UKRAINE AND RUSSIA

WAR

he Russo-Ukrainian War,[e] previously referred to as the Ukrainian crisis in its

early stages,[4] is an ongoing international conflict between Russia,
alongside Russian-backed separatists, and Ukraine, which began in February
2014.[f] Following Ukraine's Revolution of Dignity, Russia annexed Crimea from
Ukraine and supported pro-Russian separatists fighting the Ukrainian military in
the Donbas war. The first eight years of conflict also included naval
incidents, cyberwarfare, and heightened political tensions. In February 2022, Russia
launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

In early 2014, the Euromaidan protests led to the Revolution of Dignity and the
ousting of Ukraine's pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych. Shortly after, pro-
Russian unrest erupted in eastern and southern Ukraine. Simultaneously, unmarked
Russian troops moved into Ukraine's Crimea and took over government buildings,
strategic sites and infrastructure. Russia soon annexed Crimea after a highly-disputed
referendum. In April 2014, armed pro-Russian separatists seized government
buildings in Ukraine's eastern Donbas region and proclaimed the Donetsk People's
Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) as independent states, starting
the Donbas war. The separatists received considerable but covert support from Russia,
and Ukrainian attempts to fully retake separatist-held areas failed. Although Russia
denied involvement, Russian troops took part in the fighting. In February 2015,
Russia and Ukraine signed the Minsk II agreements to end the conflict, but the
agreements were never fully implemented in the years that followed. The Donbas war
settled into a violent but static conflict between Ukraine and Russian proxies, with
many brief ceasefires but no lasting peace and few changes in territorial control.

Beginning in 2021, Russia built up a large military presence near its border with
Ukraine, including within neighbouring Belarus. Russian officials repeatedly denied
plans to attack Ukraine. Russian president Vladimir Putin criticized the enlargement
of NATO and demanded that Ukraine be barred from ever joining the military
alliance. He also expressed irredentist views and questioned Ukraine's right to exist.
Russia recognized the DPR and LPR as independent states in February 2022, with
Putin announcing a "special military operation" in Ukraine and subsequently invading
the region. The invasion was internationally condemned; many countries imposed
sanctions against Russia and increased existing sanctions. Russia abandoned an
attempt to take Kyiv in early April 2022 amid fierce resistance. From August,
Ukrainian forces began recapturing territories in the north-east and south as a result of
counter-offensives. In late September, Russia declared the annexation of four
partially-occupied regions in southern and eastern Ukraine, which was internationally
unrecognized. It spent the winter conducting failed offensive operations in the Donbas,
and in the spring dug into positions for an anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive.
The war has resulted in a refugee crisis and tens of thousands of deaths.

Contents

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Background
Main article: Russia–Ukraine relations

See also: Historical background of the 2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine

Independent Ukraine and the Orange Revolution

Further information: Orange Revolution
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union (USSR) in 1991, Ukraine and Russia
maintained close ties. In 1994, Ukraine agreed to accede to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state.[5] Former
Soviet nuclear weapons in Ukraine were removed and dismantled.[6] In return, Russia,
the United Kingdom, and the United States agreed to uphold the territorial integrity
and political independence of Ukraine through the Budapest Memorandum on
Security Assurances.[7][8] In 1999, Russia was one of the signatories of the Charter for
European Security, which "reaffirmed the inherent right of each and every
participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including
treaties of alliance, as they evolve."[9] In the years after the dissolution of the USSR,
several former Eastern Bloc countries joined NATO, partly in response to regional
security threats involving Russia such as the 1993 Russian constitutional crisis,
the War in Abkhazia (1992–1993) and the First Chechen War (1994–1996). Putin
claimed Western powers broke promises not to let any Eastern European countries
join.[10][11]

Protesters in Independence Square in Kyiv during the Orange

Revolution, November 2004
The 2004 Ukrainian presidential election was controversial. During the election
campaign, opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko was poisoned by TCDD
dioxin;[12][13] he later accused Russia of involvement.[14] In November, Prime
Minister Viktor Yanukovych was declared the winner, despite allegations of vote-
rigging by election observers.[15] During a two-month period which became known as
the Orange Revolution, large peaceful protests successfully challenged the outcome.
After the Supreme Court of Ukraine annulled the initial result due to
widespread electoral fraud, a second round re-run was held, bringing to power
Yushchenko as president and Yulia Tymoshenko as prime minister, and leaving
Yanukovych in opposition.[16] The Orange Revolution is often grouped together with
other early-21st century protest movements, particularly within the former USSR,
known as colour revolutions. According to Anthony Cordesman, Russian military
officers viewed such colour revolutions as an attempt by the US and European states
to destabilise neighbouring countries and undermine Russia's national
security.[17] Russian President Vladimir Putin accused organisers of the 2011–2013
Russian protests of being former advisors to Yushchenko, and described the protests
as an attempt to transfer the Orange Revolution to Russia.[18] Rallies in favour of
Putin during this period were called "anti-Orange protests".[19]

At the 2008 Bucharest summit, Ukraine and Georgia sought to join NATO. The
response among NATO members was divided; Western European countries opposed
offering Membership Action Plans (MAP) in order to avoid antagonising Russia,
while US President George W. Bush pushed for their admission.[20] NATO ultimately
refused to offer Ukraine and Georgia MAPs, but also issued a statement agreeing that
"these countries will become members of NATO" at some point. Putin voiced strong
opposition to Georgia and Ukraine's NATO membership bids.[21] By January 2022,
the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO remained remote.[22]

In 2009, Yanukovych announced his intent to again run for president in the 2010
Ukrainian presidential election,[23] which he subsequently won.[24] In November 2013,
a wave of large, pro-European Union (EU) protests erupted in response to
Yanukovych's sudden decision not to sign the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement,
instead choosing closer ties to Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union. On 22
February 2013 the Ukrainian parliament had overwhelmingly approved of finalizing
the agreement with the EU,[25] subsequent to which Russia had put pressure on
Ukraine to reject it.[26]

Euromaidan, Revolution of Dignity, and pro-Russian unrest

Main articles: Euromaidan, Revolution of Dignity, and 2014 pro-Russian unrest
in Ukraine
Following months of protests as part of the Euromaidan movement, on 21 February
2014 Yanukovych and the leaders of the parliamentary opposition signed a settlement
agreement that called for early elections. The following day, Yanukovych fled from
the capital ahead of an impeachment vote that stripped him of his powers as
president.[27][28][29][30] On 23 February, the parliament adopted a bill to repeal
the 2012 law which gave Russian language an official status.[31] The bill was
not enacted,[32] however, the proposal provoked negative reactions in the Russian-
speaking regions of Ukraine,[33] intensified by Russian media saying that the ethnic
Russian population was in imminent danger.[34]

On 27 February, an interim government was established and early presidential

elections were scheduled. The following day, Yanukovych resurfaced in Russia and in
a press conference declared that he remained the acting president of Ukraine, just as
Russia was beginning its overt military campaign in Crimea. Leaders of Russian-
speaking eastern regions of Ukraine declared continuing loyalty to
Yanukovych,[28][35] causing the 2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine.

Russian military bases in Crimea

Main article: Political status of Crimea
At the onset of the conflict, Russia had roughly 12,000 military personnel in the Black
Sea Fleet,[34] in several locations in the Crimean peninsula like
Sevastopol, Kacha, Hvardiiske, Simferopol Raion, Sarych, and others. In 2005 a
dispute broke out over control of the Sarych cape lighthouse near Yalta, and a number
of other beacons.[36][37] Russian presence was allowed by the basing and transit
agreement with Ukraine. Under the agreements the Russian military in Crimea was
constrained to a maximum of 25,000 troops; they were required to: respect the
sovereignty of Ukraine, honor its legislation, not interfere in the internal affairs of the
country, and show their "military identification cards" when crossing the international
border.[38] Early in the conflict, the agreement's sizeable troop limit allowed Russia to
significantly reinforce its military presence under the plausible guise of security
concerns, deploy special forces and other required capabilities to conduct the
operation in Crimea.[34]

According to the original treaty on the division of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet signed in
1997, Russia was allowed to have its military bases in Crimea until 2017, after which
it would evacuate all military units including its portion of the Black Sea Fleet out of
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol. On 21 April 2010, former
Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych signed a new deal known as the Kharkiv Pact,
to resolve the 2009 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute; it extended the stay to 2042 with an
option to renew.[39]

Legality and declaration of war

Further information: On conducting a special military operation
No formal declaration of war has been issued in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War.
When Putin announced the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, he claimed to
commence a "special military operation", side-stepping a formal declaration of
war.[40] The statement was, however, regarded as a declaration of war by the
Ukrainian government[41] and reported as such by many international news
sources.[42][43] While the Ukrainian parliament refers to Russia as a "terrorist state" in
regard to its military actions in Ukraine,[44] it has not issued a formal declaration of
war on its behalf.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine violated international law (including the Charter of
the United Nations).[52][53][54][55] The invasion has also been called a crime of
aggression under international criminal law[56] and under some countries'
domestic criminal codes – including those of Ukraine and Russia – although
procedural obstacles exist to prosecutions under these laws.[57][58]

History
Russian annexation of Crimea (2014)
For a chronological guide, see Timeline of the annexation of Crimea by the
Russian Federation.
 The Russian military buildup along Ukraine's eastern border in
February–March 2014

The blockade of military units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine during

the capture of Crimea by Russia in February–March 2014

Russian troops blocking the Ukrainian military base in Perevalne

On 20 February 2014, Russia began an annexation of Crimea.[59][60][61][62] On 22 and

23 February, under the relative power vacuum immediately after the ousting of Viktor
Yanukovich,[63] Russian troops and special forces began moving into Crimea
through Novorossiysk.[61] On 27 February, Russian forces without insignias began
their advance into the Crimean Peninsula.[64] They took strategic positions
and captured the Crimean Parliament, raising a Russian flag. Security checkpoints
isolated the Crimean Peninsula from the rest of Ukraine and restricted movement
within the territory.[65][66][67][68]

In the following days, Russian soldiers secured key airports and a communications
center.[69] Russian cyberattacks shut down websites associated with the Ukrainian
government, news media, and social media. Cyberattacks also enabled Russian access
to the mobile phones of Ukrainian officials and members of parliament, further
disrupting communications.[70]

On 1 March, the Russian legislature approved the use of armed forces, leading to an
influx of Russian troops and military hardware into the peninsula.[69] In the following
days, all remaining Ukrainian military bases and installations were surrounded and
besieged, including the Southern Naval Base. After Russia formally annexed the
peninsula on 18 March, Ukrainian military bases and ships were stormed by Russian
forces. On 24 March, Ukraine ordered troops to withdraw; by 30 March, all Ukrainian
forces had left the peninsula.

On 15 April, the Ukrainian parliament declared Crimea a territory temporarily

occupied by Russia.[71] After the annexation, the Russian government increased its
military presence in the region and made nuclear threats.[72] Putin said that a Russian
military task force would be established in Crimea.[73] In November, NATO stated
that it believed Russia was deploying nuclear-capable weapons to Crimea.[74] Since
the annexation of Crimea, certain NATO members have been providing training for
the Ukrainian army.[75]

War in the Donbas (2014–2015)

For a chronological guide, see Timeline of the war in Donbas (2014).

See also: Combatants of the war in Donbas and List of equipment used by Russian
separatist forces of the war in Donbas

Ukrainian troops deploy in response to Russian maneuvers. Early

March 2014.
Pro-Russia unrest
Main article: 2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine
Beginning in late February 2014, demonstrations by pro-Russian and anti-government
groups took place in major cities across the eastern and southern regions
of Ukraine.[76] The first protests across southern and eastern Ukraine were largely
native expressions of discontent with the new Ukrainian government.[76][77] Russian
involvement at this stage was limited to voicing support for the
demonstrations.[77][78] Russia exploited this, however, launching a coordinated
political and military campaign against Ukraine.[77][79] Putin gave legitimacy to the
separatists when he described the Donbas as part of "New Russia" (Novorossiya), and
expressed bewilderment as to how the region had ever become part of Ukraine.[80]

In late March, Russia continued to gather forces near the Ukrainian eastern border,
reaching 30–40,000 troops by April.[81][34] The deployment was used to threaten
escalation and disrupt Ukraine's response.[34] This threat forced Ukraine to divert
forces to its borders instead of the conflict zone.[34]

Ukrainian authorities cracked down on the pro-Russian protests and arrested local
separatist leaders in early March. Those leaders were replaced by people with ties to
the Russian security services and interests in Russian businesses.[82] By April 2014,
Russian citizens had taken control of the separatist movement, supported by
volunteers and materiel from Russia,
including Chechen and Cossack fighters.[83][84][85][86] According to Donetsk People's
Republic (DPR) commander Igor Girkin, without this support in April, the movement
would have dissipated, as it had in Kharkiv and Odesa.[87] The separatist groups
held disputed referendums in May[88][89][90] which were not recognised by Ukraine or
any other UN member state.[88]

Armed conflict

Ukrainian response to Russian activities in Donbas after seizure

of Sloviansk on 12 April. April-May 2014.
In April, armed conflict began in eastern Ukraine between Russian-backed separatist
forces and Ukraine. The separatists declared the People's Republics of Donetsk and
Luhansk. From 6 April, militants occupied government buildings in many cities and
took control of border crossings to Russia, transport hubs, a broadcasting center, and
other strategic infrastructure. On 12 April several armed groups took cities
of Sloviansk, Kramatorsk and then Horlivka, Druzhkivka in subsequent days. They
were lead by people like retired Russian colonel Igor Girkin, lieutenant colonel Igor
Bezler. Faced with continued expansion of separatist territorial control, on 15 April
the interim Ukrainian government launched an "Anti-Terrorist Operation" (ATO),
however, Ukrainian forces were poorly prepared and ill-positioned and the operation
quickly stalled.[91]

By the end of April, Ukraine announced it had lost control of the provinces of
Donetsk and Luhansk. It claimed to be on "full combat alert" against a possible
Russian invasion and reinstated conscription to its armed forces.[92] Through May, the
Ukrainian campaign focused on containing the separatists by securing key positions
around the ATO zone to position the military for a decisive offensive once Ukraine's
national mobilization had completed.

As conflict between the separatists and the Ukrainian government escalated in May,
Russia began to employ a "hybrid approach", combining disinformation tactics,
irregular fighters, regular Russian troops, and conventional military
support.[93][94][95] The First Battle of Donetsk Airport followed the Ukrainian
presidential elections. It marked a turning point in conflict; it was the first battle
between the separatists and the Ukrainian government that involved large numbers of
Russian "volunteers".[96][97]: 15  According to Ukraine, at the height of the conflict in
the summer of 2014, Russian paramilitaries made up between 15% and 80% of the
combatants.[85] From June Russia trickled in arms, armor, and munitions.

On 17 July 2014, Russian controlled forces shot down a passenger aircraft, Malaysia
Airlines Flight 17, as it was flying over eastern Ukraine.[98] Investigations and the
recovery of bodies began in the conflict zone as fighting continued.[99][100][101]
By the end of July, Ukrainian forces were pushing into cities, to cut off supply routes
between the two, isolating Donetsk and attempting to restore control of the Russo-
Ukrainian border. By 28 July, the strategic heights of Savur-Mohyla were under
Ukrainian control, along with the town of Debaltseve, an important railroad
hub.[102] These operational successes of Ukrainian forces threatened the existence of
the DPR and LPR statelets, prompting Russian cross-border shelling targeted against
Ukrainian troops on their own soil, from mid-July onwards.[103]

August 2014 Russian invasion

See also: Battle of Ilovaisk

June–August 2014 progression map

After a series of military defeats and setbacks for the separatists, who united under
the banner of "Novorossiya",[104][105] Russia dispatched what it called a "humanitarian
convoy" of trucks across the border in mid-August 2014. Ukraine called the move a
"direct invasion".[106] Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council reported that
convoys were arriving almost daily in November (up to 9 convoys on 30 November)
and that their contents were mainly arms and ammunition. Strelkov claimed that in
early August, Russian servicemen, supposedly on "vacation" from the army, began to
arrive in Donbas.[107]

By August 2014, the Ukrainian "Anti-Terrorist Operation" shrank the territory under
pro-Russian control, and approached the border.[108] Igor Girkin urged Russian
military intervention, and said that the combat inexperience of his irregular forces,
along with recruitment difficulties amongst the local population, had caused the
setbacks. He stated, "Losing this war on the territory that President Vladimir Putin
personally named New Russia would threaten the Kremlin's power and, personally,
the power of the president".[109]

In response to the deteriorating situation, Russia abandoned its hybrid approach, and
began a conventional invasion on 25 August 2014.[108][110] On the following day, the
Russian Defence Ministry said these soldiers had crossed the border "by
accident".[111][112][113] According to Nikolai Mitrokhin's estimates, by mid-August
2014 during the Battle of Ilovaisk, between 20,000 and 25,000 troops were fighting in
the Donbas on the separatist side, and only 40–45% were "locals".[114]

On 24 August 2014, Amvrosiivka was occupied by Russian

paratroopers,[115] supported by 250 armoured vehicles and artillery pieces.[116] The
same day, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko referred to the operation as
Ukraine's "Patriotic War of 2014" and a war against external aggression.[117][118] On
25 August, a column of Russian military vehicles was reported to have crossed into
Ukraine near Novoazovsk on the Azov sea coast. It appeared headed towards
Ukrainian-held Mariupol,[119][120][121][122][123] in an area that had not seen pro-
Russian presence for weeks.[124] Russian forces captured Novoazovsk.[125] and
Russian soldiers began deporting Ukrainians who did not have an address registered
within the town.[126] Pro-Ukrainian anti-war protests took place
in Mariupol.[126][127] The UN Security Council called an emergency meeting.[128]

Residents of Kyiv with Sich Battalion volunteers on 26 August 2014

The Pskov-based 76th Guards Air Assault Division allegedly entered Ukrainian
territory in August and engaged in a skirmish near Luhansk, suffering 80 dead. The
Ukrainian Defence Ministry said that they had seized two of the unit's armoured
vehicles near Luhansk, and reported destroying another three tanks and two armoured
vehicles in other regions.[129][130] The Russian government denied the skirmish took
place,[130] but on 18 August, the 76th was awarded the Order of Suvorov, one of
Russia's highest awards, by Russian minister of defence Sergey Shoigu for the
"successful completion of military missions" and "courage and heroism".[130]

The speaker of Russia's upper house of parliament and Russian state television
channels acknowledged that Russian soldiers entered Ukraine, but referred to them as
"volunteers".[131] A reporter for Novaya Gazeta, an opposition newspaper in Russia,
stated that the Russian military leadership paid soldiers to resign their commissions
and fight in Ukraine in the early summer of 2014, and then began ordering soldiers
into Ukraine.[132] Russian opposition MP Lev Shlosberg made similar statements,
although he said combatants from his country are "regular Russian troops", disguised
as units of the DPR and LPR.[133]

In early September 2014, Russian state-owned television channels reported on the

funerals of Russian soldiers who had died in Ukraine, but described them as
"volunteers" fighting for the "Russian world". Valentina Matviyenko, a top United
Russia politician, also praised "volunteers" fighting in "our fraternal
nation".[131] Russian state television for the first time showed the funeral of a soldier
killed fighting in Ukraine.[134]

Mariupol offensive and first Minsk ceasefire

Main articles: Offensive on Mariupol (September 2014) and Minsk agreements

A map of the line of control and buffer zone established by the

Minsk Protocol on 5 September 2014
On 3 September, Poroshenko said he and Putin had reached a "permanent ceasefire"
agreement.[135] Russia denied this, denying that it was a party to the conflict, adding
that "they only discussed how to settle the conflict".[136][137] Poroshenko then
recanted.[138][139] On 5 September Russia's Permanent OSCE Representative Andrey
Kelin, said that it was natural that pro-Russian separatists "are going to
liberate" Mariupol. Ukrainian forces stated that Russian intelligence groups had been
spotted in the area. Kelin said 'there might be volunteers over there.'[140] On 4
September 2014, a NATO officer said that several thousand regular Russian forces
operating in Ukraine.[141]

On 5 September 2014, the Minsk Protocol ceasefire agreement drew a line of

demarcation between Ukraine and separatist-controlled portions of Donetsk and
Luhansk Oblasts.

End of 2014 and Minsk II agreement

See also: 2014 Russian cross-border shelling of Ukraine
On 7 and 12 November, NATO officials reconfirmed the Russian presence, citing 32
tanks, 16 howitzer cannons and 30 trucks of troops entering the country.[142] US
general Philip M. Breedlove said "Russian tanks, Russian artillery, Russian air
defence systems and Russian combat troops" had been sighted.[74][143] NATO said it
had seen an increase in Russian tanks, artillery pieces and other heavy military
equipment in Ukraine and renewed its call for Moscow to withdraw its
forces.[144] The Chicago Council on Global Affairs stated that Russian separatists
enjoyed technical advantages over the Ukrainian army since the large inflow of
advanced military systems in mid-2014: effective anti-aircraft weapons ("Buk",
MANPADS) suppressed Ukrainian air strikes, Russian drones provided intelligence,
and Russian secure communications system disrupted Ukrainian communications
intelligence. The Russian side employed electronic warfare systems that Ukraine
lacked. Similar conclusions about the technical advantage of the Russian separatists
were voiced by the Conflict Studies Research Centre.[145] In the 12 November United
Nations Security Council meeting, the United Kingdom's representative accused
Russia of intentionally constraining OSCE observation missions' capabilities, pointing
out that the observers were allowed to monitor only two kilometers of border, and
drones deployed to extend their capabilities were jammed or shot down.[146] non-primary
[

source needed]

Pro-Russian rebels in Donetsk in May 2015. Ukraine declared the

Russian-backed separatist republics from eastern Ukraine to
be terrorist organizations.[147]
In January 2014, Donetsk, Luhansk, and Mariupol represented the three battle
fronts.[148] Poroshenko described a dangerous escalation on 21 January amid reports
of more than 2,000 additional Russian troops, 200 tanks and armed personnel carriers
crossing the border. He abbreviated his visit to the World Economic Forum because
of his concerns.[149]

A new package of measures to end the conflict, known as Minsk II, was agreed on 15
February 2015.[150] On 18 February, Ukrainian forces withdrew from Debatlseve, in
the last high-intensity battle of the Donbas war until 2022. In September 2015
the United Nations Human Rights Office estimated that 8000 casualties had resulted
from the conflict.[151]

Line of conflict stabilizes (2015–2021)

Further information: Timeline of the war in Donbas (2015), Timeline of the war
in Donbas (2016), and Timeline of the war in Donbas (2017)

After the Minsk agreements, the war settled into static trench warfare around the
agreed line of contact, with few changes in territorial control. The conflict was
marked by artillery duels, special forces operations, and trench warfare. Hostilities
never ceased for a substantial period of time, but continued at a low level despite
repeated attempts at ceasefire. In the months after the fall of Debaltseve, minor
skirmishes continued along the line of contact, but no territorial changes occurred.
Both sides began fortifying their position by building networks
of trenches, bunkers and tunnels, turning the conflict into static trench
warfare.[152][153] The relatively static conflict was labelled a "frozen" by some,[154] but
Russia never achieved this as the fighting never stopped.[155][156] Between 2014 and
2022 there were 29 ceasefires, each agreed to remain in force indefinitely. However,
none of them lasted more than two weeks.[157]

US and international officials continued to report the active presence of Russian

military in eastern Ukraine, including in the Debaltseve area.[158] In 2015, Russian
separatist forces were estimated to number around 36,000 troops (compared to 34,000
Ukrainian), of whom 8,500–10,000 were Russian soldiers. Additionally, around
1,000 GRU troops were operating in the area.[159] Another 2015 estimate held that
Ukrainian forces outnumbered Russian forces 40,000 to 20,000.[160] In 2017, on
average one Ukrainian soldier died in combat every three days,[161] with an estimated
6,000 Russian and 40,000 separatist troops in the region.[162][163]

Casualties of the war in Donbas

Cases of killed and wounded Russian soldiers were discussed in local Russian
media.[164] Recruiting for Donbas was performed openly via veteran and paramilitary
organisations. Vladimir Yefimov, leader of one such organisation, explained how the
process worked in the Ural area. The organisation recruited mostly army veterans, but
also policemen, firefighters etc. with military experience. The cost of equipping one
volunteer was estimated at 350,000 rubles (around $6500) plus salary of 60,000 to
240,000 rubles per month.[165] The recruits received weapons only after arriving in
the conflict zone. Often, Russian troops traveled disguised as Red Cross
personnel.[166][167][168][169] Igor Trunov, head of the Russian Red Cross in Moscow,
condemned these convoys, saying they complicated humanitarian aid
delivery.[170] Russia refused to allow OSCE to expand its mission beyond two border
crossings.[171]

The volunteers were issued a document claiming that their participation was limited to
"offering humanitarian help" to avoid Russian mercenary laws. Russia's anti-
mercenary legislation defined a mercenary as someone who "takes part [in fighting]
with aims counter to the interests of the Russian Federation".[165]

In August 2016, the Ukrainian intelligence service, the SBU, published telephone
intercepts from 2014 of Sergey Glazyev (Russian presidential adviser), Konstantin
Zatulin, and other people in which they discussed covert funding of pro-Russian
activists in Eastern Ukraine, the occupation of administration buildings and other
actions that triggered the conflict.[172] As early as February 2014, Glazyev gave direct
instructions to various pro-Russian parties on how to take over local administration
offices, what to do afterwards, how to formulate demands, and promised support from
Russia, including "sending our guys".[173][174][175]

Russian-backed separatists in May 2016

2018 Kerch Strait incident
Main article: Kerch Strait incident
See also: List of Black Sea incidents involving Russia and Ukraine and Timeline
of the war in Donbas (2018)

The Kerch Strait incident over the passage between the Black and
Azov seas
Russia gained de facto control of the Kerch Strait in 2014. In 2017, Ukraine appealed
to a court of arbitration over the use of the strait. By 2018 Russia had built a bridge
over the strait, limiting the size of ships that could pass through, imposed new
regulations, and repeatedly detained Ukrainian vessels.[176] On 25 November 2018,
three Ukrainian boats traveling from Odesa to Mariupol were seized by Russian
warships; 24 Ukrainian sailors were detained.[177][178] A day later on 26 November
2018, the Ukrainian parliament overwhelmingly backed the imposition of martial
law along Ukraine's coastal regions and those bordering Russia.[179]

2019–2020
Further information: Timeline of the war in Donbas (2019) and Timeline of
the war in Donbas (2020)

From left, Russian President Vladimir Putin, French

President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Paris, France, December
2019
More than 110 Ukrainian soldiers were killed in the conflict in 2019.[180] In May 2019,
newly elected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy took office promising to
end the war in Donbas.[180] In December 2019, Ukraine and pro-Russian separatists
began swapping prisoners of war. Around 200 prisoners were exchanged on 29
December 2019.[181][182][183][184] According to Ukrainian authorities, 50 Ukrainian
soldiers were killed in 2020.[185] Since 2019, Russia has issued over 650,000 internal
Russian passports to Ukrainians.[186][187]

Russian military buildup around Ukraine (2021–2022)

Main article: Prelude to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine
Further information: Timeline of the war in Donbas (2021) and Timeline of
the war in Donbas (2022)
From March to April 2021, Russia commenced a major military build-up near the
border, followed by a second build-up between October 2021 to February 2022 in
Russia and Belarus.[188] Throughout, the Russian government repeatedly denied it had
plans to attack Ukraine.[189][190]

In early December 2021, following Russian denials, the US released intelligence of

Russian invasion plans, including satellite photographs showing Russian troops and
equipment near the border.[191] The intelligence reported a Russian list of key sites
and individuals to be killed or neutralized.[192] The US released multiple reports that
accurately predicted the invasion plans.[192]

Russian accusations and demands

Further information: Disinformation in the 2022 Russian invasion of
Ukraine and Russian irredentism

Ukrainian deputy prime minister Olha Stefanishyna with NATO

secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg at a conference on 10 January
2022 regarding a potential Russian invasion
In the months preceding the invasion, Russian officials accused Ukraine of inciting
tensions, Russophobia, and repressing Russian speakers. They made multiple security
demands of Ukraine, NATO, and other EU countries. On 9 December 2021 Putin said
that "Russophobia is a first step towards genocide".[193][194] Putin's claims were
dismissed by the international community,[195] and Russian claims of genocide were
rejected as baseless.[196][197][198] In a 21 February speech,[199] Putin questioned the
legitimacy of the Ukrainian state, repeating an inaccurate claim that "Ukraine never
had a tradition of genuine statehood".[200] He incorrectly stated that Vladimir
Lenin had created Ukraine, by carving a separate Soviet Republic out of what Putin
said was Russian land, that Joseph Stalin extended Ukrainian territory with lands from
other eastern European countries following the Second World War, and that Nikita
Khrushchev "took Crimea away from Russia for some reason and gave it to Ukraine"
in 1954.[201]

Putin falsely claimed that Ukrainian society and government were dominated by neo-
Nazism, invoking the history of collaboration in German-occupied
Ukraine during World War II,[202][203] and echoing an antisemitic conspiracy theory
that cast Russian Christians, rather than Jews, as the true victims of Nazi
Germany.[204][195] Ukraine does suffer a far-right fringe, including the neo-Nazi
linked Azov Battalion and Right Sector.[205][203] Analysts described Putin's rhetoric as
greatly exaggerated.[206][202] Zelenskyy, who is Jewish, stated that his grandfather
served in the Soviet army fighting against the Nazis;[207] three of his family members
were killed in the Holocaust.[206]
 A U.S. intelligence assessment map and imagery on Russian military
movement nearby the Ukrainian border, as on 3 December 2021. It
assessed that Russia had deployed about 70,000 military personnel
mostly about 100–200 kilometres (62–124 mi) from the Ukrainian
border, with an assessment this could be increased to 175,000
personnel. Published by The Washington Post.[208]
During the second build-up, Russia issued demands to the US and NATO, insisting on
a legally-binding agreement preventing Ukraine from ever joining NATO, and the
removal of multinational forces stationed in NATO's Eastern European member
states.[209] These demands were rejected.[210] A treaty to prevent Ukraine joining
NATO would go against the alliance's "open door" policy, although NATO made no
efforts to comply with Ukraine's requests to join.[211] NATO Secretary General Jens
Stoltenberg replied that "Russia has no say" on whether Ukraine joins, and that
"Russia has no right to establish a sphere of influence to try to control their
neighbors".[212]

Prelude to full invasion

Fighting in Donbas escalated significantly from 17 February 2022 onwards.[213] The
Ukrainians and the pro-Russian separatists each accused the other of
attacks.[214][215] There was a sharp increase in artillery shelling by the Russian-led
militants in Donbas, which was considered by Ukraine and its supporters to be an
attempt to provoke the Ukrainian army or create a pretext for
invasion.[216][217][218] On 18 February, the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics
ordered mandatory emergency evacuations of civilians from their respective capital
cities,[219][220][221] although observers noted that full evacuations would take
months.[222] The Russian government intensified its disinformation campaign, with
Russian state media promoting fabricated videos (false flags) on a nearly hourly basis
purporting to show Ukrainian forces attacking Russia.[223] Many of the disinformation
videos were amateurish, and evidence showed that the claimed attacks, explosions,
and evacuations in Donbas were staged by Russia.[223][224][225]

Putin's address to the nation on 21 February (English subtitles

available)
On 21 February at 22:35 (UTC+3),[226] Putin announced that the Russian government
would diplomatically recognize the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics.[227] The
same evening, Putin directed that Russian troops deploy into Donbas, in what Russia
referred to as a "peacekeeping mission".[228][229] On 22 February, the Federation
Council unanimously authorised Putin to use military force outside Russia.[230] In
response, Zelenskyy ordered the conscription of army reservists;[231] The following
day, Ukraine's parliament proclaimed a 30-day nationwide state of emergency and
ordered the mobilisation of all reservists.[232][233][234] Russia began to evacuate its
embassy in Kyiv.[235]

On the night of 23 February,[236] Zelenskyy gave a speech in Russian in which he

appealed to the citizens of Russia to prevent war.[237][238] He rejected Russia's claims
about neo-Nazis and stated that he had no intention of attacking the
Donbas.[239] Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on 23 February that the
separatist leaders in Donetsk and Luhansk had sent a letter to Putin stating that
Ukrainian shelling had caused civilian deaths and appealing for military support.[240]

Full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine (2022–present)

Main article: Russian invasion of Ukraine

For a chronological guide, see Timeline of the 2022 Russian invasion of

Ukraine.

Animated map of Russia's invasion of Ukraine through 5 December

2022 (click to play animation)
The Russian invasion of Ukraine began on the morning of 24 February,[241] when
Putin announced a "special military operation" to "demilitarise and denazify"
Ukraine.[242][243] Minutes later, missiles and airstrikes hit across Ukraine,
including Kyiv, shortly followed by a large ground invasion along multiple
fronts.[244][245] Zelenskyy declared martial law and a general mobilisation of all male
Ukrainian citizens between 18 and 60, who were banned from leaving the
country.[246][247]

Russian attacks were initially launched on a northern front from Belarus towards
Kyiv, a north-eastern front towards Kharkiv, a southern front from Crimea,
and a south-eastern front from Luhansk and Donetsk.[248][249] In the northern front,
amidst heavy losses and strong Ukrainian resistance surrounding Kyiv, Russia's
advance stalled in March, and by April its troops retreated. On 8 April, Russia placed
its forces in southern and eastern Ukraine under the command of General Aleksandr
Dvornikov, and some units withdrawn from the north were redeployed to the
Donbas.[250] On 19 April, Russia launched a renewed attack across a 500 kilometres
(300 mi) long front extending from Kharkiv to Donetsk and Luhansk.[251] By 13 May,
a Ukraine counter-offensive had driven back Russian forces near Kharkiv. By 20
May, Mariupol fell to Russian troops following a prolonged siege of the Azovstal
steel works.[252][253] Russian forces continued to bomb both military and civilian
targets far from the frontline.[254][255] The war caused the largest refugee
and humanitarian crisis within Europe since the Yugoslav Wars in the
1990s;[256][257] the UN described it as the fastest-growing such crisis since World War
II.[258] In the first week of the invasion, the UN reported over a million refugees had
fled Ukraine; this subsequently rose to over 7,405,590 by 24 September, a reduction
from over eight million due to some refugees' return.[259][260]

Ukrainian soldiers killed in the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2022

Ukrainian forces launched counteroffensives in the south in August, and in the
northeast in September. On 30 September, Russia annexed four oblasts of
Ukraine which it had partially conquered during the invasion.[261] This annexation
was generally unrecognized and condemned by the countries of the world.[262] After
Putin announced that he would begin conscription drawn from the 300,000 citizens
with military training and potentially the pool of about 25 million Russians who could
be eligible for conscription, one-way tickets out of the country nearly or completely
sold out.[263][264] The Ukrainian offensive in the northeast successfully recaptured the
majority of Kharkiv Oblast in September. In the course of the southern
counteroffensive, Ukraine retook the city of Kherson in November and Russian forces
withdrew to the east bank of the Dnieper River. citation needed
[ ]

The invasion was internationally condemned as a war of aggression.[265][266] A United

Nations General Assembly resolution demanded a full withdrawal of Russian forces,
the International Court of Justice ordered Russia to suspend military operations and
the Council of Europe expelled Russia. Many countries imposed new sanctions,
which affected the economies of Russia and the world,[267] and
provided humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine.[268] In September 2022, Putin
signed a law that would punish anyone who resists conscription with a 10-year prison
sentence[269] resulting in an international push to allow asylum for Russians fleeing
conscription.[270]

According to an estimate published by The New York Times, as of February 2023, the
"number of Russian troops killed and wounded in Ukraine is approaching
200,000."[271]

Human rights violations

See also: Casualties of the Russo-Ukrainian War, Humanitarian situation during
the war in Donbas, and Russian war crimes § Ukraine

Violations of human rights and atrocity crimes have both occurred during the war.
From 2014 to 2021, there were more than 3,000 civilian casualties, with most
occurring in 2014 and 2015.[272] The right of movement was impeded for the
inhabitants of the conflict zone.[273] Arbitrary detention was practiced by both sides in
the first years of the conflict. It decreased after 2016 in government-held areas, while
in the separatist-held ones it continued.[274] Investigations into the abuses committed
by both sides made little progress.[275][276]

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russian authorities
and armed forces have committed multiple war crimes in the form of deliberate
attacks against civilian targets,[277][278] massacres of civilians, torture and rape of
women and children,[279][280] and indiscriminate attacks in densely populated areas.
After the Russian withdrawal from areas north of Kyiv, overwhelming evidence of
war crimes by Russian forces was discovered. In particular, in the town of Bucha,
evidence emerged of a massacre of civilians perpetrated by Russian troops, including
torture, mutilation, rape, looting and deliberate killings of
civilians.[281][282][283] the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (OHCHR)
has documented the murder of at least 73 civilians – mostly men, but also women and
children – in Bucha.[284] More than 1,200 bodies of civilians were found in the Kyiv
region after Russian forces withdrew, some of them summarily executed. There were
reports of forced deportations of thousands of civilians, including children, to Russia,
mainly from Russian-occupied Mariupol,[285][286] as well as sexual violence,
including cases of rape, sexual assault and gang rape,[287] and deliberate killing of
Ukrainian civilians by Russian forces.[288]

Ukrainian forces have also been accused of committing various war crimes, including
mistreatment of detainees, though on a much smaller scale than Russian
forces.[289][290]

Related issues
Gas disputes
See also: Russia–Ukraine gas disputes, Nord Stream, Nord Stream 2,
and Russia in the European energy sector

Major Russian natural gas pipelines to Europe

Europe TTF natural gas

Until 2014 Ukraine was the main transit route for Russian natural gas sold to Europe,
which earned Ukraine about US$3 billion a year in transit fees, making it the
country's most lucrative export service.[291] Following Russia's launch of the Nord
Stream pipeline, which bypasses Ukraine, gas transit volumes steadily
decreased.[291] Following the start of the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2014,
severe tensions extended to the gas sector.[292][293] The subsequent outbreak of war in
the Donbas region forced the suspension of a project to develop Ukraine's own shale
gas reserves at the Yuzivska gas field, which had been planned as a way to reduce
Ukrainian dependence on Russian gas imports.[294] Eventually, the EU commissioner
for energy Günther Oettinger was called in to broker a deal securing supplies to
Ukraine and transit to the EU.[295]

An explosion damaged a Ukrainian portion of the Urengoy–Pomary–Uzhhorod

pipeline in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast in May 2014. Ukrainian officials blamed Russian
terrorists.[296] Another section of the pipeline exploded in the Poltava Oblast on 17
June 2014, one day after Russia limited the supply of gas to Ukrainian customers due
to non-payment. Ukraine's Interior Minister Arsen Avakov said the following day that
the explosion had been caused by a bomb.[297]

In 2015, Russian state media reported that Russia planned to completely abandon gas
supplies to Europe through Ukraine after 2018.[298][299] Russia's state-owned energy
giant Gazprom had already substantially reduced the volumes of gas transited across
Ukraine, and expressed its intention to reduce the level further by means of transit-
diversification pipelines (Turkish Stream, Nord Stream, etc.).[300] Gazprom and
Ukraine agreed to a five-year deal on Russian gas transit to Europe at the end of
2019.[301][302]

In 2020, the TurkStream natural gas pipeline running from Russia to Turkey changed
the regional gas flows in South-East Europe by diverting the transit through
Ukraine and the Trans Balkan Pipeline system.[303][304]

In May 2021, the Biden administration waived Trump's CAATSA sanctions on the
company behind Russia's Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline to Germany.[305][306] Ukrainian
President Zelenskyy said he was "surprised" and "disappointed" by Joe Biden's
decision.[307] In July 2021, the U.S. urged Ukraine not to criticise a forthcoming
agreement with Germany over the pipeline.[308][309]

In July 2021, Biden and German Chancellor Angela Merkel concluded a deal that the
U.S. might trigger sanctions if Russia used Nord Stream as a "political weapon". The
deal aimed to prevent Poland and Ukraine from being cut off from Russian gas
supplies. Ukraine will get a $50 million loan for green technology until 2024 and
Germany will set up a billion dollar fund to promote Ukraine's transition to green
energy to compensate for the loss of the gas-transit fees. The contract for transiting
Russian gas through Ukraine will be prolonged until 2034, if the Russian government
agrees.[310][311][312]

In August 2021, Zelenskyy warned that the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline
between Russia and Germany was "a dangerous weapon, not only for Ukraine but for
the whole of Europe."[313][314] In September 2021, Ukraine's Naftogaz CEO Yuriy
Vitrenko accused Russia of using natural gas as a "geopolitical weapon".[315] Vitrenko
stated that "A joint statement from the United States and Germany said that if the
Kremlin used gas as a weapon, there would be an appropriate response. We are now
waiting for the imposition of sanctions on a 100% subsidiary of Gazprom, the
operator of Nord Stream 2."[316]

Hybrid warfare
The Russo-Ukrainian conflict has also included elements of hybrid warfare using non-
traditional means. Cyberwarfare has been used by Russia in operations including
successful attacks on the Ukrainian power grid in December 2015 and in December
2016, which was the first successful cyber attack on a power grid,[317] and the Mass
hacker supply-chain attack in June 2017, which the US claimed was the largest known
cyber attack.[318] In retaliation, Ukrainian operations have included the Surkov
Leaks in October 2016 which released 2,337 e-mails in relation to Russian plans for
seizing Crimea from Ukraine and fomenting separatist unrest in
Donbas.[319] The Russian information war against Ukraine has been another front of
hybrid warfare waged by Russia.

A Russian fifth column in Ukraine has also been claimed to exist among the Party of
Regions, the Communist Party, the Progressive Socialist Party and the Russian
Orthodox Church.[320][321][322]

Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns

Main articles: Russian information war against Ukraine and Disinformation in
the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Pro-Kremlin TV and radio host Vladimir Solovyov voiced support for

his country's invasion of Ukraine.[323]
False stories have been used to provoke public outrage during the war. In April 2014,
Russian news channels Russia-1 and NTV showed a man saying he was attacked by a
fascist Ukrainian gang on one channel and on the other channel saying he was funding
the training of right-wing anti-Russia radicals.[324][325] A third segment portrayed the
man as a neo-Nazi surgeon.[326] In May 2014, Russia-1 aired a story about Ukrainian
atrocities using footage of a 2012 Russian operation in North Caucasus.[327] In the
same month, the Russian news network Life presented a 2013 photograph of a
wounded child in Syria as a victim of Ukrainian troops who had just retaken Donetsk
International Airport.[328]

In June 2014, several Russian state news outlets reported that Ukraine was
using white phosphorus using 2004 footage of white phosphorus being used by the
United States in Iraq.[327] In July 2014, Channel One Russia broadcast an interview
with a woman who said that a 3-year-old boy who spoke Russian was crucified by
Ukrainian nationalists in a fictitious square in Sloviansk that turned out to be
false.[329][330][325][327]
In 2022, Russian state media told stories of genocide and mass graves full of ethnic
Russians in eastern Ukraine. One set of graves outside Luhansk was dug when intense
fighting in 2014 cut off the electricity in the local morgue. Amnesty International
investigated 2014 Russian claims of mass graves filled with hundreds of bodies and
instead found isolated incidents of extrajudicial executions by both sides.[331][332][333]

Russian artist Alexandra Skochilenko was arrested for replacing price

tags in supermarkets with anti-war messages.[334]
The Russian censorship apparatus Roskomnadzor ordered the country's media to
employ information only from Russian state sources or face fines and blocks,[335] and
ordered media and schools to describe the war as a "special military
operation".[336] On 4 March 2022, Putin signed into law a bill introducing prison
sentences of up to 15 years for those who publish "fake news" about the Russian
military and its operations,[337] leading to some media outlets to stop reporting on
Ukraine.[338] Russia's opposition politician Alexei Navalny said the "monstrosity of
lies" in the Russian state media "is unimaginable. And, unfortunately, so is its
persuasiveness for those who have no access to alternative information."[339] He
tweeted that "warmongers" among Russian state media personalities "should be
treated as war criminals. From the editors-in-chief to the talk show hosts to the news
editors, [they] should be sanctioned now and tried someday."[340]

Putin and Russian media have described the government of Ukraine as being led by
neo-Nazis persecuting ethnic Russians who are in need of protection by Russia,
despite Ukraine's President Zelenskyy being Jewish.[341][342][332] According to
journalist Natalia Antonova, "Russia's present-day war of aggression is refashioned by
propaganda into a direct continuation of the legacy of the millions of Russian soldiers
who died to stop" Nazi Germany in World War II.[343] Ukraine's rejection of the
adoption of Russia-initiated General Assembly resolutions on combating the
glorification of Nazism, the latest iteration of which is General Assembly Resolution
A/C.3/76/L.57/Rev.1 on Combating Glorification of Nazism, Neo-Nazism and other
Practices that Contribute to Fueling Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, serve to present Ukraine as a
pro-Nazi state, and indeed likely forms the basis for Russia's claims, with the only
other state rejecting the adoption of the resolution being the US.[344][345] The Deputy
US Representative for ECOSOC describes such resolutions as "thinly veiled attempts
to legitimize Russian disinformation campaigns denigrating neighboring nations and
promoting the distorted Soviet narrative of much of contemporary European history,
using the cynical guise of halting Nazi glorification".[346]
NAFO ('North Atlantic Fellas Organization'), a loose cadre of online 'shitposters'
vowing to fight Russian disinformation generally identified by cartoon Shiba Inu dogs
in social media, gained notoriety after June 2022, in the wake of a Twitter quarrel
with Russian diplomat Mikhail Ulyanov.[347]

Russia–NATO relations
Main article: Russia–NATO relations

In his speech justifying the invasion of Ukraine, Putin falsely claimed that NATO
military infrastructure was being built up inside Ukraine and was a threat to
Russia.[348] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov characterized the conflict as
a proxy war started by NATO.[349] He said: "We don't think we're at war with
NATO ... Unfortunately, NATO believes it is at war with Russia".[350] NATO says it
is not at war with Russia; its official policy is that it does not seek confrontation, but
rather its members support Ukraine in "its right to self-defense, as enshrined in
the UN Charter".[351] NATO and Russia had co-operated until Russia annexed
Crimea.[351] Former CIA director Leon Panetta told the ABC that the U.S. is 'without
question' involved in a proxy war with Russia.[352]

Russian military aircraft flying over the Baltic and Black Seas often do not indicate
their position or communicate with air traffic controllers, thus posing a potential risk
to civilian airliners. NATO aircraft scrambled many times to track and intercept these
aircraft near alliance airspace. The Russian aircraft intercepted never entered NATO
airspace, and the interceptions were conducted in a safe and routine manner.[353]

International reactions
Further information: International sanctions during the Russo-Ukrainian
War and List of military aid to Ukraine during the Russo-Ukrainian War

See also: Second Cold War

Reactions to the Russian annexation of Crimea

Main article: International reactions to the annexation of Crimea by the Russian
Federation

Ukrainian response

Following Russia's annexation of Crimea, Ukraine blocked the North

Crimean Canal, which provided 85% of Crimea's drinking and irrigation
water.[354]
Interim Ukrainian President Oleksandr Turchynov accused Russia of "provoking a
conflict" by backing the seizure of the Crimean parliament building and other
government offices on the Crimean peninsula. He compared Russia's military actions
to the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, when Russian troops occupied parts of the Republic
of Georgia and the breakaway enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were
established under the control of Russian-backed administrations. He called on Putin to
withdraw Russian troops from Crimea and stated that Ukraine will "preserve its
territory" and "defend its independence".[355] On 1 March, he warned, "Military
intervention would be the beginning of war and the end of any relations between
Ukraine and Russia."[356] On 1 March, Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov placed
the Armed Forces of Ukraine on full alert and combat readiness.[357]

The Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and IDPs was established by

Ukrainian government on 20 April 2016 to manage occupied parts of Donetsk,
Luhansk and Crimea regions affected by Russian military intervention of 2014.[358]

NATO and United States military response

Further information: Operation Atlantic Resolve, European Deterrence
Initiative, NATO Enhanced Forward Presence, and Russia–NATO relations

A U.S. Army convoy in Vilseck, Germany during Operation Atlantic

Resolve, NATO's efforts to reassert its military presence in central
and eastern Europe that began in April 2014.
On 4 March 2014, the United States pledged $1 billion in aid to Ukraine.[359] Russia's
actions increased tensions in nearby countries historically within its sphere of
influence, particularly the Baltic and Moldova. All have large Russian-speaking
populations, and Russian troops are stationed in the breakaway Moldovan territory
of Transnistria.[360] Some devoted resources to increasing defensive
capabilities,[361] and many requested increased support from the U.S. and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, which they had joined in recent years.[360][361] The
conflict "reinvigorated" NATO, which had been created to face the Soviet Union, but
had devoted more resources to "expeditionary missions" in recent years.[362]

In addition to diplomatic support in its conflict with Russia, the U.S. provided
Ukraine with US$1.5 billion in military aid during the 2010s.[363] In 2018 the U.S.
House of Representatives passed a provision blocking any training of Azov
Battalion of the Ukrainian National Guard by American forces. In previous years,
between 2014 and 2017, the U.S. House of Representatives passed amendments
banning support of Azov, but due to pressure from the Pentagon, the amendments
were quietly lifted.[364][365][366]

Financial markets
 Euro/RUB exchange rate

USD/Russian Ruble Exchange Rate

The initial reaction to the escalation of tensions in Crimea caused the Russian and
European stock market to tumble.[367] The intervention caused the Swiss franc to
climb to a 2-year high against the dollar and 1-year high against the Euro. The Euro
and the US dollar both rose, as did the Australian dollar.[368] The Russian stock
market declined by more than 10 percent, while the Russian ruble hit all-time lows
against the US dollar and the Euro.[369][370][371] The Russian central bank hiked
interest rates and intervened in the foreign exchange markets to the tune of
$12 billion clarification needed to try to stabilize its currency.[368] Prices for wheat and
[ ]

grain rose, with Ukraine being a major exporter of both crops.[372]

Later in March 2014, the reaction of the financial markets to the Crimea annexation
was surprisingly mellow, with global financial markets rising immediately after the
referendum held in Crimea, one explanation being that the sanctions were already
priced in following the earlier Russian incursion.[373] Other observers considered that
the positive reaction of the global financial markets on Monday 17 March 2014, after
the announcement of sanctions against Russia by the EU and the US, revealed that
these sanctions were too weak to hurt Russia.[374] In early August 2014, the
German DAX was down by 6 percent for the year, and 11 percent since June, over
concerns Russia, Germany's 13th biggest trade partner, would retaliate against
sanctions.[375]

Reactions to the Russian intervention in the Donbas

Further information: International reactions to the war in Donbas

Peace march in Moscow, 21 September 2014

 Pro-Russian supporters in Donetsk, 20 December 2014
Ukrainian public opinion
See also: Putin khuylo!
A poll of the Ukrainian public, excluding Russian-annexed Crimea, was taken by
the International Republican Institute from 12 to 25 September 2014.[376] 89% of
those polled opposed 2014 Russian military intervention in Ukraine. As broken down
by region, 78% of those polled from Eastern Ukraine (including Dnipropetrovsk
Oblast) opposed said intervention, along with 89% in Southern Ukraine, 93%
in Central Ukraine, and 99% in Western Ukraine.[376] As broken down by native
language, 79% of Russian speakers and 95% of Ukrainian speakers opposed the
intervention. 80% of those polled said the country should remain
a unitary country.[376]

A poll of the Crimean public in Russian-annexed Crimea was taken by the Ukrainian
branch of Germany's biggest market research organization, GfK, on 16–22 January
2015. According to its results: "Eighty-two percent of those polled said they fully
supported Crimea's inclusion in Russia, and another 11 percent expressed partial
support. Only 4 percent spoke out against it."[377][378][379]

A joint poll conducted by Levada and the Kyiv International Institute of

Sociology from September to October 2020 found that in the breakaway regions
controlled by the DPR/LPR, just over half of the respondents wanted to join Russia
(either with or without some autonomous status) while less than one-tenth wanted
independence and 12% wanted reintegration into Ukraine. It contrasted with
respondents in Kyiv-controlled Donbas, where a vast majority felt the separatist
regions should be returned to Ukraine.[380] According to results from Levada in
January 2022, roughly 70% of those in the breakaway regions said their territories
should become part of the Russian Federation.[381]

Russian public opinion

See also: 2014 anti-war protests in Russia
An August 2014 survey by the Levada Centre reported that only 13% of those
Russians polled would support the Russian government in an open war with
Ukraine.[382] Street protests against the war in Ukraine arose in Russia. Notable
protests first occurred in March[383][384] and large protests occurred in September
when "tens of thousands" protested the war in Ukraine with a peace march in
downtown Moscow on Sunday, 21 September 2014, "under heavy police
supervision".[385]

Reactions to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

Main article: Reactions to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

Ukrainian public opinion

Ukrainian refugees in Kraków protest against the war, 6 March 2022

In March 2022, a week after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, 98% of Ukrainians –
including 82% of ethnic Russians living in Ukraine – said they did not believe that
any part of Ukraine was rightfully part of Russia, according to Lord Ashcroft's polls
which did not include Crimea and the separatist-controlled part of Donbas. 97% of
Ukrainians said they had an unfavourable view of Russian President Vladimir Putin,
with a further 94% saying they had an unfavourable view of the Russian Armed
Forces.[386]

At the end of 2021, 75% of Ukrainians said they had a positive attitude toward
ordinary Russians, while in May 2022, 82% of Ukrainians said they had a negative
attitude toward ordinary Russians.[387]

Russian public opinion

An April 2022 survey by the Levada Centre reported that approximately 74% of the
Russians polled supported the "special military operation" in Ukraine, suggesting that
Russian public opinion has shifted considerably since 2014.[388] According to some
sources, a reason many Russians supported the "special military operation" has to do
with the propaganda and disinformation.[389][390] In addition, it has been suggested
that some respondents did not want to answer pollsters' questions for fear of negative
consequences.[391][392] At the end of March, a poll conducted in Russia by the Levada
Center concluded the following: When asked why they think the military operation is
taking place, respondents said it was to protect and defend civilians, ethnic Russians
or Russian speakers in Ukraine (43%), to prevent an attack on Russia (25%), to get rid
of nationalists and "denazify" Ukraine (21%), and to incorporate Ukraine or the
Donbas region into Russia (3%)."[393] According to polls, the Russian President's
rating rose from 71% on the eve of the invasion to 82% in March 2023.[394]

United States

Russia
Countries on Russia's "Unfriendly Countries List". The list
 includes countries that have imposed sanctions against Russia for its
invasion of Ukraine.[395]
On 28 April 2022, US President Joe Biden asked Congress for an additional $33
billion to assist Ukraine, including $20 billion to provide weapons to Ukraine.[396] On
5 May, Ukraine's Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced that Ukraine had
received more than $12 billion worth of weapons and financial aid from Western
countries since the start of Russia's invasion on 24 February.[397] On 21 May 2022,
the United States passed legislation providing $40 billion in new military and
humanitarian foreign aid to Ukraine, marking a historically large commitment of
funds.[398][399] In August 2022, U.S. defense spending to counter the Russian war
effort exceeded the first 5 years of war costs in Afghanistan. The Washington
Post reported that new U.S. weapons delivered to the Ukrainian war front suggest a
closer combat scenario with more casualties.[400] The United States looks to build
"enduring strength in Ukraine" with increased arms shipments and a record-breaking
$3 billion military aid package.[400]

Russian military suppliers

After expending large amounts of heavy weapons and munitions over months,
the Russian Federation received combat drones and loitering munitions from Iran,
deliveries of tanks and other armoured vehicles from Belarus, and reportedly planned
to trade for artillery ammunition from North Korea and ballistic missiles
from Iran.[401][402][403][404]

The U.S. has accused China of providing Russia with technology it needs for high-
tech weapons, allegations which China has denied. The U.S. sanctioned a Chinese
firm for providing satellite imagery to Russian mercenary forces fighting in
Ukraine.[405]

In March 2023, Western nations had pressed the United Arab Emirates to halt re-
exports of goods to Russia which had military uses, amidst allegations that the Gulf
country exported 158 drones to Russia in 2022.[406] In May 2023, the U.S. accused
South Africa of supplying arms to Russia in a covert naval operation,[407] allegations
which have been denied by South African president Cyril Ramaphosa.[408]

See also
 Modern history portal

 Politics portal

 Russia portal

 Ukraine portal

 Outline of the Russo-Ukrainian War

 List of conflicts in Europe
 List of invasions and occupations of Ukraine
 List of ongoing armed conflicts
 List of wars involving Russia
 List of wars involving Ukraine
 Modern history of Ukraine
 New generation warfare
 Russia under Vladimir Putin
Notes
1. ^ Self-declared republic since 7 April 2014; annexation by Russia declared on 30
September 2022.

2. ^ Self-declared republic since 27 April 2014; annexation by Russia declared on 30

September 2022.

3. ^ For further details, see Belarusian involvement in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.

4. ^ There remain "some contradictions and inherent problems" regarding the date on
which the annexation began.[409] Ukraine claims 20 February 2014 as "the beginning of
the temporary occupation of Crimea and Sevastopol by Russia", citing the timeframe inscribed
on the Russian medal "For the Return of Crimea",[410] and in 2015 the Ukrainian
parliament officially designated the date as such.[411] On 20 February 2014, Vladimir
Konstantinov who at that time was a chairman of the republican council of Crimea and
representing the Party of Regions expressed his thoughts about secession of the region from
Ukraine.[412] On 23 February 2014 the Russian ambassador to Ukraine Mikhail Zurabov was
recalled to Moscow due to a "worsening of [the] situation in Ukraine". In early March 2015,
President Putin stated in a Russian movie about the annexation of Crimea that he ordered the
operation to "restore" Crimea to Russia following an all-night emergency meeting on 22–23
February 2014,[409][413] and in 2018 the Russian Foreign Minister claimed that the earlier "start
date" on the medal was due to a "technical misunderstanding".[414]

5. ^ Russian: pоссийско-украинская война, romanized: rossiysko-ukrainskaya

voyna; Ukrainian: російсько-українська війна, romanized: rosiisko-ukrainska viina.

6. ^ Many countries have provided various levels of support to Ukraine short of becoming
belligerents in the war, while Belarus has provided Russian forces territorial access for the 2022
invasion.

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