File
TDBN-601-0.12].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Messages, 7-12 October 1944,
[File TDBN-601-O.12].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Messages, 13-18 October 1944,
[File TDBN-601-0.12].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion October 19, 1944 [File TDBN-601-0.12 to
TDBN-601-1.13 Box 23550].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Messages, 25-31 October 1944,
[File TDBN-601-0.12].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion Roster 1943-45: empty, [File TDBN-601
-1.8].
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion General Orders, 1941, 1943-1945, [File
TDBN-601-1.13].
602nd Tank Destroyer Battalion
602nd Tank Destroyer Battalion November 30, 1944 [File TDBN-602-0.1 to
TDBN-602-0.3 Box 23551].
602nd Tank Destroyer Battalion History 15 December 1941 - 31 December
1943, [File TDBN-602-0.1 (28612)].
C-20
602nd Tank Destroyer Battalion Operation Report, September 1944,
[File TDBN-602-0.3 (12659)].
602nd Tank Destroyer Battalion Operation Report, October 1944, [File
TDBN-602-0.3 (12659)].
602nd Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, November 1944,
[File TDBN-602-0.3].
602nd Tank Destroyer Battalion December 1, 1944 to May 8, 1945 [File TDBN
-602-0.3 Box 23552].
602nd Tank Destroyer Battalion Historical Records, December 1944,
[File TDBN-602-0.3 (12659)].
602nd Tank Destroyer Battalion Historical Summaries January-March
- 8 May 1945, [File TDBN-602-0.3 (12659)].
602nd Tank Destroyer Battalion [File TDBN-602-0.7 to TDBN-602-1.13 Box
23553].
602nd Tank Destroyer Battalion Journal and File, 13 April 1942 - 8
March 1944, [File TDBN-602-0.7].
602nd Tank Destroyer Battalion General Orders 1942-45, [File TDBN
-602-1.13].
603d Tank Destroyer Battalion
603d Tank Destroyer Battalion [File TDBN-603-0.1 to TDBN-603-0.3 Box
23554].
603d Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, 21 July - 31
December 1944, [File TDBN-603-0.3 (14250)].
603d Tank Destroyer Battalion Operation Report, May-December 1944,
[File TDBN-603-0.3 (28623)].
603d Tank Destroyer Battalion Operation Report, January - 6 May 1945,
[File TDBN-603-0.3 (28623)].
603d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) After Action Report, January - 9
May 1945, [File TDBN-603-0.3 (14250)].
603d Tank Destroyer Battalion History Year 1942, [File TDBN-603-0.1
(28621)].
603d Tank Destroyer Battalion History Year 1943, [File TDBN-603-0.1
(28621)].
603d Tank Destroyer Battalion History Year 1944, [File TDBN-603-O.1
(28621)].
C-21
603d Tank Destroyer Battalion History Year 1945, [File TDBN-603-0.1
(28621)].
603d Tank Destroyer Battalion [File TDBN-603-0.7 to TDBN-603-1.13 Box
23555].
603d Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, 25-30 September 1944,
[File TDBN-603-0.7 (28615)].
603d Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, October 1944, [File TDBN
-603-0.7 (28615)].
603d Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, November 1944, [File
TDBN-603-0.7 (28615)].
603d Tank Destroyer Battalion General Orders 1943-1945, [File TDBN
-603-1.13].
605th Tank Destroyer Battalion
605th Tank Destroyer Battalion (File TDBN-605-O (TOWED) to TDBN-605-1.13
Box 23556].
605th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, February, March,
April, May 1945, [File TDBN-605-0.3 (21409)].
605th Tank Destroyer Battalion General Orders 1943-1944, [File TDBN
-605-1.13].
C-22
Information on 607th Tank Destroyer Battalion, (File TDBN-607-0.1].
607th Tank Destroyer Battalion Operation Report July-August 1944,
[File TDBN-607-O.3].
607th Tank Destroyer Battalion Operation Report September-December
1944, [File TDBN-607-0.3].
607th Tank Destroyer Battalion June to December 1944 [File TDBN-607-0.7
Box 23559].
607th Tank Destroyer Battalion No information, [File June].
C-23
609th Tank Destroyer Battalion General Orders, 1942-1945, [File TDBN
-609-1.13].
609th Tank Destroyer Battalion Special Orders, 1-21 November 1944,
[File TDBN-609-1.14].
609th Tank Destroyer Battalion S-2 and S-3 Journal, November 1944,
[File TDBN-609-2.2].
609th Tank Destroyer Battalion S-2 and S-3 Journal, December 1944,
[File TDBN-609-2.2].
609th Tank Destroyer Battalion S-2 and S-3 Journal, January 1945,
[File TDBN-609-2.2].
[Box 23564]
609th Tank Destroyer Battalion S-2 and S-3 Journal, February 1945,
[File TDBN-609-2.2].
609th Tank Destroyer Battalion S-2 and S-3 Journal, March 1945, (File
TDBN-609-2.2].
609th Tank Destroyer Battalion S-2 and S-3 Journal, April 1945, [File
TDBN-609-2.2].
609th Tank Destroyer Battalion S-2 and S-3 Journal, 1-10 May 1945,
[File TDBN-609-2.2].
609th Tank Destroyer Battalion S-3 Journal, 20-30 September 1944,
[File TDBN-609-3.2].
609th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report - Co "C", 18
December 1944 - 2 January 1945, [File TDBN-609-CO(C)-0.3].
609th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report - Co "C", 14-18
January 1945, [File TDBN-609-CO(C)-0.3].
610th Tank Destroyer Battalion
[Box 23565]
610th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Reports, September 1944,
[File TDBN-610].
[Box 23566]
610th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, December 1944, [File
TDBN-610].
[Boxes 23567 through 23569]
C-24
610th Tank Destroyer Battalion Map Overlays, G-2 Periodic Reports,
and G-3 Situational Reports, [File TDBN-610].
611th Tank Destroyer Battalion
[Box 23570]
611th Tank Destroyer Battalion Book of Unit History, [File TDBN-611].
[Box 23571]
611th Tank Destroyer Battalion History Narrative, Battle of the
Bulge, 17-21 December 1944, [File TDBN-611].
[Boxes 23572 through 23573]
611th Tank Destroyer Battalion Journal and Map Overlays, [File TDBN
-611].
612th Tank Destroyer Battalion
[Box 23571]
612th Tank Destroyer Battalion History. 25 June 1942 - May 1945,
[File TDBN-612-0.1].
612th Tank Destroyer Battalion History Year 1944, [File TDBN-612-0.1
(28652)].
612th Tank Destroyer Battalion Operations Report, October 1944 - 6
May 1945, [File TDBN-612-0.3].
[Box 23573]
[Box 23574]
614th Tank Destroyer Battalion History, June 1943 - November 1946,
[File TDBN-614-0.1].
614th Tank Destroyer Battalion History, January 1943 - May 1945,
[File TDBN-614-O.1].
614th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit History, May 1945, [File TDBN
-614-0.2].
[Box 23575]
C-25
614th Tank Destroyer Battalion Narrative Report, December 1944, [Fil e
TDBN-614-0.3].
614th Tank Destroyer Battalion Report of Operations, 8 May -
September 1945, [File TDBN-614-0.3].
614th Tank Destroyer Battalion Narrative Report, January-February
- 10 May 1945, [File TDBN-614-O.3].
614th Tank Destroyer Battalion General Orders, January 1944 - August
1946, [File TDBN-614-1.13].
614th Tank Destroyer Battalion S-3 Journal, December 1944, [File
TDBN-614-3.2].
614th Tank Destroyer Battalion S-3 Journal (part 1), January 1945,
[File TDBN-614-3.2].
[Box 23576]
614th Tank Destroyer Battalion S-3 Journal (part 2), January 1945,
[File TDBN-614-3.2].
614th Tank Destroyer Battalion S-3 Journal (part 3), January 1945,
[File TDBN-614-3.2].
[Box 23577]
614th Tank Destroyer Battalion S-3 Journal, 1-14 February 1945, [File
TDBN-614-3.2].
614th Tank Destroyer Battalion S-3 Journal, 15-28 February 1945,
[File TDBN-614-3.2].
[Box 23578]
614th Tank Destroyer Battalion S-3 Journal, 1-15 March 1945, [File
TDBN-614-3.2].
614th Tank Destroyer Battalion S-3 Journal, 16-31 March 1945, [File
TDBN-614-3.2].
(Box 23579]
614th Tank Destroyer Battalion S-3 Journal, April 1945, [File TDBN
-614-3.2].
614th Tank Destroyer Battalion S-3 Journal, 1-10 May 1945, [File
TDBN-614-3.2].
614th Tank Destroyer Battalion S-3 Journal, 11-31 May 1945, [File
TDBN-614-3.2].
C-26
626th Tank Destroyer Battalion
No useful information.
628th Tank Destroyer Battalion
[Box 23581]
628th Tank Destroyer Battalion History-Victory TD-628th, 1941 - 9 May
1945, [File TDBN-628-O].
628th Tank Destroyer Battalion History, 15 December 1941 - 9 May
1945, (File TDBN-628-0.1].
628th Tank Destroyer Battalion General Orders, 1942-45, [File TDBN
-628-1.13].
628th Tank Destroyer Battalion History Co "A," 27 March - 27 April
1945, [File TDBN-628-Co(A)-O.2].
628th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, January-April
1945, [File TDBN-628-O.3].
628th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, July-August, October
1944, [File TDBN-628-0.7].
628th Tank Destroyer Battalion "Analysis of Personal Losses and
Reinforcements for Separate TDBN Under Combat Conditions" -
Capt. Sparks, S-1 August 1944 - January 1945, (File TDBN-628
-1.01].
628th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, August-December
1944, [File TDBN-628-0.3].
628th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, February 1945, [File
TDBN-628-0.7].
629th Tank Destroyer Battalion
(Box 23582]
629th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit History Year 1944, (File TDBN
-629-0.1].
629th Tank Destroyer Battalion Journal, July 1944, [File TDBN-629
-0.7].
629th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, August 1944,
[File TDBN-629].
629th Tank Destroyer Battalion Journal, August 1944, [File TDBN-629
-0.7].
C-27
629th Tank Destroyer Battalion Journal, September 1944, [File TDBN
-629-0.7].
629th Tank Destroyer Battalion Journal, October 1944, [File TDBN-629
-0.7].
629th Tank Destroyer Battalion Journal, November 1944, [File TDBN
-629-0.7].
629th Tank Destroyer Battalion Journal, December 1944, [File TDBN
-629-0.7].
629th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, January-June
1945, (File TDBN-629-0.3].
629th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, July-December
1944, [File TDBN-629-0.3].
[File TDBN-629-0.7 Box 23583]
629th Tank Destroyer Battalion Journal, January 1945.
629th Tank Destroyer Battalion Journal, February 1945.
629th Tank Destroyer Battalion Journal, March 1945.
C-28
February 1945, [File TDBN-629-3.1].
630th Tank Destroyer Battalion
(Box 23585]
630th Tank Destroyer Battalion History, 15 December 1941 - June 1943,
(File TDBN-630-0.1].
630th Tank Destroyer Battalion History, 15 December 1941 - 31
December 1943, [File TDBN-630-0.1].
630th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, June 1945, [File
TDBN-630-0.3].
630th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, August-September,
November 1944, [File TDBN-630-0.7].
630th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, January 1945, [File
TDBN-630-0.7].
630th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, February-May 1945, [File
TDBN-630-0.7].
[Box 23586]
630th Tank Destroyer Battalion General Orders, 1945-1946, [File TDBN
-630-1.13].
630th Tank Destroyer Battalion S-2 Periodic Report, June 1945, [File
TDBN-630-2.1].
630th Tank Destroyer Battalion S-2 Journal, June 1945, [File TDBN
-630-2.2].
630th Tank Destroyer Battalion S-3 Journal, June 1945, [File TDBN
-630-3.2].
630th Tank Destroyer Battalion S-3 Periodic Report, June 1945, [File
TDBN-630-3.1].
630th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Report, January-May 1945, [File
TDBN-630-0.9].
630th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Report, July-December 1944, [File
TDBN-630-0.9].
631st Tank Destroyer Battalion
[Box 23587)
631st Tank Destroyer Battalion History, 15 December 1941 - 31
C-29
December 1943, [File TDBN-631-0.1].
631st Tank Destroyer Battalion History, Year 1944, [File TDBN-631
-0.1].
631st Tank Destroyer Battalion History, Year 1945, [File TDBN-631
-0.1].
C-30
[File TDBN-638-0.1 to 0.3 Box 23621]
C-31
Journals covering Operation DRAGON, no anti-tank action discussed.
[Box 23658]
Detailed History of the unit, August 1944, Mortaln actions.
[Boxes 23659 through 23672]
S-3 Journal files and map overlays.
[Box 23662]
S-2 Journal, December 1944.
[Box 23665]
Unit Report, Detailed encounter and overlay, September 1944.
656th Tank Destroyer Battalion
[Box 23674]
History of the Unit.
692nd Tank Destroyer Battalion Message Log, [File TDBN-692-0.12 Box 23693].
[Box 23714]
702d Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit History for Year 1944, [File TDBN
-702-0.1].
702d Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit History for Year 1945, [File TDBN
-702-0.1].
Brief History of 702d Tank Destroyer Battalion, [File TDBN-702-0.1].
C-33
702d Tank Destroyer Battalion S-3 Report September-November 1944,
April-June 1945, [File TDBN-702-O.1].
702d Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report July 1944 - June
1945, [File TDBN-702-0.1].
702d Tank Destroyer Battalion Operational Report, 1-30 July 1945,
[File TDBN-702-O.1].
702d Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, June-October 1944,
[File TDBN-702-2.01].
702d Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, January-May 1945,
[File TDBN-702-2.01].
Enemy Material Captured and Destroyed, June-December 1944, [File
TDBN-702-2.14].
702d Tank Destroyer Battalion Periodic Reports, 19 July - 28
September 1944, [File TDBN-702-3.1].
702d Tank Destroyer Battalion S-3 Periodic Reports, March 1945, [File
TDBN-702-3.1].
C-34
704th Tank Destroyer Battalion History, September 1944 - February 1945,
[File TDBN-704 Box 23716].
704th Tank Destroyer Battalion No useful anti-tank information, [File TDBN
-704 Box 23717].
C-35
774th Tank Destroyer Battalion
[File TDBN-774-0.1 to TDBN-774-0.3 Box 23739]
774th Tank Destroyer Battalion History, 15 December 1941 - 8 May
1945, [File TDBN-774-O.1].
774th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Battle Report, January-March
1945, [File TDBN-774-0.3 (8751)].
774th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, April 1945, [File
TDBN-774-0.3 (8751).
[File TDBN-774-1.13 to TDBN-775-1.13 Box 23740]
774th Tank Destroyer Battalion General Orders, 1943-1945 January
1945, [File TDBN-774-1.13].
774th Tank Destroyer Battalion S-3 Journal, September-December 1944,
[File TDBN-774-3.2 (47494)].
776th Tank Destroyer Battalion
File TDBN-776-0 to TDBN-776-0.6 [Box 23741]
776th Tank Destroyer Battalion Informal History, July 1941 - 8 May
1945, [File TDBN-776-O].
776th Tank Destroyer Battalion History, July-May 1945, [File TDBN
-776-0.1].
C-36
TDBN-776-0.7].
776th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, January, July, November
1944, [File TDBN-776-0.7].
776th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, January 1943, [File
TDBN-776-0.7].
776th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, November-December 1943,
[File TDBN-776-0.7].
[File TDBN-776-0.7 3-1-45 to TDBN-776-MD-O.1 Box 23743]
776th Tank Destroyer Battalion Folders for March 1945, April 1945,
1-10 May 1945, 19-30 April 1944 No information on anti-tank
actions, [File TDBN-776-0.7].
776th Tank Destroyer Battalion General Orders, 1945, [File TDBN-776
-1.3].
776th Tank Destroyer Battalion Operation Instructions (Ols), October
-April 1945 and February-April 1945, [File TDBN-776-3.17].
776th Tank Destroyer Battalion History of Medical Detachment,
December 1941 - November 1945, [File TDBN-776-0.1].
801st Tank Destroyer Battalion
C-37
805th Tank Destroyer Battalion
[File TDBN-805-0.1 to TDBN-805-0.7 10-31-43 Box 23768]
C-38
805th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, March 1944, [File TDBN
-805-0.7].
805th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, April 1944, [File TDBN
-805-0.7].
805th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, August 1944, [File TDBN-805
-0.7 Box 23773].
805th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, October 1944, [File TDBN-805
-0.7 Box 23775].
805th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, November 1944, (File TDBN-805
-0.7 Box 23776].
805th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, December 1944, [File TDBN-805
-0.7 Box 23777].
805th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, January 1945, (File TDBN-805
-0.7 Box 23778].
805th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, February 1945, [File TDBN-805
-0.7 Box 23779].
805th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, March 1945, (File TDBN-805-0.7
Box 23780].
[File TDBN-805-0.7 4-1-45 to TDBN-805-1.13 Box 23781]
805th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, April 1945, [File TDBN
-805-0.7].
805th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, May 1945, [File TDBN
-805-0.7].
805th Tank Destroyer Battalion General Orders, 1942-1945, [File TDBN
-805-1.13].
807th Tank Destroyer Battalion
C-39
[Box 23802]
809th Tank Destroyer Battalion History and Journals. No anti-tank
information.
[Box 23803]
809th Tank Destroyer Battalion -- No anti-tank information.
811th Tank Destroyer Battalion
[Box 23804]
811th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Records, Journals, December 1944.
[Box 23805 through 23808]
811th Tank Destroyer Battalion Journals and After Action Reports.
813th Tank Destroyer Battalion
(Box 23809]
813th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, June-November
1944.
(Boxes 23810 through 23812]
[Box 23818]
813th Tank Destroyer Battalion Fire Missions for Company C.
814th Tank Destroyer Battalion
C-40
817th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit History, July 1944-January 1945.
C-41
[Boxes 23861 through 23869]
824th Tank Destroyer Battalion - Good, useful information of action
against German armor.
825th Tank Destroyer Battalion
(Box 23870]
825th Tank Destroyer Battalion History -- very skimpy.
827th Tank Destroyer Battalion
[Box 23871]
C-42
899th Tank Destroyer Battalion Monthly history, April 1945, [File
TDBN-899-0.2].
899th Tank Destroyer Battalion Monthly history, June 1945, [File
TDBN-899-0.2].
[File TDBN-899-0.3 Box 23880]
899th Tank Destroyer Battalion Operation Report, 15 March - 11 April
1943, [File TDBN-899-0.3].
899th Tank Destroyer Battalion Operation Report, January - 3 May
1945, [File TDBN-899-0.3].
899th Tank Destroyer Battalion Operation Report, 8 May - October
1945, [File TDBN-899-0.3].
[File TDBN-899-0.7 6-1-44 to 12-31-44 Box 23881]
899th Tank Destroyer Battalion Operation Report, January-December
1944, [File TDBN-899-0.3].
899th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, June 1944, [File TDBN
-899-0.7].
899th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, July 1944, (File TDBN
-899-0.7).
899th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, August 1944, [File TDBN
-899-0.7].
899th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, December 1944, [File
TDBN-899-0.7].
[File TDBN-899-0.7 1-1-45 to TDBN-899-1.13 Box 23882]
899th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, January 1945, [File
TDBN-899-0.7].
899th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, February 1945, [File
TDBN-899-0.7].
899th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, March 1945, [File TDBN
-899-0.7].
899th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, April 1945, [File TDBN
-899-0.7].
899th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, December 1945, [File
TDBN-899-0.7].
C-43
-899-1.13].
**Records of the Tank Destroyer Center (Record Group 338) Boxes 1 - 69 also
researched at Suitland, Maryland.
"5th Infantry Division at Ardennes," 22-31 December 1944, [File 41 Box 24023].
C-44
"Crossing the Meuse by the 9th Infantry Division," [File 55 Box 24027).
"Siegfried Line and Hurtgen Forest, 9th Infantry Division Efforts," [File 56 Box
24027].
"Hamich Ridge, 16-29 November 1944, 9th Infantry Division," [File 57 Box 24027].
"9th Infantry Division's Advance to the Roer River," 26 November - 14 December
1944, [File 58 Box 24027].
28th Infantry Division Combat Interviews, 1-9 November 1944, "Hurtgen Forest
Campaign," [File 74 Box 24032].
28th Infantry Division Combat Interviews, 2-16 November 1944, "Hurtgen Forest
Campaign," [File 75 Box 24032].
28th Infantry Division Combat Interviews, 2-8 November 1944, "Hurtgen Forest
Campaign," [File 76 Box 24032].
28th Infantry Division Combat Interviews, 2-16 November 1944, "Hurtgen Forest
Campaign," [File 77 Box 24032].
28th Infantry Division Combat Interviews, "German Winter Offensive, 16-24
December 1944," Co K, 110th Infantry Regiment, [File 78 Box 24033].
28th Infantry Division Combat Interviews, "German Winter Offensive, 16-24
December 1944," Interview with 1st Lt. Leo A. Kodzerski ard 1st Sgt. Joseph
W. McKenna, (File 78 Box 24033].
28th Infantry Division Combat Interviews, "German Winter Offensive, 16-24
December 1944," Unit Journal, [File 78 Box 24033].
28th Infantry Division Combat Interviews, "German Winter Offensive, 16-24
December 1944," 3/112th Infantry Regiment, (File 78 Box 24033].
28th Infantry Division Combat Interviews, "German Winter Offensive, 16-24
December 1944," 112th Infantry Regiment, [File 78 Box 24033].
29th Infantry Division, "Defense of Brest, 25 August - 15 September 1944," [File
88 Box 24036].
29th Infantry Division, "29 Let's Go," 4 October 1944, [File 89 Box 24036].
29th Infantry Division, "Roer-Rhine, 1 October 1944 - 1 March 1945," [File 90 Box
24036].
30th Infantry Division Combat Interviews, 14 June - 31 July 1944, "Isigny to
Tessy-sur-Vire," [File 94 Box 24037].
"30th Infantry Division at Lo Breakthrough," 26-28 July 1944, [File 95 Box
24038].
C-45
30th Infantry Division, tMortain Counterattack, 6-12 August 1944," [File 96 Box
24038].
"30th Infantry Division at Siegfried Line, 1-19 October 1944," [File 97 Box
24038].
"30th Infantry Division at Siegfried Line, 1-19 October 1944" (photos and maps),
[File 98 Box 24039).
"30th Infantry Division at Siegfried Line, 2-17 October 1944," [File 99 Box
24039].
"30th Infantry Division in the Ardennes, 16-25 December 1944," [File 100 Box
24039].
"30th Infantry Division, Ardennes, 3-23 December 1944" (maps), [File 101 Box
24039].
82nd Airborne Division Combat Interviews, 18 December 1944 - 9 February 1945,
"The Battle of the Bulge," [File 172 Box 24058].
82nd Airborne Division Combat Interviews, 18 December 1944 - 9 February 1945,
"Houffalize to the Roer River," [File 173 Box 24058].
84th Infantry Division Combat Interviews, 19 December 1944 - 16 January 1945,
"Ardennes," [File 183 Box 24061].
Combat Interviews, [File 196].
Combat Interviews, Regiment Commander, 376th Infantry/94th Infantry Division,
[File 203 Box 24067].
99th Infantry Division Combat Interviews, "Ardennes 16-20 December 1944," [File
209 Box 24069].
101st Airborne Division, Combat Interviews, 18 December 1944 - 2 January 1945,
"The Siege of Bastogne," [File 227 Box 24074].
C-46
"103d Infantry Division St. Die to Rhine, 29 October - 28 November 1944," [File
237 Box 24078].
"103d Infantry Division Northern Alsace, December 1944," [File 238 Box 24078].
"103d Infantry Division Bobenthal to the Siegfried Line, December 1944," [File
239 Box 24078].
Combat Interviews, [File 241].
"3d Armored Division at Fromental, 7-28 August 1944," [File 261 Box 24089].
"3d Armored Division from Mons to Namurs, 4-6 September 1944," [File 262 Box
24089].
"3d Armored Division Battle of Mons, 1-19 September 1944," [File 263 Box 24089].
"3d Armored Division at Siegfried Line, 12-25 September 1944," [File 264 Box
24089].
"4th Cavalry Group at Siegfried Line, 1 September - 10 October 1944," [File 324
Box 24107].
"4th Cavalry Group at Aachen and Ardennes, 20 December 1944 - 12 January 1945,"
[File 325 Box 24107].
"4th Cavalry Group, Roer to the Rhine, 23 February - 8 March 1945," [File 326 Box
24107].
"4th Cavalry Group, 1-19 April 1945," [File 327 Box 24107].
"4th Cavalry Group, Ardennes, 20 December 1944 - 13 January 1945," [File 328 Box
24107].
"ETOUSA Battle Experiences, July 1944 - March 1945," [File 247-8 Box 24148].
82nd Airborne Division Combat Interviews, December 1944 - January 1945, "Belgium:
The Story of the Bulge," [File 469 Box 24151].
"1st US Army Tank Destroyer Bulletin, 28 September 1945," (File 888 Box 24187].
Combat Interview, "Arnhem, The Landing and the Bridge, December 9, 1944," [File
932 Box 24198].
"German Command Interview: General Erich Brandenberger, CG 7th Armee - August
1944 Counteroffensive," [File 978 Box 24200].
"German 7th Army War Diary, Daily Reports, Volume II[, 7-12 August 1944,"
[Box 24237].
"German 7th Army War Diary, Daily Reports, Volume IV, 7-12 August 1944," [Box
24237].
C-47
"German 7th Army War Diary, Daily Reports, Volume V, 6-12 August 1944," [Box
24237].
"German 7th Army, Group "B" War Diary - Phone Calls and Conversations, 7-12
August 1944, Document IV," [Box 24237].
"Interrogation Reports of German Infantrymen, August 15 - September 1944," [File
2068 Box 24255].
E. MONOGRAPHS/MANUSCRIPTS
1. The Infantry School Library, Fort Benning, Georgia
Adams, James F., Capt, "Operation of Company F, 327th Glider Infantry (101) in
Defense of Bastogne: 19-26 December 1944." Company in defense (Company
Commander, 46-47 mono). (Microfilm Number D-488].
Adams, Jonathan E. Jr., MAJ, "Operation of 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute
Infantry (82) near Bencheau (Bastogne), 22-25 December 1944." Company M
C-48
defense and withdrawal (Company Commander, 47-48 mono). [Microfilm Number
D-488).
Bartholomew, Howard 1., MAJ, "Operation of 3/121st Infantry (8th Infantry
Division) in Attack and Defense of Pleurtuit, FR, 8-12 August 1944."
(Company Commander, 49-50 mono). [Microfilm Number D-491).
Carter, Daniel M., MAJ, *(S-3) Operations of 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion (4th
Infantry Division), 2-18 July 1944 (Normandy area after the landings)."
Tank Destroyer in support of infantry. [Microfilm Number D-493].
Carter, Sam, MAJ, "Operations of 1/18 Infantry Regiment at El Guettar, 17-25
March 1943.' Battalion in defense. 47-48 Monograph. [Microfilm Number
D-493].
Clayton, George A., Maj, *Operations of 3rd Battalion, 394th Infantry (99th
Infantry Division), 16 December 1944 - 1 January 1945." (47-48
monograph). [Microfilm Number D-493].
Cook, James H., MAJ, 'Operations of Company I, 179th Infantry (45th Infantry
Division) vicinity factory - Anzio, 16-18 February 1944." Company in
defense. [Microfilm Number D-489].
Cooper, Osborn, Maj, "Operations of 411th RCT (103d Division) While Attached
to Task Force Linden, vicinity Jessenheim, GE, 16-23 January 1945.' (RCT
S-3). [Microfilm Number D-494].
Daykin, Albert, Maj, "Operation of 1st Battalion, 119th Infantry (30) in Attack
on Stoumont 19-22 December 1944.' Infantry Battalion defending a road
block and counterattacking (Artillery LNO). [Microfilm Number D-495].
DeReus, Clarence C., Capt, "Operations of 3rd Battalion, 242d Infantry Regiment
(Task Force Linden) near Hagnenau, FR, 19-27 January 1945." Infantry
Battalion in withdrawal, organization of defense, and conduct of defense.
(Battalion S-3, 48-49 monograph). [Microfilm Number D-495).
Dickerson, Robert L., MAJ, 'Operation of 325th Glider Infantry Battle of Mt.
St. Angelo (Salerno), 18-20 September 1943." Company in defense.
[Microfilm Number 0-495].
Evans, Robert H., Capt, 'Operation of Company G, 327th Glider Infantry (101)
Holland, 18 September-15 October 1944 (Market-Garden)." Infantry Company
in defense and attack (Company Commander, 46-47 mono). [Microfilm Number
D-496].
Fabianich, Keith P., Maj, "Operations of 3rd Battalion, 395th Infantry (9th
Infantry Division), 10 November - 24 December 1944." Battalion in
defense. (Company Commander and Battalion S-3 -- 47-48 monograph).
[Microfilm Number D-496].
Fossum, Embert A., Maj, 'Operations of Task Force L, 109th Infantry (28th
C-49
Infantry Division) near Grosbous, Luxembourg, 20-23 December 1944."
Reinforced Infantry Company as security for flank. (Task Force
Commander). [Microfilm Number D-497].
Galbrealth, Robert B., MAJ, "Operation of 2d Battalion, 327th Glider Infantry
(101) in Defense of Bastogne." (Battalion Company, 47-48 mono).
[Microfilm Number D-497].
Gavin, Robert J., CPT, "Operation of 2nd Platoon, Company 1, 133d Infantry (34th
Infantry Division)." Rifle platoon attacked by enemy armor and infantry.
[Microfilm Number D-489].
Gendron, Thomas J., Maj, "The Operations of 2nd Battalion, 26th Infantry (Ist
US Infantry Division) at Dom BOtgenbach, Belgium, 18-21 December 1944."
Infantry Battalion on reverse slope defense of hilly terrain against
coordinated infantry-tank attacks. (Battalion S-3, 49-50 Monograph).
[Microfilm Number D-498].
Guenther, Robert A., MAJ, "Operation of Company E, 180th Infantry (45th Infantry
Division) during major offensive, 16-20 February 1944, at Anzio." Rifle
Company defending against large scale attacks. [Microfilm Number D-498].
Hackett, Paul T., Ist LT, "Operations of Ist Infantry Division at El Guettar,
20-24 March 1943." Infantry Division defending against armored attack.
[Microfilm Number D-498].
Hancock, William F. Jr., "Operations of Ist Battalion, 9th Infantry (2d Infantry
Division) in Hasty Defense Against Armored Attack, 17-18 December 1944
(Battalion XO -- 49-50 monograph). [Microfilm Number D-499].
Hankel, Halland W., Capt, "Operations of Company M, 38th Infantry (2d Infantry
Division), vicinity of Krlnkelt, Belgium, 17-20 December 1944." Infantry
heavy weapons company in defense, (Company Commander). [Microfilm Number
D-499].
Hickman, David, Capt, "Operation of Battalion 359th Infantry (90th Infantry
Division) in closing Falalse Gap - Defense of Le Bourg St. Leonard, 14-19
August 1944." (S-3 - 49-50 mono). [Microfilm Number D-499].
Hickman, Don R., Capt, "Operation of 3/304th (76th Infantry Division) Crossing
Kyll and Seizing Ovehofen, 3-5 March 1945." Battalion attack followed by
counterattack (Company Commander, 48-49 mono). [Microfilm Number D-499].
Hollinger, John C., Maj, "Operation of 433d Infantry (106) at Schlassenback,
GE, 15-20 December 1944." Infantry Regiment in defense withdrawal and
attack. (Regiment assistant S-3). [Microfilm Number D-500].
Hollstein, Jean W., Capt, "Operation of 506th Parachute Infantry (101) in
Defense of Bastogne, 19-20 December 1944." Regiment in defense (49-50
monu). [Microfilm Number D-500].
Huebner, Otto W., 1st LT, "Operation Company A/SO4th Parachute Regiment - in
C-SO
defense of Hill 424, Altavilla (Salerno), 17-19 September 1943." Company
in defense. [Microfilm Number D-500].
Hutchinson, Robert C. Jr., Capt, "Operation of Company B, 630th Tank Destroyer
Battalion Support of 110th Infantry Near Clervaux, Luxembourg, 16-31
December 1944." Towed Tank Destroyer Company in defense. [Microfilm
Number D-500].
Kappel, Carl W., Cpt, "Operation of Company H, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment
(82), 17-21 September 1944 (Market-Garden)." Rifle Company dropped to
secure key terrain (Company Commander, 48-49 mono). [Microfilm Number D
-501].
Kemp, Harry M., MAJ, "Operation of 3d Battalion, 109th Infantry (28th Infantry
Division) vicinity Dleklrch, Luxembourg, 16-23 December 1944." Infantry
Battalion in defense and withdrawal (Battalion XO). [Microfilm Number 0-
501].
Kemp, James B., MAJ, "Operation of 612th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Towed) (2d
Infantry Division) vicinity Elsenborn corner, 16-31 December 1944." Tank
Destroyer Battalion support attack being forced on defense (Battalion XO).
[Microfilm Number D-501].
Kerley, Ralph A., MAJ, "Operation of 2nd Battalion, 120th Infantry (30th
Infantry Division) at Mortain, 6-12 August 1944." (Company Commander, 49-
50 mono). [Microfilm Number D-501].
Keyes, Lewis H., MAJ, "Operation of 106th Infantry Division, 15-22 December
1944." [Microfilm Number D-501].
Kinslow, Albert V., Capt, "Operation of 1st Bn/379th Infantry (95th Infantry
Division) at Saarlautern, GE, 2-6 December 1944." Battalion in River
crossing, capture and defense of Bridge (Company Commander, 46-47 mono).
[Microfilm Number D-502].
Koob, William L. Jr., CPT, "Operation of Anti-Tank Company, 317th Infantry (80th
Division) in closing Falaise Gap, 18-20 August 1944." AT defense of RCT
attack zone; AT and TO attachments (Company Commander). [Microfilm Number
0-502].
LeGare, Ben W., Maj, "Operations of 2nd Battalion, 394th Infantry (99th Infantry
Division), vicinity Losheimergraben, 16-19 December 1944." Infantry
Battalion defending and retrograding (Battalion XO). [Microfilm Number D-
502].
Long, Joseph W., "Operations of C Company, 691st Tank Destroyer Battalion,
Nancy, 7 October 1944." Most of TO Company into defensive position
(Company Commander). [Microfilm Number D-503].
Lunsford, James N. Jr., "Operations of Ist Battalion, 345th Infantry (87th
C-Si
Infantry Division) in Attack on Moircy, BE, 30 December 1944-1 January
1945." Infantry Battalion in attack and defense of town. [Microfilm
Number D-503].
Moon, William P. Jr., MAJ, "Operation of Ist Battalion, 422d Infantry (106th
Infantry Division) vicinity Schlossenbach, Germany, 10-19 December 1944."
(Bn XO). (Microfilm Number 0-505].
Musick, L.A., Capt, "Operation of 3d Battalion, 513th Parachute Infantry (17th
Airborne Division) 25 December 1944-9 January 1945." (Battalion S-2, 46-
47 mono). (Microfilm Number D-506].
Myers, Francis J. Jr., Capt, "Operations of 3rd Platoon, Company G, 505th
Parachute Infantry (82d Airborne Division), at Salm River, vicinity Petite
Halleux. BE, 25 December 1944." Platoon in defense (Platoon Leader 46-47
monograph). (Microfilm Number 0-506].
Neffenger, Ralph E., Capt, "Operations of 3d Platoon, G Company, 517th Infantry
(45th Infantry Division) at Anzio, 15-16 February 1944." Infantry Platoon
defending key beachhead feature. [Microfilm Number D-490].
Oettinger, Frederic N. Jr., Capt, "Operation of Company B/12th Infantry Regiment
(4th Infantry Division), 28 November-5 December 1944." Company attacking
and defending in heavy woods (Company Commander, 48-49 mono). [Microfilm
Number D-506].
Perry, Edwin A., MAJ, "Operation of Ist Battalion, 39th Infantry (9th Infantry
Division) in Defense of Bivouac Area, 17 June 1944, Jacques-de-Nehou,
France." (Company Commander, 49-50 mono). [Microfilm Number D-507].
Phillips, Ivan G., MAJ, "Operation of 502nd Parachute Infantry (101) in Defense
of Bastogne, 24-25 December 1944." (Regiment Comms off, 47-48 mono).
(Microfilm Number 0-507].
Prysi, Henry F., Capt, "Operation of Company I, 399th Infantry (100th Infantry
Division) vicinity Bitche, FR, 8-10 January 1945." (Company XO, defense
of key terrain). [Microfilm Number D-507].
Ramsey, David L., LTC, "Operations of 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion in Battle
of Kasserine Pass - personal experience of HHC Commander." (Microfilm
Number D-S08].
Redding, Frank J., LTC, "Operation of Company C, 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion
with British First Army, vicinity Medgey - El - Pab - Beja Tunisia, 24
November - 11 December 42 - personal experience." [Microfilm Number D-
508].
Richardson, James, MAJ, "Operation of 1/39th Infantry (9th Infantry Division)
at Cherence le Roussel, FR. German Attack on Avranches, 4-10 August 1944
-- before Mortain." (Battalion S-3, 47-48 mono). [Microfilm Number D-
508].
C-52
Rivette, Donald E. Capt, "The Operations of 2d Battalion, 26th Infantry (1st US
Infantry Division) at Dom BOtgenbach Belgium, 16-21 December 1944."
Infantry Battalion defending hilly terrain against coordinated tank-
infantry attacks. (Anti-tank Company Commander, 48-49 monograph).
[Microfilm Number D-508].
Roberts, Elvy B., MAJ, "Operation of 501st Parachute Infantry (101), 19-20
December 1944." Regiment in meeting engagement and defense (Regiment S
-3, 47-48 mono). [Microfilm Number D-508].
Royce, Philip M., MAJ, "Operation of 2d Battalion, 141st Infantry (36th
Division) during German Attack in Alsace, 1-4 January 1945." Battalion
in defense (Battalion XO, 47-48 mono). [Microfilm Number D-509].
Simmons, Wesley J., Capt, "Operation of Company K, 394th Infantry (99th Infantry
Division) vicinity Elsenborn Ridge, 16-21 December 1944." Infantry
Battalion withdrawing and defending key terrain (Company Commander).
[Microfilm Number D-510].
Siska, John R., 1st Lt., "Operation of Company A, 1st Battalion, 424th Infantry
(106), 12-18 December 1944." Infantry Company defending (Platoon Leader
-- 48-49 monograph). [Microfilm Number D-510].
Smith, Edwin K. Jr., MAJ, "Operations of the Anti-Tank Platoon, 2/26 Infantry
(1st Infantry Division) at El Ancar (Landing at Casablanca), 8-11 November
1942." [Microfilm Number D-510].
Stark, Marshall W. Capt, "Operations of 1st Platoon, Battery C, 80th Airborne
(Anti-tank Platoon) (82 DW), 17 December 1944-11 January 1945." AT in
C-5
support of Infantry Regiment (Platoon Leader -- 47-48 monograph).
(Microfilm Number D-511].
Sweet, William J. Jr., Capt, "Operation of 2/504 Parachute Infantry Regiment
(82nd Infantry Division) at Anzio 22 January-23 March 1944." Battalion in
attack and defense. [No Microfilm Number].
Talbott, Orwin C. MAJ, "Operation of 359th Infantry Regiment (90th Infantry
Division) Crossing Moselle, 9-14 November 1944." Regiment in river
crossing and subsequent counterattacks (Regiment S-3, 48-49 mono).
[Microfilm Number D-512].
Tallerday, Jack, Capt, "Operation of 505th Parachute Infantry (82) in Battle
of Grosebeck and Nijmegen (Market-Garden) 17-23 September 1944." (Company
Commander). [Microfilm Number D-512].
Thornblom, Carlton, C., CPT, "Operation of Ist Battalion, 320th Infantry (35th
Infantry Division), 10-12 August 1944 (Mortain)." Infantry Battalion
attacking and defending in performing rescue mission. (Company Commander,
49-50 mono). [Microfilm Number D-512].
Troup, Paul A. Jr., MAJ, "Operation of 112th Infantry (28) in Huertgen Forest,
2-14 November 1944." Regiment in attack, defense, and withdrawal (Regiment
HHC Commander, 47-48 mono). [Microfilm Number D-512].
Warden, Irving P., Maj, "Operations of Cannon Company, 110th Infantry (28th
Infantry Division) in Defense of Munchausen, Luxembourg, 16-19 December
1944." Infantry Cannon Company in defense of a village (Company
Commander). [Microfilm Number D-513].
Weigel, Levene 3., Capt, "Operation of 1st Platoon, Company H, 422d Infantry
(106th Infantry Division), 12-19 December 1944." MG platoon in attack and
defense (Platoon Leader -- 48-49 monograph). [Microfilm Number D-512].
Wright, David B., Capt, "Operation of 1st Battalion, 110th Infantry (28th
Infantry Division), vicinity of Heinerscheid and Marnach, Luxembourg, 16-
18 December 1944." Infantry Battalion in defense of wide front.
(Battalion S-3, 48-49 monograph). [Microfilm Number D-514].
C-54
"Hedgerow Fighting Near Carentan," [Call Number 41-53].
"History of Anti-Tank Company, 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division,
July 22, 1944 to March 31, 1945, [Microfilm, Reel #2177, Item 2329].
"Infantry Units, 4th Infantry Division (Card 7) - Special Report St. Pols to
Paris, Pursuit through Belgium," [Microfilm Item 2210].
"Infantry Units, 4th Infantry Division (Card 23) - 12th Infantry Regiment (4th
Infantry Division) - History of Anti-Tank Company,' [Microfilm Item 2329].
"Infantry Weapons - Military Attache Report #113, Infantry Weapons, 22 August
1944," [Microfilm Item 577].
"Jungle Operations Armor Training and Use of 632d Tank Destroyer Battalion in New
Guinea," [Call Number 41-55).
"Military Attache (Anti-Tank) - Comment on anti-tank company's operation on D
-Day," [Microfilm Item 655].
Thompson, Jack, War Correspondent, "82nd Airborne Division, Stories of Sicilian
Invasion," [Microfilm, Reel #2042, Item 2068].
"82nd Airborne - Operations in Sicily and Italy July 1943 - January 1944,"
[Microfilm Item 1300].
Young, Robert W., Capt., Military'Monograph, "Armored Support of Infantry," May
1948, [Call Number 41-417].
"Dom BUtgenbach Action, 26th Infantry (Ist Division) 19-22 December 1944,"
[Historical Manuscript File, Call Number 2-3.7 AE.P-13].
European Theater of Operations, United States Army, Office of the Historical
Section. "XV Corps - The Argentan Salient, 9-17 August 1944," No Date,
[Historical Manuscript File, Call Number 8-3.1 AN, Box 383].
European Theater of Operations, United States Army, Office of the Historical
Section. "Advance to LeMans, XV Corps Operations, 1-9 August 1944," No
C-55
Date, [Historical Manuscript File, Call Number 8-3.1 AO, Box 384].
European Theater, U.S. Army Forces. Historical Division. "Operation Cobra."
By Maj. Kenneth W. Hechler, Capt. F.P. Halas, Lt. Col. Hugh M. Cole, S/Sgt
Jose M. Topete, Maj. F. Ferriss, and Lt. Hollis Alpert, [Historical
Manuscript File, Call Number 8-3.1 AK, Box 382].
"Historical Survey of Direct Fire Weapons in World War II and the Korean War:
A Compendium in Support of the Ardfire Study Group," [Historical Manuscript
File, Call Number 4-15.1 AA 10 v. 1].
Ludden, Monroe, "Guarding the Flanks of the LeMans Salient XX Corps," 1-14 August
1944, [Historical Manuscript File, Call Number 8-3.1 AP, Box 384].
"SAAR-MOSELLE Triangle and Trier, XX Corps, 14 January - 12 March 1945,"
[Historical Manuscript File, Call Number 8-3.1 AU].
"The Siege of Bastogne," [Historical Manuscript File, Call Number 8-3.1 AD].
"Siegfried Line," [Historical Manuscript File, Call Number 8-3.1 AL v. 2 Pt. 2
cy 1].
"Tank Fight of Rocherath-Krinkelt (Belgium) 17-19 December 1944," [Historical
Manuscript File, Call Number 2-3.7 AE.P-12].
F. GERMAN RECORDS
Foreign Military Studies, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
"Attitude to the Questionnaire Concerning the Commitment of the 'Leibstandarte
Adolf Hitler' in August 1944." Draft Translation, [Manuscript #B-358].
"The Campaign in Northern France, Volume IV, Chapter 4, The German Counterattack
Against Avranches (German Translation), August 1944," [Manuscript #B-725].
"Comments on the Seventh Army Journal August 1944," [Manuscript #A-918].
C-56
"Counterattack against AVRANCHES, August 1944," [Manuscript #A-921].
"German Tank Losses," [Manuscript #P-059].
"An Interview with Genmaj (W-SS) Fritz Kraemer Sixth Panzer Army (16 November
1944 - 4 January 1945)," [Ethint 21].
"An Interview with Obstgrf 'Sepp' Dietrich Sixth Panzer Army in the Ardennes
Offensive," [Ethint 15].
Map of Mortain actions, [Manuscript #A921-AI].
"Normandy, Cobra and MORTAIN," (Manuscript #A-894].
"OB West: Preparations for Invasion to Retreat to West Wall," [Manuscript #B
-308].
"OKW War Diary: 7th Armee Counterattack Against Avranches, 29 July - 14 August
1944," (Manuscript #A-921].
"OKW War Diary: 7th Armee Counterattack Against Avranches, 29 July - 14 August
1944," [Manuscript #B-034].
"Part I Northern France, 25 July - 26 July 1944." (German translation)
[Manuscript #B-179].
"2d SS-Panzer Division 'Das Reich,' September 1944" (in German) [Manuscript #P
-159).
"2d SS-Panzer Division 'Das Reich' Einsatz im Westen, Juni bis November 1944
Tagebuch," (Manuscript #P-159].
C-57
"LXVII Armeekorps, 7 June - 30 October 1944,0 [Manuscript #B-236].
G. MISCELLANEOUS
Action of Capt. John J. Kennedy, 612th Tank Destroyer Battalion, on 17 December
1944 at BO11ingen, Belgium, [From the personal records of Jack Flanagan
612th Tank Destroyer Battalion, xeroxed from Suitland, MD].
Another Snafu, [Ft. Knox, KY Call Number 46-63].
Anti-Tank Defense - Weapons and Doctrine, [Ft. Knox, KY Call Number 45.3-25].
Anzio: Why Failure? [Ft. Knox, KY Call Number 81-23].
Ardennes Database [Property of US Army Concepts Analysis Agency, Bethesda, MD].
Armor at Anzio, [Ft. Knox, KY Call Number 45-1-2].
Armor in the Hurtgen Forest, [Ft. Knox, KY Call Number 45-1-7].
Armor in the Mobile Defense, [Ft. Knox, KY Call Number 45-5-2].
Arracourt: Armor in Defense, [Ft. Knox, KY Call Number 80-2].
Attack and Penetration. Chapter II, 'The Northern Shoulder," RG 332, ETO
Historical Division, The History of the Ardennes Campaign, [Suitland, MD].
Critical Analysis of History of Armor in World War II, [Ft. Knox, KY Call Number
45.4-17].
The Defense of Elsenborn Ridge, [Ft. Knox, KY Call Number 79-13].
Headquarters First United States Army - 90mm Firing Tests, December 1944,
[Suitland, RG 332, ETO, Armored Fighting Vehicle and Weapons Section,
311.15-381, Box labeled N1", File No. 353.4 Firing Tests].
C-58
Headquarters Twelfth Army Group - Comments on Test by First US Army to Determine
the Effectiveness of Tank and Anti-tank Weapons Against "Panther" Tank,
August 1944, [Suitland, RG 332, ETO, Armored Fighting Vehicle and Weapons
Section, 311.15-381, Box labeled "I",File No. 353.4 Firing Tests].
Headquarters Twelfth Army Group - Final Report of Board of Officers appointed to
determine comparative effectiveness of ammunition of 76mm gun and 17-pdr
gun, August 1944, [Suitland, RG 332, ETO, Armored Fighting Vehicle and
Weapons Section, 311.15-381, Box labeled "1", File No. 353.4 Firing Tests].
C-59
Seventh Army War diary, 6 June - 31 July 1944 (II), [ML 486 Box 24154].
Seventh Army War diary, 6 June - 31 July 1944 (1), [ML 487 Box 24154].
Salerno, "American Operations from the Breakthrough to the Volturno,"
September - 6 October 1943, [ML 514 Box 24158].
Interview on German Panzer Lehr Commander, [ML 998 Box 24202].
32d Cavalry Squad, 14th Cavalry Group Rhine Crossing at Remagen, 10-23
March 1945, [ML 1002 Box 24202].
119th Infantry Regiment, 30th Infantry Division assault on Mergenhausen,
5 December 1944 and 27-28 August 1944 operations, [ML 1003 Box
24202].
Rhine Bridgehead in V Corps sector, [ML 1005 Box 24202].
German Breakthrough in V Corps sector, 16 December 1944, [ML 1006 24202].
899th Tank Destroyer Battalion action on 11 July 1944 near St. Jea.-de
-Daye, [ML 1055 Box 24205].
2d Armored Division partial report on Siegfried Line, [ML 1036 Box 24205].
Operational Research in North West Euroge. The Work of No 2 Operational Research
Section With 21 Army Group, June 1944 - July 1945, [From the personal files
of Jay Karamales (SAIC)].
Operations of the 612th Tank Destroyer Battalion, 2nd Infantry Division, in the
Battle of the Bulge Vicinity of Elsenborn Corner, 16-31 December 1944
(Ardennes-Alsace Campaign), [Monograph obtained from Jack Flanagan 612th
Tank Destroyer Battalion].
Photos of Mark V Tank knocked out and soldiers manning an anti-tank gun, [RG 332,
ETO Historical Division, Stack Area 8, Row 79, Compartment 20, ETO/USFET
Theater Historian, Ardennes Campaign, 1944-1945, Box 3, Suitland].
C-60
Trials Against Front Armor of German Mark III Tanks, [Numbered box and folders
of *George B. Jarrett Papers" at Archives, USANHI, Carlisle Barracks, PA].
US Tank Destroyer Units, WWII, A Working Bibliography, [USANHI, Librarian File].
2d Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop History, December 1944, [File 302-CAV-0.2 Box
6038, Suitland].
The Georae B. Jarrett Paners from unnumbered boxes at USANHI. Carlisle. PA
First Box
several unlabeled folders: Magazine clippings on Vietnam.
Second Box
first folder: Handwritten drafts of memoirs; Chapter XI discusses some
aspects of munitions against tanks. This is like a
diary, but appears to contain some details of
observations and tests.
second folder: Thank you letters, etc.
third folder: Draft of long manuscript in post WWII visit to Europe.
Third Box
first folder: Draft of European visit - WII.
second folder: Draft of Mid-East visit - WII.
Fourth Box
first folder: News clippings.
second folder: Ordnance museum pamphlets.
third folder: Press clippings.
fourth folder: Letters of commendation.
C-61
Fifth Box
first folder: Personal letters.
second folder: Clippings.
third folder: * Draft article on the &frika related to
Jarrett by Hans Klinger -- a participant.
fourth folder: * Diagrams and notes on German munitions.
fifth folder: Japanese weapons.
sixth folder: British book on German weapons.
Eighth Box
first folder: Typed draft of "Ordnance, the Theme Song of Military
History."
second folder: Magazine & newspaper clippings on weapons.
third folder: Personal papers.
fourth folder: Description of German Pin, rfaut, Hotchkiss gun, and
37m.
C-62
Thirteenth Box Short drafts descriptions on guns and various weapons --
probably to go with museum displays.
C-63
11. SECONDARY SOURCES
A. BOOKS
Adair, L.R., CPT, Speer, W. H., CPT, et. al. Mortain: Defensive. Deliberate
Defense 30th Infantrv Division 9-13 August 1944. Annotated Bibliography,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1983. [Ft. Knox, KY].
Anziou Bchead. [OCMH D 769A532 U12].
Baily, Charles N. Faint Praise: American Tanks and Tank Destroyers during
WrldWar..11. Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1983. [From the personal files of
Charles N. Baily (SAIC)].
Ball, Ed~mund. Staff Officer with 5th Army: Sicily. Salerno. Anzio. (OCMH D
769.26 Sth.B3].
Balkoski, J. Beyond the Beachhead: 29th Infantry Division. [OCNH 05-29
1989/2].
Bennett, Ralph. Ultra in the West: The Normandy Cam~ajan of 1944-1945. New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1979. [Ft. Belvoir NIL 940.5421 BEN].
Blumenson, Martin. Examples of Employment of Tanks in Night Fighting on the
EuroRean Land Mass During World War 11. Unpublished Study, Histories
Division, OCMH, 1966. [OCMH 2-3.7 AC.Y].
Blumenson, Martin. *The Mortain Counterattack.0 United States Army in World War
11: The Euro~ean Theater of Operations: Breakout and Pursuit. Washington,
DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1961.
[Pentagon UA 25.U515 V.5].
Blumenson, Martin. Kasine Pass.1.
[OCMH D 766.99.T8 B5].
Bradford, George. Great Tank Battles of -World War II.ARCO NY, 1970. (OCMH D 793
B&].
Buisson, Gilles. Mortain 44: Objectif-Avranches. [LC D762.M56 B85 1984].
Byrnes, Laurence. History of the 94th Infantry Division in World War 1I.
Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1948. [OCMH 05-94 1948].
Carter, Sam, MAJ. The Ooerations of the 1st Battalion. 18th Infantry (1st
Divisionl at El Guettar. Tunisia. 17-25 March 1943 (Tunisian Campnaign)
(Personal Experiences of a Heavy-Wea~ons Company Commander). (Advanced
Infantry Officers Class, No. 1 1947-1948; Combat Arms Research Library,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas].
Cavanagh, William, C.C. Krinkell-Rocherath. The Battle for the Twin Villages.
1986. [LC Catalog Number 85-63825].
Cole, Hugh M. United States Army in World War II: The Euronean Theater of
C-64
ODerations: The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge. Washington, DC: Office
of the Chief of Military History Department of the Army, 1965. [Pentagon
UA 25.U515.V.8].
Cole, Hugh M. United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of
Ooeratons: The Lorraine Campaign. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief
of Military History, United States Army, 1950. [Pentagon UA25.U515 V.1].
Combat Operations of the 1st Infantry Division During World War II. Battle of El
Guettar. [OCMH 05-1 1960].
Coox and Naisawald. Survey of Allied Tank Casualties in World War 11. [OCMH U
15 ORO T-117].
Dornbusch, C.E. Histories of American Amy Units World Wars I and 1I and Korean
Conflict With Some Earlier Histories. Washington 25, DC: Department of
the Army, Office of the Adjutant General Special Services Division,
Library and Service Club Branch, April 1956. (Pentagon UX 104 071].
Dupuy, R. St. Vith: Lion in the Way. [OCMH 05-106 1949].
Emolovment of Four Tank Destroyer Battalions in the ETO. Conunittee 24 Report, A
Research Report Prepared at the Armor School Fort Knox, KY, 1949-1950.
[OCMH U 423.5.R3 1950 no. 24].
Fenili, Vasco John. The 605th Tank Destroyer Battalion. [OCMH 302-605 TO 1945].
Gabel, Christopher R., Dr. Leavenworth Papers: Seek. Strike, and Destroy: US
Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War 1I. Combat Studies Institute,
US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
September 1985. (Leavenworth Papers No. 12 Series). [Pentagon D 793.G33
1985].
German Tank Strengths and Loss Statistics. [OCMH GEOG M Germany 470.8-Tanks].
Gillespie, David. ed, History of the 47th Infantry Regiment. Munich: F.
Bruckmann, 1946. [OCMl].
Hechler, Ken. Holding the Line: The 51st Enaineer Combat Battalion and the Battle
of the Bulge. December 1944 - January 1945. Prologue and Epilogue by Barry
W. Fowle. Studies in Military Engineering, Number 4, Fort Belvoir,
Virginia: Office of History, United States Army Corps of Engineers, 1988,
pg. 29-49. [Pentagon D 756.5.A7 H42 1988].
Hewitt, Robert L. Work Horse of the Western Front - The Story of the 30th
Infantry Division. Washington: The Infantry Journal Press, 1946. [OCMH
05-30].
Hoegh, Leo A., and Doyle, Howard J. Timberwolf Tracks: The History of the 104th
Infantry Division. 1942-1945. Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press,
1946. [Pentagon UX220.NO.104.H69].
C-65
Hoffschmidt, E.J., and Tantum, IV, W.H. German Tank and Anti-tank in World War
.U.Connecticut: WE, Inc., 1968. [OCMH].
Houston, Donald. Hell on Wheels: The 2d Armored Division,. [OCMH 05-2AR 1977].
Howe, George F. The Battle History of the 1st Armored Division. "Old Ironsides".
Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1954. [OCMH 05-lAR 1954].
Howe, George F. United States Army in World War 11: Northwest Africa: Seizing
the Initiative in the West. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of
Military History, 1957. [OCMH].
Hoyt, Edwin P. The GI's War: The Story of American Soldiers in Europe in World
War 11. [OCMIH D 756.3.H68 1988].
Icks, Robert J. Famous Tank Battles. [OCMH D 431.135].
The Italian Campaign. (OCMH D 763 I8 W33].
Kemp, Arthur. The Unknown Battle. [Pentagon D756.N39K45].
Lauer, Walter. Battle Babies: The Story of the 99th Infantry Division. [OCMH
05-99 1951].
MacDonald, Charles B.. United States Army in World War 11: The Eurooean Theater
Of Ooerations: The Last Offensive. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief
of Military History United States Army, 1973. [Pentagon UA 25 U515 V.9].
MacDonald, Charles B. United States Army in World War II: The Eurgpean Theater
of Operations: The Siegfried Line Camoaign. Washington, DC: Office of
the Chief of Military History United States Army, 1963. [OCMH D 769A533
vol. 3 pt. 6].
MacDonald, Charles B., and Mathews, Sidney T. United States Army in World War
11-: The European Theater of Operations: Three Battles: Arnaville.
Altuzzo. and Schmidt. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military
History United States Army, 1952. [OCNH].
MacDonald, Charles B. A Time for Trumoets. New York: William Morrow & Company,
Inc., 1985. [LC].
Marshall, S.L.A. Bastogne: The Story of the First 8 Days in Which the 101st
Airborne Division was Closed Within the Ring of German Forces. [OCMH 05
-101 1946].
Meyer, Hubert. Krieaisaeschichte der 12.SS-Panzerdivision "Hitleriuaend" 11. Munin
Verlag GmbH, Osnabruck, 1982. [IC].
MitchellI, Ral ph M., COL. The 101 st Ai rborne Di vi sion'Is Defense of Bastogne. [OCMH
D 756.5.A7 M58 1986].
Order of Battle. United States Army. World War 11. Paris: Office of the Theater
C-66
Historian, European Theater, 1945. [OCMH].
Phillips, Robert. To Save Bastogne. (OCMH].
Pi ekal kewl cz. Tank War 1939-1945. Transl ated from German by Jan van Heurck. [OCNH
o 793 P52713 1986].
The Remaaen Bridgehead. [OCNH D 757.9.R4U45R4].
Rapport, Leonard, and Northwood, Arthur Jr. Rendezvous With Destiny: A History
of the 101st Airborne Division. Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press.
[Pentagon WX 220 No I01.R22].
Ritgen, Helmut. Die Geschichte Der Panzer-Lehr-Division Im Westen 1944-1945.
Stuttgart: Motorbuch Verlag, 1979. [From the personal library of Albert
D. McJoynt (SAIC Consultant)].
Rodt oe [OCMH 03-5 1945/5].
Salerno. [OCMH D 769A532 U164].
von Senger und Etterlin, F.M. German Tanks of World War 11. The Complete
Illustrated History of GerMan Armoured Fighting Vehicles 1926-1945. New
York City: Galahad Books, 1969. [LC].
The Sicilian Camoaian. [OCMH D 763 S5 U53].
Spearhead in the West. 1941-1945: Third Armored Division. Frankfurt am Main,
Germany: F. Guhi and Co. , Graphl sche Kustanstal t und K ischeef abri k, 1945.
reprint, Nashville: Battery Press, 1980. [OCMH].
Stanton, Shelby. US Army Order of Battle in World War 11. Part IV: Tank
Destroyers of the US Army in World War 11. Novato, CA: Presidio Press,
1984. [Suitland].
The Stars and Stripes. "101st Airborne Division.' [OCMH 05-101 1945].
Stone, Thomas R. Grenade: Gernlral Leads His 9th Army From the-Roer to the
Rhia. [OCMH E 745 S53 S88].
Story of the 82nd Airborne Division. [OCMH 05-82 1945/4].
Story of the 394th Infantry. [Pentagon UX240.NO.394.A2].
Stoufer, et. al. The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath. Vol. 11. New
York: Wiley, 1949 (1965 edition). [OCMH].
Tanks and Other Armored Fighting Vehicles 1942-1945. [OCMH Army Museum UG
446.5.W446 1975].
Toland. Battle: The Story of the Bulge. [OCMH D 756.5 AT T6].
C-67
US Army. Airborne Division. 101st. [OCMH 05-101 1945/2].
US Army. 2d Infantry Division. [OCMH 05-2 1945].
US Army. ETO. OnteWy-4 [OCNH 05-94 1945].
US Army 102d Division. With the 102d Infantry Division Through Germany. [OCMH
05-102 1947].
US Army. An Informal History of the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion. [OCMH 302
-601 TO 1945].
US Army. An Informal History of the 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion. [OCMH 302
-776 TD 1945].
Weeks, John. Men Aaainst Tanks. A History of Anti-tank Warfare. New York:
Mason/Charter, 1975. [Ft. Belvoir MIL 358.18].
Wilson, John B. comp, Armies, Cor~s. Divisions. and Se~arate Brigades.
Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1987. (OCMH].
823d Tank Destroyer Battalion. A History of the 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion.
1951. [OCMH].
91st Infantry Division. [OCMH 05-91 1947].
99th Division History -Battle Babies. [Pentagon UX220 NO.99.139].
C-68
Weidinger, Otto. Division Das Reich. Der Weg der 2.SS Panzer-Division "Das
Reich". Die Geschichte der Stammdivision der Waffen-SS, Band V: 1943
-:.=. Osnabruck: Munln-Verlag, 1982.
Weidinger, Otto, ed., Kameraden bis zum Ende. Der Wea der SS-Panzerurenadier
-Regiments 4 "DF" 1939-1945. Die Geschlchte elner deutsch-osterreichischen
Kamofoemeinschaft. Gottingen: Plesse-Verlag, 1962.
C. PERIODICALS
"The Battle For Aachen." After The Battle. Number 42. London: Battle of Britain
Prints International Limited, 1983. (Ft. Knox, KY].
"Battle of the Bulge." After The Battle. Number 4. London: Battle of Britain
Prints International Limited, 1974. [Ft. Knox, KY].
C-69
Yonos, John. "Anzio: The Soft Underbelly of Europe." Part Four. AFM. [Ft. Knox,
KY].
Yonos, John. "Anzio: The Soft Underbelly of Europe." Part Five. AF. [Ft. Knox,
KY].
Yonos, John. "Anzio: The German Offensive Fails!" Part Six. AV. [Ft. Knox, KY].
Yonos, John. "Anzio: The 'Lull' Before the Breakout." Part Seven. AFM. [Ft.
Knox, KY].
Yonos, John. "Anzio: Part Eight: Breakout!" AF!. [Ft. Knox, KY].
Yonos, John. "Anzio: Part Nine: Breakout!" A . (Ft. Knox, KY].
D. MISCELLANEOUS
Bundesarchiv Records RH 10/321 (12th SS-PzD) 19 December 1944, [From the personal
files of Jay Karamales (SAIC)].
"The Battle of Aachen." CSI Battlebook 13-C. Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat
Studies Institute, October 1944. [Ft. Knox, KY].
"The Battle of Schnee Eifel." CSI Battlebook 10-B. Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas:
Combat Studies Institute, September 1944. [Ft. Knox, KY].
"The Battle of St. Vith," CSI Battlebook 4-A, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat
Studies Institute, December 1944. [Ft. Knox, KY].
"Engineer Hero Destroys Nazi Panzer Tanks." TlheBayone. Fort Benning, Georgia,
September 2, 1960, pg. 16. [From the personal files of Brian R. McEnany
(SAIC)].
First US Army. Report of Operations, 1 August 1944 - 22 February 1945,
[Pentagon].
GSGS 4347 - Map of Nortain, France, August 1944, [National Archives Map Service,
Pickett Street Alexandria, VA].
GSGS 4414 - Map of Dom BOtgenbach, Belgium, December 1944, [National Archives Map
Service, Pickett Street Alexandria, VA].
GSGS 4414 Sheets 5503, 5504, 5603, 5604 - Map of Krinkelt-Rocherath, Belgium,
December 1944, [National Archives Map Service, Pickett Street Alexandria,
VA].
Parker, Danny S., notes to "Hitler's Last Gamble" 3W, Cambria, CA 1989, [From the
personal files of Jay Karamales (SAIC)].
Tank Destroyer Battalions - Miscellaneous Information on Unit, Activation Origin,
Combat Introduction, etc., [From Quintus Atkinson Vice President and
Washington Liaison for 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion].
C-70
Tank Destroyer Newsletter., Spring 1989, Newsletter No. 25, [Ft. Knox, KY].
The Tank School - extracts from personal experience, [OCMH D 541.135T15].
Tank and Tank Destroyer Conference, Army War College, 26 January 1945 Subj:
US Tank and Anti-tank Weapons Program [Army Field Forces Development and
Testing Section, RG 337 File 470-8/7].
US Army Field Manual 101-10, 21 December 1944, [Pentagon].
US Army Military History Institute Special Bibliography 23, American Combat
Divisions, A Comprehensive Bibliography of 1st Infantry Division
Materials, Part II: 1940-1956, Carlisle Barracks, PA. [USANHI].
US Army Military History Institute Special Bibliography 16, Volume I, The Era
of World War II, Carlisle Barracks, PA. [USANHI].
US Army Military History Institute Special Bibliography 16, Volume II, The War
in the Pacific, Carlisle Barracks, PA. [USANHI].
US Army Military History Institute Special Bibliography 16, Volume III, World
War I, The Eastern and Balkan Fronts, The Axis Forces in Europe, Carlisle
Barracks, PA. [USAMHI].
US Army Military History Institute Special Bibliography 16, Volume IV, The Era
of World War I, Mediterranean and Western European Theaters of
Operations, Carlisle Barracks, PA. [USANHI].
C-71
APPENDIX D
ORGANIZATION
The collapse of the French Amy after only six weeks in 1940 was a rude
shock to American planners, and, although misinformation abounded, tanks
appeared to be the main ingredient to the surprising German success. Stopping
massed German tanks became a vital tactical requirement. Believing that the
Germans had massed hundreds of tanks on very narrow sectors, American planners
concluded that it was impractical to equip infantry divisions with enough
antitank guns to stop such attacks. As an alternative, the American Army
developed the concept of independent antitank (later named tank destroyer)
battalions which could be massed when needed to stop tank breakthroughs. From
its base at Fort Hood, the Tank Destroyer Command directed the creation of
tank destroyer battalions in the approximate ratio of one per each infantry
and armored division. In practice, particularly in Northwest Europe,
attachment of battalions to the same divisions became habitual, and they were
virtually organic units.
Creation of the tank destroyer units did not mean that the infantry
divisions were deprived of organic antitank weapons. Each regiment had an
ant.itank company with 27 guns and, in addition, had the capability to lay
mines. Further, after its hasty introduction in 1942, the rocket launcher,
popularly known as the "Bazooka,n was present in infantry companies and
frequently used in close combat against tanks. Infantrymen also had antitank
rifle grenades, but these were cumbersome to use and less popular than the
Bazooka.
EQUIPMENT
D-1
In order to equip an Army of 220 divisions planned in 1941 adaptations and
expedients were the order of the day. To provide an infantry antitank gun,
the Army simply adapted the German Rheinmetal 37mm towed gun which the Germans
had licensed for production abroad. At the time the Army adopted the 37mm,
it was adequate for its task -- the principal German tank, the Mark III, only
had 30mm of frontal armor in its 1940 version. Indeed, an argument against
developing the towed 3-inch antitank gun, begun in 1940, was that it was
difficult to see a need for such a powerful weapon. When the Army entered
combat in 1942 in North Africa, the 37mm was the standard antitank weapon in
the infantry divisions along with the Bazooka which was so new that the troops
were introduced to it aboard the ships sailing to invade.
Equipping the tank destroyer units was more difficult. Early in the
development of their tactical doctrine, the tank destroyer officers decided
that they needed self-propelled weapons. However there would be a continuing
debate over towed versus self-propelled guns. Towed proponents argued that
self-propelled guns were too expensive, and, because they were larger, more
difficult to conceal. As an expedient self-propelled gun which it hoped to
replace before entering combat, the Tank Destroyer Center mounted the 75mm
artillery piece, available in large quantities because it was the standard
field artillery gun prior to the introduction of the 105, in the M3 half-
track. Like the 37mm, the 75mm was adequate when adopted -- it could depend-
ably penetrate 2-3 inches of armor. When the Tank Destroyer Center studied
the newly developed and more powerful 76mm gun in 1942, interest in that
weapon was primarily due to its flatter trajectory, i.e., its ability to hit
vice penetrate (the 76mm was a lighter, more compact version of the 3-inch
gun, designed to have the same ballistic performance). In addition, the Tank
Destroyer Command grudgingly accepted the MIO tank destroyer as an interim
weapon although they regarded it as too heavy and slow. An adaption of the
Sherman tank, the MIO carried the 3-inch gun. Meanwhile, the Tank Destroyer
Center rushed the development of the "ideal" tank destroyer, the M18, which
would carry the 76mm gun and had the mobility deemed essential to tank
destroyer tactics. Development of an antitank version of the new 90mm
antiaircraft gun began in 1942, but impetus for this work was largely due to
German success with their 88mm rather than any perception that existing
0-2
American weapons lacked sufficient capability to penetrate armor.
COMBAT EXPERIENCE
Later experience in the Mediterranean theater did not cause the Army to
re-examine the performance of its antitank weapons. Available antitank
weapons, artillery, and naval gunfire repulsed the German armor attacks at
Gela, Sicily and Salerno, Italy. American intelligence was aware of the
introduction of new, heavy German tanks such as the Panther and Ferdinand, but
studies in the U.S. indicated the 3-inch gun could penetrate the frontal armor
of these vehicles at ranges of 1000 yards. After one of the first encounters
with a Panther in Italy in the spring of 1944, a senior officer derided the
tank by pointing out that the superior mobility of an American light tank
enabled it to kill the German vehicle with a 37mm gun from the rear. But the
campaign in Italy, largely an infantry affair because of the mountainous
terrain, did not result in antitank equipment being a major concern to senior
leadership.
During the bitter fighting in the bocage (hedgerows) after the Normandy
landings, it became clear that American antitank weapons were not living up
to expectations when facing Panthers and Tigers. To determine exactly how
serious the problem was, the First U.S. Army conducted firing tests in July
1944. In conducting the test, First Army used every weapon in its inventory
with an AP capability against two captured Panthers (no Tigers were avail-
able). The results of the test were appalling. None of the American antitank
weapons could penetrate the front of the Panther's hull. Only the 3-inch gun
stood a chance against the Panther's turret mantle, but at less than 200
yards. However, all the weapons fired could penetrate the sides and rear.
Just two weapons, the 105 howitzer (using HEAT) and the 90mm antiaircraft gun
could pierce the front of the hull. Had a Tiger been available, the results
D-4
of the frontal tests would have been similar, but its thicker side armor would
have defeated most of the smaller weapons. The heavier Tiger II,or "Royal
Tiger' had even thicker armor, and its front was impervious to all U.S.
antitank weapons until hyper-velocity (HVAP) ammunition became available for
the 90mm in 1945. Shocked by the results of the July test, General Eisenhower
commented angrily:
Why is it that I am always the last to hear about this stuff: Ordnance
told me this 76 would take care of anything the
3
German had. Now I find
out you can't knock out a damn thing with it.
As the campaign wore on, towed guns became less and less popular. They
were far less effective than self-propelled guns for supporting attacking
infantry and difficult to maneuver for flank shots. By winter 1944, MiOs,
D-5
made excess by arriving M36s, were replacing the guns in towed tank destroyer
battalions. Fighting in the Battle of the Bulge completed discrediting towed
guns, where the battalions still using them suffered heavier losses with less
effect than self-propelled units. During this battle, many infantrymen lost
faith in the towed 57m gun and afterwards argued for it to be abandoned.
However, the ubiquitous Bazooka, despite its inability to penetrate frontal
armor, proved effective time and time again in the hands of brave soldiers
willing to maneuver for shots at the sides and rear of heavy German tanks.
D-6
PERFORATION PERFORMANCE OF BRITISH and AMERICAN TANKS AND A/T WPNS AGAINST HOMOGENEOUS ARMOR
AT 30" ANGLE OF ATTACK"
BRITISH
2 POR 6 PDR
BRITISH
A14ERICAN
37MM 754 7684 761M 9014M 90M" 904 9084N 9084 105MM 105Mm
Weapon: APC BC APC c APC BC HVAP APC BC APC HVAP APC HVAP APC HEAT
RANGE HE HE T4 HE T30 E16 T30 E16
(YARDS) M51 No M62 M82 482 N82 M67
Weight (lbs): 14.92 14 9.5 23.56 23.56 16.2 23.56 16.2 40
NV(f/s): 2900 2050 26500 3400 2600 2800 3350 3200 2900 1250
This table Isextracted from Inclosure No. 1, Military Attache Report NO. 2473-44. The bracketing in table
of perforation figures means these that jhoud be capable of performnce indicated, but, owing to over-stressing, that
perforation my be associated with shatter. The figures are against hamogeneous plate and allow direct comparison
between allied weapons and those of the snamy. The firing tests were performed InEngland and are based on 50 percent
success.
D-7
The following document is a report on firing tests, conducted in July 1944,
to determine the effectiveness of tank and anti-tank weapons against the German
Mk V "Panther* and Mk VI 'Tiger* Tanks.'
0-8
P" UAtv "j~
V - 4
f ofew-t, S /;Z
_ I
~ u~1'4 P 6~
t, q 5q (s.ee Pe,+t.., L6 , APPENDIX 2
Report of Proceedings
of Board of Officers
*Org 3085015n: Headquarters, First U. S. Army. * 1.e& Firing was conducted- on terrain per-
:PlAW*: APO 2309 U. S. Army. mitting 1,W0 yards marimum range with a
h
I Proceedixgs of a boardFirst
ed at Headquarters, of obers which pur-
U. S. Army, con- ' ero angle of qlse All guns types of m
mnition, suitable for anitkpuos, * '
suant to Special Order No. 196, Head~narters available to Frn U. S. Army were defeated on
First U. S. Army, 19 July 1944. tagt whose armor plate was slightly burned.
The board met pursuant to the foregoing Upon determination of critical rnges all pen-
~* order at Headquarters, First U. S. Army, APO etrations were proven against the armor plate
S230, at 1400On 12 July 9" and onsubse- of aGerman N&V "Panther" Tank with at.
quent dates to conduct the firing test The mor undamaged and In excellent condition.
final meeting was held on 30 July 1944. Allifiring was conducted normal tothe targeL
Present: All members. PURPOSE: To con- No firing was conducted against the German
duc tests to determine the effectiveness of Mk VI "Time" Tank a there were none avail-
tank and antitank weapons in First U. S. able.
Army, against the German. Nh V -Panther" 6. The following normal types of tank and
and Mk VI "Tgr ak.antitank weapons and amiunition were
tested:
C. The board assumed that the effect of yards On the basis of the assumption in para-
L hollow charge ammunition is not dependent graph 1e, it follows that -a the range increases,
on terminal velocity but the effect does vary thereby reducing the angle of impact against
with the angle at which. the projectile strikes the side of the turret and side armor plate the
Hits approaching a 900 angle Of impact give possibility of penetration will materially de-
better penetration. crease
2. FINDINGS: The board having carefully (2) Lacher, Grenade, MS. Grenade, AT,
considered the evidence before it finds that: MAI, will penetrate the side of the turret
(1) Launcher, Rocket, AT, 2.36incL . and the side and rear armor plate of the "Pan-
Rocket, AT, 2.36.inch, M6A1 will penetrate ther" Tank at G0 yards. On the basis of the
the side of the turret and the side and rear assumption in paragraph lc, it follows that
armor plate of the "Panther" Tank at 100 as the range increases, thereby reducing the
65
angle of impact against the side of the turret (a) 75-mm Gun, M3, Mounted on Medium
and side armor plate, the possibility of pene. Tank m14. wp, M64-Three rounds were
tration will materilly decrease fired at 500 yards for the purpose of obtaining
(3) 37-mm Gum, M6. Mounted on ilgku an incendiary or blinding effecL The results
TWnk M5A1. AMC M51 will penetrate th, were unatifsatory.
sides and rear of the "Panther" Tank at 600 (b) 75-mm Guns, M3, Mouted on Medium
yard'. Task M4. HIE, M(48 w/fs T10OS-Three
(4) 40-mm Gun, MI, (AA). AP, M(58 will rounds were fired at the front glaci. slope
penetrate the sides and rear of the "Panther" plate at 500 yards to determine its armor pene.
Tank at 600 yards. trative characteristics, The rounds failed to
(5) 57-awn Gun, Mi. (a) APC, M86 will pa t ricocheting from the plate and
penetrate the sides and Aear of the "Panther" pug in the air.
Tank at 1,50 y"rs (e) 90-mn. Guns, MIAl, (AA). nE 1(71,
(b) Sabot fails to penetrate front glad. w/fa 1(46--One round wu fied at 1,500
slope plate and gun shield at 200 yards Due yards a a ranging shot. No perceptible effect
to difficulty experienced in obtaining bits no was obtained beyond cracking the welds be-
conclusion as to the effectiveness of this am- tweem the glad.s and nose plate and the glacis
munition was reached. and side plate for a distance of approximately
(6) 75-mm Gun, M13, Mounted on Medium 12 inches. The comner of the glacis slope plate
Tank M4, (a) APC, M(61 will penetrate the' appeared to have a slight depression as a re-
sides and rear of the "Panther" Tank at 1,50 salt of this round.
yards. AMC M(61 at 200 yards will not pene. RECOMMNDATION;S: In view of the above
trate the front armor of the "Panther" Tank. findinp the board recommends: (1) That
(bt) BEAT, M66 (Spea") will not pmn- ftp-i-k by &a Ordnance Department
trate the front glad. slope plate at 500 yards. toeeo amr-pecig ammunition of mna.
mde i P~1~)terially
(Seeassmptin hige muzzle velocity and armor pen-
(7) 3-incA Gas MS5, Mounted on Motor etrative characteristics for the 3-Inch, 76-mm.
Carriage, M10. (a) AMC M62 w/BDF, and 90-mm Guns, accepting, if necessary, a
M66A1 will not penetrate front glad.s slope ~ lf slwa 0 ons
plate at 200 yards. Will penetrate gun mantlet (2) That upon availability of 90-mm. APC.
at 200 yards and penetrate sides and rear of 1(2eunionnthshaertesbeo-
Tnkup o 1500yars.ddeed to detrmine the effectiveness of this
the"Pathe"
(b) AP. M79 will not penetrate the front ammunition against the "Panther" Tank.
slope plate or the anantlet at 200 yards. It (3) That consideration be given by the Ord-
holds no advantage over AMC M(62 amnuni- nance Department to the development of a
tion w/BDF, M66A1. liquid-filled incendiary shell capable of ignit-
(By 90-mm Gums MIAI, (AA). AP, M(77 ing ie target adjacent to the point of impact.
will penetrate front glad.s slope plate up to for the 75-mm Gun and the 105-mm and 155-
600 yards, the gun mantlet up to 1,000 yards, -i Howitsem.
and turret up to 1L50 yads.1 The board adjourned at 1630 on 30 July
(9) lOS-mm Howuiaam, M14, Mounted On im.
Medium Tank M4. HEAT, M(67 will pene-
trate front glacis slope plate and gun mantlet to1 Charles E. Hat8 .[#I Peter C. Mains., 3d
at 500 yards. (See assumption made in par. CHAUL H.ART PrIE C. WARNS, 3d
lc..) Colonel, FA Colonel, Cay* (Armd)
Member President
In addition to testing the normal types of (ai Hawon D. Salisbury
tank and antitank weapons and ammunition, MAsoNf D. SAUSDURY
additional types were tested with the following Captain, FA (Armd)
resul ts: Recorder
66
Endnotes
1. Appendix drawn from Baily, Charles M., Faint Praise: American Tanks and
Tank Destroyers durina World War 11, (Hamden, CN: Shoestring Press, 1983).
2. lbkjL page 60.
3. .bj...
page 107.
4. Table and note at bottom of table extracted from a study prepared by New
Developments Division, WDSS (16 Jan '45), and included in the Tank and Tank
Destroyer Conference at the Army War College, 26 Jan 45. The table show the
thickness in millimeters that a weapon should be able to penetrate at a given
range. [SAIC File # 110]
5. Report of Proceedings of Board of Officers, First US Army. [SAIC File #206]
D-9
APPENDIX E
E-2
ACTIONS COMPLETED, SORTED BY TYPE
DATE LOCATION TYPE
1. August 1944 Mortain - St. Barthelmy 57m AT
2. August 1944 Mortaln - Abbaye Blanche 57. AT
3. December 1944 Belgium - Dom BOtgenbach 57m AT
4. December 1944 Belgium - Do. B~tgenbach 57.m AT
5. December 1944 Belgium - Dom BOtgenbach 57=. AT
6. December 1944 Belgium - Do. BOtgenbach 57.. AT
7. December 1944 elgium - Do. Btgenbach 57= AT
8. December 1944 Belgium - Dom B~tgenbach 57mm AT
9. December 1944 Belgium - Dom Bitgenbach S7mm AT
10. December 1944 Belgium - Loshelmergraben 57=. AT
11. December 1944 Belgium - Krlnkelter Wald 57. AT
12. December 1944 Belgium - Krtnkelt 57. AT
1. August 1944 Mortaln - St. Barthelmy bazooka
2. December 1944 BelgIum - Hanningen bazooka
3. December 1944 Belgium - Schwarzenbr~ch Tr bazooka
4. December 1944 Belgium - SchwarzenbrOch Tr bazooka
5. December 1944 Belgium - Lausdell bazooka
6. December 1944 Belgium - Lausdell bazooka
7. December 1944 Belgium - Lausdell bazooka
8. December 1944 Belgium - Lausde11 bazooka
9. December 1944 Belgium - Ruppenvenn bazooka
10.
11. December
December 1944
1944 Belgium
Belgium -
- Rocherath
Rocherath bazooka
bazooka
12. December 1944 Belgium - Rocherath bazooka
13. December 1944 Belgium - Rocherath bazooka
14. December 1944 Belgium - Krnkelt bazooka
15. December 1944 Belgium - Krlnkelt bazooka
1. December 1944 Belgium - Dom Btgenbach b7m AT, bazooka
1. December 1944 Belgium - Dom Bftgenbach 57mm AT, bazooka
2. December 1944 Belgium - Dom B~tgenbach 57.. AT, bazooka
1. August 1944 ortalIn - St. Barthelny 3 towed
1. August 1944 Mortaln - St. Barthelmy 3' towed
2. August 1944 Mortaln - St. Barthelmy 3" towed
3. August 1944 Mortaln - St. Barthelpy 3 towed
4. August 1944 Mortaln - St. Barthelmy 3" towed
6. August 1944 Mortaln - St. Barthelmy 3* towed
7. August 1944 Mortaln - St. Barthelmy 3" towed
7. August 1944 Mortaln - St. Barthelpy 30 towed
8. August 1944 Mortatn - AbbayS Blanche 3' towed
10. August 1944 Mortaln - Abbays Blanche 30 towed
11. August 1944 Mortaln - Abbaye Blanche 3' towed
12. December 1944 Belgium - SE of Honsfeld 30 towed
13. December 1944 Belgium - Honsfeld 3' towed
14. December 1944 Belgium - S. of HOnnlngen 3' towed
E-3
1. December 1944 Belgium - Dom B~tgenbach 30 SP, 57mm AT
2. December 1944 Belgium - Do. Botgenbach 3'w SP, 57=m AT, bazooka
3. December 1944 Belgium - Do. B~tgenbach 30 SP, 57m AT
4. December 1944 Belgium -Rocherath bazooka, SP TO
1. December 1944 Belgium - W. of Neuhof 155mm Artillery
2. December 1944 Belgium - Lausdell Artillery
3. December 1944 Belgium - Lausdell Artillery
4. December 1944 Belgium - Lausdell Artillery
1. December 1944 Belgium - Lausdell gasoline, grenades
2. December 1944 Belgium - Lausdell AT mines
3. December 1944 Belgium - Rocherath small arms
4. December 1944 Belgium - Rocherath rifle grenades
E-4
= I
-I 1%.
In n
IcI
EUE-5