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Legal Imperialism

Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman Empire, and China

Turan Kayaolu

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Hardback ISBN: 9780521765916

Chapter

2 - Extraterritoriality and Legal Imperialism pp. 40-65

Chapter DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511730252.003

Cambridge University Press

2

Extraterritoriality and Legal Imperialism

The rise and decline of Western legal imperialism1 in the nineteenth

and early twentieth centuries suggests a different period and per-
spective to understand “Westphalian” sovereignty. Essentially,
“Westphalian” sovereignty is related to two nineteenth-century devel-
opments: the dominance of legal positivism and European colonial
expansion. Contrary to the Eurocentric consenus, sovereignty was
not developed and consolidated solely within Western thought and
practices, but rather in the encounters of Western colonial – particu-
larly British – powers with Asian states. In the process of creating the
British Empire’s territorial rule in the forms of colonies, dependencies,
and protectorates, and extraterritorial rule in the form of extraterri-
torial jurisdiction over British citizens, subjects, and corporations in
Asia,2 British imperial practices clarified, crystallized, and consoli-
dated the sovereignty doctrine. These practices were embedded in a
legal episteme that excluded non-Western entities and understandings
from the sphere of law and sovereignty. The conceptual gerrymander-
ing of inclusion and exclusion around normatively powerful concepts

1
For a comparative legal history in the context of imperial expansion see Benton
(2002) and Leue (1992).
2
While formal/territorial colonization is widely discussed in international relations
scholarship, informal/extraterritorial imperialism is less frequently explored. See
Doyle (1986: 30–47) and Abernethy (2000: chapter 2); also see Jackson (1990),
Kahler (1984), and Snyder (1991). One major exception is Gong (1984), who exam-
ines extraterritoriality in the context of the expansion of international society.

40

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Extraterritoriality and Legal Imperialism 41

such as law, courts, and sovereignty was intimately tied to imperial

politics.
This chapter links the rise and decline of extraterritoriality to the
rise and decline of positive law and British hegemony from the early
nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century. I develop my argu-
ment in three sections. First, I describe the rise of extraterritoriality
and the denial of non-Western law and sovereignty. I also discuss how
explanations solely grounded on material power and culture over-
look the crucial role the legal episteme and domestic legal institu-
tions played in nineteenth-century imperialism. Second, I detail how
non-Western hostility toward extraterritoriality replaced the prior
non-Western rulers’ reluctant cooperation with Western states over
extraterritoriality. I also examine why domestic legalization was the
best strategy for non-Western states in persuading Western states to
end extraterritoriality. Third, I end the chapter with a justification of
my research method.

The Rise of Extraterritoriality

The first entities to feel the effects of this changing legal landscape,
brought by legal postivism I described in the fi rst chapter, were mer-
chant companies such as the British East India Company, the Levant
Company, and the Dutch East India Company that facilitated much of
the trade between Western and non-Western countries until the second
half of the nineteenth century.3 Premodern rulers allowed foreign-mer-
chant communities to self-adjudicate because they perceived that the
legal autonomy of foreign merchants facilitated trade.4 This self-adjudi-
cation was also compatible both with natural law and with many local
premodern political structures and practices wherein religious and
tribal communities, as well as guilds, shared legal authority with the
rulers. The prime example of sharing of legal authority between state
and nonstate actors was the Ottoman Empire’s millet system under
which the whole society was organized into religious communities. In
the religious communities, the religious leaders had quasi-sovereign
authority including tax collection, education, representation of their

3
Thomson (1994). Also Leue (1992).
4
Greif (1993) and Leue (1992).

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42 Legal Imperialism

communities, and the adjudication of legal disputes. The Ottoman rul-

ers incorporated foreign merchant communities in this environment of
legal plurality and allowed them to have legal self-governance. In the
system of foreign-merchant self-governance, if a mercantile company
existed, the mercantile consul (the highest ranking representative of
the company) would have jurisdiction over the merchant community.
For example, the British Levant Company operated in the Ottoman
Empire and had the power to solve civil and commercial disputes
among its employees, British workers in the company factories, and
other British citizens residing in the Ottoman Empire.5 According to
the Company’s Royal Charter, consuls were to administer to all British
subjects “full speedie and expedite justice in all their plaints causes
and contencions amongst them.”6 If a foreign merchant community
was not attached to a mercantile company, the foreign merchant com-
munity would either choose the Levant Company’s jurisdiction or they
would select a merchant who would act as the consul to adjudicate dis-
putes within their community. Western foreigners enjoyed a high level
of communal autonomy before being incorporated into their home-
states’ public law in the nineteenth century.7
Western imperial expansion transformed the non-Western unilat-
eral grants of merchant legal self-governance into the extraterrito-
rial rights of European states in non-Western states. This was a legal
process driven by both imperial contingencies and the legal positivist
framework of state-centric law. Essentially, the sovereign prerogative
of legislating and enforcing the laws that distinguished positive law
was incompatible with the merchants’ law-making and law-enforcing
rights.8 Western countries transferred the legal rights of mercantile
companies and merchant communities to Western state institutions
with legislative acts – most of the time without informing or nego-
tiating with the non-Western rulers. For example, in the Ottoman
Empire, merchant consuls solved foreigners’ legal disputes without

5
Wood (1935).
6
For the company’s charter, see Epstein (1908: appendix 1).
7
In China from 1676 (when the East India Company stationed its fi rst agents) to 1833,
British citizens were under the jurisdiction of the East India Company. See Keeton
(1969: 201).
8
For the role of merchant companies in the context of state building and sovereignty
see Thomson (1994).

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Extraterritoriality and Legal Imperialism 43

interference from their home states until 1825. In that year, the British
government decided to “transfer the company’s authority over the
consuls in Levant to the crown,” bringing the Levant consular service
under the British government’s sovereign authority.9
The abolition of the Levant Company caused some constitutional
problems. It was not clear how the British legal authority over British
citizens in the Ottoman Empire would be carried out. While an act
of Parliament abolished the company and transferred its legal author-
ity to the crown in 1825, British Law Officers questioned the legality
of the arrangement in 1826. The legal challenge was based on the
claim that the crown had the prerogative to enter into treaty relations
with foreign governments, but that it did not have the legal authority
to administer law on an ongoing basis without a legislative act. In
essence, the challenge rested on the fact that the crown cannot make
or apply laws without parliamentary sanction.10
Legal scholars turned their attention to this ambiguity as the num-
ber of British-involved cases in the Ottoman Empire swelled in the
1830s and 1840s (in part because of the influx of a large number of
the British Empire’s Maltese and Ionian subjects into the Ottoman
Empire). In particular, James R. Hope-Scott, a barrister and Queen’s
Counsel, produced a very influential report that argued that in
Christian states territorial sovereignty required Britain to accept
the local jurisdiction over British subjects.11 However, Hope-Scott
wrote that in non-Christian states the British government had the
right to establish its courts due to the existence of cultural differ-
ences regarding views about morality and justice. According to Hope-
Scott, any questions about the legality of British jurisdiction were a
matter of domestic law, not international law.12 Ambiguity regard-
ing the legality of the British jurisdiction in the Ottoman Empire,
as well as in other Asian and African states, could thus be solved by
an act of Parliament clarifying the extent of this right. Hope-Scott
recommended the preparation of new legislation to bring the British

9
Platt (1971: 125).
10
For discussions of legal justifications of extraterritoriality, see Hall (1894: 5–9,
149–150), Roberts-Wray (1996: 73, 191), and Holdsworth (1956: 81–82).
11
For Hope-Scott biography and legal career, see Ornsby (1884).
12
For the text of Hope-Scott’s report, see Jenkyns (1902: 243–266).

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44 Legal Imperialism

merchants’ legal jurisdiction in the Ottoman Empire under the British

Empire’s constitutional authority.
Upon Hope-Scott’s report, the fi rst Foreign Jurisdiction Act was
legislated in 1843, incorporating some of his suggestions verbatim.
The act established the legal basis of extraterritoriality by extending
British legal authority into the Ottoman Empire. The Act stated that
“by treaty, capitulation, grant, usage, sufferance, and other lawful
means, Her Majesty the Queen has jurisdiction within diverse for-
eign countries.” This jurisdiction authorized the British government
to exercise legal authority in the Ottoman Empire “in the same and in
as amply a manner as if Her Majesty had acquired that jurisdiction by
the cessation or conquest of territory.”13 While the Ottoman Empire
had not been conquered or colonized, the British government could
extend its laws into the Empire as if it had been. Of course, these
laws only applied to British citizens and protégés such as Maltese and
Ionians but the effect was much like a sovereign ruling its territory.
Thus, in 1844 when British Foreign Secretary George H. G. Aberdeen
instructed the British consuls in the Ottoman Empire to implement
the act, he was blunt: “as the maintenance of order and repression and
punishment of crime are objects of the greatest importance in every
civilized community, it is obligatory upon the Christian Powers, stand-
ing as they do in Turkey … in the place of the territorial Sovereign to
provide as far as possible for these great ends.”14
While specifically prepared to justify and organize British juris-
diction in the Ottoman Empire, the 1843 Foreign Jurisdiction Act
was broadened to have a universal reach. After 1843, each step of
British formal and informal colonialism came with an Order in
Council decision, which was secured, justified, and legalized within a
series of Foreign Jurisdictional Acts (FJAs).15 FJAs were part of British
domestic law. FJAs established the normative framework that defi ned
and justified how the British government would pursue its commer-
cial and political interest within its formal and informal empire.

13
Italics added. For the text of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1843, see Hertslet
(1845: 507–511).
14
Cited in Spagnolo (1991: 266).
15
The 1843 FJA was amended in 1865 and 1866. Subsequently new FJAs were leg-
islated in 1875, 1878, and 1890. For the text of the last Foreign Jurisdiction Act ,
1890, see W. E. Hall (1894: 287–293).

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Extraterritoriality and Legal Imperialism 45

Constructing imperial policy, FJAs also served as points of reference

for the debates among the Colonial Office, the Foreign Office, and
the Law Officers.16 As Thomas E. Holland, a senior law officer and
leading international positivist jurist of the nineteenth century, stated,
the “Foreign Jurisdiction Act established the legal justification for
the British extraterritorial colonization of non-Western countries.”17
Other Western states either followed the British example to justify
their extraterritorial courts or claimed most-favored-nation clauses
from the non-Western states to substantiate their claims on the basis
of British extraterritorial rights in these states; whatever rights a non-
Western state’ granted to one, Western power granted to all. FJAs
established an international precedent and became part of interna-
tional law to regulate Western states’ international relations with
non-Western states.

The Non-Western Response to Extraterritoriality

In the second half of the nineteenth century, hostility replaced the
prior indifference of non-Western elite and societal attitude toward
extraterritoriality. This made it difficult for local rulers to acqui-
esce to extraterritoriality and for imperial powers to persuade them
to accept it.18 There were several reasons for non-Western rulers to
regard extraterritoriality with growing antipathy. For one, extraterri-
toriality severely limited the non-Western rulers’ ability to control and
tax foreigners. This was especially trying because their revenues were
dwindling, the need to raise revenues to sustain reforms and secure
the state was intense, and the foreigners’ share in the local economies
was increasing. Worse, in addition to foreigners, some natives were
acquiring extraterritorial protection (either through naturalization or
certification of protection, like protégés) to evade taxation and cir-
cumvent the government’s regulations, thereby undermining the gov-
ernment’s capacity to reform.
16
Jackson (1993: 114–119) compares the Foreign Jurisdiction Act with the General
Act of the Berlin Conference (1884–1885) to clarify the normative framework of
colonial expansion. Also see Johnston (1973: chapter 6).
17
Holland (1898: 186).
18
For the importance of local collaboration imperialism, see Doyle (1986: 38–42). For
the Chinese antipathy and resistance to extraterritoriality, see Wong (2005). For the
Ottoman resistance, see Ahmad (2000).

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46 Legal Imperialism

Non-Western rulers also disliked the symbolism of extraterrito-

riality: There was a strong stigma attached to the unequal treaties.
Earlier generations of non-Western elites had been wary of the unequal
rights and responsibilities that were associated with extraterritorial-
ity. However, their skepticism turned into outright antagonism as they
internalized the Western norms of territorial jurisdiction and sovereign
equality that accompanied their desire to become a part of interna-
tional society. The growth of nationalist and antiimperialist movements
in non-Western societies made the perception of extraterritoriality a
more acute symbol of inferiority. These protest movements emerged in
the last part of the nineteenth century, gained momentum in the early
twentieth century, and became the dominant political current in many
non-Western states during the interwar years. Throughout the evolu-
tion of these movements extraterritoriality took an important place in
the nationalists’ framing of their agony and suffering under Western
domination. Unanimously and unequivocally, the nationalist move-
ments demanded the abolition of extraterritoriality in the name of jus-
tice and national sovereignty.
In addition to the domestic limitations extraterritoriality established
and the non-Western inferiority it represented, another reason for the
increased non-Western hostility was the perception of an extraterri-
torial vicious cycle: Growth of Western investment and trade under
extraterritoriality justified further Western interest and demands.
This, in turn, led to more Western interventions, gunboat diplomacy,
and demands of exacting criteria for non-Western reforms.
Extraterritoriality itself and the conditions non-Western states
were required to meet in order for extraterritoriality to be abol-
ished made non-Western reforms, regulations, and legalization
dependent on foreign approval. Through this dependence, Western
states were able to export and impose Western legal forms and
ideas to non-Western states.19 From the mid-nineteenth to the mid-
twentieth centuries, in societies with strikingly different legal tra-
ditions, non-Western rulers initiated similar large-scale reforms
with the goal of domestic legalization. For example, the rulers
of the Ottoman Empire, Iran , Japan, Thailand , and China uti-
lized the same three strategies with varying degrees of success: the

19
Compare it with Badie (2000).

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Extraterritoriality and Legal Imperialism 47

codifi cation of laws, the centralization of the court system, and

the establishment of a statewide court structure. In this process,
these non-Western states enacted commercial, criminal, and civil
codes. They also established state bureaucracies to subordinate
and replace religious, communal, and merchant courts with state
courts. This reorganization of the court system was accompanied
by the numerical and geographical expansion of the state’s courts.
The union of these three processes – codifi cation of laws, central-
ization of court structures, and expansion of courts – resulted in
the unifi cation of a legal system under the state. In large part,
extraterritoriality and the ensuing desire of non-Western elites to
be rid of it explain non-Western legalization.
However, the centrality of extraterritoriality in the politics of
legal reforms in non-Western states does not mean that non-Western
legalization was simply a response to exogenous factors. In impor-
tant ways these reforms were also the result of internal processes.
Under Western imperial advances, non-Western elites were aware
of the need to build the state’s institutional capacity by implement-
ing new tax codes, centralizing administrative functions, and elimi-
nating the state’s internal rivals. In any state-building process, legal
systems constitute a crucial step because they are the tools for reor-
ganization. Legal control is integral to political control. Early studies
of state building emphasize the role of legal systems. For example,
Max Weber analyzes the role of Roman law in the transformation
of the feudal institutions that led to the emergence of the modern
state and its legal-rational bureaucratic authority.20 Like Weber,
Perry Anderson emphasizes the contribution of Roman law to the
emergence of absolutist states: “Roman law was the most powerful
intellectual weapon available for their typical program of territorial
integration and administrative centralism.”21 Just as their European
counterparts did, non-Western rulers were utilizing legal standardi-
zation and unification to consolidate their own power.
Paradoxically, extraterritoriality and the Western requirements to
end it were equal parts opportunity and constraint for non-Western
elites; these conditions became both the catalyst for non-Western

20
Weber (1978: 839–880).
21
Anderson (1979: 28).

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48 Legal Imperialism

rulers’ legal reforms and their justification. The rulers’ attempts at

legal unification realigned the domestic groups in their societies.
While centralized state rulers and the bourgeoisie supported the
states’ efforts toward legal unification, traditional authority holders
(such as the ulema in the Ottoman Empire) and local notables resisted
the legal advances of the states. Faced with external demands and
internal resistance, these rulers engaged in constant negotiations with
Western states and internally with societal groups in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. The failed negotiations between some
societal actors and the state triggered top-down nationalist revolutions
that coercively eliminated societal groups that resisted the state’s legal
reforms. These revolutions were justified in antiimperialist rhetoric.
Overall, the popular desire to end extraterritoriality offered the stron-
gest justification for the reformers’ elimination of internal rivals who
resisted legal standardization and unification efforts. This dynamic
often resulted in the emergence of repressive regimes.
Western states’ contradictory demands for non-Western legal insti-
tutionalization and for the continuation of extraterritoriality were a
formidable obstacle for non-Western rulers’ state-building reforms.
In response, non-Western elites developed three strategies to persuade
Western states to relinquish extraterritoriality: First, they claimed that
extraterritoriality violated the principles of state sovereignty and sov-
ereign equality. Second, they claimed that extraterritoriality was inef-
ficient. Third, these elites initiated legal institution-building projects
conducive to a positive legal order. Among these three approaches, the
last one proved to be the most effective strategy in garnering the aboli-
tion of extraterritoriality.
The first strategy was to challenge extraterritoriality on normative
grounds. Non-Western rulers claimed that extraterritoriality was a
violation of state sovereignty and sovereign equality, and was thus incom-
patible with international law. Following the Crimean War (1853–1856),
the Ottoman Empire used the Paris Conference of 1856 to challenge
the normative basis of extraterritoriality. Similarly, China used both the
Paris Conference of 1919, and in 1921 the Washington Conference for
Disarmament, to raise normative challenges to extraterritoriality.22

22
For the Turkish claims, see Sousa (1933: 177–178). For Chinese claims, see Fishel
(1952: chapter 3).

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Extraterritoriality and Legal Imperialism 49

Responding to the Ottoman Empire’s claim, European countries

confi rmed the Ottoman Empire’s status as a member of international
society. Regarding extraterritoriality, Western states promised to estab-
lish a commission to examine the Ottoman judicial system – a promise
that was never fulfi lled. In other words, despite de jure Ottoman mem-
bership in international society, de facto inequality based on extrater-
ritoriality continued. In response to the later Chinese challenge to
extraterritoriality on normative grounds, Western states established a
commission on extraterritoriality to investigate China’s legal system.
In 1926, the Commission on Extraterritoriality in China, composed
of Western diplomats and jurists, rejected the Chinese demands for
the abolition of extraterritoriality.23 Overall, these normative chal-
lenges to extraterritoriality were tenuous because international law
and sovereignty doctrines had been conceptualized explicitly in order
to delegitimize non-Western claims. Western state rulers were able to
invoke the norm of protection of their citizens in order to reject the
non-Western arguments based on the norm of sovereign equality.
The second strategy was to challenge extraterritoriality on the
grounds of legal efficiency and justice. Western states defended extra-
territoriality as necessary because of the inefficiency and partiality of
the local judicial system. Non-Western rulers replied that extrater-
ritoriality had failed to bring order among foreigners and had led to
biased decisions against locals. These complaints about extraterrito-
riality did not result in the abolition of extraterritoriality but, rather,
its reform. Western states reformed extraterritoriality through the
establishment of new courts, the clarification of court procedures, the
growth of consular codes, and an increase in the number of consular
staff. Thus, attempts to bring order and efficiency to extraterritorial
rule led to further increases in Western states’ authority over their
citizens in non-Western states. Labeling this policy “colonizing the
colonizers,” Eileen Scully argues that the American and British con-
sular court reforms aimed to bring “sojourner nationals under more
effective and rigorous metropolitan authority.”24
The establishment of the U.S. Court for China illustrates how Wes-
tern countries reformed extraterritoriality to further bring Americans in

23
Extraterritoriality Commission (1926).
24
Scully (2001).

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50 Legal Imperialism

China under the rule of American law. Following the Boxer Rebellion
(1900), the Chinese government and U.S. entrepreneurs and missionaries
complained about the unruly behavior of U.S. citizens in treaty ports.25
Following a visit by the secretary of state in 1904, Congress passed the
U.S. District Court for China Act of 1906.26 The act introduced a regu-
lar inspection mechanism that intensified the federal government’s con-
trol over Americans and protégés in China. The act also established the
U.S. Court for China with “original jurisdiction in most civil and crim-
inal cases where Americans were defendants, and appellate jurisdiction
over cases decided first in the U.S. consular courts in China’s treaty
ports.”27 Overall, the legal efficiency strategy backfired because, rather
than abolishing extraterritoriality, Western states strengthened it.28
The third – and, ultimately, most successful – strategy of non-
Western rulers was to initiate legal institution building in order to
fulfi ll the Western states’ requirements for the establishment of a uni-
fied formal legal system based on positivist standards. This require-
ment included the codification of laws, the creation of a statewide
court system, and the establishment of a legal hierarchy in the state.
Through these requirements Western states effectively engaged non-
Western states in shaping the parameters of legal reorganization and
changing the characteristics of state-society relations in these states.

Explaining the Abolition of Extraterritoriality

Extraterritoriality emerged quickly and quietly but was eliminated
through long, often frustrating, negotiations under public scrutiny
and protests. Despite this arduous process and the challenging domes-
tic reforms associated with the abolition of extraterritoriality, start-
ing with Japan in 1899 all non-Western states persuaded Western
states to abolish extraterritoriality. What accounts for the abolition
of extraterritoriality?

25
Scully (2001: 90).
26
Scully (2001: 98). Also see Ruskola (2005, 2008).
27
Scully (2001: 105–106). Also see Raustiala (2009: chapter 3).
28
Similarly, the Ottoman complaints resulted in the Hornby Report, which led to
the creation of the Supreme Court of Constantinople. Hornby’s memoirs detail the
process in Hornby (1928).

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Extraterritoriality and Legal Imperialism 51

Domestic Legalization and Extraterritoriality

My approach links the abolition of extraterritoriality to the institu-

tionalization of state law in non-Western states, or, simply, domestic
legalization.29 Domestic legalization includes the codification of rules,
the spread of court systems, and the establishment of a legal hierarchy;
positive legal scholars deem all three elements to be necessary parts
of a legal system that clarifies and enforces legal and property rights.
While domestic legalization is critical for the abolition of extraterrito-
riality, other factors grounded in power and culture are also important
in explaining background and enabling conditions in this process.
There are three components of legal institutionalization: the clari-
fication of rules, the spread of the state’s court system, and the estab-
lishment of a hierarchical system of courts. The clarification of rules is
necessary to provide information about legal and property rights. The
spread of the state’s court system is important to the enforcement of
the state’s rules. The establishment of a legal hierarchy is required for
states to assume responsibility and accountability for the clarification
and enforcement of legal and property rights. In other words, domestic
legalization ipso facto demonstrates the presence of an institutional-
ized commitment and capacity to clarify and enforce legal and prop-
erty rights, to reduce transaction costs for transnational commercial
relations, and to assure Western rulers about the non-Western rulers’
willingness and capability to be accountable for their legal system.30
State rulers demand that other state rulers provide information about
the legal and property rights within their respective territories. In order
to do this effectively, state rulers systemize and standardize the rules.
State rulers can rely on court decisions (case law) or legislative codes
(civil law) or a combination of codes and cases to systemize and stan-
dardize the rules. Through codification, state rulers both replace cus-
tomary local rules with uniform law and provide information to other
rulers. The codification process leads to the preparation of codebooks on
different issue areas. The completion of codes on five major areas – civil,

29
Spruyt (1994) and Thomson (1994, 1995) advance theoretical propositions that
link domestic institution formation to explain international politics. The new insti-
tutionalism and legalization literatures also explore how clarity, specificity, and
enforceability of rules affect the allocation of property rights.
30
Goldstein et al. (2000) and Abbot and Snidal (2000).

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52 Legal Imperialism

commercial, criminal, criminal procedures, and civil procedures – and

the constitution establish “a complete system of legal rules.”31
“The code” refers to the totality of the five major codes and the
constitution. The code, ideally, should be comprehensive and pre-
cise and provide clear information about legal and property rights.
It should be complete, so that the legal rules cover major social areas
(criminal, civil, and commercial) in order to address socio-legal issues
of diverse aspects of social life. Furthermore, it should be specific,
so that the rules are precise statements rather than broad principles.
In other words, the code should be unambiguous in that the rules
are consistent and clear. These are ideal typical properties of “the
code” rather than empirical and practical. For any legal system, it is
impossible to establish complete, specific, unambiguous rules to cover
all social interactions in a changing social and political environment.
The code thus need to be interpreted by the state officials (judges) in
public places (courts), thereby solving empirical and practical prob-
lems inherent in any code on behalf of the state.
In addition to the clarification of rules as state law, state rulers are
responsible for enforcing state law. Establishment of mechanisms of
enforcement is tantamount to enhancing state capacity and power.32
State rulers do not merely demand that other rulers provide informa-
tion about legal and property rights; they also demand that these rul-
ers enforce the rules. State courts have been the dominant institution
used by state rulers to adjudicate disputes regarding the enforcement
of state law. Without courts, individuals would have to select informal
means to solve their legal problems. Although other forms of dispute
resolution, such as mediation and communal courts, have existed, the
state’s systemization of legal rules and the creation of state courts cre-
ated a state monopoly in the area of dispute resolution.
According to legal positivism the state is to have legal monopoly.
(Of course, in practice, even in hyper-litigious societies, like the United
States, most disputes are solved outside of the legal system.)33 The state
substantiates its claim of legal monopoly through extending its court
system in society. State courts, or simply the courts, ideally, should be
geographically and numerically extensive, independent, occupied by

31
Shapiro (1981: 126). Also see, on code and codification, Merryman (1969).
32
Abbot and Snidal (2000: 426–427).
33
Ellickson (1991).

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Extraterritoriality and Legal Imperialism 53

professionally trained and state-paid judges with no additional state-

related administrative duties, and judges should apply the state law uni-
formly. The geographical and numerical extensiveness of state courts
are important for the state’s ability to enforce legal and property rights
evenly throughout a territory. Independence of the courts refers to the
courts’ ability to carry out their daily workings separate from interfer-
ence of other state elements.34 Because judges adjudicate disputes, they
must be trained to interpret state law and must be paid adequately to
decrease incentives for corruption. The courts should apply the rules
uniformly; the appellate system helps state rulers ensure a high degree of
geographical and temporal standardization in the application of law.
The last requirement for the institutionalization of state law is the
establishment of a judicial hierarchy. A system of courts of appeal
is necessary to make rulers responsible for legal failures and legal
changes. First, state rulers are responsible for rectifying legal fail-
ures – failures to clarify legal and property rights or failures to enforce
them. State rulers bear this responsibility toward other state rulers
when the legal failures of the state impact other states or foreigners.
Second, state rulers are responsible for legal changes that may affect
other states or foreigners. State rulers create a bureaucratic legal hier-
archy under the institutional structure of state. The absence of an
internal hierarchy in a country may obstruct transnational interac-
tions because it obscures the locus of responsibility for correcting the
legal failures.
As Hendrik Spruyt shows, rulers of sovereign states – not the rulers
of city leagues or empires, European and non-European alike – took
the responsibility to remedy violations of a foreigner’s life and prop-
erty.35 The state’s appellate court structure supervises local courts in
order to compel them to apply state laws uniformly. Although, at least
as a model, the appellate system already existed in parts of Europe
such as in the structure of the Roman Catholic Church as the last sur-
viving element of the Roman Empire, the appellate system reemerged
as the dominant tool in Europe for state rulers both to impose state
law on local courts and to limit the influence of customary law in
early modern Europe.36

34
Shapiro (1981: 20).
35
Spruyt (1994: 168).
36
Compare with Shapiro (1981: 39).

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54 Legal Imperialism

In sum, I suggest that legal institutionalization meets an important

aspect of Western demands. The institutionalization of state law opens
new investment and trade opportunities, reduces transaction costs to
regulate the increasing volume of transactions between Western and
non-Western states, and allows Western rulers to hold non-Western
rulers responsible and accountable for non-Western legal systems.
Only after non-Western states have institutionalized state law might
Western states give up their claims of extraterritoriality.
However, meeting the demands of a demander and making the
demander more willing to agree are not the same thing. Conceding to
a demand may bring more demands. Thus, an explanation of the abo-
lition of extraterritoriality must include two additional factors: chang-
ing power dynamics and cultural modernization and Westernization
of non-Western states.

Power Politics, Legalization, and Extraterritoriality

Legal imperialism is a multifaceted phenomenon. While the domestic

legal system is important in explaining changes in legal imperialism,
other factors also influenced the great powers’ decisions to limit or deny
indigenous legal systems. Power is vital to legal imperialism. Focusing
on the distribution of power and authority among states, realist the-
ories clarify how powerful states impose domestic authority arrange-
ments on weaker states.37 Realists would identify three factors in the
emergence, maintenance, and ending of extraterritoriality. The first
two, power asymmetry and domestic constituencies, are more clearly
developed in Stephen Krasner’s Organized Hypocrisy38 and the third
hypothesis, strategic competition, is developed by neorealist scholars.
Krasner offers the framework of “organized hypocrisy” to explain
two seemingly contradictory observations. First, the actions of rulers

37
For the critiques to the neorealist approach to international relations and the state
see Keohane (1986), Cox (1986), Ashley (1984), and Ruggie (1983). Also see the
debate between Fischer (1992) and Hall and Kratochwil (1993) on the applicability
of state-centric neorealism to medieval Europe for the neorealist conceptualization
of the state.
38
Krasner (1999) distinguishes his approach from traditional and neorealist theories.
His emphasis on power asymmetry to explain violations of norms of sovereignty,
however, qualifies his approach as a power politics approach. See also Krasner
(1989, 1993, 1995, 1999b).

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Extraterritoriality and Legal Imperialism 55

of powerful states often violate sovereignty norms. Second, state rul-

ers always uphold sovereignty norms rhetorically. Krasner argues that
organized hypocrisy explains the persistence of sovereignty norms
despite their frequent violations. Rulers use diverse and contradic-
tory international norms instrumentally to satisfy their constituencies
and remain in power. Following Krasner’s approach, one notices that
the emergence and maintenance of extraterritoriality required coer-
cion and imposition.39 In other words, given the non-Western rulers’
demands for the abolition of extraterritoriality, Western state rulers
could not extract agreements for extraterritoriality if they did not
have the necessary coercion. Power asymmetry is thus necessary for
the imposition of extraterritoriality.40 Consequently, the narrowing of
power asymmetry between a home and host state could make a home
state more likely to concede to the abolition of extraterritoriality.
Krasner argues that because “rulers are calculators” whose pur-
pose is to stay in power,41 their willingness to use power to impose the
wishes of their constituencies on another state will be proportional to
the role these constituencies play in helping the ruler stay in power.
State rulers determine their interests depending on the interests of their
constituencies.42 State rulers also act to maintain their power; this
means that they may pursue a course of action dictated by the domes-
tic logic of appropriateness even if this contradicts the international
logic of appropriateness.43 Krasner, however, does not clarify how con-
stituencies’ preferences translate into their rulers’ preferences.
Despite the underspecified role of domestic constituencies in
Krasner’s analysis, the abolition of extraterritoriality offers an easy
case for it. In part, this is because nineteenth- and twentieth-century
imperialism provided a route of mobility for the professional middle
classes of the metropole, especially in Britain and France, and made
them proimperialist. As the middle classes in Britain and France
are enfranchised in the nineteenth century, these classes became a

39
Krasner (1999: 12–16). There are four different ways that state rulers can compro-
mise sovereignty norms: conventions, contracts, coercion, and imposition.
40
Krasner (1999: 37).
41
Krasner (1999: 41).
42
Taking state rulers as the main actors in international politics, Krasner distin-
guishes his approach from the neorealist perspective that views states as rational-
unitary actors that he argues in his previous works. Krasner (1978, 1984).
43
March and Olsen (1999).

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56 Legal Imperialism

powerful proimperialist political force. This was also because the

abolition of extraterritoriality is directly related to the interests of
two important constituencies in home states: business communities
and missionaries. The business community, located in both home and
host states, may demand extraterritoriality in order to protect their
commercial activities. Missionaries may benefit from extraterritori-
ality because it may protect their religious activities. One can expect
that, given the material and ideological power of business organi-
zations and missionary communities combined with the interest of
middle classes, these groups can influence Western state decisions
regarding extraterritoriality.
A third power politics factor to consider is the role of geopolitical
competition among the great powers.44 The level of struggle among
the great powers in a region may influence rulers’ decisions to expand
and contract their extraterritorial jurisdiction in that region. If there is
a high level of strategic competition, realism expects that great powers
will compete to expand their influence over a given state. Because
extraterritorial jurisdiction is based on bilateral treaties that allow
and legitimize the interventions of powerful states into the domestic
authority structures of host states, powerful states will compete to
have extraterritorial jurisdiction. In essence, extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion offers a reaping of the benefits of imperialism and expansion of
power without undertaking the cost of colonialism.45 Furthermore,
extraterritoriality also informally increases a powerful state’s author-
ity over a host state: With the protection of extraterritoriality, the
home states’ citizens have more incentive to move to the host state for
business and missionary activities. In addition to forming part of an
expansionist security strategy, extraterritoriality may be part of a bal-
ance of power strategy.46 If states expect that the expansion of extra-
territoriality will reduce their security insofar as it threatens other
states, provokes an opposing coalition, or endangers the possibility
of an alliance with a host state, they may be more likely to give up

44
For a statement of a contemporary realist (neorealist/structural realist) see Waltz
(1979). Also see chapters in Keohane (1986). For a critical, yet sympathetic, review
of realist literature, see Donnelly (2000). Snyder (1991) offers a review of realism’s
account of imperial expansion.
45
Krasner (2001).
46
Snyder (1991).

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Extraterritoriality and Legal Imperialism 57

their claims of extraterritorial jurisdiction. A great power may abolish

extraterritoriality under high levels of strategic competition to gain a
more favorable strategic alliance with a host state.
While realists in general and Krasner in particular stress the impor-
tance of power differences in the emergence of hierarchical authority
relations in general and legal imperialism in particular, their reduc-
tion of power to material capacity and their state centrism prevent
them from adequately theorizing the role of legal systems and inter-
national legal hierarchies in international politics. This can be seen
in Krasner’s approach to sovereignty. Krasner isolates four meanings
of sovereignty. Interdependence sovereignty refers to the ability of
public authorities to regulate the flow of goods, ideas, and people
across their borders. Domestic sovereignty refers to the structure of
political authority and the effectiveness of the authorities’ control
inside the territorial borders of the state. Westphalian sovereignty
refers to the exclusion of external actors from the authority struc-
tures of states. International legal sovereignty refers to the interna-
tional recognition of the legal capacities of political units to act as
states, that is, other states recognize the state on the international
level. After offering this typology, Krasner argues that we can decou-
ple these aspects of sovereignty from one another. Krasner decouples
different aspects of sovereignty to isolate sovereignty-as-authority
from sovereignty-as-control. International legal and Westphalian
sovereignty are related to authority, domestic sovereignty is related
to both authority and control, and interdependence sovereignty is
related to control.47
Decoupling means more than analytical separation: According to
Krasner, change in one aspect of sovereignty does not change another
aspect of sovereignty. He argues that “the organization of authority
47
The distinction between authority (right to rule) and control (capacity to rule) as
related to sovereignty was developed by Thomson and Krasner (1989) and Thomson
(1995) to reject the liberal interdependence argument that interdependence and
globalization reduce state control of transborder activities. Thomson (1995: 216)
rejects the conceptualization of sovereignty in terms of state control: “[T]here
never was a time when state control over anything, including violence, was assured
secure. State control over important external flows has not eroded relative to the
state control over internal flows over the past 100 years. In short, it makes no sense
to posit that interdependence and/or democracy has reduced state control from a
level that was never actually attained. Sovereignty is not about state control but
about state authority.”

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58 Legal Imperialism

within a state and the level of control by the state are not neces-
sarily related to international legal or Westphalian sovereignty.”48
Removing domestic sovereignty and control sovereignty from his dis-
cussion, Krasner’s argument reproduces a state-centric approach to
international politics in which states, homogenous entities with dif-
ferent capacities, struggle in anarchy. Variation in state capabilities
has consequences for the norms of sovereignty, but variation in the
other attributes of states, such as authority structures, regime type,
and state-society relations does not have any impact on the norms
of sovereignty. Such decoupling reinforces the separation of domes-
tic and international authority structures and prevents Krasner from
theorizing about how different aspects of domestic sovereignty, such
as a state’s legal system, may influence international authority struc-
tures, such as extraterritorial jurisdiction. My argument repudiates
this separation and addresses the tight relationship of domestic legal-
ization and legal imperialism. I explore why and how domestic legal
structures in client states pull or push the great powers to extend
their legal rule abroad and why and how the great powers intervene
to alter the domestic legal system of client states.

The English School, Legalization, and Extraterritoriality

English School scholars have examined the emergence, function, and

evolution of the institutions of world politics. (Constructivists have
also echoed many of the English School’s arguments about the role
of cultural and ideational factors in world politics.49) Emerging in the
1960s and rising to prominence in the 1970s and 1980s, the English
School combines insights from diplomatic history, international law,
and historical sociology. Following a diverse and interdisciplinary
methodology, these scholars often stress the role of legal ideas and
institutions in world politics. Although the English School is theo-
retically and methodologically diverse,50 the differentiation of the

48
Krasner (1999: 12).
49
For the English School’s influence on constructivism, see Dunne (1995), Checkel
(1998), Wendt (1999), and Reus-Smit (2002). For the limited influence of the English
School in the United States, see Hoffman (1995).
50
Bull (1996), Singer (1996), and Little (1995). For the development of the English
School see Dunne (1998).

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Extraterritoriality and Legal Imperialism 59

international system and international society is one of its core princi-

ples.51 Hedley Bull offers the standard defi nitions for the international
system and international society: States form an international system
when “two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and
have a sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to
behave – at least in some measure – as parts of whole.”52 States form
an international society when “a group of states, conscious of certain
common interests and common values, form a society in the sense
that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules
in their relations with one another, and share in the working of com-
mon institutions.”53 Thus, while all states are part of the international
system, only a subset of states composes international society.
States that are part of the international system, but not of inter-
national society, can enter international society if they fulfi ll certain
membership requirements. In the case of “Westphalian” international
society, the membership criteria established by Western states required
non-Western states to engage in Western-style domestic political and
social reforms.54 In addition, states had “to attain an acceptable level
of civilization in their activities as members” of international society
in order to become members of international society.55 English School
scholars admit that occasionally Western states used the membership
requirements instrumentally as a cover for their own aggression. Yet,
according to the English School, the membership criteria represented
a veritable admissions test that non-Western states could and did pass.
When non-Western states passed the test of admission into interna-
tional society, Western states abolished extraterritoriality.56
51
For a general introduction to the English School see Bull (1977) and Wight (1991).
On the distinction between international system and international society see
Wight (1977), Bull (1977), Bull and Watson (1984a), Gong (1984), and Watson
(1992). Watson (1987) and Alderson and Hurrell (2000) review Bull’s scholarship
on international society. Buzan (1993) and Little (1995) discuss international state
and international society distinction. For a critical view of the English School’s
culture-based argument for the expansion of international society see Zhang (1991)
and Stivachtis (1998). Using the English School’s standards of civilization argu-
ment, Donnelly (1998) suggests that international human rights became the con-
temporary standard of civilization for membership into international society.
52
Bull (1977: 9).
53
Bull (1977: 15).
54
Bull and Watson (1984a: 122–23).
55
Watson (1992: 273).
56
Bull and Watson (1984b: 427).

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60 Legal Imperialism

Despite this clear theoretical prediction, the conceptual vagueness

of “international society” makes it difficult to derive strong empiri-
cal predictions.57 The international society membership requirements
may include state-building practices such as domestic law and order,
administrative integrity, the protection of the rights of foreigners,
cultural changes such as the internalization of some Western values
and ethical standards, and the acceptance of Western economic and
commercial practices.58 Gerrit Gong offers the most detailed concep-
tualization of the membership criteria required to enter international
society. Gong lists five sets of policies that non-Western countries had
to accomplish: 1) guarantee basic rights (especially for foreigners)
including life, dignity, property, freedom of travel, commerce, and
religion; 2) maintain an efficient bureaucracy with a capacity for self-
defense of the country; 3) adhere to international law and maintain
an efficient legal system with published laws, which guarantee justice
for both their own citizens and foreigners; 4) maintain diplomatic
relations; and 5) comply with the civilized norms prohibiting practices
such as polygamy and slavery.59
Gong argues that the standard of “civilization” has an implicit
and subjective dimension, making it difficult to measure. Even if a
non-Western country accomplishes the necessary reforms in all five
areas, the Western countries may continue to perceive it as nonciv-
ilized, and thus not a member of international society. Therefore,
perhaps it is not membership – but “perception” of membership –
in international society that explains the abolition of extraterri-
toriality. In other words, if home states perceive host countries to
be members of international society, then home states will abolish
extraterritoriality.
Both the legal institutionalization approach and the English School
share a common variable: legal institutions. Yet, there are differences.
First, the function of legal institutions differs in the two approaches.
The English School emphasizes the role of legal institutions as a pre-
requisite for non-Western polities to attain legitimacy as civilized
states in international society. The role of legal institutionalization

57
Copeland (2003: 427) offers a methodological critique of the English School.
58
Bull and Watson (1984b: 427) and Watson (1992: 273).
59
Gong (1984: 14–15).

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Extraterritoriality and Legal Imperialism 61

in enabling and regularizing transnational interactions is not empha-

sized. Furthermore, legal institutions are only one of several causal
variables the English School uses. Among other variables, the capac-
ity of self-defense, similar to the realist power asymmetry variable,
and the abolition of polygamy and slavery are Western cultural stan-
dards. Even though legal institutionalization often appears as the most
important indicator of the standard of “civilization” in English School
studies, the circularity of the argument combined with the ambiguity
of conceptual categories like “civilizations” prevents English School
scholars from theorizing about the centrality of legal institutions in
international politics. English School scholars are unable to provide
a robust account of the expansion of international society in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Notes on the Research Design

Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century legal imperialism is mostly
related to the British hegemonic power and legal episteme. Because
of the centrality of Britain in the history of extraterritoriality, I will
defi ne the abolition of extraterritoriality as Britain’s decision to accept
non-Western jurisdiction over British citizens living in a given state.
Britain was a precedent setter whose decisions were often made in
collaboration with other Western states and in some cases through
joint multilateral treaties. These decisions to abolish extraterritorial-
ity were followed closely, in terms of both timing and content, by
other Western states that often subsequently pursued almost identical
bilateral treaties with the host state.
This project is a comparative case study based on two research strat-
egies. First, for an initial test of the hypotheses, I use Mill’s methods
to correlate explanatory variables and the abolition of extraterrito-
riality. Second, after establishing a correlation between the indepen-
dent and dependent variables, I trace the process of the abolition of
extraterritoriality in each case.
I have three cases (Japan, Turkey, and China) and two observations
from each case, for a total of six observations: The Tokyo Conference
of 1882 and the 1894–1899 period for Japan; the Paris Conference of
1856 and the Lausanne Conference of 1922–1923 for Turkey; and the
Washington Conference of 1921 and the Second World War period

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62 Legal Imperialism

for China. One of the observations in each case is a successful effort

to abolish extraterritoriality, while the other is a British decision, in
collaboration with other Western states, not to abolish extraterritori-
ality. In each case, I observe how variations on the five factors – power
asymmetry, rulers’ sensitivity to the extraterritorial groups, strategic
competition, perception of host countries’ place in international soci-
ety, and domestic legalization – correlate with the British decisions
about extraterritoriality.
Although Mill’s methods are useful in finding correlations, they
may not detect spurious correlations.60 This project is susceptible to
spurious correlations because I expect that some of the explanatory
variables (power asymmetry, institutionalization of a state-based
legal system, and perception of civilization) may be correlated with
each other. Process tracing offers another set of research tools to elim-
inate spurious correlations, identify the omitted variables in expla-
nations, and observe interaction effects among different variables.61
I use intra- and inter-government debates, parliamentary discussions,
and reports from the embassies and consuls to assess rulers’ motiva-
tions. I also use publicly available primary sources such as public dec-
larations, newspaper statements, and memoirs to link and trace the
causal variables to abolition decisions.
Four factors drive my case selection: the importance of the host
states in world politics, variation on the independent and dependent
variables, the ability to conduct within- and across-case comparisons,
and the ease with which I could test these cases against alternative
theories.62 First, I selected Japan, Turkey, and China because they are
all important actors in world politics. Although extraterritoriality is
a forgotten issue in Western countries, it is still common to see ref-
erences to it in the foreign policy discourses of Japan, Turkey, and
China. A study of extraterritoriality contributes both to the foreign
policy studies of Japan, Turkey, and China and to scholarship on the
state-building processes of these states.

60
For strengths and weaknesses of Mill’s methods see Lieberson (1992, 1994) and
Savolainen (1994).
61
Bennett and George (2004).
62
For general case selection requirements in comparative case studies, see
King, Keohane et al. (1994: 115–149); Van Evera (1997: 49–88); and Geddes
(2003: 89–130).

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Extraterritoriality and Legal Imperialism 63

Second, Japan, Turkey, and China provide observations for vari-

ation on the five independent variables. I have also opted to exam-
ine both successful and failed attempts to abolish extraterritoriality
to ensure variation on the dependent variable. Some of these failed
attempts came after a major military success and the formation of
an alliance (Ottoman Empire, 1856) or only the formation of a mili-
tary alliance (China, 1921), and some of these failed attempts corre-
late with significant cultural reforms (Japan, 1882; Ottoman Empire,
1856), which suggest a weakness in the English School’s standard of
“civilization” hypothesis. Despite my critique of the English School’s
civilizational approach, my favored explanatory variable, legal insti-
tutionalization, is also one of the factors the English School scholars
identify in the standard of “civilization,” a shared element creating
some overlaps between these arguments.
Third, all these non-Western states were “independent” states and not
colonies, so the discussion can focus on the diffusion of the Westphalian
norm of sovereignty to these non-Western states without the complica-
tions and particularities of colonial politics.63 I exclude formal colonies
because of the overdetermination of the outcome. Once a Western coun-
try formally colonized a non-Western country where extraterritoriality
had previously existed, all approaches will predict the abolition of extra-
territoriality. The material strength of the colonizer, as realism predicts,
may deter other Western states from continuing to impose extraterri-
torial rule. Because the colonization of a country may bring that terri-
tory into international society, as the English School predicts, Western
states may give up their extraterritoriality. Lastly, the colonizer’s state-
building practices that integrate the legal system into the formal legal
hierarchy of the imperial center may lead to the abolition of extraterri-
toriality, as the legal institutionalization argument claims.64 Among the
noncolonized cases, there are two cases, Iran and Thailand, which I do
not discuss extensively. I posit that my legal institutional approach can
explain the abolition of extraterritoriality there as well.

63
I also exclude the informal forms of extraterritoriality that emerged in Latin
American states. Benton (2002) argues that imposition of informal extraterritorial-
ity caused legal institutionalization in Latin America.
64
Liu (1925) provides evidence for the abolition of extraterritoriality in cases of colo-
nization. The evidence he provides suggests that the discussions of the abolition of
extraterritoriality in colonial cases focused on the legal system.

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64 Legal Imperialism

I present the case studies chronologically based on the year of abo-

lition of extraterritoriality in order to integrate the transformations in
international environment and larger imperial context into my analysis
better. The long history of extraterritoriality – from the emergence of
British legal imperialism in the 1830s and 1840s to the American legal
imperialism in the 1940s – saw some remarkable changes in interna-
tional environment, such as in the distribution of power, international
norms, and political ideas. These changes significantly influenced the
debates and negotiations about extraterritoriality. For example, the
most intense debates and negotiations in Japan occurred in the 1880s
and 1890s when Western states were pursuing imperialist policies,
such as the Scramble of Africa. In this period of imperial expansion,
the normative claims against imperialism and extraterritoriality were
weak, and thus the discussions on extraterritoriality in Japan show
hardly any normative argument against imperialism or extraterrito-
riality. Yet, three decades later, the Turkish elite constantly referred
to the norm of sovereign equality at Lausanne in 1923 to challenge
the legitimacy of extraterritoriality on normative grounds. Although
great powers spurned the Turkish attempts, the normative challenge
against extraterritoriality has significantly altered American views
about extraterritoriality in China in the 1940s.
Another example of how the international factors influenced extra-
territoriality is the change in the distribution of power. The decline of
Russian imperialism and the establishment of an antiimperialist Soviet
government were important factors for the abolition of extraterritori-
ality in Turkey and China. For instance, the Soviet Union’s unilateral
abolition of Russian extraterritoriality in Turkey and its political and
military support to the nascent Turkish government bolstered Turkish
confidence and resistance against Britain. Britain’s inability to dictate
the terms at Lausanne and to reimpose extraterritoriality indicates
decreasing British power. The British decline was further confirmed
in China, where the United States became the leading power on the
issue of extraterritoriality in the 1930s and 1940s.
In case studies, I use primary and secondary sources. My primary
sources are British and American. My reliance on these sources may
create a problem as I argue that my thesis is generalizable to other
major home countries’ abolition of extraterritoriality. However, I do
not expect any systematic bias, because there is no reason to expect

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Extraterritoriality and Legal Imperialism 65

that the explanatory variables are sensitive to differences among

home states. The only exception to the generalization of British and
American abolition of extraterritoriality to the abolition of decisions
of other major home states is the Soviet Union’s abolition of extra-
territoriality. My argument does not adequately explain the Soviet
Union’s abolition of extraterritoriality in the Ottoman Empire and
Turkey following the revolution in 1917. Abolition in this instance
occurred as a result of mostly antiimperialist ideological reasons and
the new Soviet regime’s desire to break its international isolation.
I rely on secondary sources to test some causal variables and to
establish the context for my observations.65 I follow the consensus
among historians if one exists. In the absence of consensus, I explain
why I chose a particular interpretation over other interpretations.
Archival data also allowed me to judge the validity of different histor-
ical interpretations.66

65
For how multiple historical interpretations may cause selection bias of secondary
sources and suggestions for how to prevent them, see Lustick (1996).
66
Larson (2001) argues that political scientists should conduct archival research to be
able to discriminate between different historical interpretations.

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