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VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 18, 1970 17

Caisip vs. People

No. L-287I6. November 18, 1970.

FELIX CAISIP,IGNACIO ROJALES and FEDERICO

VILLADELREY, petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Civil Law; Inapplicability of Article 429, Civil Code.— Article 429,

Civil Code is inapplicable to the case at bar, for, having been given 20 days
from June 6, 1959, within which to vacate Lot 105-A, complainant did not,
on June 17, 1959,—or within said period—invade or usurp said lot. She had
merely remained in possession thereof, even though the hacienda owner
may have become its co-possessor. Appellants did not "repel or prevent an
actual or threatened x x x physical invasion or usurpation." They expelled
the complainant from a property of which she and her husband were in
possession even before the action for forcible entry was filed against them
on May 17, 1958, despite the fact that the Sheriff had explicitly authorized
them to stay in said property up to June 26, 1959, and had expressed the
view that he could not oust them therefrom on June 17, 1959, without a
judicial order therefor.
Criminal Law; Grave Coercion.—It is accordingly clear that appellants
herein had, by means of violence, and without legal authority therefor,
prevented the complainant from "doing something not prohibited by law,"
(weeding and being in Lot 105-A), and compelled her "to do something
against" her will (stopping the weeding and leaving said lot) "whether it be
right or wrong"; thereby taking the law into their hands, in viola-

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18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Caisip vs. People

tion of Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code; U.S. vs. Mena, 11 Phil. 543).
Same; Same; Co-conspirator.—As there was community of purpose
between the policemen and Caisip, although he did not use violence against

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the complaining witness, Caisip is guilty of grave coercion, as a co-

conspirator, apart from being a principal by induction.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Godofredo F. Trajano & Rafael A. Francisco for petitioners.
          Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor
General Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor Conrado T. Limcaoco for
respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

This case is before Us upon petition of defendants Felix Caisip,

Ignacio Rojales and Federico Villadelrey, for review on certiorari of
a decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed that of the Court
of First Instance of Batangas, convicting them of the crime of Grave
Coercion, with which they are charged, and sentencing each to four
(4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of
P200.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, not to
exceed one-third of the principal penalty, as well as one-third of the
costs.
As set forth in the trial court's decision, the background of the
present case is this:

"The complainant Gloria Cabalag is the wife of Marcelino Guevarra who

cultivated a parcel of land known as Lot 105-A of Hacienda Palico situated
in sitio Bote-bote, barrio Tampisao, Nasugbu, Batangas. The said parcel of
land used to be tenanted by the deceased father of the complainant.
Hacienda Palico is owned by Roxas y Cia. and administered by Antonio
Chuidian. The overseer of the said hacienda is Felix Caisip, one of the
accused herein. Even before the occurrence of the incident presently
involved, there had been a series of misunderstandings and litigations
involving the complainant and her husband, on one hand, and the men of
Hacienda Palico on the other.

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VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 18, 1970 19

Caisip vs. People

"It appears that on December 23, 1957, Marcelino Guevarra filed an action
with the Court of Agrarian Relations seeking recognition as a lawful tenant
of Roxas y Cia. over Lot No. 105-A of Hacienda Palico. In a decision dated
February 22, 1958, the Court of Agrarian Relations declared it has no
jurisdiction over the case, inasmuch as Guevarra is not a tenant on the said
parcel of land. An appeal was taken by Guevarra to the Supreme Court, but
the appeal was dismissed in a resolution dated April 10, 1958.
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"On May 17, 1958, Roxas y Cia. filed an action against Marcelino
Guevarra in the justice of the peace court of Nasugbu, Batangas, for forcible
entry, praying therein that Guevarra be ejected from the premises of Lot No.
105-A. After due hearing, the said Court in a decision dated May 2, 1959
ordered Guevarra to vacate the lot and to pay damages and accrued rentals.
A writ of execution was issued by Justice of the Peace Rodolfo A. Castillo
of Nasugbu, which was served on Guevarra on June 6, 1959, and the return
of which was made by Deputy Sheriff Leonardo R. Aquino of this Court on
June 23, 1959 (Exhibit '10'). The writ recites among other things that the
possession of the land was delivered to the Roxas y Cia. thru Felix Caisip,
the overseer, and Guevarra was given twenty days from June 6, 1959 within
which to leave the premises."

The record before Us does not explain why said decision was
executed. According to the complainant, her husband's counsel had
appealed from said decision. The justice of the peace who rendered
it, Hon. Rodolfo Castillo, said that there really had been an attempt
to appeal, which was not given due course because the reglementary
period therefor had expired; that a motion to reconsider his order to
this effect was denied by him; and that a second motion for
reconsideration was "still pending consideration," and it was
October 19, 1959 when such testimony was given.
Continuing the narration of the antecedent facts, His Honor, the
Trial Judge, added:

"On June 15, 1959, some trouble occurred between the complainant and
Caisip regarding the cutting of sugar cane on Lot 105-A. The following day
June 16, 1959, the complainant allegedly again entered the premises of Lot
105-A and refused to be driven out by Felix Caisip. Due to the
aforementioned incidents, Gloria Cabalag was charged in the justice of the
peace court of Nasugbu, Batangas, with grave coercion for the incident of
June 15, 1959, docketed in the said court

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Caisip vs. People

as Criminal Case No. 968 (Exhibit '3'); and with the crime of unjust
vexation for the incident of June 16, 1959, docketed in the said court as
Criminal Case No. 970. Both cases, however, were filed only on June 25,
1959."

In other words, these criminal cases, Nos. 968 and 970, against
Gloria Cabalag, were filed eight (8) days after the incident involved
in the case at bar. It is, also, noteworthy that both cases were—on
motion of the prosecution, filed after a reinvestigation thereof—
provisionally dismissed, on November 8, 1960, by the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, upon the ground "that the evidence of record x
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x x are insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond

reasonable doubt." The decision of said court, in the case at bar, goes
on to say:

"It further appears that due to the tenacious attitude of Gloria Cabalag to
remain in the premises, Caisip sought the help of the chief of police of
Nasugbu who advised him to see Deputy Sheriff Aquino about the matter.
The latter, however, informed Caisip that he could not act on the request to
eject Gloria Cabalag and to stop her from what she was doing without a
proper court order. Caisip then consulted Antonio Chuidian, the hacienda
administrator, who, in turn, went to the chief of police and requested for the
detail of policemen in sitio Bote-bote. The chief of police, acting on said
request, assigned the accused Ignacio Rojales and Federico Villadelrey,
police sergeant and police 1 corporal, respectively, of the Nasugbu Police
Force, to sitio Bote-bote."

On June 17, 1959, at about 5:00 p.m., Gloria Cabalag was seen
weeding the portion of Lot 105-A which was a ricefield. Appellant
Caisip approached her and bade her to leave, but she refused to do
so, alleging that she and her husband had the right to stay there and
that the crops thereon belong to them. She having stuck to this
attitude, even when he threatened to call the police, Caisip went to
his codefendants, Sgt. Rojales and Cpl. Villadelrey, both of the local
police, who were some distance away, and brought them with him.
Rojales told Gloria, who was then in a squatting position, to stop
weeding. As Gloria insisted on her right to stay in said lot, Rojales
grabbed her right hand and, twisting the same, wrested therefrom the
trowel

_______________

1 Brief for the Appellants, pp. 58-60.

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VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 18, 1970 21

Caisip vs. People

she was holding. Thereupon, Villadelrey held her left hand and,
together with Rojales, forcibly dragged her northward—towards a
forested area, where there was a banana plantation—as Caisip stood
nearby, with a drawn gun. 2

Inasmuch as Gloria shouted "Ina ko po! Ina ko po!" her

neighbors, Librada Dulutan, followed, soon later, by Francisca
Andino, came and asked the policemen why they were dragging her.
The policemen having answered that they would take Gloria to town
—which was on the west—Francisca Andino pleaded that Gloria be
released, saying that, if their purpose was as stated by them, she

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(Gloria) would willingly go with them. By this time, Gloria had

already been3 dragged about eight meters and her dress, as well as
her blouse were torn. She then agreed to proceed westward to the
municipal building, and asked to be allowed to pass by her house,
within Lot 105-A, in order to breast-feed her nursing infant, but, the
request was turned down. As they passed, soon later, near the house
of Zoilo Rivera, head of the tenant organization to which she was
affiliated, in the barrio of Camachilihan, Gloria called out for him,
whereupon, he went down the house and accompanied them to the
municipal building. Upon arrival thereat, Rojales and Villadelrey
turned her over to the policeman on duty, and then departed. After
being interrogated by the chief of police, Gloria was, upon
representations made by Zoilo Rivera, released and allowed to go
home.
The foregoing is the prosecution's version. That of the defense is
to the effect that, upon being asked by the policemen to stop
weeding and leave the premises, Gloria, not only refused to do so,
but, also, insulted them, as well as Caisip. According to the defense,
she was arrested because of the crime of slander then committed by
her. Appellants Rojales and Villadelrey, moreover, testified that, as
they were heading towards the barrio of Camachilihan, Gloria
proceeded to tear her clothes. His Honor, the Trial Judge, accepted,
however, the ver-

_______________

2 "My mother! My mother!"

3 "Chambra."

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Caisip vs. People

sion of the prosecution and found that of the defense unworthy of

credence. The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, which fully
concurred in this view, are "final," and our authority to review on4
certiorari its appealed decision is limited to questions purely of law.
Appellants maintain that the Court of Appeals has erred: (1) in not
finding their acts "justified under Article 429 of the New Civil
Code"; (2) in holding that the 20-day period of grace given to
Marcelino Guevarra and his wife, Gloria Cabalag, by the sheriff, to
vacate Lot 105-A, was valid and lawful; (3) in finding that the
elements of the crime of grave coercion are present in the case at
bar; and (4) in finding appellants guilty as charged. This pretense is
clearly untenable.
Art. 429 of our Civil Code, reading:

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"The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any
person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may
use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual
or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property."

upon which appellants rely is obviously inapplicable to the case at

bar, for, having been given 20 days from June 6, 1959, within which
to vacate Lot 105-A, complainant did not, on June 17, 1959—or
within said period—invade or usurp said lot. She had merely
remained in possession thereof, even though the hacienda owner
may have become its co-possessor. Appellants did not "repel or
prevent in actual or threatened x x x physical invasion or
usurpation." They expelled Gloria from a property of which she and
her husband were in possession even before the action for forcible
entry was filed against them on May 17, 1958, despite the fact that
the Sheriff had explicitly authorized them to stay in said property up
to June 26, 1959, and had expressed the view that he could not oust
them therefrom on June 17, 1959, without a judicial order therefor.
It is urged, that, by weeding and refusing to leave Lot 105-A,
Gloria had committed a crime in the presence of the

_______________

4 Section 29, Rep. Act No. 296, as amended; Garcia v. Cruz, L-25790, Sept 27,
1968; People v. Caragao, L-28258, Dec. 27, 1969; Uy v. Tuason & Co., L-21525, Jan.
30, 1970.

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VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 18, 1970 23

Caisip vs. People

policemen, despite the aforementioned 20-day period, which,

appellants claim, the sheriff had no authority to grant. This
contention is manifestly untenable, because: (1) said period was
granted in the presence of the hacienda owner's representative,
appellant Caisip, who, by not objecting thereto, had impliedly
consented to or ratified the act performed by the sheriff; 2) Gloria
and her husband were thereby allowed to remain, and had, in fact,
remained, in possession of the premises, perhaps together with the
owner of the hacienda or his representative, Caisip; (3) the act of
removing weeds from the ricefield was beneficial to its owner and to
whomsoever the crops belonged, and, even if they had not
authorized it, does not constitute a criminal offense; and (4) although
Gloria and her husband had been sentenced to vacate the land, the
judgment against them did not necessarily imply that they, as the
parties who had tilled it and planted thereon, had no rights, of any
kind whatsoever, in or to the standing crops, inasmuch as "necessary
5
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expenses shall be refunded to every possessor," and the cost of

cultivation, production and upkeep
6 has been held to partake of the
nature of necessary expenses.
It is, accordingly, clear that appellants herein had, by means of
violence, and without legal authority therefor, prevented the
complainant from "doing something not prohibited by law,"
(weeding and being in Lot 105-A), and compelled her "to do
something against" her will (stopping the weeding and leaving said
lot), "whether it be right or wrong," thereby taking the law
7 into their
hands, in violation of Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant Caisip argues that, not having used violence against
the complaining witness, he should be acquitted of the charge. In
this connection, His Honor, the Trial Judge, correctly observed:

"x x x While it is true that the accused Caisip did not lay hands on the
complainant, unlike the accused Rojales and Villadelrey who were the ones
who used force against Gloria,

_______________

5 Art. 546, Civil Code of the Philippines.

6 Mendoza v. De Guzman, 52 Phil. 164.
7 U.S. v. Mena, 11 Phil. 543.

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Caisip vs. People

and while the Court is also inclined to discredit the claim of the complainant
that Felix Caisip drew a gun during the incident, it sufficiently appears from
the record that the motivation and inducement for the coercion perpetrated
on the complainant came from the accused Caisip. It was his undisguised
and particular purpose to prevent Gloria from entering the land and working
on the same. He was the one who first approached Gloria with this objective
in mind, and tried to prevent her from weeding the land. He had tried to stop
Gloria from doing the same act even the day previous to the present
incident. It was Caisip who fetched the policemen in order to accomplish his
purpose of preventing Gloria from weeding the land and making her leave
the premises. The policemen obeyed his bidding, and even when the said
policemen were already over-asserting their authority as peace officers,
Caisip simply stood by without attempting to stop their abuses. He could be
hardly said 8 to have disapproved an act which he himself induced and
initiated."

In other words, there was community of purpose between the

policemen and Caisip, so that the latter is guilty of grave coercion,
9
as a co-conspirator, apart from being a principal by induction.

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In the commission of the 10offense, the aggravating circumstances

of abuse of superior strength and disregard
11 of the respect due the
offended party, by reason of her sex, were present, insofar as the
three appellants herein are concerned. As regards appellants Rojales
and Villadelrey, there was the additional aggravating circumstance
of having taken advantage of their positions as members of the local
police force. Hence, the penalty of imprisonment meted out to
appellants herein,
12 which is the minimum of the maximum prescribed
in said Art. 286, and the fine imposed upon them, are in accordance
with law.

_______________

8 Brief for the Appellants, pp. 73-74.

9 U.S. v. Tremoya, 10 Phil. 89; People v. Mancao, 49 Phil. 887; People v. Agbuya,
57 Phil. 238; People v. Timbol, G.R. Nos. 47471-47473, Aug. 4, 1944; People v.
Delgado, 77 Phil. 11; People v. San Luis, 86 Phil. 485.
10 People v. De Guzman, 51 Phil. 105; People v. Flores, 52 Phil. 473.
11 U.S. v. Quevengco, 2 Phil. 412.
12 "x x x arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos xxx."

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VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 18, 1970 25

Caisip vs. People

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with

costs against the defendants-appellants. It is so ordered.

          Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,

Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
     Dizon, J., is on leave.
     Makasiar,J., took no part.
     Villamor, J., did not take part.

Decision affirmed.

Notes.—Grave coercion.—While the law protects the police

officer in the proper discharge of his duties, it must at the same time
also effectively protect the individual from abuse of the police (U.S.
vs. Pabalan, 37 Phil. 352). A policeman who, without warrant,
arrests a person who has not committed any crime or misdemeanor
is guilty of the crime of coercion (U.S. vs. Alexander, 8 Phil. 29).
A landowner who orders his agents to enter the house of his
tenants for the purpose of ousting them is also guilty of coercion
(Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, April 7, 1876, cited in
GUEVARA, COMMENTARIES ON THE REVISED PENAL
CODE, 408 [1957]). But a landlord who closes the door of the house
occupied by his tenant, retaining therein furniture of the latter and
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refusing to deliver it to his tenant, does not commit coercion because

under Article 2241 (Formerly Article 1922) of the Civil Code, the
landlord is justified in holding such furniture.
The following also constitute acts of grave coercion: (a)
preventing a person by violence from working on a piece of land or
compelling him to leave it (People vs. Nebreja, 76 Phil. 119; People
vs. Mojica, CA 45 O.G. 1818; People vs. Nepomuceno, 11 Phil.
661); (b) the act of a claimant of a parcel of land, held adversely by
another, of driving away by means of intimidation the employees of
the other claimant and compelling them to surrender

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Quimson vs. Philippine National Bank

the harvested crop (People vs. Tremoya, 10 Phil. 89); (c) Forcible
seizure of palay and implements in the possession of a person by one
who claimed to be the owner thereof (People vs. Vega, 2 Phil. 167);
(d) the act of a defendant who compelled the complainant to
surrender possession of three carabaos, belonging to him (the
defendant) which had trespassed on the rice paddies of the
complainant and had been caught by the latter (People vs. Mena, 11
Phil. 543).

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