SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 152423. December 15, 2010.]

SPOUSES MARCOS R. ESMAQUEL and VICTORIA

SORDEVILLA, petitioners, vs. MARIA COPRADA, respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J : p

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision 1 and the Resolution 2 of
the Court of Appeals, dated April 6, 2001 and February 15, 2002,
respectively, (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 49994.
The antecedents are as follows:
On February 24, 1997, petitioners, spouses Marcos Esmaquel and
Victoria Sordevilla (Victoria) filed an ejectment case 3 against respondent
Maria V. Coprada before the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Magdalena, Liliw and Majayjay Laguna. Petitioners claimed that they are the
registered owners of a parcel of land situated in M.H. Del Pilar St., Barangay
San Miguel, Majayjay, Laguna, containing an area of Two Hundred Fifty-
Three (253) square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-93542. In 1945, respondent was able to persuade the petitioners to
allow her and her family to use and occupy the land for their residence,
under the condition that they will vacate the premises should petitioners
need to use the same. Respondent and her family were allowed to construct
their residential house. Since then, the petitioners never made an attempt to
drive them away out of pity, knowing that respondent and her eight children
have no other place to live in. Also, respondent and her family have been
occupying the subject premises free of rent, including payment of realty
taxes. Respondent's present circumstances have completely improved, i.e.,
some of her children are already working; they are regularly sending her
financial assistance; and she has acquired her own residential house at
Barangay Panglan, Majayjay, Laguna. Because of this, petitioners verbally
demanded that respondent vacate the subject land, but the latter refused.
Thus, petitioners were forced to send a demand letter dated August 22,
1996, giving respondent until November 30, 1996 to vacate the subject
premises. However, respondent still ignored said demand, which prompted
petitioners to bring a complaint before the barangay authorities. No
settlement was reached, hence, a certification to file action in Court was
issued. Petitioners were, therefore, constrained to lodge an ejectment case
against the respondent before the MCTC. CHTcSE

Respondent admitted that petitioners are the registered owners of the

subject land. However, she averred that in 1945, it was Emiliana Coprada
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 (petitioner Victoria Sordevilla's mother and original owner of the subject
land) and not the petitioners who gave permission to her late husband
Brigido Coprada to use the subject lot. Emiliana allowed her nephew Brigido
and his family to occupy the lot as their permanent abode, because of her
love and affection for her nephew, and also, due to the fact that the said lot
is virtually a wasteland. Thereafter, Brigido and his family cleared the area
and built therein a nipa hut to dwell in. When Emiliana died, the ownership of
the property was inherited by her only child, petitioner Victoria Sordevilla.
Respondent alleged that sometime in the early 1960's, petitioner Victoria
offered the said lot for sale for P2,000.00 to respondent, who readily agreed.
The purchase price was paid in installments and was fully paid in 1962. Due
to their close relationship, the agreement was never reduced to writing.
Respondent further maintained that since the execution of the oral sale of
the subject lot, she has been the one paying the realty taxes due on the
property. After the sale, respondent built on the subject land a semi-concrete
structure. Respondent stated that petitioners' claim is barred by laches. Even
granting, without admitting, that respondent's claim of ownership over the
property is improper because petitioners are the registered owners thereof,
respondent argued that she is a builder in good faith, because she was able
to build the structure on the subject lot with the prior permission of the
owner.
In its Decision 4 dated September 11, 1997, the MCTC rendered
judgment dismissing the complaint. It held that laches had already set in
which prevented petitioners from questioning the validity of the purported
sale between Victoria and Maria.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the MCTC's
judgment. The RTC ruled that respondent's occupation of the subject
property was by virtue of petitioners' tolerance and permission. Hence,
respondent is bound by an implied promise that she will vacate the property
upon demand. Thus, her possession over the subject property became
unlawful after the petitioners demanded her to vacate the property. The RTC
found that respondent failed to prove the alleged oral sale and that
petitioners have adequately proven that they are entitled to the possession
of the subject land as registered owners thereof. The RTC ordered the
respondent and all other persons claiming rights under her to vacate and
surrender the possession of the subject land to the petitioners and to remove
any and all improvements she introduced on the parcel of land. 5
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by
the RTC in an Order 6 dated November 24, 1998. Obviously dissatisfied by
the Decision, respondent filed with the CA a petition for review with prayer
for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. 7
In its Decision dated April 6, 2001, the CA granted respondent's
petition, reversed the Decision of the RTC and affirmed in toto the Decision
of the MCTC. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied
by the CA in a Resolution 8 dated February 15, 2002. Hence, the instant
petition raising the following grounds:
TCacIA

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 I

THE RIGHT OF THE REGISTERED OWNERS TO RECOVER POSSESSION IS

NEVER BARRED BY LACHES AND/OR THE PERSON WHO HAS A
TORRENS TITLE OVER A PARCEL OF LAND IS ENTITLED TO THE
POSSESSION THEREOF.

II

THE OWNERSHIP AND RIGHT OF PETITIONERS TO RECOVER

POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY CANNOT BE DEFEATED BY
UNPROVEN ORAL SALE.

III
LACHES HAD SET IN AGAINST [RESPONDENT].

IV

THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE IS NOT SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTACK. 9

The petition is meritorious.

The pertinent point of inquiry in this case is whether or not petitioners
have a valid ground to evict respondent from the subject property.
An action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is governed by Section
1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. —
Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person
deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or
other person against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to
hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the
legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or
other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons
claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together
with damages and costs.

In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the defendant was

originally legal, as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account
of an express or implied contract between them. However, defendant's
possession became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that defendant
vacate the subject property due to the expiration or termination of the right
to possess under their contract, and defendant refused to heed such
demand. 10 ETDAaC

The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or

material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of
ownership by any of the parties. Where the issue of ownership is raised by
any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine
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 who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is, however,
merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the
same parties involving title to the property. 11 Since the issue of ownership
was raised in the unlawful detainer case, its resolution boils down to which of
the parties' respective evidence deserves more weight.
In the case at bar, petitioners' cause of action for unlawful detainer is
based on their ownership of the land covered by TCT No. T-93542 and on
their claim that they merely tolerated respondent's stay thereat.
Respondent's possession, as well as those persons claiming right under her,
became unlawful upon her refusal to vacate the premises. Petitioners
contend that since they are the registered owners of the subject land, they
are entitled to the possession thereof and their right to recover possession
over it is never barred by laches. They maintain that respondent's claim of
ownership is based on an unproven oral sale, which does not exist. Further,
respondent cannot rely on the Tax Declarations as she was paying taxes in
the petitioners' name, as the declared owners of the property. Moreover, she
started paying the taxes only in 1984 despite her claim that the property
was sold to her in 1962. Even assuming that the sale took place in 1962,
respondent is guilty of laches as she failed to take any positive action for the
delivery and conveyance to her of the portion of the property she is
occupying. Finally, respondent cannot collaterally attack the title of the
petitioners to the subject land.
On her part, respondent, although admitting that the property is
registered in petitioners' name, claimed that the 100-square-meters portion
of the property, where her house was erected, was already sold to her by
petitioner Victoria. Thus, by virtue of the sale, she and her family have the
right to possess the said property. The non-presentation of receipt and deed
of sale, non-delivery of the owner's certificate of title, and her payment of
the real property taxes in the name of the petitioners were due to the close
relationship between the parties and the existing practice of palabra de
honor in their day to day transactions. Respondent further alleged that she is
not guilty of laches; rather, it is the registered owners' right to recover
possession of their property which is barred by laches.
In the present case, respondent failed to present evidence to
substantiate her allegation that a portion of the land was sold to her in 1962.
In fact, when petitioners sent a letter 12 to the respondent, demanding her to
vacate the subject property, the respondent, in reply 13 to the said letter,
never mentioned that she purchased the subject land in 1962. If the sale
really took place, the respondent should have immediately and categorically
claimed that in her letter response. Clearly therefore, respondent's
submission that there was an oral sale is a mere afterthought.
On the other hand, it is undisputed that the subject property is covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-93542, registered in the name of the
petitioners. As against the respondent's unproven claim that she acquired a
portion of the property from the petitioners by virtue of an oral sale, the
Torrens title of petitioners must prevail. Petitioners' title over the subject
property is evidence of their ownership thereof. It is a fundamental principle
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 in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein. Moreover, the age-old rule is that the person
who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof. 14 AcEIHC

Further, respondent's argument that petitioners are no longer the

owners of a portion of the subject land because of the sale in her favor is a
collateral attack on the title of the petitioners, which is not allowed. The
validity of petitioners' certificate of title cannot be attacked by respondent in
this case for ejectment. Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be
altered, modified or canceled, except in a direct proceeding for that purpose
in accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the petitioners
can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.
Whether or not the respondent has the right to claim ownership over the
property is beyond the power of the trial court to determine in an action for
unlawful detainer. 15
In Rodriguez v. Rodriguez , 16 citing the case of Co v. Militar, 17 the
Court held that:
[T]he Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was
believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of
land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of
ownership is established and recognized.
It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and
binding upon the whole world unless and until it has been nullified by a
court of competent jurisdiction. Under existing statutory and decisional
law, the power to pass upon the validity of such certificate of title at
the first instance properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a
direct proceeding for cancellation of title.

As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession

of the property, which is one of the attributes of ownership. . . .

Anent the issue on laches, the CA's ruling that petitioners' long inaction
to assert their rights over the subject land bars them from recovering the
same is without basis. Also, the doctrine invoked by the appellate court that
a registered owner may loose his right to recover its possession by reason of
laches is not applicable here.
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. 18 There is no
absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each
case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances, with the
question of laches addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Because
laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable
considerations and should not be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate
fraud or injustice. 19 TcSHaD

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 Respondent first acquired possession of the subject lot by mere
tolerance. From 1945 until the filing of the complaint for ejectment in 1997,
the nature of that possession has never changed. Petitioners allowed the
respondent to possess the property with the knowledge that the respondent
will vacate the same upon demand. Hence, until such demand to vacate was
communicated by the petitioners to the respondent, petitioners are not
required to do any act to recover the subject land, precisely because they
knew of the nature of the respondent's possession, i.e., possession by mere
tolerance. Thus, it cannot be said that petitioners are guilty of failure or
neglect to assert a right within a reasonable time. Further, after the
petitioners gave a demand letter to the respondent giving the latter until
November 30, 1996 to vacate the subject premises, which respondent failed
to heed, they immediately filed a complaint before the barangay authorities
and, thereafter, lodged an ejectment case before the MCTC on February 24,
1997. In sum, We find that petitioners are not guilty of laches as would bar
their claim to the property in question.
In contrast, respondent, who is claiming that a portion of the property
was sold to her in 1962, has herself failed within a long period of time to
have that portion transferred in her name. Respondent had to wait for
almost 35 years since 1962, and were it not for the filing of the ejectment
suit in 1997, she would not have bothered to assert her rights under the
alleged sale. Respondent's failure to assert that right only goes to prove that
no sale ever transpired between the parties.
Moreover, as the registered owners, petitioners' right to eject any
person illegally occupying their property is not barred by laches. In
Gaudencio Labrador, represented by Lulu Labrador Uson, as Attorney-in-Fact
v. Spouses Ildefonso Perlas and Pacencia Perlas and Spouse Rogelio Pobre
and Melinda Fogata Pobre, 20 the Court held that:
. . . As a registered owner, petitioner has a right to eject
any person illegally occupying his property. This right is
imprescriptible and can never be barred by laches. In Bishop v.
Court of Appeals, we held, thus:
As registered owners of the lots in question, the private
respondents have a right to eject any person illegally occupying
their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed
that they were aware of the petitioners' occupation of the
property, and regardless of the length of that possession, the
lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property
at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or
merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches.

Since respondent's occupation of the subject lot is by mere tolerance

or permission of the petitioners, without any contract between them,
respondent is bound by an implied promise that she will vacate the same
upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against her. 21 AaIDHS

In respondent's Answer filed before the MCTC, she claimed that since
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 she was able to build a structure on the subject lot with the prior permission
from the owner, she is a builder in good faith and thus entitled to be
reimbursed the necessary and useful expenses under Articles 546 and 548
of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Without such reimbursement, she has the
right of retention over the property and she cannot just be ejected from the
premises.
Respondent's argument does not hold water. Since respondent's
occupation of the subject property was by mere tolerance, she has no right
to retain its possession under Article 448 of the Civil Code. She is aware that
her tolerated possession may be terminated any time and she cannot be
considered as builder in good faith. 22 It is well settled that both Article 448
23 and Article 546 24 of the New Civil Code, which allow full reimbursement

of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is

made, apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land
with the belief that he is the owner thereof. Verily, persons whose
occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not possessors
in good faith. 25 At the time respondent built the improvements on the
premises in 1945, she knew that her possession was by mere permission and
tolerance of the petitioners; hence, she cannot be said to be a person who
builds on land with the belief that she is the owner thereof.
Respondent's reliance on her payment of realty taxes on the property
is unavailing. She started paying taxes only in 1984 despite her claim that
she bought the property in 1962. Further, aside from the rule that tax
declarations and corresponding tax receipts cannot be used to prove title to
or ownership of a real property inasmuch as they are not conclusive
evidence of the same, 26 the RTC found that although the payment for said
taxes were received from respondent, the declared owner was petitioner
Victoria.
It must be stressed, however, that the court's adjudication of
ownership in an ejectment case is merely provisional, and affirmance of the
RTC's decision would not bar or prejudice an action between the same
parties involving title to the property, if and when such action is brought
seasonably before the proper forum. 27
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated April 6, 2001 and February 15,
2002, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 49994, affirming the Decision of the
2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court in Civil Case No. 1875, are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna,
Branch 26, in Civil Case No. SC-3580, is REINSTATED. cIETHa

SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Nachura, Abad and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1.Penned by Associate Justice Alicia L. Santos, with Associate Justice Ramon A.
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 Barcelona and Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico, concurring; rollo, pp. 43-
49.
2.Rollo , pp. 51-52.
3.Records, pp. 7-11.

4.Rollo , pp. 97-102.

5.Id. at. 137.
6.Records, pp. 226-227.
7.CA rollo, pp. 7-22.
8.Rollo , pp. 51-52.

9.Id. at 21.
10.Estate of Soledad Manantan v. Somera, G.R. No. 145867, April 7, 2009, 584
SCRA 81, 89.
11.Barias v. Heirs of Bartolome Boneo, G.R. No. 166941, December 14, 2009, 608
SCRA 169, 174.

12.Records, p. 14.
13.Id. at 41.
14.Caña v. Evangelical Free Church of the Philippines, G.R. No. 157573, February
11, 2008, 544 SCRA 225, 238-239.
15.Soriente v. Estate of the Late Arsenio E. Concepcion, G.R. No. 160239,
November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 315, 330.
16.G.R. No. 175720, September 11, 2007, 532 SCRA 642, 652-653.
17.G.R. No. 149912, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 455.
18.Fangonil-Herrera v. Fangonil, G.R. No. 169356, August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 486,
511.
19.Id.

20.G.R. No. 173900, August 9, 2010. (Emphasis supplied.)

21.Arambulo v. Gungab, 508 Phil. 612, 621-622 (2005).
22.Id. at 622, citing Del Rosario v. Manuel, 420 SCRA 128, 131 (2004).
23.Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or
planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the
works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the owner who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the
builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall
pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate
the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the
terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms
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 thereof.
24.Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the
possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed
therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with
the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the
possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of
paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason
thereof.
25.Pada-Kilario v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 515, 529-530 (2000).
26.Castillo v. Escutin , G.R. No. 171056, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 258, 285.
27.Soriente v. Estate of the Late Arsenio E. Concepcion, supra note 15.

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