Bryn Mawr College

Scholarship, Research, and Creative Work at Bryn Mawr

College
Growth and Structure of Cities Faculty Research
Growth and Structure of Cities
and Scholarship

2015

Global borderlands: A case study of Subic Bay

Freeport Zone, Philippines
Victoria Reyes
Bryn Mawr College, [email protected]

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Reyes, Victoria. 2015. “Global borderlands: A case study of Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Philippines” Theory and Society 44(4):355-384

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 Global borderlands

So Title: “Global borderlands: A case study of the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Philippines”

Abstract:
By developing the concept of “global borderlands”–semi-autonomous, foreign-
controlled geographic locations geared toward international exchange–this article shifts
the focus of globalization literature from elite global cities and cities on national borders
to within-country sites owned and/or operated by foreigners and defined by significant
social, cultural, and economic exchange. I analyze three shared features of these sites:
semi-autonomy, symbolic and geographic boundaries, and unequal relations. The multi-
method analyses reveal how the concept of global borderlands can help us better
understand the interactions that occur in the contemporary era of globalization across
people of different nationalities, classes, and races/ethnicities as well as the complex
dynamics that occur within foreign-controlled spaces. I first situate global borderlands
within the literatures of global cities and traditional borderlands. Next, I use the case
study of Subic Bay Freeport Zone (SBFZ), Philippines to show (1) how the semi-
autonomy of global borderlands produces different regulations depending on nationality,
(2) how its geographic and symbolic borders differentiate this space from the surrounding
community, and (3) how the semi-autonomy of these locations and their geographic and
symbolic borders reproduce unequal relations. As home of the former U.S. Subic Bay
Naval Base and current site of a Freeport Zone, the SBFZ serves as a particularly
strategic research location to examine the different forms of interactions that occur
between groups within spaces of unequal power.

Key words: globalization, inequality, borderlands, global cities

Author
Victoria Reyes, Bryn Mawr College, 101 N Merion Ave, Bryn Mawr, PA 19010
[email protected]

See: Reyes, Victoria. 2015. “Global borderlands: A case study of Subic Bay Freeport
Zone, Philippines” Theory and Society 44(4):355-384

I would like to thank Miguel Centeno, Viviana Zelizer, and Doug Massey for their
guidance during this project. I would also like to thank Kerstin Gentsch, Joanne Wang
Golann, and Erin Johnston for comments on earlier versions of this paper as well as Sally
Engle Merry and Annie Bunting for their feedback during the Law and Society
Association’s 2013 Graduate Student Workshop, and Saskia Sassen for her comments at
the 2014 Junior Theorist Symposium. Additionally, Amy A Quark provided valuable
advice during a PEWS mentoring activity at the 2014 ASA. The editors and anonymous
reviewers at Theory & Society also provided invaluable feedback. The research and
writing for this article was supported by generous funds from Princeton University’s
Department of Sociology, East Asian Studies Program, Center for Migration and
Development, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, as well as
the American Sociological Association’s Minority Fellowship Program.

1
 Global borderlands

Since the 1970s, global inequality has dramatically increased. A geography of

power separates the handful of rich societies from the large number of poor ones,

(Korzeniewicz and Moran 2009; Firebaugh 2003).1 Although this division is not new and

dates back to before the “age of empire” (Hobsbawm 1989), the current era of

globalization, by increasing in the speed and intensity of transactions, has arguably

transformed economic, political, and cultural relationships. Scholarship on global

inequality often takes an elite-centered view that focuses on the actors (nation-states,

cities, organizations, or groups) that are able to shape the global political economy, and

on the distribution of important cities nationally and internationally (Neal 2010; Smith

and Timberlake 2001). Such scholarship, which emphasizes the concentration and

distribution of goods and services, has been theorized through the lens of cities (Sassen

2001 [1991]; Castells 1989; Friedmann 1986), as well as dependency and world-systems

perspectives (Frank 1973; Prebisch 1959; Singer 1949; Chase-Dunn and Grimes 1995;

Wallerstein 2004). By definition, these approaches ignore sites of significant international

or intercultural exchange and interaction that occur outside these elite spaces.

In contrast, scholarship on frontiers, borders, and borderlands recognizes how

inequalities are reproduced in places that cross international or intercultural boundaries

(Alvarez 1995; Donnan and Wilson 1999). However, we know surprisingly little about

how inequalities are maintained and reproduced in spaces that are based on cultural,

social, and economic interactions beyond these particular locales and those that occur

within foreign-controlled spaces. Examining unequal interactions–namely, those among

foreign visitors, local visitors, and local workers in institutionalized, semi-autonomous

1
I am aware of the disputes regarding whether it is within- or between-country inequality that is rising. I
use “societies” here to demonstrate that there is an increasing divide between the rich and poor, whether the
unit of analysis is within- or between-countries.

2
 Global borderlands

and foreign-controlled spaces that lie within national and/or city boundaries–contributes

to research around the construction of social boundaries and its relationship to the

reproduction of inequality.

Although Philippine scholars and activists tend to use the former U.S. bases and

current Freeport Zones in the Philippines as symbols of U.S. imperialism and Philippine

dependency (e.g., Kirk 1998; Go 2011), my aim here is to not generate a theory of U.S.

and Philippine economic or military relations nor is it to say whether these spaces are

“good” or “bad” for development. Rather, I seek to identify how specific foreign-

controlled sites within national boundaries perpetuate and maintain unequal spatial,

economic, social and cultural international relationships. Political scientists and

economists analyze the economic and political impact of military bases and Special

Economic Zones (SEZs) on host countries (e.g., Thompson 1975; Cooley 2008), and

scholars writing from the perspective of feminist or ethnic studies emphasize their

negative traits and consequences (e.g., Enloe 2000 [1990]). Historians and

anthropologists analyze the expansion of frontier zones and cross-national ties within

cities on national borders (e.g., Alvarez 1995). I combine these approaches with global

city scholarship to analyze the new globalized and analytic spaces of “global

borderlands.”

In this article, I first define global borderlands and detail their shared features.

Next, I situate global borderlands with the literatures on global cities, which are

economic command and control centers, and traditional borderlands, which highlight

micro interactions across two national boundaries, and note that global borderlands

represent nationally bounded, foreign-controlled centers for cultural and social

3
 Global borderlands

interactions that also have important economic influence for their host nations. In this

way, they are localized command and control centers of varied forms of foreign

exchange. Third, I outline my methodologies and describe the micro setting of the case

study, the Subic Bay Freeport Zone (SBFZ) in the Philippines.

Next I focus on the three features that global borderlands share and show (1) how

the semi-autonomy of global borderlands produces different regulations depending on

nationality through an analysis of the legal case trial on the rape of Nicole, (2) how their

geographic and symbolic borders differentiates these spaces from their surrounding

communities vis-à-vis the socio-spatial organization, moral discourses, and cultural

practices associated with the SBFZ, and (3) how the semi-autonomy of these locales and

their geographic and symbolic borders reproduce unequal relations. To do so, I compare

structural inequality within the SBFZ with locals’ and foreigners’ cultural understandings

of these unequal exchanges to show how inequality is institutionalized in everyday

cultural practices and discourses. I also show on how locals’ perceptions of Americans

and Koreans are filtered through the broader U.S.-Philippine and Korean-Philippine

relations. Although separately, these three features are common, how they come together

in global borderlands is unique because they lie within spaces that are foreign-controlled.

I conclude by describing the significance of analyzing global borderlands as a new unit of

analysis and a social phenomenon. By examining interactions within foreign-controlled

spaces, I focus on how unequal relations between countries play out on the ground, and

the negotiations that occur in spaces where a state’s sovereignty is fluid not just for

businesses–as could be argued for global cities–but within geographically-defined

territories.

4
 Global borderlands

Global borderlands: A definition

Global borderlands are semi-autonomous, foreign-controlled geographic locations

geared toward international exchange. By “international exchange” I mean the

combination of social, cultural, and economic exchanges and interactions, since each

cannot be divorced from the others. Economic exchanges are rooted in shared cultural

understandings and social relationships (e.g., Zelizer 2013; DiMaggio and Louch 1998).

At the same time, cultural and social interactions often involve exchange and have

important economic consequences. I also use the term “foreign-controlled” to refer to

either foreign ownership or heavy foreign influence, where this influence is one of the

defining characteristics of a space–for example, special economic zones are not foreign-

owned but are created to cultivate foreign investment. Additionally, global borderlands

are territorially defined locations where distinct international, state, and sub-national legal

orders overlap, are negotiated, and directly influence one another. These sites include

overseas military bases, SEZs2 (for example, the island province of Hainan in China), all-

inclusive tourist resorts, embassies, cruise ships, and international branch campuses.

For example, NYU Abu Dhabi is a global borderland because it is a U.S.-

controlled and -owned university in the United Arab Emirates; however, NYU in New

York City is not. The semi-autonomy of universities in general–which includes the

maintenance of their own police forces–is not the same because the semi-autonomy of

global borderlands is based on nationality. Additionally, all-inclusive American-owned

2
Special economic zones (SEZ) is a generic term that encapsulates a “geographically delimited area
administered by a single body, offering certain incentives (generally duty-free importing and streamlined
customs procedures) to businesses which physically locate within the zone (FIAS report:10)” This includes
free trade zones, export processing zones, enterprise zones, freeports, single factory EPZ, and specialized
zones (e.g. science parks), each with functions varying from the processing of imports which are then
exported out from the country, to duty free shopping . Because they take different forms, names and sizes
in countries and these types differ by region, there is no overarching international governing body

5
 Global borderlands

resorts, such as the CasaMagna Marriott Cancun Resort in Cancun, Mexico, or

timeshares, such as the RCI-owned Mayan Place Acapulco in Acapulco, Mexico are

global borderlands, but a locally owned and operated hotel in Mexico is not. These places

share a basic framework of semi-autonomy and foreign control, symbolic and geographic

boundaries, and international exchange and unequal relations.

In much the same way as Sassen (2001[1991]) uses the term “global” to

emphasize how globalization is structured and localized in the current era (p. xix), I use

the term “global” in global borderlands to highlight how globalized interactions are

structured and localized in particular places, whose histories and connections with foreign

authorities shape the interactions that occur within them. In these spaces, legal authority

and applicability is ambiguous, and law and punishment differ depending on the identity

of the criminal and the context of the crime. This nationality-based semi-autonomy

occurs on a continuum. For example, overseas military bases are ruled by separate laws–

not those of the host nations–while within SEZs, national economic laws, such as tariff

barriers, are relaxed.3 For all-inclusive, foreign-owned resorts, semi-autonomy is much

more informal.

In developing countries, these spaces represent a particular type of global

borderland defined by the historical and contemporary power relations between countries

and the asymmetric distribution of resources among foreign visitors, local visitors and

local workers. They are not “flat” spaces of international exchange; instead they are

defined by macro (state-to-state) relationships between countries as well as by the micro-

interactions that occur between foreigners and locals, which are further defined by

3
Imports often stay confined within these areas; however, locals are also sometimes able to partake in these
goods and services in small doses–as is in the case of the SBFZ.

6
 Global borderlands

individuals’ class, nationality, race/ethnicity and gender. By examining semi-autonomous

non-city and non-national foreign-controlled spaces surrounded by geographic and

symbolic borders, we can shed light on spatial and symbolic segregation within urban

sociology (Paulsen 2004; Borer 2006) and how overlapping legal orders are managed on

the ground and in the courts (Benton 2008; Merry 1988). Global borderlands, in

particular, represent physical areas where governance and regulations increasingly

depend on national identity.

Such sites are not insignificant. For example, military bases are often bundled

with forms of military and economic aid, leave behind permanent structures that can later

be used locally, and are an important source of employment for locals in host countries.

The number of U.S. overseas military bases alone grew from 173 in 32 countries in 1995

to 750 in 45 countries in 2010 (e.g., Cooley 2008; Evinger 1995; United States

Department of Defense 2010).4 Similarly, the construction of SEZs is one way countries

try to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), which has consequences for national

development–though the benefits and consequences are debated–and the meanings

associated with SEZs differ depending on local context (FIAS report 2008; Evans and

Timberlake 1980; Dixon and Boswell 1996; Rondinelli 1987; Fernandez-Kelly 1989; Lee

1995). Export Processing Zones (EPZs), one of many types of SEZ, grew from 93 in 25

countries in 1997 to 3,500 in 130 countries in 2006 (Boyenge 2007).

Similarly, tourism has been called the “world’s biggest business” and affects

GDP, employment rates, exports, imports and national images (e.g., Goldstone 2001:2,

Rivera 2008; Wherry 2007). All-inclusive resorts and timeshares shape local markets and

4
The U.S. military invested $182 billion between 1989 and 1991 (just a few years before the military
withdrawal) in buildings, structures, infrastructure, and operational and recreational facilities within the
Subic Bay Naval Base; United States General Accounting Office (1992)

7
 Global borderlands

structure the interaction among different groups of people. Their very success depends on

successful short-term relationships being built across nationalities. As of September

2014, the company RCI alone operated 271 resort/vacation exchanges in Africa and the

Middle East, 593 in Asia, 234 in Australia and South Pacific, 114 in Canada, 281 in the

Caribbean and Bermuda, 62 in Central America, 1037 in Europe, 476 in Mexico, and 375

in South America.5

The impact of global borderlands can be immense. Each has its own

infrastructure, workers, and consumers, and they can represent a microcosm of the

relationship between the host and guest nations. Although formal agreements related to

embassies, military bases, and international branch campuses have the most visible and

direct connection between micro-interactions and broader, international arrangements,

timeshares and all-inclusive resorts also share such a connection. For example, in 2013,

news that six tourists were raped in Acapulco, Mexico–a center of foreign tourism–made

global news precisely because it occurred in these spaces;6 additionally, state travel

warnings lead tourists to choose certain destinations over others. In contrast to global

cities, which are concentrated financial hubs, a single borderland in a single country may

not account for a significant share of overall economic, cultural or social global

exchange. However, the sheer number of these institutions is significant and they occur in

all regions of the world.

Forms of international exchange

5
RCI online resort directory, http://www.rci.com/resort-directory/landing, last accessed September 15,
2014. Although this measure is problematic since it is an American-based organization, it allows for some
tangible measure of this phenomenon.
6
See for example: http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/05/world/americas/mexico-tourists-raped/, last accessed
September 15, 2014

8
 Global borderlands

Social science research has a long history of investigating forms of international

exchange. For example, global cities are financial command and control centers; they are

city nodes created by, and dependent on, an international economic network (Sassen

2001[1991]; Friedmann 1986; Friedman and Wolff 1982). Such cities are strategic

research sites for examining the economic processes of globalization and their

implications for internal city dynamics and inequality, as well as for stratification on a

global scale. Some scholars debate which cities can be considered “global cities,” while

others have worked to identify cities’ positions in the world city network and how these

cities are shaped by historically specific, localized processes (Hall 1996; Baum 1997;

Smith and Timberlake 2001; Rimmer 1998; Wang 2004).

Similarly, research on geopolitical borders similarly looks at sites of international

exchange. Although sometimes the words “frontiers” and “borderlands” are used

interchangeably because they both represent the meeting between different types of

groups and acknowledge the existence of “internal” (within a specified territory) and

“external” (across two territories) spaces (Donnan and Wilson 2010; D’Argemir and

Pujadas 1999), frontier scholarship tends to have a one-sided, imperial focus on powers

expanding into “borderless” lands (such as colonial expansion into the American

Southwest) and is “outward-oriented.” In contrast, borderland researchers tend to analyze

how national ideologies and understandings of “belonging” are shaped by changing

political and transportation boundaries; how individuals and states are culturally, socially,

and financially linked; how borderlands are sites of informal and formal consumption,

and cross-national organizational cooperation; how borderland or transnational identities

and cosmopolitanism are created; and how borderlands are sites of contestation,

9
 Global borderlands

negotiation, and meaning-making (Rutherford 2011; Tirres 2008-2010; Rippl, Bucker,

Petrat and Boehnke 2010; Widdis 2010; Pisani 2013; Adelman and Aron 1999).

Other scholars take a less optimistic view, suggesting that both border patrols and

residents on either side of the border can place people into wanted and unwanted

categories based on nationality, race/ethnicity, and class (Helleiner 2012; Sundberg 2008;

Heyman 2009; Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias and Pickles 2012). To these scholars, geo-

political borderlands are sites of institutionalized inequality, are rooted in national

boundaries, or form the symbolic identities of people living in two cultures (Anzaldua

1999; Alvarez 1995). However, precisely because these researchers focus on geopolitical

borders or cities along these borders, they tend to ignore bounded sites within the state

that share similar characteristics.

In analyzing global borderlands, I draw on literatures that emphasize how these

borderlands act as sites where people of groups interact and how they maintain and

reproduce inequalities through social and economic relations as well as cultural

meanings. The global cities literature is also important because of the similarities global

cities and global borderlands share in their social organization, where the dynamics of the

rich necessarily depend on the work of the poor and because the empirical approach to

analyzing and identifying global cities can be adapted to the analysis of global

borderlands.

In defining “global borderlands” as semi-autonomous, foreign-controlled

geographic locations geared towards international exchange, I draw on Sassen’s (2000,

2003 [2000], 2006) work on “analytic borderlands,” which are a “formation of particular

types of territoriality assembled out of ‘national’ and ‘global’ elements, each individual

10
 Global borderlands

or aggregate instance evincing distinct spatio-temporal features” (Sassen 2006, p. 386).

They are “assemblages” of both the national and local. I similarly emphasize the need to

identify places, understand how they are rooted in historical localized processes, examine

their “social thickness” and understand the interconnected (that is, not mutually

exclusive) and partial nature of the global and the national, as well as the transformation

of states’ and people’s territory, authority, and rights. However, my work deviates from

Sassen’s in important ways.

First, I focus on foreign-controlled spaces within a sovereign nation-state. Global

borderlands are specific places of semi-autonomy based on nationality. Second, my

emphasis on place is rooted in specific geographic locations and their ties to local

context. Although the analytic borderlands of digitized finance are “inserted in the

physical space of national territory, they may have little to do with the surrounding

context” (Sassen 2006, p. 394). Within global borderlands, the country, city, and

immediate community in which they are located, the local history, and the historic and

contemporary relationship between the host nation-state and foreign visitors’ countries of

origin are all important. This grounding in history is necessary to understand the complex

interactions that occur within these spaces, and the implications these interactions have

for broader state-to-state relationships.

For example, it is important that the SBFZ’s buildings are former U.S. naval

structures, and that it is located in Olongapo City, and not in another Philippine city. The

relationship between the U.S. Navy and Olongapo is distinct from the relationship

between Subic Bay Naval Base’s sister base, Clark Air Force Base, and its surrounding

community, Angeles City. I argue that this is, in part, because of the greater integration of

11
 Global borderlands

the U.S. Navy with Olongapo. The Subic Bay Naval Base employed almost four times as

did Clark, and the navy was integrated into the Olongapo political dynasty of the

Gordons–the first mayor of Olongapo City was the son of an American Marine (Bowen

1986). Finally, whereas Sassen (2006) emphasizes analytic borderlands’ cross-national

connections, the networked nature of global borderlands is an empirical question.

In analyzing the spaces of “global borderlands,” I follow previous work on how

place, culture, and economy interact with global and national processes. However, I

extend this literature by examining how these interactions and processes occur within

foreign-controlled spaces that are geared toward international exchange.

Methodology and data

I use qualitative historical, interview, ethnographic, and case study methods to

examine the forms of interactions that occur within the Subic Bay Freeport Zone in the

Philippines. I focus on the SBFZ because, as the home of a former U.S. military base and

the current site of a Freeport Zone (FZ), it serves as a particularly “strategic research site”

(Merton 1987) to examine the different ways that groups interact with varied forms of

foreign control within a space of unequal power.

Historical sociology “is the attempt to understand the relationship of personal

activity and experience on the one hand and social organization on the other as something

that is continuously constructed in time” (Abrams 1982, p. 16). Indeed, social, political,

legal, and economic acts have “historical residue” (Sewell 2005, p. 7) that impact

contemporary conditions, and I use an intensive strategy of studying a single place to

develop meaningful historical interpretation (Gocek 1995, p. 107). Following Braudel

(1975), I emphasize (a) path-dependent social conditions and processes that generate

12
 Global borderlands

historical spaces, and (b) the experiences of local actors (Gocek 1995). I also follow

Bradshaw and Wallace’s (1991) assertion that single case studies are particularly useful

for generating theory when they focus on a “special…set of circumstances or phenomena

that warrant intensive study” (p. 155). The SBFZ’s long history as first, as a Spanish

arsenal, then as a U.S. naval base, coupled with its current iteration as a Freeport Zone,

allows me to conduct in-depth study of a single place that has experienced varied forms

of colonial and military foreign power.

I use in-depth interviews, nine months of ethnographic observation, documents

and statistical information. I conducted 47 in-depth, semi-structured interviews of foreign

visitors, local visitors and local workers, a survey of hotel managers inside the FZ, and

informal interviews of local government workers and others whom I befriended in my

daily routine. Interviews revolved around their perceptions of the FZ, reasons that they

visited or worked inside the FZ, comparisons between inside and outside the FZ, and

where they eat, shop, and work. Interviews with foreign visitors were conducted in

English. I am also an intermediate speaker of Filipino (Tagalog), one of the national

languages of the Philippines, and interviews with local workers and local visitors were

conducted in Tagalog, unless they requested to be interviewed in English. Interviewees

were recruited through a flyer, then through snowball sampling where interviewees

recommended others. In-depth interviews are an important source of information that

allows researchers to get at meanings and collective understandings.

I also used a targeted ethnographic approach, spending a total of nine months in

the local area over three three-month periods to focus on specific borderlands and how

they interrelate. In the spirit of classical ethnographic community studies (e.g., Gans

13
 Global borderlands

1962; Stack 1974), I moved into an apartment that was approximately 15 minutes by foot

from the SBFZ, made daily trips into the SBFZ, and conducted participant observation

inside both places (e.g., shopping at local food markets, using local jeepney

transportation, and visiting local businesses). My ethnographic observations produced

three types of data: (1) counts of the number of hotels, businesses, and foreign visitors

inside and outside the borderlands, (2) observations of popular spaces of interactions and

non-interactions among different groups, with a particular focus on differences in skin

color, signals of class, and nationality, and (3) differences in the facilities and resources

available in spaces geared toward foreigners versus those that were not. Documents were

similarly analyzed using an inductive approach that emphasizes identifying emergent

theoretical and substantive patterns.

I conducted keyword searches of “Subic Bay Naval Base,” “Subic Bay Freeport

Zone,” “Subic Bay,” and “Olongapo City” using Westlaw and LexisNexis for U.S. court

cases as well as ChanRobles Virtual Law Library and Lawphil.net for Philippine legal

cases. Philippine-U.S. treaties, as well as Philippine government documents, such as

executive orders and republic acts, were also gathered from ChanRobles and Lawphil.net.

Additionally, I have paper copies of Philippine local cases from visits to the Olongapo

City regional trial courts (RTCs); however, these are limited because the 1992 eruption of

Mt. Pinatubo, which destroyed Clark Air Force Base and damaged the Subic Bay Naval

Base, also destroyed many files. The cases I highlight give insight into the types of

international disputes that occur within global borderlands. I obtained SBFZ statistics

from SBFZ workers in various departments.

Analytic approach

14
 Global borderlands

In analyzing my data, I take a relational approach (Zelizer 2010; Zelizer 2005;

Bandelj 2002; Bandelj 2009) that emphasizes the relationship between two or three

parties. For example, in contrast to global or world-systems analyses that take into

account how the unit of analysis (cities, countries) fits into a global or national

understanding, I draw and expand on Bandelj (2002, 2009) to suggest a more specific

approach aimed at understanding how relationships among actors shape localized

interactions. I have argued elsewhere (2013), that to understand global inequality, we

need to analyze how relationships between countries differ based on their specific

historical, institutional, and cultural connections. Thus, my analytic approach emphasizes

historical connections, cultural understandings, and social structures, and how they relate

to macro and micro power relations. For example, to examine the SBFZ in the

Philippines, it is not enough to consider the Philippines’ former or contemporary global

position, or its U.S. colonial past. Rather, understanding specific relationships–for

example, between the U.S. and the Philippines, Australia and the Philippines, and Japan

and the Philippines–can illuminate how Filipino workers and locals understand and

interact with different types of foreigners, depending on their nationality.

Furthermore, in contrast to Sassen (2006) who emphasizes that economic actors

(defined as firms, organizations, and business people) encounter jurisdictional overlaps in

analytic borderlands and that these spaces privilege the “multiple ‘rights’ to foreign

actors” (Sassen 2006, p. 208), I follow legal pluralist scholars who emphasize the plural

nature of legal orders (e.g., they are not limited to state laws, but also include normative

orders). Thus, my focus is on how these multiple legal orders are differently and similarly

15
 Global borderlands

understood and followed by foreigner and local actors. Furthermore, I compare not just

foreigners and local workers, but also local visitors.

The setting: Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Philippines

The SBFZ is a strategic location to study global borderlands allowing me to

examine how varied forms of foreign authority and investment influence local dynamics.

It served as a port for Spanish colonial powers and was home to the largest overseas U.S.

naval base (Subic Bay Naval Base, or SBNB) until 1992; it now functions as a key

tourism location and an FZ, which continues to host U.S. military ships, and also contains

a port district, shipping and manufacturing businesses, universities, an international

school, a local zoo, a water park, duty-free shopping centers, an upscale mall, three gated

communities and land shared with the Aetas–an indigenous group. The very visibility of

the different types of interactions and conflicts that take place in the SBFZ, rather than

any differences in the nature of these interactions, makes it an ideal case study to examine

inequality, legal ambiguity, and the porous or non-porous construction of boundaries

within foreign-controlled spaces.

Semi-autonomy

I draw on the legal geography and legal pluralism literatures to examine the

ambiguity and contextual nature of the semi-autonomous legal spaces of the SBNB and

SBFZ. Legal geographers emphasize the interwoven connections between space and law,

and how this relationship produces and reproduces meanings, identities, and

differentiations among people (Blandy and Sibley 2010; Butler 2009; Delaney, Ford, and

Blomley 2001). Territories and bounded spaces are not found; rather, their borders are

created, negotiated, and contested. They mediate the relationship between individuals and

16
 Global borderlands

their governing authority, and they are spatial representations of power and inequality

(Blomley 2010).

The negotiations and rules over and within borders and places often occur with

spaces where different cultures and people interact. For example, drawing on the legal

geography literature, Gould (2003) demonstrates how British settlers engaged in different

behaviors, obeying or flouting British laws, depending on whom they came in contact

with. In this way, settlers justified acts of war with non-Europeans because “into the early

years of the eighteenth century, the British…held that key European treaties did not apply

(or did not apply with equal force) outside the so-called lines of amity, the imaginary

quadrant that distinguished Europe from Asia, Africa, and the Americas” (479).

Similarly, certain acts, such as scalping were prohibited except when the enemy were

“Indians, or Canad[ians] dressed like Indians” (Gould 2003, p. 483). Whom the

Europeans interacted with and where these interactions took place determined what laws

they would follow.

Scholars interested in similar cross-cultural interactions often also draw on

research on legal pluralism, defined as social fields where two or more legal systems

coexist (Berman 2009; Griffiths 1986; Tamanaha 2007; Michaels 2009; Merry 1988).

The research on legal pluralism acknowledges how jurisdiction over people, rules, norms,

and expectations is increasingly ambiguous and depends on the identity of individuals

and the government. For examples, scholars have shown how colonial regimes shape

indigenous laws, how courts blend indigenous and national laws, how unofficial religious

laws are practiced to reassert identity, how international legal decisions influence

17
 Global borderlands

domestic laws, and how national and transnational court decisions are intertwined

(Synder 1981; Yilmaz 2008; De Sousa Santos 2006; Scheppele 2010).

Legal geographers have emphasized the role that place and space play in

negotiations and contestations over legal authority, while insights from legal pluralism

highlight how people on the ground negotiate and behave in spaces where legal rules,

authority, practices and norms overlap. Global borderlands are geographically defined

places that are semi-sovereign, foreign-controlled and predicated on intersections

between different groups of people and nations, where the legal order is increasingly

differentiated depending on nationality.

In the case of the SBFZ, important legal and cultural issues such as sovereignty,

legal authority, and power differentials come to light through a number of cases and

agreements. The 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) that currently governs U.S.

armed forces in the Philippines has roots in the original 1947 Military Bases Agreement

(MBA), and the U.S. and R.P. (Republic of the Philippines) negotiated very specific

terms around who has authority over what, where, and when regarding both civil and

criminal matters. The results of these negotiations reflect the uneven power dynamics that

govern macro U.S. and R.P. relations.

For example, an important VFA article delineates who has jurisdiction over what

crimes and under which circumstances. The U.S. has jurisdiction with regard to: (1) “all

criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the military law of the United

States over United States personnel in the Philippines,” including offenses solely against

U.S. property, security or persons, or those done in performance of official duty. The R.P.

has jurisdiction over U.S. personnel over all other offenses, except those spelled out for

18
 Global borderlands

U.S. jurisdiction. Although these guidelines are similar to those of the earlier MBA, there

are added sections to the VFA article on criminal jurisdiction that are presumably

included to give full credence to Philippine sovereignty. For instance, if the U.S.

authorities determine that an act is done in the performance of official duty, they have to

issue a certificate to Philippine authorities and if those authorities question the

certificate’s validity, a review that includes U.S. and R.P. authorities “at the highest

levels.” However, like the MBA, the VFA has other ambiguous and not-so-ambiguous

clauses that structure the U.S.-R.P. relationship so as to limit full use of Philippine

sovereignty. For instance, either government may request the other to waive its primary

right, but

recognizing the responsibility of the United States military authorities to maintain good
order and discipline among their forces, Philippine authorities will, upon request by the
United States, waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction except in cases of
particular importance to the Philippines

The treaty allows a channel of contestation, but the U.S. has only to take these

requests into account and does not have to abide by them. Furthermore, once an

American is convicted, his or her confinement or detention by the R.P. “shall be carried

out in facilities agreed upon by appropriate Philippine and United States authorities.” The

language that specifies court and custody jurisdiction is left ambiguous, with clear

avenues for individual R.P. and U.S. officials to come to an agreement that leaves the

negotiations open to influences of power and pressure.

The case of Nicole

Issues regarding the one-year time limit for trials–after which the U.S. does not

have any obligations to produce an accused person–and of custody before, during, and

after trial, which are included in the VFA, are contested, and this can be seen through the

19
 Global borderlands

legal case trial of the rape of Nicole, a pseudonym used by Philippine courts and media to

protect her identity. On October 30, 2005 Nicole, a 22 year-old Filipina, and her sister

traveled to the Subic Bay Freeport Zone under the invitation of two servicemen who were

their friends. After a night of drinking and dancing on the 31st, and in a white van with

three other servicemen in the back, Nicole and Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith had

sexual intercourse – rape as alleged by Nicole, consensual sex as countered by Smith.

This case ended in April 2009 when Smith’s guilty verdict was overturned by the

Philippine Court of Appeals.

Nicole’s trial was popularly known as the Subic Rape Case. The custody of Smith

before, during and after his trial–but not court jurisdiction–was at the forefront of

controversy between the two nations. In his ruling on Smith’s petition to be transferred to

U.S. custody after his conviction–which was dismissed before he ruled, because Smith

had already been transferred to U.S. authorities–Judge Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.

eloquently outlines why and how custody relates to sovereignty and dependence. He said

that “at the core of the controversy is the basic question of who gets to keep a person who

has been charged, tried and convicted of committing a crime, or stated differently, who

should punish persons who commit crimes in a given territory.” He framed the issue of

custody in terms of sovereignty and territorial supremacy, when he said that being able to

punish people for the crimes committed within their boundaries is the sign of a sovereign

state.7 Additionally, he pointed out how jurisdiction and custody go hand in hand, the one

7
This echoes Weber’s definition of power as “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will
be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance” (Weber 1978:53) and the state as an actor who
“successful upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of
order” (Guenther and Wittich 1978:54).

20
 Global borderlands

being an essential part of the other, and that the VFA is about protecting the people of the

host nation, not the foreign, visiting soldiers.

In his ruling, Judge Bruselas also noted that the U.S. did not immediately turn

Smith over after his arrest, and that officials did not respond to multiple requests (through

embassy notes) from the Philippine government for custody of Smith, nor did they file an

official request for his custody. This assertion is borne out through an analysis of the

embassy notes in question (see CA-G.R. SP. NO. 97212 for copies of these notes). On

November 16, 2005, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs sent an embassy note

to the U.S. requesting that it turn over the servicemen involved in the alleged crime,

noting that custody was to be decided among U.S. and Philippine authorities and citing

the VFA clauses related to the non-receipt of a formal request for U.S. custody and the

extraordinary, heinous nature of the case. The U.S. embassy ignored the note until a

follow-up exchange almost two months later. On January 16, 2006, the U.S. responded

that “having taken full account of the position of the Government of the Philippines

regarding custody, the U.S. Government shall continue to exercise custody until

completion of all judicial proceedings, as provided for by Article V, paragraph 6 of the

Visiting Forces Agreement.”

An immediate reply from the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs clarifies

why the Subic Rape Case qualifies as an extraordinary case. The note reads

The Philippine Government is seriously concerned over the patent disparity in the
treatment of U.S. military personnel in other countries on the issue of custody in criminal
cases. In the light of the decision of the United States Government to maintain its position
on the issue of custody during trial, the Department of Foreign Affairs wishes to continue
discussions on this matter ...

The U.S. retained custody of Smith until the end of the legal proceedings.

However, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs’ reply outlines how the issues of

21
 Global borderlands

sovereignty and dependence rely, in part, on disputes between territory and nationality in

criminal cases. They do so by noting the seeming pattern of unequal treatment of U.S.

personnel–by virtue of their nationality and not dependent on the territorial authority in

which the crimes were committed–in criminal cases across countries.

This issue of disparate treatment based on nationality goes hand-in-hand with

discussions of sovereignty and can also be seen through the discourse of the protesters

during and after the trial. For example, in a November 1, 2006 protest, activists shouted,

"U.S. band of rapists, guilty, ikulong, parusahan [jail them, punish them]," while Nicole,

who helped lead the protest, asked, “Why can't our government do anything to stop the

Americans from coming here? [We need] to avoid another rape [of Filipinas].” She also

expressed dismay at the sight of US ships in Subic again “as if nothing happened, as if it

is business as usual.”8 Likewise, in a November 21, 2006 rally, protester Joms Salvador,

referring to the VFA and the U.S. custody of Smith, told a newspaper, "[the Philippine]

government has long been subservient to the US."9

Similar discourses arose after Smith’s guilty verdict–both in protests and in court

documents. Although Smith’s conviction was seen as a victory of Philippine

independence, the controversy over post-conviction custody and detention refueled the

discourse of U.S. imperialism and Philippine dependency. For example, Evalyn Ursua,

Nicole’s lawyer, said that she would “file criminal cases against Foreign Affairs

Secretary Alberto Romula, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzalez and all those responsible for

Smith’s transfer [because] they are all rapists. They raped our Constitution. They should

8
http://www.inquirer.net/specialreports/subicrapecase/view.php?db=1&article=20061102-30202, last
accessed June 7, 2014
9
http://www.inquirer.net/specialreports/subicrapecase/view.php?db=1&article=20061121-33922, last
accessed June 7, 2014

22
 Global borderlands

all be held criminally liable.” Furthermore, she called U.S. efforts over the transfer “arm-

twisting” of the Philippine government and said that Philippine President Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo could be impeached for allowing this “violation of our sovereignty”

and “clear foreign intervention.”10

Government officials also used the trial to condemn the U.S. For example, Bayan

Muna partylist Representative Satur Ocampo said:

The appellate court’s reversal of the lower court’s conviction of Lance Corporal Daniel
Smith for raping [Nicole] is at bottom a major blow to our national sovereignty and
dignity, and to Philippine jurisprudence…[the Court] adopted the defense side, as it gave
more credence to the supposed recantation of the victim prepared by the lawyers of the
accused…In practical effect, the Court of Appeals decision abets the abuses of ‘visiting’
US military forces that have a historical record since the long years of the US military
bases presence in the country.

The Court’s acquittal of Smith also raises questions about possible political

pressure on the justices from the US government and the executive branch. Akbayan

party list Representative Risa Hontiveros said that Malacañang’s [the President’s

residence] role in facilitating Smith’s transfer to U.S. custody “lacked gender sensitivity

and nationalism and [was] an insult to our nation.”11

Nicole recanted her testimony before the Court of Appeals decision was filed,

though the judge specifically stated that the court did not take the recantation into

account. However, although the indirect effects of her recantation are unknown, it would

not be far-fetched to think that her recantation, (in which she said that she “was so drunk

when the incident happened” and “she raised doubts that Smith raped her, admitting that

she was attracted to the US Marine officer”12) was subject to U.S. influence, since shortly

10
http://www.inquirer.net/specialreports/subicrapecase/view.php?db=1&article=20061230-40832, last
accessed June 7, 2014
11
http://www.inquirer.net/specialreports/subicrapecase/view.php?db=1&article=20090424-201241, last
accessed June 7, 2014
12
http://www.preda.org/en/newsitems/subic-rape-victim-nicole-recanted-her-earlier-statements-that-lance-
corporal-daniel-smith-who-was-convicted-in-2007-raped-her/, last accessed June 7, 2014

23
 Global borderlands

after she withdrew her testimony, she permanently left the Philippines to reside in the

United States. Her retraction could then be used by the U.S. and others to counter and/or

silence the issues raised in the case.

From the beginning of the trial until after Smith’s acquittal in 2009 by the

Philippine Court of Appeals–which declared that there was insufficient evidence of rape–

judges, along with newspaper accounts, protests, and activist writings, imbued the

various court decisions with symbolism, meanings, and understandings of sovereignty,

respect, and (in)dependence among nations. Perhaps one of the most widely covered

trials related to U.S. and Philippine relations in the Philippines, this case, despite formal

agreements on criminal jurisdiction, shows the fluidity of semi-sovereignty, the varied

meanings it holds, and the importance and negotiations over space, place, and nationality,

despite formal agreements on criminal jurisdiction.

Geographic and symbolic borders

The semi-autonomy and legal geography of the SBFZ are demarcated by

geographical and symbolic borders. The theory of global cities also includes an

increasing spatial separation between the rich and the poor (e.g., Sassen 2001[1991];

Friedmann 1986). For example, Loukaitou-Sideris and Gilbert (2000) argue that workers

not only occupy separate spaces, but also differently perceive and attach meanings of

“belonging,” safety, and group territory to specific sections of downtown L.A. This idea

that cities are bounded, that certain areas cater to certain types of people, and that

strangers or “others” are not wanted is not a new concept. Since their origin, cities have

been both political and spatial phenomena (e.g., Pirenne 1969) and they reflect the

stratification of the societies to which they belong (Massey 2005). For example, much of

24
 Global borderlands

the research on cities has shown the geographic and symbolic segregation of minorities

and the poor (e.g., Sassen 1990). This includes American residential segregation patterns,

ethnic enclaves, colonial residence patterns, fortress cities, and slums (Massey and

Denton 1993; Drakakis-Smith 2000). Such borders also serve to concentrate and spatially

isolate the wealthy, for example, in gated communities, fortified enclaves, and suburban

shopping malls (Grant and Mittelsteadt 2004; Blakely and Synder 1999; Caldeira 1996;

Cohen 1996). These spatial arrangements are also often intertwined with symbolic

meanings that enforce social boundaries (Lamont and Molnar 2002). Ethnographies, in

particular, have a long tradition of examining how the meanings that people attach to

places where they work, live, and visit are shaped by spatial organization (e.g., Cressey

1932; DuBois 1996 [1899]; Drake and Cayton 1993[1945]; Zorbough 1929; Liebow

1967; Anderson 1992; Duneier 2000).

The city of Manila, Philippines, has been used to examine how these geographic

borders interact with symbolic meanings and social stratification, and perpetuate class

inequality (e.g., Shatkin 2005/2006; Berner and Korff 1995). For example, Garrido

(2013) links the symbolic and geographic boundaries that separate the rich from the poor

in Manila to the segregating practices that both groups engage in to reinforce their “sense

of place”–where “certain types of places (enclaves or slums) or the people associated

with those places elicit certain introspective states (mental states, including affect and

motivation), which, in turn, predispose certain segregating practices” (Garrido 2013, p.

1344)–thus maintaining spatial and social inequality. Global borderlands similarly

highlight the segregation between the rich and the poor; however, these locations have

legally enforced gated or guarded boundaries around a semi-autonomous space owned

25
 Global borderlands

and/or operated and influenced by foreigners. These boundaries involve not just

racial/ethnic and class differences but also those based on nationality.

For the SBFZ, these geographic and symbolic boundaries revolve around the

institutionalization of the legacies of the U.S. military–in its built environment,

discourses surrounding the differences between inside and outside, and associated

cultural practices. The U.S. military left behind an estimated $8 billion worth of

infrastructure (Bowen, Leinbach, and Mabazza 2002), and Filipino officials instilled

these buildings with a cultural myth weaving together the site’s past as a base and its

future as an economic stronghold. This is true in documents, where lease contracts

continue to reference the military base; in the military bunkers-turned-gated housing

communities for foreigners and Filipinos, whose residents are not permitted to change

their military-based façade; and in other former U.S. buildings that were transformed for

SBFZ use, for example, American ammunition bunkers that were turned into Zoobic

Safari attractions, (Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority 2009; Subic Bay Metropolitan

Authority 2011, p. 14).13

The visual legacies of the U.S. military are most telling at the SBFZ’s “Main” or

Magsaysay gated and guarded walking entrance. A bridge runs over a tributary branch of

the Kalaklan River and connects Olongapo City to the SBFZ. This bridge and the sentry

stations–the first visual cues of the SBFZ–maintain the U.S. military’s original built

forms. The sentry station has four queues, which vendors, residents, employers,

employees, and students–who all require Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA)

IDs–as well as visitors and shoppers–who are not required to have IDs–must walk

13
See Zoobic Safari’s “About” page for information related to the use of former ammunition bunkers,
http://www.zoobic.com.ph/about

26
 Global borderlands

through to enter or leave the area. Armed Filipino guards sit and stand among the queues

and in the station office to watch people as they come and go. They have the authority to

search any person or item, and this is one way they regulate who enters the SBFZ, since

no formal laws specify who is and is not allowed inside (Subic Bay Metropolitan

Authority 1992). Thus, the guards can enforce the informal norm of excluding the poor

and informal, unregistered vendors based on their “presentation of self” (Goffman 1959).

Clothes, shoes, and general appearance all identify the rich, who “belong,” and the poor,

who do not. According to my interviewees and the people I befriended during my

fieldwork, there’s a noticeable and obvious difference in the clothing and appearance of

people who frequent the SBFZ–their clothes are nice, without holes, they are well

groomed, and they always wear shoes–and those who do not.

Discourse comparing the SBFZ with the surrounding city of Olongapo also

reinforces its geographic and symbolic boundaries. Interviewees and others I encountered

still referred to SBFZ as “the base,” reflecting the common knowledge that it is distinct,

different from Olongapo City, and for foreigners and rich Filipinos. Harbor Point mall

workers describe the SBFZ as “clean,” “spacious,” “civilized,” “good,” “like Manila,”

“safer,” “[having] lots of job opportunities,” and “disciplined” because of the prevalence

of security officers and the perception that there is relatively less crime and less pollution.

Although security officers serve as literal and figurative gatekeepers, their very presence

signals a benefit to workers. Ramon,14 a Filipino contractor with the SBMA, said that the

difference is apparent “the moment you step up in the gate. … It’s good in FZ. I think

there in FZ much more order, as a practice [SBMA officials try] to continue [the] orderly

[nature/practices of the] military base [when it transformed in]to the economic zone.”
14
All names are pseudonyms

27
 Global borderlands

Maria, a Filipina high school teacher, said that the SBFZ is “better because [there is] lots

of new stuff, [there’s] no trouble or noisy.” Jing, a Filipino local, said that you can “find

all you want” in the SBFZ. Teresa, also a local Filipina, noted the contrast–the SBFZ is

“not the same as outside... [there are] lots of obstacles there [in Olongapo City].”

However, local workers’ and visitors’ view of security guards as symbols of safety and

order was in direct contrast to the views of the U.S. military personnel I interviewed. In

particular, Rob, an African American seaman, pointed out that guards often had empty

holsters, and he wasn’t sure what kind of training they received, while George, a white

American seaman, said he could probably “kill [them] with bare hands.”

Foreigner visitors see the SBFZ’s geographic and symbolic boundaries much like

the locals do, though their references of place–their home country–are different. For

example, Jeremy, a white Australian whose business is in the SBFZ, says that there’s a

“big difference [compared to Olongapo]. The Freeport, [is] just normal,” (emphasis

mine). Pat, a white British businessman, concurred; he said that “the Freeport is

organized and it's safer, I think, than outside.” Mary, a white Canadian who had been

active in business in the SBFZ since its inception reminisced:

There are two different answers to that, if you ask [what the differences
were between the SBFZ and Olongapo City] 10 years ago, I’ll give you
a completely different answer. Well, as you know, the Freeport started
in 1992, virtually and it was a very exciting time because the Freeport
was being transformed from military base to what it is today. It was a
lot more exciting and fewer problems, fewer people, bus traffic, it was
exciting. A lot of the people coming here as investors at the time were
form different countries all over the place and it was much smaller than
it is now, so you could kind of need people as they moved in and they
were very sure the same kind of problems and where can I get this, that
sort thing. Now, it’s all spread out. There isn’t that same sort of
community, can I call it camaraderie, than they used to be

Now, Mary laments, with the building of the Harbor Point mall,

where you get a bigger influx of people of course there’s more crime, if
you will, mostly petty crime but copper theft is a huge problem here.

28
 Global borderlands

Anything that’s got copper in it, street lights, sometimes two kilometers
of street lights will not be working, we find out because they're stealing
the wires constantly, which is a shame.

Gloria, a white American who spends part of her time in the SBFZ, and the other

in Hong Kong, when asked about the differences between the SBFZ and Olongapo said:

You know, it’s just a different environment. So there’s [the] issue [of going
places at certain times to avoid crowds], but the other thing that’s hard to see, is
it’s hard to see my husband fished a bunch of dead -- or bunch of kittens live out
of the garbage can. I’ve to see yet a day where there’s not someone urinating in
public or an animal being abused outside of the Freeport. It doesn’t happen very
much and that really affects you on the psychological level … [though] it's
definitely safer also. That’s a very big point. The other point is the chances of
me being harassed at Royal are a lot less than at the palengke. The chances of
my vehicle being broken into or just is not the same in the Freeport. So, a lot of
people will live here and face it will pay more and cost more just to be able to
have that, I won’t say higher standard for living but you’re actually essentially
paying for a safer environment even though it’s not related to the security
officers

These discourses are associated with distinct cultural practices that differ from

those outside the SBFZ. One practice that contributes to these discourses is trash pickup.

The absence of litter within the FZ is particularly noticeable as soon as you walk through

the main gate. The FZ’s cleanliness is one of the first things Filipino workers, Filipino

visitors, and foreign visitors alike commented on when asked about the differences inside

and outside the zone. Litter is perceived as “bad” in the U.S. (Sampson and Raudenbush

2004; Wilson and Kelling 1982). Although environmental laws prohibit littering in the

Philippines (Philippines 1975; Philippines 1997; Philippines 2001), throwing trash on the

ground is the norm. I have seen people hold onto trash inside the SBFZ, and throw it on

the ground as soon as they exit the gate.

Just as Murphy (2012) observes for American suburbs, the structural constraints

of the availability of trashcans and trash collection contribute to the buildup of litter

around Olongapo City. However, these factors do not account for all of it. Convenience

29
 Global borderlands

stores, branch fast food restaurants, and the SM mall15 in Olongapo City all have

trashcans outside their storefronts, and employees maintain their cleanliness.

Additionally, the SBFZ trashcans are often filled not with garbage, but rather with leaves,

tree branches and other miscellaneous items. Trashcans do not automatically mean that

people will place litter inside them. And the practice of not littering is more strictly

enforced in certain areas of the SBFZ than in others. For example, near the gated

entrances as well as within and around businesses, litter is absent; however, a walk or

drive around the various parts where there is not a lot of foot traffic and few visitors

shows that certain pockets of the FZ do continue to accumulate litter. The institutional

legacy does not influence cultural practices evenly.

The differences in these practices result from official enforcement of rules and

regulations and from local government officials cultivating the institutional legacy of the

military base. When the base was operational, rules prohibited litter. When the military

withdrew, Filipinos continued the American patterns of behavior because they had

become normalized and routinized. The first SBMA chairman also preserved and policed

these behaviors to maintain the symbolic link to the U.S. and to court international

businesses by signaling the SBFZ’s status as a standard Western environment. As

Douglas (2008 [1966]) argues, social relations and stratification are reinforced by

practices and discourses of pollution and cleanliness. In the SBFZ practices that reduce

visible litter and trash are one way that Filipinos and foreigners alike reinforce the

symbolic and geographic boundaries that separate it from Olongapo. In other types of

global borderlands, these boundaries may take different forms.

15
SM trashcans are only available during store hours–every morning workers haul them outside, every
night they are brought in

30
 Global borderlands

However, some of these geographic and symbolic boundaries, and the practices

associated with them, are more permeable than others. Corruption is a prime example of

how Philippine practices penetrate the SBFZ. Bureaucracy and red tape in the SBFZ, and

in the Philippines in general, present an opportunity for corruption and it contributes to

inequality in that jobs are often created to be given to certain people over others. It

becomes a cycle, where jobs are created due to over-population and utang na loob (debt

of gratitude, reciprocating social or economic debts and taking care of family), which

then creates obstacles to employment; for example, requiring paperwork that necessitates

multiple signatures from multiple offices. Local workers at the Harbor Point mall note

that there is no clear guideline for how to fulfill work requirements, such as medical

clearance, SBMA ID, SBFZ ID, specific store ID, security clearance, or a letter from

their barangay [neighborhood] captain [the elected official who represents the barangay]

who testifies to the candidates’ “moral being.” Kelly (2001) argues that this requirement

helps prevent union strikes since barangay captains hold deep influence over families.

Some workers lamented that it was very difficult to obtain the paperwork they needed to

begin their job because they had no knowledge of how to navigate the bureaucracy.

Although some workers obtain employment through SBMA job fairs, many people are

hired because of connections, often when a friend alerts them to an opening in their store

and walks them through the paperwork process. However, this and other forms of

corruption are deeply endemic to Philippine society, so workers tend to expect it.

Foreigners who live and work near or inside the SBFZ also articulate how

corruption occurs within the SBFZ. For example, Jeremy talked about needing to factor

bribes into his business expenses, since truck drivers going to Manila to pick up material

31
 Global borderlands

are consistently stopped by police and required to pay bribes, and Pat shared how his

business contracts were held up or turned down at the last minute due to certain

politicians’ influences. He also noticed, because he has ongoing cases against employees

who owe him a debt, how people are able to hold up the court process if “they pay the

right person.” Both of these men described the corruption of customs agents, who

required exorbitant bribes to release shipping containers, regardless of whether they

contained legal or illegal goods.

The borders signifying the SBFZ are ambiguously seen. For foreigners, the SBFZ

is at times too Filipino and corrupt, while at other times, it reflects a community “like

home.” To Filipinos the social stratification reinforced by these boundaries designates

this space as American and Western–for foreigners and rich Filipinos. The maintenance

(e.g., litter) or disregard (e.g., corruption) of some laws over others highlights the semi-

permeability of these borders, and how they differ depending on social position and

nationality, as well as the intent of government officials.16 The geographic and symbolic

borders that surround these semi-autonomous, foreign-controlled spaces signify unequal

exchanges between different groups of people.

Unequal relations

A key feature of global borderlands is that the nature of their inequality is such

that the everyday unequal interactions between different groups of people reflect

differences not only between classes, but also broader power structures between

countries, since they are foreign-controlled. However, unequal relationships are not

exclusive to global borderlands. A key component of the global or world city hypothesis

16
For an more in-depth examination of the legacies of the U.S. military on the SBFZ’s socio-spatial
organization, see Reyes (unpublished)

32
 Global borderlands

is that the economic concentration within global cities necessarily relies on economic and

social polarization, and that the creation and maintenance of global cities relies on the

growing chasm between the very rich and the very poor, which includes particular

relationships involving race, gender, and immigrant status–though others maintain that

global cities can be linked to a rise in professionalization (Sassen 2001[1991];

Mollenkopf and Castells 1992; Hamnett 1994; Baum 1999).

Particularly when they are in developing countries, global borderlands–like many

other places–are also built on structural foundations of inequality. The establishment and

closing of U.S. military bases are associated with changing patterns of employment,

travel, and crime (e.g., Thanner and Segal 2008). Interdisciplinary and feminist research,

which dominates the literature on U.S. overseas military bases, tends to focus on the

negative consequences of these installations, including human trafficking, sex tourism,

violations of sovereignty, and anti-militarism, seeing them as outlets of imperialism (e.g.,

Hughes, Chon and Ellerman 2007; Gonzalez 2007; Yeo 2010).

Research on SEZs reflects the variability in the definitions, functions, processes,

and outcomes of these zones. For example, Ong (2006) explores “neoliberalism as

exception” and analyzes how our traditional understandings of citizenship and

sovereignty is being unraveled and reconceptualized through government use of

neoliberal ideology to advance market-based economic and technological approaches as

development strategies (6). In SEZs, this is seen through the exclusion of citizenship for

some populations (the poor, women, low-skilled workers) who are overregulated, and

“graduated citizenship” of others, who are less regulated, based on race and ethnicity.

However, the concept of neoliberalism as exception is not geographically bound but also

33
 Global borderlands

includes changing definitions, for example, of gender. Alternatively, Sklair and Robbins

(2002) advocate a global-systems theory that, similar to the approaches by Zelizer (2005)

and Bandelj (2002, 2009), highlights how transnational practices operate in economic,

political, and cultural-ideological spheres that are “superimposed upon each other rather

than separate spheres” (p. 82). Using a transnational (transcending nation-states) rather

than an inter-national (between nation-states) approach, he uses Mexican maquiladoras

and the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone to explore the effects of export-led

industrialization fuelled by foreign investment and technology on temporary

urbanization, the emergence of new classes who benefit from the creation of these zones,

and how they influence the ways that capitalism is integrated within countries (Sklair

1991, 1992).

Global borderlands’ spatiality is an important characteristic, as is the focus on

social and cultural exchanges and not just labor and other types of economic exchanges.

In contrast to Ong, my analytic approach is not limited to the Western, neoliberal

economic and political influence but highlights specific cultural understandings,

historical connections and institutions that structure the varied forms of interaction within

these spaces; additionally I use the term nationality as opposed to the concept of

citizenship, since regulations are based on a continuum and differ according to the

aforementioned forms of interaction between countries that are shaped by history,

culture, and institutions. Though this approach is similar to Sklair’s, it differs in that I

analyze specific between-country relationships, not transnational processes, to explore

the varied cultural understandings, historical connections, and social structures of and

between local and foreign visitors and workers.

34
 Global borderlands

To examine how inequality relates to social structures, locals’ and visitors’

cultural understandings of the zone, and the historical macro relationships between

various countries, I focus specifically on work practices and discourses through a case

study of the Harbor Point mall (HP) in the SBFZ, which opened in April 2012;

newspaper analysis of Korean-owned Hanjin Shipping, an SBFZ shipping and

manufacturing company; and a document- and interview-based examination of the former

U.S. military base. I also examine locals’ perceptions of Americans and Koreans to

illustrate how state-to-state relations influence and are influenced by micro-interactions.

First, it is important to note that as in many places, structural inequality underlines

interactions between workers and consumers, as well as foreigners and visitors. For

example, there is a significant wage differential between local workers and both local and

foreign visitors. Wages of Harbor Point employees range from 230 to 330 Philippine

pesos (Php). The average fast food meal in the mall costs upwards of 79 to 99 Php,

almost one-third of their daily wage. This is in contrast to meals, including rice and

drinks, offered at local palengke stalls that range from 30 to 65 pesos. When workers

spoke of lunch, they talked about how they brought their lunch to work and very rarely

ate at fast food or other restaurants in the mall because of the price. Eating “out” is a

luxury workers can rarely afford, reserved for special occasions or for payday. Contrast

this with a self-employed Filipino businessman, a consultant and advisor to the SBMA,

whom I saw nearly everyday at a coffee shop inside HP; sometimes he would read a

paper and drink coffee, while at other times he conducted business meetings, treated

colleagues to merienda (snacks) and used the coffee shop as a work space. His salary was

100,000 Php per month. Calculating workers’ monthly salary using a six-day workweek,

35
 Global borderlands

workers’ monthly salaries are 6% (5,520Php) to 8% (7,920Php) of his. Similarly,

compared to American military salaries, which ranged from $1,000 ($600 in cash, $400

towards bills through allotments) every two weeks to $80,000 per year and others’

salaries–including an American “sexpat” (a term used by a Peace Corps Volunteer (PCV)

to describe a sex tourist) whose annual salary ranged from $20,000 to $60,000 depending

on the year and a British businessman who did not want to disclose his salary but said it

was “a range. Quite a lot,” these workers’ salaries are extremely low–though PCV’s

salaries are comparable at 150Php per day and missionaries raise their own money before

they embark on their trip.

The meanings of work within the SBFZ are complex and depend on the social

position that individuals occupy. For example, despite the wide gap in pay between

themselves and foreigners, Filipino mall employees prefer to work inside the SBFZ rather

than outside because minimum wage rules are regulated and enforced, workers are

eligible for social security benefits, and employment is more stable and available. Like

other types of immigrants who migrate within-country or internationally, they occupy a

privileged social position when compared to workers outside the SBFZ and to their

families. Interviewees were often the family breadwinners, sending remittances to family

members in the province if they lived in a boarding house nearby, or paying for a

substantial amount of their families’ housing and living costs, often giving half of each

paycheck to the head of their household.

Furthermore, when we look at interactions between different groups of workers,

employers and consumers, meanings about one another take varied forms based on

historical and contemporary meso (organizational)- and macro-relationships between

36
 Global borderlands

nation-states. These broader relationships are filtered through everyday interactions,

which both directly influence and are influenced by the macro ties between nation-states.

Here, I analyze Philippine-American and Philippine-Korean relationships through work

and consumption practices and the associated moral discourses.

Locals’ perceptions of Americans

According to Harbor Point mall employees, Americans are “friendly” and treated

workers “good” and with “more respect” than even Filipino visitors who were “stuck up”

reflecting the class-based workings of Philippine society. Local visitors who used to work

at the former base also expressed this sentiment. For example, Maria says:

I worked with Americans before, they were my employer. So in comparison, with the
salary and their treatment, Americans are better. They gave us all the benefits and treat
their employees right. Although there are some Americans who doesn’t treat their
workers well, it’s not all of them. I once had a supervisor that was biased against
Filipinos, but the rest, they were all kind people. Actually, I was given an A or an
outstanding rate by our superintendent for three years…he appreciated my work. So
when the time came that they left, it felt sad. We actually didn’t want to leave. We visited
the US counter facility before [they left]. We gathered the staff and reminisced about
everything…We miss our co-workers that are now living abroad. They returned to the
Philippines once and we had a reunion...In comparison to those new workers, they’re not
satisfied with their salaries now. Their salaries are not enough for them. Not enough to
feed their family. Unlike before, we had bonuses every December that were really high.
Americans were good employers. (This is the English translation, see author for Tagalog
version)

Roberto, a Filipino SBFZ visitor who grew up alongside the former military base because

his mother and father worked there, told me of his fear that locals would not maintain the

Americanized culture of the SBFZ:

Maybe what I generally fear is having Harbor Point [mall], [there are] a lot more people
who aren’t from here, you know? Because if you’re from Olongapo or Subic, you know.
Everyone knows everyone basically if you’re from here. But now, there’s so many new
faces. You don’t know right away, who they are. First, you just think, oh no, they’re not
from here?! So what I fear is over population since there’s a lot of visitors that don’t know,
in general, the rules and regulations here. I fear that the discipline inside here will vanish.
Because of course, some other people throw their waste or garbage in random places. But
us, generally, we're not like that. We don't spit on the floor. Normally we don't do that … I
just want to maintain our culture, which was Americanized.

37
 Global borderlands

These understandings of Americans are shaped by the broader American-Philippine

“special relationship” that originated in colonialism and continues through today’s era of

visiting military forces, as well as unequal import and export markets, and the

Philippines’ continued dependence on the U.S. for millions of dollars in nonmilitary and

military aid. In Olongapo City, while the base was operational, the U.S. military was the

second largest employer in the Philippines, pumping an estimated $500 million each year

into the local economies of Olongapo and Angeles (site of Clark Air Force Base). More

than 80,000 people in Central Luzon made their living from the bases (United States

102nd Congress 1992). SBNB also had a four-year apprenticeship program for Filipino

college graduates, and during the Vietnam War, the Aetas (one of the Philippines’

indigenous peoples) of Subic trained troops in jungle survival skills (e.g. United States

1986).

Because of the large number of both American and Filipino veterans of the U.S.

military, the only U.S. Veterans Affairs office outside the U.S. is located in the

Philippines. However, U.S. and R.P. legal cases also show that many former base

employees have sued the U.S. military to receive retirement benefits. These cases were

adjudicated in favor of the U.S. military because of the Filipinos’ work was classified as

temporary or non-entitled. So although there is nostalgia for the return of the base–

something that is in the works but on a much smaller scale–the nostalgia does not cover

or erase the wrongs omitted by the U.S. military. The relationship between the U.S. and

R.P. is complex, rooted in a colonialism that ruled “benevolently” through local elites and

continued inequality, but is also rooted through a nostalgia and good will on the part of

former Subic Bay base workers and manipulation of Filipino elites of American policies.

38
 Global borderlands

Local perceptions of Koreans

It is also important to understand broader South Korean and Philippine relations

because they serve as a foundation for Filipinos’ perceptions of Koreans and comparisons

between Koreans and Americans. Beverley drew this contrast between Americans and

Koreans: “Yeah, they kwan, they treat Filipinos like, as slave. Sabi nila ha? Hindi kwan,

hindi tao. Sabi ha? Like in Hanjin. ‘Di ba totoo ‘yun, ‘di ba? Like in Hanjin.” [Yeah, they

treat Filipinos like slaves. What did they say? That we’re not people. Like in Hanjin [a

Korean-owned shipping businesses within the SBFZ]]. Current HP workers agree with

this differentiation of customers based on nationality. While Americans are “friendly”

and “treat workers with respect,” Korean customers are rude and treat the workers poorly.

Mark noted that his Korean friends weren’t sociable and didn’t seek his advice, like his

American friends did; whereas Juanita didn’t have any Korean friends, because she

doesn’t find them approachable.

This perception of Koreans by Filipinos does not occur in a vacuum but rather is

shaped by the underlying Philippine-Korean relationship. Broadly speaking, the

Philippines and South Korea have strong economic and social ties, and the Philippines is

a popular and relatively cheap place for people from Asian countries to learn English.17

17
In 2011 South Korea was the fifth largest market for Philippine exports, comprising of 7.66%
(3,701,459,904) of the total share and also the fifth largest supplier of imports consisting of 7.31% of the
total share (4,419,530,490) while in 2009 there were 497,936 Korean visitors to the Philippines
(Department of Trade & Industry Philippines. 2011a. “Top 10 Markets of Philippine Merchandise
Exports,” accessed July 15, 2013, www.dti.gov.ph/dti/index.php?p=697 Department of Trade & Industry
Philippines. 2011b. “Top 10 Suppliers of Philippine Merchandise Imports,” accessed July 15, 2013,
www.dti.gov.ph/dti/index.php?p=697, Department of Tourism Philippines. 2009. “Arrivals by Region,”
accessed July 15, 2013,
http://www.visitmyphilippines.com/index.php?title=VisitorStatistics&func=all&pid=39&tbl=1). In 2011,
there were 81,395 total Filipinos migrating to Korea (9,127 permanent, 60,268 temporary, 12,000
“irregular), and 96,632 Koreans in the Philippines, 727 of which were permanent migrants and 29545 were
students (Department of Foreign Affairs, South Korea. 2011. “Status of Overseas Koreans,” accessed July
15, 2013,
http://www.mofat.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/korboardread.jsp?typeID=6&boardid=232&seq

39
 Global borderlands

Over the past several years, South Koreans have made up the largest share of tourists in

the Philippines, accounting for almost one-fourth of all visitors in 2012 alone.18 However,

Filipinos in South Korea often live in dire circumstances. South Korea continues to host

U.S. military bases, and reports suggest that the U.S. military personnel there, as well as

Korean businessmen, make up a large number of the clientele for Filipina women, many

of whom are illegally recruited or trafficked to work in the “entertainment industry.” In

2003, a Seoul district court ruled in favor of the Philippine embassy, which took three

night club owners to court on behalf of eleven Filipinas; the court agreed that the women

had been forced into prostitution, and ordered compensation (Korea JoongAng Daily

2003, 2002). Additionally, Filipina marriage migrants face discrimination and domestic

violence, and Filipino migrant workers are often invisible to broader society vis-à-vis

government rules and regulations (e.g. Lee 2008).

Within the SBFZ, South Koreans have a large and visible presence. In recent

months, SBMA signed an agreement for a 20 billion Php resort project with Korean-

owned Resom Resort and a memorandum of understanding with Daejeon TechnoPark,

the “second biggest center of Administration and Science and Technology” in Korea.19

The most recent SBMA statistics say that 13% (119) of all sole-owned businesses (those

that are not partially owned with Filipinos) are South Korean, and Hanjin Shipping is one

no=334627&c=&t=&pagenum=1&tableName=TYPE_DATABOARD&pc=&dc=&wc=&lu=&vu=&iu=&
du= (in Korean, translation for webpage and excel sheet by Google Translate), Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration. 2009. “Stock Estimates of Filipinos Overseas (Inter-Agency Report),”
accessed July 15, 2013, www.poea.gov.ph/stats/statistics.html ).
18
In 2012 over 1,031,155 South Koreans visitors (24.13% of all visitors) traveled to the Philippines
(Department of Tourism, Philippines. 2012. “Visitor Arrivals to the Philippines Reached Record-High 4.3
Million in 2012,” accessed July 15, 2013,
http://www.visitmyphilippines.com/images/ads/681e231e0a5d37d2e5b7090b7db5d8c1.pdf ).
19
Subic Examiner. 2013. “SBMA, Resom Sign P20-Billion Tourism Project,” accessed July 15, 2013,
http://www.subic-examiner.com/zxcvbnm/index.php/subic-bay-freeport-zone/228-sbma-resom-sign-p20-
billion-tourism-project; Subic Examiner. 2012. “SBMA Signs MOU with Korea’s Silicon Valley,”
accessed July 15, 2013, http://www.subic-examiner.com/zxcvbnm/index.php/subic-bay-freeport-zone/75-
sbma-signs-mou-with-korea-s-silicon-valley

40
 Global borderlands

of the largest employers in the SBFZ (Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority 2012).

However, as Beverley indicates, Hanjin Shipping is also associated with workers’ rights

violations, including abuse, mistreatment, lack of meal breaks, and sickness and death

due to accidents; these violations have resulted in complaints to the SBMA, worker

protests, and a recent memorandum of agreement with the Philippines’ Department of

Labor and Employment (DOLE), which will now conduct regular inspection of SBFZ

businesses.20 One case regarding two workers who were allegedly illegally dismissed

made it to the Philippine Supreme Court of Appeals, which upheld a local ruling that the

workers “are entitled to reinstatement to their former positions without loss of seniority

rights and payment of full back wages, inclusive of allowances, from the time their

compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement”

(Philippines 2011 p. 16-17). Rosa,21 a local visitor who used to work for a Korean

company inside the FZ, told me her own story of how Koreans treated Filipinos like they

were not tao (people), saying that it was not uncommon for the Koreans to physically hit

or assault employees.

The perception of Filipinos’ interactions with Americans and Koreans are shaped

not only by individual social position (worker/consumer, military/civilian, rich/poor,

foreign/local) but also both by the organizational happenings within the SBFZ, vis-à-vis

the former U.S. military base and Hanjin shipping–whose human rights violations

reverberate throughout the community–and through the historical and contemporary

connections between the two countries. These broader associations are filtered through

20
Torres, Estrella. 2012. “DOLE, SBMA Sign Deal to Protect Subic Freeport Workers” BusinessMirror,
accessed July 15, 2013, http://www.businessmirror.com.ph/index.php/en/news/regions/6603-dole-
sbma-sign-deal-to-protect-subic-freeport-workers
21
Pseudonyms are given to all interviewees

41
 Global borderlands

everyday interactions, and global borderlands provide an ideal case to analyze such

interactions because they are concentrated, geographically bounded centers geared

toward this type of international exchange, and these dealings directly and indirectly

influence and are influenced by micro-, meso-, and macro-level relationships.

Conclusion

This paper introduces the concept of “global borderlands” to identify new

globalized and analytic spaces that are semi-autonomous, foreign-controlled geographic

locations geared toward international exchange. It thus extends the rich literature on

global cities and traditional borderlands by showing the significance of these foreign-

controlled spaces. It also highlights how or state-to-state relationships–not only an

individual country’s place in a world-system– directly and indirectly influence and are

influenced by micro-interactions.

Global borderlands share three features: semi-autonomy, geographic and

symbolic boundaries, and unequal relations. Although, separately, these characteristics

are commonplace, in global borderlands they interact in spaces of unequal power and are

influenced by state-to-state relations. The case of the Subic Bay Freeport Zone,

Philippines illustrates how global borderlands work. I show the fluidity of semi-

sovereignty and foreign-control. Even when formal agreements are made to regulate

military personnel, the ambiguous wording of these agreements allows for power and

pressure to influence everyday decisions and actions. Additionally, territorial space and

the actions that occur within or outside them are subject to important negotiations

between countries.

42
 Global borderlands

Second, I show that the geographic and symbolic boundaries that differentiate the

SBFZ from Olongapo City take the form of visual representations and historical legacies

of the U.S. military, and are associated with everyday moral discourses and cultural

practices. Finally, the case of the Subic Bay Freeport Zone illustrates how semi-

autonomy and geographic and symbolic boundaries further structures unequal relations

that occur within this setting. Here, I lay the foundation of inequality vis-à-vis the

unequal structure of wages, comparing Harbor Point mall employee salaries with those of

local visitors, foreign visitors, and the workers’ families. Additionally, I outline how

macro Philippine-U.S. and Philippine-Korean state relations are filtered through everyday

interactions and perceptions.

Because the focus is on historical, localized context, a key limitation of the global

borderlands concept is not being able to link workers’, local visitors’ and foreign visitors’

experiences as easily as, for example, a world-systems theory that focuses on

exploitation. Additionally, although a global borderlands perspective can take into

account the profit that organizations and corporations extract from these spaces, that is is

not what I emphasize. Rather, I concentrate on how, for example, workers’ wages,

interactions, and perceptions of daily life influence and are influenced by broader macro

state to state relationships.

Although this article is based on a single case study, it is intended to be a

launching point for understanding the dynamics that occur in other semi-autonomous and

foreign-controlled spaces. Future research should refine and expand this framework by

analyzing how these processes vary across time, national location (e.g., within a country

in the North America, West Africa, Eastern Europe), institutional context (e.g.,

43
 Global borderlands

international branch campus, embassy, current military base, all-inclusive timeshare), and

history (e.g., history of relations between countries of origin and destination, and local

histories). Scholars should also explore the networked nature of global borderlands, and

the varying global connections that occur based on institutional context.

Global borderlands, including military bases, tourist resorts, special economic

zones, international branch campuses, embassies, and headquarters of international

organizations are new analytic spaces where we can find and examine globalization

processes. In this way, relevant research can be subsumed into a unifying theoretical

perspective that pays close attention to how semi-autonomous, foreign-controlled places

reinforce, interact, and reproduce unequal interactions among different groups, as well as

how these interactions relate to boundary-making between places and people.

44
 Global borderlands

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