Dodge TH A Caesar A History of The Art of War Among The Romans Down To The End of The Roman Empire With A Detailed Account of The Campaigns of C
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History of the Origin and Growth of the Art of the Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus, B. c. 301 ; with a detailed account of the Campaigns of the great Macedonian. With 237 Charts, Maps, Plans of Battles and Tactical Manoeuvres, Cuts of Armor, Uniforms, Siege Devices, and Portraits. 8vo, $5.00. series of chapters full of instruction The themeum (London).
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FREDERICK THE GREAT.
The
NAPOLEON.
series of six volumes (Alexander to Napoleon) will cover the History of the Art of War from the earliest times down to 1815.
HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY,
BOSTON AND
NEW
YORK.
f.\/flef.dfMfM.
rcat Captains
CESAR
A HISTORY OF THE ART OF
WAR AMONG THE ROMANS DOWN TO THE END OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE, WITH A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE
CAMPAIGNS OF CAIUS JULIUS CAESAR
WITH
258
CHARTS, MAPS, PLANS OF BATTLES
AND
TACTICAL MANOEUVRES, CUTS OF ARMOR,
WEAPONS AND ENGINES
BY
THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE
BREVET LIEUTENANT COLONEL UNITED STATES ARMY, RETIRED LIST; AUTHOR OK " THB CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLB," " A BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR," " PATROCLUS AND PENELOPE. A CHAT IN THE " SADDLE," GREAT " ALEXANDER, " "HANNIBAL," ETC., KTC. CAPTAINS,"
BOSTON AND NEW YORK HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY
C(je Kitoewtoe Press,
1900
Copyright, 1892,
THEODORE AYKAULT DODOS.
All rights reserved.
FOURTH IMPRESSION.
Electrotype*!
The Riverside Prest, Cambridge, MOM., U. S. A. and Printed by H. 0. Houghton & Co.
To
THE AMERICAN SOLDIER
WHO, NOT BRED TO ARMS, BUT NURTURED BY INDEPENDENCE, HAS ACHIEVED THE PROUDEST RANK AMONG THE VETERANS OF HISTORT
ABE DEDICATED
"Faites la guerre offensive com me Alexandra, Annibal, Cesar, Gustave Adolphe, Turenne, ie prince Eugene et Frederic ; lisez, relilisez I'histoire
eux,
c'est le seul
de leur quatre-vingt-huit campagnes ; modelez-vous sur may en de devenir grand capitaine et desurprendre
;
le sicret
de
art
votre genie, ainsi Eclair I,
imes opposes d "
celles
vousfera rejeter des maxde ces grands homines." NAPOLEON.
de Vofficier
les traites
de,
;
La
tactique, les Evolutions, la science
glnie,
de
Vofficier d'artillerie peuvent s'apprendrc
dans
mat's la
connaissance de la grande tactique ne s'acquiert que par Vexperience etpar Vltude de I'histoire des campagnes de tous les grands caj)itaines"
NAPOLEON.
I/It
PREFACE.
THE
and
his
present volume has been delayed nearly a year to
enable the author to visit the theatre of Caesar's campaigns
many
battlefields.
To do
this is almost
a prerequi-
site to
writing intelligently on the subject.
Familiarity with
the topography gives a quite different understanding of the
narrative of the ancient historians.
Though
Caesar's
Com-
mentaries are
among
the most exact and picturesque of his-
torical writings, it is
by
patient study alone that they can
be understood otherwise than superficially; without suitable maps they cannot be understood at all. From the days of ingenious but far-fetched Guischard and Turpin de Crisse,
topographical descriptions and charts have habitually been
whom
many
copied by one author from another, to the lot of neither of it has fallen to personally inspect the terrain; and
errors have been thus propagated.
is
The author hopes
that this volume
reasonably free
from such.
Napoleon III. for patronizing and the expense of the systematic excavations and todefraying
pographical and military studies which have culminated in his own and Colonel Stoffel's works on Caesar. To Colonel
Stoffel
We owe a great debt to
we
are peculiarly indebted for one of the most splen-
did military histories which exists.
The present author has
made
free use of both these works;
sonally passed over all
and though he has perthe ground covered by Caesar's cam-
paigns,
it
would savor of impertinence to seek to better the
viii
PREFACE.
and accurate research or of
In
all cases,
results of Colonel Stoffel's long
the archaeological
work
of Napoleon.
however,
the author has not been able to agree with these distinguished
men; nor
is
the plan of this volume the one on which the
other histories are based.
The
charts, while lacking the ex-
treme accuracy of detail of the plates of Napoleon and Stoffel, will be found to answer every requirement, at a mere fraction of the cost of those works;
and
their insertion in the
text will aid the average reader as large
maps
in a separate
volume
will not.
This history of Caesar follows the narrative of the Commentaries, and whenever practicable quotes from them, so as
to retain the quaintness of their flavor, as far as
is
consist-
ent with the space allowed.
other sources are uniformly from the
classical
Quotations not ascribed to Commentaries. As
names must
at times be used, the author has not
clung exclusively to the
modern
equivalents, but has inter-
changeably used both. This volume pretends to be only a military history of
Caesar.
For
clear and-ijrilliant disquisitions
on
his state-
craft or his personal career, or for the history of his era, the
reader must go to other sources. But some of the best of the histories of Rome are full of military errors. Even the
great
Momrnsen
is
by no means
free
from them.
In
all
the
histories
which pretend to cover the complicated
is
political
and absorbing
seeks to
fill
social conditions of that century, the descrip-
tion of military events
short
and
superficial.
The author
the gap.
pages will be found too technical to interest the general reader; but they are essential to the tracing out of the history of the art of war. The legend at the head of
Many
each chapter will
tell
the reader what to skip.
of facts which
The very great array
we
possess with re*
PREFACE.
ix
gard to the military career of Caesar makes it hard to compress all that should be said within the limits of even a large
volume.
omitted.
But
it is
believed that no noteworthy fact has been
The history of the art of war during the Empire cut down to very meagre limits but though there has been were abundant wars, there was much lack of method in war
;
during this period
and
it
may be
said that to omit bodily
the fourteen centuries from Caesar to the invention of gunpowder would not materially alter the general scope proposed
for these biographies of the great captains.
Some
views of
of the
hypercriticism.
all in
comment indulged in may seem to savor of But though the author may not meet the
says, the reader will at least give
what he
him
credit for qualifying himself as well as
may be by
careful
study of all the ancient authorities, of the best recognized
modern
critics,
and by personal inspection of the ground.
the
With
the sole exception of Colonel Stoffel, the author be-
lieves that
only writer on this subject who has followed Caesar entirely around the Mediterranean basin.
he
is
principal sources of our knowledge of Caesar as a captain are the Commentaries, Cicero's speeches and other writ-
The
ings,
Dion Cassius, Plutarch, Suetonius, and Velleius Paterthe best commentators are
culus;
Crisse,
Guischard, Turpin de
,
Napoleon
all
and above
Lossau, Goler, Rustow, Napoleon III. Colonel Stoffel, of whose lifework one cannot
I.
,
say too much.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER
I.
PAGE
MARITJS
AND THE ARMY CHANGES.
90-60
B.
110-86
B. c.
II.
SULLA, POMPEY.
CAESAR'S
21
III.
YOUTH, EDUCATION AND EARLY SERVICES.
B.
100-58
IV. CAESAR'S
37
THE HELVETH. 60-58 B. c. V. THE BATTLES OF THE ARAR AND BIBRACTE. JUNE, 58
PROVINCE.
B.
NEW
50
68
VI. CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARIOVISTUS.
BER, 58 B.
c.
.
. ..
AUGUST AND SEPTEM82
100
B. c.
.
.
VII.
THE
BELG.E.
SPRING OF 57
B.
VIII. BATTLE OF THE SABIS.
JULY TO SEPTEMBER, 57
.
113
128
IX.
THE WORK OF CAESAR'S LIEUTENANTS. 57-56 X. THE RHINE. SPRING OF 55 B. c.
. .
B. c.
.
150
164
XI. BRITAIN.
FALL OF 55
B. c. B. c.
. .
XII. CASSIVELLAUNUS.
XIII. AMBIORIX.
SPRING AND SUMMER, 54 WINTER, 54-53 B. c
SPRING, 53 53-52 B. c. WINTER,
177 190
XIV. THE TREVIRI AND EBURONES.
B. c.
.
210 227 238
252
XV. VERCINGETORIX.
XVI. AVARICUM. LATE WINTER AND EARLY SPRING, 52 XVII. THE SIEGE OF GERGOVIA. SPRING, 52 B. c.
.
B. c.
.
XVIII. LABIENUS' CAMPAIGN.
SPRING, 52
B. c.
270 283
300
310
XIX. THE SIEGE OF ALESIA. SUMMER AND FALL OF 52 XX. THE BATTLE OF ALESIA. FALL OF 52 B. c. XXI. THE BELLOVACI. JANUARY TO APRIL, 51 B. c.
.
B. c.
.
XXII. UXELLODUNUM. SPRING OF 51 XXIII. CESAR'S METHOD
B.
324
338
352
381
XXIV. CESAR'S ARMY
XXV.
CAMPS, SIEGES AND BALLISTICS
xii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
THE OPENING OF THE CIVIL WAR. DECEMBEK, 50, TO MAY, 49 B. c 400 XXVII. BRUNDISITJM AND MASSILIA. FEBRUARY TO APRIL,
49
B.
^g XXVI. ^\
c
.
422
438
XXVIII. ILERDA.
APRIL TO JUNE, 49 B. c. . . XXIX. GOOD MANOEUVRING. JUNE, 49 B. c. . XXX. MASSILIA, GADES, AFRICA, APRIL TO SEPTEMBER,
. .
464
474
49
B. c.
XXXI. EPIBUS. NOVEMBER, 49, TO FEBRUARY, 48 XXXII. DYRRACHIUM. MARCH TO MAY, 48 B. c.
XXXIII. CESAR'S DEFEAT. MAY, 48 B. c. XXXIV. RETREAT FROM DYRRACHIUM. MAY, 48 XXXV. PHARSALUS. JUNE 29, 48 B. c
.
B. c.
.
493
.
615
529
.
B. c.
541
557
B. c.
.
.
XXXVI. ALEXANDRIA. AUGUST, 48, TO MARCH, XXXVII. VENI, VIDI, Vici. MAY AND JUNE, 47
XXXVIII. RUSPINA.
47
677
B. c.
604
.
OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER, 47 B. c. XXXIX. INTRENCHED ADVANCE. DECEMBER, 47 B. c. XL. UCITA. JANUARY, 46 B. c XLI. THAPSUS. FEBRUARY, 47 B. c
TO AUGUST, 45 XLIII. MUNDA. MARCH, 45 B. c XLIV. THE MAN AND SOLDIER XLII. SPAIN.
619
640
659
677
DECEMBER,
46,
B. c.
695
712
731
XLV. ALEXANDER, HANNIBAL, CAESAR XL VI. THE ART OF WAR OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE
APPENDIX A.
....
.
755
.
768
781
CASUALITIES IN SOME ANCIENT BATTLES
APPENDIX B. INDEX
SOME ANCIENT MARCHES
...
782 783
X/"
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
MM
Legion of Second Punic
Marius' Legion
Section of short Quinquireme
Harbor
Route of Cimbri and Teutones
Battle of Aquae Sextae
Gallic Cuirass
.......... ........ .......
.
War
3
8 14 15 17 19
20
22
Battle of Chserouaea
Iberia
The Mediterranean
Asia Minor
.
.........
. .
28
31
33
36 41
Ancient Helmet
yEgean
Cape Carvoeiro
Caesar's Provinces
.......... .48 ..
45
. .
. .
Gallic Battle-Axe
49
Gaul
Routes of the Helvetii
Csesar's
Caesar's
55
Wall and
Sections of
Rhone Bed
.....
. .
.
59
61 65
Route across the Alps Theatre of Helvetian Campaign
Camp
at Sathonay
Operation near Toulon Battle of Bibracte
Cfesar, the Citizen.
....... ......... .73
67 69
.
75
81
The Rhine and
March
against Ariovistus
Vesontio
Ariovistus'
Manoeuvre
....... ........ ........... .........
(Vatican)
the
Germans
84
86
87
92
xiv
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
96
Battle against Ariovistus
Gallic Shield
99
Vesontio to the Axona
...
102 105
Camp
on Axona
Bridgehead on Axona
Profile of
.........
.
. .
105
106 107
Camp
Axona
Ditches at Camp-Gates
Battle of the
Axona
to Sabis
..........
Second Phase
.
108 Ill 115
Battle of the Sabis
Battle of the Sabis.
.
.
119
123
The
Sabis to
Namur
B. c.
The Town
of the Aduatuci
124
126
Santo, Pisa)
. . .
Winter-Quarters, 57-56
Caesar, early in Gallic
War (Campo
. .
.
127
Octodorus Valley
129
.
.
The Venetan Country
...
.
..
132
.
Distribution of Legions, 56 B. c.
134
135
A Venetan Town
Bay
at
Quiberon
Theatre of Sabinus' Campaign
Camp du
Chastillier
Sabinus' Battle
Theatre of Crassus'
Crassus' Battle
Campaign
....... .......
.
. .
137 140
141 142
143
145
.
The Morini and Menapii
Light-Armed
Soldier
147
Normandy
The Rhine
to the
Rhine
.........
.
149
152
Rhine and Meuse
154
158
(cross section)
The Rhine Bridge The Rhine Bridge The Rhine Bridge
Gallic
160
161
, .
(elevation)
(plan)
Horseman, from a Sarcophagus
Swords
......
.
161
163
Gaul
to Britain
.
166
.
.
Gallic
.176
181
Britain
Gallic Soldier
wounded, from a Sarcophagus
.....
189
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
Winter-Quarters, 54-53
B. c.
.
XV
.
....
..
....
191
Camp
at
Aduatuca
195 198
Cicero's
Csesar's
Camp
March
Battle against Ambiorix
....'.....
. .
. .
201
203
205
New Camps
Attack on Labienus'
Csesar,
Camp
. .
206
.
from a Coin
Campaign against Nervii and other Tribes
.....
.
209
211
The Menapii Campaign The Treviri Campaign
Pursuit of Ambiorix
.........
B.
213 215
218
The Three Columns
Cicero at Aduatuca
219
223
c
Winter-Quarters, 53-52
Gallic
225 226
Helmet
Central Gaul
229
233
to his Legions
The Province
Caesar's
March
to
234
235
.
Agendicum
Gallic
Avaricum
Horseman, from a terra-cotta Statuette Avaricum
Terrace at Avaricum (plan) Terrace at Avaricum (section)
Gallic
...........
.
.
237
241
242
243
245
Wall
to Gergovia
Avaricum
.........
to Gergovia
249 250 253
255
256
The Elaver
Gergovia and Vicinity
Larger Camp at Gergovia Smaller Camp
Profile of double
Profile of
Trench
Ground from smaller Camp
....
256 261 262
Gergovia from Roche Blanche Gergovia to
Agendicum
Labienus' Campaign
Battle of Lutetia
.......*. .........
268
271
273 278 280
Agendicum
to Alesia
Battle of the Vingeanne
xvi
Gallic
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
Swords
282
Alesia
Alesia, from the Northwest Alesia, from the South Alesia, from the Southeast Alesia, from the Northeast
Profile of
284
........
. .
287
287
.
289
289
Face of
Lilia
Work Work
292
and Stimuli
Csesar, late in Gallic
.......... ....
War
(British
293 294 299
302
Museum)
Battle of Alesia
Winter-Quarters, 52-51
B.
307
311
Campaign
Campaign
against Bituriges against Bellovaci
314 315 316
Fight of Bellovaci
Camp
at
Mt.
St. Pierre
Section of
Wall and Ditch
.317
320
321
Theatre of Bellovacian Campaign
Combat with Bellovaci
Caninius'
March
.
.
.
325
Uxellodunum
Uxellodunum, from the South Uxellodunum, from the North
....... .......
. .
326
328 328
331
Mound and Tower
Winter-Quarters, 51-50 B. c
Gallic
\
.
..
.
.332
.
Horseman, from a terra-cotta Statuette
336
.
Tribes of Gaul
Physical Features of Gaul
337 342 354
Early Cohorts Csesar's Cohort
'
354
Maniple of 120 Maniple of 200
Men Men
356
.
357
Muli Mariani
Legion
in one Line
Light- Armed
Man
Legionary ready for Battle
Legion
Legion
in
two Lines
......... ........ .........
.
357
358 358 358
360
361
in three Lines
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
Caesar's
xvii
Legion Seven Legions in three Lines
.
361
362 364
Turma
Ala Ala
in
two Lines
364 364
365 366
in three Lines
Agmen Manipulatim Agmen Centuriatim By Lines to the Right By Wings to the Front
March forward
in
367
367 369
371
Square
Army
on the March
Gallic Shield
380
382
Camp Camp Wall (section)
Cohort Tents (Hyginus)
Section of
Csesar's
383 385
388
Mound Town
Plan of Approaches to a
Musculus, light
389
391 391
Musculus, strong
The Vinea
Pluteus (three styles)
,,392
392
Tower
394
395
Ram
and Tongs Telenon
Catapult
Ballista
396 397 397
Scorpio
Crassus' Routes
Battle of Carrhse
Italy
Corfinium
.......... ...........
War
(Berlin)
.
399 402 403
410 418
421
CaBsar, early in Civil
Brundisium
Italy, Spain,
424
Epirus
430
436
Pompey's Spanish Legions Jlerda and Vicinity
Attack on Ilerda
Ilerda,
439
444 446
from the Northeast
xvm
Rescue of Convoy
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
451
Signum
Artificial
453
Ford
455 458 475
477
Theatre of Operations near Ilerda
Siege of Massilia
Vicinity of Massilia
.
........
.
Works
at Massilia
479
481
Farther Spain
Utica and Vicinity Epirus and Macedonia
Caesar and
Csesar's
485
Antony
to
join
........
.
...
497 506
511
March
Dyrrachium
Theatre of Dyrrachium
512 517
Dyrrachium, Theatre of Operations Combat of Ninth Legion
Csesar before Dyrrachium
........
.....
.
520
523
625
532
Attack on Sylla
Battle of Dyrrachium. Battle of Dyrrachium.
Pompey's Attack Caesar's Attack
535 540
546
Aquilifer
Situation,
June 6
..........
. .
Plain of Thessaly
649
555
. .
.
Pharsalus Plain
Roman Coin
Armies
with Civic Wreath
556 561
at Pharsalus
.
Battle of Pharsalus
559 567
After the Battle of Pharsalus
Ancient Helmet
Alexandria
...........
.
.
...
576
578
Egypt
Second Naval Battle
Battle at the
. .
580
.
-.
-.
'
591
Mole
.593
599
Battle of the Nile (Terrain) Battle of the Nile
.601
605 607 609
,
Asia Minor
Battle of Nicopolis
Illyricum
Theatre of Zela
612
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
Battle of Zela
xix
614 618 620
Triumphal Car North Africa
Theatre of African Campaign
Battle of Ruspina (first phase)
.
624
631
Battle of Ruspina (second phase) Battle of Ruspina (third phase)
632
634
,
Ruspina
Camp
638
646 648
Ucita Plain
Fight at Ucita
Lines of Battle at Ucita
650
.
Ravine Fight
Ucita Lines
653
656
Ancient Helmet
Caesar and Varus
.
658
661
In Line of Battle
Labienus' Stratagem
March
to Agar ZetaRaid
......... ....
.
663 666
.
669 670 678
Tegea
Thapsus and Vicinity
Battle of Thapsus
.
680
Spain Theatre of Spanish Campaign
....
.
.
684
696
698
700*
Corduba Corduba to Munda
Attegua
. .
702
.
.
.
.
704 711
721
Roman
Cuirass
Battle of
Munda
Maximus (Vatican)
.
Caesar as Pontifex
......
754
779
Triumphal Car
C^SAR.
I.
MAKIUS AND THE ARMY CHANGES.
CZSAK'S legion was more
Second Punic War.
like the
110-86 B. C.
like the legion of the
Greek phalanx than
had intervals between maniples equal to maniple and the maniples stood checkerwise. Each man occupied a space five front, the burgessfeet square. The material of the legion was of the highest order
latter
The
soldier of the simple republic.
into
But gradually the
;
professional soldier
less
came
vogue
the citizens avoided military duty
and a
reliable material
filled
the ranks.
;
Marius
first
enlisted
men
solely for their physical qualifica-
tions
and foreign mercenaries were added to the army. The general, not the republic, claimed the soldier's fealty. Arms and equipment remained the same,
but the trustworthiness of the soldier decreased, and the intervals in the line of battle were lessened. The cohort was no longer a body of citizens marshaled
on a basis of property-standing, but a body of from three hundred to six hundred of any kind of men, and the legion was marshaled in two or three lines of cohorts. The army ceased to be a national militia, but was composed of
regulars and auxiliaries.
Ballistics
and
fortification
were improved.
Sieges
more expertly managed. The fleets gained in importance. Marius' great work was the change he wrought in the army but he was also the means of rescuing Rome from the invasion of the Tentones and Cimbri, the former grew
to be
;
of
whom
he defeated at Aquae Sextiae in Southern Gaul, and the latter at
Vercellas in Northern Italy.
Both
victories
redound much to his
credit.
THE
ment
legion with which the
Romans vanquished
the Gre-
cian phalanx, and which gallantly took the fearful punishinflicted
on
it
by Hannibal, again and again facing
destruction with unflinching courage, until the Carthaginians,
exhausted by attrition, were forced to abandon Italy, was a very different body of men from the enthusiastic legion
CAESAR'S LEGION.
which Caesar led victorious to the four quarters of the then
known
legion
of the
world.
Curiously enough, the formation of Caesar's
more nearly approached that of the "simple phalanx" Greeks than that of the splendid body of burgesswhose stanch front to disaster makes the Second
so
soldiers,
Punic
War
memorable a page
in the annals of
Roman
Caesar's array in line of battle courage and intelligence. did not differ as greatly from Hannibal's phalanx in the
later battles of this war, as it did
from the legion of Marcel-
lus or Nero.
At Asculum, Herdonia and Zama, Hannibal's
up
in two or three lines of legionary phalanxes,
army was
tion
set
so to speak.
Adopting the quincunx or checkerwise formaas the typical idea of the legion of the
by maniples
was
Second Punic War, Caesar's army, during all his campaigns, set up more like Hannibal's phalanx, and at times very
it.
nearly approached
Let us
see
how
the change
came about.
The
legion of the
Second Punic
War
was a body composed
privilege as a duty,
of citizens rendering service according to the classes of Ser-
vius Tullius.
This service was as
much a
and was jealously guarded. Only burgesses with a given amount of property were allowed to serve. Those who had
less
than twelve thousand
right.
five
hundred asses were excluded
from the
They were
proletarii, having
some
slight
means, and capite censi, having nothing and reckoned merely as so many head of men.
The material
of which the legion
was made was thus of the
very highest order; and originally the armament and place in the legion were determined by the class-rating. But later
these were
made
to
youngest soldiers, were velites or light troops
hastati or
depend on length of service, so that the from seventeen to twenty -five years of age,
;
those from twenty-five to thirty,
first line
;
heavy troops of the
those from thirty to
EARLY LEGION.
forty, principes or
heavy troops of the second line ; those
acted as
skirmishers.
from forty
to forty-five, triarii or reserves of the third line.
The
light
troops
The
legionary
soldier occupied a space about five feet square.
The
lines
of hastati and of principes stood in maniples of one hundred
and twenty men each, twelve front by ten deep, and between
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Legion of the Second Punic
War.
The
each two maniples was an interval equal to maniple front. lines were some two hundred and fifty feet apart, and the
maniples of the principes stood behind the intervals of the hastati. The triarii maniples had but sixty men, and stood
behind the hastati intervals.
There were ten maniples in each of the three
lines, so that
there were of line troops twelve hundred hastati, twelve hundred principes and six hundred triarii. To these must be
added twelve hundred (or more) velites, making" forty -two hundred footmen in the legion, of whom three thousand
were heavy. There were three hundred cavalry in each legion, whose The velites often occupied the place was on the flanks.
intervals of the triarii.
fully given in the
The
details of the formation are
volume on Hannibal.
This body proved to have extraordinary mobility and capacity to meet unusual conditions, and with the discipline
CAIUS MARIUS.
the perfect material of esprit de corps natural to
of troops.
and
it
which
was composed made an unequaled body
B. C. fully
The
wars of the third century
proved the qualities of
It was at its very best. the legion so organized. of Caesar's era was quite a different body. The legion
Changes had grown up
in the state
and army which
affected
the matter of service and thus the legion; and a
number
of
marked
alterations were brought about during the times of
the civil wars.
The
legion descended to Caesar in a
new
shape, one that Marcellus
and Nero and Scipio would not
have recognized. Caius Marius is a more noteworthy figure in history from his rugged, uncouth personality and his startling political
success
and
failure
than
from
his
merit
as
captain.
to
Though him the
unquestionably able as a leader, though
Rome owed
victory at Aquae Sextiae, which delivered her from
the Cimbri and Teutones, his position in military annals was
more distinguished by the new organization
of the
Roman
army than by any other contribution
to the art of war.
When
internal disquiet began to monopolize the thought
citizens of the
and action of the
Roman
republic, the
army
was not long in feeling its influence for the worse. The civil wars sadly marred the soldierly sentiments of the Romans, but it was Caius Marius who first gave a serious downward
impetus to the character of the army. Long before his time many of the old Servian methods had got changed or distinctly modified.
The minimum property which
The armament
of the legionary
entitled a
citizen to the privilege of serving
had been reduced to four
thousand asses.
to
had ceased
be determined by census-rating; it had, as above stated, grown to be fixed by length of service. Wealth and luxury
had supplanted the ancient habits of
gesses gradually sought
to
simplicity.
The bur-
avoid service; the proletariats
POOR MATERIAL IN LEGION.
found in
it
a means of improving their condition.
A certain
number
political
of
campaigns were no longer essential to secure The burgess-cavalry had given up preferment.
field,
serving in the
and become a
sort of
guard of honor.
The avoidance
of military duty
by the
rich
made
it
impossi-
ble to raise large forces with rapidity
calling out the classes ;
by the simple means of
and
yet, as after the battle of Arausio,
contingencies occurred
made.
when large levies must be instantly The new barbarian territories of Rome had begun to
furnish cavalry, such as the heavy horse of Thrace and the
from Numidia, as well as light infantry, such as the Ligurians and the Balearic slingers; but the heavy
light irregulars
foot
had remained
Italian.
It was Marius who first gave every free-born citizen, *however poor, an equal right to serve. The heavy infantry, hastati, principes, triarii,
were
all
reduced to a
level,
and
it
was
the officers
who
decided, from the qualifications of the man,
soldier should
where and with what arms each
serve.
be allowed to
The armament of all the heavy foot was made the and gladiators were employed as masters of arms to same,
teach the recruits the use of their weapons; while Publius
Rutilius, Marius' s favorite
comrade and fellow legate in the
African war, compiled a system of tactics for the new legion. son of the people, when in 107 B. c. Marius had attained
consular rank, he found his advantage in raising his army, not from the self-respecting classes, but from men he could
supreme Later leaders, Sulla, Crassus, Pompey, followed in the steps of Marius. Under such leadership the army soon became another body, no longer representative of Roman
control.
so handle as to subserve his purpose of gaining the
courage, honesty and patriotism.
The
right to serve in the
the sole road to civic honors.
army ceased to be a privilege, The wealthy citizen would no
SOLDIER'S OATH.
Bodily exercises were neglected. longer consent to serve. The ranks were filled, not by representatives of every class,
rich
and poor, but by the
proletarii ;
and
it
fore there crept into the ranks
numbers
of
was not long bemen from peoples
Rome, freedmen, strangers and slaves. Even the criminal classes were greedily recruited, and Marius once
tributary to
made a body-guard
of slaves.
Some
veterans did service in
call for
exchange for grants of land,
and answered the
duty
as evocati, having special privileges.
The
legions were not
now
divided into simple
Roman and
In the Social War, Roman citizenship was granted allied. broadcast to the Italians, and the legions were composed of Romans, auxiliaries, provincial troops and mercenaries. The
Marius was simply personal size and strength. Character went for nothing. Cavalry was raised in a manner
test of
similar to the infantry,
If the knights still
and mostly from foreign elements. consented to serve, it was only in posts of
for raising men were utterly
peculiar honor.
The ancient rules
one ready to pay could secure freedom from service any one physically qualified could bear arms. The oath of the soldier was no longer an oath to serve the
disregarded.
Any
republic ; he swore personal fealty to the general.
The grow-
ing necessity for keeping troops long under arms, which fol-
to
lowed the extended conquests of Rome, made generals resort every means to prevent their forces from disbanding.
Gradually the honorable service of the
Roman
citizen to the
fatherland got prostituted to the low grade of soldier of fortune. Mercenaries and standing armies took the place
of voluntary service alone.
suls,
and of armies
called out
from necessity
The conquered provinces were placed under proconeach with a standing army and unlimited power, and
result.
were farmed out for revenue with the inevitable
Rome
was following in the footsteps of Greece.
INTERVALS.
This change from the old method of classified personal service rendered essential corresponding changes in the marshaling of the legion.
The ancient
distinction of principes,
hastati and triarii disappeared, and all troops were either heavy or light. The inherited arms and equipment were not
materially altered.
The
old numerical force of the legion,
say four thousand to six thousand heavy infantry and three hundred heavy cavalry as the normal strength, was retained but the light troops, now all raised from the conquered prov;
were largely increased, both foot and horse, and were no longer an integral part of the legion. The horse grew in
inces,
importance and effectiveness, for the Koman horseman had imitated the better models of light cavalry which his many
wars in every land, from Iberia to the distant Orient, had afforded him. This improvement was traceable in the heavy in a lesser degree. From about one tenth of the cavalry
numerical force of the foot, the horse grew to the proportion of one seventh or at times more.
The number
four, but ran
of legions in a consular
army was no longer
to ten, not countballistic
up to any given number, even
ing the auxiliaries, horse or foot.
Elephants and
machines came into common use.
legion in the field had small catapults and ballistas, each served by ten men. thirty
Still, as
in battle, but in the attack
with Alexander, these machines were not employed and defense of defiles, in cross-
ing rivers, and in the attack and defense of camps and other works.
Up
to the time of Marius, the quincuncial
still
form of the
legion was retained, and the intervals
the maniple front.
But when the
their
remained equal to legions grew to be com-
posed of inexpert recruits, not as in the early days of
trained to
men
war from
youth, the individuality of the
legionary could no longer be relied upon.
Moreover, the
MARIUS' LEGION.
in their wars with
Romans
tal
Germanic barbarians and Orienthe intervals grew
masses had found that the always present danger of the
his
enemy forcing
way into
more
serious as
the troops deteriorated in quality.
This difficulty had for-
merly been obviated by moving the principes up into or close behind the intervals of the hastati. But Marius introduced
another organization, the setting up of the legion in three The thirty legionary maniples, each of two lines of cohorts.
centuries,
were given up. The word cohort remained, but the body consisted no longer of a maniple each of hastati, principes and triarii, with velites and a turma of horse ; it was
a body of from four to six maniples of four, five or six hundred legionary soldiers. At first the intervals remained the
;
five feet space of each soldier, the ten deep
file
and the
dis-
tance between lines were not altered; the cohorts had forty,
L
.1
J
Marius' Legion.
Shortly the intervals between cohorts began to diminish with the individual trustworthiness of the legionary, and the distances beween lines were increased to
fifty
or sixty
files.
three hundred feet.
These lines were now known as
first
first,
second and third ; and the
had
four, the second and third
each three cohorts.
The
three cohorts in second line stood
first,
opposite the diminished intervals of the
the third line
cohorts at the flanks and opposite the centre.
eagle was
still
The legionary
first
carried
by the primipilus of the
its
cohort of
the third line,
and each cohort had
legionaries of first
own
special ensign
lines,
it
(signum).
The
and second
is
thought by some, were the soldiers who were called antesig-
MARIUS* MARCHES.
nani
;
in the third line cohorts
were the bravest and strongest
but they were no longer the triarii. Upon this formation were grafted, at times not easily determined, yet other changes. The ten cohorts stood in two lines,
soldiers ;
five in
each or instead of ten there were fifteen cohorts, each
;
of two maniples, and five of these were in each line.
files
The
split and doubled, making a five deep cohort of double length of front, which in line would close up
were now and then
full interval.
intervals,
by a process of steadily decreasing the cohorts came to all but join each other, and the
Finally,
legion
had again become a phalanx. This formation without intervals was not invariable. Caesar generally set up his
But a legion whose first line was nearly a solid body was not uncommon. The This was the inevitable ancient quincunx had disappeared.
cohorts with intervals
more or
less wide.
result of the loss of the old
Eoman
patriotism, discipline
and
stanchness in the legionary soldier, and of his being replaced by a far inferior man who needed- to be held well in hand to
force
him
to his work.
Finally, the eagle found its
way
into
to
the front line, but the
a special body, of The use of the testudo-formation grew into a huge rectangle,
word antesignani remained, applied which more will be told anon.
much
like the
indeed, in the
Romans' Oriental wars
modern square against cavalry, for which, it was frequently used.
On
open ground, marches were sometimes made in squares,
phalanx of Brasidas
like that of the
agmen quadratum. Marius especially excelled in his dispositions for the march. In the war against Jugurtha, he is said to have moved in a
column by
right and
legions.
Sulla with the cavalry and Manlius with
the slingers,
left.
bowmen and Ligurians covered the column on In the van and rear, under command of miliwere on the flanks.
tary tribunes, were some cohorts in light marching order,
and scouts
in quantities
10
DISCIPLINE.
In battle order, the Roman legions stood in the centre, the auxiliaries on the flanks, the velites in the spaces between
bodies,
on the
to
began
Cavalry be more of an arm, and was hurled in masses on the
to protect the foot.
flanks, or in front
and rear
as needed.
enemy or employed
old stand on both flanks.
no longer kept its The method of fighting was not
It
grew apace, until they reached their highest Roman development under Caesar. Other changes of even more importance were made in this
tactics
much altered, but grand
period.
The
office of dictator, that is,
;
the supreme control,
was the aim of the ambitious
possession of the state.
it
was
their
means
of gaining
The
legates
grew
to greater impor-
tance and acquired more and more the command of legions and armies. They were the general officers. The military tribunes became cohort-commanders, and the centuries were
commanded by
centurions.
The troops were
still
drilled
and
exercised in gymnastics, but not so the citizens.
Soldiers, to
keep them from
idleness
and turbulence, were put upon the
public works, especially the great military roads.
pay was doubled by Caesar at the opening of the Civil War. The footmen received ten asees a day; censoldier's
The
turions twenty, cavalrymen thirty, subject to certain deductions, as of old, for rations,
In
this era, discipline
and
arms, equipments and horses. esprit de corps were in a transiof the
tion state
from the perfect basis
still
Second Punic
War
to
the utter worthlessness of later days.
Courage and good
behavior were
present, but these were maintained
by the
severity of the laws.
times, foolishly
Punishments were cruelly unjust at inadequate at others. They were inflicted
suit the
no longer in accordance with the code, but to
or character of the general.
moods
was
The splendid
victories of the
Romans prove abundantly
still
that
much
of the old spirit
there.
But
it
proceeded from a different motive.
The
SOLDIERS NOT CITIZENS.
11
ancient love of honor and country had disappeared, and in its place stood an avaricious grasping for booty and a greed of
bloodshed and conquest.
soldiers.
These men were no longer
Roman
and he
They
belonged to the chief
who
led them,
used every motive which is peculiarly suited to a low class of military recruits to bind them to his cause and use them for
his
own
;
purposes.
Ubi
bene ibi patria was the accepted
rule
and each general
easily persuaded his troops that
he
represented the chief good.
The
the
civil uprisings in
Rome
had demonstrated how
century B. Hannibal.
c.
little
Roman
soldier of the first
was
like the
Roman
soldier of the
war against
their dis-
When
Caesar's legions mutinied
and demanded
charge, he addressed them as quirites, a title which every Roman soldier in the early /lays viewed with pride. Just
because he was a citizen, he was a soldier.
legionaries were only
soldiers.
But
Caesar's
They were not
quirites
citizens,
nor
did they care to be.
The one word
shamed or
fright-
ened them into obedience.
As punishments
ing to rule, so
in the
army were no longer made accordFavoritleaves or grasses
officers,
were unearned rewards distributed.
ism grew apace.
gave
place to expensive
The simple crown of ornaments. The
and
later
the soldiers, were freed from the duty of nightly fortification and other fatigue work. The greater triumph went to the
unworthy. Luxury and pomp stepped into the place of simplicity, not only with wealthy citizens, but in the camp. But because the soldier had degenerated, it does not follow
that the ability of the leaders had gone.
Rather because of
the degeneracy of the rank and
file,
ability in the captain
was
enabled to push
its
way
to the front.
The period
fication
of the Civil
War
shows great advance in
forti-
and
ballistics.
The form of the camp remained the
12
SIEGES.
same, but the walls and defenses were
cate.
made much more
intri-
The wall was higher and
thicker; the ditch
was wider
and usually wet; towers were more numerous and bigger, and covered ways connected them; entanglements in front of the defenses were more common ; the camp, especially castra
stativa,
became a
fortress.
Even
battlefields
were
fortified.
Sulla erected palisades
between his lines with ditches on the flanks, against the enemy's chariots at Chaerona3a. Marius intrenched himself
against the Teutones
at
the
mouth
of
the
Isere.
The
Romans kept
to their
own method, but exceeded
temporary
the Greeks
in cleverness at this sort of
fortification.
Sieges likewise gained in skillful management.
the telenon of the Greeks was used to swing
In assaults
the
men up on
enemy's wall. The corona consisted in surrounding a town with two lines of foot and one of horse and gradually decreasing the circumference of the lines until the walls could be reached under cover of penthouses and tortoises. The movable testudo of shields was commonly employed and with
good results. Lines of contra- and circumvallation were made more
expertly than of yore.
Mounds were used as formerly in but grew to enormous proportions. Sulla's at MasGreece, sada was two hundred and eighty-six feet high, and upon
and
fifty -five feet,
these were other constructions and towers of one hundred
making four hundred and forty-one
Sulla's at
feet
above the
level.
Mines were dexterously used.
especial ability.
Athens showed
all
Sheds, tortoises, movable towers, rams,
came
use.
into play.
Catapults and
ballistas
were in constant
The big
catapult projected
beams a horizontal distance
of four hundred to eight hundred paces.
(scorpio) shot heavy lances three
The
small catapult
five
hundred to
hundred
FLEETS.
paces.
13
The former was used
in sieges, the latter in the field.
The big was also hurled. burning ballista threw stones four hundred to six hundred paces on a curved path like that of a mortar, and was used in sieges.
missile (falerica)
The small one (onager) was used
in the field.
The
smallest
onager and scorpio could be worked by one man. In general, the sieges of this day were much
of the Greeks.
like those
They had gained
distinctly in skill since
the days of Hannibal, but
few besiegers reached the clever
devices of Alexander ; none approached his gallant assaults.
Foreign conquest obliged the Romans to increase the power and effectiveness of their fleet. This was done with
their usual
push and good
sense.
The government owned
to ship-building,
public forests which were devoted
and were well managed.
War
vessels con-
sisted of biremes, triremes, quinquiremes and up to octoremes; the triremes and quinquiremes were the ones mostly in commission. There were cruisers for light coast duty and
spying out the enemy (naves
like
speculatorice*)',
a smaller class
gunboats; transports and flat bottoms (pontones) for The war vessels mostly had iron rams (rostra river duty.
ferramenta'),
and
their sides were protected
by beams and
of the
shields of various kinds to save
them from the blows
enemy's.
The
larger, often the smaller, vessels had decks,
and missile-throwers and towers stood upon them. Each vessel was provided with grappling-irons, boarding-bridges,
siege implements
use of fireships
and machines for casting was well understood.
fire-pots.
The
were manned by rowers or sailors, and by soldiers or marines. The rowers and sailors were slaves or came
fleets
The
from the lower
aries.
classes
the marines were raised like legion-
Their oath of fealty was equally to the admiral and
not to the state.
quinquireme had four hundred rowers,
14
the others
HARBORS.
a
corresponding number.
The marines were
armed
like the legionaries, but
axes and boarding-swords.
had scythed lances, battleThe rowers were also armed.
Section of Short Quinqnireme.
had a chief of rowers who gave the time of the stroke by a hammer-blow on a gong; a sort of boatswain in
Each
vessel
charge of the
sails,
anchors, etc.
who was
also pilot; a captain (navarchus);
a steersman (gubemator), and a comman-
dant of marines (prcefectus navis). consul or praetor in command of the fleet, or a special officer (dux might be
prcefectusque clas&is) might lead
it.
Harbors were natural or
artificial.
favorite
form of
the latter was a semicircle from the shore, from which two
moles ran out seaward, the entrance between which was
closed
by a chain. The inner harbor was in several divisions, and well provided with arsenals and wharves. These harbors were fortified both towards the sea and on the land side.
When
fleet
was ready
to put to sea the rowers first
went
aboard, then the marines.
An
inspection with religious cerset sail,
emonies followed and the
the light vessels ahead, then the triremes and other war-galleys, then the
fleet
On landing, the vessels were drawn up on the and were protected by palisades towards the sea and beach,
transports.
fieldworks towards the land.
This rule, along the rocky
NAVAL BATTLES.
coast of Italy,
15
fleet
must frequently have been broken; but a
always passed the night ashore, when possible. Naval battles generally took place near land, and vessels
were lightened as much as possible by leaving off
ing masts, and clearing decks.
carefully watched
sails,
lower-
Ebb and
flood tides
were
and
utilized.
The common order
of battle
was a parallel one
in
two lines
(acies duplex), with the lighter ships in the rear line; a
Harbor.
concave order (acies lunata), with the heaviest ships on the flanks to outflank the enemy; a convex order, in which the
heaviest ships were in the centre; a pincer-like form (forceps), against a wedge (acies cuneata), or vice versa.
The
signal for battle
was a red
flag at the admiral's mast-
head, and a trumpet-blast from each ship. Upon this all hands gave the battle-cry and intuned the battle-hymn. The
missile-throwers opened the action and then the lines clashed.
Each
ship endeavored to run
down
or
ram an
adversary, cut
its oars,
board and capture
it,
or set
it afire.
16
SOLDIERS
AND LEADERS.
naval victory was celebrated by songs and music, and by decorating the prows of the vessels with laurel. The admiral was allowed a triumphus navalis.
and perfect militia-system of Rome had disappeared, the soldier had become a profesThe sional, and the forces on foot were simple mercenaries.
the matter up, the old
distinctions in the legions
To sum
were exclusively military, having
class.
nothing to
do with
civil
rank or
And
as everything
now depended on
regular army.
the general, so there
grew up about him
a headquarters-guard (prcetoriani) which was the germ of a
The wonderful campaigns and battles of this era were the of the leaders. The condition of the army, for good or bad, reflected the spirit and character of the general. It was
work
no longer the
state.
Roman
citizen
but the genius of great
who won the victories of Rome, men who aimed at the control of the
Jugurthan war he owed to
Much
of Marius' success in the
the skill of Sulla, his then quaestor and later political opponent. Metellus, Marius' chief, deserves the credit for the
conquest of Numidia as far as the confines of the desert; Sulla that for the capture of Jugurtha. Marius profited by both. The great army -changes are associated with Marius ;
but there
is little
in his military feats which have other than
a political significance.
however, due abundant praise for his conduct at Aquae Sextiae and Vercellse. Rome never ran a than from the invasion of the Teutones and greater danger
is,
To Marius
Cimbri; and
it
was
to
Marius she owed her rescue.
After
the defeat of the
Romans
at Arausio (Orange) in 105 B. c.,
where the consuls Mallius Maximus and Servilius Caepio, with eighty thousand Roman soldiers and half as many noncombatants, paid with their lives the penalty of mismanage-
CIMBRI AND TEUTONES.
ment,
17
a blow more seriously threatening than even Cannae,
to repair the disaster.
Marius was sent to Gaul
He
had
ample time, for instead of to Italy the barbarians
their
had headed
column towards Spain. Here, forced back by the brave Iberians and the difficulties of the Pyrenees, they again
marched towards the north, until they were checked by the stubborn Belgse and once more rolled in a vast flood towards
the
Roman
province.
Route of Cimbri and Teutones.
Marius had established himself
at the confluence of the
Rhone and
Isere
had reduced the
disaffected tribes
and con-
At this point he firmed the fealty of others in the Province. the roads to the only two then available passes, over protected
the Little St. Bernard and over the Maritime Alps.
The
barbarians were in two bodies.
One
of these essayed the
18
MARIUS' CARE.
The
fol-
Eastern Alps and in due time debouched into Italy.
other, the Teutones, aimed to pass
down
the
Rhone and
low the coast to the Maritime Alps.
appearance before the
fortified
These soon made their
camp
of Marius, which the consul
had
with extreme care.
his
Though he was an
in
excellent
disciplinarian and
men were
good heart, Marius was
to the sight of their
battle-cry.
unwilling to encounter the immense hordes of the Teutones
until his
men had become accustomed
their wild
huge
stature,
demeanor and howling
The Romans feared
Not
all
these light-haired bulky barbarians as
the Greeks had dreaded the Persians prior to Marathon. the taunts of the
enemy could make Marius budge
Finally, tired out, the Teu-
from
his secure intrenchments.
tones assaulted the
camp
for three days in succession, but
loss.
were thrust back with heavy
They then marched
families
for
Italy, filing, say the authorities, six
days and nights past the
Roman camp,
gage-trains,
with their armed
men and
and bag-
and
calling with sneers to the legionaries for
messages to their wives
and children
in Italy.
Now came
enemy
Marius' chance.
Cautiously following up the
in the
Jugurthan war, daily camping near by them on inaccessible heights and behind strong works, he finally felt that the temper of his men was
in the style he
had learned
Near Aqua3 Sextise (Aix, equal to an attack on the enemy. des Bouches du Rhone), even before his camp was Department
finished, a fight
was begun between the men of both armies who were getting water at the little river Arc, which lay
'
between them.
were Ambrones
The Romans drove
across the river
the barbarians
their
they
and to
wagon-camp.
Here took place a severe combat in which the wives of the Ambrones fought beside their husbands and the barbarians
lost heavily.
But though they had done good work, the day ended by the Romans falling back to their side of the river.
BATTLE OF AQjJM SEXTI^E.
19
During the succeeding night, Marius placed Marcellus with three thousand men some authorities say non-combatants
in
ambush
in
some wooded ravines up the river from
camp, with orders, during the battle which he At dayproposed to force, to debouch on the enemy's rear. break the consul drew up the Roman army on some heights
the barbarian
^XX.^^X^^-nr,^
f
Battle of Aqufe Sextise.
camp, and sent his cavalry out to lure the Teutones to attack. This was The barbarians, under the imprescleverly accomplished.
lining the river where he
his
had established
sion that the
Romans would not
fight,
forded the stream and
rushed tumultuously up the slope.
driven back to the plain.
They were received
midday heat
so
stoutly by the legions that they fell into disorder and were
Unused
to the
of the
Mediterranean, the barbarians, after some hours' fighting,
lost their vigor,
and at the proper instant the party
fell,
in
amtheir
bush emerged and
sustained
by
the cavalry,
upon
20
rear.
BATTLE OF VERCELL^E.
The Teutones were
as demoralized as they
had
for-
merly been eager. They fled in disorder and were cut down in their tracks, with a loss, according to Livy, of ninety
thousand killed and twenty thousand captured. in 102 B. c.
This was
Meanwhile the Cimbri had crossed the Rha3tian Alps, but Marius reached the scene did not at once march on Rome.
in time to join his colleague Catulus.
The
barbarians, ac-
cording to their odd but ancient custom, asked of Marius to appoint a day and place for battle, which to them was but a
huge duel, governed by the same forms. and near Vercellse the hosts met in 101
were beaten and annihilated
This Marius did,
B. c.
The Cimbri
no
less
than one hundred and
forty thousand being killed and sixty thousand captured, as The nation disappeared is claimed by the Latin historians. from history. Rome was saved from another burning.
Marius was more than a hero.
He was
the people's demigod.
Gallic Cuirass.
(?Narbonese.)
n.
SULLA, POMPEY.
SULLA was one
Marius.
90-60 B. C.
He
learned his trade nnder
of the ablest generals of his era.
He
first
used earthworks in
to
battle to
in his
protect his lines, and at
Orchomenus he nsed fieldworks
creet
;
he was both lion and fox.
greatness happens to
whom
enemy. Sulla was bold and diswas one of those captains upon Pompey be thrust. Of good but not high ability, excep-
hem
tional fortune enabled
him
to reap the benefit of the hard
work
of others.
He
;
was slow and lacked
cesses in Sicily
initiative,
but did some of his work well.
title
and Africa earned him the
to Spain
His early sucof Great at twenty-four but
when he went
generals of antiquity,
and opposed Sertorius, one of the most noteworthy he more than met his match. Only the death of Sertorius
enabled him to win success. The campaign in which Pompey swept the pirates from the Mediterranean was a simple piece of work excellently done his campaign in the East had been already made easy by Lucullus, whose labors
;
redounded to Pompey's credit. On the whole, while Pompey should not be underrated, it must be acknowledged that he earned his great repute on
more than usually slender grounds.
SULLA, as a general, stands higher than any of the men
He got his training in the immediately preceding Caesar. Jugurthan war under Marius, and won his first laurels by the
able negotiations which mainly contributed to the capture of
Jugurtha and the ending of that difficult conflict. He again served under Marius in the campaign against the Cimbri and
Teutones.
history of
Later on, master and pupil marked an era in the
Rome by
work
their competition for the
supremacy of
the state.
Sulla's
terly.
in the
East in the Mithridatic war was mas-
His
siege of Athens, coupled to the earlier siege of
Numantia by Scipio Africanus Minor, furnished the pattern
22
SULLA AT
on which Caesar worked and bettered, though unquestionably Caesar had studied the siege operations at Tyre and Rhodes,
and had drawn
his inspiration
from them.
All Sulla's camin the wars
paigns are of marked interest.
in skill
There was much
of the early part of the last century B. c. which
was splendid
and accomplishment, and which is specially noteworthy as being the school in which young Caesar learned his It is hard to select anyone of Sulla's numerous great trade.
deeds which shall stand alone as representative of his solThe battle of Chaeronaea, 86 B. c., on the field dierly work.
rendered famous by Philip's victory and the youthful daring of Alexander, is a sample of how to deal with unusual questions in war.
Taxiles and Archelaus, the lieutenants of Mithridates, had
PHALANX
/
CHARIOTS
n
;
o
V
A"R"C"H""R a
"r "sT/NCERs"
PALIS A DE
V.
Battle of Chaeronaea.
an army of one hundred thousand foot and ten thousand horse
with ninety scythed chariots. Sulla's force, including his Greek auxiliaries, was less than a third this number, and in on these plains a great cavalry he was especially wanting,
source of weakness.
sand
five
hundred strong.
His Roman troops were but sixteen thouBut Sulla despised his enemy,
success.
and was confident of
He made up
for his
want
of
SULLA'S BOLDNESS.
strength
23
save
by protecting his flanks with trenches which should him from the charges of the enemy's horse, and by
row of heavy palisades between his first and second which should arrest the charge of the scythed chariots.
intelligent instance of the use of fieldworks.
erecting a
lines,
Here was an
The
battle
charge of chariots.
was opened in true Oriental fashion by the Sulla's first line smartly withdrew be-
hind the palisades, which not only checked the onset of the chariots, but these, their horses being terrified by the heavy
fire
of Sulla's slingers
and archers, turned on
their
own
line
and produced marked confusion in the Macedonian phalanx and in a corps of Italian auxiliaries serving in the Mithridatic army.
To
repair the disaster, Archelaus ordered his
horse from both flanks to charge the
Orientals rode
Roman
legions.
The
and
down on
the
Romans with
great
elan,
their furious charge, despite the trenches, succeeded in break-
ing the
Roman
formation, showing clearly that without the
trenches Sulla's line would have been destroyed.
legionaries did not lose heart.
But the
They rapidly formed squares
Sulla,
and
resisted the
horsemen with great determination.
meanwhile, perceiving that the enemy's phalanx did not readily recover from the disorder into which the chariots had
thrown
driven
it,
and that the moment had arrived when a blow
at the right spot
was needed, gathered his own small force of cavalry from the right, and heading it in person charged sharply in on the exposed flank of the enemy.
home
As was
always the case with Sulla, fortune followed hard upon his boldness. The Asiatic foot offered but little resistThe horse which ance, and its flight unsettled the phalanx.
was assailing the Roman legions found its task too stubborn, and turned to aid in retrieving the disorder of the foot. The
legions gained breathing spell,
and speedily patching up a new formation advanced sharply on the wavering foot of
24
Archelaus.
FIELDWORKS AT ORCHOMENUS.
This decided the day.
off the field.
The
entire Mithridatic
army was swept from
Archelaus managed to retire to his camp, and closed the Immense slaughter gates to save what he had got within.
without the walls resulted.
forced
When
the gates were finally
entered with the by the massacre. Archelaus saved but a enemy and prolonged The Roman loss was trivial. twelfth part of his army.
the surging mass, the
Romans
At
by
the battle of Orchomenus, in the succeeding year, Sulla,
clever calculation in cutting ditches
and more clever
tac-
tics, succeeded in penning up a new army under Archelaus in such a position as to drive him into some swamps and
morasses, where he destroyed the entire force.
This operation appears to have been a species of siege, by a system of
gradually narrowed fieldworks, of an army camped in the open instead of protected by the walls of a fortress, and as
such exhibits decided originality of conception and boldness in execution. The accounts of the operation are obscure.
Sulla was equally able as statesman and soldier.
acted, not like Marius,
He
though rapid manner.
enterprising,
from impulse, but in a well-considered He was tireless and active, brave and
and singularly cool in thought and deed.
Carbo
pronounced Sulla to have the qualities of both the lion and the fox. He won the love of his soldiers, and yet was
a stern disciplinarian.
sieges as in tactics.
He showed
as
marked
skill in his
The most
when we
interesting though least creditable part of the
military career of Cnaeus
find
Pompey will be
dealt with at length
Caesar.
earlier part of his life, before
him measuring swords with he had Caesar
not be underrated.
In the
to contend with,
Pompey showed many
soldier.
characteristics of the great
man and
He must
perhaps the lightest weight of all the characters
But Pompey was who have
POMPEY'S CHARACTER.
enacted a giant's role on the stage of life. No title of Great on such slender merit.
25
such vast power with so little to back it favorably with men of a second rank ; but as he stood on the
No man won the man ever wielded up. He compares
same plane of power with the same large measure.
early achievements.
Caesar, so
It is
must we gauge him by due to Pompey to sketch his
Pompey had many
which
calls
of the virtues of the soldier.
He was
splendid as an athlete.
He was
bold in that species of war
not too largely on the intellect or the moral force.
He could
when he was unable
den strategic or
charge at the head of his horse with noble gallantry, to plan a good campaign or assume a sudtactical risk.
He was
as simple, modest
and
reserved in habit as he was fearless in battle.
qualities
He had
those
which endeared him
to the people.
Taken up by
Sulla
when a mere youth, he climbed
into popular favor as
Scipio Africanus Major had done, by belief in and assertion
of his right to
commands
state.
usually given to those
less
who have
long served the
of Scipio.
But Pompey had
He was
"
clean in his private
life,
than the ability and his " honest
countenance
relations,
was proverbial. He was upright in his family but none the less divorced his wife at the nod of
Sulla, while Caesar, against
whom much
is
charged in his
commerce with women, refused to do so. Pompey was retiring in civil life and lacked the graces of manner much considered at that day, though he
had a fair degree of culture. In council he was slow, and to a habit of silence which came
from a not over quick comprehension was referred, as
it
often
a judgment he did not possess. Pompey was but an ordinary man of good abilities. He had not the first glint of genius. Greatness was thrust upon him if it ever was upon any man. He was the very reverse
is,
of Caesar.
Circumstances made Pompey; Caesar made
cir-
26
cumstances.
POMPEY'S CAUTION.
Pompey was
In that
cold, passionless
and slow at makin
ing resolutions.
ultra opinions of
era,
when every man
's
power held
sort, Pompey very ordinariness sundered him from the ranks of his peers as his assertion and honest belief that he was great raised him above them. Had
some
his conduct risen to a higher plane, other qualities
been ascribed to him
might have but he must be judged by the event.
In him were blended a singular modesty of bearing and extravagance in demands. He was fortunate in his beginnings ;
much was done
for
him
to
what he had, more was given
he
was never overtaxed, nor did luck run counter
to his course.
such easy steps rose Cnaeus Pompey, the creation not of brilliant, but of steady good fortune.
By
Pompey possessed
which
is
obstinacy to the last degree,
a quality
intelligent
often a saving clause.
But
it
was not an
obstinacy.
imagined that he was having his own way when more clever men were outwitting him. From unreadiness to assume a heavy responsibility,
He
when
thrust
upon him,
grew a set habit of caution which well exhibits the average plane of his character. It was not the caution of a Hannibal,
who, when called on, could be bold beyond any man it was rather a want of moral incisiveness. While not lacking
;
good conduct and qualities he was, says Mommsen, "the most starched of artificial great men.'* Pompey was perhaps
the best individual to hold his party together, because he did
naught to disrupt
it.
Pompey
first
came
into notice in 83 B. c.,
when he under-
took to raise an army for Sulla in Picenum. Here his personal bearing and unquestioned gallantry stood him in good
stead.
He
raised
and equipped a superior
force,
and when
Marian armies faced him, he had the nerve to attack them in detail before they could assemble, and the good fortune to disperse them. He led an attack on the enemy's
three
SERTORIUS.
an unusual thing at that day On his joining his the Roman name.
27
camp
which did credit
to
chief, Sulla saluted
the young
man
of twenty -three as Imperator, a title which
few men ever won, and those only at the end of many years In 82 B. c., Pompey was of arduous and brilliant service. on his approach with six legions and one hundred and twenty galleys, was at once evacuated by the enemy and afforded him an easy triumph.
sent as propra3tor to Sicily.
island,
The
though with larger he conducted a handsome and successful campaign forces, His assault against Domitius Ahenobarbus, the Marian.
From
Sicily he shipped to Africa, where,
on the enemy's camp here,
too, as well as
a speedy and ener-
getic forty days' campaign, revived the
Roman name, which
had
fallen into disrepute.
On his
half in recognition," Sulla saluted
return, "half in irony and him as Magnus, and he was
allowed, against all precedent, the greater triumph, never
granted but to those of senatorial rank. Q. Sertorius, the Marian, had been for some years holding head against the Sullan faction in Spain. It was essential
that some able soldier should go thither.
felt that
Pompey
as usual
him.
He was
he had a right to demand the place, and it was given not fortunate in opposing this extraordinary
had his work been cast on a winning in lieu of a losing theatre, might have rivaled any Roman antedating Caesar. Sertorius was equally remarkable as a statesman
general, who,
and a
soldier.
kingdom
people to
in Iberia.
its
He had practically set up Few men have ever
an independent
held a difficult
work, or conducted an energetic guerilla war-
Never coming to battle, he had wearied the Sullan general Metellus by minor operations, by cutting off his foragers and water-parties, by atfare so well or on so large a scale.
tacking him on the march, and by remarkable activity in small- war. Metellus- had been unable to cope with him.
28
It
POMPEY IN
was
in the
HISPANIA.
summer
of 77 B. c. that
Spain as proconsul. On his the Cottian Alps (Mt. Genevre) which Csesar later used, and
settled
Pompey went to way he made the new road over
some troubles in Gaul.
He
enees
till
late in the fall of that year,
did not cross the Pyrand wintered in north-
Iberia.
east Spain.
Sertorius
was on the upper Ebro; of
his lieu-
tenants, Hirtuleius was facing Metellus in Farther Spain,
and Perpenna, sustained by Herennius, held the Ebro against
Pompey 's columns.
to
Pompey, early in the spring, advanced and forced the Ebro, defeated Herennius at Valentia, south of Saguntum, and captured the place. Sertorius had moved
allied to
on Lauro, a town
Pompey, on the Sucro (Xucar), south of Valentia, and was besieging it. Pompey moved and sought to shut him in. So confident was he against him,
of success that he flattered himself that he
had got Sertorius
SERTORIUS DEFEATS POMPEY.
where he must soon surrender.
29
his oppo-
He
did not
know
In the struggle which Pompey forced on him, Sertonent. rius utterly outmanoeuvred his opponent, penned him up, and
under his very eyes burned Lauro and transported its inhabitants to Lusitania. Pompey was surprised enough at the
turn affairs had taken.
Meanwhile Metellus had defeated Hirtuleius near Hispalis The next year he again defeated him near Segovia (Seville).
when
lest
the Sertorian sought to prevent Metellus from marching
to join
Foreseeing the arrival of his colleague, and he should be forced to divide his laurels with him, Pom-
Pompey.
pey offered battle to Sertorius on the Sucro, which this general was only too glad to accept before the arrival of Metellus.
On
the left of the
Roman
line,
Afranius beat back the
enemy and took Sertorius' camp; on the right, however, Pompey was severely wounded and his troops badly defeated
by Sertorius, who thereupon turned on Afranius and drove him back in turn. Pompey's army was rescued by the arrival of Metellus, and Sertorius' quite unreliable forces hereupon
began to disperse. The main difficulty this able man had to contend with was to keep his irregular levies together and At times he had very large numbers, even ready for work.
as high as one hundred
and
fifty
thousand
men t which he had
with vast labor got together; then, suddenly, on a reverse
or from some unexpected discouragement, the army would So now. On the junction of dissolve to a mere handful.
Metellus and Pompey, and learning of the defeat of Hirtuleius, Sertorius'
army
incontinently retired and dispersed to
the mountains.
After a period of recuperation they were
again collected
guntum.
and Sertorius faced Pompey south of SaMeanwhile his galleys interfered with the Roman
victualling fleets along the coast.
After some manoeuvring another battle was fought on the
30
METELLUS AND POMPEY.
It
river Turia (Guadalaviar).
gle for mastery.
Finally Sertorius defeated
was a long and stanch strugPompey and his
cavalry, while Metellus broke Perpenna's array.
The
result
dis-
was favorable
persed.
to the Sullans,
and
Sertorius'
army again
Sertorius betook himself to Clunia, a fortress on the
upper Durius (Douro), where he was besieged. But the Spanish army was once more got together, and Sertorius cleverly
The end of the year 75 escaped from Clunia and joined it. B. c. saw him again facing the Sullans, with equal chances..
On
well.
the whole, however, Metellus and
Pompey had done
Southern and Central Spain had been recovered, and This was Metellus' work rather Sertorius had made no gain.
than Pompey 's. The colleagues went into winter-quarters, Metellus in Gaul, Pompey between the Durius and Iberus,
near modern Valladolid.
began a small-war was besieging Pallantia (PaU against Pompey. At Calagurris, lencia), when Sertorius drove him from it.
B.
c. Sertorius
In the spring of 74
The
latter
though joined by Metellus, he was likewise defeated, and
then driven out of the upper Ebro region. Whenever Pommet Sertorius, he succumbed. The succeeding year was pey
by much the same fortune-, though Pompey made some headway in getting allies among the Spanish cities. The war had been going on eight years. It was a serious drain on Italy, and Spain itself by stress of war was lapsing
characterized
into barbarism.
Pompey and Metellus had found their master.
The
legions were heartily sick of their ill-rewarded labors. Many people in Rome began to fear Sertorius as a second
Hannibal, though indeed there was no such danger.
It
was
and
Sertorius' peculiar abilities, so well suited to the people
mountains of Spain, which enabled him to do such brilliant work. Able as he was, the gigantic conception of a Hannibal was beyond him,
as
beyond
all others.
WAR AGAINST THE
was assassinated in 72
PIRATES.
31
for Finally, as a piece of good fortune
Pompey, Sertorius
B. c. Perpenna, his second in comno such opponent, and him Pompey and Metellus mand, was
Then regulating the next year. speedily put down within affairs of the two Spanish provinces, they returned to the
Rome, and together triumphed. This campaign said to have added to the laurels of Pompey the Great.
cannot be
In the war against the pirates, Pompey showed considerNot that the task was one to tax the resources able skill.
of a great soldier.
I
The Mediterranean
,
pirates were to the
CAUL A
The Mediteranean.
Roman
is
legions
and
fleets
much what a gang
But the
of desperadoes
to a well-organized police.
pirates
a scourge to
necessary.
In 67
Roman commerce, and their B. c. Pompey was given
had long been suppression became
absolute power in
the premises. the entire field
He
a business-like way. He divided into thirteen districts and placed a lieutenant
began
in
and a
equip
sufficient force in each,
with instructions to raise and
men and
galleys, search the coasts
and hunt down the
pirates.
Pompey
himself undertook the western Mediterra-
nean, and cleared the coast of Sardinia, Sicily and Africa, so
as to reestablish the grain traffic with
Rome.
Part of his
force did the like on
the shores of
Gaul and Spain.
In forty
days
Pompey had
cleared the western half of the Mediterra-
32
LUCULLUS IN THE EAST.
The
resistance
nean, and proceeded to Syria and Cilicia.
offered
was
slight.
There was no general organization.
But
Pompey was
shrewd.
He
chose to be indulgent to
many and
moderate to most, rather than to crucify every pirate caught, This conduct of itself helped as it had been the rule to do.
break up an already
lost cause.
;
The
Cilicians alone offered
any serious resistance and these the Roman superior force and well-equipped galleys completely overwhelmed. The
land resorts of the pirates were next broken up. brought many to terms. In three months from the
the entire
Pardon
first
blow
war was
finished.
Some
four hundred vessels,
including ninety war- galleys, were taken ; thirteen hundred in all were destroyed ; ten thousand pirates perished and twenty
thousand were captured.
cued.
Many Roman
prisoners were res-
The
pirates
had threatened Rome with
starvation.
Pom-
pey's victories brought abundance.
to go to sea ; the Mediterranean
.
Every one had feared was henceforth open to all. No wonder Pompey was heralded as the savior of Rome. Yet he had done only a good piece of work, scarcely a great
one.
The consul Lucullus had been ably conducting war in the East against the great Mithridates, who had overrun all Asia
Minor (74
to his relief
B. c.).
His colleague, Cotta, having been deloss.
feated in the Propontis (Sea of Marmora), Lucullus hastened
and forced the king back with heavy
Set-
ting matters to rights at sea, he followed
up his advantage with a sharp offensive, crossed the Halys, marched across Pontus, won a fierce battle at Cabira, and fairly drove the
own kingdom. Capturing many cities Lucullus advanced into Armenia Minor, while Mithby siege, ridates took refuge with Tigranes, king of Armenia. In
great king out of his order to forfeit no present advantages, Lucullus, unauthor-
EXCELLENT CAMPAIGNING.
ized
33
by the Senate, crossed the Euphrates
into Armenia,
and
defeated Tigranes in the great battle of Tigranocerta near the
Tigris.
The kings
joined forces, but Lucullus beat
them
again and marched on Artaxata, the capital
of Tigranes.
mutiny among his legions prevented his reaching his objective, and forced him to retire across the Tigris into Mesopotamia.
ridates returned to Pontus,
left there, at Zela.
While Lucullus was taking Nisibis by storm, Mithand defeated the Roman army
and recalled
retreat to
Though handicapped by fresh mutinies by the Senate, Lucullus still made a handsome
Asia Minor.
Asia Minor.
While Lucullus had ended
unsuccessfully, he
had
in eight
reyears of hard campaigning done much to weaken the In 66 B. c. sources of both Mithridates and Tigranes.
34
POMPEY'S AMBUSH.
to Galatia to supplant Lucullus, purposing to advance into Pontus, whither his Cilieian legions were to follow him. He had nearly fifty thousand men. Mithridates
Pompey went
opposed him with thirty thousand foot, mostly archers, and He no longer had his ancient ally three thousand horse. and son-in-law, Tigranes, to rely upon, and would have gladly
made peace; but he would not unconditionally surrender, as Pompey demanded that he should do. Mithridates led Pompey some distance into his territory, harassing him severely
with his superior horse.
Pompey properly
ceased to follow,
and marching to the upper Euphrates crossed and entered
Mithridates' eastern provinces.
The king followed Pompey
along the Euphrates
castle of Dasteira,
and
finally arrested his progress at the
from which secure position he scoured the
lowlands with his cavalry and light troops. Pompey was forced to retire to Armenia Minor until his Cilieian legions
came up.
his sick
Then he
invested Mithridates in his eyrie and
ravaged the land.
the hands of
circuit
After six weeks' blockade Mithridates put
falling into
his escape,
and wounded to death to save them from
Pompey, and made
marching by a
towards Armenia, Tigranes' territory. Pompey folbut again perceiving Mithridates' intention of luring lowed,
him away from Pontus, he resorted
to a clever stratagem.
In front of Mithridates, on the route he was pursuing south of the Lycus, near where Nicopolis was later built, was a
narrow
Pompey, in lieu of following in Mithridates' rear, by a secret forced march got beyond him and occupied the heights surrounding the valley. Mithridates, unaware
valley.
of this fact,
fall in
marched next day as
usual,
and camped at night-
the very spot which placed his
army
in the trap ably
him by Pompey. pey attacked. The army
laid for
In the middle of the night Pomof Mithridates
was wrapped
where
it
in sleep
and unable to
resist.
It
was cut
to pieces
stood.
HIS TRIUMPH.
Mithridates
fled.
35
Unable
to
go to Tigranes, he made his
Tigranes was at the
way
along the east and north shores of the Euxine (Black
Sea) to the Chersonesus (Crimea).
mercy
of
Pompey.
He
gave up
his recent conquests,
and
paid six thousand talents into the
Roman war
chest.
Pom-
pey had dictated peace. In one easy campaign Pompey had thus overcome the two of Pontus and Armenia. The terrigreat Oriental kings,
tory of
that his
Rome had been
name was
indefinitely extended.
No wonder
in every mouth.
Pompey
for a while pursued Mithridates, which brought
about a campaign against the tribes of the Caucasus. The king he could not overtake ; the Caucasians he forced into a
peace.
Mithridates, from his refuge in Panticapaeum in the
Crimea, harbored extravagant ideas of attacking
favor as Hannibal had enlisted the Gauls.
his death in
Rome from
this wild
the north by enlisting the Scythians and Danubian Celts in
his.
But
plan was ended by
against
63 B.
c.
He had waged war
provinces,
Rome
for twenty-six years.
Pompey
finished his
work by reducing the new
Pontus, Syria, Cilicia, to order, by subduing disorders in He then Syria, and settling affairs with the Parthians.
returned to
Rome
for the reward which
was
his
by
right.
Lucullus had made
much headway with
the conquest of
the East, for which his ability and enterprise were well suited.
Pompey with
caution,
his large forces, lack of initiative,
and extreme
had completed what Lucullus had begun. Had he launched out as boldly as his predecessor he would not have
accomplished so much.
for brilliant strokes.
He had on all hands opportunities He did nothing that was not safe. He
His course was the kept his superiority of force at all times. very best to reap what Lucullus had sown, but it would never
have conquered the East without such preparation as Lucullus
86
had made.
with those
LUCULLUS VERSUS POMPEY.
The campaigns of the latter compare favorably of Pompey, who was heralded as the representa-
was most splendid in Roman annals, while Lucullus was forgotten. We shall be better able to gauge Pompey 's real abilities when we try him in the same balance
tive of all that
with Caesar.
Ancient Helmet.
m.
CESAR'S YOUTH, EDUCATION AND EARLY
SERVICES.
CJESAR was born 100 B.
care given
C.
100-58 B. C.
Roman
family.
of an old
He owed much
to the
him by
his mother.
well bestowed.
He
His education was carefully conducted and was not strong as a lad, but gymnastics and a settled regi-
men improved
his physique,
which had a tendency to epilepsy.
He was
some-
what of a dandy, and a leader of the young society of Rome. He early the developed talent as an orator and held many minor offices. His party was out of power, and the young man was wise in keeping out of the Marian
whirlpool of politics.
those
ship.
Caesar
had
less to
do with military
affairs
than most of
who
rose to distinction in
Rome.
His work was
in the line of statesman-
He saw much
At
of the world
his oration against Dolabella.
He was
became
and at twenty-three made a reputation in well known as an able man, but not as
praetor
soldier.
thirty-nine he
and received Spain as province.
He was
debts.
had as yet done nothing but accumulate immense In Spain he showed energy and ability, reduced Lusitania, and so
of middle age and
its
managed
Pompey,
finances as to discharge all his debts.
When
Caesar
Caesar
and Crassus became triumvirs
In 58 B.
c.,
he returned to Rome, was made consul and
allotted Gaul.
at the age of forty-two, he entered
upon that part
of his career which has
made him
so great a part of the world's history.
CAIUS JULIUS C^SAR was born
ties
in 100 B. c. (some authori-
hold 102 B.
c.), of an old patrician family which had
come
from Alba under the reign of Tullus Hostilius, and which had His father had been praetor enjoyed many public trusts.
and had died when Caesar was about sixteen years old. His mother, Aurelia, was of good stock of plebeian origin, and was
Caesar was proud In pronouncing the funeral oration of his aunt Julia, who had married Marius, Suetonius tells us that he thus spoke of his descent: "My aunt Julia, on the mater-
woman
of exceptionally fine character.
of his forbears.
38
nal side,
is
CESAR'S APPEARANCE.
of the issue of kings
;
on the paternal side, she descends from the immortal gods for her mother was a Marcia, and the family Marcius Eex are the descendants of An;
from Venus
The Julia family, to which I belong, descends Thus our house unites to the sacred character of kings, who are the most powerful among men, the venerated holiness of the gods, who keep kings themselves
cus Marcius.
herself.
in subjection."
Aurelia devoted her
his natural
life to
her son's education, and by this
profit as
mental and moral nature enabled him to
few youths can. He grew to manhood with many of the best qualities of head and heart stamped upon him. As pedagogue he had a Gaul, M. Antonius Gnipho, who had received all
the benefits of an education in Alexandria.
His body grew strong, though originally delicate and having a .tendency to epilepsy, his carriage was erect, his manner open and
kindly,
sive,
if
and
his countenance singularly
engaging and expres-
not handsome.
He had
black, piercing eyes, pale
face,
straight aquiline nose, small .handsome mouth, with
finely curled lips
which bore a look of kindliness
large
brow
his face
showing great intellectual activity and power. In his youth was well-rounded. He was moderate in his diet and
temperate ; his health, harmed by neither excess of labor or
of pleasure,
was uniformly good, though at Corduba and later at Thapsus he had serious nervous attacks. He exposed himself to all weathers, was an excellent gymnast, and noted as
a rider.
"From
his first
youth he was
much used
to horse-
back, and had even acquired the facility of riding with dropped " reins and his hands joined behind his back (Plutarch). By judicious exercise he gradually became able to endure great
fatigue.
His dress was
careful,
and
his person neat
and
taste-
ful to the extreme.
Like the youth of every age he was over
Suetonius speaks of his key-
fond of outward adornment.
HIS ACQUIREMENTS.
39
Sulla once repattern ornamented toga and loose girdle. marked that it would be well to look out for yonder dandy
and dandies in every age have notably made among the best This habit of personal nicety of soldiers and men. not to
"And when," says clung to him through life. Cicero, I look at his hair, so artistically arranged, and when I see him scratch his head with one finger," lest perchance
say vanity "
he should disarrange
it,
"I cannot
believe that such a
man
could conceive so black a design as to overthrow the Roman " Republic (Plutarch). Caesar was fond of art as of books. He spoke Greek and Latin with equal ease and fluency, as was common to the cul-
tured classes.
He
wrote several works which earned him a
reputation for clear
and
forcible style, but he
was not equally
happy as a poet. "For Caesar and Brutus have also made verses, and have placed them in the public libraries. They
are poets as feeble as Cicero, but happier in that fewer people
know of them," says Tacitus. His life up to manhood was that of a city youth of good family and breeding, perhaps according to our notions lax, but within the bounds set by the
age in which he lived ; in later years he was a thorough man of the world. He was fond of female society, and cultivated
it
throughout his
life.
He
possessed a
marked
taste for pic-
tures, jewels, statues; and, as we are told by Dio Cassius, habitually wore a ring with a very beautiful seal of an armed
Venus.
He
joined excellent physical endurance to very ex-
ceptional mental
and nervous strength.
"He was
liberal to
prodigality, and of a courage above human nature and even Plutarch calls him imagination," says Velleius Paterculus.
the second orator in Rome.
Pliny speaks of his extraordicredit for great calmness Seneca gives nary memory. in anger, and Plutarch says he was affable, courteous and
him
gracious to a degree which
won him
the affection of the
40
people.
EARLY
OFFICES.
"In voice, gesture, a grand and noble personality, he had a certain brilliancy in speaking, without a trace of
artifice," testifies Cicero.
To
all
the external advantages which
distinguished him from
other citizens, Caesar joined an
One could impetuous and powerful soul, says Velleius. add a single qualification to his equipment for the scarcely
profession of arms.
Such was Caius Julius Caesar
in the
estimation of his contemporaries.
fourteen years of age, Marius procured for him the At sixteen he was beappointment of priest of Jupiter.
At
trothed to Cossutia, the daughter of a wealthy knight, but
broke the engagement a year later. At eighteen he marHe is said to have been ried Cornelia, daughter of Cinna.
already well
known
for his personal
and
intellectual char-
acteristics; but this was doubtless as the promising young scion of a well-known family, rather than from any services
actually accomplished.
When
Sulla rode into power on the wreck of the Marian
party, he would have liked to bring over this brilliant young man to his cause, but he found Caesar immovable. He or-
dered him to put away Cornelia, whose father had belonged to the Marian faction, but this Caesar bluntly refused, though
he forfeited his priesthood and his wife's fortune, was declared incapable of inheriting in his own family, and ran danger of
his life.
This was at a time when such
men
as Piso
and
Pompey
divorced their wives to suit the politics of the day,
to Caesar's credit.
and scores a high mark
influence of friends,
Finally, after a
period of concealment in the Sabine country, through the
Caesar was forgiven by Sulla.
But
Sulla prophesied truly, says Suetonius, that there was more
than one Marius lurking in the personality of Caesar.
Caesar deemed
it
wise, under the circumstances, to keep
away from Rome.
He
could not remain without being thrust
ABSENCE FROM ROME.
actively into the political turmoil,
41
which he could see was but
an interlude.
Such
discretion he manifested all through his
political career.'
He
was guest of King
spent some time in Bithynia, where he Nicomedes. Here, under the praetor M.
Thermus, he served as contubernalis (aide de camp) against
Mithridates, and was (81 B. c.) actively employed both in
war
and diplomacy. At the siege of Mitylene he received a civic crown for saving the life of a Roman soldier. His reputation
for morality of
demeanor was rudely compromised by his conduct at the court of Nicomedes; but such facts do not concern the soldier. The morals of each age and clime must
Czesar in no wise differed from his stand by themselves. He then served at sea under Servilius in the camcompeers.
42
AS
AN
ORATOR.
paign of 78 B. c., against the Cilician pirates. death he returned to Rome.
On
Sulla's
was marked by great moral courage and independence coupled with common sense and a liberal policy; and in some civil proceedings his powers of oratory,
Here
his conduct
which he studied with great care, raised him high in the estimation of the people. It was an usual means of introducing
one's self to the public to pose as advocate in some great political prosecution.
Such was
Caesar's part in the prosecution
of Dolabella.
He was
"which we still moment made him famous.
twenty -one years old, and his oration, read with admiration," says Tacitus, in a
He
later
attacked Antonius
Hybrida, and was engaged in other celebrated causes. attacks were really aimed at Sulla's party, though power, rather than at individuals.
ical struggles of
These
still
in
Preferring not to join for the present in the profitless politRome, Caesar set sail for Rhodes, which at
that time was a
marked centre of
learning, intending to devote
thither he
some time
pirates of
to study.
On
the
way
was captured by
rades.
The
Pharmacusa (Fermaco), a small island of the Spopirates demanded twenty talents ransom, but
fifty,
Caesar contemptuously volunteered to pay them
of originality which insured
a piece
him good treatment.
While
waiting some forty days for the receipt of the ransom-money, Caesar gained such influence with these men, that he was
treated rather as a king than as a prisoner.
their suspicions
wit.
He disarmed
all
He
is
and entertained them by his eloquence and which they treated as said to have told them
jest
that he would return, capture
and crucify them
all.
He
was as good as his word. Collecting vessels and men so soon as he was released, he fell unawares upon the pirates,
recovered his money, took much booty, and punished them as he had threatened to do. Suetonius states that from motives
A TRUE MARIAN.
of pity he
43
their
had them
all
strangled
first
and only nailed
corpses to the cross.
After a short stay in Rhodes, where he studied under Apollonius Molo, the most celebrated of the masters of eloquence, he undertook on his own authority and cost a campaign against Mithridates in Cyzicus, in which he was measur-
ably successful.
He now
learned from
Rome
that he
had
been nominated pontifex, in place of his uncle, L. Aurelius
Cotta.
He
returned,
and shortly
after
was
also elected mili-
tary tribune.
He
declined service in armies under the com-
mand
of the Sullan generals, at the time of the
against Sertorius in Spain.
He
campaigns would gladly have gone to
field, 'but
the front to learn his duties in the
to take
did not care
party.
Still
a part against one who represented the old Marian He as usual cleverly avoided useless complications.
he was ambitious of power, and set to work to form a party for himself in the state; and by employing fortune,
he succeeded in doing this. he accompanied the proconsul Antisquaestor, tius Vetus to Spain. Returned to Rome, he was in 68 B. c.
friends, energy
ability,
and
Being made
made
curator of the
Appian
Way
and
aedile curulis,
and
largely increased his popularity by the splendor of the public
games he gave. His next office was that
of judex quaestionis, or judge of
the criminal court, in 64 B. c.,
and
in the succeeding year
still
he was made pontifex maximus.
After
another year he
became praetor. During all this time he had been earning the hate of the aristocrats and the favor of the people. He was
assigned the charge of the province of Hispania Ulterior, in 61 B. c., but could not leave Rome till some one had become
bondsman
and
for his debts, amounting,
or,
it
is said,
to over four
thousand talents,
according to Plutarch, to eight hundred
five million dollars, as the
thirty talents,
from one to
44
sura.
teristic
CJZSAR IN SPAIN.
Caesar's recklessness in
money matters was a
charac-
which pursued him through life. Crassus was prevailed on to be his security.
He
relied for
repayment on Caesar's future successes. He was not deceived. Political preferment in Rome was coupled with opportunities
of
making money
indefinitely great.
The
control of a prov-
ince opened endless avenues of gain.
was more careful
to observe the
And though no one forms of law, though no one
was
in
It
was more law-abiding
habit of his day.
in the technical sense, Caesar
larger matters as unscrupulous as Napoleon.
was the
Caesar's province as praetor
..-^r-
Farther Spain, or Boetica,
possibly included
so soon as his
Rome
He left some adjoining territories. matters were arranged, without money
waiting for the instructions of the Senate, whose action was The lowlanders of his delayed by some political trials.
province had been long subject to forays by the mountaineers of Lusitania, a section of country only half subject to the
Roman
power,
if
at
all.
Caesar found two legions, or twenty
These he at once increased by a third legion, or ten additional cohorts, giving him some ten thousand men. The tribes of Mons Herminium (Sierra di
colors.
cohorts, under the
Estrella) in Jjusitania (Portugal) were constantly troubling
the province. the
Unable
to control
them by the command
of
whose authority the hardy uplanders laughed promptly undertook a campaign against them, and by vigorous measures reduced them to
people,
to scorn, Caesar
Roman
submission.
Much
of the detail of this
campaign
is
not
known.
The other
tribes of the mountains, lest they should
suffer a like harsh fate, migrated
beyond the Douro.
This
enabled Caesar to possess himself of the strong places of
the country in the valley of the Munda (Mondego), basing on which, he set out to pursue the fugitives, whom he soon
CAPE CARVOEIRO.
reached.
45
The barbarians turned upon him, and to unsettle his cohorts by making the legionaries eager for booty, they drove their herds before them. But Caesar's men always felt
the influence of the strong hand, and these cohorts, though
new
to him,
its
had already learned
to obey.
An army
is
the
mirror of
captain, reflecting his force
and character as well
as his intelligence.
So now.
Not a
soldier left the ranks,
and the Lusitanians were quickly routed. In this campaign Caesar scoured the country on both banks of the Durius.
Meanwhile the Mt. Herminianites had again revolted, hoping that Caesar would be defeated by the migrating tribes,
and that they could
close the road against his retreat
and have
him at
their mercy.
Caesar had advanced towards the Durius
Cape Carvoeiro.
on the eastern slope of one of the minor ranges.
that the barbarians
Finding way, and not earing to encounter a guerilla warfare when he could operate to better advantage, he sought an outlet on the slope which descends
had closed
this
towards the sea
but
this, too, the
barbarians closed by occu-
pying the country from the foothills of the mountains to the
46
shore.
CAPE CARVOEIRO.
Caesar had to fight his
way through; but
this his
legions found no difficulty in doing on the easier terrain near
the sea.
In attacking the enemy, Caesar operated by his
left
and managed to cut them off from the interior so as to drive them towards the sea, where he could more readily handle
them.
They took refuge on an
island,
which some
critics
have identified with the headland of Carvoeiro, now joined to The the mainland, some forty-five miles north of Lisbon.
could be crossed in places at low tide on foot, but with Having cooped up his enemy, Caesar proposed to difficulty.
strait
It was impracticable to cross the strait under destroy him. Caesar built some rafts, and put the fire of the barbarians.
Part of the rest, over eager, over a portion of his troops. to ford the strait, but, sharply attacked by the attempted
barbarians, they were driven back into the rising tide and The first attack thus failed, the small part for engulfed.
which the rafts sufficed being unable to effect a landing. But Caesar never gave up what was possible of accomplishment.
Camping
opposite the island, where he could hold the
Lusitanians, he dispatched messengers to Gades for ships. On the arrival of these, he was able to put a suitable force
over to the island, which done, he had no difficulty in sub-
duing the enemy's force.
This matter ended, he sailed to
terrified
Brigantium (Corunna), whose inhabitants,
contest.
at
the
novel sight of such mighty vessels, voluntarily gave up the
This campaign resulted in the submission of all Lusitania, and added much territory to the Roman holding in Spain.
Caesar was saluted Imperator by his soldiers and allowed a triumph by the Senate, which also decreed a holiday in honor
given us by the historians beyond the bare outline of the campaign, that we can say of it only
little is
of his success.
So
that
it
was
Caesar's first lesson in war.
When
he attacked
CAESAR ACCUMULATES WEALTH.
the Gallic question, he showed that he
47
but not with the management of
its
was familiar with war, Gaul greater problems.
grand operations of war. It is to be regretted that we do not know how he had learned what un-
was
his school in the
questionably he
in Gaul.
knew
of the art previous to his first
campaign
He had
manifestly covered an immense territory,
but we
know naught of his method. With the civil administration of his province after this war we have no concern. Caesar accumulated great wealth; as
Suetonius says, by the begging of subsidies; as Napoleon III. phrases it, "by contributions of war, a good administration,
and even by the gratitude of those whom he governed." The fact remains, but Caesar did no more than every governor of a
Roman province felt it his right to do. Caesar unquestionably cared for money, but not from miHannibal was accused of avarice ; but every serly motives.
coin he accumulated went to fan the flame of
war against
his
country's oppressors.
to
Caesar used his gold to create an army,
win
to himself the love of his legions.
Such an amount of
booty was taken in Spain as not only to reward his soldiers with exceptional liberality, but to pay off his own debts.
His ambition was
satisfied in every
is
That Caesar was ambitious
way. no reproach.
No man
lack-
ing ambition ever rose out of mediocrity, ever accomplished anything in the world's economy. At a small village in
crossing the Alps, Caesar
is
said to have exclaimed:
"I would
rather be
first
here than second in
It is the
it
Rome
"
!
man
is
ambitious.
purpose of his ambition
Every great and the
being a
means he takes
virtue or a vice.
to satisfy
which are the
test of its
Hannibal's.
leon.
It
was more personal than was akin to that of Alexander and NapoCaesar's ambition
In the temple of Hercules at Gades, standing before the statue of Alexander, ICsesar exclaimed that he had yet
48
A SECRET COMPACT.
done nothing, when long before his age Alexander had conquered the world. Such was not the ambition of Hannibal
/for Gustavus.
For his victories in Spain, Caesar was entitled to a triumph, but he denied himself this glory in order to run for the consulship.
The Roman Senate had demonstrated
its
inability to con-
Csesar's Provinces.
trol the rival factions
the state.
which were shaking the foundations of Finally a breach between the Senate and Pompey,
who was
erans.
secret
the strongest
man
in
Rome, was brought about by
its refusal to
As
grant an allotment of lands for his Eastern veta result, Pompey, Caesar and Crassus formed a
compact to act together to divide the power and offices of Rome. They and their friends, with the easy methods of
the day, could readily control both the Senate and the people.
CJESAR RECEIVES GAUL.
49
Caesar was unanimously elected consul, and with him was The latter was to all purposes, chosen Calpurnius Bibulus. and easily, shelved as a nonentity. Caesar's first year was
passed in law-making.
years control of Illyria
He was
able,
by Pompey's
aid, to
procure the passage of a law by which he
received for five
legions.
and Cisalpine Gaul, with four
This was his
first
great step upward.
The governorship
would enable him
voted to his
ness.
to
win renown and to create an army demeasures he caused Ariovistus, king
own
person, a stepping-stone to almost any great-
Among
his other
of the Suevi, one of his later great antagonists, to be declared
a friend and ally of Rome. Before leaving for Gaul he married his daughter Julia to his Pompey, as a bond during his absence, and himself
married Calwife Cornelia having died some years before of Piso, the ex-consul. Cicero and Cato, purnia, daughter
Caesar's rich
and powerful opponents,
it
was agreed should
be exiled.
The foundation was
well laid for permanence.
years of persistent effort
by and by means of every kind, not always such as were most to his credit. But now began a new life. He was forty-two years old, and politics ceded to
arms.
Caesar had reached the goal of his political ambition
We
role,
shall hereafter
view him in a new and far more
worthy
a role which has made one of the great chap-
ters in the history of the art of war.
Gallic Battle-Axe.
IV.
OffiSAE'S
NEW
PROVINCE.
60-58 B. C.
THE HELVETII.
THE Gauls had always been the most dreaded foes of Rome. Whoever put an end to the danger would be the national hero. This fact Caesar recognized. The Gauls were a fine, hearty people. They had many fortified towns, but the
population lived mostly in open villages.
opment,
much
pastoral
fickle in
and brave, but
'liable,
There was good agricultural develand some mining industry. The men were warlike temper. Their cavalry was excellent the foot unre;
though gallant. The common people were downtrodden by the knights and Druids the powerful princes, and cantons had the weaker population and
;
tribes as clients, exacting service
and affording protection.
Just before Caesar's
arrival the Helvetii
lowlands.
had prepared a descent from their Alpine home to the Caesar saw that this migration would complicate his problem, and
across the
refused
them the passage they requested
bank
of the Rhone.
Roman
of
Province, fortifytheir
ing the Rhone below Geneva against them.
the north
The
Helvetii
made
way down
The
Gallic tribes,
some
whom
were under
Roman protection, appealed to Caesar for help. The Helvetii were three hundred and sixty-eight thousand strong, and had begun to ravage the Gallic lands
as they
marched towards the Saone.
MANY
Rome
months before Caesar
left for
Gaul, reports reached
that the Gallic allies on the
Arar (Saone) had been
defeated by the Germans, and that the Helvetii were in arms. The news created great consternation. All feared a fresh
invasion of barbarians such as had been barely averted
by
Marius.
A general levy was
ordered.
Caesar had asked as
Illyria.
his province only for Cisalpine
Gaul and
Under
the pressure of danger the Senate added Transalpine Gaul to
his charge.
The Gauls had a memorable record
the greater part of their warlike feats
in
Roman
annals, but
lie buried in obscurity.
TURMOILS OF GAUL.
51
We
know
that late in the seventh century B. c., an expedi-
tion of Celtic Gauls
Illyria,
moved through southern Germany
to
ley of the Po.
while another crossed the Alps and seized on the valIt was the descendants of these latter Gauls
who burned Rome. In the fourth century, other tribes moved down the Danube to Thrace and ravaged northern Greece. Some of them pursued their way to Byzantium and passed
into Asia,
where they overran and held a large territory Rome was constantly fighting the Gallo-Grecia or Galatia.
Gauls during the third and fourth centuries, but her knowledge of them was confined to such as lived south of the Alps
or in Mediterranean Gaul.
She had
spilled
much blood and
to terms,
spent
much
treasure to bring the
Padane Gauls
but
these tribes were no sooner subdued than they again rose
when Hannibal
crossed the Alps.
They were not
finally re-
duced for a generation after the Second Punic war. The foothold of the Romans in Gaul had been acquired in
the usual way, by taking the old Greek colony of Massilia under its protection and subduing the neighboring tribes for
about the middle of the second century B. c. Next Aquas Sextias was settled as an outpost to Massilia. Between the Rhone and the mountains lay the Vocontii as far
its benefit,
as the Isere ;
from
this river to the
;
Rhone
lay the Allobroges
with Vienna as their capital from the Rhone to the Saone and Jura mountains the Sequani, with Vesontio; between the
Saone and Loire the ^Edui, with Bibracte on both sides of The .ZEdui and Arverni had long the Allier the Arverni.
;
disputed for the hegemony of Gaul ; the Allobroges favored Rome stepped in and helped the JEdui. In the latter.
121
B. c.
Domitius Ahenobarbus and Fabius Maximus put
Thus was founded the Allobroges in two great battles. To it was later added Narbo. the Roman Province in Gaul.
down
The
irruption of the Teutones
and Cimbri about the date of
52
THE PROVINCE.
The barbarians
victory of
successively beat five
the birth of Caesar threatened to destroy the structure so
carefully reared.
Ro-
man
armies.
But the
Marius at Aquas Sextiae
influence.
forestalled the danger
and reestablished the Roman
The boundaries
of the Province
had been established from
Tolosa and Narbo, south and east of the Cebenna mountains, up to Vienna, thence along the Rhone to the Alps, and thence
southerly to the ocean.
in charge.
They were such when Caesar took
it
There was constant friction among the Gallic tribes in and adjoining the Province, and many of their representatives
visited
Rome.
Among
these were Ariovistus the
German
and Divitiacus the Gaul.
well-informed, Caesar learned
From these men, both able and much about the conditions gov-
It erning the land as well as its geography and topography. in the remote regions, by no means terra incogwas, except He found a good nita which Caesar was to take in charge.
base for his operations in the Province when Gaul was assigned to him as his share of the triumvirate spoils.
Gaul was
within
its
in a turbulent state.
War
had never ceased
borders.
There were ceaseless insurrections; and
passing through southern Gaul to Spain was sure to have to fight its way. Despite the constant turmoil,
Its endless
Roman army
the Province was, however, a favorite resort.
wealth of trade with the interior, already begun by the early
Greek
settlers,
was
attractive,
still
and
its
climate was
agreeable.
The land
bore traces of Hellenism, but
balmy and it had
gained the practical Roman imprint. Much money was made in trade. Still a residence in the Province had its drawbacks,
and was always subject to danger. "Until the time of Caesar," says Cicero, "our generals were satisfied with repelling the Gauls, thinking more of
putting a period to their aggressions than of carrying war
TRANSALPINE GAUL.
among them.
53
Marius himself did not penetrate to their
towns and homes, but confined himself to opposing a barrier to these torrents of peoples which were overflowing
Italy.
. . .
Caesar alone determined to subject
Gaul
to our
The Romans looked to conquer other peoples, To resist a but only to protect themselves from the Gauls. Gallic invasion there was always a levy en masse, and there was a special treasure in the Capitol to furnish means for
dominion."
only this occasion. This never-ending terror of the Gauls
equaled only by
explains
that of Hannibal, which lasted but eighteen years
why
ors
the
Roman
people, after the conquest of these enemies,
felt so
beholden to Caesar.
The meed due
Other
all
other conquer-
was small compared
;
to his.
victories
had meant
It
aggrandizement a knowledge of all
Cisalpine Gaul
that over the Gauls
meant
safety.
was
this, of the reputation and power he could thus win, which inspired Caesar in his task.
Hannibal.
we already know from the campaigns of Transalpine Gaul was bounded by the Rhine,
the Alps, the Mediterranean, the Pyrenees and the ocean.
Low Countries, the Rhenish provThis huge country had an irregular mountain-backbone running through its centre from north to
It comprised France, the
inces
and Switzerland.
south,
into the
a watershed on the east of which the streams flowed
Rhone and
the Rhine, and on the west into the
Garonne, the Loire and the Seine, or into their affluents.
All these rivers flowed in basins well-defined, and furnished
excellent
means
of
communication throughout the country.
glance at the course of the rivers shows
how
excellent the
lines of
tral
advance or retreat of an army might be. The cenmountain chain was readily crossed in many places. In climate there were the same distinctions in Gaul as
to-day.
The Province was mild;
the north,
still
covered by
54
TRIBES OF GAUL.
The forest of Ardudense forests, was colder than to-day. enna (Ardennes) extended over an area of two hundred miles
wide, from the Rhine to the Scheldt and the frontier of the
Remi.
The country had a wooded
is
character,
and deep
forests
covered territory which to-day
is difficult to
under close cultivation.
It
gauge the population ; but to take a reasonable
percentage of arms-bearing men, the troops raised on various occasions would argue something over seven million souls.
Gaul was divided
into
numerous
tribes,
which Tacitus
states
as sixty-four, but which others place at three or four hundred,
This latter number
the
may be
accurate,
if it
be held to comprise
relying upon some
to send its con-
many
client-tribes,
or small tribes
powerful neighbor for
tingent to
its
protection, and bound
patron's wars.
country.
This sort of feudalism existed
throughout the
cantons.
Powerful individuals
had large
of
client-
forces of clients; powerful cantons
had numbers
In central Gaul the Arverni and the JEdui strove
for the hegemony.
very loose national
conquest.
Such competition for control created a tie, and made Gaul all the more ripe for
To
the north of the Sequana (Seine) and
Matrona (Marne)
to
and west of the Rhine lived the Belgians,
whom
Caesar
accords the palm as the bravest of the barbarians.
They remembered with pride that they had defended their borders Being farthest removed against the Cimbri and Teutones.
from the Province, and least accessible to merchants, these people had nothing to render them effeminate while a con;
war with the Germans across the Rhine, though they claimed kindred with them, tended to make them bold and
stant
hardy.
In the southwest of Gaul, back of the Garumna
Between these and the Bel(Garonne) lived the Aquitani. the land was occupied by various tribes of Celts 01 gians, Gauls. The Province was in every sense a part of Gaul. Its
THE BELGJE.
55
peoples had the same origin; they had merely felt the influence of the Greek colony at Massilia, as they now did that
of
Kome.
The
Belgae comprised several notable tribes.
The
OC.'
GauL
who abutted on the thousand men into line. The
Bellovaci,
could put one hundred Nervii placed Caesar in the
sea,
most desperate strait he ever faced. The Treviri and the Remi were bold and hardy. Central Gaul, or Celtica,
counted the Arverni, the uEdui, the Sequani and the Hel-
56
THE PEOPLE.
mountain homes
proudly aloof former warred much for the three
Aquitania, in the era of Caesar,
vetii as principal nations.
The
latter stood
in their
the supremacy of Gaul.
had
less importance to the
Romans.
into clans.
These large cantons were divided into tribes, and further Caesar menThey had many towns or oppida which were mostly well placed and
of the people lived in
forti-
tions twenty-one
fied.
The bulk
open
villages.
Roads
practicable for wheels existed in
every section, and there
were bridges over many rivers. Navigation on the rivers and sailing vessels at sea were common.
The Gauls were
They dyed
tall in stature,
and
of light complexion.
their hair ; the
commoners wore beards, the nobles
only a moustache. They were dressed in trowsers and a sleeved shirt, with a mantle among the rich, a skin among
the poor.
Gold was
plentiful
among them, and bred
the
habit of wearing collars, earrings, bracelets and rings.
They
were fairly expert in agriculture, though some tribes preferred pastoral pursuits, and manufactured linen cloths and felts.
Much
grain,
and
cattle
and
horses,
were raised.
Their
houses were built of wood and wicker-work.
mined and worked.
it
Some
tribes
wrought
in iron
Copper was and plated
with tin and
silver.
They ate
beef, pork,
and other domeswas highly conslave.
tic
meats, drank milk and brewed ale and mead, in which
Italian wine
they frequently over-indulged.
sidered; ajar of
it
was deemed at times worth a
They
were pleasant and kindly, but vain and quick-tempered, fickle and restless. Brave in battle, they wilted under defeat.
They spoke in precise hyperbole and wrote with Greek letters. The women were strong and beautiful, and often as brave and hardy as the men. The husband had the right of
life
or death over his wife or child.
legally be put to the torture ; a free
A free man might not woman was not exempt.
THEIR HABITS.
57
In Caesar's day, as in Hannibal's, the Gauls wielded the long
Some tribes preferred long pikes two-edged cutting sword. with wavy blades; all cast darts, and bore both bows and
slings.
Their metal helmets were ornamented with the horns
of animals or with a bird or beast,
and were surmounted with
a high tuft of feathers. They carried big shields and wore a breast-plate or coat of mail, which they manufactured themselves. The Gallic cavalry was superior to the foot, as it
contained the nobles.
This arm was their delight.
They
took pride in their horses and sought noble breeds. Tilting was a frequent sport, and at banquets duels to the death were not unknown.
well what they saw of value among Their armies were followed by a long array of wagons, and at night they fortified their camps with a circle of them. They challenged to single combat any champion of
others.
The Gauls imitated
the
enemy before
battle, killed their prisoners,
and preserved
their heads as trophies.
which the on the
last arrival forfeited his life.
Levies en masse were common, at This put every man
They transmitted news with great rapidity by and relays of men, and by peculiar shouts from place signals to place. The Gauls were superstitious, and part of their
alert.
religious observances consisted of
human
sacrifices.
The
originated in Britain, kept them well under Their gods approximated to those of all antiquity, there being deities with the attributes of Jupiter, Mars,
Druids,
control.
who
Apollo and Neptune. The two classes of distinction were the knights and the The commonalty was ground between these as beDruids.
tween the upper and nether millstone. Each knight or noble had a following of clients, who were devoted to him to the
death.
The government
of each nation lay in a king or an
assembly.
58
THE HELVE TIL
Among
the Gallic cantons, some one or other was always in the ascendant, and exercised for a time the control of all the land.
At
the period of Csesar's receiving
Gaul
as a
province, the Sequani had the upper hand, and had severely oppressed the .ZEdui, ancient allies of the Romans.
modern Switzerland, were then, as history has always shown them to be, a stout-hearted, big-fisted, selfHelvetii, in
reliant people.
The
They waged a never-ceasing warfare with
the Germans, whose tribes constantly invaded their borders
or were invaded by them. Orgetorix was a bold, ambitious and wealthy chief of the Helvetii. He had persuaded his
people, three years before the beginning of Caesar's governorship, that their valor
fertile plains of
would easily conquer for them the more Gaul, and thus enable them to extend their
hills,
empire beyond the narrow limits of their unproductive
all too
confined for their numbers, their pride, and their re-
pute in war.
Wrought up by
the promises of gain and fame
which Orgetorix thus held out to them, the Helvetii proceeded to gather together as many beasts of burden and wagons as
possible, proposing to
move with
all their possessions
and an
abundance of corn, to serve for sowing as well as victual. Orgetorix was appointed to make arrangements with neighboring potentates for passage
over their territories.
But
Orgetorix proved faithless to the trust reposed in him, and
instead of serving his fellow-citizens, laid plans for obtain-
ing sovereignty over the Helvetii for himself and his descendants. Being brought to trial, his adherents rose in arms,
but Orgetorix died,
it
was supposed by suicide,
excited
and
this
put an end to the matter.
The Helvetian mind, however,
plan of emigration.
by the allurements
of the fertile plains towards the great sea,
made
all
still clung to the In the third year, 60-59 B. C., having their preparations, and each one carrying three
THE PAS DE L'ECLUSE.
hundred
59
months' supply of meal, they fired their twelve towns, four villages and numberless farms, burned all the corn
which they were unable to carry with them, and in order to leave no inclination to return, destroyed every vestige of their
homes and
habitations.
Several neighboring tribes
the
Rauraci, the Tulingi, the Latobriges, and some of the Boii cast in their fortunes with the Helvetii.
The
Helvetii
had
to choose between
two
routes.
They
could find an exit from their valleys into Gaul through the land of the Sequani, across the pass between the Rhone and
the Jura mountains,
now
the Pas de 1'Ecluse, just below
.
,
/v*
c,
.Jr^J JA
>
jf Jf j *
/#// ^ ^
v;
<>
f* e^r
/J7/r / ^
f
1-"
sttA
i
f
**
j ^>~?tH^
V.T**
Routes of the Helvetii.
This was a rugged road, difficult to march over, which scarcely one wagon at a time could be led," and "by which could be easily held and their progress intercepted by
Geneva.
a mere handful of enemies
skillfully disposed.
Or
they could
Rhone and pass through the land of the Allobroges, where the river the boundary between themselves and this people was then, it is said, though
cross to the south side of the
60
it is
CAESAR'S MOTIVES.
not now, fordable in
its
many
places.
what altered
built only
width and course.
left
The river has someGenava (Geneva), then
was the town of
on the
bank
of the Rhone,
the Allobroges nearest to the Helvetii, and here was also a This latter route was easy. The Helvetii felt conbridge.
fident of their ability to persuade or
compel the Allobroges to allow them to pass, for this people had been recently conquered by the Romans and were bitter accordingly. They
made a rendezvous upon
the banks of the
Rhone
for their
souls,
whole people, three hundred and sixty-eight thousand for the spring equinox of 58 B. c.
All these facts must have come to the ears of Caesar long before the time of which we are to write, for the Helvetii had
been openly preparing their expedition for two years, and one of Caesar's strong points was his ability to gather news.
Caesar had not got ready to leave
plications
and the advocacy of he was carefully watching events. War was what he anticiIn the division of spoils by the triumvirate, Caesar pated. had advisedly chosen Gaul for his consular province. His
purpose was to subdue the country, not only to save
Rome, where political comnew laws retained him. But
Rome
from future incursions, but, equally important to him personally, to create for himself an army, in those troublous times
his
an essential for the great, the possession of which was to be key to abiding success. Caesar's motives must not be im;
pugned neither must they be overrated. He was neither a Gustavus nor a Washington. He worked for Rome; but Rome was Caesar. L* empire, c'est moi! was his motive if
not his motto.
In March, 58
B. c., the
time was rife; events would no
longer wait his leisure.
Caesar hastened from
Rome
to
Ge-
neva, which journey he accomplished, says Plutarch, in eight There was at the time in Transalpine Gaul but a days.
fel
62
CAESAR A TALLEYRAND.
This he at once headed for Ge-
single legion, the Tenth.
neva, and ordering the Province to raise and equip with utmost speed as many more men as could be done, he took the only
the advance of the barpossible step momentarily to arrest barians by causing the bridge at that city to be broken down.
So soon as the Helvetii heard of Caesar's arrival, they sent an embassy to him composed of their most illustrious men,
requesting the privilege of crossing the Province peacefully, there being no other available route, and promising good
behavior on the march.
when
slain
consul with Marius in 107 B.
But remembering that L. Cassius, c. had been defeated and
,
and
his
army passed under the yoke by the Helvetii, and
pacific intention, Caesar decided
far
from believing in their
to decline the request.
impossible for a
body
of nearly four
Moreover, he recognized that it was hundred thousand souls
it
to pass through the Province without devastating
like a
plague of grasshoppers.
And
once in Gaul, the Helvetii
would but add one more
tribe to conquer, while their terrifilled
tory would almost certainly be speedily
by the GerStillj
mans whom
the Helvetii
now
held in check.
desiring
to gain time to raise troops
and complete
his preparations,
Caesar listened courteously to the ambassadors and declared
his willingness to consider the matter ; inviting
them
to return
two weeks
later,
on the ides of April, when he would have
It is evident that the Helvetii
his answer ready to give them.
believed that Caesar was sincere.
He
had conveyed
to
them
pro-
the impression that he would grant their request.
The
ceeding
is
a fair sample of Caesar's political management. he built
He was
a very Talleyrand in statecraft. Meanwhile, with wonderful expedition and
skill,
intrenchments at intervals along the left bank of the Rhone from the lake of Geneva to the Jura range at the Pas de
1'Ecluse.
This has been supposed to be continuous
fortifica-
CAESAR'S WALL.
tion
;
63
;
but
it
can scarcely have been such
many
critics,
how-
ever, think that the several redoubts
may have been joined by
continuous defense was unnecesa simple line of works. The Caesar had not men enough to man such a line. sary. Rhone itself is an enormous ditch with scarp and counterscarp,
Caesar had the which takes the place of intrenchments. and perhaps an equal Tenth legion, say five thousand men, number of new levies, and could have well built in the period
mentioned a wall sixteen feet high and eighteen miles long, Colonel Stoffel estimates as given in the Commentaries.
have been actually done could be performed by three thousand men in three days. Dion Cassius says that Caesar fortified the most important points, and
that the
work assumed
to
much
of the course of the
is
Rhone here
art.
is
so well fortified
by
to
nature that there
no need of
Caesar had too
much
do to undertake what was not necessary. The assumption that mums fossaque was a continuous line is untenable.
Only opposite the modern
Avully, Chaney, Cologny, were
villages
of
Aire,
Cartigny,
fortifications needed, because
at these places the slope of the left
bank was gradual.
feet
It
was here that Caesar cut the trenches sixteen
deep.
With
plete
the natural scarp of the river
bank
the line was comto
and continuous.
The words cannot be held
mean a
built wall for the entire distance,
tells
the
story.
and the topography clearly The whole line was fortified with well-
manned redoubts
at suitable intervals, as at all possible fords or crossing places, and the fortifications were held with a
strong garrison.
at the five
Caesar unquestionably distributed his forces
points.
named
From
there they could easily con;
centrate on any threatened point in a few hours
and we may
presume that he posted observation parties at the several
places where the Helvetii could best be seen.
It is strange that the Helvetii,
who must have
clearly per-
64
/
THE HELVETII MOVE.
ceived what Caesar was intending to do by thus fortifying the valley against them, should have kept quiet two weeks while
waiting for his answer, instead of either attacking his halffinished works, or of moving by the other route. Probably
the glib tongue of Caesar had been employed to such good
purpose in his intercourse with them that they gave credit to the words which his acts belied.
When
the ambassadors returned on the ides of April to
receive their answer, Caesar, being
now
well prepared, bluntly
informed them that the
to
Roman
customs would not allow him
intimated at the same time
if
comply with their wishes.
He
see,
that he should be compelled to use force
to pass,
they attempted
and as they could
was
justified in considering
himself master of the situation.
Some
slight efforts
were
made by
the disgusted Helvetii to try the strength of Caesar's
to
steal a
works or
march by night across the fords, but these proved signal failures, and they found that they must turn to the other route, having lost two weeks and been completely outwitted
by the Roman.
they endeavored to procure from the
substantially the territory covered
For
this purpose,
Sequani,
who occupied
by
the Jura and
its foothills,
the necessary permission to pass
over their land, and, as they could not themselves prevail in this request, they enlisted the services of Dumnorix, the
2Eduan, who had married the daughter of Orgetorix and who
among the Sequani, to interThis Dumnorix did, and shortly obtained the desired right. Hostages were given by each party, the
stood in high consideration
cede for them.
Sequani to allow the passage, the Helvetii to refrain from pillaging on the way.
The rumor
of this action reaching Caesar,
and hearing,
moreover, that the Helvetii were heading for the land of the Santones, on the coast, northwest from the Tolosates, about
CESAR'S PREPARATIONS.
modern Toulouse, he determined
also ; for a
fail to
65
to prevent this
movement
wandering be a danger to the Roman supremacy, and the ToloWhat was more, the Helsates had become Koman clients.
tribe of warlike barbarians could not
would probably take possession of the best corn-bearing region of the Province, which he himself might need, and
vetii
would keep within no
distinct boundaries.
Ca3sar estimated correctly that the Helvetii would need
some weeks
in completing their preparations for the
march
Caesar's
Route across the Alps.
and leaving Titus Labienus,
his
most trusted
legate, in
com-
mand
of his works, he himself hastened to Cisalpine Gaul,
new legions (the Eleventh and Twelfth), called in three old ones (the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth) which were
raised two
wintering at Aquileia, and with these five crossed the Alps by forced marches into Gaul. His route lay through Ocelum
Mont Genevre, and by Grenoble to Lyon, the road opened by Pompey when he was in command of Spain. He
over
experienced some difficulty on the road from the opposition of the mountain tribes, who, despite the reduction of .Cisal-
66
ADVANCE OF HELVE TIL
pine Gaul, were still their own masters; but, though they held the commanding points of the passes, he defeated these
barbarians in several smart encounters, safely reached the land of the Allobroges with his five legions, and crossed the
Rhone near modern Lyon,
to the territory of the Segusiani.
All this he had accomplished in an incredibly short time. JFrom Ocelum to the land of the Vocontii, about modern
Grenoble, he took but seven days, thus making about sixteen It had taken miles a day over a rough mountain mule-road.
two months from the refusal of the demand of the Helvetii
to raise
and place his troops upon the Rhone.
The
Helvetii had, indeed, consumed
much time
Pas de
still
in negotia-
tions to secure their passage over the
in their actual
1'Ecluse,
and
march, loaded as they were,
more.
But
once across this natural obstacle they had made better speed, and, passing through the land of the Sequani, had reached
that of the JEdui, which they were ravaging in the most cruel
manner
in revenge for Caesar's evident perfidy to them. These people and the Ambarri, their kinsmen, both tribes
located north of the Rhone, appealed to Caesar for help, alleg-
ing their ancient friendship for
The
present distress. Allobroges also appealed, assuring Caesar that they had
Rome and
nothing remaining.
vetii, to
All were clients of Rome.
The Hel-
Rhone
to
judge by the lay of the land, must have followed the modern Culoz and then struck across country to
the river Arar, which they reached near
modern Trevoux.
that some three
Their slowness
is
natural
when we consider
hundred and sixty-eight thousand men, women and children, followed by a train of ten thousand wagons (for it would take
at least so
ber),
many
to carry three months' victual for this
num-
had
to pass through a single defile.
Caesar had relied
on
this essential slowness to get his troops
from
Italy.
He
lost
no time in deciding to attack and punish the Helvetii,
GALLIC HORSE.
67
and told the supplicants that they might rely on his protecHe required from them, however, a number of troops, especially a body of cavalry, of which arm he had none.
tion.
It is rather strange that Ca3sar, throughout his campaigns in Gaul, relied all but
exclusively^ native horse ; and stran-
Theatre of Helvetian Campaign.
ger
still,
that he left the
command
last
of this horse to native
polit-
leaders.
ical
;
His reasons for the
were probably mainly
but the plan was not always followed by good results, and was constantly attended by danger. The Gallic horse,
however, proved for his purposes
much
better than the Ro-
man.
They were an exceptional body of men.
'V.
THE BATTLES OF THE ARAR AND BIBRACTE.
JUNE, 58
C.ESAK had six
legions.
B. C.
He came up
with the Helvetii on the Saone above
Lyon. Three quarters of the enemy's force had crossed the river. Caesar by skillful dispositions surprised and destroyed the quarter remaining on the left bank. He then crossed and cautiously followed the rest, who, somewhat abashed,
retreated.
The
Helvetii
still
had seventy thousand
warriors,
and were heading
down
the Loire.
At one
place Caesar sought to attack them, but his well-con-
ceived tactical combinations failed to work.
Finding that his rations were grow-
ing short, Caesar then ceased from pursuit and
moved towards
Bibracte, where
to have acted
was much
from
fear,
corn.
The enemy turned upon him, deeming him
battle.
,
and offered
Caesar
drew up
his legions expertly,
and awaited
was hotly contested. At one period, having advanced too far, Caesar was attacked in rear and forced to form two fronts. But Roman
their attack. battle
discipline finally prevailed
;
The
the victory was complete and overwhelming.
A
to
bare third of the Helvetians remained.
their ancient homes.
These Caesar compelled to return
He had
exhibited intelligent decision, coupled to a
marked
caution, in this first campaign.
AFTER
crossing the Rhone, Caesar
had established a camp,
not unlikely on the heights of Sathonay, south of where the Helvetii were lying while they effected a passage of the Arar. It was here that Labienus probably joined him, from the
Geneva works, which
it
was now
useless to hold.
This gave
Caesar six legions, thirty thousand men ; and the JEdui and the Province raised for him some four thousand horse. He
was now ready to act with vigor.
Caesar's reconnoitring
parties, of
which he had already
out, soon
learned to keep a more than usual
number
brought
him word
that the Helvetii were leisurely crossing the
Arar
C&SAR'S FIRST FIGHT.
by means
oi boats
69
as
and
rafts.
The Saone flowed then
now
so slowly in places that one could scarcely distinguish the
direction of its current.
At one
of these places, north of Tre-
voux, the Helvetii were ferrying over in boats, for they were not sufficiently clever to bridge the stream. Caesar at once
set out for that vicinity.
He
8 A
dispatched spies to ascertain
the enemy's movements, and
shortly
learned
of
that
three
quarters
their
force
three cantons
had been got
nnr
over, leaving one canton on the left bank where he himself still was.
Here was
his
Breaking up at with the Seventh, midnight Eighth and Ninth legions, he
opportunity.
marched between that hour
and
six A.
M. about twelve
left
miles,
up the
bank
to the
place where the enemy was crossing, and sharply pushing
in
upon the unsuspecting Hel-
Camp
at Sathonay.
vetii,
he surprised them, cut a large number to pieces, and
dispersed the rest,
forests.
who
fled in terror into the
neighboring
It
this
have
rini,
it,
was early in June. As a curious fortune would the Tigohappened to be the particular canton
that
whose home was near modern Zurich
had deThis
feated and slain Cassius, in which disaster had perished Piso,
of the family into which Ca3sar
had
lately married.
defeat crippled the forces of the Helvetii, but left something
like
two hundred and eighty thousand people still to be dealt with, of whom seventy thousand were warriors and they had
;
70
THE HELVE TH DESIRE PEACE.
The locality of the battle is well proven plenty of rations. excavations which have revealed immense numbers of by
skeletons of men,
women and
children,
some cremated, but
and
all hastily interred,
and of broken arms and ornaments.
Caesar at once bridged the
crossed.
Arar near the
battlefield,
It seems surprising that the Helvetii,
under whose
very nose this operation took place, should have made no effort to interfere with it, but nothing is said in the CommenAll they did was to observe him closely. taries of an attack.
Caesar no doubt had vessels on the river which were transport-
The ing rations in his wake, and these aided in the passage. other three legions soon rejoined him from camp at Sathonay. Astonished to see Caesar do in one day what they had taken
twenty to accomplish, the Helvetii again sent ambassadors to him, to represent that they were desirous of peace and would go and settle wherever Caesar would allow; but that, if
opposed, Caesar must remember that the Helvetii were brave
from- experience.
and numerous and feared no one, as the Romans well knew Caesar replied that if they would give him
hostages to do as they agreed, he would treat with them ; but
the ambassadors haughtily answered that they were in the
habit of receiving, not giving hostages, and left in high dudgeon.
Still the Helvetii
were anxious not to
fight.
They preferred
must have
full quarter
to carry out their original project, though they
keenly
felt Caesar's
blow in the destruction of a
of their number.
intending
still
to
They marched away on the succeeding day, head for the land of the Santones. To do
this they could not
advance directly west, on account of the intervening mountainous region, which placed two distinct ranges between them and their objective. They headed northwest, so as to strike the lowest part of the watershed between
the Saone
west.
and Loire, which they could
cross
and thence move
CAESAR PURSUES.
71
Caesar was not placed so as readily to bring them to battle,
as their
column and
his
own were more
or less confined in the
narrow space between the Arar and the mountains. A slow, dogged pursuit was his only immediate resource, but he threw
out his Gallic cavalry under
command
of
Dumnorix
the
.ZEduan, to reconnoitre their movements.
A clay or two after-
wards a body of five hundred Helvetian horse attacked this force, and under unequal conditions inflicted on it a defeat
and some considerable
loss,
though Dumnorix outnumbered
this 6asy success, the
them
eight to one.
Emboldened by
Helvetii began to indulge in constant
Caesar was cautious.
War
call
on so large a
rearguard fighting. scale was still a
novelty to him.
The teaching
of the art in that
day did not V,
war.
else
embrace what we now
the grand operations of
What
he knew of them he had assimilated, as no one
had
possessed the intelligence to do, frpm the history of his predecessors,
bal.
But
from the splendid deeds of Alexander and Hannithis was theory merely. Caesar still felt a lack
;
own ability he knew that his grasp was not yet as large as his problem, and wisely kept without the But he did his best to prelimits of a general engagement.
of confidence in his
vent the Helvetii from plundering and foraging ; and thus, at a distance of about five miles, he followed them closely for
fifteen days.
Caesar was being led from the vicinity of the Arar, and the
The corn brought question of supplies was becoming grave. the river to him proved bad, and the crops were not yet up
ripe.
The supply
of forage at this season
was
limited,
and
was consumed by the immense column of the enemy. The jEdui had agreed to furnish Caesar with corn, but it was not
forthcoming, though he had made a number of demands for it. It seems that the .ZEduan population, seduced by the
representations of Dumnorix,
who was,
as before stated,
72
CAESAR TRIES RUSE.
serving in Caesar's army, were neglecting to furnish it, lest Caesar, having by their help overcome the Helvetii, should in
turn deprive them of their liberties. Dumnorix was anxious to see Caesar thwarted, for the Romans interfered with his
He had, in fact, played the plans of aggrandizement. traitor in the late cavalry conflict with the Helvetii, and had been the cause of the loss of the field by retiring at the first
own
attack.
Caesar suspected that all was not right.
He
called
some
of the leading
the difficulty lay.
JEduans together, and discovered where He was much tempted to make an ex;
ample of Dumnorix
from his
but, probably
from motives of
policy,
lest the latter 's fellow-citizens
should feel aggrieved and turn
definitely
alliance,
intercession of Divitiacus, his brother, of Caesar's
he feigned to forgive him at the who was a great friend
and a
faithful ally of the
Romans.
Caesar,
how-
ever, caused Dumnorix to be watched, determined not to
allow
him to push matters too far. The Helvetii, at modern St. Vallier, had borne
to the west
to advance towards the valley of the Liger (Loire),
down
which they proposed to march, and to cross at Decize. Caesar's scouts reported that on their march they had en-
some seven miles distant (not far from modern Toulon), and he saw at last his opportunity He reconnoitred the apof attacking them to advantage.
camped
at the foot of
hill
proaches to the hill with care, and sent Labienus after midnight, with two legions and guides, to ascend to the summit
by a
circuit
and get into the Helvetian
rear, while
he himself,
with the other four legions, preceded by cavalry, broke camp
long before daylight to approach closer to the enemy's front. The plan, well conceived and ordered, all but succeeded.
Labienus actually reached his .goal unknown to the Helvetii. The victory of Caesar, who advanced to within fifteen hundred paces of the enemy, seemed secure.
But Considius, an
FAILURE.
excellent officer
73
and experienced, one of Sulla's old staff, Caesar sent out with the vanguard scouts, in some way lost his head and gave his chief quite erroneous information
whom
cp cp
*"~^
\^V
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,'
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***^
**.'''./.,'
to the effect that the Helvetii
and not the Romans had occu-
pied the summit.
He
imagined that he had recognized their
weapons and standards. This report led Caesar to believe that Labienus had not reached his post, and he was unwilling
to attack without the aid of the
ambush.
Thus
lieutenant
and captain
failed to
work
lost.
in unison,
and the chance of an
immediate success was
Caesar withdrew to an adjoining
height, where he went into line, to invite an attack by the Labienus, whose orders on reaching the summit enemy.
were to wait for Caesar's attack, refrained from an advance. It was not till the close of the day that Caesar learned the actual facts. The enemy had meanwhile moved away.
Caesar was not in the habit of doing his
own
reconnoitring,
even in important cases, if we may judge- from a number of such instances as this. He was constant and careful and intelligent in procuring information
;
but of
all the
great cap-
tains he seems to have relied
In
this case,
most upon the eyes of others. and in others to be narrated, his own observation
fruitful.
would have been more
The
Helvetii, having thus
74
'CAESAR
TURNS ASIDE.
escaped from the ambuscade, were much elated that Caesar as they deemed from fear ; but they had had not attacked,
no idea of assaulting Caesar's strong
position.
passing the Arar, the Helvetii had marched two weeks at the rate of about seven miles a day. It was the end of June. Finding that he was running short of corn, and
that the JEdui were
still slow in furnishing it, Caesar decided next day to make a push past the Helvetii for Bibracte (Mt. Beuvray, near Autun).
From
Bibracte
is
apt to be located at Autun, but that
probable.
it
was Mt.
to
Beuvray
it
is
much more
on
The Gauls were wont
if
place their towns
plain,
hills, like
Gergovia or Alesia ; or
on a
was surrounded by a stream or marsh, as Avaricum.
They would scarcely have located their capital and largest city, Bibracte, at the foot of the mountains where lies Autun.
Several ancient roads centre on Mt. Beuvray, and the hilltop
is full
of the ruins of a town.
There
is
every indication that
this
was the Bibracte
of the ^Edui.
From where
Caesar lay the place was about eighteen miles,
to find food in plenty.
and here he was sure
issuing rations, which
The time
for
was usually done every
soldiers
fifteen days,
when each man
received twenty-five pounds of wheat, was
two days hence, and the
supply.
were near the end of their
The
Helvetii were told of Caesar's movements
his
by a deserter
from the Gallic cavalry, and construed
retreat.
manoeuvre as a
Their assumption that Caesar was afraid to attack
them was strengthened by
his thus giving up pursuit, and instead of keeping on towards the Loire valley, they turned
back to attack Caesar and cut him
began
to harass the rear of the
They Romans by more daring
off
from
retreat.
though isolated attacks. Their action accorded well with Caesar's mood.
He
deter-
LOCALITY OF BATTLE.
mined
the
to afford
75
them an opportunity for battle.
battlefield
He
occupied
first
available eminence which he reached in his
march
his
on Bibracte.
The
appears to have
been identified
by Colonel
Stoffel as near Toulon.
Here he drew up
forces, sending the cavalry forward to arrest the too speedy
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Battle of Bibracte.
approach of the enemy, who had some seventy thousand warriors, while himself had from thirty thousand to thirty-six
thousand legionaries, perhaps twenty thousand auxiliaries (Appian says Gallic mountaineers), and four thousand horse.
76
THE ROMAN FORMATION.
his four old legions (Seventh, Eighth,
He drew up
Ninth and
Tenth), in three lines halfway up the slope, the two legions
(Eleventh and Twelfth) recently raised in Cisalpine Gaul and all the auxiliaries on the plateau in the rear, with the baggage
parked and intrenched and committed to their care. Here, as on other occasions, Caesar declined to use his new legions in the fighting lines, but kept them in the background. The
baggage referred to
selves carried.
is sarcince,
that which the soldiers them-
The
legions thus
went into action in light
order.
The
location of the train baggage (impedimenta) is
not given.
These three lines must not be confounded with the old
three line formation of the Punic wars, of hastati, principes
The cohort was now formed in one line, as has been already explained. The two or three lines which Caesar used were separate and distinct, each legion being drawn up
and
triarii.
The Helvetii parked their wagons an irregular circle on some low ground opposite Caesar's position, and having repulsed the Roman allied cavalry, drew
in three lines of cohorts.
in
up
are
in phalangial order,
a formation in which
all
barbarians
wont to
fight
Roman army
and advanced on the pitched battles, with closed ranks. They joined their shields
together in testudinal fashion, in front, on the flanks and aloft, so as to ward off the first shower of pila, and came on
with an impetus which promised hot work.
Caesar had prepared his
battle-speech,
to feel that
men by
the usual allocutio, or
and
in order once for all to encourage his
men
he proposed to share their danger, whatever it he dismounted from his own horse and obliged the might be, other mounted officers to do the like. He may have been
distrustful of the
stanchness of some of his
new
officers.
He
did not yet
"
:
meant
know them. This act with the legionaries I will stay here and fight with you, for I have given
BATTLE OF BIBRACTE.
up
ray means of flight."
It
officers
11
was an act the direct reverse of
dismounting in action, as is sometimes done in these
of musketry.
modern days
The Roman
first line,
awaiting
the Helvetian
onset and
hurling their javelins
from the
height on which they stood, succeeded after a while in breaking gaps in the Helvetian phalanx, and immediately charged
down upon the barbarians with the sword. combat ensued. Many of the Helvetian
A most obstinate
shields
had been
pierced by the Roman pila, whose iron points being turned, the spear could not readily be plucked out, thus making the
cumbersome that the barbarians threw them away. The pilum of this era was a little short of two metres, half of
shields so
which consisted of a long flexible blade with a barbed point, or some equivalent. They could be hurled from sixty to
eighty feet; and
when
cast at a testudo,
would often pin two
shields together and render them useless. Despite this initial check the barbarians exposed their persons recklessly, as the But hardy mountaineers of Helvetia have always done.
robbed of their bucklers, the Romans were enabled to do the
greater execution, and after long-sustained effort forced the
enemy slowly but
surely from the field.
In no wise broken
or demoralized, the Helvetii retired in good order to an emi-
nence three quarters of a mile away. once again made a stand.
Here they halted and
still
The two new
legions and auxiliaries
remained with the
wagons. up the retiring foe, they advanced beyond where the Helvetian rearguard, consisting of some fifteen thousand allied Boii and Tulingi, had
filed into position
As
the old legionaries followed
which enabled them to protect the Gallic
wagon-park* These troops, now on the Roman rear, charged down upon the legions with the utmost fury, perceiving which
diversion the Helvetian
main
line again advanced, giving vent
to exultant shouts, and resumed the battle with yet greater
78
vigor.
A DOUBLE ATTACK.
Caesar states that they fell upon his exposed flank.
This does not appear from the topography, and the phrase " "exposed flank may perhaps be the equivalent of the phrase "masked batteries" of 1861. It will be remembered that
the right side with the ancients was always weak, as the shield was carried on the left arm, and the right flank of a
body of troops was shieldless. It is constantly referred to as latus apertum, and the legions were always nervous about
explaining a defeat or suggesting a tactical danger would be to speak of an attack on the exposed flank. Caesar thus refers to the triarii long after
this flank.
A convenient way of
from the
their disappearance
legions.
Caesar was thus compelled to form two fronts to receive
this double attack.
He
faced the standards of the third line
to the rear to
meet the Boii and Tulingi, holding back the
of the Helvetii with his first two.
still
new onslaught
The danger
was grave, but there was
a reserve of two legions, and the fighting home. For a long while the comCaesar pushed bat wavered the Helvetii would not give up the contest, how;
ever unequal, but after a long and obstinate combat the legions drove the enemy back to the hill they had first retired
and forced the rearguard party of allies to the wagons. The Helvetii had fought like heroes. During the entire
to,
action,
from noon
to eventide, not
man had shown
his back.
Bitter fighting was
now resumed
for the possession of the
The enemy wagon-park and continued till late at night. threw their weapons from the wagons and intrenched themselves
between the wheels, whence they used their long pikes. The women and children took part in the battle. It was only
after
supreme
efforts that the
wagon-park was
finally cap-
tured.
The
victory
sustaining losses
was complete. The Helvetii fled after which reduced their number to one hundred
Caesar did not pursue.
and
thirty thousand souls.
His cav-
THE HELVE Til FLEE.
airy could not effect
leon.
79
much
in this hilly country, says
Napo-
But the
indisposition to pursue
came
of the caution of
it
inexperience rather than because Caesar judged
less.
to be use-
Caesar's dispositions for the battle
and the vigor of the
fighting
had been in the highest degree commendable, but he may perhaps be criticised for advancing so far from his reLess serves as to be liable to be taken in flank and rear.
than the two legions and the auxiliaries could have guarded the intrenched baggage-park, and the presence of one of them
in a supplemental line as at Pharsalus would have rendered
victory
more speedy and
less costly.
The
loss of the Helvetii
was very heavy ; but a large part of the entire people escaped from the massacre. These, marching four days and nights
without a halt, reached the territory of the Lingones (near Tonnerre), where they hoped to find corn as well as safety.
This
tribe,
however, under Caesar's declaration sent by cou-
riers that
he would treat them in the same manner as the
they harbored or traded with these enemies of people, refused to have any communication with
Helvetii
if
the
Roman
the footsore and famished barbarians.
The
Helvetii, in the
severest distress, at once sent messengers soliciting peace.
Caesar had remained three days at Bibracte, or near the
battlefield, to
His
loss is not given,
bury the dead and care for the severely wounded. but it must have been very large. On
the fourth day he followed
into
up the
Helvetii,
camp near
by, he received their
and having gone embassy, which we can
imagine couched in less arrogant language than the last. To the Helvetian petition he assented upon their delivering up
hostages, their arms,
and a number pf slaves who had deserted
to
them from the Roman camp.
Having complied with
Cae-
sar's
demands, they were treated with liberality, and furnished with food; but they were obliged to march back to
80
their
FORCED TO RETURN
own country and
to rebuild their towns
and
villages,
were able to accomplish this, the Allobroges were instructed to supply them with corn. Caesar "drove
and
until they
this people
ing his flock
back into their country as it were a shepherd drivback into the fold," says Floras. A party of
six thousand of the Helvetii (Verbigeni) attempted to escape towards Germany; but they were at Caesar's order stopped on the way by the tribes through whose territory they tried to pass, brought back and "treated like enemies," which no
doubt means that they were sold as slaves or massacred, one of those cases of unnecessary cruelty which blot the pages
of Caesar's glorious campaigns.
of the battle has by some been placed at Cussy but that place does not suit the topography of la Colonne, the Commentaries. Napoleon III. places it nearer Bibracte,
The location
but Stoffel's researches are the latest and most reliable.
Lists were found in the Helvetian camp, written in the
Greek
had
character, showing that three
all,
thousand in
men, women and
:
children, Helvetii
hundred and sixty-eight and allies,
hundred and
sixty-
left their
homes, to wit
Helvetii, two
three thousand ; Tulingi, thirty-six thousand, Latobrigi, four-
teen thousand ; Rauraci, twenty -three thousand
Boii, thirty-
two thousand.
men.
thousand were fighting There returned home, according to Caesar's census, but
these, ninety -two
Of
one hundred and ten thousand; the rest had perished in the
migration, the battles or the massacres, or had dispersed. Of the latter it is probable that very many eventually returned
to Helvetia.
The
gallant Boii were allowed to settle
among
the JEdui,
who
desired to receive them.
This
is
first
characterized
campaign of Qsesar's in command of a large army by great dash and ability coupled to a certain
caution apparently bred of self-distrust.
He
was greatly
aided by the want of unity and prompt action
among
the
CAESAR RESTS.
Helvetii, who,
81
had they been more
alive to their advantages,
might have greatly hampered Caesar's movements. For a first campaign the conduct and results were certainly brilliant.
Caesar intrenched his
camp near Tonnerre, and here he
remained until
midsummer.
Caesar, the Citizen.
(Vatican Museum.)
VI.
CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARIOVISTUS.
SEPTEMBER,
THE
German
./Edui,
AUGUST AND
58 B. C.
Ariovistus,
Sequani and Arvenii now invoked Caesar's aid against the who had crossed the Rhine and taken land and hostages
from them.
Csesar
saw the danger of permitting German and with
truth, that he
invasions.
He
sent
word to Ariovistus that he must restore the hostages and return across the Rhine.
The German
him, and
ing
retorted, haughtily
than Caesar was and with equal right.
Caesar determined to
dissension
was doing no more march against
the legions, hav-
moved
to Vesontio.
Here arose a
among
a dread of the Germans and of the unknown lands they were about to invade. Caesar suppressed it by his persuasiveness, and the army
its origin in
marched against
Ariovistus.
conference with
him
led to no results.
The
German then
cleverly
marched around
Caesar's flank
;
and cut him from
his base
a remarkable manoeuvre for a barbarian
Caesar recovered his communications.
but by an equally skillful march
Then, learning that Ariovistus was,
under advice of his soothsayers, waiting for the new moon before coming to an engagement, he forced battle upon him and signally defeated him. In the two
campaigns of
this first year, Caesar
had shown much
caution, bred probably of
inexperience, but he
had
also
shown boldness and
skill in
abundant measure.
;
The numbers
Iberia.
against
him had
not greatly exceeded his
own
and he had not
been called on to show the decision of Alexander in Thrace or Hannibal in
AFTER
the brilliant Helvetian campaign, the Gauls with
Caesar's consent convoked a general assembly of tribes,
and
the whole of the country sent ambassadors to sue for the victor's good-will. They saw that they now had a Roman consul of a different
stamp in their midst.
Among
the suppli-
cants came embassies from the 2Edui, Sequani and Arverni led by the .ZEduan Divitiacus, who particularly begged Cesar's assistance against Ariovistus,
a king of the Germans
THE SUE VI.
(the people dwelling
83
beyond the Rhine), "a savage, passionThis chief, it seemed, having been ate and reckless man."
called in to aid the Sequani
tic
enemies, the .ZEdui,
and Arverni against their domeshad as a reward for this help forcibly
taken one third of
all their land,
from another third
subjects, of
to
and was now driving them accommodate fresh arrivals of his own
whom
one hundred and twenty thousand had
already come across the Rhine to settle on the more fertile Gallic lands. Nor was this their only grievance, for Ariovistus
had taken
all
the children of their nobles as hostages,
tribes with
and had treated these
consummate
cruelty.
Par-
ticularly the -*Edui had been oppressed and compelled to swear that they would not even complain of their torments, or
invite aid
from Rome, or ask back their hostages. The Suevi were the largest of the German nations and the
most powerful.
hundred cantons, each of which furnished yearly one thousand men for war, and one thousand for tillage, and these alternated, the tillers
They were divided
into one
being bound to main tain the warriors.
They were big-framed
and hardy in the extreme, strong and savage, and disdained all other peoples. Their land was said to be surrounded by
desert wastes, they having devastated the lands of all their
neighbors.
Two immense
forests, the
Hercynian and that
began at the Rhine and ran eastward. The former covered the territory between the Danube and the
called Bacenis,
Main, the other was substantially the Thiiringerwald of South of this latter dwelt the Suevi. day.
of
to-
Caesar was of course alive to the danger of allowing tribes
Germans
to migrate at will
in large bodies across the
Rhine, for, emboldened by success, they might soon spread over Gaul, reach the Province, and from thence move to The Rhone alone sepItaly, like the Cimbri and Teutones.
arated the Province from the Sequani, on whose land they
84
INVASION OF GERMANS.
Moreover, the 2Edui had long been
protection.
were already trenching.
"kinsmen "of Rome and deserved
Caesar had
less conception of proposed to himself to conquer Gaul. As a preliminary, the ejection his problem is unlikely.
of the
Germans from
the land was essential.
His method of
thought stopped at
into
no halfway measures.
to protect
He
had not come
Gaul merely
Roman
territory or interests in
BALE.
The Rhine and
the Germans.
the old way.
He came
for conquest, which as a soldier he
saw was the only true way to cut the knot of the Gallic difficulty, and which as a statesman he saw might be a steppingstone to future greatness.
ity,
Caesar was equipped in author-
men and purpose
it
for war,
and
it
was war he
desired.
The sooner
Gaul.
casus
belli.
came, the sooner he would be able to subdue
reason was as good as another to serve as a To examine such questions as these is scarcely
One
within our present purpose. Let us keep as closely as be to the current of military events.
may
ARIOVISTUS.
Caesar sent messengers to Ariovistus,
the Rhine somewhere about
85
who was probably on
collecting
modern Strasburg,
an
army among returned word
come
to
the Tribocci, proposing an interview. Ariovistus that
if
when he
desired to see Caesar, he would
him
Caesar wished to see Ariovistus, he might
himself come; that he saw no reason
why
Caesar had any
business in that part of Gaul which he, Ariovistus, had con-
quered, as he should not venture into those parts which Caesar
This was bold language, but it has the ring of honest bravery in it. Caesar, who looked at the reply from the standheld.
point of true
Roman
arrogance, answered that he \jas sur-
prised that Ariovistus, a man who had been styled "king and " friend by the Roman Senate, should refuse his proposal for
a conference
from across the Rhine
to cause to
he required this chief to bring no more men into Gaul, nor seize upon land ; at once
be restored the hostages of the -/Edui, and to cease Should he do so, Caesar and the Senate .from war in Gaul.
and people of Rome would still regard him as a friend if not, Caesar, under his instructions to protect the -3dui and
;
other allies of the
hand without
Roman To delay.
Republic, would take the case in
this
ultimatum, Ariovistus made
answer, that he
rightfully
had conquered the ^Edui in battle, and had made them pay tribute in exactly the same fashion
those
they had subdued; that he should not restore the ^Eduan hostages that if the .2Edui
as the
;
Romans did by
whom
did not pay tribute, he would compel them to do so, and that
their title of
them naught. He ended his message with a challenge, averring that none had ever entered the lists against him but to be exterminated.
of
avail
"kinsmen"
Rome would
Csesar had certainly
met
his
match
in aggressiveness.
It is not quite clear
how broad was
of
the authority Caesar
provinces were
possessed
by law.
The governors
Roman
usually prohibited from leaving their limits without the ex-
86
CAESAR'S ROUTE.
But the governor of Gaul press permission of the Senate. or had assumed, a wider authority, and was had been given,
As a expected to protect the allies of the Roman people. of fact, there was no control whatever over Caesar, matter
except that exerted by his colleagues in the triumvirate.
And
the
this related only to affairs in
Rome.
Learning at the same time that the Germans were ravaging JEduan lands, and that other large bands of Suevi were
on the right bank of the Rhine opposite the Treviran district, making preparations to cross the river, Caesar determined to
strike Ariovistus before
to his assistance.
any reinforcements could come over Accordingly, after rationing his men and
accumulating a supply of corn, he set out early in August from the neighborhood of Tonnerre, and by forced marches moved towards the upper Arar, where lay Ariovistus. There
-t
^
March against
Ariovistus.
was subsequently a Roman road which led from Tonnerre to Langres, so that we may fairly assume that there was a
previous Gallic path or road, and
it
was
this Caesar took.
Being informed on the way, perhaps near modern Langres, that Ariovistus was on the march to seize Yesontio (Besan9on)
HE SEIZES
VESONTIO.
87
on the Dubas (Doubs), capital city of the Sequani, a depot containing large supplies and an admirable position for
strength,
of
very considerable importance to whomsoever
it, and fearing that Ariovistus might be nearer to the place than he actually was, Caesar turned from his straight
held
road to the Rhine, which ran by
way
of Vesoul
and
Belfort,
and forcing
his
marching day and night, made such speed
Vesontio.
that he reached Yesontio
Ariovistus could arrive.
tio so clearly that there
and threw a garrison into it before The Commentaries describe Vesoncan be no mistake in
its location.
"It was so well fortified by nature that it offered every facilThe Dubas, forming a circle, surity for sustaining war.
almost entirely, and the space of sixteen hundred feet which is not bathed by the water is occupied by a high mountain, the base of which reaches on each side to the edge
rounds
it
of the river."
No
military narrative exceeds the
it
Commen-
taries in lucidity;
few equal
in its
keen descriptions and
clear-cut style.
was active in the pursuit of information, though the Romans as a rule were lax in this Like Alexander and Hannibal like all great particular.
It is evident that Caesar
commanders
he had antennae out in front of the army
88
ROMAN DEMORALIZATION.
felt its
way. He was at all times abundantly supplied with knowledge about the countries and peoples he was to
which
invade and contend with.
This he procured by spies, deserters and reconnoissances, the latter conducted mostly by
native cavalry.
with the Gallic
The Roman horse could by no means vie in doing such work, and Caesar had a way of
the latter. insuring the almost uniform fidelity of was moving towards him, Ariovistus, learning that Caesar
arrested his advance on Vesontio, deeming
it
wiser to remain
near the reinforcements which he could draw from across the
Moreover, the proximity of the Rhine, near modern upper Alsace, afforded a terrain which was better suited to
Rhine.
the operations of his cavalry.
At Vesontio
Caesar remained some days.
A grave danger
here beset him,
decay of the morale of the
one which well shows how deep was the Roman army. There were in the
army a number of tribunes and praefects, one might call them volunteer line officers, men who had accompanied Caesar for
friendship or excitement or profit, having been given their
commissions for political or personal motives, but who were
inexperienced soldiers and lacking in that stanchness which
few men in an army possess unless they have taken up arms
as a business.
Many
of these holiday-soldiers, frightened
by
the tales they heard of the stature and fierceness of the Ger-
mans and
of the dangerous route before them,
which
tales
were well borne out by the daring courage of the Helvetii,
who themselves feared
these Teutons,
besought Caesar to
allow them to return to Italy, each one alleging some peculiar Even those who were willing to remain personal pretext.
strike
one as
Romans.
little enough like what we are apt to dub "These could neither compose their countenance
nor even sometimes check their tears; but hidden in their tents, either bewailed their fate, or deplored with their com-
CHECKED BY
rades the general danger.
CAESAR.
89
Wills were sealed universally By the expressions and cowardthroughout the whole camp. ice of these men, even those who possessed great experience
camp, both soldiers and centurions, and those (the decurions) who were in command of the cavalry, were gradin the
ually disconcerted.
less
Such
of
them as wished
to be considered
alarmed, said that they did not dread the enemy, but feared the narrowness of the roads and the vastness of the
forests
which lay between them and Ariovistus, or
else that
the supplies could not be brought
up
readily enough.
Some
would
even declared to Caesar that when he gave orders for the camp
moved and the troops to advance, the not be obedient to the command, nor advance
to be
soldiers
of their fear."
in consequence This disaffection was spreading to the ranks
and threatening the most serious results. Caesar grasped the grave nature of the matter, and his strong will at once rose
to the occasion.
He
called a council of
war
to
which
all
the
centurions were invited, and with his customary skill and reasonableness, but without weakening his powers as
to compel, he presented to
commander
them the matter
of roads, rations,
the skill and courage of the enemy and their own, alleging in conclusion that he should march on the enemy immediately,
and
if
the other legions would not follow, he would
march
himself, with his favorite
Tenth
legion, alone.
But he did
not believe, said he, that the rest were afraid to go, having Marius as an example, who, with their ancestors, had defeated
these
same Germans.
at once
His
self-reliant persuasiveness
and
we know from abundant
be
to cheerfulness,
sources
how
persuasive Caesar could
Dismay gave place good heart resumed its sway. The legions expressed their devotion and obedience, the Tenth particularly and instantly, and loudly proclaimed their willingness to fol-
changed the tide of feeling.
low Caesar to the end of the world, alleging that they had
90
A CIRCUIT.
never thought of usurping the right of the chief to decide on
the movements of the army.
This and other similar facts not only show that Roman human nature was pretty much the same as human nature has
been
all
over the world and in
all ages,
but they show that
an army is discipline. These troops, not yet hardened to service, were acting as militia or
the most essential quality of
unseasoned volunteers will sometimes
act.
It is probable
that Caesar, himself yet inexperienced in the duties of com-
manding
officer,
had not kept
his troops sufficiently occupied
with drill and camp-duties to prevent their wasting their idle time in foolish gossip. How much the disaffection is over-
drawn in the Commentaries, to show Caesar's eloquence and moral power, cannot be said, but the bald facts must be as stated. Caesar's management was wise in not having recourse to rigorous measures.
From
foothills.
Vesontio towards the Ehine,
if
he would go the
straight road, Caesar must cross the northern part of the Jura
That part of the route which lay along the valley
Dubas was extremely rough, in parts a continuous defile, and much more wooded and difficult then than now. But Divitiacus pointed out to him that by a northerly circuit,
of the
of which the
Dubas would be
the chord, he could
move
in
comparatively open country and reach the undulating plains of the Rhine valley without danger of ambush. Divitiacus,
always intelligent and useful, had been reconnoitring the region in front of the army, and found that the circuit would
not exceed
third
fifty miles.
Proceeding, towards the end of the
week
in August, along this route in the direction of the
enemy, in seven days Ca3sar reached the vicinity of AriovisUnless tus, who was reported some twenty-four miles off.
Caesar's marches were far below the usual rate,
and he would
not loiter under the circumstances, he must in seven days
A CONFERENCE.
have marched at least
eighty-five or ninety miles.
91
This
would carry him beyond Belfort, usually chosen as the scene
of the battle against Ariovistus, to near Cernay.
This
is
Goler's opinion.
Riistow
is
in error in selecting the
upper
Saar as the theatre of the approaching campaign.
Not anticipating Caesar's speedy coming, Ariovistus himself requested a conference, in a way which made Caesar believe
that the
German had grown more
reasonable, and
it
was
agreed that the two generals should meet on a
naked emi-
nence in a large plain between both camps, with an escort No large plain exists near Belfort, another only of horse.
reason for placing the scene farther to the east.
scarcely trusting his Gallic cavalry
Caesar,
circumstances, had "taken
away
all
under such exceptional their horses," and had
might accompany him. They seemed to be ready and expert horsemen. Reaching the place of conference, they were drawn up in line two hundred paces from the mound, the cavalry of Each Ariovistus taking a similar station on the other side.
mounted
his trusted
Tenth
legionaries, so that they
commander was accompanied
men.
to the meeting
by ten mounted
from the conference accomplishing any good end, Ariovistus, according to what Caesar wishes us to infer from
far
So
the Commentaries, behaved in a most haughty and provoking
manner.
But even the Commentaries show Ariovistus
to
have talked in a reasonable way. He claimed only the same right to conquer a province in Gaul that the Romans had
exerted,
his intention of
same way; he denied Gaul further, and agreed to a invading " "hands-off policy, if Caesar would accept it. But the Comto collect tribute in the
and
mentaries allege that Ariovistus' cavalry showed the bad faith of the transaction by commencing an attack on Caesar's escort,
"hurling stones and weapons at them."
Caesar, forbidding
92
his
CAESAR'S
FLANK TURNED.
blame should be cast upon him,
men
to retaliate, lest the
withdrew from the conference.
to engage
The eagerness
of the legions
was greatly increased by Ariovistus' treachery. Two days after, Ariovistus again requested a meeting or an embassy, and on Caesar's sending to him two of his officers,
he seized these and cast them into chains, though one was a
Gaul and the other bound
pitality.
to
him by the sacred
ties of hos-
At
the same time Ariovistus
moved
to within six miles of
Ariovistus' Manoeuvre.
the Romans, and
Vosegus (Vosges) mountains ; and next day, by a bold and skillful manreuvre, he marched around Caesar's flank and within his immediate
encamped
at the foot of the
HE OFFERS BATTLE.
reach,
93
and camped two miles
off,
a position which actually cut the Romans
west of modern Reinigen, in off from their base
and the convoys of corn furnished by the Sequani and -3dui. But it fortunately left open the communications with the Leuci and Lingones farther north, on whom in part Caesar
depended, though theirs was a scant province from which to draw his supplies for so large a force.
From
had
lost
the slight description of this manoeuvre of Ariovistus
it
in the Commentaries,
would at
first
blush seem that Caesar
an excellent opportunity of striking his enemy on the
flank while thus marching near to and around the
Roman
camp, and this criticism has been frequently made. During such a manoeuvre, any column, especially with baggage, is wont to be more or less out of order, and there can be no
better time to attack.
case, protected
The march
forest, of
of Ariovistus was, in this
still
by the
which a portion
remains
and Caesar had not yet learned that action for which he later grew so noted, power of summary and did not attempt to interfere with the march of the
at the present time;
enemy.
In
fact, it is
moment know
enemy.
probable that Caesar did not at the Nor was it usual with the of the manoeuvre.
ancients to take advantage for attack of a flank
march by the
five succes-
Caesar, however, did the next best thing.
For
sive days he
emerged from
;
his
camp and drew up in
satisfied
battle
array, inviting action
tion, the effect of
but Ariovistus,
with his posi-
which he perfectly comprehended, kept to his camp, merely throwing out his cavalry, which was six thousand strong, to skirmish with the Roman allied horse.
The German horseman at this period was accompanied by a foot soldier, who was practised to run alongside, holding to
the horse's mane, and to fight in connection with the cavalry.
By
these peculiar tactics the
Germans puzzled
the
Gallic
94
squadrons, though device to be found
it
NEW
CAMP.
was really nothing new, but an ancient
peoples.
among many
Caesar was unable to provoke Ariovistus to battle.
real reason for this
The
was that the female soothsayers of the
Germans had decided by divination that their army could not conquer if it fought before the new moon. This Caesar did
not at the
moment know.
Fearing to be definitely cut
off
his base, which Ariovistus might attempt to accomplish a further advance, he himself resorted to a similar maby He was not above taking a lesson from this skillnoeuvre.
from
army in three lines, he marched out as if ready to give battle, and moving by the right, placed his line on the west of the German camp in such a manner
ful barbarian.
Forming
his
as to regain the road along which lay his communications.
Halting at a distance of not more than two thirds of a mile from Ariovistus' camp and two miles and a half from his
own, Caesar held the
first
two
lines in readiness to resist the
set the third to intrench
it
enemy's attack
if
made, and
a new
camp and,
as usual, surround
with a rampart.
Ariovistus
cavalry
sent some sixteen thousand light troops
to interfere with the
and
all his
was driven
left
off.
two legions legions he marched back and reoccupied the old camp. Though divided, Caesar was now in better position. He had
reestablished himself
Romans in this operation, but this body In the new camp, when completed, Caesar and some auxiliaries. With the other four
upon his own communications, and had placed Ariovistus where he could not undertake the
In attacking either Roman camp, the from the other would be able to fall upon his flank. troops Next day Caesar marshaled his forces from both camps for
offensive to advantage.
battle, taking
up a position
in
advance of the larger one, but
as Ariovistus did not accept the gage, the Romans retired to their intrenchments about noon. Then Ariovistus sent part
CAESAR FORCES BATTLE.
95
of his forces to attack the lesser camp, and a vigorous combat
with some loss ensued, which lasted
tus retired.
till
night,
when
Ariovis-
From some
it
prisoners captured on this occasion
it
Caesar finally ascertained why
to fight: "that
was Ariovistus was unwilling was not the will of heaven that the Ger-
mans should conquer if they engaged in battle before the new moon," and deemed it wiser to force a general engagement at
once, so as to let the moral effect of fighting against fate do
its
demoralizing work
among
the
German
troops.
On
the
following day, probably September 10, Caesar
drew the two legions from the small camp and joined them to the four of the larger camp. He drew up all his
secretly
impose on the enemy by the number of their array, and to simulate the continued This must have been cleverly presence of the two legions. done to have escaped detection. With all his legionaries, in
auxiliaries before the lesser
camp
to
three lines, Caesar advanced on Ariovistus' camp.
cient force
A suffi-
had been
left in
each of the camps to defend the
ramparts.
saw from Caesar's pronounced action that it was imperative to fight. He had no intrenched and could probably not resist a determined assault camp, should Caesar make one. He accordingly drew up his forces
last Ariovistus
At
Harudes, by tribes with an interval between each two, Marcomanni, Tribocci, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii, Suevi, and surrounded the whole rear and flanks with his wagons so "that no hope might be
left in flight."
The women
remained in the wagon-train as witnesses of the battle, and conjured with frantic cries and gestures their husbands,
fathers
and sons
to fight so as not to deliver
them
to the
sword or to slavery, as had been the fate of the women of the Cimbri and Teutones at Aix.
It is probable that Ariovistus
force, but by how much
it
much exceeded
Caesar in
Caesar's
is
impossible to say.
96
total,
A SEVERE ENGAGEMENT.
after his losses at Bibracte, cannot have been
fifty
much
to
more than
thousand men, allowing a
full
complement
each legion.
his quaestor in
The Romans faced east, Ariovistus west. Caesar placed command of one of the legions and a legate
over each of the others, with instructions to force the fightHe himself opened the action with the Roman right ing.
wing as was
part of the
his wont,
and "because he had observed that
him) to be the least strong." in a species of phalangial order.
to
enemy (opposite The Germans were drawn up
fs
eic
CAMP
vt
'
Battle against Ariovistus.
The Roman
soldiers attacked the foe with their usual vigor-
ous onslaught, but the Germans met them by a rush given with such impetuosity that the legionaries did not have time
to shift ranks so as to cast all their javelins
they were almost immediately constrained to resort to their swords. They
;
AN ABLE LIEUTENANT.
97
were for the moment put on the defensive. But they quickly resumed their ancient habit of offense, and to resist their
Germans grouped themselves in bodies of three or four hundred, who made a tortoise, covering themselves with The Roman soldiers held to the their interlocked shields.
onset the
attack with consummate courage, advancing boldly into the
intervals
and ranks of the enemy, and tearing away their Some leaped upon the roof of shields shields by main force.
so interlocked, forced
them
apart,
and hewed
at the
Germans
from above.
The
left
wing of the barbarians was thus routed,
but the enemy
still
by
far stronger.
held firmly upon the right, where he was The Roman line was unable to make the
and finally wavered. Perceiving this danger, P. Crassus, who commanded the cavalry, not being at young the moment engaged, but placed where he could see what was
least impression,
going on, took
reserve, ployed
command
it
of the third line which
had
lain in
into column,
left.
and led
it
quickly to the sup-
port of the
Roman
The shock
of these fresh troops
broke the enemy's resistance.
their soothsayers
No
doubt the divination of
had produced its due effect, and they saw in the Roman success the hand of fate. They turned from the Roman line, ceased resistance, and soon melted into utter rout and
till they reached the Rhine, a matter Their flight was presumably down the valley of the 111, up which they had advanced. Some, it is Some others, said, swam across the Rhine, near Rheinau.
flight,
nor stopped
of fifty miles distant.
among them
cross,
Ariovistus,
Gallic cavalry.
and thus escaped. The two Roman ambassadors who had been
.
managed to find boats in which to The rest were cut down by Caesar's
cast into chains
were recovered.
to the right
The Suevi, who had come down
Rhine with intention
of Ariovistus, at once decamped.
bank
of the
to cross, hearing of the terrible defeat
But
their enemies,
the
98
Ubii, from lower
C&SAR'S SUCCESS.
down
the river,
hung upon
their rear
and
inflicted severe loss
upon them.
This victory ended, for the
time being, any fear of the Germans. Caesar, having thus conducted two successful campaigns in one season, early put his army into winter-quarters in the land
of the Sequani, likely of Labienus.
enough near Vesontio, under command
himself returned to Cisalpine Gaul to hold the assizes, as well as to be nearer the political turmoils of
He
Rome and
to
watch for his own
interests.
In this initial year of his command of an army, Caesar showed plainly those qualities of rapid decision and action, courage and intelligent grasp of the situation, which always
yielded such vast results. But he was at times more markedly cautious than later in his military life, as if he had not yet
learned to trust to his good fortune, nor acquired wide experience in arms.
One can
notice mistakes
and a certain was not
all
in-
decision in these campaigns, to which Caesar
later so
much
subject; though the
his military career.
He
through has been criticised because he did
same quality crops up
not attack Ariovistus on his dangerous flank march past his camp, but this has already received comment. It has also
been observed that the sixteen thousand men sent by Ariovistus against the working-party on the new camp might have been destroyed instead of merely driven back by his protectBut ing lines of legionaries, who much outnumbered them.
Caesar accomplished his purpose and completed his second camp, which was all he needed to do. Chief criticism of all,
Ca3sar should apparently have been in
wing
the
opposed to the stronger part of the
habit for the
command of his left German line, in-
stead of on the right, where the
common
enemy was weaker. It was commander to open the attack with
was
distinctly
his right in person; but in this instance it
unwise, as the bulk of the
work had
to be done on the left.
ROMAN VERSUS
If
GAUL.
99
intelligence
victory, for
young Crassus had not acted with unusual and promptness, Caesar might have forfeited the
his success
on the right in no wise demoralized the en-' emy's other flank. His presence on the right was a tactical
lapse.
Though indeed
merit,
it
the fact does not detract from Caesar's
cannot be said that the balance of numbers of the
untrained barbarians opposed to his army during this year was so excessive as to make his triumph over them a remarkable thing for
to
Roman legionaries.
it
war
in the best
manner then known.
it
His army had been trained He himself was able
perfect method.
to
command
and manoeuvre
by a
His
enemy, while somewhat larger, had no such preponderance as to make the victory of the Romans an extraordinary achievement. One rather admires the Helvetii and Germans, with
their comparatively poor discipline, art
their noble courage in defense of
and equipment, for
what they undoubtedly beIn this campaign the odds of the barbarians against Ca3sar was in no sense as great as that against Alexander in his Eastern campaigns; while the oplieved to be their rights. position to
Hannibal was many-fold as
great.
But no gen-
eral, ancient or modern, ever encountered such overwhelming oilds and stood his enemies off so successfully as the great
of Carthaginian; no general ever attacked with the fury Alexander.
Gallic Buckler
found in Normandy.
VII.
THE
THE
ter,
BELG.E.
SPRING OF
set out
57 B. C.
redoubtable Belgae had raised a coalition against Caesar during the win-
and so soon as forage grew he
allies
with sixty thousand
men
legions
and
against them.
Arriving opportunely
among
the Remi, he antici-
pated their defection, and by politic treatment transformed them into allies who thereafter remained constant. The BelgSB and allies had nearly threej hundred thousand men, but as all were not yet assembled, Caesar was able to
attack them in detail.
vaci,
He
sent a detachment to invade the land of the Bello-
one of the most powerful of the coalition, crossed the Aisne, and
camped
beyond the then existing bridge in the land of the Remi. He went cautiously to work, showing none of Alexander's self-confident dash, and sought to induce the enemy to assault his intrenched camp. This they declined, and made a
clever diversion around Caesar's left flank, hoping to capture the bridge in his
him off. But Caesar caught them while crossing the fords, and a partial engagement routed them with his light troops alone. Easily disheartened, the coalition dissolved, and the Belgian tribes left, each for its 'own
rear and cut
in
territory.
Caesar then attacked
success.
a siege with
rately.
Noviodunum, but being repulsed, resorted to Having done this, he could deal with the tribes sepa-
the succeeding winter of 58-57 B. c., Csesar, in Cisalpine Gaul, received news from Labienus that the Belgse were threatening trouble, and had roused their neighbors to
resistance in the fear that
DURING
Roman
success should also overof
whelm them, so soon as Gaul south They made a coalition and
mutual action. been to save
them was subdued.
exchanged hostages to insure
Thus
far, the result of Caesar's
work had
a possible danger; but it had roused the Belgae, a more redoubtable enemy than the Helperhaps
vetii or the
Eome from
Germans.
ted by Caesar.
He saw
This rising was not altogether regretin it the opportunity and excuse for
CAESAR'S FORCES.
101
The pushing his conquests beyond their present limits. of conquered Gaul must be the Rhine on the north boundary
could be no permanent rest. He had his six old legions, the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth. Raising two new ones in Italy, the Thirteenth
and
east, or there
and Fourteenth, he sent them under
ant,
his
nephew and
lieuten-
Gaul, probably by the Q. Pedius, Great St. Bernard, to the land of the Sequani. This made
into Transalpine
eight legions, each probably with not
much
less
than
its full
complement.
If
we assume
five
thousand
men
to each,
he
had forty thousand heavy
auxiliaries,
foot.
To
these
we may add we may
Gallic
Cretan archers, slingers and Numidians which,
allusions in the Commentaries,
from certain
thirteen
place at
foot.
thousand, or a total of
fifty-three thousand
Add
again five thousand cavalry and some ^Eduan foot under Divitiacus, and we have an army of over sixty thousand
men.
The non-combatants
(servants
and camp-followers)
His lieutenants were M. Crassus, quaestor, and T. Labienus, C. Fabius, Q. Cicero, L. Roscius, L.
were numerous.
Munatius Plancus, C. Trebonius, Q. Titurius Sabinus, and L. Arunculeius Cotta, legates, all good men and tried. We later find some others placed in responsible command.
Caesar had authority from the Senate to appoint ten lieutenants of proprsetorian rank. But his legates are not, as a
rule,
mentioned as such.
the season had advanced so that there was an abun-
When
dance of forage, Caesar joined the army, probably at Vesontio. Learning by scouts and by spies of the Senones and
other tribes, neighbors to the Belgae,
less suspicious
whom
he sent out as
an army, and that
of the
than other Gauls, that the Belgae had raised it was encamped in a certain region north
(Aisne), but apparently not ready to move,
Axona
Caesar, after properly providing for rations, broke
up and
102
MARCH ON
BELGJE.
headed towards their boundaries, some fifteen days distant. It was late in May. From Vesontio he marched back over
the route he had taken
when he moved
against Ariovistus, to
Vesontio to the Axona.
Langres, and thence by Bar-sur-Aube, to Vitry le Francois, one hundred and forty -five miles in fifteen days. This route is laid down on the assumption that there was an
ancient Gallic road between these points.
This march on the enemy's army as objective was in accordance with Caesar's energetic mood, as well as in strict
conformity with the best rules of warfare.
attack on the
summary
enemy before
his plans are completely devel-
oped into action is uniformly the surest means of disconcertIt was ing him, and of providing for his discomfiture.
FORCES OF THE BELGM.
103
always Napoleon's plan, and whenever energetically emHaving ployed is apt to succeed even beyond expectation.
determined on this course, Caesar's speed in carrying out his purpose was characteristic of the man, and a first step towards
victory.
The
result justified
tribe of Belgae, the
Cesar's anticipations. The nearest Remi, at once submitted, awed by the
unexpected arrival of Caesar in their very midst.
They had
not yet committed themselves to the coalition, but, familiar with its details, their submission put Ca3sar into possession of all the facts. They were not unwilling to play in northern
which was assumed by the -ZEdui in the centre of the country. It was the safest, and they proved constant
Gaul the
role
to their pledges.
The
tors
BelgaB were of
German
origin.
Their distant ances-
had come from beyond the Rhine, and they were equally haughty and warlike. They, alone and unsupported, had
thrown back the wave of the Ciinbri and Teutones which had
come so near to wrecking Rome. The Commentaries open with the statement that the Belgse were the bravest of the
barbarians.
They were very numerous.
It
seemed that the
Bellovaci had promised to the
common
cause one hundred
thousand fighting men, of whom sixty thousand picked troops should go into the field; the Suessiones and Nervii, fifty thousand each; and twelve other tribes a total of one hundred and thirty-six thousand more.
the colors were as follows
Bellovaci, around " Suessiones,
:
The
actual forces under
modern Beauvais
" Soissons
50,000 50,000
60,000 men. "
Nervii,
" " " "
" "
"
Hainault
St.
"
"
Atrebates,
Quentin
.
15,000
10,000
Ambiani,
Morini,
Amiens
Artois.
"
"
25,000
"
104
ADVANCE TO THE
( Flanders ) . r Menapii, around modern < _
AISNE.
.
7,000 men.
.
Caletes,
Viliocasses,
"
" "
(Brabant Havre
)
.
10,000
"
"
lower Seine
">
Veromandui,
Aduatuci,
"
"
"
,
>
IAAAA
10,000
.
Arras
)
. .
Namur
..
19,000
40,000
"
Four German Tribes
"
296,000
As
the
Germans
it
of the left
bank of the Rhine had joined
was not improbable that additional help the coalition, would likewise come from across the river. Galba, king of
the Suessiones, which tribe Divitiacus had once ruled, was to
be commander-in-chief
This coalition covered the whole of what
is
now northern
France and Belgium.
it
Caesar plainly saw that he must not
allow this gigantic force to assemble, but must speedily attack
in detail
He
he would not be overwhelmed by it as a whole. therefore, as a diversion, sent Divitiacus with the conif
tingents of the .^Edui,
Remi and Senones
into the territory
of the Bellovaci on a ravaging expedition.
This was an
excellent thrust, even
if
Divitiacus should prove unable to
accomplish much,
for his presence alone
was apt to produce
Di-
present dissension in the ranks of the Belgian cantons.
vitiacus,
allied
though by friendship to the Bellovaci, did his work in a handsome manner. Caesar himself, learning that
the
enemy was near
at hand,
advanced across the Matrona
to the
(Marne) through Durocortorum (Reims), and at modern Berry au Bac. Here was a bridge.
possession of
it,
Axona
Caesar took
crossed the river and went into camp.
in
His army was
as good,
good
spirits
and
;
able.
His legions were
to better
vastly superior to the barbarians
his Gallic allies probably
and Caesar could of course handle them
advantage than the enemy his own troops. was but one head, one purpose.
In his camp there
CAMP AND BRIDGEHEAD.
The
river
105
Axona
protected a large part of the territory of
his
new allies, the Remi, and formed an excellent defensive line. His camp
lay north of the Axona, on
the hill between the river and a
low, marshy brook
now
called the
re-
Miette.
There are substantial
mains of the camp extant. The hill was eighty feet above the Axona, and the slopes were such as to allow a convenient deployment of the The bridge, if he continlegions.
ued
his
IOC
to hold
it,
made
certain that
rations
could be
securely de-
ACRES
livered to
him by the contributory
This bridge he on the north side
tribes in the rear. at once fortified
by a bridgehead, with a rampart and palisades twelve feet high and
/
/
a trench eighteen feet wide
and he
placed Q. Titurius Sabinus in com-
R< O
,
su pposto
mand
of the south
bank with
six co-
horts, or about three thousand men.
Camp
on Axona.
CaBsar was, to be sure, astride the
river, but the bulk of his force was
on the offensive bank, he had good communications with the Province,
and
his
camp formed an
excellent
intermediate base for action against
the Belgse.
The enemy was near at hand. They had invaded that part of the territory of the Remi which lay
Bridgehead on Axona.
106
CAESAR CAUTIOUS.
north of the Axona.
They had laid siege to Bibrax (Vieux some eight miles north of Caesar's camp. Their Laon), method of siege was to drive the defenders from the ramparts
stones
by showers of and arrows,
to
and then
against testudo
advance
wall
the
(or
tortoise
made by
Profile of
the soldiers
shields
holding their
Camp
Defenses.
close
together
over
it.
their heads) to cover
workmen who should undermine
At
first day the besieged managed to smugsome messengers through the lines, never carefully held gle at night, and sent word to Caesar that they must be aided
the close of the
or speedily surrender.
Caesar at once sent
them a force
of
his best Numidian and Cretan archers and Balacrean slingers. This reinforcement probably penetrated the town by
the south, where impregnable escarpments
ers lax in their watch.
made
the besieg-
They were active only on the other
drew
off
three sides.
The
easily discouraged Belgae
from the
siege,
and
giving up They then advanced and took up a position within two miles Their camp appeared from the fires to have of the Romans.
hope of taking the place, devastated the region.
a front some eight miles long. Caesar was cautious about engaging this enormous army until he had made essay of their valor and discipline as well
as of that of his
^Eduan
horse,
and he made daily cavalry
reconnoissances by which the Romans could gauge the value of the enemy in action. They soon ascertained that the allied
horse was quite equal to the Belgian
and the Roman
soldier
was by far
his
superior.
The
legionary's ambition rose
THE BATTLE-GROUND.
accordingly.
107
This caution on Caesar's part was as much an
outcome of his own inexperience as it was the desire of teachHe ing his troops that they were safe in despising numbers.
could not afford to have one bad check now, as
its effect
might
his
be so far-reaching as to prejudice the results of his whole
plan of action in Gaul.
But having
satisfied himself
and
soldiers of their superiority, he concluded to bring
tle.
on a bat-
We
admire the method and
skill of Caesar,
but we look
first
in vain for that elan
which characterized even the
cam-
that mettle which made no tale of paigns of Alexander the enemy. Caesar's caution was advisable, but it does not
appeal to us like the Macedonian's brilliant gallantry. The ground on the north slope in
PR/'LTORIAN
front of the bridgehead was not only
136 FTt
GATE
ranging the Roman battle-lines, but its left was protected
available
for
by the Miette and Aisne
the right
could lean on the camp. But between the camp and both the Axona
and the brook were gaps through which the barbarians with their vast
numbers might penetrate, and take
the legions in reverse.
Caesar
fortified
These gaps
wall
with a
and
35 FT
trench four hundred paces long, at
right angles to the front of the camp,
E
IS FT
and
built
a redoubt at each outer
end, where he placed some of his
military engines to support his right
flank in case the
Ditches at Camp-Gates.
lap him.
enemy should overHe left the two new legions
in
camp
as a reserve.
The other
hill.
six he drew up in line on the north slope of the The enemy did the same in front of their own camp.
108
THE ARMIES IN LINE.
Between the two armies was the marshy bit of land made by
Neither army appeared willing to cross this strip, lest the disorder into which it might fall during the crossing should enable the other to take it at a disadvantage.
the brook.
The
the
action was opened by some cavalry exchanges between two armies, in which the Roman allies again proved their
o"**"
X
Battle of the Axona.
superiority after a hot contest.
Caesar, not caring himself to
attack, but wishing to lure the Belgians on to begin the en-
gagement, after some hours thus spent in line, led back his forces to camp. The barbarians, who were really anxious
to fight, for their victual
was not overabundant, but unwilling
to assault Cesar's intrenchments,
now
tried another, scheme.
They marched round the Roman left to the river, where they had discovered a passable and strangely enough to Caesar unknown ford below the camp and here they began to make
;
their
way
across in small parties, purposing to cut off the
bridge or the
command
of Titurius ; or failing this, to devas-
FIGHT AT THE FORD.
tate the region of the
109
relied for
Remi on which
the
Romans
much of
ily
their corn.
It is probable that the country
was heav-
wooded.
Caesar at all events did not discover the turning
it
manoeuvre until informed of
gions
still
by Titurius.
Leaving his
le-
in
camp, Caesar himself, with his cavalry and light
to the rear, crossed
this serious threat.
troops,
moved rapidly
advanced to meet
his Gallic cavalry,
by the bridge and His force consisted of
and of Njimidian and Cretan archers and Balacrean slingers, the best of their kind, and of great value and utility. He arrived at the ford not a moment too soon,
for the barbarians were already
considerable numbers.
vigor.
swarming across the river in The light troops attacked them with
they were in disorder from the difficulties of the ford, which they were crossing without any preparation or
support, Caesar had
As
them
at his mercy,
and
inflicted enor-
mous
losses
upon them.
reached the south bank to
warriors
The cavalry cut those who had pieces, and drove back the other
who were
The
gallantly seeking to force their
way over
up
the river on the bodies of the slain, which all but filled the ford.
victory was
won with
small effort.
The
is
fact
that the legions were not brought on to the field
a fair
gauge to the battle of the
Axona.
at not taking Bibrax, nor
The barbarians, disappointed
able to cut
drawing Caesar into battle on their
own ground, nor being
river, lost heart
him
off
by crossing the
and de-
termined to
were especially constrained, when on hearing that the ^Edui had invaded the land of the
retire.
To
this they
Bellovaci, this latter tribe at once
own
territory.
It
decamped to protect its was agreed, however, among all the tribes
before dispersing, that they should again assemble to resist the Roman army whenever it might invade the country, on
the territory of whatever tribe was
first
attacked.
p. M.,
They accordingly broke camp that night about ten
110
AN ASSAULT
REPULSED.
and began their rearward movement.
as a whole set out on their retreat in
As
the column of each
tribe naturally strove to be first in order of march, the
army
This
much
confusion.
was increased by the darkness.
Perceiving the disorder, but
fearing an, ambush, Caesar, with Fabian caution, remained in
daybreak. Having then satisfied himself that there was no such danger, he sent his cavalry under Pedius and Cotta, and three legions under Labienus, to harass the rear of
camp
till
the retreating enemy.
This was effectually done, and with-
The Roman troops cut down many thousands of the barbarians, who had no further idea of resistance, and
out
loss.
allowed themselves to be
beasts.
slaughtered like so
many
brute
The pursuit was checked at night, and the party returned to camp. Judging from the account in the Commentaries, the pursuit was not over vigorous. The^ remorseless
energy with which Alexander followed up his broken
flying enemy was entirely lacking here. Next day, Ca3sar made a forced march of twenty-eight miles down the Axona to a city of the Suessiones which had
and
joined the Belgae.
It
was
called
Noviodunum
as
it
(Soissons).
He
hoped
to take the place
by storm,
had but a scanty
and wide that the
garrison, the tribe being absent in the general expedition.
The wall and
ditch were, however, so high
of hand.
town could not be captured out
The Commentaries
It appears simply state that Caesar attempted the assault. that he did so without proper precautions, and being probable
driven back with loss,
seems, was not the
ditches ;
skill
made no second assault. Hannibal, it only general who was balked by walls and
fortified soldiers.
and the towns he assaulted were
and garrisoned by Roman
by Roman The Commentaries
are our only source of information for the details of this war,
and as these were written with a purpose, and are as eminently plausible as they are remarkable as a narrative of
NOVIODUNUM.
events,
it is
Ill
often difficult to read between the lines so as to
But in this case it is evident that guess at the exact truth. Caesar was beaten back by the garrison of Noviodunum. Finding that the assault was a failure, Caesar camped near
Axona
to Sabis.
by and sent back for the vineae and other engines of siege. Vineae, it will be remembered, were portable, strongly constructed huts, open at both ends, which could be placed
together so as to
make
galleries to
approach the walls of
towns for undermining.
parallels in
They
served the same purpose as
modern war.
of the Suessiones
meanwhile returned, and a reinforcement to the garrison was thrown into the place durThe Commentaries lead one to infer ing the following night.
that the entire
if
The army
this should
body of Suessiones filed in. It would seem as have been prevented by Caesar. The tribe
could be more easily fought outside than inside the place, and if he had enough men to besiege it in the presence of the
112
BtiATUSPANTIUM.
had enough
to prevent their en-
relieving army, he certainly
tering the town.
It is probable that the barbarians outwit-
ted Caesar in this matter also.
terrace;
ans,
But Caesar
started to
make a
and when the siege apparatus arrived, the barbariastonished at the enormous preparations made by the
Roman engineers, and their speed in the work of the siege, concluded that they had better sue for peace. By intercession of the Remi, whose allies they had always been, their suit was granted, the people were disarmed, and the usual
hostages taken. arms.
In the town was found a large supply of
Caesar then marched across the
vaci,
Axona
against the Bello-
the most dangerous of the allies,
who
retired into
their capital
town called Bratuspantium (Breteuil, or possibly
But when the Roman army came near the place, Beauvais). a deputation of old men was met who sued for peace and so
;
soon as Caesar had arrived within sight of
its
walls,
the
women and boys made supplication from the ramparts. Divitiacus, who had returned after disbanding his ^duan
army, also pleaded for
its
this people,
which had been misled by
chiefs,
and out
of respect to
him and
to the ^Eduans,
Caesar took the Bellovaci under his protection, requiring, however, six hundred hostages from them as well as the
surrender of their arms.
children of the king,
else
if
Such hostages were, as a rule, the any, and of important citizens, or
were illustrious men, needful to the state and influential
in its councils.
The
Bellovaci declared that the promoters
fled to Britain,
of the Belgic
war had
with which country
there
was considerable
intercourse.
The neighboring people, the Ambiani, on being approached, also brought in their submission, and now Caesar concluded
to turn northeasterly towards the land of the Nervii.
vin,
BATTLE OF THE
MANY
their allies.
SABIS.
JULY-SEPTEMBER,
for peace.
57 B. C.
and
of the Belgian tribes Caesar
had sued
Not
so the Nervii
marched against them.
At
the river Sabis he was surprised
by the barbarians, owing purely
to insufficient scouting.
While the legions
were preparing to camp, the enemy fell violently upon them. They were caught unprepared, and came close to being overwhelmed. Caesar was never,
except at Munda, hi so grave a danger.
his
Finally, by superhuman exertions on and by cheerful gallantry on the part of his men, the tide of batOut of tle turned, and the barbarians were defeated with terrible slaughter. thousand Nervii, but five hundred remained fit for duty of six hundred sixty
own
part,
senators, but three returned
from the
battle.
Caesar then
marched down the
serious but
Sabis to a city of the Aduatuci (Namur), which after some trouble he took.
The campaign had been
advantage.
successful
and
glorious.
Caesar
had made
natural mistakes, of which happily the Gauls were not able enough to take
Nervii were the most warlike of the Belgians, and not only absolutely refused to make terms, but reproached they the other Belgians for submission. This people kept themselves entirely aloof from commerce 'or intercourse with other
nations,
THE
and
in this
strength and hardihood. and Veromandui to pool
manner had preserved their native The Nervii had got the Atrebates
issues with them,
and the Aduatuci
were on the way to join the coalition. The women and children had been sent to a spot defended by a marsh, perhaps Mons, whose hill is now surrounded by low meadows once
marshes.
In three days' march Caesar reached a point near modern Bavay, not far from the Sabis (Sambre), on which
river, ten miles
away, he learned from some prisoners that the Nervii and the adjoining allied tribes were awaiting the
114
THE NERVIAN AMBUSH.
at a place near
Roman army,
his
modern Maubeuge.
left or
Caesar
north kept up were on the right or south bank. He bank. The Nervii sent forward his light troops to reconnoitre, and the usual
advance and struck the Sabis on the
number
of centurions to choose a place for camp.
The com-
mon
formation for the march of the
its
legion being followed by
Roman army (i. e. each own baggage) had been carefully
noted by the neighboring tribes, and its manner reported to the Nervii ; some native deserters had also joined them with
similar information
chiefs
it
from the Roman camp
and the Nervian
were advised to promptly attack the leading legion as approached its new camping ground encumbered with its
impedimenta, because, hampered by the baggage-train following it, they would probably be able to destroy it before the
other legions could arrive to
its
support.
This would in the
opinion of the Gallic advisers quite demoralize the rest of the army and result in Caesar's complete overthrow. Orders
were accordingly issued by the Nervian chiefs to attack as
soon as the baggage-train came in view.
all the
Such action was
more promising
as the locality
was rough and wooded,
having
little
and suitable for the Nervii to
fight in, they
horse but most excellent infantry.
It
for
was towards the end of July. Caesar's officers had chosen camping a place where an uncovered hill sloped gently
to the left
down
bank of the Sabis,
at Neuf-Mesnil.
On
the
other side of the river was a like hill (Haumont), the upper slope of which, beginning some two hundred paces away from
the river, was heavily wooded. In these woods the Nervii hid their camp. Having no cavalry, they resorted to a clever means to stop the enemy's. They bent down saplings and
interlaced their branches with brambles
and brushwork, thus
of this section
fields.
making the
still
stiffest
kind of hedge.
The people
do the same thing to-day to fence in
By
this
SKILLFUL DISPOSITIONS.
115
means the Nervii intercepted the advance of the Roman allied horse which was reconnoitring, and effectually prevented the
discovery of their position.
Every warrior was kept out of
Battle on the Sabis.
sight, excepting only river,
a few videttes near the
flats
along the
which was here but about three feet deep; and these served to attract the Romans' attention and prevent their
scouting beyond the river. ceeded Caesar's.
Their skillful dispositions ex-
Knowing
that he
stead of the usual column, adopted an order of
to the occasion.
was approaching the enemy, Caesar, inmarch proper
First
came the cavalry; then the
all in
six old
legions ;
then the baggage
one train ;
last the rear
and
116
CARELESS CAMPING.
baggage guard, consisting of the two new legions. But Caesar was far from imagining that the whole force of the enemy
was
close at hand.
His scouting was not
effective.
On approaching the camping-ground, the cavalry sent a detachment across the river with slingers and archers to drive
away the Nervian
mished
the
videttes, while the six leading legions set
about fortifying the camp.
well, holding the edge of the
The Nervian horsemen skirwood in such a way that
Romans did not discover the Gallic line of battle. The Ninth and Tenth legions, meanwhile, began work on
camp
;
the left front of the proposed
the Eighth
and Eleventh
on the front facing the
right front.
river, the Seventh and Twelfth on the
The
legionaries, unsuspicious of danger, dis-
persed to collect palisades
and other stuff, with but the slender
cordon of horse out as pickets. While all this was passing, and so soon as the wagon-train had come in sight, this being
the preconcerted signal, the Nervii and their allies, the Atre-
bates
and Veromandui, rushed impetuously from
their
am-
bush, brushed away the Roman skirmish-line of horse like a cobweb, forded the river and fell, as it were an avalanche,
upon the Romans, who were entirely unconscious of their presence and unprepared for an assault. It was evident that
Caesar had not yet grown expert in reconnoitring his ground
in the presence of the enemy, nor careful in his
method
of
camping.
Here was an unwarranted breach of the usual Ro-
man
method, which always put out a line of battle to protect a camping party. The surprise was complete. It was all but certain that Caesar's army would be wiped from exist-
In the onslaught the Atrebates were so placed on the enemy's right as to attack the Ninth and Tenth legions;
ence.
the Veromandui in the centre, the Eighth and Eleventh
the
Nervii on their
left,
the Seventh
left
and Twelfth.
The
Nervii
were opposite the rugged
bank
of the Sabis at Boussieres.
A COMPLETE SURPRISE.
But
for the discipline of the legions,
117
which was in every sense commendable, the Roman army would have been deMany of the soldiers were at a distance seeking stroyed.
material for the rampart; the rest were busy at
work with
what they had already brought. Lucky it was that the men had become hardened in their past year's campaigns. Better There was still, they had gained confidence in their leader.
not a sign of demoralization.
later enabled Caesar with
The stanch
qualities
which
them
to complete the overthrow
had already taken root. So soon as the enemy was seen to emerge from the woods, every legionary caught the alarm. The trumpet was quickly sounded, and
of all his enemies
the standards displayed;
it
the officers were happily all at one of Caesar's explicit orders that none such hand, being should, under any pretense, leave his legion till the camp
was
fully
fortified;
and the Roman
soldiers
had already
and
learned
how
to fall quickly into the ranks.
The attack
of the barbarians
officers,
had been
so well-timed
sudden that the
many
of them,
had not even time to
put on their badges, such as were usual to distinguish the
several ranks, or the
men
to take off the leather covers with
which, during the march, they were wont to protect their
often beautifully ornamented shields.
Nor
could they by any
fell in
means seek each man
his
own
cohort.
They
under
whatever standard was nearest, while Caesar and his lieutenants rushed to and fro, encouraging the patchwork lines and
striving to call order
from confusion.
the
was barely formed in this irregular manner, when reached the ground. They had crossed an open enemy stretch of nearly three quarters of a mile and forded a river,
The
line
which
may have
considerably cut
to,
The surface was occupied twenty minutes. the artificial hedges before referred up by
abatis.
which might be described as a sort of
This
cir-
118
THE LINES CONFUSED.
to prevent all manoeuvring.
cum stance operated
The
line
thus thrown together was an irregular convex formation, standing in so confused a manner that the legionaries had no
notion whatsoever of what was going on around them.
small body fought where
safety.
it
stood, as
it
were, for
its
Each own sole
other.
There was no possibility of mutually assisting each Aid could not be sent from one to another part of
the line.
There was, for the nonce, no head, no purpose. worse surprise can scarcely be imagined. Still there was
;
no manifestation of fear
proposed to fight
'
the legionaries set their teeth and
it
out as best they might.
legions were, as stated, on the left.
all
The Ninth and Tenth
with
These men behaved
the gallantry for which Caesar so
loved the Tenth, cast the pilum, fell to with the gladius, and
after a hearty tussle drove
back the Atrebates in their front
tired
for these barbarians
had become
and out of breath with
their hurried attack.
their sharp rush across the river
and
They were pushed, with great loss, across the ford, followed up and cut down by thousands. The Atrebates rallied for a
moment, but were again broken and hustled back Ninth and Tenth finally reached the Gallic camp.
until the
The Eleventh and Eighth
legions in the centre likewise
behaved with praise worthy fortitude. After a wavering combat, in which both sides lost heavily, the success of the Ninth
and Tenth on
foe
their left so
emboldened these two bodies
that,
with a shout of triumph, they made a
and pushed the Veromandui in to the river, on whose bank they kept up the combat. But this very success was the cause of the gravest danger. The advance of the four legions of the left and centre absolutely exposed
common charge on the their front sharply down
the front
and
left of
the
camp works
just
begun, and left naked the flank and rear of the Seventh and Twelfth legions on the right. While all this was going on, a
THREATENING DISASTER.
119
heavy force of sixty thousand Nervii, under Boduognatus, the chief in command, had been fording the Sabis and climbing the heights of Boussieres. Perceiving the opening, this entire force fell on the two legions, which numbered some
ten thousand men, striking them on the right flank (aperto latere) with a fierceness which the Romans had never yet
Battle on the Sabis (second phase).
encountered.
driven in,
The cavalry and light troops, who, had just rallied and placed themselves
this
after being
in reserve,
;
were again utterly disorganized by
while the host of non-combatants,
overwhelming onset drivers, servants and
sutlers, penned up in the camp, seeing a column of the barbarians penetrating into its very midst, made a hasty exit from the half finished rear-gate in the wildest confusion, and
made
for the woods.
So apparently
fatal
was the
disaster
120
CAESAR'S
rout, that
PERSONAL GALLANTRY.
and
in Gaul, took to its heels,
some auxiliary cavalry, reputed to be the best and conveyed to the tribes along the
route
that the
by which Caesar had advanced, and at home, the news Romans had been surprised and utterly destroyed.
had rushed
to
Caesar, at the earliest onset of the enemy,
the
left,
where the line was
first
the Ninth and Tenth legions,
threatened, and encouraged who under his cheerful words
and bearing had gone to work with a will which accomplished wonders. Thence he galloped to the centre, where his pres-
On his reaching the right, ence exerted a like happy effect. he found matters in the worst possible condition. On this
front
had
fallen the attack of the Nervii themselves, the
bravest of the brave.
The standards
of the Twelfth legion
had been planted so closely together that the troops were huddled in masses, and unable to fight to any advantage. The files were pressed too close to use the sword. There had
been a terrible
loss of officers, the missiles falling
fatality.
on the close
ranks with awful
was
killed or
wounded.
If Ca3sar
In some cohorts every centurion had not yet been hard
fill
pressed by the Gauls, he had his
efforts of the troops
of fighting now.
The
en-
were apparently slackening.
The
the flanks, and more and more were coming.
reserve.
emy, in vast numbers, was pushing in front and overlapping There was no
The
other legions had not yet worked out their
at its
problem.
The matter was
climax.
Defeat stared
massacre was its result. Caesar in the face, Snatching a buckler from a soldier in the rear, with the inspiration of dire as he later did at Munda, where, as he said, he necessity,
fought for his
the
life,
Caesar rushed on foot to the front to
reestablish order.
common
Seeing their chief performing the part of soldier, the courage of the men near by at once
revived,
and the good feeling spread.
They opened ranks
its
so
as to wield the gladius.
Their battle-cry resumed
normal
VICTORY HARD WON.
resonance, and
resolute.
121
the resistance to the
enemy became more
Rushing thence to the Seventh legion, Caesar reanimated that body in like manner, and brought it sharply up to the support of the Twelfth, and, as some critics read
the Commentaries, got the two legions back to back, so as to prevent being surrounded. The benefit of Caesar's gallantry
was immediate.
It struck the
heading the grenadiers at the bridge of Lodi.
same key-note as Napoleon's Such is the
effect of a great man's divine fury upon other men. It was the burning genius of the heart within, which could thus in
a moment transform disaster into victory, could revive the ardor of courage fast ebbing away. Such, too, was the
throbbing heart which turned the tide at Winchester, such the dauntless presence which saved the wreck of Chicka-
mauga.
It
began to look as
if
the Seventh and Twelfth
could hold their own.
of the battle, hastened up,
Meanwhile the two legions of the rearguard, having notice and being seen approaching by
the
enemy spread a disheartening effect among their ranks. Labienus, who with the Tenth legion had gained possession
of the enemy's
camp beyond
Tenth to
the ford, also perceived from the
hill opposite the distress of
the Twelfth and Seventh, and
This admirable body of men came up at a pas de charge, and took the Nervii in the rear with a shock which instantly reestablished the fighting
speedily sent the
their succor.
on the right and, seeing the change of tide, the camp-followers and cavalry regained their courage, and turning upon
;
the foe drove the flanking column of the barbarians from the
camp.
the battle was won, but so tenacious ; were the Nervii that the survivors stood and ground fought on the bodies of the slain, and even piled them up
tide
The
had turned
of their
as breastworks.
It
was by brute pressure alone that these
122
NERVIAN
The
little
LOSSES.
obstinately gallant barbarians could be forced to cease from
flight. They had fought with a doggedness exhibited by no foes Csesar The Roman army was exhausted as it ever encountered.
fighting.
remainder Ca3sar drove into
had rarely been, and
once fortified ; the
its losses
men
had been heavy. Camp was at buried the dead, and took their rest.
The old men from
the Nervian retreat shortly sent and
sued for peace. They stated that of six hundred senators but three had returned from the battle that of the sixty thou;
sand
men who had
now bear arms.
vanquished.
butchery, and
been engaged, a bare five hundred could Such had been the splendid valor of the
tribes not to assail
Caesar accepted their plea, arrested further
commanded the neighboring
them
in their utter present weakness.
The Aduatuci had been on
the Nervii, but frightened at
the march to the assistance of
reports of the battle of the
tl\e
Sabis, they turned back, deserted their other towns, and con-
veyed
all their
for defense.
people and goods into one, peculiarly adapted This town, whose name is not given, was situ-
ated upon a precipitous hill wellnigh inaccessible on every side but one, where a gentle slope not over two hundred feet
This slope they had fortidouble wall. These people were descendfied with a very high ants of some six thousand of the Cimbri and Teutones, who
in width descended to the plain.
had been
behind in charge of the baggage, while the bulk of the tribes had marched south and been destroyed by
left
Marius two generations before. This site was doubtless in the angle made by the Sabis and Mosa (Meuse) opposite Namur. Mt. Falhize is suggested as the location, but it does
not as well correspond with the text or with the distances
marched
as the other.
the legions
Against this town of the Aduatuci, Ca3sar, with seven of at once one was detached under Crassus
BIG GAULS VERSUS LITTLE ROMANS.
directed his inarch
123
found
its
Reaching the place, he location impregnable, and, seeing that he could not
the Sabis.
it,
down
otherwise capture
he began a siege by the construction of
The
Sabis to
Namur.
feet high
a rampart or line of contravallation. This work was twelve and fifteen thousand feet long, with redoubts at intervals. The length of the works is often given as fifteen
miles, but this is a manifest error, as the topography plainly
shows.
After the quindecim millia of the
text,
the
word
pedum must be understood. The barbarians endeavored to interrupt this work by repeated petty attacks, but to no
effect.
they saw the construction of a tower and vinea3 at a distance, they taunted the Romans for their small stature,
which, indeed, then as now, was in marked contrast to the
When
bulky bodies of the Germans, and of the Gauls who were of German lineage, and asked who would bring the tower to their walls. But when this same tower began to move to-
wards them, and actually did approach their walls, they at once sent ambassadors to treat for peace, alleging their belief that the Romans were aided by the gods. They begged that
they might retain their arms as a defense against their local enemies. Caesar demanded unconditional surrender and dis-
armament, but told them that he would command their neighbors to abstain from attack. The Aduatuci were fain to
submit.
Their manner of surrendering their arms was to
124
TREACHEROUS SURRENDER.
throw them from the town rampart into the trench, and the supply was so great that it filled the trench and made a pile
nearly up to the height of the rampart for a considerable distance along its circuit. Despite their surrender, the chiefs
had acted treacherously, and had yet concealed a third part After this apparent disarmament the gates of their arms.
were opened, and the
possession.
Roman
legions
marched in and took
When
the town to their camps.
night came on, the Romans were all ordered from Cassar feared the violence and
J^#;VU3hV
5*^
..
"fl**>l>s>*\
A ^ o
_
^/
-?
^ n
v
.
"ILE
V*
-V-^"
The Town
of the Aduatuci.
rapacity of his legionaries, and the
flow therefrom.
Still this
was a
from a town
that the
just captured.
which might than to retire danger The Aduatuci naturally believed
ill
results
lesser
less careful now that they had received the surrender of the town, and planned an attack that
Romans would be
very night upon what appeared to be the least strong part of
SACK AND MASSACRE.
Caesar's contravallation wall.
125
They had
the
arms not
sur-
rendered, and they
made new bucklers
of bark
and wicker-
work.
They
delivered the assault shortly after midnight and
Caesar, suspecting possible treach-
with considerable vigor.
The usual ery, had provided for just such an occurrence. was lighted at the point of attack, and the legionsignal-fire
aries at once rushed
from
all
points to the defense of their
like brave
threatened rampart.
but,
The Aduatuci fought
men,
with a loss of some four thousand killed, they were driven back into the town and penned in. Caesar retaliated
for this treachery
by marketing
the whole spoil of the town.
There were
fifty-three thousand people sold as slaves.
This
was
early in September.
this time,
During
Crassus,
who had been detached with
the Seventh legion against the maritime tribes living on the
northwest coast of Belgium, had done his work well, and reported that these peoples had all been brought under the
Roman
sway.
His method of operation
is
not known.
So great had the fame of Caesar's conquests become that many of the nations from beyond the Rhine, the Ubii in particular, sent
ambassadors to tender their submission to the
of returning to Italy,
Romans.
season was
But desirous
and
as the cold
now approaching,
Caesar put his troops into win-
der-quarters along the river Liger (Loire), among the Carnutes, Andes and Turones, echeloned between Orleans and
Angers and, inviting these ambassadors to return early the next summer, himself set out for the south. Reaching Rome, a a thanksgiving (supplicatio) of fifteen days was decreed,
;
longer period than had ever before been granted a
general.
Roman
suc-
The
cess.
best praise of this splendid campaign
is its
own
rapidity, clear-sightedness and skill with which Caesar divided, attacked and overcame the Belgian
The energy,
126
tribes is
CESAR'S ERRORS.
a model for study. The fact that he had next to no fighting to do is all the more to the credit of his strategy. But in this his second campaign, he still committed errors.
.PYRENEES
Winter- Quarters, B.
c.
57-56.
Many
of these are
more or
less
frankly acknowledged in the
in his unprepared
Commentaries.
His miscalculation
and
fc
therefore unsuccessful assault on
Noviodunum was a natural
even the greatest, commanders are liable. His being surprised, as he was at the river Sabis, by the Nervii was due to a piece of carelessness which
enough mistake, one to which
all,
came near being, and but for the stanchness of the Roman character would have proved, fatal. He should have placed
a garrison at once in the town of the Aduatuci, to forestall the night attack which he suspected might occur, and but for
good luck would have proved much more disastrous
to him.
THE COMMENTARIES.
He
127
should not have allowed his political desire to visit Rome to prevent his receiving the embassies tendering submission
by the German
to all
tribes.
The
surprise at the Sabis
is
the most
grave of these errors.
Caesar appears to have had, contrary
Roman
precedent, no troops out to protect the camp-
ing-parties, except a small cavalry detachment,
which plainly
had been checked by the enemy
unable to penetrate the woods.
close to the river
and was
This fact should at once have
excited Caesar's curiosity and have led to greater caution.
That he was not absolutely destroyed on this occasion he owed to the excellence of his troops, and by no means to his own skill or care. The Commentaries on this subject show
an uphill
to cover.
effort to palliate his error.
But
it
wa's too glaring
The
truth can be easily read between the lines.
Caesar, early in Gallic
War.
(Campo
Santo, Pisa.)
IX.
THE WOKK OF
During
CAESAR'S LIEUTENANTS.
57-56 B. C.
C.ESAK usually spent his winters in Cisalpine Gaul, to be near events in Italy. this winter, he sent Galba, one of his legates, to open the road from
Italy over the
Simplon and down the modern Rhone.
At Martigny, Galba had
Crassus, another legate,
a serious battle with the natives, but defeated them.
wintered
among
the Veneti on the coast, and sent ambassadors to gather corn.
These
officers
were seized by the Veneti and held so as to compel the return of
their hostages.
On
learning of this, Caesar at once
protect his envoys
;
the act.
He must
him
and
to
made preparations to avenge subdue the Veneti would more-
over give
easier access to Britain.
In order to cover more ground, Caesar
;
Labienus went to the Rhine region Crassus to Aquitania, Sabinus to the coast of modern Normandy. Brutus was put in command of the fleet. After a tedious campaign against the Veneti, they were
decided to divide his forces.
utterly overthrown
by Brutus
in a naval battle.
Meanwhile Sabinus conducted
a successful campaign against the Unelli, and Crassus a brilliant one in AquiThe year was finished by a^artial campaign against the Morini on the tania.
Channel, by Caesar.
lieutenants.
The work
of the year
had mostly been done by
Caesar's
ON
leaving for Italy for the winter of B. C. 57-56, Caesar
had sent Servius Galba, with the Twelfth legion and some
horse, against the tribes south of the lake of Geneva, the
Nantuates, Veragri and Seduni, to open one of the most available roads over the Alps between Cis- and Transalpine Gaul, which ran from Milan via the Simplon or the Great
St.
Bernard to the Rhone
valley.
The merchants and
set-
tlers, in passing through- this valley,
had generally experienced
a good deal of trouble from the native
them
tribes, who subjected did not rob them outright. It heavy imposts, they was essential for military security that this road should be
to
if
made
free to passage.
Galba was given permission
to winter
AN ALPINE
in the Alps, if
CAMPAIGN.
129
he deemed
it essential.
This Galba did, and
he rehaving defeated the barbarians in several combats, ceived their submission and hostages, and camped in the
where lay the town called Octodorus (Marcohorts to occupy the land of the Nantigny), detailing two
Rhone
valley,
tuates farther
down
is
the river.
The
valley
cut in two by the Rhone. the Gallic on the other.
lay on one side,
The Roman camp The Gauls formed
Octodorus Valley.
the plan of cutting off this solitary legion, which by reason of its small number they thought could easily be done. They
were indignant at the holding of so
as hostages
many
of their children to
by the Romans, and they feared annexation
all
Rome,
the fate of all the tribes of Gaul.
the suroff
These local clans had accordingly occupied
rounding heights and passes, victual and assistance. This
so as to cut
action,
Galba
from
taking Galba
to hold the
entirely
by
surprise, placed
him
it
in a
most
difficult situation.
Call-
ing a council of war,
was determined
camp and
abide the attack which the barbarians were sure to make.
This was the only present resource, though, for some unaccountable reason, the fortifications of the winter-quarters'
130
GALLANT DEFENSE.
Even Roman
orders and
camp had not yet been completed.
regulations were not invariably obeyed. The assault of the Gauls came in due time and was sudden
and severe.
The defense was
obstinate
and the legionaries
moved from
attacks on the wall.
small,
place to place to resist the constantly repeated But the number of the defenders was
and the enemy, whose force was considerable, were
able constantly to bring fresh troops to supplant the weary. So vigorously was the fighting pushed that even the Roman
wounded could not
until the
retire
from the trenches.
For
six long
hours the barbarians continued to press on in continual waves,
Romans had discharged
all their darts,
and Galba
the sword.
saw that their only hope lay in cutting their way out with The sortie was suggested by primipilus P. Sex-
tius Baculus,
who had
distinguished himself at the Sabis, and
C. Volusenus, a military tribune.
To
carry out the idea,
Galba gave orders to collect as many weapons as could be got from those which had fallen into the camp, and then to make
a sally from
all the
gates at once.
resulted in unexpected success.
at the
This desperate venture Surprised beyond measure
sudden appearance of the Romans and their vigorous for they were momentarily expecting a surrenonslaught
der
is
the barbarians, disconcerted, turned and fled.
This
a fair sample of the inconstancy of the
Gaul of that
Brave to a noteworthy degree, when surprised or once day. The bulk of the fighting done defeated, he could not rally.
by the legions was far from taxing their stanchness. The legionaries pursued and slaughtered above a third
of
the enemy, who could not have fallen much short of thirty thousand men. After this victory, having devastated the
valley as a punishment for the treachery, and being unwill-
ing to trust to the bad roads and worse population for his supply of corn, Galba passed through the Nantuates, picked
VENETAN REVOLT.
up
his
131
two cohorts and returned to the Province to winter, His conduct pitching his quarters among the Allobroges.
had been brave and
sensible.
Caesar, while in Hither Gaul, believed that he
was
safe in
setting out to Illyricum, as the Belgae had been subdued, the Germans expelled, the tribes along the most important road
over the Alps defeated, and Gaul appeared to be quiet. But Crassus, with one of the peace was not of long duration.
legions,
tribe near the Atlantic
had taken up winter-quarters among the Andes, a on the north shore of the Bay of Bisthe neighboring tribes the Veneti were the strongest.
cay.
Of
They owned all important harbors on the coast, drove a thriving commerce with Britain and Spain, and possessed great
numbers
of vessels
and considerable wealth.
Crassus, run-
ning short of victuals during the winter, had sent out some prefects and tribunes among the tribes to negotiate for a supT. Terrasidius had gone to the Unelli, M. Treply of corn. bius to the Curiosolita3, and Q. Velanius and T. Silius to the
Veneti.
These
tribes, led
by
the Veneti, having determined
among
themselves on protecting their territories and
made a
compact to act together, seized these officers, hoping thereby to be able to compel the return of their own hostages. They
sent, in fact, to
demand such surrender
.
as the price of the
return of Crassus' ambassadors.
Caesar,
being informed of these things by Crassus, but unable to take action during the winter, sent back orders to build a fleet in the Liger, provided rowers, sailors and pilots
from the Mediterranean coast of the Province, and commanded everything to be prepared for a marine expedition.
So soon as the season of B. c. 56 opened, he hurried to Gaul. The revolted tribes, knowing that they had, by seizing ambassadors,
committed the most inexpiable of
all offenses,
pre-
pared for the worst.
They
fortified their towns, collected in
132
CAESAR'S MOTIVES.
all
them
the breadstuffs which they could bring together, and
brought their fleet to Venetia, their principal seaport, situated probably in the estuary of the charges into the Bay of Quiberon.
of their tides
Auray River, which disThey knew that ignorance
and
inlets
and harbors would place the Romans
The Venetan
at a great disadvantage.
Country.
even sent for to Britain.
Allies, according to Ca3sar, were All the cantons on the coast from
the Loire to the Scheldt gave aid, material or moral.
There was not a moment's hesitation in Caesar's mind as
to the necessity of
surrection
is
subduing this insurrection. The term inused, inasmuch as these tribes had once handed
in their submission to Crassus,
fense of their liberties.
But
it
and now again rose in deseems a harsh word to apply
an
to these gallant peoples resisting the encroachments of
invader with no right but that of might to back him. The but they were as difficulties Ca3sar by no means underrated, nothing compared to the necessity of punishing the Veneti.
If
any tribe could, after giving hostages in token of submission, be allowed to transgress, without speedy retribution,
DIVISION OF FORCES.
133
the most universally accepted of the laws of nations, observed
even among distant barbarians, then all his conquests in Gaul were but a house of cards. This is the motive Caesar would
have us believe he acted on.
goes.
It is a valid
one as far as
it
But there was another reason
subdue the Veneti.
for Caesar's determination to
commerce with Britain.
it,
This people practically owned all the They were loath to have Caesar seize
Strabo
tells
as they feared he would do.
us that Caesar
had already planned to invade Britain, and to reduce the Veneti was a necessary first step, for they controlled the sea, and while he might push
his
way between
their fleets, they
could seriously threaten his rear during his absence. It must be acknowledged in Caesar's behalf that the neces-
subduing the whole of Gaul, if Rome was to extend her dominion in this direction, if indeed Italy was
sity existed of
to
be safe
and
if
Alexander was
justified in
avenging the
attacks of Persia on Greece, so was Csesar justified in avengIt is hard to criticise the ing those of the Gauls on Rome. claimed right of simple conquest among the anuniversally
cients;
and once we accept so much, nothing remains to
blame except unnecessary harshness in the exercise of conCaesar was justified from his standpoint. quest. As to the method to be pursued in this campaign, Caesar
decided that
it
was
essential to divide his forces, to
occupy
the country in a military sense, in order to impose on other
tribes
who might be tempted
to imitate the
example of the
Veneti.
He
therefore sent Labienus with part of the cav-
alry to the Treviri near the Rhine, with orders to sustain the
Remi and keep
quiet
ble inroads of the
had been invited
among the Belgae, and to resist possiGermans from across the river; for they to make another incursion by the Belgae.
Crassus, with twelve legionary cohorts and a stout body of
134
WINTER-QUARTERS.
and prevent
cavalry, he sent to Aquitania, to preserve quiet,
Aquitanian support to the Venetan insurrection. Triturius Sabinus he stationed among the Unelli, and other tribes
Distribution of Legions, B.
c. 56.
along the coast of modern Normandy, for a similar purpose. Decimus Brutus was given command of the fleet. He had
brought some galleys from the Mediterranean, and vessels were borrowed from the Pictones, Santones and others.
Caesar's eight legions at the opening of the campaign were thus distributed : north of the Liger, three legions ; in Aquitania one legion and two cohorts ; a legion on the fleet ; two
legions
and eight cohorts with Caesar. Galba had no doubt Caesar probrejoined from his winter among the Allobroges.
ably rendezvoused in the vicinity of Nantes, not far from the mouth of the Loire, and thence crossed the Vilaine.
VENETAN
The towns
access.
OPPIDA.
135
of the Veneti were
exceptionally difficult of
inaccessible except
Generally on points of land, they were at high tide by boats ; and the retiring tide, while it
gave access to land forces, was apt to leave the boats stranded
and
defenseless.
any town had been cut
desperate strait,
Again, whenever, after great exertions, off from the sea or been put into a the barbarians would simply embark their
goods on their own boats, of which they had a vast number, and escape through the creeks and bays, with which the
A Venetan Town.
Romans were not
familiar.
they carried on all through the
This shifting from place to place summer of 56 B. c. Their
ships were flat-bottomed so as to be the
more readily used
in
inland navigation, but with high bows and stern to resist the
waves and the shock of rams.
The wood was seasoned oak,
the parts of which were held together by heavy iron spikes an inch thick, and their anchors had iron chains. Their bows,
made much higher and stronger than
those of the
Roman
136
galleys, rendered
METHOD OF CAPTURE.
them
all the
more
difficult to attack or to
grapple
skins.
to.
Their
sails
were of
all
These boats were in
and thin but tough respects seaworthy, and far
soft
better adapted to shoal water warfare than those which the
Romans had
and
this
built
on their usual pattern.
Only
in speed,
by rowing, did the
Roman
galley excel that of the
Veneti; the latter was impelled by
sails alone.
The Roman method
as high as the
of taking the
Venetan towns was
to
build out from the main land two parallel dikes, sometimes
which when completed excluded tides and gave an excellent approach for engines and men a place of arms, in fact. It was a vast labor and the opera-
town
walls,
tion
was rendered nugatory
in
most cases by the escape of
Caesar
the barbarians as above explained.
The bulk
of the season thus passed without success.
saw that he could accomplish nothing without a fleet, and this was not yet assembled, though it had been ordered many
months before and rendezvous given at the mouth of the The tides, an unknown element to the Romans, the Liger.
lack of harbors, the inexperience of Roman sailors in these waters, and many other causes had operated to delay the
preparations.
But there
is
mentaries do not explain.
ily constructed.
something which the ComRoman galleys were very speedstill
Scipio Africanus, e. g., built and launched twenty quinquiremes and ten quadriremes in forty-five days ; Caesar had been at work nine months, and his fleet was not
yet equipped.
The delay was not a reasonable
one.
We
know but
half the truth.
After taking a number of the Venetan towns,' it was plainly brought home to Caesar that he was making no practical
He accordingly determined to risk the headway. event on the result of a naval battle. He camped on the
heights of St. Gildas, on the east of the
Bay
of Quiberon,
VENETAN AND ROMAN
and waited for
his fleet.
SHIPS.
137
This was shortly after assembled.
fleet
So soon as matters were made ready, the Roman
against the Veneti into the bay.
moved
sight,
When
it
hove in
about two hundred and twenty of the vessels of the Veneti
Bay
sailed out
of Quiberon.
man
line
and confidently made ready for battle. The Roformed near modern Point St. Jaques, with its
from
shore.
;
right not far
The Roman
ships were lower
even their turrets were not
so that the
as high as the stern of the barbarian ships,
marines could not effectively cast their darts, while fully exposed to those of the enemy. It was a question what tactics
could be advantageously employed.
rior only in courage
The Romans were
and
supe-
and
discipline,
their vessels in speed,
but this was
offset
by
their being
unused to and apprehensive
of the ocean, to
which they ascribed qualities different from
138
NAVAL BATTLE.
But they
luckily
their native Mediterranean.
had on board
a great number of grappling hooks (falces), not unlike those used in sieges to pull stones from the tops of walls, or, as
some construe
it,
had provided
sickles tied to the
end of long
These Brutus, by a stroke of genius, divined how he poles. f alx was slung to the mast the Rocould put to use.
mans rowed alongside the enemy and grappled on to the main cable which held up the yard and sail of a Venetan
ship ; after doing which the oarsmen would pull vigorously
away, thus cutting the cable and letting
sail.
fall
The
vessels thus disabled,
for they
the yard and had no oars,
were then at the mercy of the waves and ready to be boarded by the much superior Roman soldiers. Each one
boarded succumbed.
This naval
fight,
the
first of
the Atlantic ocean, was witnessed from the hills
-which we have any record on by Caesar
and the
entire
Roman army,
It
deeds of valor.
Though
boarded,
the ships of
a vast encouragement to must have been a splendid spectacle. the enemy outnumbered the Romans two
or more to one, after
many
of
them had been disabled and
the uncaptured ones soon
Roman valor prevailed, and
to take refuge in flight.
attempted
But a dead calm suddenly
Caesar's fortune always
arose so that they could not move,
came
to his aid at opportune
moments.
The wind
in this
bay
to-day blows at this season east or northeast till midday, then almost invariably a calm sets in. The attempt at flight was
unfortunate.
Venetan ships so that when the calm came, the Roman galleys could attack them one by one,
It dispersed the
without their being able to assist each other. From about ten o'clock till sundown the contest raged, and so effectual
were the
of the
tactics
and
discipline of the
Romans
that very few
Venetan galleys got to land,
and these under cover
of night.
CAESAR'S CRUELTY.
139
All the valor, youth and strength of the Veneti had been assembled in this one fleet. After its utter destruction there
remained to them no means of defense.
They had
neither
men nor
selves
vessels.
They were
fain, therefore, to throw them-
on Caesar's mercy. But, deeming, as he says in the Commentaries, that he could not forgive their infringement
of the sacred rights of ambassadors, Caesar determined to
make an example
of this tribe.
He
put
all
the senate to
death and sold the rest of the people into slavery. It would be hard to decide whether this act was more unpardonable
for its mistaken policy or for its ruthless cruelty.
Caesar
never considered this latter point. He did not often err in the former; but one or two of his acts of extermination appear
to be grave mistakes.
While one hardly
palliates a similar
policy on the part of Alexander, the cruelties of Caesar appear more monstrous on account of the intervening centuries of growth in civilization and international law. Not only was the military necessity which often constrained Alexander to
his acts absent in Caesar's case, but the latter's destruction
of
human
life
far exceeds anything of which Alexander was
ever guilty.
Almost
all critics
including Napoleon
are
particularly severe
Veneti.
It is
upon Caesar's unnecessary cruelty to the Caesar had less excuse than precedent for his action. strange that Alexander and Hannibal have been so conwhat
is
stantly upbraided for
termed their cruelty, while
this
quality
rarely imputed During the early part of this campaign against the Veneti, Titurius Sabinus had been engaged with the affairs of the
is
to Caesar.
Unelli, a canton south of
modern Cherbourg, in Normandy, whose king was Viridovix. This chief had collected a large army from all the adjoining tribes, principally the Lexovii and Aulerci-Eburovices, added to which were numbers of
robbers and soldiers of fortune from all parts of Gaul.
140
SABINUS* RUSE.
Sabinus started from the vicinity of Angers on the Loire, marched north, and camped among the Unelli. The remains of a camp some four miles east of modern Avranches, known
as
Camp du
Chastellier, indicate his probable location
and
Theatre of Sabinus' Campaign.
though the remains may be those of a later camp, it was not uncommon to pitch new camps on the old locations of predecessors.
This camp shows an interesting variation from
the usual shape, dictated
by the ground.
officer,
Sabinus was a cautious
with a bent to stratagem.
He
kept to his
camp, which he had established so that his
be cut
off.
breadstuffs could not
Viridovix camped over against him some two miles away on the other side of the
river
little
now
called the See, daily drawing
up
in battle
array,
ing the gage.
and taunting the Romans for cowardice in not acceptEven his own men grew dissatisfied and
;
ashamed
but Sabinus had his purpose in thus acting. He wished to bring about a habit of carelessness on the enemy's
parti
by inducing him
to underrate his opponents.
Having
THE BATTLEFIELD.
141
succeeded in so doing, he selected a crafty Gaul, and by promises of valuable gifts, persuaded him to pretend desertion
to the enemy,
where suitable representations to Viridovix
might convince that chief that the Romans were actually cowed by the situation. This spy was directed to state to the
chief that the
Romans were compelled during
the following
decamp and march towards Caesar, whose campaign against the Yeneti was rumored to be going wrong; and he was to seek to persuade him that the Roman army could be
night to
easily attacked
and destroyed before
its
retreat.
The spy
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Camp da
Chastellier.
proved to be a clever one. Viridovix, in effect, lent a willing ear to his story, and determined on assaulting the Roman
camp without loss This camp was
west, less so
of time.
situated on a hill, rocky
sides.
and steep on the
it
on the other
Towards the north
sloped
gradually
down a mile
or so to the river See.
In pursuance
of their project the
Gauls not only armed themselves fully, but carried large quantities of fagots and brushwood to fill
up the Roman trench.
They were over-eager
to reach the
142
THE BATTLE.
before the
camp down
Roman army
should get away ; and, loaded
as the warriors were, in toiling
its
up the
arrived in
front wearied
and out
of breath.
ascent, they Sabinus had
#f
V
Sabinus' Battle.
been watching for just
this chance.
The
signal
was given,
and the Romans, fresh and ready for the combat, rushed out ' Surupon the Unelli from the two corner gates at once.
prised and overwhelmed, the barbarians offered no resistance
worthy the name but, turning, sought safely in flight. The legionaries and horse followed hard at their heels, and
;
slaughtered the greater part of them.
This victory and the
shortly arriving news of Caesar's triumph over the Veneti for Caesar and Sabinus each heard of the victory of the other
about the same time
so entirely broke
up the
its
coalition of
these peoples that tribe
now
vied with tribe in their anxiety
acceptance.
to bring in their submission
and be assured of
CRASSUS.
This battle
is
143
another fair index to the hasty and impetuGenerous, courageous, ous, but frail character of the Gauls.
they were dangerous opponents at the inception of a campaign. But they became easily discouraged, and were never long of one mind. Their treaties for mutual support
patriotic,
were wont to be short-lived.
aster.
They were unable
to bear dis-
Polybius and Caesar gauge the Gauls alike. P. Crassus, meanwhile, had a large task set him in Aquitania, the territory which is comprised between the Loire
Vv-^vt
Theatre of Crassus' Campaign.
and the Pyrenees, where the Romans, a few years before,
under Valerius and Manlius, had suffered two galling defeats.
ing to his aid the best
Moving south and collecting corn in plenty, summonmen of Tolosa, Carcase and Narbo, in
the southwest Province, and enlisting auxiliaries, both foot
and horse, among the best material to be had in the cantons under Roman sway, Crassus crossed the Garumna (Garonne) and marched into the lan& of the Sotiates on the
left
bank.
These barbarians, having brought together a large force and much cavalry, attempted to attack the Romans on the
march.
horse,
They opened
the action
by a
diversion with the
meanwhile placing their infantry in ambush.
The
144
INTELLIGENT GAULS.
Roman
infantry, someits
horse was speedily routed, and the
what
in disorder with the fray,
was resuming
march and
defile, when it was suddenly assaulted by this force, which debouched from hiding, with exceptional vigor. The combat at once waxed hot. The barbarians were fighting for
passing a
their soil ; the legionaries to
their general-in-chief,
show what they could do without and under a very young commander,
which every Roman must have always had of the slender chance to be found in flight. And again Roman discipline prevailed.
also with the clear appreciation
and no doubt
The
Sotiates were defeated with great slaughter.
Crassus then laid siege to their capital, placed variously at modern Lectoure or Sos, the principal of their towns on
his line of march.
The
resistance
was so
effective that
he
was obliged
of
to build vineae
and
turrets.
The
Sotiates,
many
whom
were copper-miners, developed great
skill in resist-
ing these means of siege, undermining the Roman ramparts, and themselves building vinese, but without eventual success.
The Romans were
so bold
and persistent that they were
obliged to surrender.
Adcantuannus, with six hundred chosen
During the capitulation the chief, men bound to him
by a
off.
special oath, essayed to cut his
way
out, but
was headed
he was not denied equal terms, out of to his gallantry. Crassus then marched upon the regard Vocates, also on the left bank of the Garumna, and the TaruDespite this fact,
sates
on the Aturis (Adour). These peoples were intelligent enough to send for auxiliaries into Hither Spain, where war had been a long time
waged with the Romans, and obtained from there not only men, but officers of rank familiar with the Roman method of
warfare,
many
of
whom,
indeed,
had served under
officers,
Sertorius,
the great partisan-chief.
These
whose training had
been of the very best, began to fortify suitable positions, to
A BOLD ASSAULT.
occupy available
defiles,
145
and
to harass Crassus to such
an
extent and in so able a way, that he found that unless he soon came to battle, he would be cut off from his bread and driven
to a retreat beset
by danger.
He
therefore called a council,
as
was usual.
These
Roman
assemblies belie the saying that
a council of war never fights,
remained combative.
the Romans held them and now decided to fight. They
in the centre,
Next day Crassus drew up in two lines with the auxiliaries and offered battle. But the enemy, though
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Crassus' Battle.
greatly superior in numbers, preferred their Fabian tactics,
intending not to attack the
Romans
until they could force
them
into retreat for
want of corn, and thus have them
at
disadvantage, loaded down, as they would be, with their bagCrassus saw that there was nothing left but for himgage.
self
to attack,
though to assault
fortifications
was much
146
against the rule.
A CLEVER DIVERSION.
This he did, relying greatly on the eager-
ness of his troops,
who
loudly demanded battle, and deemed
the barbarians to be afraid.
The enemy had occupied and intrenched a formidable camp, in the Roman fashion. The attack was boldly made
on the front and flanks of the enemy's works.
fire of missiles
By
a heavy
the
Romans sought
The
to drive the defenders
from the ramparts, so that an assault might be made with
success, if undertaken.
auxiliaries served to supply the
legionaries
and
light troops with stones
to
fill
and weapons,
to bring
turf
its
and material
the trench.
While
the battle
was
at
height, Crassus
gate of the enemy's camp,
was informed that the Decuman, or rear was not well guarded. Moreover,
as a rule, the rear of every
camp was
less well intrenched
than the front and flanks.
Selecting the horse and such of
the cohorts as had been left to guard his
own camp, and
were therefore fresh, Crassus sent this force, with promises of great reward in case of success, by a long circuit and out
of sight, around to the rear.
The barbarians had
filed into the
so little
anticipated this, that the
Roman
and
soldiers demolished the for-
tifications of the rear gate
enemy's camp,
fell
before the bulk of the foe were aware of their being at hand.
The manoeuvre was crowned with
success.
The Romans
upon the enemy's rear with loud shouts and blare of trumpets,
the ardor of their fighting.
encouraged by which the legionaries in front redoubled No assault appears to have been
needed.
onset.
The barbarians were unable
Terrified, they turned
to resist this double
battle, cast
from the
them-
from the ramparts, and fled into the plains. Out of their entire number of fifty thousand men, barely a fourth escaped the sword of the Roman horse, which pursued them
selves
across the open.
This battle, fought in the
fall of B. c. 56,
resulted in the submission of substantially all Aquitania.
A BIG UNDERTAKING.
The whole
of
147
Gaul had now been reduced, save only the land of the Morini and Menapii, which extended along the
coast southerly
from the mouth of the Rhine to modern Bou-
logne, the land which the Dutch have since so laboriously rescued from the ocean. These peoples had never sent am-
bassadors to Caesar, and
when he approached
their territory,
taught by defeat of other Gauls, they retired into the forests
The Morini and Menapii.
and morasses of the coast and bade him
defiance.
Having no
towns, but dwelling in tents or in caverns, this was to them no great hardship. Caesar in person undertook to drive them
from their
lairs.
Arrived at the edge of the forests border-
ing on the lowlands of the sea, the vicinity of St. Omer, inland from Calais, to which locality these tribes had removed
all their possessions,
some
slight interchange of hostilities
took place, the barbarians attacking the
Romans
while pre-
paring to
camp.
Seeing that there was grave danger of
am-
buscades while advancing through the forests, Caesar began to cut a wide swath for his line of operations and astonished
the
enemy beyond measure by the
rapidity with which he laid
148
the forest low.
THE EARLY DUTCH.
For
their
own poor
tools enabled
them
to
work but
slowly.
The
cut timber Csesar piled on either
side of his path as a rampart.
He had
particularly good
engineers (prcefecti fabrum).
Especially L. Cornelius Bal-
bus and the knight Mamurra were noted for cleverness in This apparently vast undertaking tesenginery and sieges.
tifies to
the ability of these officers.
The Roman army, say the Commentaries, had already reached the rear of the retreating barbarian forces and had
cut out a
number
of cattle
owing
to the lateness
and wagons from their train but of the season and the setting in of severe
;
storms, Csesar was obliged to defer his operations against the
Morini and Menapii and to go into winter-quarters. After ravaging the country and burning such dwellings as there
were, the troops were
camped among the Aulerci and Lexovii
on the coast between the Sequana and Liger (Normandy).
Csesar gives the best complexion to this as to his other
campaigns but the truth is that he never entirely subjugated The Morini and Menapii were but the northwest of Gaul.
;
prevented from spreading mischief.
dent.
They remained indepen-
To
of the
Csesar belongs the credit of the intelligent cutting out
work
of this campaign.
But the success
of Sabinus
and Crassus must remain
sar's plans
their own.
Their execution of Cae-
came
fully
to their credit.
up to expectation, and redounds much The outcome of Caesar's fourth campaign,
against the Veneti, must be set
down
in
no small measure to
of
the able conduct of Brutus with a
quantum
good fortune
added.
No
criticism can belittle the splendid achievements
of Caesar; neither
must they be overestimated.
With
the
best troops in the then world, perfect in discipline, commanded by officers trained in all the minutiae of war, he was
contending with peoples
all
but savage, unapt at regular war,
CREDIT OF THESE OPERATIONS.
much
Romans
149
disunited in counsel, and unable to put into the field forces
superior to the
in numbers,
and in view of
all
conditions far inferior to them.
The fifth campaign,
But
against the Morini, has been called one
of pure ambition, quite unnecessary for the conquest of Gaul.
this does not so readily appear.
The Rhine,
the ocean
and the Pyrenees were the only boundaries which Caesar could set to his conquest of Gaul, if he was to make it at all and
;
without entering into the question of Cesar's right to conquer a square rood of the country, it may be assumed that
everything within those boundaries must be counted under the same head.
As
usual, Cassar personally returned to Cisalpine
Gaul for
the winter months of B. c. 56-55.
Light-Armed
Soldier.
X.
THE RHINE.
SOME German
far above
its
SPRING OF
55 B. C.
tribes, the Usipetes
and Tenchtheri, had crossed the Rhine not
mouth, crowded from their homes by the Suevi, the most powerful of the Teutonic nations. Once in Gaul, they had advanced into the Vosegus
Caesar's plan necessitated
country.
one hundred thousand warriors.
From
a check to these barbarians, who had over his winter-quarters near Amiens, he
marched
to the
Meuse
in
May.
In the ensuing negotiations, the enemy acted,
So, confessedly, did he.
Caesar claims, with duplicity.
And when
their
am-
bassadors next
battle,
body
sword.
camp, he detained them, put his legions in order of marched upon the unsuspecting Germans, surprised and put the entire to the four hundred and thirty thousand men, women and children
to his
came
A very few escaped across the Rhine.
its
This
is
unquestionably the most
guilty.
It
atrocious act of which
its
any civilized man has ever been
enormity.
accomplished
end, but this fact does not palliate
Caesar then built his cele-
brated bridge, and crossed the Rhine, probably near Bonn.
into the forests
The Suevi
retired
beyond
their domain.
broke down the bridge.
After eighteen days he returned and The foray had no useful results.
AT
the beginning of the next year, B. c. 55, there
was an
incursion across the Rhine, not far above
its mouth, by some which three years before had been harassed and driven from their lands by the Suevi. They had wan-
German
tribes
dered about in
Germany during
the three years and finally,
as a last resort,
had crossed the Rhine and devastated the
land of the Menapii with great slaughter. The preceding winter (B. c. 56-55) had been spent there, and no one knew
what
their next movements might be. The Suevi have been already mentioned.
They had
sent
over the troops which Caesar had defeated two years before under Ariovistus. They were a fierce and warlike people.
ANOTHER GERMAN INVASION.
151
They subsisted on meat and milk rather than corn, were great In hunters, and celebrated for their strength and stature.
the coldest weather they wore nothing but skins which scantily
covered their bodies, and constantly bathed in the open rivers. Their cavalry was drilled to dismount and fight on foot, the
horses being trained to remain where
left,
until the riders
They used no housings upon their and presumably, like the Numidians, no bridle, dehorses, On the east side of this spised luxury and forbade wine.
could again rejoin them.
people the territory was said to be devastated for six hundred miles on the west they bordered, among other peoples, on the
;
Ubii,
whom
was some of these Ubian
they had reduced to the payment of tribute. It tribes, the Usipetes and Tenchtheri,
which had now forced a passage of the Rhine to the number of four hundred and thirty thousand souls, and had advanced
some distance inland.
It
was thought, and
truly, that this
advance had been made with the consent of some of the Gauls,
who hoped by
power
this
immigration to be able to increase their
of opposing the
Romans.
The
place of crossing was
probably near modern Cleves and Xanten, which were opposite their territory.
On
the left bank, from
Xanten down,
is
a chain of heights some thirty miles long, at the foot of which
the river used to flow.
Xanten and near Cleves.
gaps pierce these heights, at That these passes were used by the
Two
Germans
fortified
in their incursions is
shown by
their having been
Romans after the conquest. The Usipetes by and Tenchtheri had moved forward nearly to the Mosa
the
(Meuse). Caesar joined his legions in Normandy in April, B. c. 55, earlier than usual. He determined to make immediate war
upon these Germans, who, justified by the invitation of sundry Gallic tribes, had already made incursions as far as the
Eburones and Condrusi, the
latter clients of
the Treviri.
152
C&SAR MEETS
IT.
He
mobilized his army in the early spring, from his winter-
Calling together the tribes of the vicinity at Samarobriva (Amiens), he wisely
quarters between the Sequana
and Liger.
Normandy
to the Rhine.
refrained from accusing
sion,
them
of complicity with this incureffect as to
but used his powers of persuasion to such
secure from
troops, and
them
-
victual,
a goodly number of auxiliary
especially a fine
body of
five
thousand horse.
From
to
the winter
quarters of his legions, Caesar probably
rendezvoused, early in
Amiens, and thence marched Cambrai, Charleroi, Tongres and Maestricht, where he This would crossed the Mosa towards the end of the month.
May,
at
have been his most natural
route.
There was need of
prompt measures. The danger was imminent. There must have been over one hundred thousand warriors among these
migrating peoples. Before he reached the Mosa, Caesar met ambassadors sent
by the Germans, who were authorized
sar
to treat, provided Cae-
would consent to their keeping the lands they had already
A CAVALRY SKIRMISH.
conquered.
153
would by no means permit, informing them that they must go back across the Ehine, where,
But
this Caesar
he suggested, the Ubii, who dwelt near modern Cologne,
would now grant them territory willingly; for this tribe had begged his aid against the Suevi, and stood ready to perform his behests. The German ambassadors pretended to assent
to these terms,
but asked Caesar to delay his advance for a
short space until they could report to their senate
and return.
This delay Caesar would not grant, as, according to the Commentaries, he believed that they desired only to gain time
until their horse,
which had gone on a distant raid among
the Ambivariti beyond the
Mosa
for provision, could return.
Crossing the
Mosa and
continuing his advance to within some
twelve miles of the enemy, Caesar,
perhaps near Straelen,
again met the ambassadors, who made similar excuses, and prayed for a delay of at least three days, when the tribes
would cross the Rhine
to receive them.
if
the Ubii
bound themselves by oath
was early in June. Caesar had left the vicinity of the Mosa, and had probably advanced beyond modern Venloo.
It
The Usipetes and Tenchtheri were on the
the Niers River.
levels near
Goch on
If
He
agreed to
advance but four miles, to
the nearest place where he could get water for the army.
our topographical assumption is so far correct, this was the Niers. No sooner had his cavalry moved forward to its vicinity than the Germans attacked this body with some eight
hundred horse and threw
four of their number.
back in disorder, killing seventyTheir tactics were peculiar. They
it
'made an onset on our men and soon threw them into
order.
dis-
When
our
men
in their turn
made a
stand, they
according to their practice leaped
feet,
from their horses to their
and, stabbing our horses in the belly and overturning a great many of our men, put the rest to flight, and drove
154
ALLEGED TREACHERY.
so
them forward
their retreat
much alarmed
that they did not desist from
till
looks like a serious case of fright.
they had come in sight of our army." This The attack appears to
TEN C HTE f?|
U5IPETES
JO
40
50
Rhine and Mease Region.
have been caused by some misunderstanding. It seems curious that five thousand of the Roman allied horse should have been thus driven back by so small a force. The attack must have been vigorously made and weakly met. This German
horse was always a fighting arm. Irritated at the defeat, Caesar determined to avenge it as an act of treachery, for,
as he explains, the attack
had been made while the ambassa-
dors were
still treating, and a truce existed; "after having sued for peace by way of stratagem and treachery, they had
AN AWFUL BUTCHERY.
made war without
provocation."
155
He
at once proceeded to
do the same act he so heartily condemns, paying no heed to
explanations or apologies. The next day the Germans again sent a large embassy to apologize for the yesterday's misadventure; but Ca3sar construed the act to be for the original purpose of obtaining a further truce till their still absent horse could arrive. The
ambassadors Caesar detained, and putting his army in three lines, probably in columns by cohorts, with the cavalry beaten
moved forward the intervening eight miles at a double-quick, and reaching their camp in an incredibly short time, took the Germans entirely by surprise, and fell on them with fury. Such was their consternation that, after a short resistance by a few who were not panicthe previous day in the rear,
stricken, the
directions.
Germans threw away The cavalry was sent
their
arms and
fled in all
in pursuit
and drove the
fugitives into the cul de sac
formed by the confluence of the
Mosa and Rhine.
Here those who did not perish by the
sword threw themselves into the river and were mostly Few succeeded in getting across. All, including drowned.
women and
children, were indiscriminately butchered, to the
thirty thousand souls.
number of four hundred and
but a few
The whole
nation was exterminated, save only the absent cavalry, and
Romans were wounded.
it
This whole campaign lacks clearness in the Commentaries.
Floras confuses
still
more by placing the defeat
of the
Usipetes and Tenchtheri in the confluence of the Moselle and Rhine, and Dion Cassius by stating that Caesar reached them
among
the Treviri.
This latter has been the theory of many,
who, in compiling their data, stray unwarranted
from the
The country in the Moselle-Rhine angle is much cut up, has no traces of ancient roads, and could scarcely have supported these tribes. To conduct his march on the
Commentaries.
156
CMSAR VERSUS HANNIBAL.
theory that he reached the enemy there, Csesar would have been led through the Forest of Ardennes, a fact which he
does not mention, as he most likely would have done. It looks more probable that the situation was as described, and that,
on learning of Caesar's approach, the Usipetes and Tenchtheri withdrew their foragers and retired towards their base among
the Menapii.
To
cross the
Rhine near the Moselle would
have led them to their enemies, the TJbii ; and to make them head that way is an improbable assumption.
This awful act in the Gallic drama has uniformly received
the severest condemnation of thinking men.
None
of the
extensive acts of retaliation of Alexander, not all the deeds
of
Punic cruelty charged upon Hannibal by his
bitterest ene-
the
mies during his fifteen years in Italy put together, can equal sum of destruction of human life here wantonly exhibited. Unlike some of the holocausts of Alexander, which were
required for his own and his army's safety at the distance from his base at which he found himself, this slaughter
appears to have been absolutely uncalled for. If the barbarians broke the laws of international intercourse, Caesar had
done the
like.
So indignant were
his political enemies in
Rome, that Cato openly proposed that Caesar's head should be sent to the surviving Usipetes and Tenchtheri in expiation of
his attack while their
ambassadors were in his camp.
Per-
haps no more inexcusable act was ever perpetrated.
Even
the plausible tone of the Commentaries quite fails to convey
an extenuation.
The unnecessarily harsh measures
thus insisted on were
it
of Caesar
all
would not be
not that of
the great soldiers of
antiquity, the one least deserving the accusation, Hannibal,
has come down to us bearing the reproach of cruelty. That the charge is unjust has been abundantly proven. It may be that none of these captains can be properly taxed with inhu-
CROSSING THE RHINE.
157
manity; that the trait belongs to the age and not to the men. But if cruelty is to be imputed to any of them, it is certain
that, of the three great captains of antiquity, Caesar
was by
far the most reprehensible, Hannibal the
least.
Having accomplished
III. phrases
it,
this "brilliant success," as
Napoleon
Caesar determined, as a means of imposing
on the Germans, to cross the Rhine, so that those tribes which were still unconvinced of his power might feel that
they were not safe from Caesar's reach even in their own He deemed it wise to show the Germans that no territory.
obstacle, natural or national, could arrest the
Roman
arms,
and
to
make them
see that,
if
however
distant, they could be
reached and punished
into Gaul.
they indulged in any more incursions
The occasion was good.
The party
of cavalry which
had
been on a raid at the time of the destruction of the Usipetes and Tenchtheri had retired across the Rhine and joined the
Sugambri, which was one of the most powerful tribes between where the modern Ruhr and Sieg join the Rhine. Caesar
sent and
demanded
their surrender
longing to those
who had
by the Sugambri, as betreacherously attacked the Romans.
This demand was refused, and at the same time the Ubii sent
again to beg for aid against the Suevi, who were grievously They offered all their ships for transportaoppressing them.
tion across the river, but this
safe,
means Caesar neither deemed
nor, says he, was
it
consistent with the dignity of the
Roman
tion.
republic to depend on others.
This invasion of
It
German
was beyond Caesar's province.
cedented construction of
solely by ambiWithout an unprethe rule of the Roman Senate, he had
soil
was dictated
indeed no authority to go beyond Gaul. Under the then well-understood laws of nations, he had no right to attack a
tribe
which had committed no covert or overt act of
hostility
158
CAESAR REFUSES SHIPS.
Rome, other than
the right of conquest.
against himself or
This
not desired to deny to him. So much is said of his and motives only to brush away the often made asserrights tion that Caesar was actuated by no motive save the patriotic
it is
one of defending the
Roman
republic.
The
refusal of the ships
and the project of building a
RI
TENCHTE
ostPtres
The Rhine.
bridge was probably the result of a desire to have a perfectly secure means of returning to Gaul in case of any reverse. This was wise. But it is a question whether the invasion
itself
was
wise.
the offensive,
country.
In Gaul, Caesar had of course maintained as he must, if he was to subdue the whole
it
But
is
scarcely doubtful that the best military
policy beyond the borders of
especially at so distinct
Gaul was a
strict defensive,
a natural barrier as the Rhine.
all
He
had made an example of and this was sufficient.
who had
crossed
it
into Gaul,
The
location of the bridge has been
much
disputed.
It
LOCATION OF BRIDGE.
cannot be absolutely proven.
159
of the
The confluence
Rhine
and Moselle below modern Coblentz has many advocates. Those who place the slaughter of the Usipetes and Tenchtheri at this place naturally favor
it
as the crossing point.
Some
authorities put the passage as far
down
the river as
Cologne.
There
is
reason for selecting
Bonn
as the crossing point.
The
fact given in the Commentaries, that Caesar passed
from
the land of the Treviri to that of the Ubii, would suit
localities.
many
bri,
no great distance from the Sugamand the confluence of the Moselle and Rhine is far above
at
But he was
the territory of this people.
crossed
"a
little
The next year but one, having above "the present bridge, Caesar started
to
from the Rhine and marched
Aduatuca (Tongres) through
by the Segni and Condrusi. From Cologne he would have marched north of these peoples from Coblentz, south. The bed of the Rhine about Bonn is well suited for piles south of Bonn it is more rocky, and the mountainous banks would make the location
;
;
the forest of Arduenna, from east to west, near
a bridge. Fifty years later, as we are told by Floras, Drusus crossed at this place to attack the Sugambri; and Drusus would likely have profited by Caesar's expeless desirable for
run strongly in favor of Bonn. build a bridge at this point over the Rhine, rapidly without previous preparation or a bridge train, is to-day no
rience.
The
probabilities
To
The river is over a quarter contemptible engineering feat. of a mile wide. Caesar accomplished the task in ten days from the time when he began to cut the timber. It was
mid-June.
The bridge was supported on
piles driven into
the bed of the river and held firmly in place by cross pieces and braces. His own description is clear : " He devised this
He joined together at the distance of two plan of a bridge. feet, two piles, each a foot and a half thick, sharpened a little
160
at the lower end,
PLAN OF BRIDGE.
and proportioned in length to the depth of After he had, by means of engines, sunk these and
fixed
the river.
into the river,
them
at the
bottom and then driven
like a stake,
them
in with
rammers, not quite perpendicularly,
but bending forward and sloping, so as to incline in the direction of the current of the river ; he also placed two (other
piles) opposite to these, at the distance of forty feet lower
down, fastened together in the same manner, but directed Both these, against the force and current of the river.
moreover, were kept firmly apart by beams two feet thick
The Rhine Bridge
(cross section).
(the space which the binding of the piles occupied), laid in at
their extremities between
two braces on each side
and in
fas-
consequence of these being in different directions
and
tened on sides the one opposite to the other, so great was the strength of the work, and such the arrangement of the materials, that in proportion as the greater body of water
dashed against the bridge, so much the closer were its parts held fastened together. These beams were bound together
by timber
laid over
them
in the direction of the length of
laths
the, bridge,
and were (then) covered over with
and
hurdles ; and, in addition to this, piles were driven into the water obliquely, at the lower side of the and these
bridge,
DESCRIPTION.
161
of the work, sustained the force of the stream ;
serving as buttresses, and being connected with every portion and there were
if
others also above the bridge at a moderate distance, that
The Rhine Bridge
(elevation).
trunks of trees or vessels were floated down the river by the barbarians for the purpose of destroying the work, the violence of such things might be diminished
by these
defenses,
The Rhine Bridge
(plan).
and might not injure the bridge."
the structure.
Plans best describe
Engineering feats are measured largely by the amount of As Caesar had all the men he available material and labor.
162
A SHORT CAMPAIGN.
could use and more, as the material was close at hand, and
form of bridge was one well-known to the Romans, the construction is noted chiefly for its great size and the
as the
remarkable speed with which it was accomplished. And it has already been stated that Caesar had exceptionally good
engineers.
He
did not have to contend with opposition to
Ms
passage.
Having completed the structure and posting a strong guard at either end in a suitable bridgehead, Caesar led his army
across
and moved up the Sieg and Agger.
Several nations
retired
at once offered submission ; the
Sugambri
from their
territory with all their wealth, "and concealed themselves in Caesar devastated their country, and deserts and woods."
marched into the land
the vicinity of
of the Ubii.
Bonn
as the crossing-place.
This fact also points to Had it been at
territory
Coblentz, he would have been in
the right bank.
Ubian
on reaching
Among
sent
the Ubii, Caesar learned that the Suevi had also
all their possessions
away
and wives and children
had
collected all their fighting
their land, a
men
at a spot about the centre of
number
of days'
march
to the east,
and were
as the
awaiting the arrival of the Romans.
But having,
Commentaries
state,
accomplished
all
he intended, and having
spent eighteen days beyond the Rhine, Caesar returned to
Gaul and broke down the bridge. He had really accomplished nothing.
the cavalry
He had
;
not recovered
demanded
of the
Sugambri
he had done no more
than promise help to the Ubii ; he had failed to attack the Suevi. The question arises whether he would not have stood
better in the eyes of the
Germans
wonder
if
he had not crossed at
all,
except, indeed, for their
In a military he would, perhaps, have acted more wisely if he had sense, remained in Gaul. This land had been sufficiently defended
at the bridge.
NOTHING GAINED.
by twice driving the Germans back
savage a punishment had brought absolutely no
;
163
across the
Rhine with so
territory
said,
his invasion of the
result.
German
In
fact, it
may be
that his failure to accomplish anything on the east shore of
the Rhine must have tended to lower his standing
among
the Germans.
But his reputation
in
Rome and
his self-esteem
had been greatly raised by the performance, to which his And letters, as well as the Commentaries, lent great lustre. his friends in Rome had something to offset against the
avalanche of reproach with which his enemies sought to overwhelm him for his slaughter of the Usipetes and Tenchtheri.
The passage
on as
it
of the
Rhine was as splendid a subject
to enlarge
was, in a certain sense, a brilliant achievement.
Gallic Horseman.
(From a Sarcophagus.)
XI.
BRITAIN.
dffiSAK
his Gallic
FALL OF
To
55 B. C.
had the
traveler's instinct.
invade Britain was even less a part of
problem than to cross the Rhine. But he determined to see that that they had given help to resisting Gallic tribes island, and a pretext was readily conjured up. He sought information from merchants and leading
Gauls and sent a subordinate over to Britain to prospect ; but he learned
little.
He He
shipped two legions and some cavalry in transports and crossed in August. reached the Dover cliffs and actually landed at Deal, though with difficulty,
owing to the warlike opposition of the Britons.
;
After a few days, a storm
;
damaged the fleet the Britons attacked Caesar, but were defeated a peace was patched up hostages were promised, who were never delivered and hav;
ing accomplished nothing whatever except as a discoverer, Caesar returned to
Gaul.
He had
run great risk of being cut
off,
and had
in
illy
provided against
in the
probable contingencies.
first
There
It
is little
commendable
a military sense
invasion of Britain.
had no connection with the
Gallic theatre of war.
THOUGH
the
the season was well advanced
it
was
late in
summer
Caesar determined to move over to Britain,
"because," as he says, "he discovered that in almost all the wars with the Gauls succors had been furnished to our
enemy from
be
that country ;
and even
if
the time of year should
on the war, yet he thought it would be of great service to him if he only entered the island and saw into the character of the people, and got knowledge
insufficient for carrying
of their localities, harbors and landing-places, all which were,
most part, unknown to the Gauls." This explanation The fact of British aid to has the look of an afterthought. the Gauls seems doubtful, and rests almost entirely on this
for the
statement and another that the Suessiones, under Divitiacus,
had extended
their control to Britain.
THE BRITONS.
It is probable that Csesar
instinct in addition to his
165
had a good deal of the traveler's ambition, and desired to know and
its
something about the
island
people,
its
harbors,
resources and accessibility.
Plutarch and Dion
Cassius
use to agree that the expedition against Britain was of no search for pearls, a Rome. Suetonius says Caesar was in
rather
weak motive.
Any
reason, good or bad, which could
belli
plausibly be used, sufficed for a casus
to invade a country.
when
Csesar wished
to the coast in July,
And so it was with Britain. Returning and calling to him all the merchants he could find, he interrogated them, and ascertained that these was people knew only that part of the British coast which
immediately opposite to Gaul, and
little
indeed of that,
inasmuch as they had never been able to go inland, and had traded only in one or two places.
vague, but good considerHe thought the ing the difficulties of obtaining information. The climate of Britain more temperate than that of Gaul.
Caesar's description of Britain
is
same products of the
were known, but ripened more The population was considerable, and the east and slowly. south coasts had been peopled by the Belgse, who had crossed
soil
the Channel for spoil and ended
by
settling in Britain.
Can-
tium (Kent) had thus been settled. Each tribe had its king. Csesar mentions the Trinobantes, in modern Essex and Middlesex,
in Suffolk ; the Segontiaci in
whose oppidum was no doubt London the Cenimagni Hampshire and Berkshire the
;
;
Bibroci in Sussex and Surrey; the Ancalites and the Cassii
farther north.
The Britons were, on the whole,
thatch.
less
advanced
in civilization than the Gauls.
of
Their habitations were huts
They buried their corn in underground vaults. Their towns were mere places of refuge in forests, defended by a ditch and rampart. They had the same structure as the Gauls, but the Britons were taller and bodily
wood and rough
166
THE FLEET ASSEMBLED.
They wore
and milk, with
little
bolder, with long blond, rather than red hair.
skins and lived on flesh
vegetable food.
They painted their bodies blue with woad. Polyandry was common. They sold tin to the Phoenicians at a very early
age, but relied on foreign nations for bronze.
They had no
Their religion was Druidical. ships. They fought with swords and small bucklers, and skirmished, rather than long
fought in masses, as the Gauls did.
Their chariots were nu-
merous and
able.
little
As
Caesar could ascertain
about Britain, he sent
Caius Volusenus with a ship of war to make a rapid examination of the coast, to
ascertain
what harbors
there
might be for a
large
and something fleet, about the peoples, their sysof
tem
war and customs.
fleet to
He
Gaul to Britain.
ordered the
assemble
in one of the harbors of the
Morini,
later Portus Itius,
not improbably Boulogne, though it cannot be taken as setwhither he himself, by steady marches from the Rhine, tled,
repaired with all his forces, and
many
ships
from
all
be brought directions, including those with which
to
commanded
he had fought the Veneti. While this was going on, several tribes from Britain, who had, no doubt, heard through
THE FORCES.
merchants of Caesar's
victories,
167
his preparations to
and of
invade their land, sent in their offers of submission.
These
ambassadors he received with courtesy, and sent back with them Commius, a Gallic chief, whom Caesar had made king of the Atrebates, and in whom he reposed great confidence.
leading Britons.
many Commius was to visit as many of the British tribes as he could; make them familiar with Caesar's exploits tell them what manner of people the Romans were
;
;
This man,. Caesar says, stood high in the sight of
satisfy
them that the new-comers would be friends and not
foes ;
and say that Caesar in person would shortly arrive. Volusenus brought back his report in five days. He had not even landed. He had seen and could tell but little.
This brief time, and apparent lack of push, had enabled him to catch but a glimpse of the coast.
The Morini had luckily given in their submission and surrendered numerous hostages, excusing their late resistance on the score of want of knowledge of the Romans. This had
been done without a further' campaign, which Caesar had anticipated; there, was now no enemy left to prejudice his
rear.
He
had, during August, provided eighty transports,
which
sufficed for the
two legions, the Seventh and Tenth,
presumably under Galba and Labienus, which he proposed to take with him, to be escorted by a suitable number of war
galleys.
The two
legions
must have been
less
than ten
thousand strong. The horse, four hundred and fifty effective, was marched to and embarked on eighteen transports from
another harbor some eight miles up the coast, Portus Ulterior (Ambleteuse), where, in addition to some tardiness, they had
been held by contrary winds. The quaestor, the legates and praefects were divided up among the men of war, in such a
manner that each had a The
rest of the
certain
number under
his charge.
army
Caesar left with Titurius Sabinus and
168
LANDING OPPOSED,
Arunculeius Cotta to hold head against those coast-tribes of the Menapii and Morini which had not yet so frankly submitted as to make him feel confident he could trust them
unwatched.
in
A garrison under Sulpicius
Rufus was
also left
camp in the harbor of departure. Caesar set sail with the first favorable wind, towards the
A. M.) arrived
end of August, B. c. 55, and in a few hours (one to ten on the British shore opposite the chalk cliffs
of Dover.
In Caesar's day the sea came so close to the
cliffs
that a dart thrown from the top would reach the tide-covered
beach; but by about 950 A. D., the old port had been quite blocked up by alluvium. As this spot did not appear to be
a good place for landing, after cautioning his officers to act at about three P. M. promptly in their orders, he sailed
some seven miles farther up the coast, doubling, according to Dion Cassius, a lofty promontory, no doubt South Foreland,
and stopped
Britons,
at Deal.
The
who had assembled
in great
numbers on the
shore to oppose his landing, guessed his intention and followed up his movement, sending cavalry and chariots on
Their opposition to the landing of the Romans was This they conducted by advancing into the very spirited. water and casting their javelins at the Roman legionaries as
ahead.
The men thus found it difficult to they attempted to land. out of the boats, because these drew too much water to get
get close to shore, and they themselves were heavy-armed and laden with camp-gear. Caesar, to escape from this dilemma,
sent some ships of
stones, arrows
war
to a cove close by, where, with sling-
flank.
retire
and engines he could attack the Britons in This diversion surprised them and obliged them to
Perceiving that the soldiers slow to land, the standard-bearer of the Tenth
somewhat up the beach.
still
were
legion leaped into the waves with the legionary eagle, and
ANCIENT AND MODERN SOLDIERS.
called
169
on the men to follow him
if
they would not see their
their very eyes.
to the shore,
sacred
emblem captured by
the
enemy under
The
soldiers of the
Tenth at once swarmed
which example so encouraged the whole body of the Romans
that they speedily leaped into the water to drive
away the
sides.
enemy.
"The battle was maintained vigorously on both Our men, however, as they could neither keep their
ranks,
nor get firm footing, nor follow their standards, and as one from one ship and another from another assembled around
whatever standard they met, were thrown into great confusion. But the enemy, who were acquainted with all the shallows, when from the shore they saw any coming from a
ship one
by one, spurred on
their horses
and attacked them
few, others threw
while embarrassed;
their
many surrounded a
weapons upon our collected forces on their exposed flank. When Caesar observed this, he ordered the boats of
the ships of
war and the spy-sloops to be filled with soldiers and sent them up to the succor of those whom he had observed in distress.
their footing
Our men,
as soon as they
made good
on dry ground, and all their comrades had them, made an attack upon the enemy, and put them joined to flight, but cotdd not pursue them very far, because the horse had not been able to maintain their course at sea and
reach the island.
This alone was wanting to Caesar's accus-
tomed success."
It is little items like these
which enable one to draw a com-
parison between the ancient and
modern
soldier.
To
read
under heavy fire, conin such a haphazard way, where each man appeared ducted
of a disembarkation of troops to-day,
to consult his
own ideas of prudence or courage instead of under the orders of his officers, would savor of absurdacting ity. Discipline of old was good, but even under Caesar it
170
THE FLEET DAMAGED.
what they called
did not seem to reach the grade of the best discipline of
to-day; that
is,
discipline
was a
different
thing from ours.
The
particular tribe of Britons which
had been thus beaten
concluded to sue for peace, and there came back with the British ambassadors Commius, whom Caesar had sent into
Britain with the messengers that had been dispatched to
into Gaul.
him
This
man
the Britons had seized and thrown into
chains, a fact
which seems to deny the influence the Com-
mentaries claim that
Commius had in Britain. now returned Commius with pretended excuses
duct, saying that the multitude
The Britons
for their con-
had overwhelmed them.
The
apparent complete submission of these coast-tribes constrained He felt Caesar to forgive this breach of the law of nations.
that he was not strong enough to do less.
He
took some
hostages and required more.
presently delivered.
Thus
in four days after the legions
These were promised, but not had
landed, a peace was patched up with the peoples
ited the shore line
who inhab-
on which he had landed, to wit, Kent.
cavalry, which had sailed in eighteen transports from another port, reached the coast, but met with a serious storm
The
near by. They were unable to land, though they tried to do At the same time a very high tide so, and returned to Gaul. and damaged a large number of the vessels in which destroyed
the legions had crossed the Channel.
full
This was the season of
moon and high tides, at the end of August, 55 B. C. The Romans had not drawn their ships far enough up on the shore. The war -galleys had been beached; the transports
were riding at anchor. The heavy seas filled the galleys and dashed the transports one against the other. Those that were
not crushed lost their anchors, tackling and
inability to repair this loss,
sails.
The
and the fact that the Romans had
not corn enough to winter in Britain, not only caused a
TREACHEROUS PEACE.
171
certain feeling of insecurity among the soldiery, but afforded the Britons an opportunity to reconsider their action in
submitting to Caesar.
Therefore, instead of bringing in their
promised hostages, they conferred together, and agreed to
attack Caesar's camp, in the belief that
this
if
they could destroy
army, none other would ever cross to Britain. Caesar's camp was small. The legionaries had come without much
Caesar,
baggage.
we
hear,
had but three servants with him,
though
this does not give
one
much
of an idea of the general
impedimenta.
had
lost
The barbarians saw he had no many ships. The opportunity looked
cavalry and
favorable to
expel him.
Suspecting, though not informed of their designs, Caesar
made
provision against every probable contingency, and saw
it
personally to
that the discipline of the
camp was The
strin-
gently enforced.
rians
Peace was not ruptured, and the barbain the
went to and fro
Roman
quarters.
ships
were duly repaired
in the expedition
for there were numberless shipwrights
brass of the worst
materials as
by using the seasoned timber and the damaged ones to repair the rest. Such
lost in the
had been
wreckage were sent for to
the continent.
Only twelve remained unfit for further use.
Seventh legion, having gone out as by where the wheat
scattered filling their sacks.
Not long
after, the
usual to forage at the only place left near
had not been
cut,
was attacked by the enemy from an amThis
bush while the
legion,
men were
surrounded by a host of cavalry and chariots, was on
the point of succumbing, for the novelty of the dashing chariots and the strange shouts given by the Britons had greatly
demoralized the men.
They had huddled together
in
a mass,
and the barbarians were casting weapons on them from all sides. Even the Gallic wars had not yet made them proof
to panic.
172
A SUDDEN ATTACK.
:
" Their mode of fighting with their chariots is this firstly, they drive about in all directions and throw their weapons,
and generally break the ranks of the enemy with the very dread of their horses and the noise of their wheels and when
;
they have worked themselves in between the troops of horse, leap from their chariots and engage on foot. The charioteers
in the
battle,
mean time withdraw some
little
distance from the
that, if their
and so place themselves with the chariots
masters are overpowered by the number of the enemy, they may have a ready retreat to their own troops. Thus they display in battle the speed of horse, together with the firmness
of infantry ;
expertness that they are accustomed, even on a declining
steep place, to check their horses at full speed,
and by daily practice and exercise attain to such and
and manage
and turn them in an
instant,
and run along the pole and stand
on the yoke, and thence betake themselves, with the greatest
celerity, to their chariots again."
Caesar, perceiving
that something
was wrong from the
great clouds of dust which could be seen from the camp, had speeded to the assistance of the legion attacked, with those
cohorts of the Tenth which happened to be on duty.
Disen-
gaging it by a vigorous assault on the Britons, who promptly retreated, he deemed it wise to retire at once to the shelter
of the camp.
The Seventh
legion had lost heavily.
For
several days no further action
was taken on account of the
rainy weather;
Caesar was kept close to the limits of his
works preparing for a further attack; while the Britons collected troops from all the neighboring tribes, urging that now was their opportunity to redeem their cause. Caesar
had no cavalry save about thirty horsemen brought over by Commius, but he determined nevertheless to engage the
enemy
so soon as his troops were again in proper condition.
He
thought he could accomplish something with even thirty
RETURN TO
horsemen.
GAUL.
173
After the lapse of a few days, the Britons made Caesar drew up his legions a demonstration on the camp.
in its front with the purpose of accepting battle.
But the
Britons, though they
made a smart
assault,
were unable long
to withstand the well-drilled ranks of the legions,
and being
routed and pursued, lost
many men; whereupon
the
Romans
devastated the vicinity and returned to camp. The Britons now again sued for peace, which Ca3sar deemed
it
wise to grant after doubling the
number
of hostages they
were to furnish.
And, no doubt fearing that he could not
enforce their present delivery, he ordered these to be brought over to the continent by a given time. Then, the autumnal equinox being near at hand, which Caesar desired not to
encounter at sea, he embarked and safely reached the shores of Gaul. He had been less than three weeks in Britain.
Two
The
ships were, however, carried farther
down
the coast.
three hundred soldiers in these, after safely landing,
were on the march to rejoin the main army, when they were surrounded and attacked by some warriors belonging to the
Morini,
who were
shortly reinforced
up
to six thousand
men.
The legionaries defended themselves manfully, drawn up in a circle for nearly four hours, until Caesar's cavalry, which he
happened at the eleventh hour The Morini were penned in by the to come to the rescue. and large numbers were killed. cavalry
had sent out
in quest of them,
For this act of the Morini speedy vengeance was taken. Labienus, with the Seventh and Tenth legions, just back
from Britain, marched into their land, and, as the morasses were almost dry at this season, was able to reach and capture
all
the tribes which
had taken part
in the attack.
These
were no doubt summarily dealt with. The legions under Sabinus and Cotta, which had been sent
out
among
the Menapii, had been unable to hunt
up the
174
A USELESS CAMPAIGN.
Having, therefore, mowed
habitations, they returned
natives in their forest retreats.
down
all
the crops
and burned the
to camp.
The
limited effect of Caesar's invasion of Britain
fact that out of all the tribes
is
well
in
shown by the
who handed
their submission, only
The peace and
Caesar
its
two sent over the hostages demanded. security had been a mere farce.
winter-quarters
now took up
among
the Belgae, and,
returning himself to Rome, was decreed a thanksgiving of
twenty days. This decree was, however, violently opposed by his enemies under leadership of Cato, who depreciated or
laughed at his performances as and overrated them.
much
as his friends extolled
It cannot be claimed that the
been
brilliant.
The
crossing of
campaigns of this year had both the Rhine and the
Channel had been without
result.
In the former case
this
is
has already been pointed out.
subject to equal criticism.
The campaign
into Britain
Caesar's preparations for crossing
were lamentably wanting.
He had
too few ships
he sailed
without his cavalry, absolutely essential
had chariots and horses
in plenty.
among tribes which The expedition may be
said to have been undertaken in a happy-go-lucky way.
The
invasion of Britain was no part of Caesar's military
the conquest of Gaul.
interests quite as
scheme so far as concerned the mere protection of Rome by But Caesar was looking to his own
much
as to those of
Rome.
To him
his his
own
success
was Rome's.
Each conquered land enhanced
to his riches ;
reputation and might add
fame and wealth
fur-
thered his political aspirations.
This ambition was proper
enough.
It is
and
soldiers.
what has inspired some of the greatest of men But it was the ambition of a Napoleon, not of
It led to over-rapid operations, not carefully
a Gustavus.
planned, the results, or rather the lack of failure of which are
ITS DEFECTS.
largely due to good fortune.
175
of
The most necessary elements
:
the
a distinct conception of his plan; scrupulous preparation for what he undertakes; and courage tempered with caution in its execution. He should not undertake operations without full consideration of what
of a great captain are
work
every step
either the
may mean. These elements scarcely appeared in German or British campaign of this year. Caesar's
upon an unproven, perhaps
right to go to Britain he based quite
improbable assertion, that the Britons had aided the
Gauls during his campaign against them.
tense
of examining the ground.
He made
no pre-
Volusenus, sailing alone along the coast, could at best bring him but little information quite insufficient to warrant him in risking his
two
that he left no force whose special duty
His preparations and conduct were deficient in it was to protect his return should he be driven back; that he carried along no
legions.
victuals or
baggage
that he left his cavalry to
come behind
;
in a haphazard
way
that he had no vessels in reserve
that
he apparently knew nothing about the ebb and flow of the tide on the shores of Britain, or had not thought of it;
that he inflicted
harm on
;
the
enemy rather than gained an
and that he showed an unnecessary advantage cruelty against the Britons as he had against the Gauls and Germans. Some of the best critics go so far as to say
himself
that both campaigns of this year were
in conception
awkward and
deficient
and execution, and were as far from useful as from glorious. Had Alexander planned his steps after this fashion, he would never have penetrated beyond the edge of
the Persian empire; had Hannibal contrived his
Italy as carelessly, he would not have held his
work
in
own
for one
campaign.
Indeed,
it
may
be said that Caesar's good star
was
at the
And
bottom of his coming out whole. yet, if viewed in the light of reconnoissances in
force,
176
RECONNOISSANCE IN FORCE.
unknown
lands,
to ascertain, in
what he might be able
to
do
with a stronger expedition thereafter, perhaps both these campaigns may be absolved from such criticism. On no
other ground, however, are they even tenable.
But
is
the
commander-in-chief whose death would
,
mean
the destruction
of his army, warranted in leading such a reconnoissance in
person ?
Gallic Swords.
177
XII.
CASSIVELLAUNUS.
NOT
satisfied
SPRING AND SUMMER,
54 B.
C.
with his
first trip
to Britain, Caesar prepared to cross again.
This time he took better precautions, though there is little to justify either invasion from a military point of view. In all he had eight hundred craft, carrying eight legions and four thousand horse.
The balance
of his force he left on
set sail in July, landed
the Gallic coast under Labienus, to protect his base.
safely,
He
and marched inland
to attack the Britons.
the
fleet.
Caesar returned, hauled
up
the fleet on the beach, intrenched
Once more a storm damaged it, and
again set out.
of the
After several engagements with the Britons, he forced a passage
Kingston.
Cassivellaunus,
Thames near
who commanded
St.
the Britons,
opposed him ably, but Caesar marched as far as
deserted the national standard, and Cassivellaunus
many tribes was unable to do much to
Albans, for
check him.
the fleet
When
Caesar was at a distance, the tribes in the rear attacked
camp and compelled his retreat Caesar recognized that there was nothing for him to gain by subduing the island. He had seen what manner of
land and people there were in Britain.
as a traveler, nothing as a soldier,
He
retired,
and returned
to
having accomplished much Gaul in two embarkations
without accident.
C.3ESAR had not yet satisfied his curiosity with regard to
Britain.
When
leaving for Italy to attend
to
political
affairs after the
manded
campaign of the preceding year, he comhis lieutenants to construct as many new vessels as
possible during the winter,
and to have the old ones well
Channel a second time.
repaired, purposing to cross the
He
ships himself, making them somewhat broader, so as better to accommodate the cavalry and other burden, and with lower sides, so as to be more easily loaded
planned the
new
and unloaded.
the beach.
be more readily drawn up on These, as described by Caesar, were for a similar
They could
also
purpose substantially imitated by Napoleon, in 1804, showing
178
1LLYRICUM.
the conditions to have remained practically the same for the
intervening centuries.
They were
fitted to
row or
to
sail.
The equipments were brought from Spain.
recognized the failure and faults in his
ain.
first
No doubt
Caesai
invasion of Brit-
No man was more
opponent's errors than he.
ready to profit by his own or his This is really one of Caesar's
strong points, though in writing the Commentaries he
to
acknowledge as
much.
in a
He
is unapt determined that he would do
the
it
more business-like manner, so that might not only add to the dominion of Rome, but to his
work over again
reputation in such a fashion as to silence those wordy and troublesome adversaries who had laughed at his first
expedition.
own
During Caesar's winter absence from his Gallic legions, he was called on to settle what promised to prove a warlike
The Pirustae had been laying waste question in Illyricum. the boundaries of that province. To meet the emergency
Caesar at once began to raise troops. But seeing his promptness and having heard of his Gallic exploits, the Pirustae sent
and offering
ambassadors to make their peace, praying humbly for pardon, to make compensation for all damage committed.
These terms were accepted, for Caesar did not wish to turn
from the Gallic problem, and hostages were given for their
performance.
On
returning to his Gallic army in June, Caesar found that
about six hundred transports and twenty-eight ships of war had been constructed or repaired and made ready to launch.
Strabo says he had established a naval arsenal at the mouth
of the Sequana. Ordering the fleet, when ready, to rendezvous and await his arrival at Portus Itius, which was the
nearest harbor, as he supposed, to Britain, he himself took four legions without baggage and eight hundred horse, and
marched against the Treviri, who were threatening trouble,
THE
and
it
NEW
FLEET.
179
was said had again invited the Germans across the Rhine. There is no clue to which legions he took. The Treviri,
we remember, were very numerous and strong in
territory bordering
cavalry,
and occupied
chiefs,
on the great
river.
Two
Indutiomarus and Cingetorix, his son-in-law, were
contending among the Treviri for the upper hand in the government. Indutiomarus placed in the Ardennes forest all the
people incapable of bearing arms, raised an army and prepared to fight. But when many chiefs deserted him to make
submission to Caesar, he concluded to do the
like.
Caesar
gave the power to Cingetorix, who had been singularly attached to him. This made of Indutiomarus an implacable enemy. Both having brought in their submission and delivered up two hundred hostages, including Indutiomarus' relatives, Caesar, being anxious to go to Britain, settled the
matter for the time being, though leaving the two chieftains His trip had unreconciled, and returned to Portus Itius.
consumed the month of June.
Here he found that
been able to reach were
all
the ships, save forty, which had not
this port
built, stood ready for sailing.
from the Matrona, where they He had six hundred
transports and twenty -eight galleys, plus a
barks, eight hundred in
all.
number
less
of private
In order to leave
chance of
trouble in the rear during his coming absence, he proposed to carry with him nearly all the Gallic horse, numbering four
thousand men.
They would be
also insisted
in the nature of hostages for
the good behavior of the tribes to which they belonged.
With them he
upon taking Dumnorix, the
chief
of the JEdui, a
man "fond
of change, fond of power, possess-
and great influence among the Gauls," with whom he had heretofore had difficulty, for Dumnorix
ing great resolution
was aiming
of Gaul.
at the chieftaincy of the ^Edui,
and the autocracy
persuade Csesar to
This
man
used every
artifice to
180
leave
DUMNORIX KILLED.
him behind, and
finally, unable to accomplish his he broke out into open revolt and rode away with purpose, the whole cavalry force of the .2Edui. Though Caesar had
been detained twenty -five days waiting for a favorable wind, and one had just begun to blow, he saw that he could not for
a moment temporize with so grave a matter. He sent the bulk of his horse in pursuit. The fugitives were caught up with, and the mutiny came to a speedy termination by the
killing of
Dumnorix;
for the
troops had been ordered to Caesar made
commanders of the pursuing bring him back, dead or alive.
There
much more
careful preparations for his present
descent on Britain, and for the protection of his rear.
were assembled at Boulogne eight legions and four thousand His legate, Labienus, was placed in command of cavalry.
the detachment left in Gaul, which consisted of three legions
and two thousand
normal strength,
horse,
seventeen thousand
men, at
a force amply large to provide tempoLabienus was also to take rarily for the safety of the land. to insure Caesar a steady supply of corn. His orders steps
were general, to act for the best interests of Caesar under any circumstances which might arise. Labienus was, to all appearances, a faithful, and was unquestionably a clever
lieutenant.
One can but wonder how he
could prove so
treacherous as he later did, or sink so low in ability. Caesar took with him the other five legions and two thousand horse,
to
some twenty-seven thousand men, if we assume the legions be full. There is no means of telling how strong the
it
legions at this time were.
and
is
Later they were greatly depleted, probable that at this date they fell below the
set sail,
numbers given. Caesar embarked and
craft,
with over eight hundred
one day at sunset, thought to have been the twentieth of July. The fleet sailed with a southwest wind till mid-
LANDING IN BRITAIN.
night,
181
by dint continuous, the British coast was made
when
the wind fell; but,
of hard rowing
and
in the morning, and next midday, after having been carried somewhat too far
Britain.
Goodwin Sands, from whence the were rowed back, made good the landing at several
north, probably to
at a place
vessels
points,
which the preceding year Caesar had discovered to
be a suitable spot. The Britons had been frightened by the appearance of this enormous fleet, the like of which they had never imagined,
and in
lieu of opposing the landing, had, as Caesar learned
from some prisoners, concealed themselves some distance back of the coast on the high land.
The
operation of this year stands out in marked contrast
Caesar had brought victuals, baggage, a
to that of the last.
sufficient fleet, his cavajry,
and enough troops
to enable
him
182
to accomplish
subsist
ADVANCE INLAND.
For quite a season he could on what he had, and he had perfected arrangements
some
result.
for future supplies.
safer place, taught
Caesar probably chose his
camp
in a
by the experience of the last year. Atrius in charge of the ships, with a strong Leaving Q. two from each legion and three guard of ten cohorts
hundred horse, Caesar marched by night towards the place, some twelve miles distant, where prisoners had told him the
enemy lay encamped.
party of warriors, who, with chariots
Little Stour, near Kingston
Here he was met by an advanced and horsemen, essayed
or Littlebourne.
to dispute his passage of a small river, very probably the
The
Gallic
cavalry, however, easily threw this force back, and following it up, Caesar found the main army strongly intrenched in a
fort well protected
by
felled trees,
"which -the Britons had
before prepared on account of a civil war." The locality cannot be identified, nor indeed are most of the places settled
beyond dispute.
But some
of
them may be considered
as practically determined.
The
Britons, not content with
having harassed the marching column very materially, offered in a desultory way quite a stubborn defense of their fort;
but the Seventh legionaries, having thrown up a temporary terrace and forming a testudo, overwhelmed the barbarians
with missiles, captured the fort, and drove the Britons out of The loss of the Romans was small. Caesar the woods.
forbade their pursuing to any distance, lest they should fall He desired, moreover, to intrench his into an ambuscade.
camp more
carefully than usual.
On
the morrow,
when
Caesar was about to pursue the
to several
Britons, and
had already given marching orders
detachments of foot and horse, three of which had proceeded some distance, had caught up with the barbarian rear, and
were pushing them to a fight in
netreat,
he received by
THE FLEET DAMAGED.
183
mounted messengers word from Atrius that a storm had These had destroyed and damaged a number of the ships.
been
left at
anqhor, and had been violently dashed against
each other by the heavy sea. The experience of the last year had not been heeded, and the same danger had been incurred.
Recalling the cohorts already in pursuit, Caesar marched back to the fleet. Here he found that forty of the vessels had been
seriously broken, but that the
damage
to the rest could be
repaired with time and labor.
He
detailed skilled
workmen
from the legions for this purpose. He also deemed it wise to send to Labienus in Gaul to have additional ships built.
And he now took the precaution, though at great labor, to haul the ships up on the beach out of the reach of the waves,
and strongly fortified the position. This work consumed ten days and nights of unremitting toil, for eight hundred ships
would take up much space and were not easily handled. If each was eighty feet long by twenty wide, and they were put six feet apart and in four lines ten feet apart, they would
occupy a mile of beach three hundred and fifty feet wide. To add the space required for the crews and room to receive
the legions as well would
ground. The time occupied was mainly used in putting the
tions
make a camp covering much This was, however, no unusual feat for the Romans.
fortifica-
beyond fear of capture.
August had come, and Caesar
had made small headway. The same cohorts were
left to protect the new camp, and Caesar marched back to the place where he had last met the
enemy.
Here he found the Britons assembled under com-
mand
of Cassivellaunus, a noble chieftain whose territories
were separated from the maritime states by the Tamesis (Thames) about eighty miles up from the sea, above London. The several tribes, who were constantly at war, had laid aside
their
own feuds
in order to
meet the common enemy, and
184
BRITISH CHARIOTEERS.
disliked,
though Cassivellaunus was universally recognized as the best commander.
he had been
The
British foot was useless against the legions.
Cassivel-
launus recognized this fact, and appears to have discharged it. But the cavalry and chariots proved useful. They hovered
about Caesar's column on the march, made frequent attacks,
and gave unceasing trouble
daunted by the
stained skins,
to the
Romans, who,
at first,
fierce looks of these barbarians, their
woad-
ended by finding discipline more than a match for their wild tactics. After
their courageous demeanor,
and
camping, a constant skirmish was kept up with the outposts. The Britons at one time appeared suddenly from the woods and drove in a Roman guard with serious loss. But Caesar
sent forward two cohorts as reinforcement,
after
and the action
some time resulted
in greater loss,
who were
driven back to the forest.
by far, to the Britons, The method of fighting
of the Britons
was novel
to the
Romans.
The
charioteers
did not act in large bodies, nor indeed the cavalry, but in small squads, relying upon their individual prowess. They would often purposely retreat and then turn furiously upon
the pursuers, and as often as necessary they relieved the
fighting
of the of
men with fresh ones. The drill and heavy masses Roman legions were by no means suited to this method The Roman allied horse was subjected to the warfare.
difficulty, for the Britons, seeing that
same
they could not
meet the squadrons on equal terms, merely skirmished in loose order and cut out an occasional horseman whenever
chance offered.
Caesar does not give us details of just what means he One is led to believe adopted to meet these novel tactics.
that Caesar's legionaries in this their fifth year of campaign-
ing were not as apt at coping with the unusual as Alexander's phalangites, who could and did skirmish as well as they
ANOTHER AMBUSH.
fought in line or column, against any and
Caesar's legionary
all
185
comers.
Still,
hand
to
was an adaptable fellow, able to turn his almost anything. He had already had considerable
experience in dealing with
new methods
is
of warfare,
and to
rank him as he was at
this period after the
had been trained by
well
Philip,
Macedonians, who no disgrace. Later, he came
up
to their standard.
Probably without altering any-
thing of the regular formation or maiiffiuvring of the legion, Caesar was able to meet the Britons at their own tactics.
Next day the enemy assembled "with less spirit than the day before," on the hills surrounding the camp, and challenged the
ers,
Romans to battle by advancing cavalry skirmishwho galloped tauntingly around the Roman horse without This challenge being venturing to make a serious attack.
refused,
when towards noon Ca3sar
all
sent out the legate Trebo-
nius with three legions and
expedition, the Britons,
the cavalry on a foraging
who
lay in ambush, suddenly and
from
all sides, fell
upon them.
The barbarians fought with
uncommon
standards.
They pressed on so sharply vigor and daring. that the legionaries were compelled to close in round their
But, as always, Roman discipline under able leadership prevailed; the Britons were driven back and
broken, and in the pursuit, a vast number of them were killed. The cavalry, finding itself sustained by the foot,
kept so close to their heels that they were unable to display
their peculiar tactics. their
Reinforcements which came up to
dispersed.
in
aid were
likewise
severe,
and thereafter no attack
columns.
The punishment was force was made on the
Roman
After these preliminary combats, Caesar advanced on Cassivellaunus via Maidstone and Westerham. He saw that the
enemy proposed
to
draw the war out
to a great length
and
believed that he had better force the fighting.
In order to
186
FORCING THE THAMES.
the Thames.
reach Cassivellaunus, he must cross
Several
places were fordable, and at each of these localities the enemy had erected defenses. Caesar chose a spot between Kingston
and Brentford.
Here he found that Cassivellaunus had
driven sharp stakes into the farther bank and into the river bed near by, with the points below the surface of the water,
and expected
overwhelm the Romans when they These stakes should get into disorder in forcing the ford. were probably driven both above and below. Caesar had got
to be able to
this device
wind of
snare.
from prisoners, and was able
or
to avoid the
the river up Sending so as to cross and take the Britons in flank, and, following up its mano3uvre with the legions, who, though the water was up
his cavalry to points
down
to their necks, dashed into the ford with courage, the
com-
bined onset was so sharp and vigorous that Cassivellaunus'
men
This
It
sought safety in
flight.
Polysenus says Casar had an
doubtful.
of the auxiliaries of
elephant, the sight of which greatly disturbed the Britons.
is
not elsewhere mentioned, and
is
was the middle of August.
Many
Cassivellaunus
now
deserted him, and he was reduced to de-
fend himself with his
own
forces,
men
in chariots, perhaps seven or eight
amounting to four thousand hundred chariots,
with their auxiliary fighters. in a small system of warfare.
goods, and to fall upon the
He
showed himself an adept
all
Knowing
the paths of the
country, he was able adequately to hide his people, cattle and
Roman
foragers wherever they
went, from one ambush after another.
So
clever were his
devices, that he succeeded in almost entirely preventing for-
aging at a distance from the main body of the legions and so effectively did he interfere with their obtaining corn, that one is tempted to make the same criticism upon Caesar's
;
passing over to the north side of the Thames which was applied as a whole to his first invasion of Britain.
SOME TRIBES SUCCUMB.
At
this time, the Trinobantes,
187
who
lived in
modern Essex
and Middlesex, came in and surrendered, they being one of No the most powerful tribes and inimical to Cassivellaunus.
doubt Caesar had exerted
this result.
all his
diplomacy to bring about
The Trinobantes were secured from plundering
by the Roman
soldiers, and on giving forty hostages, and corn for the troops, Caesar reinstated their chief, furnishing Mandubratius, who had been to Gaul to see Caesar, and was
still
with him.
The
old king, his father, Cassivellaunus had
killed.
Other
tribes, the
Bibroci and Cassi, soon followed this example.
Cenimagni, Segontiaci, Ancalites, These tribes
covered substantially the entire southeast section of Britain. Learning from the new allies to what place Cassivellaunus
had
he had fortified his capital, at modern St. Albans, probably, though it could have been little more
retired, that
than a camp, and had collected in it a large force and much After reconnoitring cattle, Caesar took up his march thither.
had a rampart and ditch, "admirably fortified by nature and by art," and lay in a thickly wooded district, he determined upon attacking it from two directions. The
the camp,
it
storming columns made short work. The Britons did not long resist the assault, but hurriedly retreated by the gate on one of the sides which had not been attacked, leaving be-
hind corn and
cattle, and losing many people in the flight This was not a very flattering victory, nor a decisive, but it furnished a pretext to declare the advance
and pursuit.
a success, and enabled Caesar to withdraw from a campaign which promised no eventual gain.
While Caesar was thus engaged, Cassivellaunus sent messengers to the tribes in Kent whose kings were Cingetorix,
Carvilius, Taximagulus,
to
make a sudden
attack on the
and Segonax, and persuaded them Roman fleet and camp. This
they did with a large force, but the Romans, expertly sallying
188
CASSIVELLAUNUS SURRENDERS.
out upon them, routed them, killed a vast number, and captured Lugotorix, a celebrated leader. This was, indeed,
fortunate.
A disaster at the rear would have meant destruc-
tion of all Caesar's forces.
After this defeat Cassivellaunus, thoroughly alarmed by his
want of
success,
by the wasting of the country, and by the
many tribes, concluded to treat for peace. He Commius to make advances for him. Caesar, as employed the summer was far spent, it was now the end of August,
desertion of
and he
felt that
he must return to Gaul, where some tribes
had revolted and others were threatening to follow suit, after taking great numbers of hostages and prescribing a
tribute to be paid the
Roman
people,
and forbidding Cassi-
vellaunus, moreover, to attack the Trinobantes or
Mandu-
bratius, concluded peace. By no means all of the vessels which had been sent back to Gaul for supplies had returned
to Britain.
Many had
gone astray.
over.
Caesar had fewer ships
by far than he had brought convey his army back to Gaul
in
two
was compelled to trips, for his numbers
He
were swelled by an array of hostages and prisoners. There were many disasters to vessels returning empty from the first
crossing, but the transfer
containing soldiers,
of
was managed without loss of a skip and Caesar reached Gaul after an absence
his ships, he called a great
two months.
Having housed
congress of the Gallic tribes at Samarobriva (Amiens) in the
land of the Ambiani.
The
skill
resultless as those of the previous one,
operations of this year in Britain were practically as though the care and
with which the invasion was conducted were in this case
Caesar had accomplished nothing substantial.
commendable.
As
Tacitus remarks, he had
made
rather a survey than a
reduction of Britain.
He had
not added a
new province
to
Rome, nor indeed paved the way for so doing.
He had
not
INEFFECTIVE CAMPAIGN.
left
189
back hostages, to be
assure
to look
a force to hold what he had conquered. He had brought sure, but their possession was unable to
him any
control over the island.
We
are constrained
upon the expeditions to Britain in the light of invaconsideration or effect.
sions
made without proper warranty,
They had no influence upon the military problem in Gaul.
However valuable
as giving historians their earliest bird's-eye
view of Britain, from a military point of view they were
unnecessary and ineffective.
Wounded
Gaul.
(From a Sarcophagus.)
xm.
AMBIORIX.
WINTER, 54-53
B. C.
THE crops had been poor. Caesar spread his legions in winter-quarters ovei a large area, so as more readily to subsist. The camps were three hundred miles apart between extremes. Of this fact the Gauls took advantage. Ambiorix attacked Sabinus at Aduatuca.
Instead of fighting
it out,
Sabinus relied
upon Ambiorix's promise of free exit, and sought to march to Cicero's camp, the nearest to his own. But he did this carelessly, was attacked, and entirely
cut up.
Ambiorix then marched
to Cicero's
camp and
tried the
same
artifice
of promising free exit.
Cicero acted the soldier's part and held to his camp.
Caesar heard of these events.
He had
but seven thousand
men whom on
the
spur of the
Cicero.
moment he
could concentrate.
With
It
these he set out to rescue
So soon as he reached the
vicinity,
Cicero's
camp and advanced
and
to
meet him.
Ambiorix quitted the siege of was nine to one. Caasar, with
admirable ruse, led on Ambiorix, who despised his meagre numbers, to attack
him
in careless order;
it.
falling suddenly on him, defeated his
army and
dispersed
He
thua released Cicero from his bad case.
Few
of Cicero's
men
had escaped wounds or death. Labienus meanwhile had been attacked by the Treviri, but had won a brilliant victory.
an exceptionally dry season the corn-crop had not been good in Gaul during the year 54 B. C. so that
to
;
OWING
Caesar, as he says,
was obliged
to disperse his legions to
provide them food in winter-quarters during the succeeding winter. Fabius, with one legion, was sent to the Morini,
and established himself
at
modern
St. Pol;
Q. Cicero, bro-
ther of the orator, went with one to the Nervii, between
the Scaldis and Sabis, and
camped probably at Charleroi; with one, was placed among the Esuvii, in southern Roscius, Normandy, near Seez; Labienus, with one, was among the
Remi, near the Treviri, very likely at Lavacherie; Crassus, Plancus and Trebonius, with three legions, occupied Bel-
WINTER-QUARTERS.
191
Trebonius at Amigium, between the Scaldis and Isara, ens, Crassus among the Bellovaci at Montdidier, twenty five miles from Amiens, Plancus near the confluence of the
Winter-Quarters, B.
c.
54-63.
Oise and Aisne; and the new legion last raised on the Po, and five cohorts, under Sabinus and Cotta, were placed near
among the Eburones, the country governed by Ambiorix and Cativolcus, at Aduatuca (Tongres). The bulk of the legions were thus in the northwest section of Gaul.
the Meuse,
The exact The
locations are, of course, not certain.
The only
ones which are determined are Samarobriva and Aduatuca.
others are set
down according
as topographical features
or the subsequent establishment of
Roman
oppida, or camps,
suggest the probable earlier locations, and are approximately
correct.
five cohorts.
These forces made up a grand total of eight legions and This was the same number Caesar had had for
a year.
No new
ones were raised
till later,
though some
192
GAUL DANGEROUS.
authorities claim that there was, at this time, one extra one,
or nine legions and a half.
Caesar determined to remain with the
army
until the
camps were
all
fortified.
One
legion (Plancus') was later
hastily sent to the Carnutes in the neighborhood of
modern
Chartres, where Tasgetius,
allies,
for Caesar
who was one of had replaced him on the
Caesar's firm
throne of his
forefathers
from which he had been driven,
had been
murdered by his subjects. Plancus' orders were to hunt up the murderers, and send them to Caesar for trial.
It proved in the event that these several
camps were un-
able to support each other in case of need.
They were,
as
the crow
flies,
over three hundred miles distant between
the
extremes; or
if
camp
of Roscius be left out, the other
camps could not be contained in a circle of a diameter less than one hundred and sixty miles. Why Caesar chose to so
divide his forces can be explained only on the score of ex-
treme stress of victual.
Even
this scarcely suffices.
Corn
he had or must procure, despite the bad harvests, and he could in some fashion have brought the supplies into magazines.
His method was clearly a miscalculation, natural
enough, but not Caesarian. Having, not far from the end of October, received word
from
his quaestor that the
camps were
all intrenched,
it
appears that he did not personally inspect the camps, Caesar prepared to leave for Cisalpine Gaul.
Gaul was only outwardly quiet. The Roman legions were The Gallic tribes had been really camping on a volcano.
fearfully maltreated,
bearing
all
fruit.
The people were
and the mistaken policy was now poor, their chiefs had lost
power and influence, large districts had been devastated, and starvation promised to be the lot of thousands. The
Romans were always
careless in
providing for conquered
NO RENDEZVOUS.
peoples.
193
Caesar had been particularly so in Gaul.
He
imag-
would prevent insurrection; but it produced the reverse effect. Fury and despair outweighed
ined that this
very fact
calculation or
common
sense.
It does not appear that
a general rendezvous had been
it
given the legions, in case
concentrate.
Caesar,
became
essential for
them
to
To do who had not
this was,
in fact, not the
method
of
yet taught himself some of the most
necessary lessons of the military art, which even among In the African cambarbarians require to be observed.
paign,
we
shall see
still
more glaring instance
of this, the
outcome of a certain habit of carelessness on Caesar's part. Caesar's theory was that each isolated body, as was possible
in a well intrenched
defend
itself,
and victualed Roman camp, should and take the most available means of procuring
succor from neighboring legions.
When
he was absent, he
did not, in fact, leave any one in command.
Each
legate
was independent.
of
With
his
any military situation, weeks after all the legions had been settled, a sudden insurrection arose among the Eburones (a tribe south of the
enormous grasp of the requisites this is somewhat curious.
Two
confluence of the
of
Meuse and the Rhine), under leadership
These chiefs had apparently
Ambiorix and Cativolcus.
been friendly. They had at least brought in provisions to Sabinus and Cotta. Though these chiefs struck the first
blow, Indutiomarus of the Treviri
the prime
is
thought to have been
mover of the
rising.
The insurgents began by making an assault on the Roman soldiers who were gathering forage and wood for the camp
under Sabinus at Aduatuca.
doubtful.
distances
parties
That
this
was Tongres
is
not
No
other place satisfies all the requirements of
and topography made by the Commentaries. These rallied, held together and reached camp, whose
194
AMBIORIX ATTACKS.
The Spanish cavalry completed. successful sortie, which, coupled to the stanch front
up the
attack.
defenses had just been
made a
of the legionaries, broke
Then, after their
usual treacherous manner, the barbarians asked for a confer-
This was unwisely granted. C. Arpineius, a Roman knight, and Q. Jumus, a Spaniard, who personally knew
ence.
Ambiorix, being sent on the parley, the Gallic chief informed *he messengers, with every show of truth, that he had been
compelled by his people to make the attack on the camp that he himself was Caesar's constant friend; that this day had
;
been selected throughout Gaul for an attack on the isolated legions that a large force of Germans was within two days'
;
march; that for their own safety, Sabinus and Cotta had best retire; and he promised under oath that he would give them
a safe -conduct.
Upon
was
ily
these statements being reported, a council of
war
which the most opposite opinions were stormCotta, backed by many of the tribunes and expressed.
held, at
centurions, was for holding on.
They had
rations; he be-
lieved that
Caesar would come
to their relief,
and that untold
forces of the
Germans could be encountered
in their fortified
winter-quarters; why, then, should they, on the advice of the enemy, cast aside these advantages? But finally, late
at night, Sabinus succeeded in
imposing his opinion on the
others.
This was to the
effect that
though the information
did come from an enemy, they would do well to regard it and not wait till the Germans arrived ; that Caesar had probably started for Italy; that they had the choice of quick
retreat or
a prolonged siege
that they could easily join the
nearest
Roman
winter-quarters, which were but sixty miles
away; that the statement of Ambiorix bore the stamp of It was determined probability, though he was an enemy. to retreat towards Cicero at early dawn.
A HASTY RETREAT.
The
its
195
soldiers spent the night without sleep,
making prepa-
rations for the march.
At daybreak
the column started on
way, not in close order and with due precautions, but strung out and hampered by an immense amount of baggage,
as
if
relying solely on Ambiorix's promise of safe-conduct,
least
and not in the
on their own resources.
This utterly
..
Camp
at Aduatuca.
un-Roman conduct shows how much more the safety of an army depends upon the commander than upon the men. The enemy, from the stir of the camp, quickly perceived that the Komans had decided on retreat. They accordingly
placed an ambuscade in the woods about two miles from the camp, on the road the Romans must pursue on the march
towards Cicero's camp. This was in the defile of Lowaige, on the heights north and south of the village, where the
Geer flows between two hills.
The Gauls occupied both
exits
and the adjoining eminences.
The Roman army started on its ill-fated march. No sooner had it descended into the valley where the Gallic
196
THE GAULS BEHAVE WISELY.
troops lay hid, than the barbarians emerged from cover and attacked the head and rear of the Roman column. Sabinus,
who had been
full of vigor.
for retreat, quite lost his head ; Cotta,
who had
and
yielded to his views only after long persuasion,
was active and
The
discipline of the soldiers
was
lax,
each -one, instead of rallying on the standards, sought rather to save some of his goods from the baggage-train. The
column was much extended.
It
was hard to convey
orders.
to such
The march had been begun without the precautions essential an operation. The men were not kept closed up;
no method of defense was apparent; every one worked on an independent basis. The train soon had to be abandoned.
Danger crowded the legionaries together, and the army was drawn up in a square (prbis) for defense.
The Gauls behaved
but
first victory.
wisely.
They did not seek plunder,
Roman
defeat
legions.
They began a system of tiring out the Out of the square, from time to time,
would charge on the enemy and uniformly then retire again to their place in the line. The ; barbarians soon ceased to offer resistance to these charges.
certain cohorts
him
Whenever one was made, they would
the
retire
but so soon as
Roman
would rush forward and beset their
of the cohorts exposed
cohorts turned back, being lighter armed, they flanks, and the flanks
by
their advance.
Though, in the
square, the
Roman
lost
his
initiative, the impetus which
made him
strong, yet from early morning till near nightfall the legionaries held their ground without disgrace, but at a serious loss in men
and officers. Sabinus, still weakly relying on Ambiorix's word, sent Cnaeus Pompeius, during a lull in
the fighting, to ask a conference with him.
To
this being
granted and protection again promised under oath, he himself and a number of tribunes went; but during the conference
they were surrounded and slain ; whereupon the Gauls again
A MASSACRE.
197
attacked the circle, and, owing to the demoralization of the men, speedily forced their way into it. Cotta was slain; a
few of the cohorts cut their way out of the melee and managed to get back to the camp, where the survivors all committed
suicide during the night.
A handful of fugitives found their
way
to the
camp
of Labienus, nearly seventy miles distant.
Ambiorix, elated at his victory, made forced marches with
his cavalry,
the infantry following as rapidly as possible, to the westerly clans of the Aduatuci and the Nervii, to
rouse them to embrace this opportunity of revenge and free-
dom.
by his exaggerated promises, willand all the neighboring and dependent ingly joined him, tribes were sent for. Having assembled a large force with
the utmost dispatch, they attacked some foraging parties, and
These
tribes, elated
then the
camp
of Cicero at Charleroi,
who had heard not a
word of the disaster to Sabinus and Cotta, and who was exThe legionaries pecting nothing so little as an insurrection.
rushed to arms and manned the vallum, and the Gauls were
foiled in their
hope of seizing the place out of hand. Cicero at once dispatched messengers to Caesar, but of these
despite great promises of reward
through the enemy's
all
lines.
none made their way The roads and passes had been
his precautions
beset
by
the Gauls.
Ambiorix had taken
well.
The Romans had got together a great deal
winter-quarter fortifications.
of timber "for
after
During the night
the
attack they worked hard at the defenses of the camp, shortly building one hundred and twenty towers (the towers were
built as they
still build scaffolds in Italy, by lashing together and cross poles), weaving hurdles and preparing upright burned stakes and mural spikes for use from the battlements.
Not even the wounded could cease from
labor.
The enemy
attacked next day, and thanks to the preparations were
198
beaten back.
for
A SOLDIER'S ANSWER.
some days.
Desultory attempts to take the camp continued Cicero, though sick, would give himself no
rest until obliged to
do so by his men.
The
legionaries de-
winter camp fended the camp well, though with difficulty. was more extended than the daily camp and gave a much
<*r;;r4&;* < . ,Vo,.Vo'--'S* Jo- V"5O aV,*- 0.o
& r**v/ r~i
//
<
I
^ ICAMP!
r,
'--y-
3_^i
r1
Cicero's
Camp.
longer rampart to defend.
Unable
to
make
sensible prog-
ress, the Gallic chiefs signified their desire to confer with
Cicero. On this being granted, Ambiorix plausibly stated the same things with which he had persuaded Sabinus, re-
fraining however, from promises, and told of the destruction
of that legion.
He
claimed that the cause of war was the
burden laid on the Gauls by the Romans in wintering regularly in the country and consuming the corn which was
needed to keep their own people in life. To all this Cicero made the soldier's answer that the Eomans never treated with
foes in arms, but that if the
enemy would lay down
Ambiorix
their
arms and
state their case as supplicants,
justice.
no doubt Caesar
would do them ample
retired baffled.
The Nervii then
built
around
it
teen feet deep.
set about to besiege the Roman camp, and a rampart eleven feet high and a ditch thirThey had learned these methods from Roman
A BRAVE DEFENSE.
prisoners
199
tools to
and former wars.
Though they had few
work
and
with, but were "forced to cut the turf with their swords
empty out the earth with their hands and cloaks," so was their number that in three hours they had made vast
to
a rampart fifteen thousand feet long. The text here says passuum, but it is probably meant for pedum. The former
would make the length of the rampart ten miles it was in effect less than three, for they had to surround only the camp of a legion. Next day they built towers, mantelets
;
and
galleries,
and made mural hooks.
They had
attained
some
skill in the minutiae of sieges.
entirely shut in. On the seventh day there and the barbarians, by means of hot clay was a high wind, balls and heated javelins, set on fire the camp-huts which
Cicero was
now
were thatched after the Gallic fashion, and under cover of the confusion of the flames made a vehrment assault. The
legionaries stood manfully to their work, despite the fact
that their baggage was being consumed,
and utterly worsted
some acts of personal
the enemy.
The Commentaries give prominence
"
to
In that legion there were two very brave men, gallantry. centurions, who were now approaching the first ranks, T. Pulfio and L. Varenus. These used to have continual disputes between them which of them should be preferred, and every year used to contend for promotion with the utmost
animosity.
When
the fight was going on most vigorously
before the fortifications, Pulfio, one of them, says:
hesitate
'Why
do
Varenus ? or what better opportunity of signalyou izing your valor do you seek ? This very day shall decide our disputes.' When he had uttered these words, he proceeds beyond the fortifications, and rushes on that part of the
enemy which appeared the thickest. Nor does Varenus remain within the rampart, but respecting the high opinion of
200
all,
TWO
follows close after.
RIVALS.
Then, when an inconsiderable space intervened, Pulfio throws his javelin at the enemy, and pierces one of the multitude who was running up, and while
the latter was
their shields
wounded and
and
all
slain, the
enemy cover him with
throw their weapons at the other and afford him no opportunity of retreating. The shield of Pulpierced and a javelin
is
fio is
fastened in his belt.
This
cir-
cumstance turns aside his scabbard and obstructs his right hand when attempting to draw his sword ; the enemy crowd
around him when thus embarrassed. His rival runs up to him and succors him in this emergency. Immediately, the
whole host turn from Pulfio to him, supposing the other to be pierced through by the javelin. Varenus rushes on briskly
with his sword and carries on the combat hand to hand, and
having slain one man, for a short time drove back the rest ; while he urges on too eagerly, slipping into a hollow, he fell.
To him,
in his turn,
slain
when surrounded,
Pulfio brings relief ;
and both having
a great number, retreat into the fortifications amidst the highest applause. Fortune so dealt with
both in this rivalry and conflict, that the one competitor was a succor and a safeguard to the other, nor could it be deter-
mined which of the two appeared worthy
to the other."
of being preferred
This story lends local color to the rivalries of
of defenders of the
the
Roman
soldier's life.
The number
Roman camp was
daily
becoming smaller, and these were weakened by exertion. Of the messengers dispatched to Caesar, none reached him. Some
were captured and tortured in sight of the camp. Finally, a Nervian who had deserted to the Romans undertook to
carry a message and succeeded in reaching the chief. Caesar was at Samarobriva. He had not left for Italy so soon as he expected. He at once headed Trebonius' legion
for the scene of danger,
and ordered Crassus, who was
at
SPEEDY MEASURES.
201
Montdidier, to march to headquarters with his legion to Fabius, with his legion, was directed to replace Trebonius.
march from
Caesar
St.
Pol toward the Nervian
frontiers,
and
join
among
the Atrebates.
Caesar received notice of Cicero's peril about four p. M.
So rapid was
officer
his
message and so alert was Crassus that
this
reached Caesar at ten A. M. next day, a march of fully
Caesar's March.
twenty-five miles.
The camp
to rejoin
at
Samarobriva was protected
Crassus was
left
by the rearguard when it set out
of Trebonius' legion until Crassus' arrival,
the column.
behind at the main camp to protect the baggage, treasure, prisoners, archives and the vast amount of corn there
collected.
At
to
the same
to
moment
Caesar had sent word to Labienus
march
meet him in the vicinity of Cicero's camp; but
Labienus replied, explaining the state of revolt of the Eburones and the imminent danger from the Treviri. He
knew
relied
the confidence Caesar reposed in his judgment
and
obey orders.
on his properly gauging the reason of his failure to He was right.
Caesar instantly followed Trebonius' legion.
He
had, in
addition to that body, but four hundred horse available at
202
GOOD WINTER MARCHING.
One
is
headquarters, or a total of only two small legions, perhaps
seven thousand to eight thousand men.
of the
most
singular facts in the military history of Caesar
in
the
manner
which he was repeatedly caught in dilemmas with but a handful of troops at his disposal. We shall see him at
Alexandria, Zela and
lack of foresight.
as well as his
Hadrumetum
in a desperate strait
from
It required luck superior to Alexander's,
own
splendid resources, to save
him from
destruction in these false positions.
Caesar's fortune will
ever remain proverbial, and indeed, had not the fickle goddess laid aside her wonted character to favor him, Caesar
would have ended
enduring name.
results
his career before
he had made himself an
great captain was ever rescued from the of his own neglect so often as was Caesar.
No
Caesar
was of
now had but a handful, but he felt that dispatch more moment than larger forces. On the first day he
covered twenty miles in the direction of modern Cambrai, and was joined on the road by Fabius, not far from that
place.
Pushing on, he reached the borders of the Nervii, and learned from prisoners what the conditions were. He
to send
managed
word
to Cicero that he
was coming, by a
Gallic horseman,
who
shot an arrow, or threw a javelin with
the message tied to the thong into his camp,
to hold out to the last.
and urged him
in Greek.
The message was
"Courage!
Po-
lyaenus says
it
was
brief:
Expect succor!
"
days Caesar marched from Samarobriva to near the winter-quarters of Cicero, not far from one hundred and ten
In
five
miles, twenty -two miles a day, over winter roads, a
good but
not wonderful performance. He camped in the vicinity of Binche. So soon as the Nervii discovered Caesar's approach,
they raised the blockade and marched towards him, some
sixty thousand strong.
Cicero sent Caesar word that the
enemy had turned
against him.
He had no men
left to
send
CESAR'S RUSE.
as a reinforcement to his chief.
203
Caesar had but about seven
thousand men, and saw the necessity for caution. His having but one man to nine of the enemy was due to his miscalculated system of winter-quarters.
He
broke camp at
first
He Binche, advanced, and soon ran across the enemy. caught sight of them across the valley of the Haine.
camped on Mount
to
St.
He
Aldegonde
in a very contracted space,
the Nervii underestimate even the paltry force he had with him. He then sent forward his horse to skirmish
make
Battle against Ambioriz.
with the enemy, and by simulating retreat, draw them on to attack the camp. He and his legion lay west of the Haine
;
the barbarians were on
as to get
its
east
bank; Caesar mano3uvred so
them
to cross the stream to the attack.
He
also
began fortifying and gave orders to the soldiers to act with
apparent confusion, as Nervii on.
if
in fear, so as still
more
to lure the
The
ruse succeeded, and the barbarians advanced, took
up
204
CICERO'S
HEAVY
LOSS.
sent out a
a disadvantageous and careless position, and
proclamation that they would receive and spare any deserters from the Roman legions. They believed that they had
bagged their game. They then began the fight as if nothing were so sure as victory, advancing to the gates and ramparts
in
enthusiastic
disorder.
Caesar
still
simulated
fear,
to
render them yet more careless, and held his men sharply At the proper in hand, intending to take them unawares.
moment he gave
the signal.
The
legionaries rushed
from
all
the gates at once ; and the cavalry sallied out with unexpected dash. So entirely surprised were the barbarians by the vigor
and courage of
their opponents
that they fled in dismay.
They were pursued with great
loss,
but the pursuit was not
kept up to any distance, owing to the wooded and cut-up nature of the country. In pursuit, Caesar was never equal to
the great Macedonian.
No
one but Napoleon was.
Having thus opened the way, Caesar marched to Cicero's camp, where he found the garrison in sad case, but still full
of courage.
"The
legion having been
drawn out he
finds
that
wounds."
even every tenth soldier had not escaped without This was a heavy loss, which might be estimated
and eighty-three per cent, wounded ; out of a legion of five thousand men, three hundred and or, Caesar fifty killed and four thousand one hundred wounded.
at seven per cent, killed,
highly
commended
the legions
and
officers for their valor,
and distributed rewards among the bravest. and gifts had been gallantly won.
Both praise
was speedily conveyed to the Treviri. This determined Indutiomarus, who had been on the point of at least attacking Labienus, to withdraw from his front,
of this victory
for the
News
time being.
The news had
traveled sixty miles
Caesar had reached
between the ninth hour and midnight.
Cicero's
camp
at three P. M.
before midnight some of the
NEW
Remi
Labienus.
sounds.
WINTER-QUARTERS.
205
raised a shout of joy which announced the victory to
This
is
A single courier might
less
not so wonderful a performance as it have done it; three or four,
Fifty miles have been
relieving each other, very handily.
run in
days.
than seven hours, in these so-called degenerate
sooner was the campaign thus happily decided than Fabius was sent back to his winter-quarters. Caesar deter-
No
mined
to
remain in Gaul.
Profiting
by his
bitter experience,
he concentrated his forces ; established his own headquarters at Samarobriva, with three legions, Crassus', Cicero's, Trebonius', in three several camps.
relics still
:
a camp at the citadel
Of these there are some of Amiens the Camp de
;
1'Etoile;
and one near modern Tirancourt.
Labienus, Plan-
cus and Roscius remained in situ.
The
defeat of Sabinus and Cotta had bred a feeling of un-
certainty all through the land ; nocturnal meetings were held,
New
Camps.
and insurrections were threatened and expected on every hand. An attack on Roscius had all but occurred. Among
the Senones, on the
Upper Sequana,
there was a political
206
ATTACK ON LABIENUS.
upheaval, and a refusal to comply with Caesar's demands, which he does not appear to have felt in a position to enforce.
This badly affected the tribes. The Remi and ^Edui alone remained quite true. By calling together the principal citizens and alternately using threats and courtesies, most
troubles were for the
-moment averted, though a constant
it
turmoil went on.
Indutiomarus, chief of the Treviri, was,
appears, the
tried to get
head and front of this entire movement.
He
Attack on Labienus' Camp.
the
Germans
across the Rhine, but they
Still
had conceived a
hearty dread of Caesar.
Indutiomarus ceased not his
work, and finally his efforts induced some isolated tribes of the Senones and Carnutes to join him; and the Aduatuci and
Nervii seemed ready to help. But his army was largely composed of outlaws and criminals. He called an armed
assembly of
chiefs,
and under
its
inspiration advanced
and
camped again before Labienus.
ramparts, simulating fear,
seemed to make
it
stale,
This officer kept to his a trick whose repetition never but watching keenly for a good
DEFEAT OF INDUTIOMARUS.
chance for attack.
207
Growing more
careless
day by day,
Indutiomams
finally laid himself open.
Labienus had a good body of native horse which he had Indutioquietly assembled a.nd introduced into the camp.
marus made, as usual, a threatening advance to the Roman ramparts, and towards evening withdrew in more than
usually careless order, no doubt laughing at the cowardice of
the legionaries.
This was Labienus' opportunity.
Throw-
ing open the two main gates of the camp, the cavalry issued, Taken by surprise the enemy followed by the cohorts.
fled.
Indutiomarus himself was
slain,
and much
loss
was
This victory and the death of the chief plotter allayed the turmoil greatly; but though the Nervii and Eburones dispersed to their homes, it
inflicted
on the barbarians.
was far from quieting Caesar's apprehensions of further
trouble.
These operations show the immense
fied
role the
Roman
forti-
camp played
in the days of short-carry weapons.
Gun-
powder
field
first nullified
the importance of the camp.
A modern
Roman
battery would with a few rounds demolish a
vallum.
To-day, anything
concentric
fire.
like a
camp would be subject to
positions
artillery.
irresistible
Well chosen natural
had
to be sought as
a defense against
Cicero's defense at Charleroi leads Napoleon to contrast
ancient
war with modern very skillfully: "Si Ton disait aujourd'hui a un general: 'Vous aurez, comme Ciceron,
outils
hommes, 16 pieces de canon, 5,000 de pionniers, 5,000 sacs a terre; vous serez a portee d'une foret, dans un terrain ordinaire; dans quinze jours
sous vos ordres, 5,000
vous serez attaque par une armee de 60,000 hommes ayant 120 pieces de canon ; vous ne serez secouru que quatre-vingts
ou quatre-vingt-seize heures apres avoir ete attaque.'
Quels
sont les ouvrages, quels sont les traces, quels sont les profils
208
que
DIVIDED COMMAND.
lui
L'art de I'ingenieur a-t-il des " probleme ? The quartering of the legions in such widely separated localities was certainly a grave error, severely punished in
1'art
prescrit?
secrets qui puissent satisfaire a ce
the event.
But
the
rapid,
able
and
decisive
measures
adopted by
praise.
Caesar to retrieve the disaster are quite beyond
set
The superb courage with which he
skill
out with a
mere handful of men
and the
to relieve his beleaguered lieutenant,
he showed in dealing with the barbarians when
he met them, cannot but excite the highest admiration. It is this sort of conduct on Caesar's part which makes one forget
the carelessness which lay at the root of so
brilliant strokes.
many
of his
Criticism seems to be almost out of order.
ability.
Sabinus had given proofs of
How
he contrived
to allow himself, against the advice of Cotta
and
his other
fellow officers, to enter into negotiations with the
crafty
having left his camp to make a junction with Cicero, why he should have marched in loose order and without proper precautions is still more of a puzzle..
Ambiorix
is
an enigma.
And
His only real chance was to stick to his camp and defend it as Cicero did, and as he had Caesar's orders as well as all
precedent to do.
There can be no excuse for the
This disaster
is
shiftlessness
of his order of march.
one more instance of
the folly of divided
equal.
command,
for Sabinus
and Cotta were
Caesar should have given absolute
command
to one
or the other legate. That the system of rotation and division of authority did not wreck the Koman army, is referable
solely to the
other
wonderful character of the people of Rome. No has ever had such a system and survived it. army The conduct of Cicero stands out in marked contrast to
that of Sabinus.
The
incisive conduct of Caesar in
fail of effect
remedying the disaster
did not
among
the Gallic tribes, and produced
EFFECT OF CAMPAIGN.
its full influence, political
209
Nervii,
and
military.
The
Menhome;
In
apii
and Aduatuci, who had been
the
in arms, returned
the maritime cantons followed suit; the Treviri, and their
clients,
Eburones,
retired
from before Labienus.
Koine Caesar's reputation stood higher than ever.
Csesar,
from a Coin.
XIV.
THE TREVIRI AND EBURONES.
Caesar determined to take the rebels unawares.
season,
mites.
SPRING, 53
He
B. C.
DTJBINO the winter another uprising was planned, headed by the Treviri.
set out, despite the winter
and successively surprised and punished the
Nervii, Senones
and Car-
He
then reduced the Menapii on the lower Meuse, while Labienus a
Caesar again crossed the Rhine, to impose on
second time defeated the Treviri.
the Germans, having done which he begun his pursuit of Ambiorix,
who was
now
isolated.
He
sent his cavalry ahead to surprise
possible,
but without success.
and capture this chief, if The Eburones were now hunted down without
mercy.
Caesar divided his force into three columns, which advanced on three
His baggage he left at Aduatuca. During his absence, some German tribes, who had crossed on a foray, attacked the camp at that place and came close to capturing it. Though Caesar thoroughly
several lines throughout northern Gaul.
suppressed the rising of this year, he was unable to catch Ambiorix.
into winter-quarters near Sens.
He went
IT had become necessary to raise and have on hand a
greater
number
of men, as well as to
fill
large gaps occa-
by the last campaigns. Caesar deemed it essential to show the Gauls that the resources of Rome were ample that
sioned
;
one legion meant to have two others spring ready from the earth. By negotiation with Pompey, equipped whom business retained in Rome, he was able to obtain a
to destroy
legion which the latter
had raised
in
Gaul when he was
furloughed to their
proconsul in Spain.
The men had been
homes, but they were recalled to the eagles and the legion took its place in line. Two additional legions were enlisted in
Gaul by
Caesar's lieutenants, Silanus, Reginus
and
Sextius.
The
three
teenth
(it
took the
new legions were the First, number of the one destroyed
the Fourat
Adua-
WINTER CAMPAIGN.
tuca),
211
fifteen lost
Thus thirty cohorts replaced the Caesar now commanded ten legions. Sabinus. by After Indutiomarus' death, the Treviri elected new chiefs
and the Fifteenth.
his family.
from
They were unable
to induce the riear-by
Germans
to do so.
to join their cause, but persuaded
some of the Suevi
of
Ambiorix joined them.
Rumors
war were
and
far
spread.
The
Senones were
still
antagonistic,
the
Carnutes abetted them.
The
Nervii, despite their fearful
punishment, the Aduatuci and Menapii were under arms.
Campaign against Nervii and other
Tribes.
Anticipating trouble with the tribes which had placed themselves under the leadership of the Nervii, and knowing that
they were constantly striving to induce the
Germans
to un-
dertake another invasion, Caesar determined to strike them
212
unawares.
GALLIC CONGRESS.
Suddenly and before the season for campaigning opened, perhaps in March, he concentrated the four legions nearest headquarters at Samarobriva (under Fabius, Crassus,
Cicero, Trebonius),
marched upon the Nervii, rushed
off victual.
like
hurricane over their territory, captured great booty, devastated the land
and carried
had them
By
taking them off
at his mercy. Having cowed he compelled them to give him hostages for good behavior, and returned to his winter-quarters.
their guard, he
them,
Here he
called
an
assembly of
the Gauls.
All sent
representatives except the Senones, the
Treviri.
Carnutes and the
Caesar transferred the congress to Lutetia (modern
Paris), so as to do both his political
justice at the
and military scheme
same time.
the Senones
From
here, he
made a demonstra-
tion against
adjoined the Parisii. their oppida; but they were unable to resist Caesar's prompt measures. They respectively begged the ^Edui and Remi to
intercede for them; and on giving the hitherto refused hostages, Caesar overlooked their defection.
and Carnutes, whose territory These tribes, under Acco, retired into
He
had no time
to split hairs.
He was
content to check a growing disposiconfided to the
tion
to revolt.
The hostages given were
JEdui for security. Caesar then closed the congress. His rapid and well-considered action had tranquillized central
Gaul, and he could devote himself to the war with Ambiorix,
chief of the Eburones.
It
was of the highest importance,
Caesar thought, in a military as well as a political sense, that
the disgrace of Aduatuca should be wiped out.
As a part of his scheme, Caesar had imposed a fresh levy of horse on the Gallic tribes. The Senonian cavalry under
Cavarinus he ordered to accompany him. He was distrustful of its fidelity, as it contained many of the chief men of
the tribe, unless he had
it
under his eye.
AMBIORIX.
213
The Menapii, north of and next to the Eburones, were the only tribe which had never sent ambassadors to Cassar.
They were
allies of
Ambiorix, and Caesar desired
first to
detach this people from his alliance. So long as they were Ambiorix retained an inaccessible place of refuge unsubdued,
in their
woods and morasses.
Next to the
fear that
Ambiorix
would persuade the Germans to a fresh war, was the safety this chief possessed in this alliance. The two things to be
accomplished were the reduction of the Treviri and the The last task he detaching from Ambiorix of the Menapii.
The Menapii Campaign.
undertook himself, the
Labienus, who knew
first
he
left to
the management of
the problem well, as he had wintered on
the borders of the Treviri,
and had already
tried issues with
them.
Sending
Caesar
all his
moved with
five legions, in light
baggage and two legions to Labienus, marching order and
in three columns,
against the Menapii,
who
at once took
214
MAN
HUNT.
They had assembled no refuge in their natural fastnesses. Caesar divided his five legions into three columns, forces.
under Fabius, Crassus and himself. By the aid of the Senonian cavalry, and by bridging the marshes and streams,
he advanced on three lines into their land.
These
lines
were probably down both banks of the Meuse and down the Aa or Dommel, affluents of the Meuse, running from south
to north through the
Menapian
all the
territory.
Caesar began
by
relentlessly devastating their country, capturing their cattle,
and taking prisoners
from their
prominent men he could reach.
Shortly the Menapii sued for peace. Though independent were not wont to act in unison, isolation, they
and were quite unable
granted their petition
to resist organized invasion.
Caesar
on their undertaking by no means to harbor Ambiorix; and leaving some of the cavalry, under Commius the Atrebatian, among them, he marched towards
Labienus and the Treviri.
His route was probably up the Rhine, for we next find him at Bonn. Labienus had wintered in his old camp at modern La-
vacherie.
The
Treviri had harbored certain designs against
him, and even since the victory over Indutiomarus made
sundry demonstrations against his camp; but hearing that he had received two fresh legions from Caesar, they deter-
mined
to await the
Germans,
whom they had now some
reason
of
to expect.
They
established themselves on the right
bank
the Ourthe.
Labienus did not await the barbarians.
Taking
twenty -five of his thirty
cohorts and his cavalry, five remain-
ing to guard the baggage, he anticipated their advance by marching against them, and camping on the other side of
the Ourthe, a mile distant from their station.
The enemy were
cor.
evidently anxious to wait for
German
suc-
Labienus desired to bring them to speedy battle. He stated in public, in such a manner that the rumor might be
LABIENUS' VICTORY.
215
carried to them, that, not desiring to measure swords with
both Treviri and Germans, he proposed to retreat the next day, and made certain preparations which looked like hurried
and confused withdrawal, actually leaving his intrenchments. This fact the enemy's scouts soon saw, and some deserters
carried to
them the statement
lose the booty of the
flight,
of Labienus.
Fearing that
encouraged
they might
Roman camp, and
it
by the apparent
attacked the
the barbarians crossed the river and
Roman
rear so soon as
had
filed
out of camp,
with the expectation of an easy victory. themselves in a dangerous
position,
They had placed
with
the
river at their back, and,
the
river
banks
being
lost all
precipitous,
had
of
semblance
order in
the crossing.
Labienus
had explained the whole
purpose to his lieutenants
and centurions, and
had placed his baggage under its guard on a
secure
eminence.
his
Exto
Tlie Treviri Campaign,
horting
legions
fight as they should,
Labienus, whose troops were well in hand and whose simulated retreat was but a well-drilled
manoeuvre, speedily gave the order to face the eagles to the enemy, and deploy into line. The command was executed
with clockwork precision.
enemy's
flanks.
The
battle-shout
The horse was thrown in on the was clear and crisp. The
showed
little fight.
Treviri, taken utterly at a disadvantage,
Falling upon them with the utmost cavalry cut most of them to pieces.
fury, the legions and
The
rest fled to the
216
forests.
SECOND CROSSING OF RHINE.
Labienus had ably used his knowledge of the imThis petuosity and lack of cool calculation in the Gauls. lesson forestalled the threatened irruption of the Gersharp
mans, who returned home.
Cingetorix,
place of Indutiomarus.
The state was turned over to who had always been an ally of Rome, in the
troops fought with steady discipline, the Gauls, whatever their numbers, were inevitably beaten. There were no open-field pitched
battles in the Gallic war, in the sense
It will
be noticed that whenever the
Roman
we understand the
words.
At
the river Sabis, Caesar had to fight, because he
had allowed himself to be surprised.
ready to
fight;
The Gauls were always
they ching strenuously to their struggle against the Roman conquest, and deserve credit for heroic efforts. But in line of battle they could never face the
legions.
Ambiorix was now isolated. The Menapii on one hand and the Treviri on the other were subdued, and the Germans could no longer be counted on.
from the land of the Menapii, had marched up the Rhine, and hearing of Labienus' victory, remained at Bonn, near the place where he had crossed two years before. He
Caesar, to impose
determined again to cross the river, principally, as he states, upon the Germans by a show of force, because they
assisted the Treviri, but also in order to prevent their
had
receiving Ambiorix.
He
built again a similar bridge at a
first
place a
little
above where he had built the
one.
This
bridge was completed yet more quickly;
ertion of the soldiers."
still
"by
great ex-
Leaving a large and suitable guard at the west bridgehead, he crossed with the legions and cavThe Ubii at alry and advanced into the German territory.
once approached and easily proved to him that they had been faithful to their alliance, and that it was the Suevi who had
ON GERMAN TERRITORY.
sent auxiliaries to Ambiorix.
to
217
so far as
The Suevi had gone
make
drafts
on their
ready for invasion.
discover the
and assemble a large army Caesar employed the Ubii as scouts to
clients
movements of the Suevi, and through them
as-
certained that, on learning of Caesar's approach, they had retreated to the Bacenis forest (Hartz mountains) on the bound-
ary of their territory. Caesar did not deem it wise to march against them, on account of the impossibility of rationing his
men
ture,
in a land whose inhabitants
had paid no heed
little
to agricul-
and which would therefore be had driven
better than a desert
after the Suevi
off their flocks
and herds.
The
barbarians had calculated shrewdly.
But
in order to leave
them convinced that he would return and thereby prevent
their undertaking immediate operations, after recrossing his
army
to the west bank, he broke
down two hundred
feet of
the farther end of the bridge and "at the extremity of the bridge raised towers of four stories," and "strengthening the
place with considerable fortifications
"
on the
left
bank,
left
therein a strong guard of twelve cohorts under Volcatius
Tullus.
He
himself with the bulk of his ten legions, so
soon as corn began to ripen, set out across the Forest of Arduenna against Ambiorix, determined to punish him for his
treachery to Sabinus.
Caesar marched from the bridge via Zulpich and Eupen.
He
sent forward all the cavalry force, under L. Minucius
Basilus, to endeavor to surprise Ambiorix, promising to follow rapidly with the legions. He instructed Basilus to march This officer secretly and refrain from lighting camp-fires.
performed his duty with excellent discretion and
skill, direct-
ing his course by information got from prisoners taken on the way to a place where Ambiorix was said to be hiding
with a small body of cavalry. So speedily did he march that he reached the retreat of Ambiorix before any rumor of his
218
AMBIORIX ESCAPES.
being on the road had come to the ears of this chief ; surprised and almost succeeded in capturing him. But "Fortune
accomplishes much," says Ca3sar, "not only in other matters,
Pursuit of Ambiorix.
but .also in the chances of war."
stroke of luck,
loyal,
And
made good
fight,
his escape.
Ambiorix, by a rare His escort proved
of
it
made a smart
fled.
and under cover had begun
he mounted
a horse and
It seems that this chieftain
to see the folly of
continuing the struggle against Caesar, for he sent notice to
his allies that each one
must now provide for
his
own
se-
an act of desertion which roused up fury against curity, him. Cativolcus, king of the Eburones, committed suicide.
Many
of the tribes
which had risen in arms
fled
with their
possessions from the anger of Caesar into the forests and morasses. The Segni and Condrusi threw themselves on his
mercy and were forgiven, having proven that they had not abetted Ambiorix. But they were cautioned to secure and surrender to Caesar
all
Eburones who took refuge among them.
THREE COLUMNS.
Caesar's task
219
was now vastly easier. He could deal with the barbarians in detail, and needed much fewer men under
own command. Having reached the ancient ford on the Mosa (at Vise), he divided his army into three parts. His baggage he sent to the camp at Aduatuca, among the Ebuhis
rones, where Sabinus' legion
many
camp.
of the fortifications
still
had been destroyed, and where stood, which would relieve the
soldiers
from much of the work incident to preparing a fresh He left the Fourteenth legion and two hundred cavit,
alry to guard
under command of Cicero.
Labienus with
The Three Columns.
three legions he sent toward the ocean, near the boundary
between the Eburones and Menapii, on a reconnoissance to
the standing of this part of Gaul, and to take measures accordingly. Trebonius he sent southwest with three to lay waste the region contiguous to the Aduatuci he
ascertain
;
himself,
with three legions, marched towards the Scaldis
(Scheldt), intending to pursue
Ambiorix
to the confines of
the Forest of
Arduenna, between modern Brussels and Ant-
220
AN
IMPOSSIBLE RENDEZVOUS.
werp, whither he had retired with a few mounted companions.
By some
is
authorities the river Sabis
is
read instead of the
Scheldt, because the latter does not flow into the Mosa, as
by the Commentaries. The phrase is, "the river Scaldis which flows into the Mosa." But Caesar could readthe Scheldt does empty ily be in error geographically, and
stated
into the sea not
far
from the mouth of the Meuse; the
Scheldt was more likely to be the objective of one of the
columns than the Sabis.
far as the Sabis could accomplish nothing,
over,
column which marched only so and this, more-
was Trebonius'
direction.
given to both Labienus and Trebonius if possible to again rejoin Csesar at Aduatuca on the seventh day, when, from their several reports, Caesar would be able
to determine the situation
A rendezvous was
and decide upon future operations.
On
this
day
rations were due to the troops remaining in
of
garrison.
The amount
work thus cut out
for the short
space of a se'nnight reminds one forcibly of some of Alexander's campaigns against mountain barbarians.
The
three
columns were really more like three forced reconnoissances. Little could be accomplished in so short a time.
which had scattered from their allegiance to Ambiorix had so effectually done this, that there was neither
tribes
The
town nor camp nor army to attack. They had retreated in small parties to the woods, and the only warfare they could wage was to attack isolated soldiers who were foraging or
"There was, as we have observed, no regular army, nor a town, nor a garrison which could defend
straggling for booty.
itself
by arms; but the people were
scattered in all directions.
Where
either a hidden valley, or a
woody
spot, or a difficult
morass furnished any hope of protection or of security to any These places were known one, there he had fixed himself.
A
to those that dwell
MAN-HUNT PARTY.
in
221
the neighborhood,
and the matter
demanded great attention, not so much in protecting the main body of the army (for no peril could occur to them all together from those alarmed and scattered troops), as in
preserving individual soldiers, which in some measure tended to the safety of the army. For both the desire of booty was
leading
many
too far, and the woods with their
unknown and
hidden routes would not allow them to go in large bodies. If he desired the business to be completed and the race of
those infamous people to be cut
off,
more bodies
of
men must
must be
be sent in several directions,
detached on
all sides
;
and the
soldiers
if
he were disposed to keep the com-
panies at their standards, as the established discipline and practice of the Roman army required, the situation itself was
a safeguard to the barbarians, nor was there wanting to
individuals the daring to lay secret ambuscades
scattered soldiers.
and beset
But amidst
difficulties of this nature, as
far as precautions could be taken
tions were taken ; so that
by vigilance, such precausome opportunities of injuring the enemy were neglected, though the minds of all were burning to take revenge, rather than that injury should be effected
with any loss to our soldiers." Czesar found that his time would not admit of his dealing
single-handed with the question as
to spare his legionaries.
it
stood;
and he desired
He
invited the neighboring tribes,
by
abundant booty, to come and aid in exterminating these tribes, which were chiefly Eburones. This he had made up his mind to do, as a punishment for their
promise of
destruction of the legion of Sabinus
and Cotta, under
cir-
cumstances which, according to his view, were treacherous in the extreme. Caesar could not forgive the tribes the bad
faith of their leader.
more
terrible as
it
He visited them with punishment the ended only with their extinction.
222
CICERO SURPRISED.
of this invitation reached the
Rumor
them
a
Germans
across the
Rhine, who deemed
rare
that
it
also applied to them,
and gave
the
chance of
plunder.
certain tribe,
Sugambri, abutting on the Rhine, crossed a force of two thousand horsemen in boats thirty miles below Caesar's
bridge,
and began
collecting
and driving
off cattle,
"of which
Learning at the same time that the camp at Aduatuca had been left without much of a garrison, and drawing small distinction between
the barbarians are
extremely covetous."
them to try their concealed their booty and marched on They Aduatuca, crossing the Mosa at Maestricht.
friend and foe, their greed of gain tempted
fortunes there.
Caesar and his lieutenants were unable to return to the
camp at Aduatuca by the seventh day, by no means a reand the garrison, which had been markable circumstance, left with but seven days' rations, began to clamor to go forCicero had so far kept them closely within the ramaging.
parts.
To
collect victuals soon
became a matter of
necessity,
and Cicero determined
to send out
some parties for food, not
imagining that there could be any grave danger, as all the tribes had been scattered and there must be nine legions at
no great distance. He erred in sending out too large a force, five cohorts, and these probably the best, leaving the
camp by no means
safely garrisoned.
As
ill-luck
would have
it, not long after these foraging parties had left camp, the two thousand German horse put in an appearance and found
the
camp
insufficiently defended.
Though
his position
had
indeed been a trying one, the condition of affairs showed lack of care on the part of Cicero. soldier must assume
that the improbable will happen.
The Germans had so suddenly approached by the Decuman gate, that a number of sutlers had been surprised with their
booths outside, and the cohort there on guard was unable to
A PITFALL.
223
do aught but retire in confusion and close the entrance behind them. Inside the camp everything was in disorder, and the
power to act. It was even surmised must have been defeated, and that this was the that Caesar van of the victorious army of Gauls. But for the presence
forces all but lost their
by wounds, but who nevertheless seized weapons and encouraged the men
of
mind
of Sextius Bacillus,
who was
invalided
Cicero at Aduatnca.
to
an entrance.
if five
defend the ramparts, the enemy could readily have forced Thus state the Commentaries but it seems as
;
cohorts inside a
camp were more than a match for two
thousand horsemen outside.
Where
Cicero was
is
not stated;
yet he had earned reputation last year
his
by stanchly defending
camp.
Aduatuca seemed
to be a pitfall to Caesar.
But while the German horsemen were debating how to make good their capture, the foragers returned. These, in
their turn,
were unable to
effect
an entrance
for the whole
224
THE GERMANS RETIRE.
camp was surrounded by the barbarians. Different counsels prevailed among them; the veterans urging one course, the new soldiers and camp-followers another. The foragers had
No one apparently been sent out under several officers. seems to have had sole authority. The veterans, under comof C. Trebonius, a knight, took the only reasonable view of the case and resolved to cut their way through.
mand
Forming a compact column, a wedge or
triangle (cuneus),
by a bold push they reached the camp in good order and in Another party, safety, with the horse and camp-attendants.
less well-led,
had endeavored
to
make a stand on an
adjoin-
but on perceiving the success of the veterans, to do the same thing. Of this party, however, a attempted number were cut out and slain; for not only were the Gering knoll;
mans on the lookout
for such a manoeuvre, but the party
presumably acted inexpertly, and passed over unfavorable The entire matter shows demoralization and lack ground.
of
management.
The camp having been
plunder beyond the Rhine.
regarrisoned,
the
Germans saw
their
their chance of success gone,
and withdrew, carrying
forces in the
camp were in a sorry state, and scarcely believed that Caesar was safe when his cavalry vanguard, under Volusenus, actually arrived.
Caesar had returned with his
The
work
half done, because he
to
had
promised Cicero to do and Trebonius.
so,
and had agreed
meet Labienus
Having
from
all
reestablished affairs in the camp, he again set forth
in pursuit of Ambiorix, this time accompanied
by
auxiliaries
the neighboring tribes,
who scouted
the country
traversed
by the army, and burned and ravaged to such an extent that those insurgents who escaped the sword would
surely perish
by hunger.
But
despite the greatest rewards
offered for the capture of Ambiorix, this wily chief eluded
ACCO EXECUTED.
225
With but every snare, though frequently nearly taken. four companions, it is said, he moved from one fort or hiding-place to another and escaped the closest pursuit.
Caesar next marched back to Durocortorum (Reims), the
town of the Remi, the tribe which of all others, except the -iJEdui, was most faithful to and most highly esteemed by
chief
Rome.
Here he held a council
of the Gallic tribes, to decide
upon the conspiracy of the Senones and Carnutes. Acco, the" chief of the conspirators, was found guilty, together with
a number of others.
Acco was punished "according
to the
Winter-Quarters, B.
c.
53-52.
custom of our ancestors
"
(more majorum), by being stood in
a collar and beaten to death.
Some
of the conspirators fled,
fire
and to these
water.
all allies
were forbidden to furnish
and
Caesar
now went
into winter -quarters.
Two
legions were
camped on the frontiers of the Treviri, two among the Lingones; the remaining six at Agendicum (Sens) in the land of the Senones. The legions were thus within better supporting
distance of each other, in lieu of isolated, as they
had been
the year before.
Corn having been provided
safe
in
abundance
and stored in
that his
safety, Caesar himself set out for Italy, feeling
army was
from insurrections for some months.
226
A SUCCESSFUL YEAR.
operations of this year are characterized
by the able and rapid dispositions and manoeuvres of Caesar against the The equally subtle work of Ambiorix in northeast Gaul.
campaign was accompanied by thorough devastation of the country, but in this instance the devastation was not only
not an unusual act, but
it
The
may
perhaps be claimed to be the
only means of subduing the
tribes actually in revolt.
Such
atten-
-measures have to be judged, even at that day,
by the
one occasion was a simple act of war, on another occasion might be an act of simple bardant circumstances.
barity.
What on
The one point
of criticism in this year's operations
is
the
carelessness of Cicero at Aduatuca, which Caesar felt called
on gravely to rebuke.
great evil
As good
but
it
fortune would have
it,
no
came
of
it,
might well have resulted in
another Sabinus
affair.
Gallic Helmet.
XV.
VERCINGETOEIX.
GAUL had
years' work.
WINTER
;
53-52 B. C.
back on a good
six
apparently been reduced
Caesar could look
But Gaul was
really ripe for
was
bitter.
No
;
one was habitually left
he was absent
the Gauls had free play.
Roman yoke by Caesar in supreme command while They rose under Vercingetorix, a man
a fresh
revolt, for the
;
of remarkable ability and breadth, and beforV Caesar could rejoin his legions
they had cut
off his access to
them.
Cassar reached the Province, he
saw
his
The outlook was desperate so soon as dilemma. The Province was threat-
ened
difficult
but by activity he was able sufficiently to protect it. By a bold and winter march across the Cebenna mountains with a few cohorts,
Caesar attracted the attention of Vercingetorix, who, surprised at his audacity,
advanced to meet him.
Upon
this, Caesar
with a mere escort of horse pushed
through the gap the enemy had opened, and by riding night and day kept well ahead of danger, rejoined his legions, and concentrated them at Agendicum in
February.
Caesar
He had
critical
war on
his hands.
Vercingetorix, finding that
had eluded him, retraced his steps to the Liger. Caesar advanced from Agendicum south, taking Vellaunodunum and Genabum.
WHEN
Caesar
reached Cisalpine Gaul, he heard of the
intestine turmoils in
report that all
Rome, of the murder of Clodius, and the the youth had been ordered to take the military
words to report for duty with the eagles. warranted in ordering a general draft in
oath, or in other
He
therefore felt
His six years' campaign Cisalpine Gaul and the Province. had borne good fruit. To all appearance Gaul had been subdued and her neighbors in Germany and Britain taught
not to interfere with her internal economies.
these grave troubles in
Rumors
of
Roman
politics
had
also reached
Gaul, and though this country had been fully tranquillized, the quiet was but skin deep. No sooner had Caesar's back
228
SECRET MEETINGS.
been turned than the chiefs of the leading tribes began conspiring to rid their country of the burden of the Roman
This was a favorable season, as Caesar, they thought, would be obliged to remain in Italy to protect his own inpeople.
terests in the
of far
home government; a necessity they deemed greater consequence to him than the allegiance of
met
in secret
Gaul.
The
conspirators
and
retired places; they
especial complaint of
discussed their grievances; they
made
the cruel death of Acco, and other leading Gauls; they
foresaw the possibility of a similar fate befalling themselves ; they denounced the devastation of their land they bewailed
;
the yoke put
upon
their country,
die, if
with a solemn oath to
and they bound themselves need be, in freeing her. It was
planned to attack, or at least blockade, the
before Caesar could return, and to try to cut
Roman camps
him
off
from
return by waylaying him on the road. This seemed all the more easy to accomplish because these chieftains knew that not one of the legions could move its camp without Caesar's
personal orders,
it
special officer in full
was not Cassar's custom to leave any and with the roads beset, command,
Caesar could not himself reach the legions without an escort-
ing army.
supreme command during Caesar's absence strikes us as a singularly weak method. Lack of positive rules of rank and command had
That there should be no one
left
in
more than once brought about disastrous
custom, as well as the constant rotation in
results;
but
this
command among
Roman
might
officers,
appears to have wrought less injury than
It
be
expected.
;
worked,
barely worked, in the
Roman army
worked
in
no other army could such a system have
seriously struck
at all.
The Carnutes, who had been most
by the
CENTRAL GAUL.
229
death of Acco, were
first
under arms and agreed to begin the
sustain
war, providing the other tribes would
them.
An
oath so to do was taken
by all, and was pledged on their standards in the most solemn manner. Accordmilitary
230
ingly,
CONVEYING NEWS.
on the day set for the insurrection, under command of Cotuatus and Conetodunus, two desperate men, the Carnutes
rendezvoused at
Genabum
(perhaps Orleans, but more likely
all the Romans, them was C. Fusius Among
Gien, to the east of Orleans) and massacred
mostly traders, in the place.
Cita, Caesar's
commissary of
reached
this department.
The
intelligence of this act traveled like lightning.
It is
said to have
the Arverni
(Auvergne),
in
other
from Genabum to Gergovia, one hundred and sixty miles through the valleys of the Loire and Allier, from sunrise to the end of the first watch, nine A. M. The
words, to have gone
news was passed along by men stationed in towers on convenient
it
is
out shouts of peculiar kinds, or as phrased "sonorous monosyllables." The habit of thus
hills,
who gave
conveying intelligence continued in Gaul through the Middle Ages. Some remains of these towers still exist. If the
wind was contrary, fire was employed in lieu of the voice. Similar' means have been used in many lands and ages. It
is
a natural thing to do.
Signaling
is
very old; but alpha-
betical signaling is of quite recent origin.
Vercingetorix, a young, intelligent and powerful chief, born in Gergovia, son of Celtillus the Arvernian who had
been put to death for aspiring to the sovereignty of all Gaul, excited the passions of his subjects and caused them to
rise against their
Roman
tyrants.
The
older chiefs did not
deem
the
movement
allies of
opportune, for the Arverni
had long
to
been faithful
Rome.
They caused Vercingetorix
be expelled from Gergovia, their chief fortress. But Vercingetorix was not to be so readily turned from his purpose.
He
called to his standard all the poor
and desperate, and
many of the young and ambitious; and in a short period of time grew so strong that he drove out all the other chiefs and established himself in Gergovia. Saluted as king, he won
A SEVERE DRAFT.
231
the ear of all the neighboring tribes along the Liger to the
sea,
and even beyond that
river,
Senones, Parisii, Pic-
tones,
Cadurci, Turones, Aulerci, Lemnovices,
and was
chosen chief leader of the uprising.
take part,
The
-5Cdui declined to
and kept some of the
tribes east of the Liger
from joining in the insurrection.
Vercingetorix'
army grew
apace, though his discipline
is
was
so severe
and cruel that he
said often to have forced
from fear of death or mayhem. In one fashion or another, at all events, he assembled an army
recruits into his ranks
was especially excellent in cavalry. The infantry was not so good, but the horse was increased in numbers by mixing light troops with the squadrons.
of vast numbers, which
Vercingetorix
ability.
undoubtedly a man of exceptional His time, as it turned out, was inopportune, but
was
this error
At how much more dangerous
can scarcely be attributed to want of judgment. that moment, neither he nor any person could foresee
for the
Romans and promising
of success to his countrymen an uprising would be, if put off a few years, until Caasar was so deeply engaged in the Civil War that he could not personally come to Gaul. Fortunate
indeed for Caesar, that so strong an adversary as Vercingetorix should not have delayed his action until after the final
rupture with Pompey.
Vercingetorix opened his campaign by sending a force under the Cadurcan Lucterius into the land of the Ruteni in
southern Gaul, while he himself marched on the Bituriges south of the Liger, who had not joined his cause. The latter
sent for aid to the -ZEdui, the ever faithful allies of
Rome,
who dispatched a
the Liger, which
force to their assistance.
is
On
arriving at
the boundary of the ^Edui, this force
it
heard, or the anti-Romans in
pretended to hear, that the
Bituriges had treacherously planned to attack them; and,
232
CAESAR HURRIES TO GAUL.
The
Bituriges then
acting on this ground, returned home.
joined Vercingetorix. Caesar heard of these things while in Italy.
Pompey and
he had again placed
to both,
affairs in
Rome on
to leave.
and Caesar was enabled
a basis satisfactory But so soon as he
reached Cisalpine Gaul, perhaps at the Rhone, he perceived He was quite at a loss how to join his army. his dilemma.
The
Gallic chieftains
had been shrewd
in their plans.
He
He could get no messengers could not send for the legions. to any one of his camps, nor indeed direct their through
movements.
Isolated as they were, they might each be cut
if
to pieces in detail
they attempted to move, and before they
could concentrate.
They had no
special
head on
whom
he
could rely to do the wisest thing under the circumstances. Nor could he go to the legions, for he dare not trust himself
to
any one, the disaffection had become so general. Meanwhile Lucterius had gained over the Ruteni and the
Nitiobriges and Gabali, adjoining tribes, and was preparing
to
make a
descent on Narbo, in the Province near the coast.
But
Csar
was
fertile in expedients.
His
restless nature
recognized no impossibilities.
to the occasion,
Like
all
great soldiers he rose
ened.
He
set
and gained in strength as the dangers thickout for Narbo, and reaching the place, as
he readily could, for the Province was in no wise associated with the uprising, he took the reins in hand.
Caesar's
appearance restored confidence; he garrisoned
Narbo, and by encouraging the populations near by, raised a sufficient body of recruits to enable him to protect the border towns along the Tarnis river, adjoining the Ruteni, and those among the Volcae Arecomici and Tolosates. He thus
made
it impossible for Lucterius to invade the Province, for the fron.t presented to him was too bold to promise lasting
results.
A WINTER CAMPAIGN.
233
Having secured the left flank of the Province front, Caesar moved northward towards the Helvii, where he had meanwhile ordered to assemble a number of recruits from Italy
and some forces from the Province.
getorix would
He
feared that Vercin-
move
against his legions, and he planned to
attract his attention
away from them and towards
himself.'
The
Province.
Province, where he could be neutralized.
Something must be done to draw the Gallic leader near the Caesar saw that
he must undertake some daring operation to arrest the notice of Vercingetorix, if he would gain a chance to reach his army; and though the snow was six feet deep, he marched
his troops with incredible labor
Cebenna mountains,
and sufferings across the substantially up the Ardeche and
down the Loire
Cirgues,
valleys
by modern Aps, Aubenas, and
into
St.
debouched
the
territory of
the Arverni
towards
Le Puy, and advanced
to Brioude.
He
then sent
234
A SUCCESSFUL DIVERSION.
wide swath through the land to
his cavalry forward to cut a
inspire dread
and
terror.
Dumfounded
at seeing their land
made
the scene of
war
in lieu of the Province,
as well as at the sight of
fully
equipped
emerging from mountains which not
army
even an individual had
ever
before
attempted
to cross in winter, the
Arverni cried aloud to
Vercingetorix for
aid.
The
latter left the Bi-
turiges question to settle itself,
and with
his
best troops
moved by
army.
Cae-
forced marches towards
the
Roman
sar's diversion
had lured
Vercingetorix
away
cause.
from where he was most
useful
to
his
Leaving the younger in Brutus command,
with orders to use his
cavalry in vigorous scoutCaesar's
March
to his Legions.
ing and to keep restlessly on the move, Caesar
himself hurried to Vienna on the
Rhone
there, finding
some
cavalry which had been newly recruited, and had at his orders assembled in this town, he placed himself at their head, set out and marched day and night through the land of
A BOLD RIDE.
235
the -5Cdui to that of the Lingeries, where two of his legions
were wintering at Andaematunum (Langres). He had thrust aside a danger which menaced his entire scheme of conquest
Agendicum
to
Avaricum.
by a markedly
hesitation,
fine diversion;
he had, without a moment's
risk,
run a serious personal
which, however,
was unavoidable, and therefore advisable, and had comHe was now safe. He had travpletely baffled the enemy.
eled so rapidly that he
had kept ahead of the danger of
dis-
covery.
From Andaematunum
the Treviri to
Caesar sent orders to the two
move towards him, so as again legions among to gather his forces into one body. The other six had winAt this place he tered at Agendicum, among the Senones.
summarily rendezvoused all the legions. These exceedingly rapid and well conceived movements puzzled the Gauls as to
his intentions,
the plot in
any of the tribes engaged in an attack which they might otherwise have made
forestalled
and
236
CAESAR CONCENTRATES.
on the legions during their concentration. Caesar reached Agendicum about the end of February. One cannot admire
his conduct of this affair too highly.
Hearing that Caesar was thus concentrating, Vercingetorix moved back to the land of the Bituriges, and thence to Gergobina Bojorum (St. Parize
the Liger
le
Chatel) at the confluence of
was the
and Elaver, which he determined to attack. This capital of the Boii, who had remained faithful to
settled there
It
Rome.
They had been
defeat in the Helvetian campaign.
by Caesar after their was a difficult task for
Caesar to undertake a winter campaign, as the transportation
was almost impossible one can scarcely imagine how bad the few roads there were could be but everything
of supplies
; ;
must be
risked, lest the allied tribes should lose confidence in
still
Rome, and,
more important,
lose confidence in Caesar,
which they would be sure to do if he allowed one of their chief towns to be taken. He concluded to rely largely on
the good will of the
^dui
to
Having
got his forces well in hand, he left
keep him supplied with corn. two legions
and the baggage at Agendicum, and moved towards the Boii, hoping to keep them in allegiance by extending to them his
protection.
He
sent forward messengers to encourage
them
to stout resistance
and assure them of
his speedy arrival.
Coming on
the second day after starting to
Vellaunodunum
(Trigueres), he made arrangements to capture it, as he not only needed it for a storehouse, but could not leave it in the
enemy's hands in his rear.
In two days Caesar had drawn
up
his lines of contravallation,
that resistance would be useless, capitulated,
and the town, seeing plainly and gave up its
arms and
six
plete the surrender, Caesar
hundred hostages. Leaving Trebonius to commarched without delay on GenaThis, as above said, was probably
to be Orleans.
bum
of the Carnutes.
modern Gien, though generally assumed
In
GENABUM.
23T
pushing for Gergobina, which he aimed quickly to reach, it would be much out of Caesar's way and over a bad tract of
country to march to Orleans, and as it was not essential to do so, he would not be likely at this moment to vary from
Moreover, Gien is a better location for an oppidum, being on a hill, while Orleans is on a slope. This town, Genabum, the Carnutes had not yet garrisoned,
his straight course.
would be delayed a long time at whereas he reached Genabum, much to the Vellaunodunum, surprise of the inhabitants, in two days after Vellaunoas they expected Caesar
dunum had
of the fact.
capitulated,
when they had barely received news He could scarcely have reached Orleans, ham-
pered by his considerable trains, which is fifty miles as another argument in the crow flies, in this short time
favor of Gien.
The population
at
midnight endeavored to
to ob-
escape across the Liger, near by, over which there was a
bridge, but Ca3sar
had already detailed two legions
serve the town; and the inhabitants, being
much
delayed at
the bridge on account of
its
narrowness, were prevented from
Ca3sar entered the escaping and driven back into the place. town and gave it up to pillage, as punishment for the recent murder of Romans within its walls. Thence he marched
south on
Noviodunum (Sancerre) and Avaricum
of
the
Bituriges (Bourges).
Gallic
Horseman.
(Prom a
terra-cotta Statuette.)
XVI.
AVAEICTJM.
LATE WINTER AND EARLY SPRING,
52 B. C.
to interfere with Caesar's siege of
it
VERCINGETORIX sought
to no effect.
;
Noviodmram, hut
He
conceived the idea that
was unwise
to risk battle with the
Romans that more could be accomplished by a system of small- war. This was a remarkable plan of campaign for a barbarian. It is what gave Fabius his fame in the second Punic War. The Gauls burned their crops and towns to
prevent Caesar from victualling his army.
spared.
Avaricnm alone
in that section
was
This town (Bourges) had but one approach.
Here Caesar began
siege
works and built a mound.
the
Vercingetorix tried to raise the siege by harassing
army. He suffered much from the jealousies and dissensions of the allied tribes, but his ability and character sufficed to hold them together. The
Roman
Gauls ably managed the siege. The wall, built up of logs, stones and earth, was strong and tough. Sallies were made with considerable success, still there was but one end possible the place was taken and forty thousand souls
;
perished.
Caesar found on
hand much
corn.
Labienns was sent from here
against the Parisii.
Vercingetorix, foreseeing Caesar's plans, sought to defend
the line of the Elaver, but Caesar cleverly stole a passage, and marched on Gergovia.
VERCINGETORIX, on hearing of the havoc Caesar was playing with his allied towns, gave up the siege of Gergobina and moved forward to meet the Romans. Caesar had just
completed the siege of Noviodunum.
in the act of delivering
The
inhabitants were
up
hostages, horses
and arms
to the
centurions,
when
the arrival of Vercingetorix' cavalry van-
guard was seen in the distance.
Encouraged by this apparent a certain party of citizens again re'sorted to arms, shut relief, the gates, manned the walls and refused to surrender. They
were with
difficulty suppressed, though the centurions receivthe surrender behaved with consummate skill. At the ing
VERCINGETORIX' ABILITY.
same time
combat
Caesar,
239
by a smart attack
came near
of his cavalry, drove
loss.
back the van of the Gauls with considerable
his native cavalry
In the
to being beaten, but a
hundred Germans newly recruited proved equal body to their reputation, and by their vigorous and unusual tactics
of four
turned the
tide.
Vercingetorix retired, and Caesar marched to Avaricum,
the best fortified town of the Bituriges.
besiege
it,
in the belief that its capture
proposed to would reduce all
He
the region to obedience.
the River
The name Avaricum comes from Avara (Euse); Bourges is a relic of Bituriges. Vercingetorix, who was by long odds the strongest oppo-
nent Caesar ever had in Gaul, was taught by the failures at Vellaunodunum, Genabum and Noviodunum, that he could
He convoked an asnot deal with Caesar in open warfare. sembly of the tribes, and informed the chiefs that, in order
to
win
success, he
so as, if possible,
must undertake a system of small-war, to cut the Romans off from rations and
forage for their beasts, the want of which latter would ren-
der Caesar's cavalry more or less harmless.
alone could they save Gaul from
By
self-sacrifice
Roman
oppression.
They
must burn and destroy
their
own farms and
villages ; every-
thing not beyond capture from its defenses or position must be made unavailable to the enemy. This course would oblige
the
Romans
to send to a distance to gather supplies,
and
Vercingetorix could then fall upon their detachments and beat them in detail. So long as the legions could keep there was no Gallic courage or discipline which together,
could cope with them.
This plan, however severely
full of
it fell
on
his
wisdom
in regard to the
enemy.
credit is
own people, was With a sufficiency
of victual in his
own
rear, Vercingetorix
out the
Roman
armies.
As much
proposed to starve due to this barba-
240
COSTLY WARFARE.
means
of
rian chief for his masterly conception of the proper
opposing Caesar's legions as was due to Fabius for the same
method of meeting the victorious phalanxes of Hannibal. The plan was the more easy for the barbarians to carry out,
as they scoured the country to a
much
greater extent than
its
the soldiers of Caesar; were more familiar with
resources
and topography, and had the population on their side. Acting on the scheme thus devised for them by Vercingetorix, the Bituriges
began to destroy
all
the towns and pro-
visions which could possibly fall into the
It
Roman possession.
lot, but they preferred this loss to the prospect of death themselves, and the sale of their wives and daugha certain fate, as they believed, if Caesar ters into slavery
was a hard
should
now succeed
in conquering the land.
Twenty towns
were burned in one day. Almost alone and after long debate, Avaricum was spared on account of its exceptional situation
for defense,
and a proper garrison was thrown
into the town.
Vercingetorix camped with his army in a spot defended by woods and marshes, probably near Dun-le-roy, at the confluence of the Taisseau
And,
at a distance of fifteen miles,
and Auron, some eighteen miles southeast of Avaricum. The marshes have now dried up and the streams have been narrowed.
He did
not dare to interfere with the siege of Avar-
icum, but closely watched the operations of the Romans,
faithfully scouted the neighborhood, attacked their foraging
parties whenever he could safely do so,
and kept well posted
in all their movements.
He
"received intelligence every
hour in the day."
Avaricum, in the middle of an extended level stretch of country, was surrounded on north and east and west by marshy rivers, the modern Yevres, Yevrette and Auron, affluents of the Liger, and the marsh It had they produced.
but one narrow approach on the southwest.
This
is
now
AVARICUM.
much wider than
it
241
rivers of
Bourges have gradually been canalled, a work which has broadened the strip of land, while constant accretions have raised the level
used to be.
of its slopes.
The
The
entire
erations been reclaimed,
and rich
marsh has by the industry of genfields and gardens now
occupy
fields in
its site.
a gentle
The plateau descends to these low -lying grade. The general height of the plateau
is still
above the meadows
are less abrupt.
what Caesar gives
it,
but
its
edges
Avaricum had
forty thousand souls.
Caesar
camped be-
tween the Auron and Yevrette, on an eminence half a mile
from the
gates.
The
site of his
camp
is
now, appropriately
enough, occupied by a government gun-foundry and shop,
and by other military establishments. Between the camp and town was a depression in the ground protecting the latter like a
huge ditch. This has now been filled up to accommodate modern structures, though it can still be traced, if
carefully sought.
Caesar began the erection of a terrace,
242
vineae
DEPRIVATIONS OF BESIEGERS.
and two towers.
Owing
to the marshes, a line of
contravallation was neither feasible nor necessary. He must attack along the narrow approach, which was not over four
hundred feet wide.
eighty feet higher
The top
of the wall of
Avaricum was
than the floor of the ravine.
Vercingetorix carried out his small-war
programme
well.
1*0
ET
Terrace at Avaricum (plan).
being Rations began to fail ; the -^Edui, growing lax in their fealty, were by no means prompt in furnishing corn;
attacked.
The Romans could not go
far
to
forage without
the Boii were poor; foraging
resource,
now
that the country
was an altogether uncertain was devastated. Still, the
Ca3sar not infrequently
soldiers bore their deprivations well.
well as precedent.
legions,
consulted the wishes of his army, as a matter of policy as Now, in his anxiety for the welfare of his
he went so far as to offer to raise the siege
if
the
CESAR'S SCOUTING.
243
men
felt
that their hardships were too great; the answer
came promptly, an emphatic "No." They would avenge the manes of their comrades at any cost. Thus rings with no
uncertain sound the voice of
great captain in their chief.
all soldiers
who
recognize the
While
all
the siege was progressing, and
it
was pressed with
vigor, Vercingetorix, from his camp to the south, approached near to Avaricum and camped on its northwest. He hoped for some chance to deal the Romans a blow. With his horse
and the attendant
light foot
he soon after made his
100
Terrace at Avaricum (section on line A-B).
FEET
way
to a place
which the
Roman
foragers were wont to pass
in going out
on
in
this
daily duty, hoping to catch a large
party of
them
an ambush.
Caesar fortunately learned of
this attempt.
do not hear much of the details of Caesar's scouting and spy system, but he was generally so well informed of
We
what went on
in the
enemy's camp that we can but draw the
conclusion that he had organized an effective "secret ser" vice system.
Caesar set out at midnight with the bulk of his force to
his
checkmate the scheme of the barbarian leader by attacking camp in his absence, where no person, he heard, was left
in absolute
command.
On
reaching the place he "ordered
244
AN AMBUSH THWARTED.
Vercingetorix had placed
the baggage to be piled and the arms to be got ready," in
other words, prepared for battle.
his
camp on a height surrounded by the Avaricum morass, where it was but fifty feet wide; had broken down the
it,
bridges leading to
On
reconnoitring
it,
and occupied the few fords in force. Caesar found the position so strong, that
he sensibly declined an unequal combat from which nothing The soldiers, not recognizing the dangers could be gained. of the ground, demanded battle, but Caesar showed them that
would be too costly in life, and as he had already accomplished his aim in forestalling the ambush of Vercingetorix,
it
it
was not worth the doing.
The army returned
to the siege.
On
the return to
camp
of Vercingetorix, the failure to
bring the Romans to a fight on unequal terms, his having gone off with the cavalry just before Caesar appeared before
the camp, and
the general delay in affairs, raised a clamor
against him among his fickle-minded Gallic allies, who accused him of treacherously playing into Caesar's hands.
But
this accusation
and feeling Vercingetorix, by representcleverness,
ing his case
and prospects with great
managed
to
turn aside, and, indeed, change into so favorable a sentiment, that the Gauls determined to send ten thousand men
to Avaricum, lest
the Bituriges alone should reap all the
Still,
glory of defeating Caesar.
the difference between the
hearty cooperation of Caesar's legionaries, and the suspicious
and jealous dissensions in the camp of Vercingetorix was marked, and made the chances run all the more in favor of
the
Romans.
That Vercingetorix was able
to hold these con-
flicting
The Gauls ably managed
elements together redounds much to his credit. the defense of Avaricum.
They
opposed the Roman method of sieges with great ingenuity. The mural hooks and rams used by the Romans to pull and
batter
down
the walls they would catch with a noose, and
GALLIC WALL.
245
drag into the town. They undermined the Roman mound, at which work they were expert, as there were many iron and
copper miners in the country ; they raised towers as high as the Romans on the threatened side of their wall, and covered
the
woodwork with
skins ; they set the vineae on fire
by noc-
turnal sallies ; they
made
sorties every day,
work greatly by throwing sharp
stakes, stones
and impeded the and hot pitch
upon the besiegers. A civilized garrison could scarcely have done the defense greater justice.
The
Gallic wall, of heavy logs and stones, was peculiarly
difficult to
attack with batfire.
tering-ram or
The
logs
were laid across the line of
the wall, two feet apart, and
held in place by heavy cross logs mortised together. These
SECTION;
were packed with earth, and the ends of the logs at the
outer side of the wall were
held in place with the stones
PLAN
which made
stone
its
facing.
The
.OF.
ONE LAY
from
logs
protected the walls the ends of the fire;
would only char, and the logs and earth, from their
greater
the
elasticity,
resisted
rams
far
better
than
ELE.
VAT
stone alone could do.
wall had to be broken
together.
Still,
The down piecemeal
Gallic Wall.
it
would not tumble
the legions persevered, despite wet and cold,
and
in
twenty-five days had raised a mound three hundred and These figures are thirty feet broad and eighty feet high.
246
ANCIENT GALLANTRY.
disputed by some critics, though given by the Commentaries. They are not exceptional, and the topography bears them
out.
When
it
the
mound had
It
walls,
began
to sink.
all but reached the enemy's had been undermined, and was,
moreover, fired from the mine.
when
at the
Caesar happened to be
This occurred at midnight, making a tour of inspection, and
side of the tower
same moment a vigorous sally from two gates on each was made by the besieged. The Avaricans
threw torches, pitch, dry wood and other inflammables on the Two legions were generally on guard towers and terrace. at night, and these were taken unawares. The fight lasted
all night.
for a while
cover.
The pent-houses were destroyed, and the Romans had to march to and fro from the towers without The besieged now saw a good chance of victory.
:
Caesar here mentions an occurrence which enables us to " There compare ancient with modern gallantry under fire
happened
in
appeared to be omitted.
my own view a circumstance which, having be worthy of record, we thought it ought not to
certain
Gaul before the gate
of the town,
who was
casting into the* fire
fire
opposite the turret balls of
tallow and
which were passed along to him, was pierced
fell
with a dart on the right side and
dead.
One
of those
next him stepped over him as he lay, and discharged the same office; when the second man was slain in the same
manner by a wound from a cross-bow, a third succeeded him, and a fourth succeeded the third; nor was this post left
vacant by the besieged, until, the
fire
of the
mound having
been extinguished and the enemy repulsed in every direction, an end was put to the fighting." It seems that three men or more were shot down at their post, and that the post was at
once
filled
by fresh men.
This
is
mentioned as an excep-
tional piece of courage.
In our day we have seen many such. Entire color-guards have not infrequently been shot down in
ANOTHER MASSACRE.
battle ; but there has never
247
been a lack of
men
eager to take
their places.
The
sortie was, after
Gallic soldiers in the city
a fierce struggle, beaten back. The now formed a project of leaving
the town
by retiring across the marshes in its rear by night, and making for the camp of Vercingetorix but the clamor of the women, who were to be left behind to the tender
;
mercies of the besiegers, gave notice to the Romans of this evasion, and, for fear of being cut off, the garrison desisted.
Next day, a heavy rain coming on, the ramparts of the town were carelessly guarded. Csesar, perceiving this,
quietly
made
his preparations, sharply advanced the towers
and ordered the walls
those
who
first
be scaled, offering great rewards to mounted them. The Romans broke from
to
cover with exceptional energy, and assaulted in good form. The enemy, surprised and disconcerted, was driven in; but
with admirable constancy drew up in the market-place in wedges (or close order), determined to resist to the end.
And
here no doubt they would have stubbornly fought ; but
when they saw the Romans moving along the walls so as to surround all who should be left in the city, the columns
dissolved,
flight.
and each man sought
lost
his
individual
safety in
Most
fled to the northern extremity of the
Thus broken up, the Gauls
oppidum. head; and having thrown
away their arms, the Romans had them at their mercy, and cut them down remorselessly, sparing neither age nor sex.
What
the infantry could not reach fell at the hands of the
men, women and children, barely eight hundred escaped across the marshes to VercinThe Gallic chief received and distributed getorix' camp. them among the several divisions of his army, lest in one
cavalry.
Out
of forty thousand
body their sad
breed a mutiny. Once again, Vercingetorix had a hard task in reconciling
tale should
248
jEDUAN IMBROGLIO.
and nothing shows the
better than the
his fellow-citizens to this disaster;
native ability of this remarkable
man
way
in
which, under the
stress of misfortune,
he kept his ascend-
"As ill success ancy over this fickle, unreasonable people. weakens the authority of other generals, so on the contrary
his dignity increased daily,
though a
loss
had been
sus-
tained."
Vercingetorix
to
now
advised the Gauls to imitate the
Roman method and
by
fortify their camps.
This counsel
they followed and thenceforward continued to do.
skillful appeals to the
all
He
also
neighboring tribes succeeded in over to his cause, and very shortly replaced the winning troops lost at Avaricum with a still larger force. Especially
a fine body of cavalry came to him under Teutomatus, prince
of the Nitiobriges.
But though he would have been backed
up by public sentiment in an offensive policy, this barbarian chief refrained from an attack on Cesar's lines. He wisely kept to small-war.
Caesar found in
Avaricum
also a large supply of corn
and
provender, and gave his army a much needed, well-earned rest. The spring and the time for more active operations
ivere at
hand, when the
to
^dui
sent urgent messages to Caesar
praying him
come
to their assistance, as there
had arisen
a serious division in the state, two parties respectively under Cotus and Convictolitavis, both of high lineage and much power, claiming the government, which was governed by an annual chief magistrate. Csesar was loath to leave operations
against Vercingetorix, whom he now hoped either to drive from the forest retreats to which he had retired, or else to
close in
and
trap.
But Caesar could neither allow danger
to
lurk in his rear, nor temporize with the fealty of the -ZEdui. He therefore turned backward. It was through their land
that his line of operations ran from his base, in the Province.
If the JEdui were to waver in their allegiance,
it
would
THE TROUBLE SETTLED.
become a question
of subsistence
249
It
and not
strategy.
was
they kept his granary full of corn. intermediate base. Arrived
They were indeed an
among
Decetia
Liger,
this
people,
at
(Decize) on
the
Caesar sent for the
senate of the .ZEdui to meet
him, and not only decided
the matter in dispute
by making Cotus, who had but
a minority at his back, re-
and by placing the government in the hands of
sign,
Convictolitavis,
priests favored
;
whom
the
but he in-
duced the 2Edui to promise ten thousand infantry and
all their
horse for
him
to
use in garrisons along his
line of operations, to protect the trains of corn
which
they should forward him.
Having
shelved
this
danger, Czesar sent Labie-
nus with four legions, two
from the army and the two
left at
Agendicum, against
Parisii
the
Senones and
Avaricum
to Gergovia.
(or Lutetii),
who had been
roused by Vercingetorix ; while he, with the six remaining, marched on Gergovia in the land of the Arverni, proposing to besiege
it.
faithful allies of
The Arverni, though they had long been Rome, were now the centre of the rebellion.
250
MARCH UP THE EL AVER.
Caesar.
The cavalry was divided between Labienus and
What Vercingetorix had been doing during Caesar's absence It looks as if he had retired into the hills is not told us.
and woods of the Bituriges, and had been watching
nent.
tive
his oppo-
On
and betook himself
learning Caesar's direction, he guessed his objecto the farther (left) bank of the
it
Elaver (Allier), and occupied
before Caesar reached the
right bank.
This movethat Vercin-
ment shows
getorix,
*ne to
too,
had
either
6 instincts
of the
soldier, or else possessed
an equally good corps of His scouts and spies.
manreuvre
placed
him
athwart Caesar's path.
He
was intent on barring the Romans from approach to
Gergovia,
and
he
took
all
care to break
down
the bridges over the river.
The Elaver
is still
it
sized stream ;
a goodwas then
a mighty bulwark of his territory, and he must
keep
The
Elaver.
it
intact at all haz-
ards.
This river was not
then fordable except in
the low-water season in autumn,
and
it
was
essential
to Caesar to cross
unless
force
he was to acknowledge that
without delay Vercingetorix could
the river,
him
it
to change his plans.
He moved up
struck
near modern Moulins
from Decetia was an old
Gaulish road which led to Moulins and was later made a
STEALING A PASSAGE.
Roman
road
251
to day Vercingetorix
From day and sought a chance to cross. moved exactly as far as the Romans
cross.
moved, and camped opposite to them at night. Caesar saw that he must resort to some stratagem to
at one of
the broken bridges, Having camped one night most likely near Varennes, Ca3sar next morning sent forward only two thirds of the army and all the baggage, ordering it
to
march
in six corps,
and
in such order as to appear to
be
the entire force of six legions.
legions he remained behind in hiding in the woods well back of the river. Ver-
With two
cingetorix followed the
the river.
moving column on the other side up So soon as the enemy was out of the way, Caesar
emerged from his hiding-place, and speedily rebuilt the bridge on the old piles which had been left standing, crossed
to the left
bank and intrenched a bridgehead having done which he sent on and recalled the body which had marched
;
ahead.
during the coming night.
This rejoined by stealing a march on Vercingetorix Vercingetorix, when he saw that
he had been outwitted and knew that the whole
Roman
army had crossed, moved by forced marches on Gergovia,
so as not to be brought to battle against his will.
This passage was skillfully accomplished. Caesar here earned as much credit for a clever stratagem as Vercingetorix showed that he had been careless in scouting the river-banks.
But we cannot too much praise the native
barbarian chief,
ability of this
was able
to
who without military education or example do so much to oppose one of the greatest soldiers
the world has ever seen.
We cannot compare
Caesar's oper-
ation at the Elaver to the passage of the
ander, or that of the
as
ful
Hydaspes by AlexRhone by Hannibal. It was far from But nevertheless it was skilldistinguished an operation.
and well-conceived; and was so well executed as
to de-
ceive a very keen-eyed opponent.
XVII.
THE SIEGE OF GERGOVIA.
THE
has at the summit a plateau over a mile long.
SPRING, 52
It could be attacked
B. C.
height of Gergovia stands twelve hundred feet above the plain, and
most
easily
from the south.
as the
Vercingetorix had drawn up his forces on this slope.
arrived, cavalry skirmishes
So soon
Gallic
Romans
became common, but the
infantry remained behind the defenses.
Caesar
camped
off
southeast of the town
and
later seized a hill on its south, intrenched a second
two camps by works.
their
This cut the Gergovians
camp, and joined the from the river, and made
water supply uncertain.
;
The
_<Edui, Caesar's chief allies,
had been giving
him anxiety
join him.
rebellion
now broke out
Caesar left Fabius in
army, which was on its way to command at Gergovia, made a speedy march
in their
to the rear, brought the rebels to terms,
and returned.
fifty miles.
In twenty-four hours,
his
column of four legions had marched
After due consideration,
Caesar determined to assault Gergovia.
He
laid his plans skillfully.
Sending
a force to
make a demonstration
strong, he
against the west front, which the Gauls felt
was not very
drew
all
the Gallic troops to that quarter.
He
then
suddenly threw forward his legions, which gallantly advanced and reached the very walls of the town.
But they had not been furnished with
;
scaling-ladders
few only mounted the top of the walls the Gauls returned from the western front Caesar was driven back with heavy loss. He essays to gloss over this
;
defeat in the Commentaries, but the facts are plain.
into
The ^Edui now broke
out
open
revolt,
and Caesar had to give over the
siege.
He had
been roundly
defeated.
IN
five days'
march, the
first
one being short on account
of the fatigue of the
back, and the last
column which moved up tlje river and one short because he reached Gergovia
slight cavalry skirmish,
early in the day, Caesar arrived at the capital of the Arverni.
The enemy opposed him only by a and then retired to the upper slope
which the town was
built,
of the very high hill on
where, outside the wall of the
oppidum, they camped.
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254
HEIGHTS OF GERGOViA.
heights of Gergovia, four miles south of
modern Clermont-Ferrand, stand boldly up twelve hundred feet above
the plain.
It has been rechristened its ancient
The
name.
At
third
the top is a quadrangular plateau a mile long
of a mile wide.
by over a
On
the north and east the slope was prob-
ably wooded ; access to the plateau by a body of troops might have been difficult. The south slope is a succession of terraces rather wide and not over steep.
not wooded.
is
On
the west
lie
These apparently were the heights of Bisolles, whose
top only one hundred feet lower than Gergovia and is connected with it by a neck of land. Two other hills, Monts
Rognon and Puy Giroux,
like
flank the Eisolles, and are north-
west and southwest of Gergovia respectively. On the south, a huge buttress, is the Roche Blanche, a long and narrow
hill,
with rocky face on the south and east, and easy slopes elsewhere, about five hundred feet below the plateau of Ger-
govia.
The Auzon
flows south of Gergovia,
and
falls into
the Allier.
east
On
the northwest runs a small brook.
lake,
On
the
was a large shallow
now
drained.
On
the south
and southeast, Gergovia was thought to be most accessible to
attack.
Caesar established his main
camp on high and
healthful
ground south of the lake, perhaps one hundred feet above The Auzon ran behind his camp. It was certhe plain. a task of some danger to attempt to take Gergovia tainly
by storm until Vercingetorix' army was disposed of, and Caesar must get together victual in abundance before he
could blockade or besiege
it.
Descriptions and pictures of Gergovia are somewhat mis-
apt to conceive of a rocky eminence with The top palisaded by nature and practically inaccessible. north slope is wont to be described as impossible to capture.
leading.
is
One
It is not so.
The
slope is not steep, though
it is
long.
The
GERGOVIA NOT INEXPUGNABLE.
cultivation of
fields
255
rich
it
and vineyards
many generations may have
it is
now covered with
softened the slopes, but
It is probable that in cannot have materially altered them. Cesar's day the slope was concealed by woods, and that he But the position could did not reconnoitre it thoroughly.
have been surprised on the north far more easily than asSo far from being, as it is generally saulted on the south.
Larger Camp.
said to be, inexpugnable, the
men who
captured Lookout
Mountain, or who charged with Pickett up Cemetery Ridge, would have laughed at the idea. But ancient warfare was
different.
The
up
his
terraces of the southern slopes were
it
no doubt more
open, and
was on these terraces that Vercingetorix drew
running along
its front.
army, which was protected by a wall of heavy stones,
allies, in
six feet high,
posted his
ner,
order by tribes, in
his troops
Here Vercingetorix the most skillful manespecially his cavalry
and daily exercised
256
ROCHE BLANCHE SEIZED.
light
mixed with
Romans,
Caesar's
armed
foot
in
skirmishes with
their courage
the
so as to ascertain
and improve
and
discipline.
These combats took place oa the plains between camp and the slopes of Gergovia; the barbarians
debouching from the outlets of the south and east front of the
oppidum.
Caesar
soon discovered that
hill
south of the town, and
opposite the eminence on which
was
built
Gergovia
its
(Roche
Blanche), was
essential to the
enemy. By Gauls were
Small
posesssion the
to
able
protect
themselves in getting at their
Camp
at Gergovia.
water, corn
and
forage,
and
here Vercingetorix had a small advanced post. He should have held it in heavier force. The hill in places was no
doubt steeper in Caesar's day than it now is. Slides have since altered its slopes, but towards the plateau it could not
have been steep. Caesar determined to capture this hill. By a carefully planned night attack he drove off the meagre
garrison,
and placing two
le-
gions in their stead, speedily intrenched a small camp upon
it,
and connected
this hill with Double Trench.
main camp by a double trench, twelve feet wide, and a
the
Profile of
parapet, such that access from one to the other was secure.
The two camps have been excavated.
still
Their outlines are
distinct. This act of Caesar's cut the Gergovians off from their main supply of water, for the Auzon, to which they had been going by the glen road from the plateau, was
JZDUAN TREACHERY.
not easily accessible from another place.
rely
257
They now had
exist
to
on springs on the plateau, which
to the west,
still
and are fed
at
from the higher mountains
no demonstration.
and on the brook
the northwest of the town.
On
this side Caesar
had made
Meanwhile the young 2Eduan nobles had been tampered with by the emissaries of Vercingetorix, who had contrived,
by misrepresentations and
even,
gold, to abuse their
minds about
Caesar's intentions respecting their nation.
Convictolitavis,
whom
Caesar had
made
chief of this tribe, partook of
and ordered the ten thousand men who, it had been agreed, should guard Caesar's line of supplies, and who were just setting out with a large convoy, to march ostensibly
this feeling,
to join Caesar, but really to
rix.
make a
junction with Vercingeto-
The
leader of this body was Litavicus.
On
the way,
he and his
men
first
exhibited their treachery, perhaps near
modern Serbannes, by massacring the Romans who accompanied the train. The plot was revealed to Caesar by Eporedorix, the .ZEduan noble, who was part of his entourage.
The matter was
pressing.
Caesar was between two
fires.
The danger was to the 'delayed not a moment.
rations on which he relied.
He
Leaving Fabius in command at Gergovia, he hastened with four legions in light order, accompanied by all his cavalry, to the -ZEduan army, which
was
ing
at
it,
Randan on
the
way to
join Vercingetorix.
Surround-
he speedily brought
it
to terms.
He
convinced the
soldiers of the faithlessness of their leaders, all of
fled to
whom had
had been
Gergovia so soon as their real intentions
discovered. Eporedorix and Viridomarus, both serving with Caesar, added their words to his ; and their explanation and
the conspirators' flight restored quiet in the
2Eduan army.
the
disaffected
sedition, fell
Caesar was,
however,
unable
to
reach
JEduan
citizens at
home.
These, stirred
up by
258
to massacring the
&DUAN
up arms.
DUPLICITY.
others to take
Many, indeed, harm to the ^Eduan army
because he was
Komans in their midst, and incited many The whole nation was in turmoil. when they heard that Caesar had done no
for its treachery,
as he
had not
re-
obliged to temporize,
were desirous of
turning to their allegiance;
rection.
others were boldly for insur-
In Bibracte, Convictolitavis murdered the
Roman
residents
and plundered every Roman's property.
essential that Caesar
All this
made
it
should return to quell this
Vercinge'torix
tumult, which threatened his very base.
had
by
his machinations attacked
him
in his weakest spot.
faith-
Many
lessness;
of the
JEduans had acted with duplicity and
when they were put
in the wrong, they professed
contrition
really
and humbly craved forgiveness. Part had been It was hard to distinguish the honest misguided.
perfidious.
from the
A Fabian policy had to be
resorted to.
Caesar's military
and
political resources were taxed to the
utmost.
Though he had regained
still
control of the
^Eduan
army, the -ZEduan state was
leaders of
capable of vast mischief.
During Cesar's absence to suppress the mutiny of the the ^Eduan army, Vercingetorix attacked the
;
Roman camp and owing
left
to its large extent, the
two legions
behind had much ado to defend the ramparts. Vercingetorix forced the fighting, and constantly sent on relays of fresh troops. Though the defenses were strong, it was only
with the aid of the engines and at great loss in men that the enemy could be held at bay. Fabius sent messengers to Caesar, who speeded his return, leaving the revolt in the
-ZEduan territory
Caesar's
however dangerous
for the future.
men made their long forced march with great From the Gergovian camp to Randan, where alacrity. Caesar met the 2Eduan army, is twenty -five miles. He
heard of the plot "almost at midnight."
He
left the
camp
A WONDERFUL MARCH.
259
presumably at sunrise, say at four A. M., reached Randan at noon, spent six or seven hours in negotiations and consequent
action, then gave "three hours of the night to his soldiers for
repose," say seven to ten p. M. (the night watches began at six P. M.), and returned from Randan to the camp in six
hours more, making twenty -four hours in
his
all,
during which
column covered
fifty miles.
any too soon to avert serious
well-nigh exhausted.
Nor did they reach the camp disaster. The two legions were
Some days
after,
attacking the enemy.
a favorable opportunity occurred for Caesar gives us to understand that he
to give
had already determined
owing
partly to its difficulties,
up his attempt on Gergovia, and especially to the ^Eduan
imbroglio; but that he desired to
so as to retire with credit,
make some
demonstration,
and not allow Vercingetorix to accuse the legions of cowardice. He was not really besiegHe was only observing it. Except that he ing Gergovia.
was annoying the enemy, he had
him.
in
no sense even blockaded
Vercingetorix could have retired at any time. This part of the Commentaries is plainly disingenuous. It may be true that Caesar felt that he would have to return
to the
jEduan
territory before
long, but the fact remains
plain that he attacked the Gergovian stronghold in the full
expectation that he could capture
it
out of hand, and that he
was repulsed with a heavy loss. We have nothing but the Commentaries, with an occasional reference in other authors,
added to the topography, on which to base our narrative; but, reading the Commentaries between the lines, and in the
our other knowledge (as in the case of Hannibal, we must sometimes read Livy), and keeping the topography clearly in view, the fact of an assault in good faith and a
light of
bloody repulse is manifest. Caesar had a keen eye.
In the days when
field-glasses
260
A CHANCE FOR ATTACK.
were unknown, the eye, if naturally good, was trained, like those of our Indians, to a surprising degree of accuracy. He noticed from the Eoche Blanche, where he had located
camp, that the defenses of the main plateau of the town, so far strongly beset, were quite disgarnished of
his lesser
troops.
daily,"
"a great number of whom flocked to him informed him that the top of one of the adjoining
Deserters,
heights, the Risolles,
marked 1 on the
chart,
was
level,
and
communicated with the oppidum by a wooded and narrow
neck (2) and that Vercingetorix had conceived some danger from that quarter. The north of the Gergovian height, it will
;
be remembered, was not attempted by Caesar in any sense but he had seized the Roche Blanche, and might seize the Risolles, and thus win a nearer, and to the Gauls more dan;
gerous,
access to the plateau.
to
it
The gate
(3) of the oppi-
dum, and the road
been dug out so as to It varied but little from what day.
certain
from the westerly height (1), has show the lay of the land in Caesar's
it
now
is,
except from a
amount
by
of natural debris,
the surface
generations of plowing since.
and gradual smoothing of Should Caesar
get possession of the Risolles height (1), he could do more
towards cutting the enemy off from water and forage, a fact which they cared not to face. What Caesar might
do next was the unknown quantity of the Gallic problem.
Vercingetorix had foreseen the danger, and had sent all his force to fortify this flanking height. Some authors pick out
Mont Rognon
or
Puy Giroux
as the object of Vercingetorix'
solicitude; but for Caesar to take either of these
would by
no means compromise the Gergovians, both being beyond the range, and neither being connected with the plateau.
Besides, the facts related
work near
at hand, at
show that the Gergovians were at a place from which they could in a
oppidum.
few minutes return
to the
CLEVER PREPARATIONS.
that here
261
Acting on this information, Caesar saw was an excellent opening for a
assault.
general
He
sent
some turmae
of cavalry at night round towards the
height in question, to make a noisy demonstration on the west and south of it
(6),
and, to add to their number, he hel-
meted many of his muleteers, and sent them at daylight on the same errand,
instructing
skirts of the
them by ranging about woods to attract the
and lead them
in the
attento be-
tion of the Gauls,
lieve that
an attack was coming from that
quarter.
He
also sent a legion in sup-
port, with orders to take post below Puy Giroux, and to pretend to be hiding in
the hollows and woods as
surprise.
preparing a This demonstration, seen from
if
the oppidum, resulted, as Caesar anticipated, in the
all his force
enemy withdrawing nearly
of the
from the south front
oppidum, and marching it over to the position (1) they thus deemed to be threatened.
It
was evident
to
them
that Ver-
cingetorix
had been right in apprehend-
ing trouble from this quarter.
to
They
set
work
to fortify its west front (a to b),
and presumably the neck of land, for this was not precipitous enough to be its
own
defense.
it
Caesar's capital feint
had
This Gergovia affair
is is
succeeded as
deserved to succeed.
one of the earliest where the terrain
so well explored as to
give us a thorough insight into the manoeuvre.
Barring the
262
INSTRUCTIONS.
use of artillery, the whole operation closely resembles a modern assault, in its
method of preparation
-
and execution
Thus much accomplished,
under cover of his
Caesar,
feint, transferred
the bulk of his force secretly and in small detachments from the greater
to
the
lesser
camp.
wall,
The men
as Polyso as
marched behind the
aenus
.
says,
crouching down
not to be seen, and the ensigns,
plumes and shields, which would have betrayed them, were covered
so
\
a
as not to
attract
attention to
the manoeuvre.
his instructions to his legates.
>
3JQ
Then he gave out The
place, he said, could not be taken
'.
by
the
assault, but
only by surprise;
to
men were
be kept well in
to
hand and not allowed
orders, either
go beyond
from
zeal or
hope of
plunder, lest
they should be taken in flank when in confused order
;
of which, to judge
description,
from Caesar's
there was some dan-
ger, which would not otherwise apThe .<Edui were sent from pear.
the greater
camp by another
circuit
on the right to attack in another This was probably on the place.
southeast angle of the
oppidum
(4).
The town
wall was twelve hundred paces distant from the
ATTACK AND RECALL.
foot of the mountain, as the
263
crow
flies.
Irregularities in the
to this distance
ground made the access
at least a half.
circuitous,
and added
The road up
the mountain
now runs by
the
glen where
Merdogne, and must always have done so. Midway up the ascent there was the stone wall six feet high, No defenses or camps were below but already mentioned.
lies
;
above the stone wall were the barbarians' camps very closely
packed together.
The
aries
signal of attack
was given.
With
a rush the legion-
debouched from the gates of the lesser camp, advanced the short mile up the hill (9 and 10), and, swarming over the
became possessors of the camp. The surprise was complete. So much was this the fact that the king of
wall, at once
the Nitiobriges,
Teutomatus,
barely escaped
half-clothed
from his
tent, where he was resting during the noon -tide. At this point, and having made this gain, for some strange
reason Caesar paused, and halted the Tenth legion, which he was with. This is one of the most inexplicable circumstances of his career.
this
He
states in his
Commentaries that
"Caesar,
much was
all
he intended to do.
having
accomplished the object which he had in view, ordered the
signal to be sounded for retreat."
But
this is clearly
an
excuse framed after the event.
position
(it
It is probable that,
from his
when
the troops were swarming over the stone wall
may have been the knoll marked 5 on the chart), he was
better able to recognize the questionable nature of the task than from below, and decided to call off his men. It is not
impossible that he purposed to hold this position and erect
vinea3
and mounds
it
happened, in a summary assault on the town, had he then and there
pressed
seems as
though, indeed, from what subsequently if he might have been successful
Writing afterwards, he says that "success depended on a surprise," and he had succeeded in surprising
on.
264
the enemy.
FAILURE IN ASSAULT.
Sounding the
recall,
he endeavored to arrest the
onset of the other legions; but though the centurions and
tribunes did their utmost, the legionaries, with the flush of
past victories and the hope of plunder, either would not or There were accidents in the ground between did not hear.
Caesar and
legions at
them
to intercept
the trumpet-blasts, but the
Thapsus broke away from Caesar, and perhaps they did so here. They pressed on till they reached the wall of the town, where they were stopped for want of means of
escalading the rampart, which had not been provided
curious lapse,
little
if
a surprise and assault was intended. So defended were the walls, that the women were seen
hanging over them and imploring for mercy, expecting no less than immediate capture or death, as at Avaricum.
Some
of the
men
did reach the top of the wall.
L. Fabius,
centurion of the Eighth legion, lifted
it,
by
his soldiers, scaled
and others followed.
it
Had
if
the legionaries been furnished
effort
with ladders,
seems as
one vigorous
it
would have
that
met with
success.
Even
as
was,
the fact
some
managed
to scale the wall
shows that in the absence of the
garrison the thing was feasible.
By
this
time the Gauls had heard of the
Roman
assault,
and, preceded
by
the cavalry,
defense of the city.
the wall
came rushing back to the In a few moments the ground back of
been imploring mercy, now
was beset by defenders, and the women, who had as was their wont, with dis-
heveled hair and holding up their infants bade their husbands defend them. The speedy return of the Gergovians proves that they could not have been so far away as Mont
Rognon or Puy Giroux.
equal, so
to the
The
contest
much
so that Caesar
was constrained
was now quite unto send back
on guard under T.
camp
for the cohorts left there
to take
Sextius,
ordering them
up a position at the foot of
HEAVY
the
hill,
LOSSES.
265
so as to threaten Vercingetorix' right (8),
if it
and
to
protect the retreat
the Gauls in flank.
He
should have to be made, by attacking himself, with the Tenth legion, now
advanced somewhat to the support of the other legions which
had gone beyond the position where he had halted the Tenth, and awaited the issue, holding his men well in hand. The
other legionaries were
still
fighting bravely, but against odds
of position and numbers, the Gauls having been able to make a sortie on their flank. T. Sextius and the others who had
climbed
it
were thrown from the wall; the centurion, M.
Petronius, also of the Eighth, attempting to burst the gates,
was
killed in trying to save his
men.
At this instant the ^Edui emerged on the Roman right, as the and though they had their right shoulders bared, Gallic allies of Caesar were in the habit of doing to distinguish them from the other barbarians,
the legionaries
assumed that these were fresh troops of the enemy who had bared their shoulders as a stratagem, and at once began to
somewhat confusedly. They had lost in killed, seven hundred men and forty-six centurions, but had illustrated
retire
Koman
valor in every phase.
The great
loss in officers
shows
that these
by no means lacked devotion. The Tenth legion, by changes of position
to suit the several
cases,
abundantly protected the retreat by threatening Ver-
cingetorix' flank ; the cohorts
from the camp did their share, taking position on high ground to impose on Vercingetorix. by endangering his advance. So soon as they reached the Vercinplain, the legions all turned and faced the enemy.
getorix,
who had hoped to have them at his mercy and who had followed in pursuit, impressed by this bold front, decided not to risk an attack, but led back his forces into the town.
the return to camp, Caesar took occasion to "censure " the rashness of the legionaries for not heeding the orders of
On
266
their officers,
CAESAR DISINGENUOUS.
while commending their valor; and showed
them how nearly they had come to suffering a fatal defeat. As at Avaricum, said he, he had desired not to risk the lives of his men in a futile assault and he bade them remember
;
that he, their general, was the best judge of what
to do,
it
was wise
and
and that he required in
less
his soldiers forbearance
self-command not
than valor and magnanimity. At the same time he encouraged them not to lose heart from one
bad luck, "nor attribute to the valor of the enemy what disadvantage of position had caused."
piece of
Caesar had, as he says, not obtained such success over the
enemy as would enable him under
its
cover to retire from the
He felt that he must do more. On the siege with honor. next day he led out his army into the plain and offered battle
to Vercingetorix, which this chief declined,
and
hostilities
were confined to a cavalry skirmish, in which the Romans
proved the victors.
having made
all
The succeeding day
Caesar did the like,
preparations to raise the siege.
But as
Vercingetorix would not accept his gage and descend into the level, Caesar began to withdraw in open daylight, in full
view of the enemy. Vercingetorix did not pursue. One cannot refrain from contrasting this assault on Geras, e. g., the Rock of govia with some of Alexander's, The energy of the Malli. Chorienes, or Aornus, or the city
of Hannibal, one of whose
.sieges, in
weak
more than one instance
points was his conduct of stands as at Saguntum
out in marked relief from the lack of vigor here exhibited by Caesar. And we have to judge Hannibal from the accounts
of his enemies
;
Caesar,
by
his
own
statements.
Nor
is
this the only similar case.
We
'
shall see
paused at Thapsus, until his men took matters into hands. At Munda he stopped at the brook which separated him from Cnaeus Pompey. With all Caesar's consummate
how he their own
RETREAT.
strategic courage,
267
and a personal bearing above reproach, he
tremendous
vitality in tactical initiative
was wont
to lack the
which we admire so heartily in other captains. There are in other authors hints that this Gergovia
is
affair
not accurately given by Caesar, but that a really serious
is
defeat
to the report of a
explained away in a manner which would do justice modern general. It is related by Servirus
that so
Maurus Honoratus
was taken prisoner
marked was the defeat
that Caesar
and only escaped by a accident. Plutarch, indeed, says the Arverni had a lucky sword captured from Caesar's person, either here or at the
in the confusion,
battle preceding the siege of Alesia.
However apochryphal
to
these statements
may
be, Caesar
was clearly compelled
give
up ^Eduan question had, however, become so pressing that he was no doubt wise, for that reason alone, in retiring from
Gergovia.
the siege for
want
of success in his assault.
The
That
it
was the only place he had
failed to take
in the Gallic
war abundantly condones the failure. Caesar moved east, and on the third day after the
assault
he reached the Elaver, and repairing the bridge over the river, perhaps at Vichy, he retired to the right bank on the
way
to the territory of his former
"kinsmen."
the question of the ^Edui,
Caesar
now
deliberately took
of
up
whose prominent men was apparent, many the manner in which he had honored and protected despite them. The .2Eduan army, under Viridomarus and Eporedothe treachery of
rix,
probably disgusted at the late defeat, was leaving for home, and "Litivacus had set out with all the cavalry to
raise the
He
vEdui," but Caesar made no effort to retain them. merely represented to them how he had found the ^Edui
at the
mercy
of their neighbors
highest position of any the inference.
tribe in Gaul,
and had placed them in the and left them to draw
268
JEDUAN REVOLT.
Noviodunum
(Nevers), a town
Caesar had collected a large amount of baggage, corn,
horses and all his hostages in
of the
this
^Edui on the Liger. When the ^Eduan army came to place, they found that the chief men of the state had
sent to Vercingetorix to
negotiate a peace, and
that the
Roman
still
alliance
had been thrown over.
This act
more con-
firms the idea of a seri-
ous defeat at Gergovia.
Not
willing to
neglect
so favorable
an opportu-
nity for regaining their
independence, Eporedorix
and
and
Viridomarus
massacred
seized
the garrison of Novio-
dunum and
ers,
all its trad-
divided the
spoil,
sent the hostages to Bibracte, drove off the re-
serve horses which Caesar
had got from Italy
and Spain for remounts, and burned the town,
together
Gergovia to Agendicum.
with
all
the
carry away.
they then placed troops at the fords of the They
corn
Could
not
Liger to prevent the Romans from crossing.
to force Caesar
They hoped
at Lute-
by lack
of provisions to retire to the Nar-
bonese.
They would then have Labienus, who was
mercy.
tia, at their
CAESAR
AT HIS
BEST.
269
Learning of these things on the march from the Elaver
towards the Liger, Caesar sa\7 that he was in a very danHis enemies were in high spirits at his late gerous position.
defeat ; he was surrounded
by troops
in revolt
the victori-
ous Arverni were on his rear, the ^Edui in his front holding the Liger, the Bituriges on his left. But he also saw that it would be a shameful as well as a perilous thing to allow himself to be driven back to the Province, for this would isolate Labienus.
He
proposed, come what might, to go to the
bottom of the matter, join Labienus, and punish the traitors
at their
own threshold. Here we have Caesar
at his best.
No
one ever rose to the
occasion more splendidly than this captain.
The graver
the
danger, the bolder the front this great man presented to it. At times Caesar appeared to lack a certain spirit of enter-
which Alexander and Napoleon excelled. But once put impending disaster before him, and no general ever proved himself more energetic, more able.
prise, in
Caesar
made speed
to reach the Liger,
and sought a
ford.
At modern Bourbon-Lancy there has always been one; it was on his direct road and though this ford was not what
;
was the only one he could secure. He drove off the enemy and crossed, the legionaries being up to their armpits in water, but having the current broken for
he could have desired,
it
them by stationing cavalry obliquely
them.
in
the water above
for the harvest
his
On
the other side he found corn
was at hand
and
cattle,
and refreshed
troops.
He
then marched rapidly to the land of the Senones to join Labienus. It was still early in the year.
xvni.
LABIENUS' CAMPAIGN.
SPRING, 52
B. C.
LABIENUS had. been conducting a campaign against the
Parisii.
He
reached
Lutetia, but shortly heard of Caesar's failure before Gergovia. He was opposed by Camulogenus, an able man, and saw that he could not safely retire, as he
ought to do, towards Caesar, without first imposing on the enemy. This he did in a bold and well-planned battle, and promptly retreated to Agendicum. The ^Eduan rebellion practically cut Caesar off from his lieutenant and Vercinget;
orix
was
all
the more active since Caesar's defeat at Gergovia.
Caesar
But by a bold
march northward,
made a
junction with Labienns, and thus reunited
his eleven legions in one body.
His manifest policy was now to push for the from which he was cut off, reestablish his base securely, and again Province, advance on the Gallic allies. He set out by the most promising route. Vercingetorix believed .the moment to have come for' a coup de grace. He gave up
his policy of small-war,
and intercepted Caesar on the way.
But
in the ensuing
battle the
Romans won, and
Vercingetorix retired to Alesia, the last and main
stronghold of the Gauls.
This victory reopened Caesar's communications witK
the Province, and he followed the Gauls to Alesia.
DURING Caesar's Gergovia campaign Labienus had marched on Lutetia of the Parisii with four legions, having left a
suitable force of
new
recruits
and
victuals
at
bank
of the Icauna (Yonne)
Agendicum. and the Sequana.
from Italy with his basrg;ae:e OO O He marched down the left
*J
A large army
Dame
de
from the neighboring states assembled to oppose him as soon as his arrival was known. The town of Lutetia occupied
the island in the Seine where
Paris.
now
stands Notre
The
chief
excellent soldier
command had been given named Camulogenus. This
to an aged but
officer,
perceiv-
ing that Labienus was marching along the left bank, camped and drew up his army near a neighboring marsh. This was
LABIENUS AT LUTETIA.
271
It unquestionably where the Esonne flows into the Seine. could not have been Le Marais, a part of Paris, as has been
claimed.
His position prevented the Romans from advan-
Labienus' Campaign.
Labienus tried to make a road across the marsh by using hurdles and branches, a sort of corduroy-road, but
cing.
failed in the attempt.
He
then resorted to stratagem, and sought to steal a march
272
IN DIFFICULTY.
on Camulogenus by a flank manoeuvre.
the
He marched
back
at
bank, on which he night by had so far been, to Melodunum (Melun), which was likewise on an island in the Seine. Here, by seizing boats, he crossed
way he came, along the
left
the left branch of the river to the island, captured the town
and, having repaired the bridge which led to the right bank, moved down on the other side towards Lutetia. He reached
the latter oppidum before Camulogenus,
see through Labienus' manoeuvre.
who did not at once But his delay was not
long.
He
soon followed the
set
Roman army.
on
fire
On
its
his arrival
he ordered Lutetia to be
destroyed.
and
bridges to be
The two armies camped on
ill
either
bank
of the
Sequana opposite the city. Labienus now heard of Caesar's
and the Gauls added
forced back to the Province
success at Gergovia,
to the story that his chief
had been
Bello-
by hunger.
The near-by
vaci, hearing of the revolt of the JEdui, assembled forces for
war.
one
Labienus was thus placed with this inimical tribe on side, only separated from him by the Isara, and with the
Parisii,
Sequana and the from his depots
left
on the other
side.
He was
cut off
Agendicum, which was on the farther bank of the Sequana, and from the road to it leading up the
at
bank, the way he had advanced. He very properly thought it of no use to attempt to reduce the Parisii under
these adverse conditions, but
deemed that he had best
retire
towards his base and seek to preserve his army intact for Caesar. Single-handed, he could not suppress the insurrection.
In order to escape from his awkward situation, Labienus
must recross
to the left
bank
of the Sequana.
still
To accomplish
this in face of the
army which was
on the other side and
would oppose his passage, required ruse. To retrace his steps was to invite Camulogenus to oppose his crossing at
ABLE MEASURES.
Melodunum, and
his boats
2TB
would be hard to get so far up slow process would not accomplish his end. the river. Labienus was a good soldier and a bold. He saw that it was
on the enemy by daring than to encourage a retreat, which would convey the idea of weakness. him by He called his lieutenants together and impressed their task
safer to impose
.5
CO H
CNU
Battle of Lutetia.
upon them.
He placed
the boats which he had brought from
Melodunum under trusted Roman knights and ordered them quietly to fall down the river about four miles at an early
hour of the night.
camp
steady cohorts in the other five cohorts of the same legion he ordered up
left five
He
a force of
the river
and sent some boats with them, instructing them
to proceed in
a noisy manner, to lead the enemy to suppose His other three legions he that he was marching that way.
led
downstream to the boats and crossed them unperceived under cover of a storm. This was probably near modern
Point du Joir.
The
Gallic posts were sheltering themselves
from the weather, and were easily dispersed.
274
VICTORY WELL EARNED.
Not knowing what Labienus was doing, but learning of these three parties, the enemy drew the inference that
Labienus was trying to steal away in detachments, hoping that some might be saved by the sacrifice of the rest, and
determined to capture
divisions,
all three.
They broke up
river,
into three
sending part up and part down the
and leav-
Camulogenus led the party which went ing a part in camp. the river. By daylight the Romans were across, drew up in line and fell smartly upon the Gauls, who encountered
down
them with equal boldness.
on the
it
The Seventh
it,
legion on the right
at once routed the force opposed to
left,
but the Twelfth legion
loss
on the barbarians, heavy though who were under the eye of their chief, was unable to break their ranks until the Seventh legion wheeled to the right and
inflicted
took them in flank and rear, and the cavalry rode them down. Even then the Gauls stood their ground until they were cut
to pieces.
The party
in the camp, at the sound of battle,
marched towards
haps Vaugiraud).
cut
its chief,
and took position on a
hill (per-
But they could not hold it. The cavalry who did not reach the woods. Camulogenus was killed. The detached forces of the enemy were next dispersed; and Labienus, having drawn in his own detach-
down
all
ments, marched to Agendicum, where the baggage had been left. From here he moved towards Caesar.
This campaign proves Labienus to have been an able
.officer.
is
His manoeuvring was excellent in every respect. It a grievous pity that the latter part of his military career was clouded with ingratitude to his former chief. Under
Caesar's control, Labienus did far better
work than he
later
did
when opposed to Caesar. The revolt of the ^Edui,
the outbreak of which was an
immediate consequence of the Gergovia defeat, gave a dangerous aspect to the war, for this people was all the more
THE PROVINCE IN DANGER.
influential as
275
control.
having been long under
Roman
In
order to terrify the neighboring tribes into joining the war, they murdered the hostages Caesar had committed to their
keeping, and threatened to do the like by those of such nations as did not join them. They were all the more de-
termined
now
that they had broken loose.
to Bibracte.
A council of
all
Gaul was summoned
All but the Remi, Lin-
gones and Treviri came. Here the 2Edui claimed the chief command; but it was given by universal choice to Vercingetorix, to
whom,
in consequence, the
^Eduan
chiefs
gave
half-hearted support.
Vercingetorix exacted hostages from the allies, and ordered a general levy of cavalry, to the number of fifteen thousand,
which he used as body-guard. Of infantry he already had an abundance. All Gaul had risen, save only the Remi and
Leuci and Lingones. It was the only occasion when the entire country was in arms. Vertheir clients, the Suessiones,
cingetorix proposed to continue
his
cunctatory policy of
harassing the Romans and keeping them from obtaining corn; and advised the allies again to set fire to the crops and houses and thus to hamper Caesar, as they had done
before.
An
^Eduan and Segusian army
of ten thousand foot
and eight hundred horse under Eporedorix, he sent against the Allobroges some of the Arvernian tribes and the Gabali
;
he sent into the land of the Helvii, in the Province, to devastate
it
;
the Ruteni
Arecomici, hoping to
Province.
and Cadurci he sent against the Volcae tamper with some of the tribes in the
He
tried to gain over the Allobroges
by
flattery
and promises.
The only
force in the Province to oppose this host con-
sisted of twenty-two cohorts put in the field by the legate Lucius Caesar. The Helvii were defeated by the enemy and
driven within walls, with loss of
many
of their leading
men
276
RAISING THE LEGIONS.
but the Allobroges held their boundary, the line of the Rhone, by a multitude of posts.
Knowing how large
to be, Caesar
the enemy's force of cavalry had grown was obliged to send to Germany, to those tribes
he had rendered tributary, to increase his own squadrons, as the peculiar warfare waged by the barbarians made this arm
one on which at
all
which sometimes was indispensable.
ceeded,
far subdued, a
times great reliance could be placed, and In this effort he suc-
and raised beyond the Rhine, in the states he had so most excellent though small body of cavalry, perhaps one thousand men, which he mixed with light troops.
were of poor quality, he dismounted the tribunes, knights and evocati, and gave their horses to the Germans. This was a radical measure,
to its efficiency, as their horses
To add
but Caesar never stopped halfway; nor was this the time to do so.
After crossing the Liger on his way from Gergovia, Caesar apparently directed his march due north to join Labienus,
who, when he had defeated Camulogenus, had made his way towards his chief. Not far south of Agendicum, the captain
and lieutenant met. had
failed.
The enemy's plan
to divide the
Romans
Caesar
now had
eleven legions, the First,
Sixth, Sev-
enth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth,
Fourteenth and Fifteenth.
The
had
First was the one lent by
six legions, the Seventh,
Pompey.
In 58
B. c. Caesar
Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth.
In 57
B. c.
two
In
new ones were
the winter of
raised, the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth.
he got five cohorts more. He lost at Aduatuca fifteen cohorts, a legion and a half, but in
55-54
B.
c.
53
B. c.
Fourteenth and the Fifteenth.
he raised three more legions, i. e., the new First, Later the First and Fif-
teenth were lent to Pompey, and the Fifteenth became the
RETREAT TO PROVINCE.
Third.
strong.
277
The
legions were usually four to five thousand
men
When
up
reduced, they were
so
soon as possible
recruited
to standard.
When
Caesar raised
new
levies,
they were not generally made into new legions, but were These legions, during the distributed among the old ones.
thousand strong. Caesar had also some twenty thousand Gallic, Cretan or Numidian light troops, and five thousand cavalry, of which one thouGallic
fifty
War, were thus about
sand were Germans; a total of seventy -five thousand men. This is an estimate, but it is not far from accurate. Later,
War, the legions were more depleted, the average being not much over three thousand men. Having made his junction with Labienus, Caesar deemed it essential to direct his march as speedily as possible on his
in the Civil
base.
ince,
He
could not
move
south, straight towards the Provit,
because the ^Edui lay between him and
and they
were in insurrection.
Lingones to the
east,
He moved
through the land of the
and then heading south, purposed to
the territory of the Sequani towards
make
his
way through
the Province.
He had
a good storehouse and intermediate
it,
base, should he require
at Vesontio.
He
followed the
same route he had pursued when going to meet Ariovistus, and when moving from Vienna to Agendicum. He intended
to
march up the
valley of the
on
his way to Vesontio. mean by saying that he marched "through
Vingeanne and cross the Arar, This is what the Commentaries
the confines of
the Lingones into the country of the Sequani, in order that
he might the more easily render aid to the Province." Caesar's purpose in regaining the Province was not only to be able to protect this almost Roman territory; but,
foreseeing that the uprising would probably be general, he
preferred to base himself afresh on what was unquestionably safe place of retreat, and the only place from which he
278
THE GAULS RISK BATTLE.
in other words, to
could be certain to obtain victual,
make
a fresh start for the conquest of Gaul.
Meanwhile, Vercingetorix, after driving Caesar from Gergovia, had concentrated his forces, some eighty thousand
Agendicum
to Alesia.
men, near Bibracte, and had moved up and encamped on the road he divined the Romans would pursue. He placed his
army
so as to bar Caesar's passage
through the land of the
Sequani.
He camped
at a fork in the roads in three divi-
sions, each covering
one of the paths Caesar might choose
Caesar marched to within
towards the Arar and Vesontio.
ten miles of his enemy, ignorant of his presence.
CJESAR SURPRISED.
279
Vercingetorlx' position on the modern heights of Sacquenay was very strong. The heights bulged out in three
promontories, so to speak, on each one of which lay a third The right flank of his army thus of Vercingetorix' army.
rested on the Vingeanne.
The Badin brook was
in its front.
That this is the field of battle seems to be proven by the tumuli of the region, which contain skeletons identified from their ornaments as Gallic, and by the horseshoes, still occasionally
dug up by
the peasants.
Moreover,
it
suits the
distance from Alesia given
by the Commentaries.
Calling a council of war, Vercingetorix declared to the
chiefs that
now was
If
the
tyranny, as even at that
the Province.
larger forces;
if
moment forever to put down Roman moment the enemy was flying to
it,
he reached
he would return with even
if destroyed without delay, .which he could be He attacked on the march, no Roman would ever return.
especially encouraged his
this
mounted
troops,
and the men of
to deprive of all
body bound themselves by solemn oath
any
soldier
his rights
who did not
ride twice through
and
through the
Roman army.
While Vercingetorix was camping on the heights of Sacquenay, Caesar kept on his march up the Vingeanne, camping near Longeau. Next day, Vercingetorix moved his
foot
up
to the
Badin and sent out
his cavalry to attack Caesar
as he should debouch
on the plain north of the brook.
The
Gallic cavalry was divided into three bodies.
Of
these one
was to attack each flank of the Roman army and one the head of column. As Caesar reached the plain, he saw
Vercingetorix' central division of cavalry opposite his
own
head of column.
its
Shortly the other two columns appeared on
left. He was taken by surprise. had not anticipated this attack, but he was marchHe met ing with care and with his troops well in hand.
right
and
Caesar
280
GALLANT CAVALRY.
own
cavalry.
called a halt, collected his baggage,
the attack by ordering out three bodies of his
He
and drew up the
a
army
in battle order, probably in three lines of legions,
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Battle of the Vingeaime.
sort of
square, for "the baggage
was received within the
the horse seemed hard
ranks of the legions."
pressed, Caesar supported
Whenever
it by an advance of infantry, and by making a sharp demonstration in that quarter, and thus kept up the courage of the fighting line. The affair was only a cavalry fight; Caesar's cavalry was supported by his
THE GAULS DEFEATED.
foot,
281
which was near at hand.
all.
Vercingetorix' foot was not
put in at
After considerable skirmishing, the German
Caesar's
right got possession of the hill of drove the Gallic horse from it, and pursuing Montsaugeon, it to the infantry at the Badin, produced such demoralization
cavalry on
weaken the other columns of the enemy's cavalry, which, thus taken in reverse, precipitately retired from the
as to
field.
This retreat enabled Caesar's horse to
kill
many and
capture more prisoners;
other noted
^Eduan
and Cavarillus
among them Eporedorix and two Cotus commanding the cavalry, the foot. commanding
chiefs,
This check was a serious blow to the prestige of Vercingetorix, and determined him to retire to Alesia (Mont
Caesar followed
Auxois) with his infantry and the baggage from his camp. up his advantage, parked his baggage on
hill
flicted
near by, and by pursuing the retreating Gauls, ina loss of three thousand men on the enemy's rearguard. Vercingetorix was wise enough not to return to his
camps on the
baggage
hills of
Sacquenay.
Had
he done
so,
Caesar
his
could have cut
him
off
from Alesia.
which
But he risked
to secure Alesia,
latter he did
by moving
at
His baggage hurried thither once by his left to the town. a parallel road farther to the south. Caesar, as it hapby
pened,
made no
effort to capture
it.
Vercingetorix had been unwise in the last degree to give do not know how much he up his system of small-war.
We
was impelled to do this by the insistence of those who did not So long as he pursued this appreciate his Fabian policy.
method, he might be more than a match for Caesar's army. fighting machine can accomplish little unless it can fight,
and meanwhile
have
it
must
subsist.
But Vercingetorix should
in
known
that he could not meet the well-drilled legion-
aries in the open, especially
when commanded by Caesar
282
person,
his
CESAR'S STRATEGY CHANGES.
and that Caesar's German horse, manoeuvred under direction, would be more than a match for his own.
movement, showed distinctly his great qualities. Having drawn in the forces of Labienus, his one object was to reach the Province, from which he was now cut off, drive from its borders the hosts of hostiles which
Caesar, in this
were threatening it, and thence make a fresh start. He proposed that no obstacle should obstruct him in his march.
Vercingetorix could not have attacked him at a less opporNor when met by Vercingetorix, had Caesar tune moment.
any idea of fighting on the defensive.
a sharp offensive. by his able manoeuvres carried
important in its
to the dignity of
He
at once undertook
He
sustained his cavalry handsomely, and
off
moral
effect
than in
a victory vastly more For its dimensions.
the affair itself was only a cavalry combat, and scarcely rose
an engagement. When Vercingetorix retired towards Alesia, the road to the Province was thereby opened to Caesar. There was no
more need
for
him
to his base.
He
to fray a path through the enemy's lines could now rely on the fact that Vercinget-
orix would recall his outlying forces which were threatening the Province, or that the cohorts there would be able to
defend themselves.
to his base, but to
He
decided not to continue his march
directly
march
upon the enemy's army.
There was no fear for his communications.
once pass over into a sharp offensive.
He
might
at
Gallic Sword.
XIX.
THE SIEGE OF ALESIA.
THE
strong
;
SUMMER AND FALL OF
parties to be tbe final act in the
52 B. C.
siege of Alesia
was foreseen by both
iiito
struggle.
Vercingetorix retired
the city with his army, eighty thousand
his lines of
it with sixty thousand men, and began to draw Meanwhile cavalry skirmishes were frequent. Vercingetorix had provisions for thirty days he sent away his cavalry, and by them word to the allies that before that period was past he must be rescued or
Caesar sat
down
before
contravallation.
surrender.
Caesar set to
work on
his defenses.
western approaches, where there was a large plain.
relief
These were strongest at the Aware that an army of
were added.
The* works
would speedily come,
lines of circumvallation
were singularly complete, and skillfully adapted to the ground.
six weeks,
After about
an immense army of
relief did, in fact,
come up, numbering nearly
a quarter of a million of men.
within lent his aid.
This shortly attacked, and Vercingetorix from
partial
But the attack was
and did not succeed.
their own.
A second
failure of
attack had no better result.
these two attacks did
The Romans held
The
much
to depress the Gauls.
ON
the day but one (altero die) after the battle of the
Vingeanne, Caesar reached Alesia, and determined upon its This siege is one of the most notable of antiquity, siege.
and shows Caesar's genius in high relief. The stronghold lay on an isolated hill (Mt. Auxois), or rather an elevated
oval plateau, one
a half
feet
and a quarter miles long east and west, by mile wide at the centre north and south, five hundred
above the surrounding valleys, in the confluence of two of the small tributaries of the upper Sequana, the Lutosa
(Ose) and Osera (Oserain) which bounded it on north and south. In front of the town to the west was a plain over now called the three miles in length north and south
-dm. .jir *;#>.
-vJ^-A.
DIFFICULTIES OVERRATED.
Plaine des
brook.
east
285
Laumes bisected by Around the town on the
the Oserain
and a
little
three other sides, north,
and
south, at the distance of a mile or so
measured from
the edges of the plateau, was a line of hills of about equal
height as Mt. Auxois, separated each from the other by There were springs on the plasmoothly sloping valleys.
teau and
many
wells.
The streams
at the foot of the hill of
The grade up the hill was but at the top was a wall of rock interrupted at intereasy, vals, but on the whole steep and impracticable to assault.
Alesia were accessible by paths.
It
has been the habit of most authors to overrate the
the position at Alesia.
It is a sort of pocket
difficulties of
edition of Gergovia.
While the
slopes are unquestionably
easier to-day than they were in Caesar's time,
made
so
by the
continuous labors of sixty generations of farmers, yet the ground itself can have changed comparatively little. This
is
abundantly demonstrated by the excavations of Caesar's
lines;
light of ancient warfare,
and though the position of Alesia, considered in the was very strong, it was by no means
The place could readily be taken along the inexpugnable. neck of land leading from the heights on the southeast, which was a sort of a natural siege-mound. Caesar's real
knowledge of the fact that all Gaul would hands in sending an army of relief before he could take join
difficulty lay in his
the place
by regular approaches. The Roman army approached from the east, south of Mt. Bussy. The Gauls were encamped on the east of the town
under the walls, with a trench and stone wall six feet high This was their weak spot, and here they (z) as defense.
expected the struggle. They had prolonged their wall down hill to the streams on either hand; and because this wall
could be readily taken in reverse, they had
crotchet at either end.
made a double
On
reconnoitring the place, Caesar
286
AN ODD
SIEGE.
to carry
it
deemed it inexpedient to attempt the number of its defenders and
by storm, from
especially in view of his
it
recent failure at Gergovia; but that
by a complete investment he believed.
ciated the advantages of
might be starved out He no doubt appre-
moving along the neck on the southbut having decided on a siege and not an assault, he east; threw his decision in favor of an approach from the west at
the plain.
He
and he made
manifestly desired to shut in Vercingetorix, his chief works where the position was weakest.
He had
eleven legions, a scant fifty thousand men, five
thousand Gallic and German horse, and perhaps ten thousand Gallic and other auxiliary foot. Vercingetorix is said
to
have had eighty thousand men.
critics
This has been doubted
size of the plateau
by many and consequent lack
on account of the small
of space to hold so large a body.
But
according to all the accounts, Caesar
sixty to seventy thousand
was undertaking with
men
to besiege eighty thousand.
In
than twice that of the besieged has been considered too small to predicate success. But the
all eras,
a force
less
question of
ity,
number adds
to or detracts little
from the
abil-
It is probable that Caesar
boldness and far-reaching results of this noted siege. had made up his mind that here
his last chance.
was
Another
failure
would mean such en-
couragement of the Gauls as to prejudice his entire campaign.
This must not be another Gergovia failure.
on the north, east and south, place thereon suitable detachments, and deThe termine where the lines of contravallation should run.
Caesar's first step
was to
seize all the hills
cavalry was established near the watercourses ; the infantry on the hilltops. He then began along the slope of the hills,
from point to point, the erection of intrenchments which were eleven miles in length. The camps were protected by twenty-three square and high earthwork redoubts near the
288
foot of the slopes,
sallies,
THE CAMPS.
and these were well guarded
to prevent
being held by day by small posts, at night by forces which bivouacked in them. The redoubts were as usual the
first
defenses constructed, and were later joined by lines of
earthworks.
There appear to have been four infantry camps, two (A and B) on the hilltop south of Alesia, one on the hill northeast (C), one on the hill northwest (D).
The topography
dictated the shape of these camps; the intrenchments com-
manded the ground in their front. The naturally weak side was made the stronger by art the camp A, for instance, had
;
three lines on the south front.
It
may have been
The
ditches of
Cesar's
of
headquarters.
The camp
was larger.
relics, coins
The debouches
the camps were all towards Alesia.
were
excavated and found full of
and weapons, bones
and helmets,
been found.
collars
and
rings.
Four cavalry camps, three
less
in the big plain (H, I, K), one north of Alesia (G), have
Their ditches were
infantry camps. been exhumed, 10, 11, 15, 18, 22.
the stoutest ones that were made.
Of
the twenty-three
deep than those of the castella, five have
These
are,
no doubt,
The
have
others were presum-
ably
mere
block-houses,
which
disappeared.
The
by the
probable positions of the other eighteen are indicated
topography.
The work on the
cavalry action
lines
had hardly been begun, when a
was brought about by Vercingetorix, who advanced into the open plain to the west. The fighting was
obstinate.
The Roman horse was
at
first
unsuccessful.
But the Roman infantry was ordered into line in front of the camps to forestall a sally from the town by its imposing
Reanimated by the presence of the legions, which had learned in the late battle could be relied on to they sustain them heartily, the German horse took courage,
front.
I!
<V
290
THIRTY DAYS' RATIONS.
its charges, put the enemy's horse to and pursued them to the gates of the intrenchments. flight, Caesar advanced the infantry at the proper moment, and this
redoubled the vigor of
demonstration increased the rout.
retire into the
The Gauls endeavored
to
town, but Vercingetorix ordered the gates to be shut, so that the camp outside the city proper should not be left undefended. Many Gauls sought to climb the ditch
and wall but
the
failed.
Roman allied enemy with curiosity how many
war were mere combats
good service
ions
;
After inflicting a heavy loss on the horse withdrew. It will be noted
of the engagements of the Gallic
of cavalry.
This arm did Caesar
like the
"
and yet it was never used or the Numidian horse.
"
CompanStill
Vercingetorix
now saw
that a siege
was
inevitable.
he was not bold enough to cut his way out before it was too He feared again to encounter the, legionaries in the late. but he had strong hopes that this siege might result like the one of Gergovia, and determined to abide by the
open
He sent anything, stronger. away his fifteen thousand cavalry one night in the second watch, before the lines of contravallation were completed,
result.
The
position was,
if
not only because he was unable to provide forage for them, but particularly because he desired these men to visit and
arouse all the tribes to his aid.
the valleys of the two rivers.
The squadrons escaped up Vercingetorix sent word by
had beef and
them that he and
his sixty -five thousand foot
corn for thirty days, which, by good management, might be made to last a trifle longer, and that they must have^ succor before the expiration of that time, or else Alesia and the
whole cause would
fall together.
He
his
then withdrew
all the
forces to the plateau,
and took into
own hands
the distri-
bution of rations.
for regular issue.
He
divided the cattle, but kept the corn
It remains a question as to
whether
sixty-
INTRENCHMENTS CONTINUED.
five
291
thousand
men
of the place.
could actually crowd into the small limits The old city walls have in places been found.
it
;
might be done and the barbarians were used to herding together in a very small space. Vercingetorix was now inclosed in a town whose well constructed
By
close
camping
walls rested on the edge of a
cliff
of stone which
may have
stood forty to sixty feet above the slope of the ground as it This is the character, more or less rises from the valley.
marked, of
all of
the surrounding plateaux.
Part of the
slope and of the edge of the plateau was wooded or covered with bushes. Except from the neck of land on the east,
nothing but hunger was apt to drive him out.
water-supply on the plateau.
He had
His main reliance was on the arrival
manlike manner despite
mouths were many. an army of relief. Caesar went at the business of the siege in the most workhis
of
its
But
exceptional
difficulties.
The
earth in some places was rocky and unsuited to intrenchments, and the land was, no doubt, rougher than it is to-day.
As
Vercingetorix could escape only by the plain or up one of the north ravines, Caesar devoted most of his attention to
fortifying at these points.
On
the other sides the ground
was in
itself
a defense, and less was needed.
While the
by
out-
men were
rison,
at
work they had constantly
to be protected
lying guards of light troops against the sallies of the gar-
which were many and fierce. Caesar's preparations were on a remarkable
scale of
nitude.
feet
He dug a trench
on the west
side of the
magtown twenty
deep and wide, with perpendicular sides, to protect the This trench was four building of his other works (f).
hundred feet in front of the main
line of contravallation, at
the foot of the slope at the west end of the oppidum,
and
stretched
from one stream
to the other.
It both prevented
sudden
sallies
and
left the regular lines
beyond the throw of
SEVERE LABOR.
javelins.
293
piled
The earth from the trench was
up behind
it.
In front of the main line of works came two other trenches
first
one trench (g) on low ground, fifteen feet wide and deep, which he located so as to be readily filled with water from the Osera. It now shows only eight or nine feet deep.
Then back
level.
another equally big, dry trench on the same These ditches continued half a mile south of the
of
it
Osera up the slope of the hill on the south. Thence the ditch was single. Back of these a rampart (agger) and wall twelve feet high. The top of this wall had a par(vallum)
apet of hurdles (lorica) and battlements (pinna) and the top of the rampart was provided with stakes "like stags' horns,"
projecting outward and
downward
so as to hinder sealers,
Faoe of Work.
and was armed with towers eighty
length of the line
is
feet apart.
When
the
considered,
the front thus protected
this
was over a mile and a half long,
piece of work.
was indeed a
fine
Caesar's legionaries handled the pick
and
spade as effectively as the pilum and gladius.
Performing all this work and foraging for corn at the same time made the duties severe on the men and so long a
;
line really
needed more force than Caesar had at command.
There were but three
were
all
men
per metre front
or
if
the
men
continuously on duty in three reliefs, there was but
294
one
NOVEL ENTANGLEMENTS.
man
The per metre front, and no reserves to draw on. enemy made many assaults or demonstrations during the For progress of the work, which added to the annoyance.
this reason Caesar
deemed the defenses not yet strong enough.
that a small body of
He wanted
of his
to
make them such
to other points.
men
could defend them, so that he could detach at need the bulk
command
The undertaking was one
and he did not
which demanded
cease
every possible aid from art,
one instant from perfecting his lines. He devised several kinds of obstacles against sallies and drew up still another threefold line of entanglements. Five rows of
slanting trenches, five feet deep, were dug,
and sharpened branches like abatis sunk in
the bottom.
The men
These
called
3 these cippi.
five
rows
of cippi were close together,
V
Lilia
so that the abatis could be
interlaced.
and Stimuli.
Eight rows of
conical pits (scrdbes) three
feet
deep and three
feet apart
were placed checkerwise, each
with a fire-hardened sharp stake as thick as one's thigh at the bottom, and the surface covered with osiers and twigs.
These wolf -pits with stakes were nicknamed
of these trous de loup have been found.
"lilies."
Many
In front of these
were sunk stakes close together, armed with iron hooks called stimuli (spurs), somewhat resembling huge fishing
tackle.
The
fact that the
Romans gave
these devices
new
names looks
as if they had not been previously used. Outside this vast line of contravallation and two hundred
yards back, Caesar drew another similar line of circumvallation (x) to provide defense against the
Gauls who would
These
latter
cer-
tainly soon arrive to raise the siege.
works
covered an area of fourteen miles in circumference.
The
THE CAMPS.
defenses stopped at the perpendicular sides of the
hills,
295
and
began again on the plateaux, as shown
ities
in the
map.
The
author-
line varied at places according to topography.
Some
have attempted to cast a doubt on the accuracy of the
extent of these lines; but the Commentaries give the figures
as eleven
verified
fruitful.
and fourteen
miles,
and they have been completely
by modern excavations.
These have proved very Caesar's intrenchments have been traced through
is
their entire length,
shown.
rian has
There
no reason,
and many parts of the defenses plainly if the work of an ancient histoto us intact, why, within the limits of
come down
his intelligence, his statements should not be as
credit as those of
an author of to-day.
worthy of Caesar's works at
Alesia are clearly as described in the Commentaries.
They
are no more wonderful than those of Vicksburg or of Peters-
burg.
Unlimited numbers of
men
at
work always accom-
plish wonders.
To man
these works facing both ways, Caesar
had
two men per five metres front. Cesar's defenses, immense as were their dimensions, were
in three reliefs but
completed in about forty days. Despite their hardships, the Caesar said legionaries worked with the best of good will.
in later days that he could have overturned the heavens with
such men.
At Rome
his friends were
wont
to say
that
scarcely a mortal man could imagine, none but a god execute such a work; his enemies, for once, were silenced.
It is probable that
the others leads one to place one legion in
in C, in all eight.
two legions. The size of A, two in B, three The other three were in castella. The
camp
D had
eleven-mile circuit was the line of the
Having completed
the danger due to
this
camps and redoubts. extraordinary task, each man was
and to provide against their
ordered to lay in provisions for thirty days, so as to reduce
foraging,
being themselves blockaded by the
army
of relief.
296
HUGE ARMY OF
RELIEF.
Acting on the message of Vercingetorix sent out by his retiring cavalry, the Gauls immediately convened an assembly, probably at Bibracte, and decreed, from all the states, a
levy, not a general but a specified levy, lest too large
an
army should be hard to ration,
thousand
foot,
two hundred and forty
all.
and eight thousand horse in
The paper
Even strength was two hundred and eighty-three thousand. those Gauls whom Caesar had best treated now caught the
national infection, revolted and put their best efforts at the service of the cause. The Bellovaci alone declined to send
their contingent, but sent
two thousand men as an act of
to
friendship.
They proposed
of this
be subject to no control.
The
enormous army was given to Commius the Atrebatian, the man Caesar had sent to Britain, Vercasivelaunus the Arvernian, cousin to Vercingetorix, Viridomachief
command
rus and Eporedorix the .ZEduan.
How
the latter escaped
from imprisonment,
is
for he
not explained.
was captured in the last battle, war council of members from each tribe
Full of confidence, as well
it
was added
might
to these chiefs.
be, for to barbarians strength resides solely in
numand
not,
bers, this
huge army rendezvoused on -^Eduan
soil,
marched
for a
to Alesia, imagining that the
Romans could
especially
moment, withstand such a multitude, sallies should also be made from within.
when
Not aware
of the speedy arrival of this army, the besieged
loss
Six weeks had elapsed since Vercingetorix sent out his message, and he then had It Starvation was at hand. barely corn for thirty days.
were already at a
what to do.
was proposed by Cirtognatus, an Arvernian, to eat the useless soldiers and inhabitants; but this yielded to a projec
to send
them away. The whole population (Mandubii) WE accordingly marched out but the Romans declined to receh them even as slaves, and drove them back into the city.
;
FIRST ATTACK FAILS.
Commius and
lines,
297
the great
army
finally reached the
Roman
and, camping on the heights southwest of the town, within a mile of Caesar's lines, led out their cavalry the very next day to the large plain, where it was supported by their
It covered the entire infantry on the hills at their back. movement could be distinctly seen from Every plain.
Alesia.
Vercingetorix responded by marshaling his
own
any
army
outside the city walls and
making
ready to sustain
assault
by the relieving
fill
force.
He had
prepared great num-
bers of hurdles to
up the trenches and cover the entangle-
ments.
Vercingetorix' troops advanced.
They had
affair
actually be-
gun
to
fill
up
the
first ditch,
and the
promised to
Posting his
develop into a general
engagement
of infantry.
forces on the walls facing both to the city
and towards the
army of relief, Caesar opened the action by sending in his German and Gallic allied cavalry. The enemy had light In a troops mixed with their cavalry, to lend it steadiness.
Gauls feeling confident of victory from mere force of numbers, and urging on their men by yells and shouts. The people of Alesia encouraged
short while the battle
hot, the
waxed
their friends
till
by equal clamor.
The
action lasted from noon
sundown.
army
of relief put in its foot.
Vercingetorix did not push on, nor did the The action does not appear to
have gone beyond a combat of cavalry aided by slingers and bowmen. Finally, after the cavalry of Caesar had been all
but defeated, the Germans, rallying in column for a final effort, drove in the Gauls despite their numbers, and broke
them up.
selves;
Once
fairly routed, they could not recover
them-
Caesar's
squadrons pursued them to camp, killing
of the archers
mid not
so
who were supporting them, and who The forces from Alesia speedily get away.
There had been no organized attack upon
stired dejected.
298
the intrenchments.
SECOND ATTACK.
The prominent
role played
by
the cav-
alry in all Caesar's wars shows that
most of
his battles
were
confined to a skirmishing contact.
legions alone were available.
For pitched battle the Caesar had no cavalry proper.
The next day but one the army of relief again attacked, having, in the mean time, made a much greater number of
and provided themselves with scaling-ladders and wall-hooks. They selected midnight for the hour and delivhurdles,
ered the assault suddenly at the westerly plain. Their shouts aroused Vercingetorix and the forces in the town, who at
once sallied forth to lend assistance to their friends outside.
The Gauls,
pits
as best they might in the darkness, filled
up the
their
and trenches with fascines and hurdles, covering operation with a fire of sling-stones and arrows.
The
Romans were fully Each man knew his
it
alive to the necessities of the occasion.
place.
They
sent for troops from those
redoubts which were least exposed, to resist the onset where
was
hottest.
The
legates Trebonius
and Antonius brought
up reinforcements.
The Romans
replied to the Gallic fire
with arrows, sling-stones,
hand-hurled stones of about a
pound weight, of which they had gathered a large supply, and pointed stakes kept on the walls in reserve. The military engines also
came
into play.
In the dark, shields were
almost useless.
the assault
While the enemy's line was at a distance, proved more harmful in loss to the Romans than
when
the barbarians neared the walls, for then
many of them
inflicted little
fell into
the pits and trenches; this bred confusion and dis-
may
their
;
aim grew wild, and
their
weapons
damage
the Romans, on the other hand, threw
down
their
heavy siege pila from the intrenchments with deadly effect. Before long the vigor of the Gauls slackened. Finally, at
daylight they conceived a fear of a demonstration on their
uncovered right flank from the
Roman
lines
on the. hills
IT ALSO FAILS.
299
south of the town, which, coupled to fatigue and loss of
men, induced them to
side,
retire.
Vercingetorix, from the town
suffered equally
from the entanglements.
it
His men
used up most of their time in
filling the twenty-foot ditch,
and as daylight came on, seeing that the assault by the army of relief had failed, he also blew
and did not get beyond
the signal to retire.
;
Caesar, late in Gallic
War.
(British
Museum.)
XX.
THE BATTLE OF
THE
Roman
it
ALESIA.
made a
FALL OF
52 .B. C.
Gallic
army
of relief
third and last assault on Caesar's lines,
after careful preparation.
line,
probed the weakest spot in the which was at the northwest camp, and made a violent attack on with a chosen body of sixty thousand men. At the same moment the cav-
They
skillfully
alry
made a demonstration
moved
at the western plain.
The
legions were put to
it
as never before to hold their own.
Perceiving the attack by the
Caesar
Vercingetorix
to his
against the lines from within.
army of relief, had an army equal
own on
either side of him, each delivering
same moment, and with huge
ent and kept his
reserves in support.
a desperate assault at the He himself was omnipres-
now
apparent.
men heartily to their work. The value of the defenses was The Gauls could nowhere penetrate the line, though attacks
were made at several places, and came dangerously close to success. Finally, by a well-timed sortie with the sword and a simultaneous cavalry charge on their flank, the Gauls were driven back, and discouraged at their threefold
defeat, the
army
of relief retired
Vercingetorix surrendered.
The
siege of
Alesia practically sealed the
doom
of Gaul.
THE
Gauls had now been defeated in two
assaults.
These,
indeed, had been partial ones, but want of success had begun
to discourage the men.
The
leaders distinctly foresaw fail-
ure unless they could wrest a victory from the Romans in The Gallic character before the Christhe next encounter.
tian era is universally described as .illy adapted to bear the
strain of continued disaster.
Commius proposed
to
make
and
one more strong effort to break through Caesar's
the Gauls went to
lines,
work systematically to discover the weakest
part of the
Roman walls. By inquiries of the country people they learned what were the troops and kinds of defenses at each point.
On
the northwest of the town was
hill
which the
ATTACK IN FORCE.
301
engineers had not included in the circumvallation, on account of its area. They had been obliged to run the wall at its
foot
on comparatively low ground.
Here was the camp
of
It
two legions, under the legates Anstitius and Caninius. was located on the steep slope of the hillside. Back of
this
point the Gallic chiefs decided to assemble sixty thousand men chosen from the tribes most noted for valor, and to
attack on a given day at noon,
given the
command
of the assaulting party.
Vercasivelaunus being This force was
moved
at night
selected
by a circuit of a dozen miles to near the spot and was concealed under cover of the hill on its
north slope.
approached, his men being well rested, fed and eager for the fray, Vercasivelaunus drew them up in order
As noon
and marched
rapidly against
the
Roman camp.
There
appear to have been some works on Mt. Rea ; probably only an outpost. This body, at all events, was hustled out and
the Gauls
moved down
the slope on
time, as agreed, the cavalry
upon the Roman defenses
advance of the
camp D. At the same made a sharp demonstration fronting the plain, sustained by an
foot. Vercingetorix, in the town, was not slow to perceive what his countrymen were about, he was constantly and anxiously on the outlook for their assault,
implements, movable penthouses, ladders, mural hooks and other tools, of which he had
sallied forth
and
with
all
his
prepared a large supply for such an occasion.
His attack
was delivered opposite Vercasivelaunus, somewhat to the
left.
caused Caesar no
Thus, while at the plain the cavalry demonstration little anxiety, two infantry armies, each
nearly equal to the entire Roman force, were again attacking his lines front and rear on the side where perhaps he was
weakest.
The Roman
forces were widely distributed,
line
and
it
was hard to say what other part of the
might be
THE ROMANS PUT TO
attempted.
IT.
303
could scarcely expect that with some three hundred thousand men the Gauls within and
fact, Caesar
In
without would put into action less than half their force.
The attack was sudden and
severe.
The Gauls, with every
kind of expedient, pressed in on whatever part of the wall They were evidently in earnest, and appeared most weak.
they fought as
if
they expected and meant to win.
Their
Csesar had prepared several gallantry was consummate. outlooks from which he could get a commanding view of the
In one of these he stationed himself, probably near the south end of the twenty -foot trench, and dispatched
whole
field.
troops from place to place, wherever they seemed to be most
needed.
Each party was nerved up
to
do
its best.
The
Gauls evidently felt this to be their last chance of freeing themselves from the hated Roman yoke the Romans under;
stood that this battle,
labors.
if
gained, would be the term of their
if
Moreover, they recognized their certain fate
of the struggle
they
did not win.
The brunt
came
at the northwest
camp,
where, owing to the high ground above the Roman defenses, missiles could be more effectively hurled by the barbarians,
and testudos put
to use.
Here, too, were the most renowned
warriors, while at the main lines the Gauls were, however
numerous, of no marked fighting quality. The abundant force at the northwest camp enabled the enemy to relieve the
weary with fresh men
at
frequent intervals, and to heap
wall, which put them on a After some hours of combat the
mounds up against the Roman
par with the legionaries.
Roman
soldiers at this point
had used up
all their missiles.
Labienus with six Observing cohorts from the northeast camp (C) to go to their relief, and if compelled to do so, to make a sally with the sword, while
their distress, Csesar ordered
he himself repaired to the plain to encourage
the troops.
304
CAESAR'S ACTIVITY.
within, in despair of effect-
The Gauls under Vercingetorix,
ing a lodgment in the
where they had been fighting, made a fresh attempt on a more precipitous but less guarded place, probably the foot of the south
lines at the point
Roman
camp; and having brought engines and tools, which they used under cover of a storm of missiles, they succeeded in
driving the defenders from the walls, in filling the ditches and tearing down the wattling cover of the palisades with mural
hooks.
To meet
this
new and threatening danger,
Caesar
dispatched Brutus with six cohorts to the point assailed, and as this did not appear to suffice, followed him up by Fabius
with seven more.
Even
this did not turn the tide;
he was
at last personally obliged to
rehabilitate
the battle,
hurry to this point in order to a matter which he succeeded in
accomplishing after some time and with considerable effort. As Labienus had been unable to hold the enemy in check
at
the northwest
camp
(D), Caesar sent a portion of his
cavalry by a circuit outside the walls, to debouch from the
north ravine,
the
file
up along the
slope of the hills,
and attack
enemy
in the rear.
He
himself, so soon as the assault of
Vercingetorix had been beaten off, taking four cohorts and some horse, rushed to the support of Labienus. The latter,
meanwhile, had drawn a large number of cohorts from the The bulk of the redoubts which could best spare them.
barbarians, happily for Caesar, remained inactive in reserve.
His arrival
which
all
the legionaries could see, for he
wore the imperator's robe, the purple paludamentum, over his armor yielded the utmost encouragement to his men.
They could always do wonders under the eye
their ardor they ceased the use of missiles
selves to the sword.
of Caesar.
In
and betook themhad
At
this
moment
the
German
cavalry, which Caesar
sent out, charged sharply in on the left rear of the Gauls,
VERCINGETORIX SURRENDERED.
and raising a great shout the
legionaries rushed
305
upon them.
Nothing could withstand their onset. Broken by its vigor, the enemy turned and fled, but only to be cut down by the
cavalry.
number
of the chiefs,
among them
Sedulius,
prince of the Lemovices, were slain; others, principal
among
whom was
Vercasivelaunus, were captured; and seventy-four The men under Vercingetorix, seeing standards were taken.
and Caesar ready to turn on withdrew from their attack and retired into Alesia, in them,
their auxiliaries thus defeated,
utmost dejection. The troops which had not been engaged caught the alarm and made haste to retreat; rethe
treat soon
battlefield
became
rout.
The
flight of the
Gauls from the
was by no means arrested at
their
camp; the
whole body of warriors began to seek safety wherever each could find it had the cavalry been fresh, they could have
;
been annihilated.
As
it
was, a large
number were cut down
and the
Only after long dispersed into the woods. did they find their way to their respective states. wandering
rest
The
stake having been nobly played and
lost,
Vercingeto-
rix surrendered himself to his
countrymen
to be dealt with
as they
sar.
saw
fit;
and these
at once sent ambassadors to Cae-
Caesar disarmed the Gallic " Versoldiers and ordered them to surrender their leaders.
There was no alternative.
cingetorix, who was the chief spring of the war, putting his best armor on, and adorning his horse, rode out of the gates,
and made a turn about Caesar as he was
ting
his horse, threw off his
sitting at Caesar's feet until
sitting,
then quit-
armor and remained quietly he was led away." (Plutarch.)
This gallant chieftain was kept for exhibition in Caesar's triumph, and immediate death thereafter, a thing which, whatever the precedent,
for though aji enemy, Vercingetorix
Eoman, was assuredly a hero. The uEduan and Arvernian prisoners were reserved to use in
is
scarcely creditable to the
306
CESAR'S CLEMENCY.
Of
all the
once more gaining over their respective tribes.
other prisoners, Caesar gave one apiece to the soldiers as
These were sold to the traders, of whom there were always plenty not far from a Roman camp. After a battle, they always appeared, ready to profit by the abunplunder.
dance of bargains.
The
siege of Alesia exhibits the greatest art in Caesar
and
The equal courage and endurance on the part of his troops. inaction of the bulk of the barbarians in the last battle had
been his salvation, as well as led to the
pendence.
loss of Gallic inde-
Though
there were, thereafter, isolated cases of
insurrection, the country never again rose en masse.
In a
year Gaul was practically a Roman province. resistance had been finally crushed.
Her
spirit of
After this brilliant success, Caesar marched back to the
land of the 2Edui, and found no difficulty in recovering that state; and the Arverni made haste to bring in their submission
and hostages.
To both
these tribes Caesar restored
some
twenty thousand prisoners.
well afford to
After his great victory he could
make use
of generosity in his treatment of the
Gauls.
quarters.
He was
then enabled to put his army into winterLabienus, with the Seventh and Fifteenth legions
and some cavalry, was placed among the Sequani with Rutilius as his lieutenant; Fabius with the Eighth, and Basilius
with the Ninth, among the Remi to protect them against the
Bellovaci ; the legion of Antlstius, the Eleventh,
Ambivereti
that of Sextius, the Thirteenth,
among the among the Bitu-
riges ; that of Caninius, the First,
among
the Ruteni ; Cicero,
with the Sixth at Matisco (Macon), and Sulpicius, with the Fourteenth, at Cabillonum (Chalons), charged with procurCaesar ing corn along the Arar in the land of the JEdui. himself fixed his headquarters at Bibracte. The location of
Antonius, with the Tenth and Twelfth,
is
not given.
It
was
WINTER-Q UA R TERS.
likely
307
supplicatio of twenty enough at headquarters. was granted Caesar in Rome. days During none of the campaigns in Gaul did the tribes put
so large a force into the field as
on
this occasion.
Forty of
the eighty-five tribes, in the course of a month, contributed
Winter-Quarters, B.
c.
52-51.
a quarter of a million men which, added to the eighty thousand under Vercingetorix, made a grand total of three hundred and thirty thousand, almost five times as many as the
Roman
legions,
light troops
and
allied
cavalry together.
his
The danger had been grave
the stanchness of the
for Caesar.
But
own
genius,
legionaries and especially the divided counsels of the barbarians, had saved him. The
sixty thousand
Roman
men who
assaulted at the northwest
camp
at
Alesia had been picked ; the bulk of the barbarians on the
308
A SPLENDID YEAR.
But had even this force west plain were of poor, stuff. attacked from the western face, while Caesar was with difficulty driving
back the front and rear assaults on the northern
camp, and meeting Vercingetorix from within on the south, however good his lines, he must, it seems, have been over-
whelmed.
the partial attack proves
His own account of how hard pushed he was by how near he came to a fatal out-
come.
of his
and brilliant gallantry the loyalty of the allied and the splendid qualimen,
Caesar's courage, the ambition
ties of
the
German
horse,
added to good fortune, which
smiled on him with even more constancy than it did on Alexander, yielded him the victory. And this victory led
which were far reaching. This seventh year is the most interesting as well as the most important of the entire war. It exhibits Caesar's power in engineering, in tactics, in strategy, in logistics. Let us
to results
recapitulate events, so as to group the superb list of achieve-
ments.
Caesar's rapid appearance in the Province on hear;
ing of the Gallic insurrection his raising troops and crossing the Cebennae into the land of the Arverni, to forestall their
invading the Province and deceive the enemy as to his intentions his personal forced march thence through a network
;
of dangers to the land of the Lingones, where he concentrated
his legions
on the rear of Vercingetorix, made a splendid and
successful strategical opening, particularly as Vercingetorix
flattered himself that he
had cut Caesar
off
from
his army,
and had that army at
his mercy.
Following this concentra-
tion of his legions in the face of opposition
came
his
march
from Agendicum to Vellaunodunum, Genabum, Noviodunum and Avaricum, and his rapid successive capture of these
towns.
Thence he marched up the Elaver, cleverly stole a passage of that river under the very eyes of Vercingetorix, and besieged Gergovia. Called away from the siege by the
VERCINGETORIX.
imbroglio, as
assault of
it,
309
lie
represents, or beaten
back from his
as
is
the truth, which he could well afford to
acknowledge, Csesar moved back over the Elaver through the land of the revolted ^Edui and Senones, forcing the
Liger and making his way to Agendicum, where he joined Labienus. Having recruited his forces, he retired through the land of the Lingones on his way to the Province, beat in
fair
fight Vercingetorix,
who
stood
across
his
path,
and
Thence following the enemy finished the year by his wonderful siege and to Alesia, Caesar These operations, alike splendid capture of this stronghold.
reopened his communications.
in conception
and execution, make a string of military jewels
hard to match.
His plan Vercingetorix had proved a worthy antagonist. to avoid open conflict with Caesar and to fight him by a
Fabian policy
rian.
is
an extraordinary conception for a barba-
arms.
Vercingetorix exhibited a true natural genius for His mistake lay in not clinging to his original plan. So soon as he wavered in it, he lost. This was not his fault,
but that of the political combination against him among his
own
Despite the capacity of Vercingetorix and the fact that the Gauls had more than five times Caesar's force,
people.
the genius of this great captain, added to
Roman
discipline
and
training, overcame the courage, but lack of unity, of
allies.
the Gallic
Art versus mere strength
as always
could have but one ending.
XXI.
THE BELLOVACI. JANUARY TO
THE
combination
;
APRIL, 51 B.
Romans
C.
Gauls had learned that they were not equal to the
in whatever
but they saw that a number of isolated insurrections gave Caesar vastly more trouble than a single combined one. Several uprisings were therefore initiated but Caesar did not delay an instant. He made a series of winter
;
campaigns, and by taking them unawares, successively reduced the Bituriges and Carnutes. He then marched against the Bellovaci, who, with their allies,
had rendezvoused
in
what
is
now
the Forest of Compiegne.
Caesar found
them
strongly intrenched.
He camped
wall in two stories.
on an adjacent hill, making a ditch and his After some skirmishing between the rival outposts and
Caesar
cavalry, the barbarians prepared to retire, fearing another Alesia.
made
ready to follow, but the Gauls detained
Seeking shortly to entrap him in
selves surprised
and escaped. an ambuscade, the barbarians were themclever stratagem,
him by a
and defeated.
Caesar then distributed his legions so as best
to dope with the several insurrections, whose extent he could not yet gauge.
which the Roman legions had fairly earned in the splendid campaign just ended was not destined to last long. The Gauls had been beaten, to be sure, but not all of them
rest
THE
were subdued.
Then
as
now they added
to native gallantry
the habit of not yielding until they had tried a
number
of
ways
accomplish a desired end. They had tried the of rising in one body and had been distinctly experiment worsted ; they had learned that they were, in whatever numto
bers,
no match for Roman
discipline, courage
and
intellect.
But they had also learned that the most grievous blows they had inflicted on Caesar were those they had given by waging a judicious small-war in many localities at the same time.
This system they determined once more to try. They were intelligent enough to understand that while Caesar could, no
NEW
If the
PERIL.
311
doubt, defeat them wherever he might be, he was unable to
be everywhere at once.
Gauls had
all
if
been willing to
they had had another leader like Vercingetorix to carry through such a policy to the end, Caesar's conquest of Gaul might never have been completed. But fortune did not favor the Gauls
come within the scope
of this plan,
and
in their brave struggle for liberty.
It
was destined, happily
for
them and
for us, that they, too, should bear the
Roman
yoke.
Caesar was shortly informed of the consultations of the
Campaign against
Bituriges.
Gauls to
the bud.
this end,
and determined
to crush the uprising in
still
While the
leaders of the several tribes were
arguing and preparing, he went to work.
Leaving Mark
312
CAMPAIGN AGAINST BITURIGES.
in charge of headquarters at Bibracte, on the day
Antony
before the kalends of January, he set out with a body of
horse for the Thirteenth legion, which was wintering
the Bituriges on their boundary nearest the .ZEdui.
single legion should not be sufficient to keep the
among
Lest a
in
enemy
control, he added to the Thirteenth the Eleventh legion, which was stationed among the Ambivareti near by. Leav-
ing two cohorts of each to guard the baggage and winterquarters, he moved by forced marches upon the Bituriges
and surprised them completely.
He made many
prisoners,
but forbade plundering or burning, promising his men two hundred sestertii each, and every centurion two thousand
not only desired not to disaffect the population too seriously, but also to preserve the corn
sestertii in lieu thereof.
He
and forage for his own use. The burning stacks and farms would moreover serve to give warning of their danger to adjoining tribes, and it was Caesar's plan to attack and compel each tribe separately to bring in
its
submission.
The
suit of
chiefs of the Bituriges endeavored to escape, for their
preparations were barely begun, but so hot was Caesar's pur-
them wherever they fled, that, by heading them off, and capturing them one by one, he speedily broke up their combinations. Those of the population who desired to retain
Rome he protected by taking from their midst the conspirators who were leading them astray. This policy of vigor flavored with generosity forestalled a general
their allegiance to
uprising.
The campaign had
and
success, it
lasted but forty days.
In
its
rapidity
approaches some of Alexander's
short operations against mountain tribes.
The two
legions
went back to winter-quarters.
Eighteen days after Caesar had returned to Bibracte at the end of February, the Bituriges invoked his aid against the Carnutes who had begun war upon them.
In order not to
WINTER CAMPAIGNS.
313
disappoint this tribe in its newly sworn allegiance, Caesar called in Cicero's Sixth legion from Cabillonum and Sulpi-
on the Arar, and marched to Genabum. From this place as a centre he conducted a partisan warfare against the Carnutes with his
cius'
Fourteenth legion from Matisco,
allied horse.
This tribe made no pretense at resistance but
dispersed into the country,
where at
this season they
had
much ado to get provisions, and finally fled to other tribes. The soldiers gathered much booty. Caesar had scarcely used He preferred for the sake of his men not to his infantry.
undertake further active operations at this inclement season, and left the two legions in Genabum, where he could quarter
them
to advantage.
Caesar and Hannibal
both disliked
winter campaigns.
Unlike Alexander, for whose exuberant physical and moral hardihood no season was too severe, they kept their troops in
winter-quarters unless operations became imperative.
But
on
this occasion Caesar
sent out his
cavalry detachments
through the length and breadth of the land, and these, backed up by the presence of the legions, broke down all
present opposition.
at this season.
He was
fain to be content with so
much
of the
This task finished, he placed Trebonius in
command
two legions at Genabum, and left for the land of the Remi, who had appealed to him against the Bellovaci and neighboring tribes ; for these were preparing war upon them and the Suessiones, their clients, under the leadership of Correus the
Bellovacian and the so long faithful Caninius the Atrebatian.
The Remi were allies of Rome and had been stanch friends, who must be helped at any cost. Their early usefulness in
the Belgian campaign will be remembered.
to
Caesar hastened
from Labienus at Vesontio.
Durocortorum with the Eleventh legion and one drawn The Commentaries say that the
314
legion was
BELLOVACIAN CAMPAIGN.
drawn from Trebonius, but as this legate was later ordered to bring up both his from Genabum, it is Caesar ordered Fabius probable that Labienus was meant.
Campaign
of Bellovaci.
to
march
to the land of the Suessiones with the two which,
under his command, had been wintering among the Remi. By these details he endeavored to give duty alternately to
the legions.
He, individually, ceased not from work.
Arrived in the territory of the Bellovaci, Caesar camped
and sent
all
He ascertained that his cavalry out to reconnoitre. the able-bodied men of this and adjacent tribes (the
Ambiani, Aulerci, Caletes, Veliocasses and Atrebates.) had left their dwellings, were on a war footing, and camped on
surrounded by a morass modern Mt. St. Marc in the Forest of Compiegne with their baggage hidden in the of the forest farther away ; that Correus was in gendepths
hill
FOREST WARFARE.
315
era! command, Commius being away to gather auxiliaries from the Germans on the Mosa; that they proposed to fight
if
Caesar had but three legions, but to remain in
camp and
which was
"Cae-
harass
in
him with small-war and cut
get, if
off his forage,
any event hard to
he had more than three.
sar was convinced of the truth of this account
by
the concur-
ring testimony of several prisoners." This prudent resolution, so far as
it
applied to fighting
only a small force, Caesar determined to encourage.
Though
Fight against Bellovaci.
he had four legions with him, three veteran, the Seventh, and Ninth, and the Eleventh " composed of chosen Eighth
young men of great hopes, who had served eight campaigns, but who, compared to the others, had not yet acquired any
316
MARCHING IN -SQUARE.
he endeavored great reputation for experience or valor," He therefore to make the enemy believe he had only three.
marched the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth by themselves in the van, and left the Eleventh to follow the train at a convenient
distance.
"
By
this disposition
he formed his army almost
into a square,
sooner than was anticipated."
instructions as to his plans.
and brought them within sight of the enemy He had given his officers full
There are frequent rather puzThis was largely a
his
zling statements in the Commentaries.
wooded country, and how Caesar could move
anything like
column in
a square seems to us, who are familiar with the
Camp
limitations of
at Mt. St. Pierre.
modern armies, highly
singular.
But
infan-
try or cavalry, with no baggage except pack-mules, can, and
on our Western plains does, get over ground which would be considered utterly impracticable for an army if hampered by
artillery
and
trains.
We may accept Caesar's statement as a
broad description of his order of march, and not assume his
NOVEL DEFENSES.
square to have been
square.
317
an exact equivalent of our modern
On
perceiving Caesar's approach, the
enemy drew up
in
front of their camp, but declined to leave their advantageous
position
on the heights.
Caesar saw that their
number was
SECTION
Section of
01
git
Wall and Ditch.
much
too great to attack without proper preparation, and
on went into camp on the other side of a deep valley, Mt. St. Pierre. His camp he fortified with a twelve-foot
rampart, with roofed breastworks on it and down the slope two trenches fifteen feet wide, with, as he says, perpendicular sides
show them such.
it,
and square bottom, though the excavations do not It was easy, when he later wrote about
to forget the kind of trench he
may have
dug.
He
built
several turrets three stories high, intercommunicating with
galleries, all protected
by hurdles.
Two
rows of men, one
above the other, could fight on the ramparts. the galleries could throw their darts farther,
Those on
while the
lower rank on the vallum would be protected by the plat-
318
REINFORCEMENTS.
falling
darts.
form against
heavy
turrets.
The
gates were flanked
by
This camp would be secure when a part of the garrison had gone foraging; would make a safe magazine for stores;
and Caesar hoped the enemy would suppose
from
preparation that he felt concerned for his safety and be induced to attack him in his intrenchments. This camp of Caesar's at Mt. St. Pierre has been exploited,
all
this
and
its
contours and area and
light.
many
of its details have been
brought to
These are interesting to show how the
Caesar was fond of doing things in a
idea which occurred to
accentuation of the ground was put to use to facilitate the
erection of defenses.
novel way.
Any new
him he was apt
to carry out, to test its adaptability
and usefulness.
There was constant skirmishing at a ford across the marsh, now a piece of low meadow land, which lay between the rival
camps; either party crossing and engaging the other with alternate success. The Roman foragers were constantly
attacked by the barbarians. Some successes thus obtained, and particularly the arrival of five hundred German horse,
under Commius, greatly encouraged the barbarians. Caesar deemed it wise to send back for more troops, as the
as he
Gauls were many and in a peculiarly strong situation, and deemed an investment the only safe means of attacking
the barbarian stronghold.
in the Thirteenth legion,
He
ordered Trebonius to draw
which under Sextius was in the
territory of the Bituriges,
and with
it
and
his
own
two, the
Sixth and Fourteenth at Genabum, to join him by forced marches.
more encouraged by an ambuscade into which they led the Reman, Lingonian, and other allied horse, and during which a number were
Meanwhile the barbarians were
all the
killed, including their chief.
Caesar had drafted a considall
erable tale of
mounted men from
the tribes which he had
BELLOVACI RETIRE.
subdued.
their
319
This was an easy and effectual way of insuring good behavior, for it took from among them their leadin other words, those able to serve mounted,
ing citizens,
and kept them under
Caesar's
own
eye.
It
had
its
corresponding danger in keeping with the army a sometimes uncertain element; but under Caesar's immediate control the
danger was minimized. few days after the above defeat, some of the German foot auxiliaries crossed the marsh, and in a hand-to-hand
combat drove the enemy into and a few even beyond their camp. This defeat and the arrival of Trebonius frightened
and disheartened the enemy as much as they had been before
Fearing another Alesia siege they prepared to leave, and sent forward by night their baggage and old As daylight overtook them during this operation, people.
encouraged.
not daring openly to continue the retreat, they drew up part
of their
the
army in front of movement in retreat.
their
camp
to protect
it
and conceal
Caesar saw what the barbarians were doing. He bridged in his front (there are still traces of this road), the morass
and making
his
the enemy, he drew
to assault, nor
Mt. Collet way to a hill overlooking in line of battle. He did not wish up
it
was
as
owing
to the river
worth while to follow the flying column, Axona on one side and the marsh on
the other, he could not reach
it except by exposing his flank. The enemy declined to leave their position. Caesar camped and fortified in that place and then remained in line of
battle, the horses bridled
the
ready for attack or pursuit, in case should divide in order to get away. The hill on enemy
sides,
which he lay had abrupt
and was separated from the
Bellovacian position by a narrow valley in places but two
hundred yards apart. The engines, it appears, could fire This fire, which they were unable to return, galled across it.
320
CLEVER STRATAGEM.
Observing Caesar's intention, the
the barbarians sensibly.
Bellovaci resorted to the following clever stratagem. Piling bundles of straw, of which they used much to sit and lie
upon, with hurdles and other inflammables in their front, at
Theatre of Bellovacian Campaign.
nightfall they set all this
on
fire.
Under cover
of the
smoke
they precipitately retired. Caesar guessed as much, but advanced
cautiously, natu-
The horse could not easily rally fearing some ambuscade. advance through the line of fire. Thus the enemy was able
to retreat in safety ten miles, where they took
up another
strong position on a hill fortified
to
have been
Mont Ganelon,
but a circuit
by nature. This is thought north of the confluence of the
from Mt.
St.
Aisne and Oise.
the crow
flies,
It is only six miles
Marc
as
may
have been necessary to cross
the rivers.
It is not stated that Caesar followed
them up.
He
probably kept to his camp and reconnoitred the vicinity
AN AMBUSH
to await
FAILS.
321
a favorable chance of action.
From
their
new
by a
camp number
the barbarians again engaged in their small- war
of lesser ambushes, doing
much harm
to the
Roman
foragers.
Learning soon after that Correus, the chief of the Bellovaci, had placed six thousand of his best foot and one
thousand horse in an ambush where the
Roman
foragers were
Combat with
Bellovaci.
apt to go because there was considerable provision, Caesar himself accompanied these, and made his party somewhat
larger than usual.
His cavalry he mixed with light infantry and sustained by some cohorts of legionaries. The ground for the ambush was a plain about a mile in extent, not far
from Choisy au Bac,
Aisne.
surrounded by woods and the river The enemy's force was led by Correus. At the moment Correus emerged from the woods and atproper tacked the column of foragers, expecting entire victory. The ambush proved a failure, as the Romans were in force and
fully prepared for it; the cavalry
was quickly sustained by
322
the
THREATENED EMIGRATION.
bowmen, and after a severe combat of the van, in which the cavalry and light troops fought with commendable bravery, the
legions
arrived and
retire,
hemmed
in
the barbarians.
Correus tried to
had
laid
for the
but he was himself in the trap he Romans, with the river closing him in.
The Romans
killed all but a very few, Correus
among them,
of the
despite the latter 's desperate resistance.
Caesar then marched sharply upon the
camp
main
body, but the other chiefs, believing resistance useless, sued
for peace.
Commius
the Atrebatian,
who was
the chief
instigator of the revolt, fled to the
Germans.
Csesar gave
the Bellovaci to understand that they themselves were the
cause of
all their
own
troubles, but pursued a liberal policy
in dealing with them.
He
had become convinced that his
system of extermination was politically unsound. Caesar now saw that these nations were quite subjugated, but that many were endeavoring to get rid of the Roman
dominion by emigration.
To
this
he desired to put a stop.
to control the tribes.
He
The
distributed his army, the better
legate, C. Caninius, had been previously sent south to the land of the Ruteni, with his two legions, the First and
Tenth
but he found himself too weak to control the turbu-
lent population
on his route, and had stopped on the way,
among
sent
the Pictones.
To
Caninius' assistance, Caesar
now
C.
Fabius with
twenty-five cohorts.
He
ordered the
Fifteenth legion to Cisalpine Gaul to protect that province
from inroads
for his
of mountain tribes,
and smaller detachments
to one or other place where they were needed.
He
retained
own
disposition
Mark Antony, now
quaestor,
and the
Twelfth legion, together with Labienus and some of the other legions, and marched to the country of Ambiorix. This chief had fled, but Caesar thoroughly devastated the
Eburonian territory by
fire,
sword and rapine.
This was the
IDENTIFYING THE LEGIONS.
second time he had thus visited the land.
It
323
was an act
which was entirely uncalled for, and as inexcusable as it was inhuman and unworthy of Caesar. The Commentaries give
as a reason that Caesar desired to leave no territory for Ambiorix to return to which could afford him support, and
to
make
the few remaining people hate this chief for the
evils
he had brought on them.
But
this is
no valid excuse
Ambiorix was an enemy and had even for ancient days. inflicted a heavy penalty on Sabinus and Cotta. Kevenge
against Ambiorix' person should not have been thus late
carried forward upon his people.
He had
when he
previously punCsesar shines
is cruel.
ished the Eburones with sufficient severity.
most when he
From
the
magnanimous, Eburonean land Caesar sent Labienus with two
is
least
legions to overawe the Treviri,
who were much
like the
Ger-
mans, and never abode long in their allegiance. It is rare that the Commentaries mention the legions by name or number. They cannot, therefore, always be followed with certainty. Subsequent mention often enables Occaa legion to be identified, but not in every instance.
sionally the
Commentaries are manifestly
in error.
When-
ever possible, the legions have been specified by number, but
The rotation generally they have to be dealt with in gross. in command of the officers of the Roman army conflicts with
the individuality of the legion.
favorite,
and the one he was wont
is
to
Only the Tenth, Caesar's have on the wing where
This legion Csesar
he commanded,
specially prominent.
continually refers to.
XXII.
TJXELLODUNUM.
SPRING OF
half,
51 B.
C.
CANINIUS and Fabius, with four legions and a
Uxellodunum, which these outlaws had
had pursued an army of
freebooters heading for the Province under Drappes and Lucterius, as far south
as
seized.
as difficult of access as Gergovia or Alesia.
This oppidum was almost The barbarians having sent out a
party to bring provisions to the place, the
entire
Romans managed
to capture the
convoy.
Caninius and Fabius had the place invested
when
Caesar
arrived.
The enemy had enough
on the west of the place. and the Gauls were then confined to a spring on the
corn, but relied for water on a stream flowing Caesar out off this supply by a system of outposts,
hillside.
Caesar set to
work
to cut this off also.
He
built a
mound and tower from which he
could
upon the water-carriers, and gradually undermined the spring, so as to tap and divert its flow. Uxellodunum then surrendered. Caesar spent the rest of the year in traversing Gaul from end to end to confirm the people in
direct missiles
their allegiance,
and to
rectify the
many
abuses naturally arising from the war.
C. CANINIUS, meanwhile, hearing that Duracius, a friendly
was besieged in Limonum (Poitiers), a town of the Pictones, by Dumnaqus, chief of the Andes, marched from his winter-quarters among the Ruteni with his two legions, the
ally,
First
and Tenth,
to his assistance.
to cope with the barbarians,
who were
Finding himself unable in large force, he
camped near by
attacked his
in
a strong
position.
The barbarians
camp but without success ; they were driven back with loss. When it was reported, soon thereafter, that
Caninius was to be reinforced by C. Fabius, whom Caesar had sent to his aid with twenty -five cohorts, the besiegers not
only raised the siege and decamped, but retired beyond the he had been Liger. Fabius, coming from the north,
among
the Renii,
caught them on the march, harassed
CANINIUS.
their rear with great loss at the bridge
325
where now stands
the horse
Saumur, and gained much
booty.
The next day,
in pursuit, having gone too far
beyond the infantry for the
Caninius' March.
purpose of bringing the fugitive army to a halt, engaged in a combat with the rear of the enemy, who turned upon them
and, sustaining their cavalry with foot, pressed them hard. The legions arrived when the Roman allied horse was all but
exhausted, reestablished matters, and put the
enemy
to rout
with a loss of not far from twelve thousand men.
entire baggage-train
Their
was captured. The Andes having been disposed of and the land quieted by the destruction of all its warriors and warlike material,
326
FABIUS.
Uxellodunam.
Caninius was called on to follow towards the Province a body
of
some
slaves
thousand men, consisting of robbers, runaway and other desperate characters, who under Drappes and
five
Lucterius were moving thither. Fabius, with his twentyfive cohorts, marched to the land of the Carnutes, who had
been engaged in the recent uprising, but with
all
the
Armor-
UXELLODUNUM.
lean tribes between
327
submission.
them and the ocean now brought in their Dumnacus was obliged to flee to remotest
Gaul.
Caninius followed Drappes and Lucterius, who, knowing
that they could accomplish nothing in the Province against his legions, had stopped in the land of the Cadurci, and
seized
inaccessible rocks
TJxellodunum (Puy d'Issolu), a stronghold on very and hardly needing defenses. It had been
The location of Uxelloformerly a vassal town of Drappes. dunum has been put on the Oltis (Lot), but late excavations have proved it to be modern Puy d'Issolu. Caninius followed the enemy, camped
to
011
three adjacent hills, and began
draw
lines of contravallation to besiege the place.
The plateau of TJxellodunum covers some two hundred acres
and
is six
hundred feet above the
plain.
It is north of the
Duranius (Dordogne), between which and it lies a flat plain. On its west is a range of hills separated from it by a narrow
valley,
and on
its
it
northeast
is
a smaller plateau (Pech
Demont)
dum.
joined to
by a ravine.
On these
heights Caninius
established his camps, which were on a level with the oppi-
On
the west
and south of the Uxellodunum plateau
were perpendicular rocks one hundred and forty feet high. On the east was an easier slope. Of the three camps, 1 and 2 were not intrenched, as from the lay of the land it was not
necessary, and there were few
intrenched because
position of
it
was
accessible
is
camps 1 and 2
in Uxellodunum; 3 was from the oppidum. The fixed upon from the topography.
men
No
remains have been found of their walls.
The barbarians, fearing another Alesia and determined not to be starved into surrender, sent out all but two thousand of their force to gather corn, of which they established a de'pQt some ten miles away. Meanwhile the garrison simulated numbers
by sundry attacks on Caninius' camps, and
fig
SUCCESSFUL DIVERSION.
interrupted his work.
329
gradually convey the provision
trains.
Lucterius and Drappes proposed to to the oppidum in small
night
into the
But when Lucterius sought to carry some corn by town on beasts of burden by a steep and
side, passing
wooded path, probably on the north
camp
3 on
the west, Caninius, notified by his outposts who had heard the sound of the moving convoy, fell upon and captured the
whole train.
Lucterius was cut off and could not rejoin
Drappes, who, back in the supply-camp, knew nothing of the disaster but assumed his colleague to have reached the oppi-
one legion to guard his own camps and with the other and his cavalry he advanced on the ene-
dum.
Caninius then
left
my's supply-camp
This was on low ground, enabling Caninius to seize the hills around it and corral the whole
itself.
party.
Having well disposed
his
men, he
fell
on
and
destroyed the entire foraging force with the loss of but a few men wounded. Drappes was taken prisoner. Caninius then
completed the lines around the town, and Fabius shortly joined him on completion of his work north of the Liger,
thus giving
him enough men
to finish
and man the
lines.
Fabius took one side of the town, Caninius the other.
Caesar had, meanwhile, left
Mark Antony and
fifteen co-
horts in the territory of the Bellovaci to keep them in subHe jection, while he himself was making a tour of Gaul.
visited
each region in turn, and by politic generosity and' some necessary severity he won over each tribe. Among the
Carnutes,
he caused
Guturvatus, said to have been the
instigator of the late rebellion, to be brought to
him and on
the clamor of the soldiers executed more majorum, i. e., He did this, it is said, to beaten to death and decapitated.
save executing vengeance on the whole people. Learning by letters from Caninius the situation at Uxello-
dunuin, Caesar put Q. Calenus in charge of the two legions
330
CAESAR ARRIVES.
which he had kept with himself, ordered him to follow by regular marches and, taking only the cavalry, moved rapidly
to the aid of
Caninius.
This he did because
it
had now
become
essential speedily to
natives well
knew
that his term in
stamp out all opposition; the Gaul lasted but one
summer more, and he feared they might argue that if they much longer they would eventually get rid of the Eomans. He therefore determined to make an
could hold out so
example of this body of freebooters. Caesar was wont to leave as little to his lieutenants and to
While abundantly busy with the political questions of Gaul and Italy, he yet deemed it wise never to allow a military operation to drag for want
of his
do as much personally as he could.
own
supervision.
To
this personal activity is trace-
able the remarkable success of his Gallic campaigns, which
from beginning
to
clear judgment, presence of mind, boldness
end breathe of Caesar's genius, cool head, and never -tiring
energy.
On
his arrival
he found that the inhabitants of Uxelloof corn,
dunum had abundance
plish his end, he
and
that, in order to
accom-
must cut them
off
from water.
This he
could not easily do, for a stream (the Tourmente) flowed at the foot of the crags on the west side of the town, and through a narrow ravine, so that its waters could not be
diverted.
But, by disposing slingers, archers and engines in
certain places in the ravine, Caesar rendered the operation of
getting water so hazardous, that he finally confined the
enemy
to procuring
it
in one place.
This was between the town and the stream, where, near
the walls, gushed out
he must also cut this
an ample spring (a). Caesar saw that off. He advanced vineae and a mound
towards the place with great labor and constant skirmishing, in which a number of Romans were wounded. He also
CUTTING OFF WATER.
331
undertook to tap the sources of the spring by a subterranean passage which was run some distance in the rock towards it.
MOUND AND TOWER
Mound and Tower.
This passage has been discovered, and some traces also of the mound and works.
Finally, the outside works were
advanced so near the
spring that the
feet
Romans from
marked
effect
the mound, which was sixty
high and surmounted by a ten-story turret, could cast
their darts with
upon any
of the garrison
who
came
for water; thus they succeeded in all but preventing
its use.
The tower was
too far below the walls of the op-
pidum
to attack the latter.
Thus deprived
of the spring,
many people and all the cattle in the town died of thirst. But the besieged, with the fury of despair, determined
make a supreme
low, pitch
effort for their salvation.
to
They accumumaterial,
tal-
lated an enormous
amount
and
of inflammable
and
tar,
filling barrels, rolled
them down
upon
the
Roman
works, at the
same time making a desper-
ate sortie in force against them.
The
patiently constructed
works speedily caught fire. To beat back this sortie and at the same time to enable his men to handle the fire to advantage, Caesar ordered
a feigned general attack from
all sides
at once,
which being stoutly given, the barbarians withdrew quickly into their town, for they did not know which quarter was most in danger, and they feared that the Romans might
332
UXELLODUNUM CAPTURED.
This enabled the legions to extinguish the
enter the town.
flames and to gain a material amount of ground as well. Some days after, the Roman mine reached the sources of
the spring and diverted
its flow.
The
barbarians, consider-
be an act of the gods and not of men, for they had deemed the spring unreachable, were compelled both by
ing this to
and by thirst to surrender. In pursuance of his determination above explained, Caesar cut off the hands of all Both leaders had been prethose who had here borne arms.
fear
viously captured and imprisoned.
to death in prison to
Drappes starved himself save himself from a worse fate.
Meanwhile Labienus, among the Treviri, had got the
j>... cii,v rl
."</, ,<'''
Vt/i.iv
\ t \"."Jz
i^ilnfj.
Winter-Quarters, B.
c.
51-50.
insurgent chiefs into his hands, and Caesar, seeing that his
return thither would not be necessary, marched throughout
CESAR'S POLICY.
833
Aquitania, where lie received the submission of all the tribes which Crassus had already partly brought under control. This occupied the summer. When the time arrived for going
into winter-quarters, four legions (under
and Q. Tullius) two among the ^Edui; two among the Turoni near the Carnutes to hold the seaside tribes in check; two
Trebonius, P. Vatinius
the Belgae;
Mark Antony, C. were left among
among
the
Lemnovices
near
the
Arverni.
Caesar
then
personally went to the Province, where he attended to the duties of the state, returned to the legions among the Belg33,
and wintered at Nemetocenna (Arras). There were no rebels left except a few bands of rovers, who could accomplish
nothing unaided.
But Caesar had
to rest content with
merely nominal submission, in the north of Gaul. There was always a relic of war in that quarter. Commius, after
some cavalry exchanges with Volusenus, turned freebooter. According to Frontinus, he retired to Britain. Only he and
Ambiorix, of
Caesar
all the Gallic chieftains, survived.
now devoted
his time to demonstrating to the Gallic
tribes the advantages of the
Roman
"
alliance, as he
had shown
them the dangers
to
of revolt.
Caesar, whilst in winter-quar-
ters in the country of the Belgse,
made
it
his only business
keep the states in amity with him, and to give none either For nothing was further hopes of or pretext for revolt.
from
his wishes than to be
in another
his
war
at his departure ; lest,
under the necessity of engaging when he was drawing
left unfin-
army out of the country, any war should be
which the Gauls would cheerfully undertake when there was no immediate danger. Therefore, by treating the
ished,
states with respect,
making
rich presents to the leading men,
their
imposing no new burdens, and making the terms of
subjection lighter, he easily kept
so
Gaul (already exhausted by
many
unsuccessful battles) in obedience."
334
A GRAND REVIEW.
winter,
Thus Caesar spent the
he proceeded towards Italy, way, and confirming them in their allegiance, as far as CisalHe was received with the greatest honor and pine Gaul.
acclamations.
and when the spring opened, visiting all the towns by the
He
then returned to Nemetocenna, ordered
his legions to the territory of the Treviri,
and held there a
grand review of his troops. Having settled the affairs of Gaul on a solid basis, Caesar journeyed to Ravenna to be
near the events in Italy when his consulate should expire.
Labienus in command, regarding whom, though warned that he was solicited by his enemies, he harbored no
left
He
suspicion.
The
Gallic campaigns are peculiarly interesting to the
military student as showing
his legions.
ing,
eral,
how
Caesar schooled himself and
He began with but the ordinary military trainon a small basis of experience he ended as a great gen;
with an experience which enabled him to rise to the
most astounding height. His legions commenced green and untried; they ended as veterans equal to conquering the
world.
Each became
so
wedded
to the other that mutual
confidence
and affection made the army commanded by
this period of schooling Cae-
Caesar irresistible.
It
was impossible that during
sar should not
make
mistakes,
grave ones.
But
all his
mistakes bore fruit, and raised the qualities of both general and legions. One can see, step by step, how Csesar's suc-
produced their effect ; how his inborn ability came to the surface how he impressed his own individuality on whatever he did ; and how his intelligence
cesses
and
failures alike
led
him
to apply whatever he learned to his future conduct.
is
No
praise
too high for the conduct or moral qualities
of the army.
From
Caesar down, through every grade,
all
military virtues were pronounced.
In organization and
dis-
CAESAR'S OPPONENTS.
cipline, ability to
335
and
of
trial,
do almost any work, endurance of danger toughness and courage, it was a model for the rest
but a model unhappily not imitated. And not were imbued
spirit,
all
Rome,
only his legionaries, but his auxiliary troops,
with the same
breathed not only devotion to
Caesar, but reflected in a measure his
own
great qualities.
this, however, was of a nature different from the high These were wonqualities of the legions of the Punic wars.
All
derful in their devotion, discipline and effectiveness because
the material in them was incomparable.
Caesar's legions
were equally wonderful, but
ioned and always
earlier legion
it
was because Caesar had fash-
commanded them.
The
discipline of the
depended largely on the men; that of Caesar's
entirely on himself.
As
in the case of Napoleon, the disci-
pline of Caesar's legions
was often terribly lax; but
called
battle-discipline
in that
quality which
may be
they were
unsurpassed.
Caesar had in Gaul some opponents worthy even of him.
Yercingetorix, Ariovistus, Casivelaunus were, each in his
way, great leaders. That they were overcome by Caesar was but natural. Disciplined troops well led cannot but win
against barbarians.
The end could not be
otherwise.
And
while the Gallic "War does not show Caesar
as the Second
Punic
War
did Hannibal
it
opposed to the strongest milidid show him opposed to gener-
tary machine in existence,
als
Alexander.
and troops quite equal to most of those encountered by The Gauls must not be underrated. Some of and some of
their fighting
their operations
est order.
were of the high-
They contended nobly for their independence. Defeat did not discourage them. Once put down, they again
hand was removed.
in
rose in rebellion so soon as the strong
no sense weak opponents, and while in all They were things Caesar's army was superior to theirs, yet in their
336
GAUL CONQUERED.
motives and hearty cooperation they certainly were more commendable than Caesar in his mere love of conquest.
Gaul was conquered. Even though the master's grasp of the reins was soon relaxed, to reach for other and greater
things, the subjected province rose not.
There were small
wars and rumors of wars, but these were so isolated and
unimportant that the local governors could do them justice. In the remote corners of the new territory, the Pyrenees,
the Scheldt, and the coast, some tribes were
free.
still
de facto
But time
itself
reduced these.
Caesar's
work had
been thorough, and it was the work of civilization. Whatever fault can be found with his method, or indeed his abstract rights, that
Gaul should be conquered was a
well that
it fell
historical
necessity,
and
it is
to the lot of a
man
as
broad, as thorough, as enlightened as Caesar.
Gallic
Horseman.
(From a
terra-cotta Statuette.)
>
xxin.
CESAR'S METHOD.
THE
Gauls had been the terror of
hero.
Rome
for centuries.
Whoever conquered
His mission was
to
them would be the national
protect the Province
;
Caesar understood this.
he purposed to subdue Gaul. He worked for his own ends as much as for Rome, but he understood his problem thoroughly. He
considered the strategic field of Gaul with a clear eye, and committed no errors
in his general plan.
detail, for Caesar
It
had not been brought up as a
was natural that he should make early mistakes of soldier and we find a hesi;
tancy in his
campaigns which later he threw off. His line of advance from the Province through central Gaul was in strict accord with the topographical
first
values,
and he studied the
tribal instincts keenly.
He
educated himself as he
went along, profiting by all his mistakes. His campaigns across the Rhine and to Britain were useless they did not aid the general scheme. Caesar was ener;
getic in obtaining information, ingenious in contending with
telligent in selecting his objective, careful of his base.
new
obstacles, in-
exertions
from
his
men, but rewarded
He demanded severe them handsomely. He was much aided
by
fortune, but under trial
Csesar entered the Gallic
was doubly energetic. In view of the fact that campaign without experience in war, it was a marvel-
ous success.
IT has already been pointed out that Caesar, on being appointed governor of Gaul, had been vested with no right
do more than protect the exposed boundaries of the then All prefects had confined themselves to this role. Province.
to
The laws
of nations in Caesar's day
had already received
some recognition; but right was no valid argument against might, and few rights were accorded to barbarian tribes by
Rome
all to
in the last century before the Christian era, least of
the redoubted Gauls,
who had
at that
so often
brought
lawless.
Rome to
Every
the verge of ruin.
Rome
day was
great
man wrought
for himself.
Csesar had been brought up
CAESAR'S PLANS.
in a school
339
all things to his ama great party ; only by his personal bition. represented War meant to him an success could his party succeed.
which prompted him to bend
He
army
When
an army was to him but a means of winning power. he went to Gaul, Pompey was distinctly the leader
of the triumvirate.
With
man
of Caesar's make-up, this
could not
that he
last.
must aim
Like his colleague, Caesar soon recognized at the sole control of Rome if he would
win any standing.
this end.
Without war and conquest, he could
gain neither the experience, fame nor influence requisite to
Caesar could This was no unworthy ambition. not be great with a lesser end in view, and the importance of his object was equaled by the splendor of his means. To
deliver the republic forever
from the Gauls was
to
make
their
conqueror the foremost of the Romans, as the Gauls had been
the most dreaded of the foes of
Rome.
To subdue Gaul
was a stepping-stone to certain and unapproached renown. Caesar was fortunate. At the very inception of his charge
of Gaul, the outbreak of the Helvetii opportunely occurred,
and
led, in its progress, to the current of events
which ended
of the entire country. One thing after with Caesar's uniform good fortune, was sure to another,
in the conquest
happen, to give him at least a pretense of right in extending his conquests. The Helvetian question solved, the ^Edui
called in his aid against the
this, too,
Germans under
Ariovistus.
In
Caesar could assert that he was but protecting the
allies allies
of the Province.
The Romans always helped
their
when by so doing they could help themselves. Caesar worked on the like theory. Gaul publicly thanked the
consul for freeing her from the Helvetii and the
Germans ;
but Gaul did not then anticipate her own subjugation. Caesar's next step requires more of his own plausible
explanation.
It is
hard to justify his action in carrying the
340
CAESAR'S AMBITION.
Belgae, but he solves the
war among the
enigma by
reciting
the danger to which the Province would be subjected by any combination of tribes, even if not offensively meant. The
same course
of
and
into Britain,
argument carried Caesar beyond the Rhine, and was the motive of all his other conunjustifiable this
quests.
However
see the
may have
been,
and
same process of conquest going on in the nineyet teenth century, Caesar's purpose was clear and definite,
and he played his cards well. His course was consistent throughout and he had the happy faculty in his public utter;
we
ances of arguing the law to his side, of placing there the
appearance of right.
Whatever he undertook
all,
resulted in
his favor, and, greatest accomplishment of
he disciplined hardened an army devoted to himself, by means -of which and he was able to make himself master of Rome.
by no means to Caesar's discredit. what other leading men had been doing in Rome
All this
is
He
did but
for genera-
tions.
The old-fashioned Roman patriotism had long
selfish one, scarce
since
vanished.
There was scarce another road to honor and
power than the
for those
who
held high rank.
another means of safety Caesar cannot fairly be
blamed
model
for self-seeking; neither should he be held
up
as a
patriot.
Judged by
his
own Commentaries, he never
for him, so long
rose to the plane of a Washington, a Gustavus, a Hannibal.
Ubi
bene, ibi patria
was a serviceable motto
as the good ran in his
own
favor.
Rome needed
a Caesar to
is
shape the destiny to which she was manifestly drifting. It well that such a man was at hand, and that he did his
work with thoroughness
the ancient world as Napoleon to modern Europe,
but though Caesar was as useful to it cannot
be said that either worked on the instincts of elevated patriotism.
Whatever
criticism
may be
passed upon Caesar in a
politi-
HIS STATECRAFT.
cal aspect, as a great captain
341
he
is
almost beyond cavil.
Barring such errors of vigilance and judgment as are of pe-
showing certain characteristics as well as how Caesar educated himself to arms, his military conduct
through this memorable series of campaigns is a fruitful His errors were more often in policy than in war. study.
times he could be generous, even magnanimous, to subAt times he was cruel beyond what any jugated peoples.
civilized conqueror has cruel.
culiar interest in
At
ever been, unnecessarily, unwisely
The world had advanced since the days of Alexander, and while what is now known as the law of nations was not
then a code, certain of
its
tenets
had been
established.
But
Caesar absolutely disregarded any such when they interfered with his own projects. Statecraft counts for much in a great captain's work.
Caesar's policy in
Gaul was on the whole
all.
so harsh as scarcely
to rate as policy at
ter.
This
is
the civil aspect of the mat-
another point of view it was as masterly as the problem was difficult. Caesar had to conciliate some tribes He while attacking other neighboring and friendly tribes.
From
had
to supply himself while destroying victual for the
enemy.
He had
to elevate part of the people in order to suppress
another part. He had to play one half of the population He had a population of eight million against the other half.
Gauls to oppose his dozen legions. In no other way could he do his work. So far as this his military policy goes, his conduct was irreproachable.
Caesar's strategy
vince,
was farsighted and sound.
The Prowas
when Gaul
fell to his lot,
as one of the triumvirs,
a sort of salient thrust forward into the midst of the country. West and north of its boundary, the Ehone, lived allied
peoples ; from the mountains on the east danger threatened from a number of restless tribes. The advantages of this
342
salient position
CAESAR'S STRATEGY.
were by no means which
lost
it
power
of concentrated action
on Caesar, nor the gave him. His first
campaign, against the Helvetii, was intended to protect and
Physical Features of Gaul.
resulted in protecting the right flank of the salient,
lute essential to safety in
an abso-
Gaul.
From
this point
advancing into north or northwest duly secured, northerly, the Rhine
and the Jura and Vosegus mountains protected to a certain degree the right of an advancing army, provided the tribes on
the left
will
bank
of the great river were not unfriendly ;
and
it
be noticed that one of Caesar's early efforts was directed
as
to
making
many of
these tribes as possible his firm friends
effective protection against their
by generous treatment and
enemies.
When
he could not quickly accomplish his end by
CENTRAL LINES.
343
In carrying negotiation, he resorted to drastic measures. out his scheme of conquest, Caesar advanced his salient along the Arar and the Mosa as far as the Sabis, and could then
debouch from the watershed to the west of these rivers down
the valleys of the Sequana
and
its tributaries,
the
Matrona
and
Axona, with perfect safety. And Caesar not only secured the friendship of the abutting tribes, but always kept
several strongly fortified
camps among them as an additional
protection.
The flow of the Axona across his line of operations furnished Caesar an advanced base from which he could move
against the Belgae.
This line from his
first
base in the
lay along the
Province to the secondary one on the
Axona
Arar and the Mosa.
From
his hands, Caesar could safely
Belgian territory, when once in move even so far as Britain,
provided he properly protected his rear and was careful that his victuals were accumulated or certain to be delivered by
friendly tribes.
Having subdued the
Belgae, he could turn
without danger to the southwest corner of Gaul, against Caesar thus exemplified in the fullest degree the Aquitania.
advantage in grand strategy of central lines of operation. Neither Alexander nor Hannibal exhibited a clearer grasp of
his strategical
problem than Caesar.
It
is
noticeable that
this
the hardest part of Caesar's
central salient
work was
to establish
by alliance or conquest of the tribes which
his
abutted on
it;
gravest danger
of
when the JEdui, who
joined
their
guarded
brethren.
his
line
operations,
revolting
But
this
salient
definitely
gained,
Caesar was
able to reduce the operations of the
isolated
war
to the basis of single
campaigns.
These,
indeed,
were
difficult,
but
dangerous only when they threatened with intestine
military structure he
broils the
had
erected.
The
several campaigns,
from the cautious handling of the
844
SEEKING INFORMATION.
Helvetian question to the splendid management of the siege of Alesia, have each received comment in its proper place.
Caesar, as a
Roman
general, carried out the
Roman
idea
of a conquest of the world
by
virtue of a constant offensive.
In studying Caesar, one studies the
soldier, all that
Roman
military status
at its best, so far as generalship goes.; so far as concerns the
was best in the burgess-militia of Rome had Caesar's legionary was a professional long ago disappeared. soldier in every sense. Caesar began the war by a defensive
operation against the Helvetii ; after that he always assumed
the offensive, though in the Commentaries he frequently goes out of his way to convince his readers that he was the
If he ever resorted to the defensive it was aggrieved party. but for a moment, shortly to resume the offensive and push
it
vigorously.
Like
all
generals
who
are
careful of their
men, Caesar
preferred to campaign only in the season of good weather, and to lie in quarters in winter. But that he could conduct
a winter
campaign was
more than once
demonstrated.
While
in quarters he appears to have been fairly careful of
good discipline and studious to keep his men busy. The panic at Vesontio was a good object-lesson, by which he
profited.
qualities.
His teachableness was one of Caesar's admirable
Caesar was energetic in procuring information on which to
This was often both hard to get and unreliable when got, but he sought it intelligently. He con-
form
his plans.
stantly kept afoot
some of
his Gallic officers or horsemen;
used spies from allied tribes or gained friends within the enemy's lines. Deserters were put to use and were hand-
somely rewarded.
procured, Caesar
If
information could not be otherwise
in force.
made reconnoissances
As
such
we
may
well treat Caesar's first expeditions against
Germany and
CESAR'S OBJECTIVE.
Britain.
345
no other ground can these be justified as military operations; and a reconnoissance in force should
never risk the existence of army or commander,
first
On
as the
crossing to Britain did.
Caesar as a rule was numerically weaker than the enemy,
but he was not so vastly overmatched as was Alexander, nor can the opposition to him be in any sense compared to what
Hannibal encountered during his entire military life. Caesar was far stronger than his enemies in everything but numbers,
and power of work. His legionaries would bear anything and could do anything. They were very Yankees for ingenuity. Caesar did not willingly
especially in self-confidence
mix
the allies with his legions ; he employed the native foot
mostly as
native.
bowmen and
his
slingers; his cavalry
was uniformly
He worked
army
it
habitually well concentrated.
If he divided his forces
again
to concentrate.
This
was but for a short time, soon is an almost uniform test of
But Caesar sought to attack the enemy before the latter had concentrated, and generally made good use of such a chance. Nimbleness of movement stood in the
military capacity.
stead of numbers.
it,
He
understood how, as Napoleon phrases
"se multiplier par la vitesse."
Caesar's objective was always well chosen. It was either the most important strategic point, or more usually the army
of the enemy. Thus in the campaign against the Belgae, he threw himself upon the Remi, who had not yet decided whether to join the confederacy, and by preventing their so doing at once made secure a secondary base. He chose the
In 52 the enemy concentrated his forces between the Cebennae mountains and the upper
shortest road to
march by.
Liger.
trona.
Caesar's
army
it,
lay between the
He
joined
got his
Sequana and Maforces well in hand, and
marched from Agendicum by way of Genabum straight on
346
the enemy.
ful so to
CESAR'S BASE.
In the division of his forces he was usually careas to be able again to make a junction of the
march
In the campaign against the Veneti, while the army was divided into several parts, two of these, comprising six legions under himself and Titurius, were
bulk of his forces.
placed where they could easily be concentrated. Caesar was careful of his base. This cannot be said to
apply to the
first
British expedition, but in the second he left
half of all his cavalry
and three legions on the coast of Gaul
first
as an intermediate base.
the Province was his
In 52, in the general insurrection, base, with twenty-two cohorts
under L. Caesar the legate. The second base was the land of the friendly Remi, and the line from the first to the second
base lay along the Arar, through the land of the likewise
friendly Sequani
and Lingones, and was strengthened by
In order to secure another line along the
Vesontio midway.
Liger, Caesar left Labienus with two (later reinforced to
Agendicum, well intrenched. Even these His leaving the fleet prodispositions barely saved him. tected by an intrenched camp on the coast of Britain was a
four) legions
at
simpler instance of his care for his base, taught by unfortu-
nate experience.
Caesar always sought to induce his
forces.
enemy
to divide his
In the war with the Belgae he sent the .ZEdui to
attack the Bellovacian territory, thus easily detaching this powerful tribe from the confederacy. His diversions were
well conceived
orix
and well timed.
When
he drew Vercinget-
meet him by crossing the Cebennse, and when, after so doing, he personally hurried to his legions, Caesar
to
down
showed that he was a master of the art of blinding the enemy as to his real intentions. This was a device in the
style of
Hannibal.
Caesar was careful of his soldiers.
But he
called
on them
THE ROMAN SYSTEM.
for the severest exertions at
stances.
347
His
foresight in
any time or under any circumwas good. He showed in Gaul more logistics the matter of rations and magazines than in later
Protection of Gallic tribes was paid for
campaigns.
victual.
by
got rations from those neighboring tribes whose alliance he had accepted. beaten people was always mulcted in a given amount of corn. He was rarely in a
He
strait for bread.
forage,
if
this
was
he campaigned only when there was train of pack-animals accompossible.
Still
panied his column, loaded with a supply in addition to what the men themselves carried.
Caesar speaks in his Commentaries of a threefold advantage
called the methodical system over that of any other nation, namely: of conducting war, the holding of decisive points, the intrenching of camps, and
of the
Roman, or what Napoleon
the breaking
up
of the enemy's communications.
The cap-
ture of decisive points opened the campaign, and placed the
troops where they were advantageously located for winning a
victory
;
the
Roman
its
intrenched
camp was a movable
fortress
which from
victory
effect
on the morale of the troops made
more certain as well as neutralized defeat; by the breaking up of his communications the enemy was compelled
to shift his ground, to fight
under adverse circumstances, or
surrender.
Decisive points were to be reached
friendly or at least neutral territory.
if
possible through
If
they must be then every step must be through the enemy's, On Caesar's protected to secure his own communications.
reached
march from Agendicum to the Bituriges, he could not leave Vellaunodunum in his rear, but must capture it to keep open
his communications with Labienus.
sive point as one
Caesar describes a deci-
having
many
advantages, the most impor-
tant being that of opening and holding an entrance into the
348
DECISIVE POINTS.
enemy's country. In the march above instanced, such a point was Genabum where there was a bridge over the Liger.
This bridge Caesar must have in order to approach VercinIn his campaign against the Belgse, so soon as he getorix.
had crossed the Axona he was on the enemy's territory, and therefore his camp on the Axona was located at a decisive
point.
In moving on the Helvetii, after crossing the Rhone,
Caesar intrenched in the angle of that river and the Arar,
where he was among the friendly ^Edui, and from here he This was a decisive point. could readily attack the enemy.
Whether Caesar
his plans
laid
among
his
his
much stress on secrecy in relation to own men does not appear. In secrecy,
Hannibal
even
unapproached. Alexander, too, kept his own counsel, but rather as master than for military reasons. Hephaestion knew his every purlieutenants,
to
was
pose.
Caesar deemed great speed in executing his projects
the equivalent of secrecy.
captain must be largely gauged by the strength of his
Caesar's in Gaul by no means lacked ability. opponents. Ariovistus was a man of exceptional strength, and Vercin-
came near to being a genius. Both recognized the value of decisive points as well as Csesar, though war to them was not a science, and what Caesar relied on against such men was not so much secrecy as the rapidity of his
getorix
marches and the discipline of his legions. The decisive point secured, a battle was sought or an attack on a town was made, or some operation was undertaken to bring the enemy to such action that he might be overwhelmed. Caesar preferred a battle in the open field
because a victory so
falling into his
won was
apt to result in
many towns
But
to
if
the
hands or in making their capture easier. enemy constantly avoided it, he was compelled
forego a battle and to resort to a siege or a blockade.
CAMPING.
While
it
349
is
true that Caesar sought battle, the fact that
there were few pitched battles proper in the Gallic campaign
shows how much stronger the legions were than any troops opposed to them. Defeat was often inflicted by Caesar's
native cavalry alone.
When
camp
within
Caesar
camped
in the presence of the
expectation of battle, he sought to lure
so that should he
it
win a
victory,
enemy in him away from his he might make the
most of
it
by pursuit, without the enemy taking refuge and compelling an assault. With secret forced
marches he approached the foe, camped a short march from Thus him, and next day endeavored to take him unawares.
he approached Ariovistus, thus the Usipetes and Tenchtheri. Sometimes Caesar would move nearer to the enemy the even-
camp unobserved, or he would do the same thing in case he needed more information before engaging. Occasionally he camped
at a distance of
ing before he intended to bring on a battle, some obstacle behind which he could easily
if
there
was
two short marches.
In determining the locality of a camp, Caesar paid strict heed to his own communications and sought to prejudice the
enemy's.
At
the outset he paid the more heed to his own.
Later he showed more dash, more reliance on the enemy's inertia. When Ariovistus moved around his flank, Caesar
at once took
Ariovistus'
sar's
up a defensive and moved only a small body on flank. In Britain Cassivellaunus moved on Cae-
Vercingetorix cut Caesar's line at Gergovia by rousing the -ZEdui in his rear. There is sometimes a lack of strategic dash in Caesar's movements in the
communications.
do not see him moving on the enemy's communications by the great turning movements he
Gallic campaign.
We
afterwards employed.
nications
He
and fought.
simply secured his own commuIn besieging towns he disturbed the
350
PURSUIT.
enemy's communications after a fashion, but not by turning movements. This was caution bred of self-distrust which
wore away before the Civil War.
When
Caesar conquered in open fight, he pursued vigorunless he had been very
ously, as a rule with his cavalry, but not infrequently with
the legions,
much
exhausted.
It
was only the cavalry, however, which actually reached the
enemy.
until
one ever pursued so remorselessly as Alexander, Napoleon dawned upon the world and showed it how to
Caesar followed up the politiand appearing after a victory in the very enemies had no difficulty in subjecting them
No
utilize victories to the fullest.
cal chances keenly,
midst of his
and
in forcing
them
to furnish victuals
and transportation.
He
insisted on dictating what their government should be. After a victory, when danger was over, he divided his forces, the better to work on the moral nature of the people
by a sudden display
of his legions in
many
places at once.
The
what
ered, Caesar
summer's campaign having been gathwent into such winter-quarters as best fostered had been accomplished. He avoided loading the
results of the
Province with the care of the legions. His winter-quarters accustomed the newly subjected tribes to the army, to the Roman yoke and to furnishing regular supplies. After the
victory over Ariovistus, winter-quarters were taken
up
in
the east part of the land of the Sequani about Vesontio,
where were rich supplies, with the Province near by; and at the same time Caesar was threatening the Belgae and keeping
In 57 he took up winter-quarters on the lower Liger, when Crassus had already accustomed the Belgae to their masters. The Sequani needed rest
the Sequani well in hand.
from furnishing provisions, the Remi had been on Caesar's side, the Belgae were exhausted, and the .yEdui and neighbors
were friendly.
Besides, Caesar wished to see what effect his
ANCIENT AND MODERN WAR.
eastern victories had had in the west, and whether
it
351
would
In 56 and still require force to subdue the western tribes. 55 winter-quarters were taken with reference to the British
In 54, after this expedition, he had winterquarters near the coast, but spread over a large area because
expedition.
of the late
bad harvest.
In consequence of the
terrible
experience gained by distributing the legions too widely, in
53 and 52 they were kept close together; six were in Agendicum.
When Caesar had bad luck, his energy markedly grew. He particularly watched for and guarded against any loss of
morale among his men.
his fluent
In such circumstances he could use
greatest
He would advantage. convince his men that they were not beaten, turn to another field and by redoubled energy wrest victory out of failure.
tongue to the
This he did after Gergovia. Caesar throughout his camshall meet notable paigns shows best after a backset.
We
instances of this in the Civil
It has
War.
been said that ancient differs so entirely from modern war that one can learn little from the great deeds of
the captains antedating the Christian era.
said of Caesar
erals
But what can be
would be high praise for the best of the genof modern times. When we read the old campaigns,
not superficially but for their inmost meaning, they convey to us the same broad lessons which the most able captains
Middle Ages have given us. An artist learns his technique in a modern studio; he gathers his inspiration
since the
from the old masters.
So with war.
In no better way can
the characteristic quality essential to the soldier be developed
than by the study of the work of the ancient captains ; by
searching earnestly for the reasons which led them to what they did. Every great general has confessed his debt to the
soldiers of antiquity.
XXIV.
CESAR'S AEMY.
legionary was no longer a citizen-soldier, as in the Punic wars
;
he
was a
professional, or
a mercenary.
He
served for a livelihood, not as a duty.
;
The
legion was no longer set
in
was marshaled
to six
up in three lines according to property rating it two or three lines of cohorts, the cohort being a body of four
qualities,
hundred men, ranked according to military
legion.
and ten cohorts
;
went to the
The men
retained substantially the old equipment
five.
they
occupied in line a space of but three feet front instead of
The
intervals
between cohorts had sensibly decreased. The camp and camp-followers, musicians, standards and petty details of all kinds remained much as before. Light troops and cavalry were recruited from conquered tribes. Each legion had six
tribunes
who commanded
it
in turn
under a legate.
The
general staff of the
army had quartermasters, aides, engineers, lictors, scouts and a body-guard. The legionary's pay was about .that of a day-laborer, but largesses and booty
were bountiful.
readily ployed into column or deployed into line.
For defense, the legion or army formed square or circle. It The orders of march were
observed.
accurately laid
down and well
train
The average march was about
fif-
teen miles.
The
was
less
long than ours, there being neither artillery nor
;
ammunition.
attacked, as had always been
For battle the army was drawn up on the slope of a hill it still its habit. The legion of the Punic war was good
;
because the
men were good
Caesar's
was
effective because
he was able.
THE
tactical
formation of
the early
Roman army was
described in the volume on Hannibal.
in this tactical formation
Considerable changes
had taken place since the Punic
wars; some were introduced by Marius, or by Caesar as a
consequence of his campaigns.
The Roman
soldier as to
arms, equipment and minor tactics, was
to all intents
and
purposes the same as he had been in the time of Hannibal. He still wore helmet, cuirass, and greave on right leg; he
still
bore spear, shield and sword.
But
in character, quality
CAESAR'S LEGION.
and
discipline,
353
of that day.
if
He was
he was no longer the splendid citizen-soldier a professional if a Roman a merce;
a foreigner; and as such he was exactly what his nary similar change had obtained in commander made him.
the officers.
The
six tribunes of
a legion were no longer
appointed for their military qualifications or long service,
but claimed their rank on the score of political or social
standing, or of friendship for the chief.
The
original smaller tactical unit of the
It next
Romans had been
the century.
became the maniple of two centuries. Later the three maniples of the hastati, principes and triarii,
with some cavalry and velites, were merged into one body called a cohort. But the name alone remained. Under
Ca3sar the cohort was no longer the ancient one, but a body
the evolution of which has
already been traced.
It
was
It was practically the divided only for the smaller details. tactical unit of the legion, and all manoauvres were by
cohorts.
The
three-class
formation of
each
cohort
had
entirely disappeared.
It seems odd, with all that has
tactics
been written about
to
Roman
legion,
and organization from Polybius
the
Vegetius and
Onosander, that
cohort, maniple tion
exact
structure of
Caesar's
The addiand century cannot be given. of a few words in some paragraphs would elucidate the
difficulties
as the omission of the
we encounter in construing these authors. But, name of some single well-known spot
rise to endless discussion as to
by Polybius has given
Hanni-
bal's route across the Alps, so a certain lapse in explanation
in all the Latin authors
who
treat of tactics has produced
many
different views as to the details of organization of
legion.
Caesar's
Particularly Riistow,
Goler
and
Stoffel
have discussed the matter au fond.
But they disagree on
many
points.
354
ANCIENT COHORT.
of the cohort, according to Riistow, stood
still
The maniples
beside each other; according to Goler
other.
It
in rear of each
seems much more probable
are given a
that they stood in line ; the manreuvres,
HASTATI
of which
we
more or
alone
less
detailed account,
PRINCIPM
can thus
be
readily understood.
to
make
a deep
Goler 's plan tends file, whereas the ten-
VEUTC8
dency was to make the line of battle less rather than more deep as time wore
on.
If beside each other, the maniples
to
TOTAL
flORCC
4SO MCN
would have come to stand from right
though these
left: pilani (ancient triarii), principes,
0000000000'
hastati,
dis-
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tinctions gradually
disap-
oooooooooooaoooooooo o S29SS2 OOO OOOOOQOOO HASTAfl OO OOoGOO ooooooOOOO OOOOO I OOOOO OOoOOOO SOOOCOoOoQOOOOO iOOoOQOOOO OOOOO pp, INCHES oooooooo
peared.
The
cohort which
op-
00OOOOOOOOOOOOOOCOOOOOOOCOOO
posed Hannibal was formed of three maniples or companies,
300QOOOOOOOOOOOOQOOODO OOOO OOOO OOOOO \lf\ lTf5 oooooooooooo oSooO VtUlt<
each
maniple
in
Early Cohorts.
two centuries or platoons, and the maniples standing
in xear of each other with intervals between hastati, prin-
HASTATI
o
PRINCIPES
L ATM
ooooo QOooooooooooooooooodooo oooo 00,0006 OOOOOOOOOOOO OOQOOOOOOOOO OOOOOOO OOOOO oooooo oooooo oooooooooooo oooooooooooo ,000000000 o.O o oooooooooooo *QOOOOOO'OOOOO OOOOOOOOOOOO OOOOO.o OOOOOO V OOOOOOOOOOOO ooooooo 00000000000000000060000000 000006 oooooooooooo oooooooooooo 'oooooo ooooo oooo oo.o ooooo ^oooooooooooo _o "ooooooooo oo o OOOOOOOOOOOO OOOOOOOOOOOO ''OOOOOOO OOOOO .OOOOOOOOOOOO OOOOOOOOOOOO. OOOOO OOOOOOO
Caesar's Cohort.
cipes, triarii,
disposed.
The
and with cavalry and light troops conveniently cohort with which Caesar conquered the world
CESAR'S COHORT.
was a body of three maniples, each in two centuries (prdines) and the maniples standing- side by side without intervals.
ordo comprised the front five ranks of the maniOr if the cohort the rear five ranks. ple, the second ordo was set up in eight ranks, there were four in each century.
The
first
The normal numerical
force of Caesar's legions cannot be
determined with the accuracy of the legions of the Punic At times they had five or even six thousand men at wars.
;
Pharsalus they had been reduced by service to an average Riistow construes of but twenty-seven hundred and fifty.
the various authorities to give the legion an average field
strength of thirty-six hundred
eight hundred.
men; Gbler puts
it
at forty-
This latter
is
perhaps nearer the normal
force, not often reached in time of war.
Ten
cohorts composed the legion.
If
the
cohorts
had
three hundred and sixty men, ten deep, there would be If eight deep, which was not thirty-six men in each rank.
unlikely the usual case, and at Pharsalus probably so, there
would be forty -five men in each rank. If these thirty-six men in close order for the march or parade or column of
up three feet each in breadth and six feet in and there was six feet between maniples, the size of a depth cohort would be one hundred and twenty feet front by sixty
assault took
feet depth.
If there
were forty -five men in rank and eight
in
file,
the size of a cohort would be, in close order, with say
seven and a half feet between maniples, one hundred and
fifty feet front
by
fifty feet
depth.
But
three feet front was not sufficient to enable the legion-
ary to hurl his pilum or use his gladius to advantage. There was therefore an open order of battle. This was either
taken by each odd-numbered
man
stepping three feet for-
ward
to gain arm-room, or to right or left
more
likely each
rank deployed
by a face
from the centre and took distance
356
as needed.
FIELD STRENGTH.
This doubled the front of a cohort.
there must have
On
this
latter supposition
been,
in
close
order,
intervals between cohorts equal to their front so as to provide for deployment; in open order after there
deployment
would be no intervals at
all.
Taking the eight-deep formation, with close-order intervals equal to cohort front added, the cohort would occupy, in
open or in close order, three hundred
depth.
vals, it
feet front
by
fifty
Taking the ten-deep formation, equally with inter-
would occupy two hundred and forty
feet front
by
sixty feet depth.
Eiistow makes calculations on the average strength of a
legion in active service being thirty-six hundred men.
At
ooooooooooo 06 000000000000
OOOOOO OOOOO
Ilerda, Caesar tells us that a
ridge, well identified to-day,
certain
if
was wide
O j
ooooooooooo o. OOOOOO OOOOOO** 0000000000006
ooooooooooo
ooo'oo'o'o'o'ooo'o'E'
o5
enough for three cohorts in
ri dge,
1
line.
j/1
The
1
says Kustow, measures three hun-
13 "
a.
dred and Sixtv feet in Width-Which
gives one hundred and twenty feet front
to a cohort
tervals.
oooooo oooooo**
as they stood without in-
But the
actual width of the
This vitiates the descends to the plain. the deduction is not far from correct. calculation, though
ridge varies as
it
may fairly assume the average front of Caesar's cohort without intervals as one hundred and twenty to one hundred
and
fifty feet,
We
and the cohort as commonly numbering not
over three hundred and sixty
men during
his campaigns.
Each maniple had two centurions, a senior and a junior, and to each centurion there was a sub -centurion. These,
like our
company
officers, all
served on foot.
its
The
senior
like
centurion of the cohort was
commander.
While,
the non-commissioned officers of
modern armies, the
cen-
turions could not rise in rank beyond their
own
grade, and
MUSIC AND TRAIN.
357
while their duties were assimilated to these, they more nearly
approached, in the extent of their command, our company officers than our sergeants. oooooooooooooooooooo 6 Their relative rank in the OOOOOOOO OQOOOOOOOOOO
legion
was
well
deter-
mined.
The music and
ards of
legions
stand-
the
cohorts and
were
much
OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOQOOOO OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO oooooooooooooooooooo oo ooooooooooooooooo 06 OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO oooooooooooooooooooo OOOOOOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO
Maniple of 200 Men.
like
those of the Punic wars.
Each maniple had an ensign; each cohort an
dier's
eagle.
The
baggage consisted of pack-train (impedimenta) and the solown load (sarcince), which Cicero says was sixty
a possible pounds in addition to his armor and weapons, maximum. Sutlers (mercatores) were the only persons acThe tents were of companying the army who used carts.
skins,
ten feet square.
of
Each
tent could accommodate ten
men,
probably be on duty. centurion had a tent; the camp-followers must be
tered;
whom two would
Each
shel-
the
higher
officers
had servants
lesser.
and more tents than the
With
tools for intrenching, tent-poles
and pegs
and the usual baggage carried, Riistow estimates five hundred and twenty sumpter-mules for a field legion of thirty-six
hundred men, or one animal for every seven men. This was all there was to the
pack-train,
and
is
invented
forked
not far astray. Marius stick or pole (muli
in carrying the
rations, cloth-
Mariani) for convenience
sarcinse.
The bundles
were tied to
of
Muli Mariani.
ing, etc.,
this,
and
it
was
borne on the shoulder.
The
ration for fifteen days, grain
358
TRIBUNES.
unground, weighed probably twenty-five pounds. The rest of the kit, armor, etc., much more than doubled this load. Cicero's estimate may be considered high.
The
allied legions of old times
had
:
all
disappeared.
;
i^:n^-n^ i^ M^ i-^ H^'F^
:
:
m n^
;
Legion
in
One
Line.
legion no longer
meant one Roinan and one
It
allied legion, or
ten thousand men.
In place of the
allied
meant simply a body of ten cohorts. legions there was a larger force than
of
light
theretofore
troops
armed
like
legionaries, but less heavily,
and consid-
The erably more bowmen and slingers. light troops had a leather jerkin but
no armor, and carried the round shield
(parma) instead of the cylindrical scutum. The bowmen and slingers wore no armor
at all.
The
of two.
six tribunes
were divided into
sets
Each
set
com-
manded
~~
the legion for
tri-
two months, the two
Light- Armed Man.
bunes alternating daily, after the odd Roman
only
fashion, which
among them
could
work without destroying all idea of disciThe four tribunes off duty acted pline.
much
of
as quartermasters, commissaries or
aides de
camp do
in
modern
times.
All
them served mounted.
To be
sure that
each legion should not suffer from the divided command, a legate was put in su-
Legionary ready tor
Battle.
preme
supervisory control.
Later Ca3sar
GENERAL STAFF.
on duty probably acted as chief of
eral of a
staff
359
put him in actual command, and under him the two tribunes
and adjutant gen-
modern brigade.
staff of Caesar's
The general
army comprised
Legates, assigned by the Senate to the consul, and deriving their authority from him.
officers.
They were
the general
Caesar had one for each of his legions.
This was
the
first
time their duty had been made definite.
Quaestors,
or of an army.
general.
who superintended the The quaestor was a
business of a province
sort of quartermaster-
Contubernales and comites
aides, or
if
praetorii,
who were
volunteer
numerous a
sort of gentleman body-guard.
The Cohors
praetoria,
consisting of lictors,
secretaries,
marshals, spies, servants and orderlies.
Speculatores (scouts),
who
acted as vanguard and flankers
on the march,
each legion had ten,
and who were generimmediate circum-
ally sent out to reconnoitre.
We
must conclude that these
had placed under them such
stances called for.
details as the
The Body-guard, sometimes a small cavalry detachment, but principally evocati, veterans past duty years who remained voluntarily in service. Though footmen, they had
horses and servants, were highly honored, served near the
general,
and were put into places of trust. Fabrij or engineers, under a prcefectus fabrorum, of whom mention has already been made. They were used to repair
weapons, construct bridges, siege -mounds and towers, and Caesar had generally do the engineering work of the army.
some very able engineers.
Antesignani, thought by some historians to have been a select body of a few men from each cohort, for service in
delicate cases requiring skill
and experience.
They
carried
360
OFFENSIVE FORMATION.
no baggage, and from them were often selected the centuBut it is not improbable that the antesignani were rions.
actually what their
name
designates; that in each maniple
they formed the
first
was carried
in the second
two ranks, to protect the ensign, which rank and that they were thus a
;
quarter or a fifth of the entire body.
Some
events, as at
Herda, lead up to this belief.
The pay
of
Caesar's legionaries
was two hundred and
This was about
twenty-five denarii (forty dollars) a year.
the pay of a day-laborer.
His rations and clothing were
deducted from his pay,
increased
it.
but booty and largesses greatly His ration is variously stated to have been
from one
to three pecks of wheat, or other grain, a
month;
which was probably supplemented by beef, and such vegetables and fruit as the foragers could find.
The
offensive formation of the legion
four lines (acies
5
duplex, triplex
*
was in two, three or or quadruplex). In two
rm rm
AO'
rrn
8 7
nm rm
2.
9
_
EED
lines there
era
an cm
.
rrn
Legion
in
Two
Lines.
were
five cohorts in each,
standing checkerwise.
In three
which was usual, four cohorts were in the first and three in each of the others, also checkerwise. Intervals
lines,
between cohorts in battle order
are,
by many commentators,
;
said to have been equal to the cohort front
but though this
is
was true of the era of the Punic wars, there
to doubt such intervals in Caesar's time.
much room
doubt there
No
was an
that
is,
interval, especially
when the men stood
in close order,
three feet apart; but the quincuncial formation, whose
C&SAR'S LEGION.
intervals
361
must be equal to the front of the bodies and so remain in battle, had tended to disappear by gradual decrease
of the intervals.
What
these actually were at this time
we
do not know.
They may have been prescribed
4
I
in the Drill
Regulations, and used on
parade ; but
probable that in action they were
often reduced to a mini-
it is
Mil
^
I
I
I
III
mum.
The
best explana-
rrn
.
tion of which the involved
rm cm
5
statements of the old authorities are capable
seems
10
to
be
the
one
already
LLLJ
LLU
Legion
LLU
'
given, that in close (threefoot) order
" Three Lines
cohort front;
there were intervals between cohorts equal to and in open or battle (six-foot) order, these
intervals were quite filled up.
As
the third line was apt to
be held in reserve and in close order, a legion in battle order would have the first two lines deployed, i. e,, without intervals between cohorts
and the third
line ployed into close
order with intervals equal to cohort front.
CLOSC
10
'
ORDER
Caesar's Legion.
The
lines
were some one hundred and
is
fifty feet apart,
though this distance
also disputed.
This would give, in
362
DEFENSIVE FORMATION.
an eight-rank formation, about four hundred and fifty feet depth and ten hundred and fifty feet front for a legion in The weight of such a legion was, therefore, three lines.
very great, and
still
its
mobility was well preserved.
The
had twenty-eight men per metre of front line. The legion of the Second Punic War and Caesar's era had eleven men. The modern army has not far from seven.
phalanx of Alexander
An
army
of seven legions
field strength
in three
lines
twenty -five
less
thousand
men
would take up somewhat
than a mile and a half of front.
The
defensive formation of 'the legion was in one line
(acies simplex), or in
(prbis).
7
a square (acies quadrata), or a
circle
The one
6
line
5
was usual for the defense of breast*
3
JL
CJI)C}
t)[IEl
Clt]C)
tlClcS
pClJ
(3C)f)
in
Cll|[)
|[3C1
IJ[)I)
tICJC3
C1[ICI
C)[J()
C)(DI]
Seven Legions
Three Lines.
works or of the camp, depth being unnecessary, as reserves were kept for the protection of the gates and for
sorties.
The
five front
ranks were on the rampart without
at
intervals, the five rear ones
the
foot of the rampart.
Sometimes only two ranks were on the rampart and the
three other ranks of the ordo back of
it in
reserve, while the
rear ordo of five ranks was similarly disposed at the left of the front ordo. The space allowed for the usual defensive
line
was
six feet per
man; or with only ordo depth and
^
assuming that the centurions were not in line, two hundred
and sixteen
two
feet for the maniple,
four hundred and thirty-
feet, four fifths of
and forty-three hundred and twenty a mile, for the legion. single line disposition was sometimes practiced to resist attacks in the
feet for the cohort,
THE
field,
ORBIS.
its
363
but the cohort retained
feet,
front of about one hundred
and twenty
and the
intervals being closed, the legion
had but twelve hundred
the orbis was,
feet front. It
How much
of a circle
we do not know.
was formed for defense in
the field against overwhelming and surrounding forces.
resist
To
such an attack, the cohorts drew up in what was the Smaller bodies might form equivalent of our hollow square.
circular groups, using their shields
and hurling
their spears
and occasionally
falling to with the sword.
Were
not the
hollow square also described we should be tempted to believe that the orbis was the same formation.
A legion in three
ing the
first,
lines could readily
form square by leav-
second and
third cohorts facing to the front;
by
facing the fifth and sixth to the right ; the fourth and
seventh to the
to the rear.
and by facing the eighth, ninth and tenth The term orbis may have come from the natleft,
ural habit of flattening out the corners of such a square for
easier defense. It is difficult to imagine the mano3uvre by which a legion ployed into anything approaching an actual circle and again deployed into line. It may have been an
irregular half -square, half -circle, according to the accentuation of the
ground or
to the conditions
demanding a defen-
sive formation.
On
rare occasions there was a quadruple line.
The fourth
was intended to protect a flank and might consist of some cohorts specially detailed and marshaled at an angle to the Such was Caesar's disposition at Pharsalus. general line.
The
auxiliary troops were drilled to conform to the
same
methods.
They had not the cohort formation, but they were
utilized so as to sustain the legionary tactics,
velites of old
much
as the
had been.
The bowmen and
slingers
were
mere skirmishers having no definite tactical position. In the cavalry, the turma of thirty-two enlisted men was
364
the tactical unit.
CAVALRY FORMATION.
It rode in four ranks of eight front.
It
has been thought that the ranks were P en so tnat the men stood checkerwise.
There were three decurions to
each turma, the senior being its chief. The turma must have been a body
about forty feet square, reckoning
crudely five feet front and ten feet
Turma.
depth per mounted man. Twelve turmae were an ala (wing) or regiin
ment, which
may have been formed
two (or three)
lines,
each say four hundred and forty (or two hundred and eighty)
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between
turma3, which were more essential in the cavalry than the
infantry.
The cavalry was commanded by a
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Ala
turn.
in
Three Lines.
must guess
In larger bodies, in which the cavalry often acted, we at the formation. It no doubt, at this era, con-
ORDER OF MARCH.
365
formed much to the habits of the peoples furnishing the troops, modified by Roman experience and the necessities of
the army.
ing.
Caesar had no
all recruited
Roman
cavalry, properly speak-
It
was
among
the Gauls or Germans.
The order The
of
the legion to
march (agmeri) was quickly formed by facing the right or left, according as it was to move.
If to the
cohorts thus followed each other in order.
right, the maniples of each cohort would be pilani, principes,
hastati ;
if
to the left, the reverse.
The depth
of the
file,
i.
on
e.,
facing to the right or left,
eight or ten
would be column
front,
could comfortably march in a breadth of three feet each, this front could be reduced to
as the
men; and
men
twenty -four or thirty feet by simply dressing on the front rank man ; or by making each second ordo fall in behind its first,
this could
be again reduced to fifteen or twelve feet front.
PRIN
PlL
HAS
'.'.'.
3>
Aginen Manipulating
It
was a "column of
in
fives or fours."
This was called
column of maniples (manlpulatim). The marching in column of maniples could then file in any legion
direction.
Or
the legion could
march
in
column of centuries
(centuriatim or ordinatim) by the maniple on the right or left marching straight forward, followed in
order by each succeeding maniple. In this order each cohort would march with its centuries in regular sequence: first ordo of pilani, second ditto; first
;
4-
ordo of principes, second ditto first ordo of hastati, second ditto. In other words, the centuries (prdines) would succes-
366
DEPLOYMENTS.
This column would have a front
sively follow each other.
of twelve
men
if
the cohort had only field strength;
t
PI i
but
we can imagine
full
it
ployed into
a "column of sixes."
In
its
width
it
was employed
p*
Few only in open country. roads would accommodate so
wide a column.
Line
1
was
again
quickly
formed from column by conjust
H 4 verse means,
to-day.
as
it
is
Deployments
were
left
sometimes made by the
instead of the right, as,
e.
g.,
when
HAS
PIUN
circumstances
would
PL
expose the right flank, which, with the shield on the left
Agmen
Centuriatim.
arm,
it
will
be remembered,
was considered the weak or open side (latus apertum). Thus, in debouching from a defile, to deploy at its mouth, the col-
umn might
exposed.
issue left in front,
and deploy
to the right of the
leading century or cohort.
The open
side
would not be thus
The men could
from front to
readily
march each
in a space of four feet
rear.
cohort of field strength (three hun-
dred and sixty men) would thus take up, in length of column, if marching centuriatim, full front, one hundred and
twenty feet; half front, two hundred and forty manipulatim, and the men kept
as they could for short distances,
feet.
If
their distance of" three feet,
it
would be one hundred
and eight
allow each
feet long;
if
the column was extended so as to
it
man
four feet,
would be one hundred and
hundred and four
fifty-
two feet long in
full front, three
feet in
MARCHES.
half front.
It scarcely
its
367
seems probable that the column could
length out so
be allowed to drag
required by the line of battle.
much beyond the space But marches then were gov-
erned by the condition of the roads as they are to-day, and
it
was, no doubt, difficult to keep the column closed up.
The
legion could
march
in
line
(acies
instructd);
in
column (agmen pilatuni); in square (agmen quadratum).
10
i-
By
Lines to the Eight.
The march
was only employed on the battlefield and had the same advantages and disadvantages, saving the
in line
absence of artillery, as it has to-day. lines wished to take ground to
the right, and
line of battle,
it
If the legion in three
A
still
remain, in
|U
fl*
*
fl 1
could do so by
facing the whole body to the
right
/M
/
/
/
'
'
and marching the three columns so made as far as desired.
U
y
rs
By
a halt and front the
line of battle
was again formed
This enabled a
A
!
in three lines.
/,'
.'
legion to change
its
position ob' '
liquely without great difficulty.
i
If
the
it
line
was on
difficult
i
,/,
Y/
i.
X *;
.
S
'
t/'
y /
ground
could advance by col-
/
\
/
9
umn
of wings (cornu).
The
right
/
Front
wing would have cohorts 1, 5, 8; the centre would have cohorts 2, 6, 9
;
By Wings
to the
the left wing would have cohorts 4, 3, 7, 10.
368
COLUMN OF MARCH.
of these
Each
would march by the flank and
file
file
to the front,
like our
forward by the right of companies.
its right.
On
halting,
each cohort would
to its proper place in line
and dress
forward on
In marching in column the cohorts followed each other according to number (No. 1 to No. 10 from right to left).
Thus marching centuriatim gave the legion, with an interval of twenty feet between cohorts, some fourteen hundred feet
of length ; if doubled up, twenty-six
hundred
feet.
The baggage-train
of a legion Riistow has estimated at five
hundred and twenty pack-animals. In a breadth of forty feet eight animals could go abreast, which gave sixty -five ranks
or allowing ten feet for each, six hundred and fifty feet for the pack-train, or thirteen hundred feet if doubled
of
;
them
on a road twenty feet wide. Thus the marching length of a legion of thirty-six hundred men, with its train, was not
far
from two thousand
feet, or
doubled, four thousand feet,
If the legion
say three quarters of a mile.
was marching
manipulatim
in
"column of
fives," the cohorts would take
up over three thousand feet, and with baggage added would stretch out somewhat more on a bad road, a full mile.
;
In presence of the enemy, or in line of battle, the troops were drilled to ploy into column or deploy back into line, to
march by the right or left flank, to the front or rear, much The drill-ground or battlefield maas modern armies do.
noeuvres of a legion were almost identical in principle and performance with our own, the variation relating mainly to
the greater depth of the
Roman
lines, the difference in
arms
and the absence of
civil
artillery.
The manoeuvres
of one of our
war brigades, in a line of battalion -columns doubled on the centre, would not be much unlike those of a legion. The legion in presence of the enemy also marched, when
the ground permitted, in a sort of square formed
by a van
TO FORM SQUARE.
369
and rear with baggage between, and heavy flanking columns The square was quickly formed on each side of the train.
for the
march from the legion
to to
in line.
Cohorts
1,
2 and 3
left in
\
kept straight on.
front so as
Cohorts 5 and 6 formed column
face
when coming horts 4 and
right in front.
a front.
outwardly Co-
formed column
Cohorts
8,
9 and
10 formed line to the rear, and
then broke by the right of cohorts or maniples to the rear
and
marched
These
behind
the
last
were
then
baggage. in such
10
order as readily to form line to the rear and complete the square.
-D
The baggage was thus
in the centre;
its
inclosed
length might somewhat modify the formation
of
the marching
square.
We
I I
i i
hear of the
Roman army march-
cm
b
5
ing over what we know must have been very difficult ground
in this formation.
It is not to
dZl CUD
10
be presumed that accurate order was preserved when the ground
ii
ii
11
ii
ii
in
II I
BAGGAGE
I
II II I
was wooded or much cut up.
Caesar
is
II
II
as perfectly exact in
March Forward
in Square.
his use of terms to describe these manoauvres as if writing
a book of
tactics.
And
the
Roman
"drill-regulations" had
been established for generations and modified only as reStill there are many quirements from age to age dictated.
minor points which cannot be positively elucidated. The cavalry wings of four hundred men marched by turmaB
370
THE DAY'S MARCH.
forty feet wide, taking up, without baggage, nearly five hundred feet length of column. The train probably added
half as
much.
The ranks
of the turmse
column were
also
doubled in narrow ways, just how is not known. They must often have been obliged to reduce front and thus lengthen
A body of four thousand horse, such as Ca3sar had in Gaul, with baggage, would take up, in simple column, nearly a mile and a half doubled up, three miles.
the column.
;
All this was naturally subject to precisely the same culties which are encountered by every army in the
diffi-
field.
And
the more
wooded and broken the
"
territory the less
to.
accurately could the "tactics
be conformed
In Gaul,
no doubt, there was constant and great deviation from the
regulations.
The day's march
(iter)
was reckoned from camp to camp.
day of
rest
marches.
Each
was customary after every three or four night,- or whenever a stop was made, the
This intrenching practically took the
in their rear.
camp was
The
fortified.
place of our outpost system, besides being something else.
legions usually fought with
their
camp
If they
came across the enemy on the march, they stopped,
half the
men
fortified
them, placed the baggage in
day's march was from
a camp, while the others protected it and then fought, provided,
indeed, they could so long fend off the enemy.
The ordinary
fifteen to eighteen miles, theoretically
five
supposed to be done in
summer
hours, nearly seven of
ours, generally from early morning to noon, there being thus
enough time
left for
camping.
The
step tyradus)
was two and one half Roman
feet long;
the route step one hundred to the minute ; the quick step one
hundred and twenty. This is about our own standard. pace (passus) was two steps, from right heel to right
'
The
heel.
The Roman
foot
was nine tenths
of ours.
EXCEPTIONAL MARCHES.
The average Roman
than
371
march was no greater that of modern
days.
Some
excepre-
tional
marches were
S
CUARQ
markable.
Caesar left
Gergovia at daybreak to move on Litavicus,
I o
G D
MAIN
ti
marched
twenty
miles,
five
Roman
struck
him and brought him to reason the same day,
marched back twentyfive miles, and the next
day reached Gergovia
before
legions
D D
D
BODY
daybreak,
the
having rested three hours during the
twenty -four,
and
six
.
D D D
more having been consumed in watching the
enemy under arms. The
only superior
to
this
march which
quickly recalled
can
is
be
that
BAG
CAGE
of the Spartans to
Ma-
rathon,
one
hundred
and
fifty miles in three
days.
Crassus marched
QC3 R EAR, D
C3
G
to join Caesar,
who was
assist-
O cb
UARO
ti
moving
ance
of
to
the
Cicero,
and
to
made from midnight
Army
on the March.
372
VAN AND REARGUARD.
Roman
miles.
nine A. M. twenty-five
In the Zeta
raid,
Caesar's legions marched
thirty-six miles from before day-
break to nightfall, capturing a town and fighting four hours We do not know just what periods in retreat on the way.
of rest were
allowed during the day's march.
We
rest
usually ten minutes every hour.
On
occasion marches were
made without baggage.
It goes without
saying that the
Roman marches were
culties
subject to the
in rivers
and delays as our own. were as common in Gaul as in Mexico or Virginia. vanguard (primuni agmeri) was usual, and consisted of
same interruptions, diffiMuddy roads and freshets
the bulk of the cavalry and light troops, scouts, staff-officers
and camp men supported by some cohorts without baggage. The main body followed. A guard brought up the rear. The duty of the van was to attack and hold the enemy, if met, so
main body to form to reconnoitre the front and advance flanks; to select and stake out a camp. The
as to enable the
;
cavalry Caesar sometimes kept with the main body when he did not deem it reliable, or when one of the flanks had to be
protected from danger of attack.
Light troops alone were used as vanguard when the cavalry was on other duty. The rearguard (agmen extremuni) in marches towards the
enemy had no duties except to keep order column and pick up stragglers.
at the tail of the
simple column or in battle order by the flank, according as the enemy was far or near, or the land was friendly or inimical. An army of five
in
legions, with baggage, eighteen to twenty thousand
told, took, in a forty -foot wide order,
The main body marched
from two
to
men, all two and a
In
this
half miles of length, with ranks doubled twice as
practice, the column was
much.
much more strung out than
when
the roads were not good.
of presence of the
Out
enemy, the train of each legion
FLANK MARCHES.
;
373
accompanied it for greater convenience in his presence, the When moving on the train was kept together in one body.
of the main army enemy, the bulk say three quarters was in front, then 'the train, then the remainder as baggage and rearguard.
distance.
In battle order the legions were not intended to march any This order was used only in the immediate vicinity
of the enemy.
When
Caesar
is
moved against
supposed to
the Usipetes
and Tenchtheri, each legion
have marched
ployed into three columns at deploying distance. There were thus fifteen parallel columns for the five legions. The
whole could at once deploy forward into line. The legionaries had their helmets on, their shields uncovered and their
weapons ready; the baggage had been left in the camp. We remember that on the march the legionary had his helmet hanging on his chest, his shield in a case, and his
plumes, and other insignia of rank or corps, wrapped up. If suddenly attacked the men must lay down their baggage,
prepare and put on their badges and get ready their weapons. At the river Sabis the Romans had to fight without this
preparation.
The marches
ples,
were conducted on reverse princiwith similar precautions. The baggage went with the
in retreat
vanguard, followed by the bulk of the army; then came a The marches in squares were made strong rearguard.
through an enemy's territory, or in times of insurrection, or when the enemy was on every side. Sometimes the square was composed of the whole army; sometimes each
legion marched in square.
every front of such a square, slingers were thrown out as skirmishcavalry, The baggage was in the centre of the one large square, ers. or that of the legion in the centre of each legionary square.
On
bowmen and
Flank marches were made in
battle order, with
baggage
374
BRIDGES AND FORDS.
on the side opposite the enemy, or between the lines if there were more than one. Such marches were not usually made In the open field the legions so for any great distance.
marching were protected by flankers.
might serve to protect the column.
In a valley a stream
Caesar marched up the Elaver in battle order by the flank for several days. The order of march was changed daily, to equalize the
Caesar's legions crossed rivers with
to the waist, breast
;
labor of the legionaries.
ease,
wading fords
up
and even neck.
They carried no ammunition their armor and weapons could not be spoiled. Bridges took as a rule too long to
build; Caesar preferred fords
when
available.
If the river
was deep and the current rapid, a line of cavalry was stationed above and below, the first in an oblique line to
break the current, the last to catch men who were carried down. Fords were now and then passed in line of battle, as
at the
Thames.
Bridges were as quickly built as to-day. The absence of pontoon -trains was no apparent hindrance. They were built
of boats picked
up along the
river,
as often as on piles;
whichever was at the moment handier.
in the Gallic
But once did Caesar
War cross
a river directly in the face of the
enemy.
This was the Thames.
Bridgeheads usually pro-
tected both ends of a bridge.
Caesar kept to the uniform ancient habit of drawing up his legions for battle on the gentle slope of a hill, so that they
might have the advantage of the descent for casting their The utmost pila as well as for the rush upon the enemy.
reliance
was put upon the
initiative so as to
make
the
first
shock a telling one when possible.
The
legions were
wont
to
await the advance of the enemy to within two hundred and fifty paces (if, indeed, he would advance), then at the
common
step to
move upon him, and when within
half this
METHOD OF FIGHTING.
space to take the run (cursus).
375
The
distance
was not great
first
enough to wind the men, even in their heavy armor. The two ranks held their spears aloft in readiness and hurled
at ten to twenty paces
sufficient
them
from the enemy.
If the volley
produced
gaps, falling to with
the
sword
the
legionaries would penetrate into these and have the enemy at their mercy. In case the enemy was brave and determined,
the legions often remained longer at javelin-casting distance
and used
their spears only, the rear ranks advancing through
the front ranks to hurl their pila in their turn.
The ten
ranks could thus deliver
exhausted which, the
five
first line of
heavy volleys of javelins, having cohorts drew the sword or
its
allowed the second line to advance in
turn.
It
sometimes
occurred that the enemy was so rapid as to leave no time to hurl the pila, and the legionaries set to at once with the
gladius.
But
this
was
rare.
The
light
troops kept the
fighting line
supplied with javelins, collected from those
hurled at
pila,
it.
Or
at
would
again the two first lines, after casting their once close in with the sword. When
exhausted they would allow the next two ranks to come forward, hurl their pila and use the sword; and thus the
ranks worked successively, hours being often consumed in this array of duels between the individuals of each fighting
line.
The
shield.
old legionary always pushed his
enemy with
his bossed
He
sometimes fight
was so well armed and so expert that he could He all day without receiving a wound.
was physically strong and could gradually force the enemy back in places by sheer pressure and thus make gaps into which he could penetrate with deadly effect. During battle, few legionaries were either killed or wounded, but when
one line broke, the other could cut
it
to pieces.
this
In case the enemy awaited the Roman advance,
was
376
INFANTRY AND CAVALRY.
the backward ones in such a
conducted in similar manner.
by
never-ceasing motion in their pila in their turn advanced to hurl them ; yet there was no loss of formation, as the space occupied by each man gave
The first ranks were sustained manner that there was a each cohort as those who still held
cohort.
ample room to advance and retire within the body of the The second and third lines remained at a suitable two hundred
feet or more,
distance in the rear,
ready to
its
support the front line by advancing into or through
vals.
interfirst
The second
line
was ordered forward when the
line ceased to gain
a perceptible advantage over the enemy.
the third at the
All the lines gradually came into action,
critical
moment.
legion in Caesar's time excelled because he
It
The
head.
was
at its
was not without
its
disadvantages.
The
soldiery
was brave and well
disciplined, but the
Roman army was
not independent of terrain.
slingers
The work
of the skirmishers,
and bowmen, of the auxiliaries, and of the veteran antesignani did not always chime in with that of the legions.
The two kinds
and had
of infantry
would sometimes
clash,
owing
to
their different formation.
to be strengthened
The cavalry was
by bodies
often inefficient,
of light infantry placed
This infantry, when the shock with the enemy's horse came, could inflict serious damage on it. It helped to steady the movements of the
in the intervals of the turmae.
turmae, while
protected at the same time from being run
cavalry.
down by the enemy's
is
it
one of the most ancient of devices.
This mixing cavalry and foot In a modified form
service-
has survived to our day. able, but at its very best
The Roman cavalry was
it
was not cavalry, such as were
fact,
Alexander's Companions or the squadrons of Seidlitz. The real battle was fought out by the legions. In
the legions could be independent of any other troops.
Cav-
THEIR DUTIES.
airy could attack cavalry
;
377
;
it
could cut up broken infantry
but unbroken cohorts could not be successfully attacked by cavalry except in flank. By a front attack, steady infantry
could drive cavalry in every instance. During battle, cavThe alry was useful only against the enemy's squadrons.
cavalry and skirmishers were chiefly of use in outpost and
reconnoitring duties and in pursuit.
In actual
battle, the
it
Since Alexander's day, cavalry was not much Employed. will be seen, cavalry had degenerated.
The
cohorts were all-sufficient.
When
Still
cavalry and light
difficulty in
troops were not on hand, the legions found no
doing
all
the
work themselves.
if
they relied
on the
cavalry and
light troops,
present, to protect their flanks
In case there was grave danger of a flank attack, especially on the right, a fourth line was more than once made by Caesar, the duty of which it was to stand near
while fighting.
and defend the threatened quarter.
Habitually the line of cohorts in each legion was threefold This arrangement in an army of six as before detailed.
legions in line would give twenty-four cohorts in the
line
first
and eighteen cohorts
It
in each of the others. to
The
till
third
was considered as a reserve not by the general.
of the legions,
go into action
Its
ordered
was on occasion used
and
to sustain the flanks
utility
or threaten the enemy's.
was
shown
at Bibracte
in the battle against Ariovistus.
curious feature of Caesar's formation, due probably to Marius,
was that the oldest and best cohorts were placed in the front This was the direct line, and the younger ones in the rear.
reverse of the principle which in the old legion
had ranked
the three class-lines as hastati, principes, triarii.
The cavalry was placed
it
as occasion required.
As a
rear, as
rule
was on the
flanks.
It
the case at Bibracte, because
might be posted in the it was not deemed
was
reliable,
and
378
CENTRE AND WINGS.
in the battle against Ariovistus because the barbarians were
protected in flank and rear by their wagons set up as defense, and cavalry against these was useless.
The
light troops
skirmishers.
were only available as a curtain or as In battle they were harmful rather than of use.
to have
They do not appear
eral duties.
ries supplied
been employed to open the
action as uniformly as in earlier days, but rather in collat-
But they
collected darts
and kept the legiona-
with them.
(acies media),
The
times
legates
battle
line
had a centre
wing (cornu dextrum, sinistrum).
first
and right and left The cavalry wings some-
in
command.
advanced; then legion after legion under the This was, as it were, an order of
with the centre withdrawn.
The
oldest
and most
If experienced legions were posted on the right and left. there were no prevailing reasons to the contrary, Caesar preferred to attack with his right in advance, where, like Alex-
ander, he was wont to take his stand.
species of oblique order of battle.
It
This resulted in a
result of
was more the
CaBsar's predilection for personally leading off in action than
a definite tactical oblique order, like that of Epaminondas, or as most perfectly exemplified by Frederick at Leuthen.
On
the signal being blown,
the
right
cohorts
at
It
once
advanced, those on their
left successively following.
was
not a tactical advance in echelon
with heavily reinforced
right flank, but a gradual rushing to battle of the cohorts
from right
wing.
to left.
In a measure
it
had similar
results.
The
best legions would naturally be stationed on the attacking
The
line of cohorts
its
part of
impinged upon the enemy only along front when there were intervals between the
cohorts ; and the
into these
enemy might and sometimes did penetrate intervals, and take the cohorts on the sensitive
ACTS OF A BATTLE.
right flank.
379
was always on the watch for just this thing, and v/as ready to correct the evil by a Cassar's probable formation, by which the vigorous onset.
line
But the second
cohorts deployed into a battle order without intervals, elimi-
nated this danger. During the fighting contact there was not only a succession of smaller shocks by the several ranks
of each cohort, but the
first,
second and third lines could
in
deliver their heavier blows
succession, following
each
other as the tired lines got rest from the advance of those in
rear.
A hard-fought field was one of incessant motion.
different acts of a battle
The
might be stated as
these.
Before the action opened unless it was precipitated the general rode the lines and made a short address (cohortatio)
to each of his legions, to rouse their martial
ardor.
He
then went to the attacking flank and gave the trumpet signal,
which was repeated down the line. The legions of the flank advanced with their battle-cry and the attacking
legions on their right or left successively
cies of
came on
in a spe-
rough echelon.
The
legions of the first line were
followed after a certain lapse of time, perhaps minutes, perhaps hours, by the second and third lines, the cavalry riding
forward at the same time to protect the flank or attack the the flank of when this was beaten enemy's cavalry, or
the infantry line.
When
the
first line
was exhausted, the
lines in rear replaced
them
in places or along the whole
front as ordered, and special bodies of troops were brought up to support decimated legions much as in our own days;
moving forward through
intervals
when
j;hese
existed, or
allowing the broken lines in front to fall irregularly through intervals specially opened for the purpose. Victory being
won, the cavalry pursued. Defeat ensuing, the legions withdrew to the fortified camp and re-formed there, the
general holding back the enemy with
his reserves or the
380
DEFENSIVE BATTLES.
and the cavalry.
legions least exhausted,
The
battles
of
remote antiquity were very different; the battles of Alexander, Hannibal and Caesar bear more resemblance, in a
general way, to our own. Defensive battles were not fought unless the terrain was
especially suitable.
The
flanks were then leaned on natural
obstacles, and the front was protected by wolf -pits or other If possible, the army backed on the camp, entanglements.
protected their flanks, and gave the enemy only one approach, in front and up a slope. The camp of Caesar on the Axona,
where he invited an attack, was a good sample of this. If the barbarians had crossed the morass in his front, they must have broken ranks in so doing, and Caesar could have
charged down on their phalanx with decisive effect, for his At Alesia, the fighting flanks were protected by ramparts.
was defensive, coupled with
the
sallies.
But
in the open field,
Roman
strength lay in attack, or in inviting attack
and
in meeting it halfway.
Gallic Buckler.
XXV.
CAMPS, SIEGES
IN camp the men had
tents,
AND
BALLISTICS.
which were carried in the column by pack-mules.
In winter-quarters the camps were larger and more carefully intrenched, but These latter could be intrenched in a few hours. similar to the daily camps.
Little change in fortification
to Caesar's.
The walls
;
of the Italian cities
and siege work took place from Alexander's era were by no means like those of
Babylon and Nineveh but they were high and well built, and much skill was put to defend and take them. The same sheds and screens for approaching
walls were used
;
mounds and towers were
up
built,
and the
lines of contra-
and
circumvallation were thrown
as of yore.
The
walls were undermined or
battered
sieger's works.
down by rams. Sorties were made by the garrison to destroy the beThe ballistic machines of the Romans do not strike UB as being
Still
as good as those of Alexander, whose field artillery was excellent and easily
transported.
there were small engines used on the walls of
Caesar's sieges
camps and
is
sometimes in
line of battle.
were expert
that of Alesia
one
of the finest of antiquity.
WE do not know exactly how Caesar's camps were laid out.
Polybius gives us the plan of the Roman camps in the Second Punic War; Hyginus gives us that of the time of the
Empire. As Riistow says, what is common to both was no doubt a constituent of Caesar's camp. Caesar's was presumably much the same as either, the changes relating merely to
the differences in organization of troops.
definite
Caesar had no
number
of
auxiliaries, as
was usual in the
War
against Hannibal, and the camp was calculated accordingly. Its general arrangement was what it had been for centuries.
was pitched on high ground, fronting down a slope, favorably near wood and water, and away from probable opportuIt
nity for ambush.
desirable place
was the slope towards
382
CAMP OF FIVE LEGIONS.
if
But the enemy lay beyond. Romans camped where they must, if the best site was not at hand, and the shape of the camp was modified by the ground.
a stream, particularly
the
camping party always went ahead to select and stake out camp, and the legionaries pitched and intrenched it in
the course of a few
hours, while the cav-
alry
posts.
served as out-
Each
was
its
legion
it
and cohort as
L.
ar-
ECAT.
"1^1
TR
coifs
rived
marched
appointed
(
-lo
VIA PRlNClPALlS
M
{ )
into
place, the detail for
guard was
-oJ-
selected,
the baggage was laid
STAFF
PRXtTORIu
down, the weapons,
except
the
01*
sword,
A au
NTANA
AUX
AUX
put aside. The camp was then fortified,
and the tents
I
after-
5"
y j
wards put up. If the weather was stormy the tents were put
Caesar's
Camp.
up
first.
Then
the
troops took supper,
the officers assembled for orders, and
much
the same routine
was gone through which has been described in a previous
volume.
which the
The fortifications took the place of outpost-duty, Romans did not practice in our sense. In the im-
mediate presence of the enemy the work would be done by the third line, the two first being sent out to protect the
fatigue party; or
by the second
line if only two, the first
standing in line in front, ready to meet an attack.
When
DITCH AND WALL.
the legions
383
left in entire
marched out
to battle, the
camp was
order under a guard, usually composed of the younger troops, who were fully able to hold it. The camps were rectangular
unless modified
by the ground.
applies to the little
The same thing
(castella)
camps or redoubts
which were built in siege operations or for outpost
defenses of a general camp. Of these castella the smallest were one hundred and twenty feet square, for a garrison of a cohort. The corners of all camps were rounded off to
prevent the enemy getting a footing on them in the assault.
wide enough for a maniple front (forty feet), were protected by half-moons, and materials were on hand for Gates closing them quickly in case of threatened attack.
gates,
like our
The
modern ones seem
fortifications.
to have been
unknown, except
in
permanent
The
ditch (fossa) was nine to twelve feet wide at the top,
It
with a depth of seven to nine feet.
was often deeper and
Camp Wall
(section).
wider, the ratio being preserved.
The scarp and
counter-
scarp had, one or both, a slope or not, according to the The height of the wall (agger) was not nature of the soil.
deemed
so important, for the shield of the ancient soldier
384
protected
INTRENCHING THE CAMP.
him abundantly.
The percentage
of darts which
took actual effect was, as in the case of bullets, very small. From the wall the soldier could, however, cast his own
missiles with better effect
upon the enemy below, whom the
distance.
ditch
stopped
at
a good spear-hurling
This,
of the
indeed, was the
main object of the wall. wall was supposed to be about two thirds
of the ditch.
The height
of the surface -width
Its thickness was about equal to the height, or The slopes were covered with sods, or intera bit greater. There was a laced with branches, fascines or hurdles.
banquette of suitable width, and palisades (vallum) were The word vallum is often used for the planted at the top.
entire
Embrasures in the palisades were common and towers were generally built. The inside slope
palisaded wall.
of the wall
was cut in steps for easy
access, or faced with
logs in steps.
It took, as a rule, four or five hours to complete the in-
trenching of a camp.
It could,
be done in three.
The Roman
under favorable conditions, used his spade to good effect.
fin-
If the troops reached
camp by noon, they would have
of a short day.
in nomenclature,
ished their
work by sundown
The
division of the
camp was,
much
like
that of the
War
against Hannibal.
in their regular order.
The cohorts camped Each cohort took up a space one
hundred and twenty feet wide, with a depth of one hundred and eighty feet, cut into six parts, thirty feet wide, one for
each century.
The century
feet
tents were pitched
back to back
and front to
front, in streets.
hundred and twenty
turmae took up as
by
A cavalry turma took up one A regiment of twelve thirty.
what has already been to show the details of
much
space as two cohorts.
The accompanying
Caesar's camp.
sketch, added to
given in a previous volume, suffices
PICKETS.
385
A
spies.
cavalry picket was usual, which sent out scouts and
The
gates were specially guarded, the wall was duly
lined with sentinels, averaging one every thirty feet.
The
STREET
386
ANCIENT
SIEGES.
Occasionally summer hours are spoken of, being the time from sunrise to sunset, divided into twelve hours. This would at times lengthen the hour materially from what it
would be
six P. M.
if
the day had been reckoned as from six A. M. to
and defending strong places underwent comparatively little change for more than a thousand As far back as there are any records, written or years.
art of attacking
The
sculptured, the processes of a siege are
tially the same.
shown
to be substan-
verses from Ezekiel iv. 1, " of a siege about 600 B. c. : Thou also, son of 2, 3, speak
tile,
The following
and lay
man, take thee a
it
before thee, and portray
upon works
it
city,
even Jerusalem."
This was the plan of the
lay siege against
it,
to be undertaken.
"And
and
build forts against
\i ; set
it
These are the usual steps of the "Moreover take thou unto thee an iron pan, and set
camps also round about."
it, and cast up a mount (mound) against against it, and plant battering rams against
siege.
it
for
this refers to a wall of iron between thee and the city," "and set iron mantelets used in preparing the approaches,
thy face against
it,
and
it
shall
be besieged, and thou shalt
lay siege against it."
At
certain periods, as during the wonderful activity of
Alexander's military career, or during the siege of Rhodes
by Demetrius
Syracuse by Archimedes, or Sylla's siege of Athens, a marked advance was made, "but this again was wont to be lost, and the
Poliorcetes,
or the
defense of
methods and machines remained almost
identical.
In
fact,
from dim antiquity they were so. The walls of towns were generally of
stone,
and very high
and
thick.
Those of the Gauls were, as we have seen, some-
times of earth, logs and stone. They were guarded by towers at regular intervals, and were apt to be fronted by a
METHOD OF
ditch,
SIEGES.
387
wet or dry.
Immense
cities
skill
and patience were devoted
interior citadels.
to the defenses of
and
their
To
to blockade, or siege, or capture a town, one must resort
assault.
To
attack the walls there was no artillery capable
of
making breaches.
The
catapults
and
ballistas could
throw
heavy stones and huge arrows to a remarkable distance, but had not penetration enough to break down walls. To operate a breach, it was essential to approach near to the wall,
and
it down by battering-rams could not be made except This approach or mural hooks. under artificial cover, and hence arose the more or less
either
undermine
it,
or break
effective series of tortoises, galleries
and mantelets, terraces and towers, added to mining and countermining, which were good or poor according as the skill and energy of the besiegers varied.
was concerned,
All this remained unchanged so far as principle until the invention of gunpowder reduced the
ancient walls to uselessness in the same
it
summary fashion
as
unseated the knight in armor. In sieges either towers were erected to override the wall,
its foot.
or else simple battering was resorted to at
In the
former case, so soon as the place had been approached, the
army was camped, generally
in several suitable locations,
having heed to health, sustenance and siege operations. Each camp was fortified by a stockade and ditch, and often
much more
elaborately.
Communications were established
between these camps, and a line of investment or conwas drawn around the city. If there was dantravallation
ger of an enemy's army coming to the relief of the place, of circumvallation was drawn outside the another line
besieger's camps, facing outward to forestall an attempt to
raise the siege.
Caesar generally uses the term circumvalearlier
e.
,
lation
for
what was
i.
contravallation,
and more properly known as the works erected against a town.
388
BUILDING A MOUND.
A terrace
or
mound
(agger)
was then begun, which should slope up to the bottom of the
city wall.
In case the city was a terrace was not
es-
on a
level
It might be raised to a point part way up the wall, but this was not usual. Its
sential.
surface was smooth enough to
allow the moving
of
towers
per-
along
it.
The labor was
soldiers
formed by the
and such
part of the surrounding population as could be set at it.
It
was
on
built of
hand.
set
any material at As terraces were often
to be
fire, it is
presumed
in
logs, hur-
that
much wood was used
etc.
their construction,
dles,
That
sort
it
was gen-
erally
work,
filled
of cob-house
least,
.in
on the edges at
with loose
is
material
the middle,
to
be inferred
from the rapidity with which it was set on fire and burned,
a fact which argues a strong The terrace was probadraft. A bly built a story at a time.
line
of mantelets (plutei)
was
placed as near the wall as possible, but still out of range.
Behind
these,
galleries
made
PLAN OF APPROACHES.
end, protected the
rial
389
of a succession of small pent-houses (yinece), placed end to
men going
through the galleries
who brought mateand began work behind the manto
and
fro,
C ITY
WALL
TESTUOO
jTJTtSTuOO
i
rJn
P LUTE
:N
,,-tf
'0
01
D
D
u
D D
Hi
D
telets.
Movable towers with
fire
artillery
a constant
upon the walls to clear from
and bowmen kept up them the missileand
throwers of the enemy
who
interfered with the work,
390
suitable details
BIG TERRACES.
were posted to check
sorties.
When
built.
as
much
was finished as one
tect, these
set of mantelets
were calculated to pro-
were advanced and another section
Upon
this first section or story
a second was constructed, and a
third
and more, as
size
desirable.
The end near the wall was made
especially strong so as to bear the weight of
The
heavy towers. of some of these terraces excites the same wonder
as temporary structures that the
Pyramids do as monuments
for all time. They are explained by the fact that so many thousands of hands worked at them. The terrace was made as wide as convenient, to contain all the necessary engines
it and to allow a storming advance along it, say fifty feet. When completed the terrace was crowned by towers which were higher than the city walls, and which were connected by curtains or walls.
if
these were to be used on
to
column
Such a terrace appears
at first blush to be a
it
work more
gigantic than called for; but
was made .necessary by the
fact that so long as the garrison could hold the platform of
the wall, they could prevent the approach of the battering-
ram
or the filling of the ditch,
by throwing
missiles, inflam;
mables, hot tar and heavy stones from above or they could interfere by grappling tackle with the free swing of the ram
essential to
an
effective blow, or
deaden
its effect
by
cable-
But so soon as the aprons hung at its point of impact. had reached the height of the wall, so as to be able besiegers
numbers to drive the garrison from the could secure free play for the ram, fill up the platform, they ditch, and make ready to storm the walls by bridges from the towers, or through a breach after one had been operated. by
their greater
When the ram
place was
was got
secure,
fairly at work, the capture of the
deemed
and no capitulation was received
on any save harsh terms. Sometimes, on a breach being made, a new wall or demi-lune was found to have been con-
PENT-HOUSES.
391
structed within, which obliged the besiegers to begin their
work
all
over again.
galleries (vinece, musculi) took the place
The pent-house
of
our
trenches
and
these
parallels.
But
not
latter
were
un-
known.
The
galleries
were set up obliquely
to the wall as trenches
are to
so.
day, but less Accidents in the
-
Musculus,
ground
light.
were
utilized
for cover, but so soon
as the approaches arrived in the open, they were run with
regularity on a most intelligent system.
Parallels were not
so deep as ours because the missiles were not so destructive.
Portable curtains and defenses were
common
for surprises.
Mantelets (plutei) were made of
skins, cable-mats,
mattresses,
etc. ,
suspended
frequently
plates or
on
masts, and not in-
iron
They
unlike
Musculus, strong.
.
heavy
lumber.
were
not
plank and wicker-work covered with rawhide, ropes and wet cloth to resist missiles and fire, and were usually sixteen feet long
huge snow-plows mounted on wheels. The vinese were constructed of a roof of
and seven
sides
feet wide, resting
were also protected by wicker-work.
on posts eight feet high. The These vinea3 were
392
carried forward
MANTELETS. MINES.
by the men.
If heavier, they
were rolled
on wheels. They were then pushed forward obliquely, a number were joined together, and under their cover the
terrace
laid
foundations
to
were
close
the ditch.
Wet
lus
ditches were tapped
and drained.
The muscu-
was a low triangular
hut on rollers for the protection of the
men; when
it
working near the walls
Vmea
-
was heavier.
The
testudo
was much
like the musculus, but larger.
The building
work
of the terrace
ance imaginable.
of the day.
was opposed by every contrivSorties were made at night to destroy the
Mines were driven underneath the terrace
Plutei
(3 styles).
and
ble
filled
with inflammables which, set on
in
its
fire,
would crumThese were
the earth and drop
foundation.
opposed by
counter-mines.
Mines were run under the walls
by the
besiegers with a similar object ; and they were often
its
run as a means of throwing a force into a town under
CITY WALLS.
walls,
393
which force, once in, would open the gates to the Such mines often showed ability to a high degree besiegers. in design and execution.
The towers with which the
often
terraces were surmounted were
many
stories in height.
They were usually
structures
of wood, but sometimes of earth, stone or brick, so high as
to dominate the walls of the town.
The heavy machines of the city were within the walls on the level. Only soldiers and light engines occupied the walls
a wall was escaladed and the assaulting party had reached the platform, it still had to descend into the inclosure, a work of yet greater danger. On the plat-
and towers.
Where
towers,
form the party had to encounter the cross-fire from the and must get ropes and ladders to descend on the
inner side.
The operation was
difficult.
Hence the greater
practicability of breaches.
The
walls were not usually of solid masonry; one front
built of stone, perhaps twenty feet
and one back wall were
from the
apart; the space between was filled in with the earth taken
ditch, or with rubble or other available material.
Huge
is
earthen ramparts were not uncommon, as at Gaza.
the towers which surmounted the terraces
The immensity of
perhaps the most astonishing feature of sieges.
Vitruvius
(who was one of Caesar's engineers in the African war) The smaller had sixty cubits speaks of two ordinary sizes.
one and a half feet) by seventeen cubits The larger square, and decreased one fifth in going up. was one hundred and twenty cubits high by twenty-seven
of height (a cubit
is
cubits square.
Each had ten
stories.
Demetrius at Rhodes
made one much
larger than even this. These towers were usually prepared in advance with
fitted
beams, were brought as close to the walls as could be under
cover of mantelets, and there set up.
They generally
carried
SIEGE TOWERS.
a ram in the lower story, and were furnished with drawThe ram could operate bridges to drop on the enemy's wall.
under cover of the armed
clear
by
their missiles.
men above, who kept the platform These towers were furnished with
huge wheels on which
they were
moved forward.
The
approach of such a tower to the walls
by the capture
fire.
of the town, unless it
was generally followed could be destroyed by
Fire and heavy missiles were the means of combating the
approach of these towers.
the towers.
The
object of sorties was to
fire
falling drawbridges were kept off by long sharpened beams fastened on the walls of the city. Earns were either mounted on wheels or suspended by ropes
The
DEFENSE AGAINST RAMS.
or chains.
395
huge beam (or one made of several lashed together) was furnished with a heavy cast-iron end, frequently
form of a ram's head, fixed to it by iron bands. The beam was reinforced in the centre, the better to withstand
in the
the shock.
The head was
at times furnished with a
mural
in
hook as well as a ram.
The ram was hung
or
mounted
shed,
well protected from
soldiers.
surprise.
and was manipulated by The size and weight of these rams excite our Demetrius used a ram one hundred and twenty
fire,
feet long against Rhodes.
Appian speaks of
six
one, at the to
siege of Carthage,
it.
which required
thousand
men
mount
its
means Perhaps emplacement and covering.
this
their labor used in speedily building
396
TELENON. ARTILLERY.
resist
To
the ram,
the walls were
covered with
soft
hung upon them from above, such as bags of feathers and wool, or mattresses, or plaited cordage. Heavy
material
suspended beams were dropped upon it to disable it. Big grappling devices to seize not only rams but other machines,
and even to pick up men, were common.
Callias, at
Rhodes,
enjoyed a great reputation for such fishing tackle, until Demetrius constructed such heavy rams and engines that Callias' tackling would no longer work.
The telenon was a rude crane by which was
raised a cage
s
containing
diers
o1
who could
thus reach and attack the platform, or make observations of
what was
being done inside
the walls.
The
the
artillery of
ancients was
far from despicable.
all
Caesar calls
the
missile-
throwers tormenta, because
they derived their
propulsive
Telenon.
power
or
from twisted
ropes,
sinews
hair (torquere).
The catapults and ballistas of the Greeks had no doubt survived and been little altered. These have been described in previous volumes. The ballistas were
able to throw stones weighing five hundred to six hundred
CATAPULTS AND BALLISTAS.
pounds.
397
pound
arrows
stones,
Smaller ballistas (scorpiones) threw one-hundred and were known as centenaria. bundle of
placed
on
the
horizontal
upper beam
at the proper angle
and
by the ballista head could be thrown
struck
a great distance. Dead bodies or pestilential
other such matter were
thrown into the enemy's
lines.
lista
The average
balCatapult.
could hurl up to
twelve hundred feet.
The catapults were on the principle of huge bows, and threw sharpened beams, darts, leaden bullets, fire-pots and fire-darts with great effect. These machines were really,
Ballista.
except for size and convenience, almost as powerful as the
early artillery.
Their aim was good.
398
COURSE OF A SIEGE.
walls of cities and towns were plentifully provided
The
up
with missile-throwers.
Besiegers had to await the bringing
of a siege-train or the construction of fresh machines,
which was a long process. Caesar had anything like as
There
is
nothing to show that
missile-
effective artillery, or artillery as
easily transported, as Alexander.
But Caesar had
throwers with his army, for they are mentioned as being
mounted on the walls
of his camp. After a breach was opened, heavy columns assaulted it and were met with the resistance of like bodies. breach by no means always brought about the capture of a city. half-
moon, or reentering angle, which the besieged could build in rear of the place where a breach was being made, was all
the
more
difficult to
attack lay on the besieger's flanks and rear.
take because the besieged during its At Rhodes such
a half -moon was faced with a ditch.
Ancient sieges were much more obstinately contested than modern ones, and for good reason. The besieged had to face the alternative of victory, or of slavery or
death.
The ordinary course
1.
2.
3.
of a siege might be stated as :
A reconnoissance of the place.
The establishment of camps in suitable positions. The collection of material for the siege. The manufacture of vinece, plutei, musculi, etc. The building of redoubts and joining them with lines'-of
and perhaps circumvallation.
of covered
4.
5.
contra6.
The preparation
ways
to the town,
mines and
subterranean passages.
The building of a terrace, by legionaries within reach of darts, by natives beyond range. 8. The erection of towers on the terrace, or pushing them
7.
forward along
it.
END OF A
9.
SIEGE.
399
The operation
is
of breaches.
10. Storming the breaches.
This chapter
largely a recapitulation of
it
what has been
told in former volumes ; but
has been deemed essential to
the proper appreciation of Cesar's numerous sieges.
Scorpion.
XXVI.
THE OPENING OF THE CIVIL WAR. DECEMBER,
TO MAY,
THE
triumvirate
50,
49 B. C.
campaign.
The
had been broken np by the death of Crassiis in the Parthian friendship of Caesar and Pompey had ended in competition for
the sole control.fijCsesar represented the democratic, Pompey the aristocratic parfot/tiWar was forbad ^n C,aeaar. Though he entered into it in self-protection,
it
was Be who took the
initiative,
when the
tribunes of the people fled to
;
him
for
safety.
He marched
into Italy with one legion
Pompey had many,
but they
were on paper. Great numbers of recruits joined Caesar's standard, while Pompey, from lack of preparation and energy, found his forces dwindle. Caesar's
legions were veterans
his
;
Pompey had but On
fresh levies.
Gradually Caesar forced
way down
the Adriatic coast to Brundisium, where
Pompey with
his
ad-
herents had taken refuge.
the way, the gates of most of the towns were
opened to Csesar
some, especially Corfinium, had to be besieged.
to Caesar
;
Many
of
Pompey' s cohorts voluntarily went over
then joined his cause.
others were captured, and
and the rich with Pompey.
his
The people weie-WittiJCflasar ;jthe Senate, the aristocrats The latter, overwhelmed by Caesar's rapidity and
war
to Greece instead of fighting in
own
lethargy, resolved to transfer the
Italy. *"**
WHEN
light of
the triumvirs assumed power,
spirit,
upon as the ruling
Caesar
Pompey was and Crassus much
looked
in the
Pompey
's
adjutants.
To Pompey were opened
the
and the power of the entire state; to Caesar only those he was given by law. Pompey 's term was unlimited;
treasures
was a long but fixed term. Pompey remained at the capital; Caesar was sent to a distant province. But the
Caesar's
important work undertaken by Pompey soon developed his weakness. So far from ruling Rome, its rival factions
reduced the capital to a state of anarchy which Pompey had not the ability to check. "The rabble of every sort never
THE TRIUMVIRATE.
found a merrier arena."
401
The
leaders of the several bands
which played
sweet
will.
fast
and
loose in the city followed their
own
no
Never was
capital
so ungoverned.
It
is
part of the purpose of this volume to describe political
imbroglios; suffice
it
that
and
his standing. of a mere puppet.
He
gradually lost hia grasp was at times reduced to the condition
Pompey
while Pompev'a
forgotten.
Caesar was gaining^ laurels in the north, military reputation was in... a way to be
lost control of the rabble,
Having
Pompey was
unable to control the popular assembly; his strength and ability were unequal to the exceptional conditions, and his
failure to
perform his share in the scheme of joint government necessarily ended by estranging himself and Caesar.
This state of things worked against Caesar, who was distant from Rome and with difficulty able to control what friends
he had.
The
56
B.
away from him. triumvirs held a meeting at Luca
slip
c.
Power might
in the spring of
There were two hundred senators present and numbers of other men of mark. Here a further division of
provinces was agreed upon, but
it
was evident that Pompey
to
had ceded a substantial part of the controlling voice
Caesar.
The
aristocrats,
triumvirate.
meanwhile, were combining against the Yet every one seemed to be his own master.
Caesar raised legions without authority; Crassus equally so conducted the Parthian war. The forms of law were
observed, but
election.
money
or violence carried the votes in every
There was abundant manifestation of the unli-
censed spirit of all in the constant armed conflicts in the streets. These finally culminated in the murder of Clodius
by Milo, an episode which roused the energy of Pompey to the point of seizing the dictatorship, and to a certain degree
bringing the law again into operation.
402
CRASSUS' CAMPAIGN.
make-weight between
Caesar and
Crassus had been a
Pompey, but steadily leaned to Caesar's side. In the late division of provinces he was afforded a chance to gain military power and still greater wealth in a Parthian war, which
had come about by Pompey 's bad
the line of the Euphrates.
faith in failing to respect
Crassus reached Syria instinct
with the purpose of another Alexander, resolved to penetrate He had two routes. He could invade Parthia to India.
through mountainous and allied Armenia, or through the
PAH.TJ1.IA
iiOO
Mesopotamian
desert.
He
chose the latter route, on the
mistaken testimony of a native friendly prince. He had seven full legions, four thousand cavalry and an equal
number
of archers
and
slingers,
The great Macedonian had made
centuries before.
nearly fifty thousand men. this march nearly three
Careless scouting led Crassus into an ambush of the enemy not far from Carrhae. Surenas, the Parthian vizier
who commanded
Eastern
the enemy, had recognized the fact that
foot could accomplish nothing against Roman he had utilized his infantry to keep a large body legions;
CAVALRY VERSUS LEGIONS.
of
403
Armenian horse from jdining Crassus, and with a keen tactical appreciation of the conditions had chosen to do his
fighting solely with cavalry.
Crassus advanced into the
desert ; soon his marching
column of foot was met by a body
of mail-clad horsemen, partly heavy lancers, partly lighter
R O.M A
NI
(I
Hit
=:E:
CAGE,
;::::[}
ARMY
"*
Battle of CarrhaB.
archers.
The legionary was more than a match
could cut the
for his
man
when he could get
cations
at him, but here the foe could fight or
;
decline to fight as he chose
Koman communi-
by his superior activity; could move with twice the Roman's speed. The armies were on a limitless rolling plain,
the very arena for a huge body of horse, a very pitfall for
foot in those days of short-carry weapons.
There was on
the sandy soil scarce a chance to intrench a camp; water was at distant intervals ; the Roman was out of his bearing,
the Oriental in his element.
For the
first
time the legions
met a native
with which they could not cope. The mounted archer Close combat weapons were useless. was master of the situation, and the Parthian had made the
tactical array
bow a
national weapon.
404
A MASSACRE.
battle of Carrhze is interesting as a defeat of the best
The
of infantry by inferior horse, and yet not by cavalry tactics
so called.
The Parthians drew up
in
an extended order
fire.
affording the greatest scope for their drew up in their usual dense square.
The Romans
Here we have the
generally assumed to be a deployed line of superior fire modern idea a dense mass limited in its ability to against
hurl missiles.
There was but one outcome.
The Parthian
mounted archers were accompanied by camel-loads of spare The legions had absolutely no means of attack or arrows.
defense.
Their
own
archers were of small avail.
They
were speedily defeated when sent out.
the
Gradually the thin Oriental line swept by and outflanked Roman square. Fearing to be surrounded and thus
have his progress checked, Crassus sent his son Publius, one of Csesar's young veterans, to attack the enemy with a seject
body
of six thousand
mixed
troops.
This diversion for a
moment
arrested
pursued by the
sealed his fate.
Orientals, who summarily retired, brave young soldier. But his gallantry had
the
Luring him to a distance, the Parthians made about face on his column, and, surrounding it, cut the
entire force to pieces.
They then turned again on
the re-
treating
Roman
square.
Darkness alone saved the wreck of the
Roman
army.
The
Orientals, fearing a night surprise, rode off to camp at a But distance, intending to return to their prey next day.
the Romans, by leaving behind some four thousand wounded to be massacred, continued the march and reached Carrhse.
Thence, after a brief
rest, the
mere remnant
of the force,
some
tress
five
on the
thousand men, made their way to Sinnaca, a forfoothills of Armenia, only to be followed by
lost,
the Parthians, and again cut up. The entire army was and Crassus killed. This was in June, B. c. 53._
BEGINNING OF RUPTURE.
The end
of
405
Caesar
the triumvirate
thus
came.
and
Pompey between them controlled the state, but they had already begun to be politically estranged socially, the death
;
of Julia, in
54
B. c., severed the last tie.
When Pompey
was
had secured for himself the undivided
consulship, he
fully prepared to fling his gauntlet at the feet of the
man
who, he foresaw, would soon outstrip him unless overridden The death of Crassus before he acquired more headway.
was a grievous blow to Caesar, who could uniformly rely on his colleague's fidelity. It was in this same year that the
had Pompey taken the vigorous step of having Caesar recalled from Gaul, it would have put a term to Caesar's career. But Pompey was
insurrection of Vercingetorix occurred;
never ready to seize an opportunity
fatally characteristic of the
lack of incisiveness was
man.
Caesar was strictly and from the beginning a democrat,
and
was now the leader of the party. Pompey had been playing with democracy and shortly reverted to his old Sullan traditions.
He easily effected
a reconciliation with the Catonians,
and became the head
of the aristocratic party.
Thus Caesar
and he were formally arrayed against each other. Caesar desired no He had, at Luca, been promised the rupture.
consulship in B. C. 48, and this he was anxious to obtain
peacefully,
as a base
from which to exert
his
influence.
Through the legal trickery of Pompey and the Catonians this was denied him, and it was sought to disable him by an
order to break
up
his
legions.
Caesar offered to disarm
whenever Pompey was made to do the like. Tt was during the debate on this matter that Caesar was completing the pacification of Gaul, holding his grand review on the
Scheldt,
and
making
his
triumphal march
in
through the
province of Cisalpine Gaul.
Finally, through the
manage-
ment
of Curio, Caesar's
henchman
Rome,
the Senate voted
406
that both
POMPEY BEGINS WAR.
Pompey and down
Caesar, as proconsuls of Spain
and
Gaul, should lay
their offices.
Caesar was willing to
do
so;
Pompey
declined.
On
the assumption that Caesar
was disobeying orders, Pompey asked to be instructed by the Senate to march against him. This was refused. But
the old consul and the newly elected ones gave the authority the Senate had denied. On this
Pompey
slender
pretense
Pompey
-
legions at hand,
put himself at the head of the only two they were the two sent by Caesar to be
used in the
Parthian war,
Pompey, and were far from reliable against and began levies of fresh troops. mander,
but wrongfully detained by their old com-
Of
the prominent Pompeians, Cicero remained in
Cam-
pania to recruit; Minucius Thermus was sent to Umbria; Lentulus Spinther and Attius Varus to Picenum ; Scribonius Libo to Etruria; Domitius AtLenoharbus, whom the -Senate
had designated as Caesar's successor in Gaul, went
finium.
to
!QJ>
This proceeding was substantially a declaration of war.
Caesar,
if
forced to
it,
was ready
to strike the first blow.
Ravenna, some two passed from Rome. Here Curio joined hundred and forty miles
the winter at
Caesar had
him.
The news he brought decided
nearest legion to
(Trieste),
Caesar's action.
He
ordered his
Ravenna,
the Thirteenth
from Tergeste
a body which he speedily recruited
normal strength, five thousand foot and His other eight legions were far away four among the Belgae, under Trebonius; four among the JEdui, under Fabius all in winter-quarters. He had already
up
to nearly or quite
three hundred horse.
ordered Fabius to send him the Eighth and Twelfth, and Trebonius to give over one of his own to Fabius, and with
the rest to approach the Arar. Fabius, with the three legions thus under his command, was sent to Narbo, lest Pompey's
CROSSING THE RUBICON.
407
seven legions in the Spanish peninsula should invade Gaul. The strength of Ciesar's legions in Gaul varied from three
thousand to thirty-five hundred men each. Caesar, in due course, sent an ultimatum to Rome, couched
Under Ponipey's dictation the Senate replied by ordering Caesar to lay down his arms unconditionThe tribunes of the people, ally, or be deemed a traitor.
in a reasonable spirit.
Mark Antony and Q. Cassius, vetoed the resolution, but were forced by Pompey's adherents to flee for their lives. They started north to join Caesar, who was the recognized
centre point of the democratic party.
Caesar's
resource.
mind was soon made up.
War
was
his only
He
why
he struck the
harangued the Thirteenth legion, to explain first blow in a civil war. His cause was
equaled by his eloquence, and he found a generous response. With these cohorts he advanced towards the border of his
province,
December
16,
50
B.
c.
crossed the Rubicon on the night of
Civil
The Thirteenth legion December 16-17. The
for foolhardy opera-
had began.Sj^. In Gaul, Caesar had not been noted
War
tions.
Bold as Alexander when boldness was demanded, as when he started with seven thousand men to rescue Cicero
from sixty thousand Nervii, yet Caesar exhibited as a rule the
virtue of caution rather than the error of untimely boldness.
We
find
shall,
from the outbreak of the Civil War, however,
committing acts of precipitancy which are never altogether admirable, and sometimes much to be condemned. For the present proceeding, even,
role, constantly
him
in a
new
he has been severely blamed by many critics and historians. It can scarcely be classed as prudent generalship, it is said, however bold, for Ceesar to set out with five thousand men
against Pompey, an excellent tactician and a
experience,
man
of large
forces
who would probably array
considerable
408
against him.
CAESAR ADVANCES.
But
in this instance
it
the rather appears that
Caesar was both bold and prudent.
The temerity was
in
forces
He knew the condition of his enemy's had not got his levies made in season Pompey that the two Apulian legions were too far off to be immediCesar's own
:
style.
that
ately available, even
his route
they were reliable; that the towns on illy garrisoned ; that there was a strong sentiment in his own favor if suitably met. Moreover, he
if
were
could not afford to wait; he believed ihat a surprise of_the enemy before he increased his numbers was his safest course,
and that rapid work would secure him control of the northern His course, fortunately, was the right provinces of Italy. as it was the bold one.
Caesar had no difficulty in assuring himself of the personal
fidelity of the rest of his legions, of
which he ordered some
in
from Gaul so soon as he learned that the tribunes of the
This people had fled to him from Rome for protection. latter fact gave him the required appearance of right. It
was
but determined to give his enemies no unfair advantage, that Caesar set out towards Ariminum. The handful of troops he had with him reflected
in a
distinctly conciliatory,
mood
the feeling of the rest in declaring that they would
to protect their insulted chief
know how
and the tribunes of the people.
Caesar's pause at the
With
his
Rubicon has pointed many morals. quick habit of judgment and action, it was unquesroads to Rome.
tionably of short duration.
From Ravenna were two
coast to
One ran from
Bononia across the Apennines to Arretium; one down the
road.
His plan was not
Fanum, thence southwest. Caesar chose the coast to move on Rome. He proposed to
with
its many and rich towns, and much of his territory, but create
seize the Adriatic coast,
thus not only rob Pompey of a base for himself in Italy.
WHOSE FAULT?
At Ariminmn, taken by
surprise
409
17, Caesar
December
met
the tribunes, and also messengers from
Pompey.
The
latter
were Roscius the praetor, and young L. Csesar, whose father was one of Caesar's legates. They offered in indefinite terms
an accommodation.
lest
Pompey, no doubt, had been alarmed Caesar should take him unawares. Csesar^ replied^ by_a
message agreeing to lay down arms and retire to his province if Pompey would do the like at the same moment and retire
to Spain;
and requested an interview either in Pompey 's To this message, which Roscius and camp or his own. Caesar conveyed to their chief\ Pompey, and the Senate,
by the same messengers that whenever Caesar had disbanded his army and gone^to Gaul, he, Pompey, would
replied
It is not improbable that do the like_jjttdgo'to Spain. Pompey was desirous of coming to an accommodation but
;
he did not adopt the proper tone or terms to secure such a result. Caesar was reasonable, but he demanded a crisp
understanding.
One
of our authorities for the tone of these
messages
is
the Commentaries.
They are presumably accu-
rate as to facts, but they were
ing parties.
Either rival
penned by one of the negotiatwas right in opposing the sole
;
exercise of authority
from the
facts
by the other but we must judge mainly and from the other authorities, and not from
the statements of Caesar, which was least to blame for the
war that
for years decimated the republic.
of the two chiefs when they should be concentrated was very different. Caesar at this time properly had nine legions two had been spirited away from him to
;
The material power
Pompey, and were now arrayed against him. He had no fleet, and but himself to rely on. Pompey, on the contrary, had the formal power of the Roman state in his own or his
friends' hands,
and could
;
retain
it, if
it
was not
forfeited
by
some signal error he practically controlled the
entire Italian
CAESAR
AND POMPEY.
411
peninsula except the regions abutting on Caesar's province; he had his Spanish and African legions, and all the forces Caesar controlled of Italy, Greece, Egypt and the East.
Gaul
Cisalpine, Narbonese
and Transalpine7the
latter only
just subdued
and Illyricum; Pompey
practically controlled
the rest of Rome's enormous territory, and especially in the
provinces was
Pompey 's
influence
still
strong.
Pompey had
the chief officers of the republic, the
cracy, the
Senate, the aristoCaesar had but his
rich burgesses on his side;
few adherents, the tribunes of the people and the many
headed.
was undivided within
ants were truly such.
But Caesar possessed what Pompey lacked. His authority His lieutenhis camp and his party.
His legions were
to victory.
his,
body and
soul,
and were veterans used
He
could do with them
what no other captain could do.
Their imperator was the
embodiment
of success not only in their eyes, but in the eyes
of all soldiers in the service of
Rome.
Wherever Caesar
went, armies would gather from the multitude. Moreover, Caesar was untrammeled and able to act as best to him
seemed, while
of his party. in their
Pompey was
really little
all,
more than the
tool
And
above
deeming
the power to be all
hands, Pompey's party had taken no immediate measures to defend themselves against Caesar. What they
own
had was scattered
at arm's length;
what Caesar had he could
put to instant use.
side, the
The material weight was on Pompey's
moral weight and the power of initiative on Caesar's. Pompey's reputation was for deeds long gone by; Caesar's
was fresh in the minds
of alL
Of
Cassar's lieutenants every
office,
aspired to higher
man, save Labienus, who had remained faithful. Caesar's
plan of keeping his lieutenants in subordinate positions worked well with him, who purposed to do everything him-
412
self ;
THE RIVAL FORCES.
but
it
robbed him sometimes of
efficient marshals,
who,
on occasion, would have served him better.V Pompey's military forces were enormous, but they were He had seven legions in Spain, and numberless scattered.
cohorts in every part of the empire,
Sicily, Africa, Syria,
In addition to the two legions at Luceria, there were three legions of the levy of 55 B. c., and men
Asia, Macedonia.
already sworn in of the general levy of 52 B. c. in Italy. total of ten legions in the peninsula, not countnot far from one hundred thousand ing the seven in Spain,
There was a
men but
;
It was really they were not yet under the eagles. " no idle boast that Pompey had but to stamp with his foot to
cover the ground with armed men."
essence in war.
But time
is
of the
Pompey's army was yet a
skeleton.
As we
have seen, he had recognized the fact and had at once sent out eminent nobles to bring in the levies to rendezvous in
the various provinces.
The
force of
Caesar's legions
is
very hard to gauge.
Judging by what they were afterwards at Pharsalus, when they had been reduced by campaigning, Caesar's cohorts
may
and
at this time
fifty
have been three hundred to three hundred
This would have made the average
men
strong.
hundred men, so that Caesar had under his control a minimum of some thirtyof each legion three thousand to thirty -five
two thousand heavy infantry. No better ever bore arms. Added to this force was a body of auxiliaries and some
cavalry.
men.
all
All told, Caesar's army exceeded forty thousand Closer calculations are often made, but the data are
Caesar's manifest advantage lay
founded on estimates.
in the fact that his legions were veteran
and
at
hand
Pom-
pey's weakness was that the legions he might have had ready for the field, though strong on the morning reports, had yet
to be assembled.
STRATEGIC OPENING.
From Ariminum
cohorts to Arretium.
413
with
five
Caesar sent
Mark Antony
This was for the purpose of antici-
pating an advance against his line of communications with Gaul by way of that place, and across the Apennines to
either Faventia or Bononia.
Libo, at Arretium, had taken
no measures of defense
Antony seized the place the 20th. Caesar himself remained at Ariminum with two cohorts, to
;
raise levies, while he
made Pisaurum, Fanum and Ancona
If secure, with a cohort each, on the succeeding two days. he could get possession of Iguvium, on the Flaminian Way, he would thus gain a base line from Arretium to Ancona,
securely protecting Gaul.
Learning that the praetor Thermus, with five cohorts, was fortifying Iguvium, whose inhabitants were well disposed
towards Caesar, he sent Curio, on the 23d, to that town, with
the three cohorts drawn from
his approach,
December
;
Ariminum and Pisaurum. On 25, Thermus drew out his forces
but his troops dispersed to their homes, Curio entered the unwilling probably to oppose Caesar. town and later occupied Iguvium. This put an end to any
and marched away
danger to Caesar's rear. Pompey being nowhere within reach, Caesar then withdrew Antony from Arretium, for by advancing down the coast he
would minimize any danger of operations against his communications. Antony drew in Curio at Iguvium and moved to
Ancona, where he joined his men a day's rest on January 4.
chief,
and Caesar gave the
In two Brief repose was all Caesar could give his troops. days he marched on Attius Varus at Auximum, southwest of
Ancona, where
this legate
chief, Lentulus Spinther, was at Asculum.
was recruiting for Pompey. His The senate of
Auximum
from the
refused support to Attius.
place.
The
latter
retired
Caesar's
van pursued and struck Attius'
414
soldiers.
LEANING TOWARD
CAESAR.
These either dispersed or were for the most part glad to join Caesar, who was welcomed by the inhabitants Lucius Pupius, the chief centurion of with loud acclaim.
Attius Varus, on being brought to Caesar as a prisoner, was
at once released.
Caesar had no quarrel with the individ-
uals of his enemy's army.
He knew
the value of generous
treatment.
About the same time Hirrus evacuated CameriCaesar was dealt a heavy blow
num
the
with three thousand men.
At Auximum
desertion of
Labienus,
his
hitherto
by learning apparently most
Caesar made no attempt to but sent his properties and money after him. What stop him, was the immediate cause of this sad mishap is not known,
devoted and able lieutenant.
but Labienus, after joining the cause of Pompey, exhibited the greatest hatred towards the chief he had for ten years
so ably
and cordially served.
their
testi-
Though thousands of recruits were willing to leave homes and cast in their fortunes with Pompey, thus
fying to a strong sentiment for his party, this manifest leaning towards Ca3sar on the part of the population pro-
duced great
consternation in
Umbrian
successes arrived
the
Rome, where news 20th and 21st.
of
It
his
was
rumored that "the monster" was marching on the city. The consuls, Lentulus and Marcellus, followed by most of
the magistrates, within two days fled from the protection of its walls. It is curious how infectious the dread of the conIt was as if these dreaded queror of the Gauls could be. barbarians themselves had once more marched on Rome.
The enemies
of Capua.
of Caesar did not feel secure at any point north Here they arrested their flight, and reestablished the Roman government. But in their haste they forgot to make the usual sacrifices to the gods, and, worse still, omitted to carry
away the public
treasure.
LISTLESS POMPEY.
415
Having abandoned Rome, Pompey held a conference with his chief supporters at Teanum Sidicinum on the 27th. The
various chances of the campaign were canvassed, Labienus
being present, and Pompey decided to take the two legions in Apulia and advance on Picenum, where, by hurrying up the collection of the levies, he might gather a force sufficient
to arrest Caesar's farther progress.
It
was
in this province,
thirty -five
years before, that
Pompey had
first
acquired his
reputation
by
raising troops for Sulla.
accordingly repaired to Luceria to carry out his plan of campaign. But with his usual listless method he sat down, gave out his work to others to do, and practically
Pompey
accomplished nothing until
Caesar
it
was too
late.
moved down Picenum,
and material support by
received with hearty good will most of the towns, and recruiting
with success in each locality. Even Cingulum, a town Labienus had founded, in fact owned, offered to join him
and sent him
soldiers.
How great
the
number
of his recruits
may have been it is impossible to say. The Twelfth legion now joined him, and with these two, the Twelfth and Thirteenth, Caesar marched, via Firmum and Truentum, to Asculum, the chief town of Picenum.
ten cohorts,
five
Lentulus Spinther here had
;
thousand
men but
he, too, fled at Caesar's
approach, and his soldiers largely deserted to the new chief. Caesar entered the town January 11. Military gloiy is conAll soldiers were anxious to "serve under a chief tagious.
who had accomplished such wonders in Gaul, and in the company of men who had served in so many glorious
campaigns.
Vibullius Rufus, an old soldier and a good, had been sent
Caesar.
oy Pompey into Picenum to check the growing sentiment for Meeting Lentulus Spinther on his retreat, Vibullius
took his few remaining cohorts and dismissed him.
To these
416
SENATE AT CAPUA.
He
then collected as
he added those of Hirrus.
possible of the
new
levies
which had been made for
many as Pompey
;
some other retreating Pompeian garrisons made thirteen cohorts, with which he fell back January 11 on up Domitius Ahenobarbus, Pompey 's lieutenant at Corfinium, a recruiting rendezvous, and reported Caesar's advance.
these with
Domitius had about twenty cohorts, collected in neighboring states where recruiting seemed better than elsewhere.
With
those of Vibullius he
made up
thirty-three
cohorts.
Had
these lieutenants possessed the true soldier's instinct,
they would have marched north on Caesar, to seek, by a bold offense, to hold head against him. They might not have succeeded, but it was the thing to do.
Caesar had two legions.
seeking_ojit-the 4eser4er-s
added to their numbers by from Lentulus and .bringing them
He
under the
colors.
Having delayedbut one day beyond the
tune needed for the muster of these
at once
men
to provide corn,
he
marched south
to Corfinium,
by way
of
Interamnum
and Pinna.
In Corfinium were assembled many notables
at
;
and refugees. Meanwhile the Senate
all these losses
on Pompey volunteers were few; and the cause of the aristocrats looked
;
Capua was laying the blame of the new levies did not come in
worse and worse.
Instead of
it
Pompey 's
collecting endless
cohorts to oppose Caesar,
was Caesar whose forces were
growing in number and enthusiasm, while Pompey had but two legions rather weak in their allegiance, and a few newly
recruited cohorts, not yet consolidated into legions.
Caesar found the outposts of Domitius, five cohorts strong, breaking down the bridge over the Aternus, three miles
north of
Corfinium.
By an
unexpected
and
impetuous
attack his van was able to drive off the party and save the
structure.
Caesar passed over and sat
down before Corfinium
SIEGE OF CORFINIUM.
on the 18th of January.
417
His position was on the east of Corfinium, cuttmgJDomitms off from communication with Pompev. Domitius, who had thirty cohorts, prepared for
vigorous defense.
to
He
had previously sent hurriedly for aid
in Apulia.
Pompey, who was
still
He
told
Pompey
that
easily be surrounded in the narrow valley in which lay Corfinium, but that without help he himself was apt to be shut up and to lose his army. He
Caesar could between
them
promised his
men
largesses
out of his
own
estate,
event of success,
to each soldier four
acres, with
in_Jkhe corre-
Corfinium sponding increase to veterans and centurions. was situated on a plain surrounded by high and abrupt
was a place of much importance and strength^ It^was prgifictedby a wall compassing over one hundred acres, and could only be
mountains,
It
the bed of an ancient lake.
attacked from the south.
Thejlain can
alone be entered
from the north thrcmgh the two ravines of the Aternus. Domitius had been wise in selecting Corfinium for his base.
Caesar,
who was awaiting
farther reinforcements from Gaul,
it,
pitched two camps before
southeast from Corfinium,
on the road
notice
to Sulino.
Caesar shortly received
that
Sulino,
ten
miles
was ready
to declare for
him, but
was held
in check
by a garrison of seven cohorts under
Sending Antony thither with five cohorts of the Thirteenth legion, the gates were opened to him and the cohorts enlisted under Caesar's standards.
Caesar cared naught for the leaders.
Attius, taken prisoner,
Lucretius and Attius.
Lucretius escaped;
in safety.
was sent away
Aiitony
returned the same day to Cmsar's camp, having successful campaign in a few hours.
made
At Corfinium
Caesar determined to gather
his other troops.
corn, fortify
and wait for some of
In addition to the
Eighth legion there shortly arrived twenty -two newly levied
418
cohorts, with three
DOMITIUS DESERTED.
hundred Gallic horse from Noricum.
He
formed a camp in his investment line for these troops, such that it would hold the Via Valeria, and placed Curio in
command.
He
went on with
his contravallation, joining the
two camps with a line of works crowned by towers.
The
Corfinium.
entire line was nearly five miles long. His three old legions, the Eighth, Twelfth and Thirteenth, and some thirty cohorts of new levies made up an army approaching twenty thousand
men.
Of
the
new
cohorts he formed three
new
legions.
By
the time that the works in front of Corfinium were
completed, Pompey, after some exchanges of correspondence, had^finallyL replied- that -he could send no help to Domitius,
but that the latter must save his force as best he might and Domitius now changed his conduct; he misled join him.
the soldiers
by false
declarations while personally contemplat-
POMPEY WEAKENS.
seized his person,
419
ing flight ; and the men, discovering the treachery, mutinied,
January 23, and sent word to Caesar that
While believing in their intenthey would surrender Turn. He paraded his entire tion, Caesar left nothing to chance.
force on his works, exhorted the officers to extra caution,
and ordered that no man should sleep that night.
EvejjLflne
was on the
alert.
During the night Lentulus was surren-
dered, and on being pardoned
by Caesar returned
to Corfin-
ium, where he reported Caesar's generosity. Next morning, January 24, Domitius, Vibullius, Varus and Rubrius were
given up, with
many
other magnates.
Caesar forgave them
all for their ingratitude,
each one being indebted to him for
of the soldiers,
past favors,
protected them from the taunts
to
and restored
Domitius six millions of
sestertii
which he
had brought with him to pay the soldiers, and which had been taken from him. Caesar's clemency at Corfinium was
as much a surprise to
Rome
as his advance
had been a terror.
tide
He was no
longer "the monster."
The popular
began
to set in his
Having sworn
own
favor>yf^ in the legionaries of Domitius under his eagles, Caesar, after only a week's delay before Corfin-
ium, marched into Apulia, along the coast through the land of the Marrucini, Frentani and Larinates. He_guessed that
Pompey would man as well as
seek to leave Italy for Greece.
He knew
his
The port of Brundisium was the conditions. the most available one for this purpose, in fact all but the only one, and Caesar hoped that he could succeed in anticipating
Pompey
at this place,
and thus confine him
to battle.
to Italy
and
all
the sooner bring
him
tion.
This was, indeed, since early in January, Pompey's intenHe saw that almost all the available men in the penin-
sula were joining the enemy's standard.
In
all
he had
lost
by
defection nearly sixty cohorts.
He had
got together a
420
POMPETS PROCRASTINATION.
of
number
levies.
men
in the vicinity of
marched down to Campania. As matters had eventuated, Pompey could scarcely
Rome, and these had been He was certain about no other
expect to hold himself in Italy.
his
With
command, large enough
away.
to crush out
a potential army at Caesar before he
fairly reached
slip
Picenum, he had allowed all his chances to His ancient habit of procrastination had grown
on him; and it was Caesar's just estimate of this fact which had made his temerity in advancing into Italy safe. Pompey,
who now had only
the two Luceria legions, the recent
from Campania, together with the few remaining faithful cohorts in Picenum, was no longer a match for his
recruits
rapid -thrusting opponent.
He deemed
it
advisable not to
come
to a general encounter with Caesar in Italy,
but to draw
him over
to Greece,
where he could assemble many more
troops, and where Caesar would not be so near a friendly
population to support him. Every step taken by either of the two men is characteristic. Caesar was positive in what he
did.
He knew
fight.
;
his
own
intentions well; he
was ready and
anxious to
his purpose
Pompey was hesitating and uncertain in
he appeared shy of crossing swords. Instead of taking the matter personally in hand, he had been lying in and near Luceria, the "key of Apulia," often so valuable to Hannibal. His headquarters were at Lari-
num.
Some
cohorts had previously
moved from Luceria
to his
Canusium; all were now marched to Brundisium, and levies were instructed to repair thither to join him.
himself reached the place January 28.
of his
He
Not a few, however,
Thither
new cohorts
deserted and went over to Caesar.
available galleys
he also ordered
all
and transports from
every near-by port.
Pompey's calculations had from the outset been essentially wrong. He had taken no seasonable means to defend Italy,
HE PREPARES TO LEAVE
ITALY.
421
and he was now leaving it to Caesar as a prize. He was giving up what he ought to have been prepared to hold at
all
hazards for
its
mere moral
effect.
When
he had_once
abandoned
Italy, Caesar
would have
full control of
Rome,
Driven
ancTwoiiIxl riot again afford
him a chance
to return.
from Rome, how long could Pompey maintain his influence over the provinces ? His leaving was to all intents and purposes a
Unprepared when the struggle came, he had now taken though himself had brought it about, such action as to throw a first great advantage over to Ca3flight.
sar's side.
His conduct showed a lack of calculation and
decision as
marked
as his apparent dread of Caesar.
It is
but fair to his colleagues to say that most of them objected
strenuously to
Pompey 's
policy.
Csesar, at
(Berlin
Opening of Civil War. Museum.)
XXVII.
BRUNDISIUM AND MASSILIA. FEBRUARY TO APRIL,
49 B. C.
LACKING force
no
fleet
to
meet Csesar
in Italy,
and could not
at once follow.
He sought
Pompey retired to Epirus. to pen Pompey
Csesar
in
had
Uruiidi-
sium, and there bring him to a decisive conflict, surrounded the place, and
built moles to close the harbor mouth.
But Pompey managed
his escape with
great cleverness,
notables.
and took with him
to Epiru_the_ .Senate^ _consjils__ajnd^
manj
He had
rejected all Caesar's overtures of peace.
There were seven
legions in Spain, under good lieutenants. Ca?sar feared that these might invade Gaul and thus strike him at his weakest point. Rglrjng'on Pbn pey's inertia, he determined to go first to Spain and neutralize these legions
Pompeian
before he followed
to uphold his
Pompey
interests,
to Greece.
He
placed
affairs in
Rome
on a basis
own
and
set out for Massilia.
This city he found io
the hand* of the Pflmpoiaa^L
He laid aye,
to
it,
and, placing Trebonius in
command,
left for Spain.
HAVING concluded that he could not hold Italy, and having made Brundisium his headquarters, Pompey there collected his troops.
a large number of slaves and had made a corps of three hundred horse from the Cama good material the cow-boys of Italy, panian herders,
for irregular cavalry.
He had armed
A considerable
fraction of his levies
failed to reach him, the cohorts breaking
Some
of
further bodies deserted to
;
up on the way. Caesar while on the march to
some
Pompey but
politicians
there assembled at Brundisium a motley crowd
and
soldiers
intermixed, numbering
twenty-five thousand men.
Pompey
sent Metellus Scipio to
Syria to recruit.
He
dispatched the consuls to Dyrrachium
in Epirus with a van of thirty cohorts in January, 49s. C.,
promising soon to follow with the balance of the army.
But
CMSAR ASKS INTERVIEW.
the effect of his mistaken policy was
tions continued.
still
423
apparent; deser-
His two praetors, Manlius and Kutilus, went
over to Caesar with nine cohorts.
Caesar, in all his communications to
Pompey, and repeat-
for a personal interview, with the feeling edly, TTH could be amicably adjusted. that matters ogajp
had asked
overtures here through
whom
Magius, Pompey's chief engineer, he had captured. He was wise enough to see that if Pompey escaped to Greece There was a long, tedious and
as not to allow this fact to
very uncertain war thrust upon him, and was not so blinded
by political passion it was worth in his
calculations.
But
his efforts
weigh for all were vain;
Pompey
finium,
sedulously avoided a meeting, personal or tactical.
Caesar, having been delayed but seven days before Cor-
marched on Brundisium via Anxanum and Teanum, He reached the place FebruArpi, Canusium and Barium. after a march of seventeen days at the rate of nearly ary 9,
seventeen miles a day. He had now six legions, the Eighth, Twelfth and Thirteenth veteran, the rest made up of what he had raised and what had voluntarily joined his ranks, in
all,
at least twenty-five
thousand legionaries.
Domitius'
cohorts he had sent to Sicily.
Brundisium was one of the best of the old-world harbors.
The town was
wall.
well defended from the land side
city
by a towered
It
was a rich
and the principal port on the
Adriatic.
Caesar ascertained that the consuls had gone to Dyrra-
chium with
thirty cohorts, while
Pompey remained
cohorts
at
Brun-
disium with twenty. thirty thousand men.
to transport all
These
fifty
numbered some
Pompey had not had enough vessels the troops, and non-combatants as well, at
off
one
trip.
Caesar grasped immediately at the advantage of
cutting
Pompey
from joining them.
This he could do
424
BLOCKADE OF BRUNDISIUM.
Pompey
of the use of the harbor of Brun.
only by depriving
disium, which commanded the Adriatic, and in which Pompey was awaiting the return of his fleet.
Ca3sar went to work.
He
blockaded the town from the
land side by a circle of works, placing his legions in three camps joined by contravallation walls, and proceeded to build
out into the harbor, from opposite sides and near
its
mouth,
Brundisium.
where he had located two camps and where it was narrowest and shallow, two moles some twenty feet wide, extending towards each other. These moles were constructed of rough
wood or other material near at hand. After building out from each shore a distance of some two hundred and fifty
stone,
feet, the
depth of the water made the work too difficult for speedy completion, and in order to join these moles, yet over
POMPEY'S CLEVER FLIGHT.
five
425
of floating
hundred
feet apart, Caesar devised a
number
which he joined together, anchored at each corner, covered with earth and protected with a
rafts, thirty feet square,
On every fourth one he built a parapet of wicker-work. tower of two stories, to get an effective cross-fire. To offset
this proceeding,
Pompey on
his side fitted out a
number
of
merchantmen with three-story towers, and sent them out to interrupt and break through Caesar's works. Skirmishing
between these rival naval forces was of daily occurrence, with heavy interchanges of fire from bowmen and slingers.
For the
third time Cffisar
now smi^T-it
ft
pftrannfll interview,
through Scribonius Libo, to whom he sent a messenger. But Pompey evaded it on the pretext that without the advice
and consent
of .the consuls he could take no action,
and they
were in Dyrrachium. This subterfuge determined Caesar to push the war with vigor.
When
Caesar's
works were about half
finished,
on the
ninth day of the blockade, February 17, the fleet that had conveyed the forces of the consuls to Dyrrachium returned
and made
its
way
into the harbor.
Pompey determined
at
once to leave Brundisium with the balance of his force.
He
strengthened the city walls and barricaded the streets, lest
Caesar should enter the town from the land side while he was
embarking.
The
citizens
were distinctly in favor of Caesar,
designs.
and gave him
notice of
Pompey's
But owing
to the
defenses erected by Pompey, consisting of entanglements of
various kinds and excellent
intrenchments, and to a rear-
guard of chosen men that he left on the walls while he was embarking, which he did at night, Caesar was entirely deceived as to Pompey's actual movements, and was prepared
to do nothing to harass his retreat.
irritated at the high-handedness of
This, though the citizens,
Pompey's
soldiers,
sought
to give
Caesar notice of what
Pompey was
doing.
The
426
POMPEY'S ESCAPE.
which Pompey managed the retreat was markedly He got embarked before Caesar reached the walls
in
manner
good.
with his scaling ladders, and as the notice of the entanglements within had made the latter overcautious, Pompey
sailed out of the port before Caesar could get to
it.
The
only mishap which befell Pompey was that two of his ships laden with soldiers became entangled in the harbor chain
and
at the mole,
Pompey
and were captured. thus escaped, despite Caesar's efforts to bring
and as he had taken possession of
him
to battle in Italy ;
all the
ships on the coast, and Caesar could procure none from nearer than Gaul and Spain, the latter was, as he says, com-
pelled to give over all present idea of following his enemy.
he shut Pompey up in Brundisium, he might have ended the war there, instead of having to spend more than
four additional years in pursuing Pompey 's partisans all around the Mediterranean basin. It is certain that Caesar
Had
began to appreciate the difference between fighting barbarians and Eomans. Still he had good cause to be satisfied
with what he had accomplished.
against
He had
been waging war
Pompey
the Great,
the idol of the
Roman
people.
from crossing the Rubicon, he had put himself in possession of all Italy. He must have been
Yet
in sixty days
keenly alive to his
tary success.
own
superiority in all that breeds mili-
His decision, energy and speed stand out in
strange contrast to the weakness, the vacillation of
Pompey.
Caesar had unquestionably gained by getting possession of But his responsibilities and risks had increased in Italy.
equal measure.
A very considerable part of
Pompey 's mercy, who
his entire force
must now go to garrison the peninsula, which would reduce his military power correspondingly. As he had no fleet,
Italy
was largely
its
at
could cut
it off
from
grain supplies in Sicily, Sardinia
and Egypt.
The
CHANGE OF CESAR'S PLAN.
427
revenues of the East would no longer flow into Roman coffers they would all be stopped midway by Pompey ; and
;
yet Italy had grave need of these contributions, for every-
thing had been organized on a spendthrift scale. Moreover, Caesar was not at first looked on, even by the people whose champion he was, with a feeling of security. Many of his
adherents in power were dissolute, irresponsible men, deeply in debt and reckless. People had seriously feared a return
of the Marius-Sulla horrors.
But
it
was not long before
Italy
practically monarch,
Caesar succeeded in reassuring people on this head.
became
tranquil.
Though Caesar was
of
every one saw that the change
better.
masters was for the
Caesar
escape to
now changed his plans to accord with Pompey's Greece. He commanded the coast towns to procure
and send them
to Brundisium.
ships from whatever source,
He
ordered the construction of two
new
fleets,
one on the
Adriatic, one in Etruria, which Dolabella and Hortensius
should respectively command. Valerius the legate he sent to Sardinia with one legion; Curio the propraetor_he ordered to
Sicily_
which was of the highest importance as a granary with three legions made up of cohorts captured at Cor-
and instructed him, after securing the island, to proceed to Africa, where the government was in dispute by rival Pompeian factions and could perhaps
levies,
finium and one of
new
be brought over to his side. On their arrival, these lieutenants found both Sardinia and Sicily hastily abandoned by
their respective governors,
M. Cotta and M. Cato
(who, like
the rest, seemed to have taken fright at Caesar's approach),
and the population
fallen
from Pompey's and favorably
The Cavalitans in Sardidisposed towards Caesar's cause. nia drove out Cotta Cato, who was energetically equipping
;
vessels
and recruiting for Pompey, feeling that he was unable
428
POMPEY'S STRATEGIC PLAN.
to hold the island for his chief, took ship for Epirus to join
him.
,
Here was a large and easily gotten advantage. The province of Africa had fallen by lot to Tubero
his province the
control.
at
but
when he reached
Varus in
lost his
new governor found Attius
be remembered, had
This
officer, it will
army
Auximum, had
fled to Africa,
which seemed
to be a limitless refuge for all the aristocrats,
and finding no
governor on hand had assumed the reins, and raised two legions. Having formerly been praetor in Africa, he had
been able to do
of law
this
without
much
opposition.
As
the days
up his and drove him from the
and order seemed past, Varus did not propose to give power, resisted the attempt of Tubero to land at Utica,
coast.
Pompey had been
to facing the
misled by his calculation on the influence
It
of the aristocratic party in Italy.
of the facts which
democrats headed 'by had determined him to leave Italy and to
had proved unequal This was one Caesar.
make Greece
part to hold
his battle-ground.
He had abandoned
and
it
the best
part of the national prize to Caesar,
it.
was now Caesar's
There were seven legions of Pompey 's in Spain. These were, say the Commentaries, a constant and serious threat to
Gaul; or they might indeed be brought to
Italy.
Caesar
deemed these legions
more
immediately dangerous than
Pompey.
to Hellas, Caesar
While, therefore, Pompey was flying from Caesar saw that he might be compelled to turn
from Pompey to Iberia.
It is probable that
Pompey had formulated a broad
it
strategic
plan.
We are not told what
in the
was, but an occasional stateguess.
Italy,
ment
^Not
Commentaries and elsewhere helps us to anticipating Caesar's sudden irruption into
Pompey had expected to quietly finish his preparations and then carry the war against Caesar into Gaul, from Spain and
POMPErS LOST CHANCE.
Italy at the
429
same moment.
With
time in his favor he could
fifteen to twenty whose favor he had won, legions, as his base. When this plan was frustrated by Caesar's active campaign, Pompey himself might have done well to go to Spain, where his legions and lieutenants were both
have thus marched into Gaul with from
and have
utilized Massilia,
efficient,
and
to
make
that country his theatre of war, leaving
Greece under a legate.
political
But Pompey was
his
tied
down
to his
associates,
and
Oriental resources were the
greater.
He
could not look at the matter coolly as a mere
military problem.
His vacillation persuaded him to ship to Greece and abandon Italy to the democratic party, headed
Caesar.
is
by
no question that Pompey, with half the mental activity of Caesar, could have held himself in the Italian But the keystone peninsula instead of decamping from it.
of
There
war
is
preparation,
and Pompey had not made any.
His
temperament and actions were always of a laissez aller If he had begun his levies, Italian and Eastern, in nature.
he had brought half his Spanish legions to Italy, Cesar's task could have been made all but impossible on the
season;
if
lines
in
he had chosen. As it was, Pompey's personal presence Picenum might have turned the scale. For Pompey, at
his best, could exercise
If he could not hold
on.
an influence few men could equal. Rome, he might have held some point
all the
the coast, every rood of which he controlled with his fleet ;
and having summoned forces from have vastly outnumbered Caesar.
sit still
provinces he would
It stands to reason that to
while your opponent
is
actively pursuing his advan-
tages can result but in disaster.
in his contests with
We
shajl_8ee that Caesar,
third-rate generals,
Roman
troops and
was wont to exhibit great caution. Would he not have been less apt to make rapid progress had he known, so soon as he
CESAR'S ARGUMENT.
reached Ancona, that
431
Pompey
the Great stood personally at
the head of even the fresh levies which lay athwart his path ? For Caesar had not then as fully gauged his opponent as he
later did.
Pompey's first great error lay in entering on without preparing for war this he followed up by a greater one in deserting Italy without a struggle.
;
As
to Caesar, it is
by no means clear that he acted wisely
to Spain,
in undertaking a
campaign
instead of
at
once
Every month he gave Pompey following up Pompey. enabled the latter to collect more men and material and made him a more dangerous opponent. Though Spain was rich
and a valuable
though Caesar must prevent the Spanish forces from operating on his rear, it would seem that to leave Italy, not to follow Pompey but to go to Spain
acquisition,
directly
of the moral strength which he
away from Pompey, threatened to lose him a part had acquired by his own
.
boldness in pushing into Italy and by Pompey's hebetude in Caesar had to march overland to Spain ; crossing to Greece.
why not march through Illyricum to Greece, and following up Pompey push him to the wall ? It may be said that Caesar
counted on Pompey's character, which he well knew, and concluded that Pompey would not attempt to return to Italy. But was this not reckoning without his host? How could
Caesar believe that
Pompey would behave with such
unmili-
tary laxness ?
he not underrating his opponent ? His reasons given in the Commentaries are, taken alone, quite insufficient to account for his movement to Spain instead of
Was
on Pompey, in Greece. And Caesar's dangerous campaign and narrow escape from disaster in Epirus, after Pompey had
show that he was giving his opponent a manifest advantage by not attacking him before he
raised his Eastern army,
collected his forces.
We
may assume
that Caesar argued that
if
he
left for
432
CAESAR'S
GENERAL PLAN.
in Italy,
Greece, his absence might give rise to partisan movements which the presence of the seven Pompeian legions,
easily transferred
disfavor;
that
natural base,
Rome, might turn to his draw him away from his Pompey might which was Italy backed by Gaul; that he
to
from Spain
hoped that by eliminating the Spanish question he would be In other words, more able to attack Pompey to advantage.
he
felt that Italy
was not
his so long as
Pompey had
seven
legions in Spain, and he was unwilling to move on Pompey, with Italy for a base, unless this base was secure beyond
This was well enough. But could he not a peradventure. have neutralized the seven Pompeian legions quoad Gaul by
a lesser force of his veterans at the Pyrenees, and
strategically stronger
still
be
ricum before the
raised
latter
by moving on Pompey through Illyhad concentrated all his forces, or
to strike
more?
The time
feared to be struck.
And was
not
Pompey was when he most Pompey in Greece, with
his limitless resources,
legions
in
's
Spain?
How
a far graver threat than the seven could Caesar safely reckon on
Pompey not returning to Italy so soon as himself had left? It will always remain a question whether Caesar could not
have moved on Pompey, through Illyricuin, most of his were easily available for such a march, and have legions
defeated him, or driven
of his enemy, before
him
into flight with a hearty dread
any
serious danger
would happen from
Caesar's
the activity of the Spanish legions.
lieutenants were better
And
Gallic
legates,
men than Pompey's Spanish
and might be
against them.
fairly relied
on to hold the Pyrenean country
All these arguments are based on assumptions. Little is told us by the Commentaries about Caesar's reasons for his
actions.
"I am
setting forth to fight
an army without a
leader," said he, "so as
by and by
to fight a leader without
C&SAR IN ROME.
an army."
433
All we are told
is
Aphorisms do not explain.
that Caesar determined to go to Spain.
After quartering his legions for rest in the chief municipal
towns, Caesar went to Rome, had the tribunes call together
on the 3d of March what remained of the
stated his grievances.
Senate and
should be
He
claimed that
Pompey
made to obey the law as he himself was willing to do, and demanded that ambassadors should be sent to P-ompey to
effect
reconciliation
between
them.
But no
one was
found who cared to act as envoy, for Pompey had declared that those who remained in Rome were as much his enemies
as those
who were
in Cesar's camp.
little.
Caesar was able to accomplish
His secret enemies
left
were
still
numerous
in
Rome.
Before he
the city, he
appropriated from the treasury the fund deposited there to defend the city against the Gauls, alleging that, as he had
conquered them, there was no further use for it. The tribune Metellus attempted to prevent him from so doing, but " Caesar drew his sword upon him, exclaiming Young man,
:
it
is
as easy to do this as to say
it
"
!
The money was soon
expended, and Caesar, not long after, was obliged to borrow money from his officers to pay his legions. It must have
been a strange spectacle to Roman citizens to see the treaCaesar was sury thus despoiled; but they were powerless.
sole master.
Caesar had his legions strung out from
Gaul
to
Sicily.
He
was not well concentrated and had
to
make many changes
to accord with his
new
plans.
His fresh troops he stationed
in Apulia and along the Adriatic Sea, garrisoned the coast towns having good harbors, ordered the Eighth, Twelfth and Thirteenth legions back towards Gaul, whence he had
already drawn Trebonius with his three legions, and concentrated these and Fabius' three in the Narbonese. Then he
434
MASSILIA.
placed his Eoman interests in the hands of Marcus Lepidus, gave the military command in Italy to Mark Antony, and
put Illyricum under Caius Antonius and Cisalpine Gaul under Licinius Crassus. He released Aristobulus, king of
the Jews,
return
who was captive in Rome, hoping he would on his home oppose the recruiting of Pompey's lieutenant,
After completing these preparations he
left
Scipio, in Syria.
Rome March
9,
and went to the province of Transalpine
Gaul, thence over the Corniche towards Massilia, the vicinity of which he reached in about twelve days.
Meanwhile Vibullius Rufus, whom Caesar set at liberty at Corfinium, had gone to Spain to act for Pompey. Domitius,
who, we remember, was Caesar's successor as governor of Gaul, on the appointment of the Senate, had got friends
at Igilium
out seven rowing galleys for him, and had sailed for Massilia. As Caesar marched along the
to
fit
and Cosa
coast he heard that Massilia
had
collected all the corn
from
the vicinity and fortified the town, and that Pompey's adherents had roused the citizens in his favor.
They had
also
procured the aid of the Albici, near-by mountain tribes of the Western Alps, between the modern Durance and Verdon
rivers.
of the principal citizens of
So soon as he reached the place Caesar invited some Massilia to come to him, and
endeavored to talk them over to his cause.
eloquence proved vain.
But
for once his
The
magistrates claimed that they
Caesar,
had received equal favors from Pompey as from
and
could in good faith give allegiance to neither, nor admit the forces of either to their town or harbor. Domitius, during
the parley, arrived with his
fleet,
was admitted
to the harbor,
and made governor of the place. no means of stopping him.
Domitius at once
all
Caesar, without ships,
had
set to fitting out
fleet.
He
seized on
the
merchantmen which were
in the harbor or in the
MATTERS IN
vicinity,
SPAIN.
435
which
and confiscated
their cargoes, mostly corn,
was
laid
up
for a siege.
Caesar, incensed that a town in the
Province should
compromised by
its
thus turn against him, as well as all but for Massilia, with the aid of treachery
the Albici, might cut at Aquae Sextiae the road from Italy to Spain began to provide means for besieging the place.
He
for
could not leave
it
it
in his rear without at least
a blockade,
was one of the most important towns on the MediterHe built ranean, and its example might prove disastrous. and equipped twelve
vessels in the short space of thirty days,
at Arelas near by, placed these under
skillful victor of the Veneti,
Decimus Brutus, the
and
left
Trebonius with the three
legions he was marching towards Narbo to invest the place. He himself began the construction of a line of contravallation.
in Narbo.
Fabius' three legions had, we remember, been wintering Caesar sent word to Antony to hurry up the
Eighth, Twelfth and Thirteenth, already on the march, and diverted them from Gaul towards Spain. Meanwhile he disFabius into Spain, with the three legions at Narbo, patched
to occupy the passes in the Pyrenees, in advance of his
own
coming. Fabius marched with speed enough to dislodge a small party of Pompey's adherents (part of the forces under
L. Afranius) from the passes in the Pyrenees, and descended into Spain. It had been the purpose of Afranius and
Petreius to occupy the Pyrenees, but Fabius anticipated
them.
Vibullius Rufus had recently arrived with instructions to
assume supervisory charge on behalf of Pompey of all HisBut the several generals remained in command of pania.
their respective armies.
The
lieutenants
who had been
there
before, L. Afranius,
M.
Petreius and
M.
Varro, with seven
legions, divided the peninsula between them, each practically
436
POMPEIANS IN SPAIN.
Afranius, who had served under Pompey independent. Sertorius and Mithridates, had three legions in against
Hither Spain,
west
;
i.
e.,
Catalonia and the territory south and
Petreius had two near the river
Anas
and Varro had
getting news
two between the Anas and
the west coast.
On
of the happenings in Italy and at Massilia, Petreius
marched
towards Afranius, and joined forces near Ilerda (Lerida), on the Sicoris (Segre), early in April, while Varro was left to
Pompey's Spanish Legions.
hold the western part of the peninsula. The five legions of Afranius and Petreius were increased by a large force of
auxiliaries
and horse recruited by these
legates.
In
all
Spain
there were the seven legions mentioned, six being old Italian legions and one Spanish; eighty cohorts of auxiliaries, those
from Hither Spain with shields, those from Farther Spain with round leather targets and five thousand Spanish horse. It is difficult to estimate these forces. At normal
;
RAISING MONEY.
strength they would
437
number eighty-seven thousand men.
they were of good average field strength alone, say four hundred men to a cohort, they would count but sixtyif
But
five
thousand, with
cavalry some
seventy thousand men.
legions
on the ground, the three to arrive by and by from Italy, five thousand Gallic foot-auxiliaries, three thousand horse of old German
Cassar counted Fabius with three
and Gallic
troops,
and the same number
of
new
foot
and
horse recruited of the best material, of
whom
those of most
repute were from the Aquitani and neighboring mountaineers.
The
total of these forces is equally
hard to estimate.
Probably the Cffisarian cohorts fell below those of Pompey's
lieutenants,
of war.
If his cohort
which had not been ground down by the attrition numbered three hundred and sixty
men, as we formerly called them, the total under the eagles would have been thirty-seven thousand six hundred. It was
no doubt under forty thousand men but the army was veteran and included many of the best of the Gallic chiefs.
;
Stoffel estimates that
Fabius had twenty-five thousand men,
or with the three legions yet to arrive thirty-six thousand
men.
These
are, as estimates, close enough.
Caesar had used up all his moneys, including the large
sum which he took from the Roman treasury, to pay his He now adopted a novel course of conduct to raise legions.
more.
He
borrowed various sums from
his tribunes
and
centurions and distributed the
soldiers.
money among the private thus secured the good will of the latter by his gifts and the adherence of the former on account of the loan.
He
This certainly original proceeding was perhaps justifiable in view of the fact that Roman legionaries were now for the first
time in this war to meet
double hold on the fidelity of his
fortune.
Romans in hostile array, and a men was a further bond to
xxvin.
ILERDA. APRIL TO JUNE, 49
AFKANHJS and Petreius held Herda.
leaving the fleet at Massilia.
B. C.
Caesar sent Fabius ahead with his army, he himself came up he at once advanced on the Pompeians, who declined battle. Caesar camped near by and shortly essayed to capture a hill -which lay between the Pompeian camp and the city.
When
In this he was checked by his veterans becoming demoralized, but in a fight under the walls of Ilerda got the better of the enemy. For a long while the contention of each army was confined to foraging and seeking to disturb its
rival in foraging.
Bat
shortly a serious storm and flood cut Caesar off
;
from his
which
base,
by
destroying his bridges over the Sicoris
the
enemy kept
theirs
was a
solid one of stone.
In Ciesar's camp there was great
distress,
and a con-
voy comJDgJjkhun from Gaul jraaalyoat aantoifld by the Pympefons. Caesar contrived a bridg nt jffgti frf Tfhjflh victualed JiajaaEadJ3lfl_flOinroy jnd again
bJsarjny. 9&*^^
The Pompeians began
to lose energy.
FROM
the Iberus to the vicinity of Ilerda the country
is
mountainous and in Czesar's day was in part heavily wooded. North of Ilerda the country was level, and it is well com-
manded by the on the bank of
city,
the Sicoris.
which stands on a bold, prominent rock While Ilerda was an excellent
it
place for tactical defensive purposes,
was not a
strategic
point from which central Spain could be controlled or even The river Ebro was the true line of defense, protected.
but the Pompeian lieutenants not only did riot hold this, but did not even have secure communications with the river and
the interior beyond.
Having by delay
forfeited the Pyre-
nees, they were short-sighted in relying solely
on Ilerda to
protect Spain.
They took up the position "on account of
the advantages of the situation."
On
reaching Ilerda, about April 20, which he had done
OPERATIONS AT ILERDA.
"by hasty marches" from
the
439
Fabius found
Pyrenees,
Afranius strongly camped, some eight hundred paces south
Herda and
Vicinity.
on the right bank of the river Sicoris. The cavalry lay between this camp and the river, in the plain. The situation of the town made it
of the town,
on an isolated
hill
440
FABIUS AT ILERDA.
Between camp and town lay another piece inexpugnable. of slightly elevated ground, the south part of it nearer the
camp than
ius
the town.
In
to
this location
Afranius and Petre-
had determined
could arrive,
keep on the defensive till Pompey for their chief was reported to be on his way
How the rumor originated through Mauretania to join them. it is hard to say. There was no foundation whatsoever for
it.
The Pompeians had accumulated goodly
still
supplies of
food in Ilerda, but
not enough to last through a long campaign. They imagined, however, that they could here hold the road into the interior of Spain against Caesar's
forces.
Fabius went into camp and intrenched on the right bank
of the Sicoris, about three miles
on the slope of a
the river.
hill,
upstream from Afranius, between two brooks discharging into
the inclinations of the neigh-
Here he "sounded
boring states by letters and messengers." He was joined not far from the middle of May by the three legions from Italy. He had made two bridges over the Sicoris, one near the left
flank of his camp, the other four miles upstream.
Afranius
had control of the stone bridge
Each army used
at the town.^jL to send across their own bridges
on for-
aging expeditions, because the corn supply on the right bank was exhausted, and constant skirmishing resulted. On the
21st of
May, when Fabius had
and two
sent his foragers, under cover
of his cavalry
legions, across the lower of the bridges,
the weight of the train and troops, and the high water, broke it down before the horse could cross, and cut the infantry off
.
from that in camp. The party none the less kept on its way, Seeing the debris of the bridge anticipating no danger.
floating
the stream, Afranius guessed the reason and, four legions and all his cavalry from Ilerda over marching his own bridge, attacked the two legions thus left without
down
CAESAR ARRIVES.
support.
441
L. Plancus, the legate who was in command of
the Caesarian party, "took post on a rising ground and
drew
up
his
army with two
fronts,"
perhaps meaning a square,
to resist the enemy's
perhaps that each legion backed on the other with a cohort
so drawn up across the flanks, This was a formation cavalry.
as"
later
used by Caesar at
less in use.
Ruspina, and may have been more or
nius.
Here
Plancus bravely held head against a furious attack by AfraBefore the enemy had His defense succeeded.
any serious injury on him, Fabius was seen to be He had approaching with a reinforcement of two legions.
inflicted
made
the circuit over the upper bridge
by a forced march
in
light order.
deemed
it
This put an end to the combat, as Afranius wise to withdraw. The broken bridge was speedily
repaired.
days after this encounter, Caesar arrived with a bodyhundred horse. After thoroughly reconnoiguard the topography of the region, he at once began active tring
of nine
Two
operations.
He
felt that
he had no time to waste.
Every
in
week was adding
Greece.
to the potential strength of
Pompey
the
One
is
of the
most noticeable features of
all Caesar's
campaigns
the restless, unceasing activity of
man.
He^never
sits
down
to await events.
He
puts his
hand^o
working out the problem so soon as he encounters it. His speed in planning; is_ as remarkable as the rapidity of his
execution.
tions.
He
never waits for the enemy to initiate operaTIP.
This
prftrngaiivp.
-reserves to himself.
He now
one from each legion to guard the camp, and baggage, and "with all his forces drawn up in bridges " in battle order, and then faced to the right into three lines
left six cohorts
column of march, he moved to Ilerda, marshaled his legions opposite the Pompeian camp, and offered Afranius battle on
equal terms.
But Afranius, though he drew out
his forces
442
DANGEROUS CAMP.
with a show of resolution, finally declined it. He was well enough off as he was, and wished to wait for Pompey's
arrival.
Caesar,
after remaining in line
all
day, though
barely half a mile from the enemy's
the hill on which
it
lay,
camp and at the foot of determined to remain where he was,
the moral gain of seeing
for protection,
instead of giving the
retire
;
enemy
him
kept out his two
first lines
and with
his third line unobserved
began to fortify the front line of a camp with a trench some two thousand feet from the foot No rampart waa. at -first added, lest Afranius the hill.
should attack during the_inceptfo)ti of the work? which he would be able to see from the greater prominence of the
rampart.
two
first
Hejsould not see the diteh^JhMd.en in rear of the An additional reason for omitting the ramlines.
part may have been that the legionaries were not provided with palisades ; there were none to be obtained close at hand, and it would have been dangerous to send to a distance for
them.
This camping in the open plain in the close vicinity of the enemy was a bold thing to do, if it was not a wise one.
reminds one of old Friedrich camping in the very teeth of the Austrians before the battle of Hochkirch. Caesar
It
does not sufficiently explain what he purposed to accomplish by this proceeding, quite un-Roman and without precedent. The troops lay on their arms all night behind the ditch.
Having thus made a beginning,
for a day or two Caesar
continued to intrench the other fronts of the camp, keeping
at all times a large force behind the front ditch for protection,
and paid no heed
to Afranius
and Petreius, who each
day drew up as
for battle not far off but on their slope.
When
the ditch was finished, on the third day, Caesar added
a rampart to the camp; and after the whole thing was completed, on the same day drew in the baggage and cohorts
CAESAR'S FIRST ATTACK.
from the
was
tbft
first
443
camp up
the river.
;
The
it
location of the
camp
in every sense unfavorable
but
enabled Ca3sar to cut
Pompeians
off from-t'oraging
on the right bank of the
river.
hill.
Afranius and Petreius were, as stated, encamped upon a Between them and Ilerda was a plain some five hun-
dred yards broad, with the slight eminence in the middle, already mentioned, which had abrupt sides about fifty feet high on the south. It occurred to Caesar_thatL he wouldjtry to take this eminence, which Afranius had neglected to fortify, because its possession would cut the Pompeian camp
Lj
'
f2
from the town where were the supplies, and from safe access to the bridge by the use of which alone they could
off
contrive to forage
on the
I?ft
bank.
This was of
itself
an
admirable diversion, but
it
was not expertly managed.
The
hiUwas
nearer the
enemy than
to Caesar, so that the latter
must employ ruse to seize it, as the Pompeians were always on the watch. Instead of sending a party thither by night,
which would seem to have been his better plan, Caesar drew
up three
legions of his
army
as
if
again to offer battle,
Cl\&
extending them from opposite the Pompeian camp to opposite The Ninth and Fourteenth legions were respectively Ilerda.
in the centre
//~V
and on the
left.
The duty
of the latter
hill.
was
at
the proper
moment
to advance
and take the
It is prob-
able that only the
first
Fourteenth were thrown upon the
_two ranks, or the antesignani, of the hill. At all events the
attack was not perfectly planned, nor delivered with sufficient vim or speed. Afranius was on the watch. He had no
intention of accepting an offer of battle
by
Caesar, but divin-
ing his purpose from some of his movements, he groved too quick for his opponent. He could not permit himself to be
thus cut
off.
He
threw forward those of his cohorts which
antici-
happened
to
be on guard on the north of his camp to
444
ODD TACTICS.
These cohorts, having " a nearer way " pate the movement. to the hill, as Caesar alleges, though this is not borne out by
the topography, reached
it first
and drove back Caesar's men.
r|
n& /?*
'^-f ^>^ $??/? CAMP
c.
yQ- \V>P
$?JW A
Attack on
Ilerda.
Even a reinforcement did not
"
suffice
to carry the hill.
They were obliged to turn their backs, and retreat to the
standard of the legions."
The method of fighting of Afranius* men, and they were war-hardened veterans, was peculiar. They had learned it in combats with the Lusitanians and other barbarians of Spain.
Instead of fighting in close order in the usual legionary manner, they scattered in small parties, and taking ad van tage of Jheaccidents of the ground advanced or retired, fight-
CAESAR CHECKED.
ing in loose order.
445
"If hard pressed they thought it no It seems to have disgrace to retire and give up the post." sort jjf loose order in groups? which advanced by short been_a
much like the system which has obtained in recent days against the decimation of the
rushes from one cover to another
arms
of precision.
Unused
the rushes of some of
method and fearing that these small groups from hiding would
to this
jeopardize their exposed (right) flank, Caesar's legionaries
were
at
first
i.
considerably unsettled, and
when
its
"advanced
e., antesignani, felljback_ from the eminence, the guard," Fourteenth legion also gave way, and retreating to the next
hill
in
its
rear,
not_only weakened the entire
line,
but
imparted a feeling of insecurity to
all the legionaries.
The
effect of this lose of confidence Caesar
saw that he
must immediately overcome. Ninth legion, which was in
teenth,
He
line
seized on
and headed the
on the right of the Four-
and while covering the retirement of his beaten men, a bold onslaught drove the enemy back in ^nfiision. by Part retreated over the hill in dispute, as_far as the walls of
Ilerda,
where they stopped and drew up
part appear to have
retired to their camp.
Ilerda was built on a rock which stands
up boldly
five
above the plain, with a plateau of some one hundred and fifty acres on the top. Every side of this rock
feet
is
hundred
practically inaccessible to assault except that
is
on the south.
Here, in a sort of ravine,
a slope, up which ran the road to
the town, some six hundred yards long from the plain.
the plain the
Near
mouth
of the ravine
is
some three hundred and
fifty yards wide ; at the town, about a third that width. It was between the two walls of the ravine that the enemy
turned, and backing against the fortifications of the town
awaited
success,
Caesar's
Ninth
legion.
Emboldened by
their
and advancing too far in
their eagerness to efface
446
SEVERE CONTEST.
it
their comrades' defeat, this legion got engaged on an up-slope
where
had
difficulty in
disengaging
itself.
Its situation
was
critical.
It
there met the enemy's
it
had advanced well up the rocky hillside, and line, which it could not destroy; when
essayed to retire the
enemy
to the
ground.
The approach
fell upon it from the higher town on which they stood was
flanked with craggy sides.
There was but one way down,
Ilerda,
from the Northeast.
the
way they had come.
The enemy's men not only
stood
where they could use their weapons to excellent effect, but no aid could be put in on the flanks of the Ninth, nor the
cavalry be of the slightest service.
Meanwhile the enemy
was fighting with his back to the town, and felt confidence There was room along the approach for but a accordingly. front of three cohorts, and though Caesar had had no idea of coming
to close quarters
on such bad ground, he was con-
strained to send in, from time to time, out of the troops he
could not use, fresh forces to relieve the weary.
likewise did.
And
this the
"Cohorts were frequently sent to their enemy aid by a circuit from the camp through the town," which seems to argue that there was access to the plateau from the
river side, at least for friends.
The contest raged on this narrow slope for five hours. Neither line gave way, and Caesar could not well extricate
DRAWN COMBAT.
his
447
men
without danger of demoralization.
He
ently sent in as
many
successive cohorts as could fight ones.
to
had apparon
continue
the narrow front, and kept- "
it
was which enabled the three cohorts front
loss of heart.
to light five hours without
Finally Caesar's
the sight of this
legionaries exhausted their
javelins.
At
the
enemy renewed their efforts, resolved to hold their own. Caesar was threatened with disaster but under the inspira;
tion of his personal appeals the
men persuaded
themselves to
make one
hill
last effort, drew their swords, and charging up the on the enemy's cohorts, drove them in disorder to the
Under cover of this charge they withvery walls of Ilerda. to file in to a point where the cayalry_was able on the flanks, "which though stationed on sloping or low
drew down
ground, yet bravely struggled to the top of the hill and riding_between the ""two armies made our retreat more easy mw and^sficjuxe." Cavalry here was enacting one of its chief
'
'
BII
roles to great advantage.
This, added to the smart attack
enemy from following. The combat waa drawn. I^etiring_to camp, Caesar found thatjhe had lost in all one centurion and seventy men killed and six hundred wounded. The enemy's loss in killed
of the foot, prevented the
alone, as the
Commentaries claim, was two hundred, with
five centurions.
Considering given. that the combat had been hotly contested for five hours, this was not so serious a loss. It shows how safe the Roman
legionary was with his excellent armor and broad and skillfully handled shield, so long as he did not
It is to
The wounded are not
break his ranks.
be observed in a generainvay that while the losses of a thoroughly defeated enemy were often in olden times
awful beyond anything we know to-day, the losses of the victors were usually by no means heavy; and the casualties
of ordinary
campaign work,
outpost and picket fighting,
448
such as
far
WHOSE VICTORY f
we
are familiar with and which are frequently
more numerous than those of pitched battles, were small compared to those of modern days. The percentage of loss
by wounds in one of Caesar's campaigns was as a Each party claimed the victory in the fight
Caesar's
rule low.
at
Ilerda;
because, though they had at first fallen back, they had forced the enemy to his gates and liftl^ Jn'm there,
men
and had moreover driven him uphill with the sword, an unusual feat; jAfranius' men because they had kept and
\gere able to fortify the
i*^
eminence in dispute. This they did with strong works and put a garrison in them.
Caesar's operation so far
had for
result that his cavalry
which was
far superior to Afranius*
could hold the sur-
rounding territory, and by watching the bridges could prevent Afranius from foraging at large on the farther side of
the Sicoris.
later drive
He
foresaw that want of bread would sooner or
Afranius from his position. Still Caesar must lave keenly felt the fact that he had in his first combat with
ioman troops quite failed to accomplish what he set out to His luck had for the moment turned on him, and this do.
n a contest with an
officer
of minor rank
and
ability.
No doubt
the fight.
here, too, his persuasive words were
advantage in satisfying his soldiers that they
employed to had really won
But
to construe the
Commentaries as we often
have to do in the Gallic War,
like
this affair at Ilerda looks
more
it
a defeat for Caesar than a drawn
battle.
Nor can
was
be
said that the attempt to seize the hill in question
liantly conceived or executed.
bril-
Rather
is
Afranius' defense
to be
commended.
days after the battle a serious disaster happened. The melting snows poured down from
their
Two
severe storm arose.
the mountains in a vast flood, and the waters of the river
overflowed
banks
"it
was agreed that
there
had
SERIOUS DISASTER.
449
and never been seen higher floods in those countries" swept away both of Caesar's bridges, which were of but temporary construction. The camp was flooded by the brook which ran through it. Caesar found himself cut off from his
communications with Gaul, and shut in between the two
rivers
still
Cinga and Sicoris, over the latter of which Afranius had a bridge, and Caesar now had none. No fords were
within thirty miles. Afranius had previously gathered a the corn of the immediate vicinity, so that foraging wa
difficult,
and the
light
troops attached
to
the
army
o:
1
Afranius kept up a harassing small-war. His Lusitanians and targeteers of Hither Spain could easily swim the river,
it is the custom of all those people not to join the without bladders," and Caesar was no longer able to army interfere with the foraging of Afranius on the left bank.
"because
Worse than
all,
Caesar's convoys could not reach him.
large force of foragers had been prevented from returning to
camp. The friendly states could not get to him with corn, and the new crops were not yet ripe. All the cattle had
been removed to a great distance. There were no boats to be had, for Afranius had secured these long ago. Caesar's
rations
grew supplied, and
short.
his
own bridge was
Afranius, on the contrary, was well still intact, which enabled
him
to cross the Sicoris, not only to forage, but to receive
supplies
from the
interior of Spain.
The
tables were turned.
The height
of water, the
sition prevented Caesar
rough banks and the enemy's oppofrom repairing the bridges, "it
was no easy matter at one and the same time to execute a work in a very rapid flood and to avoid the darts," and any attempt to cross small parties was headed cohorts of the enemy, which lined the banks.
off
by the
A
Gaul
still
was that a large convoy from including slaves and freedmen, some six thousand
fatal matter
more
450
souls all told
fact,
SCARCITY.
was near
at hand,
and Afranius knew the
and
all his
and had
set out with three legions
cavalry to
In this convoy "there was no order or regular attih'k it. discipline, as every one followed his own humor, and all traveled without apprehension," knowing nothing of the
disaster to Caesar's bridges.
Reaching the convoy, Afranius
horse
summarily fell upon it, and but for the courage of the Gallic which now as always behaved with consummate might have corralled the whole body, in which gallantry
"there were several young noblemen, sons of senators and of
equestri^iLxank ; there were ambassadors from several states ; But to the aid of the therj!_were lieutenants of Caesar's."
and daring of the Gallic horse came the faultiness of Afranius' dispositions, which lacked both vigor and ability.
skill
These men held Afranius' forces at a distance by skirmishing about his legions in their own peculiar manner, and thus
The loss -was enabled the convoy to retreat to the uplands. two hundred bowmen, some horse and non-combatants, and
baggage. All these disasters made provisions scarce and high. Corn reached fifty denarii a bushel. "The want of corn had
diminished the strength of the soldiers." Cattle were got, but by great efforts only. Caesar was obliged to forage at a
considerable distance.
to encourage the
little
This series of misadventures tended
enemy, and, reported at Rome, as they were
believe that Caesar's fortunes were at
actually
very circumstantially by Afranius, began to lead people to an end. Had Pompey
this moment, as he jjhould have Caesar might well have been in bad case. But did not deem it essential to come. He was waiting Pompey for Caesar in Greece.
come
to
Spain at
done,
Caesar's resources in corn were small; but in intelligence
and audacity they had as yet scarcely been taxed.
He deter-
A NOVEL BRIDGE.
451
rained to cross the Sicoris, whatever the difficulty or danger,
reestablish his
communications with Gaul, and rescue his
convoy.
He^
built a lot of boats
whose keels and ribs were
a
of light timber, covered with wickerwork and hides,
Rescue of Convoy.
trick he
had learned
in Britain.
on wagons
in one night,
These he now transported -two miles from camp, up the twenty
>
y
river to a place already selected, near the
modern
village of
San Llorens.^ Here he sent a body of men across, who seized upon and fortified unperceived a hill on the opposite shore; and to this place he soon transported a legion. Then, by
beginning a bridge at both ends under cover of thia force^. he
finished
it
in
foragers across to
two days and safely brought his convoy and camp (June 11). At the same time he put
452
FIGHT AT MASSILIA.
over a large body of horse, and sending it out at an opportune moment, he surrounded the enemy ^dispersed as foragers,
and captured a great store of men and provisions; and when some Spanish light-armed cohorts came to the rescue, a part
o_ the
drove
horse protected the plunder, while another advanced
it
against the enemy, cut off one cohort, put
off the rest in disorder,
to the sword,
and returned
to
camp, across
of provisions
the bridge, with
much
booty.
The question
of Afranius
was thus
settled,
and the superiority
time,
and Petreius
at once vanished into thin air.
During
this
there was
a naval
engagement
at
Massilia between the forces of Domitius and Brutus, near an
island (modern Rattonneaux), opposite the town, where Caesar's fleet
was
stationed.
the
number
of his vessels.
The enemy was largely superior in He had seventeen war -galleys,
eleven decked and
many smaller ones, well manned by archers and the auxiliary Albici, and was the attacking parity. Brutus The Romans, though bravely sallied out to meet the enemy.
their rowers
rions, all
were new, had aboard antesignani and centuveterans of stanch courage, who for its honor had
For a while the skillful manosuvring requested this service. "The Massilians of the Massilians threatened disaster.
*&
>tv*
themselves, confiding in the quickness of their ships and the skill of their pilots, eluded ours, and evaded the shock, and
as long as they were permitted
by
clear space, lengthening
their line they endeavored to surround us, or to attack single
ships with several of theirs, or to run across our ships
and and
carry away our oars,
if
possible ;
but when necessity obliged
skill
them
to
come nearer, they had recourse, from the
art of the pilots, to the valor of the mountaineers.
But our
men, not having such expert seamen, or skillful pilots, for they had been hastily drafted from the merchant ships, and
were not yet acquainted even with the names of the rigging,
NAVAL VICTORY.
453
were, moreover, impeded by the heaviness and slowness of our vessels, which having been built in a hurry and of green
timber, were^ not so easily manoeuvred.
Caesar's
Therefore,
when
men had an
I
ii
opportunity of a close engagement, they
the^gra^pling throwing both ships fast, they fought on both side^ pf the dfylr. and boarded the enemy's and having killed numbers of the Albici
;
one of cheerfully opposed two of the enemy's ships with 4MiMvM^Mfe * ----'^^^"^rfBfcur in irons T and holding theirs. And
and shepherds, they sank some of their ships, took others with the men on frflardi jpd drove the rest into thaJiapbor.
That day the Massilians
were taken."
lost nine ships, including those that
The news
and
of this victory tended
much
to encourage the
forces at Derda.
as a result a
Caesar purposely exaggerated the success,
number
of towns
and native
tribes tendered
fealty
and corn, Osca, Calagurris, Tarraco, the Jacetani at the mouth of the Iberus, the Illurgari south of them, and
the Ausitani on the sea near the eastern end of the Pyrenees. Even a cohort of Illurgari, in the enemy's camp, deserted to
Caesar in a body.
Signum.
XXIX.
GOOD MANOEUVRING. JUNE,
battle.
49 B. C.
in
to
CESAR'S desire was to capture the Pompeian army instead of destroying it His new bridge was many miles up river. The stream was too full
build one farther down.
In order to have a means of crossing near Ilerda. he
cut a
number
of canals in a low island in the middle of the river to divert the
stream into
many
channels, thus lower the water and
well.
make an
artificial
ford.
The plan succeeded
The Pompeians determined
;
to retire to the Ebro.
They crossed the Sicoris on their bridge Caesar followed by way of his ford. The enemy sought to escape to the mountain-passes Caesar anticipated them
;
and thus cut
off their retreat.
They then
tried to return to Ilerda
Caesar folbattle
;
lowed, harassed and finally surrounded them.
Cii'sar,
The, legions
demanded
from water, the entire Pompeian army surrendered, on agreement that they should be discharged. Cassar had thus neutralized Pompey's whole force in Spain without a
anxious to spare
lives, refused.
Roman
Finally, cut off
general engagement.
Itjsone of
r his finest f eats juf iuana3uvriii<,
The
Ilerda
camDaig'n had lasted but six weeks.
THUS Fortune
took a turn.
Soon the
horse intimidated
"The enemy,
daunted by the courage of our horse, did not scour the country as freely or as boldly as before; but sometimes
advancing a small distance from the camp, that they, might a. Tflafly yflftrea.t, they foraged within narrower bounds ;
at
other times,
they took a longer circuit to avoid our
;
outposts and parties of horse or having sustained some loss, or descried our MM> HHM MM MIWHMdistance, they fled in the midst horse at a *^*iaM M aW *^^ ^*WM^M**MMMHIIM^MM>l *>^BMMMW^MKMWW^^M
'*IM'* ** '^ H of their expedition, their baggage behind them; at leaving
'
"
'
l'
length they resolved to leave off foraging for several days
and, contrary to the practice of
Anight."
all nations,
to ffl
jmt
at
The neighboring
tribes, too,
and many distant ones,
CLEVER ENGINEERING.
so soon as Caesar's success in their allegiance
455
and desert Afranius
of corn
was demonstrated, began to send and furnished the
;
army with plenty
and
cattle.
More than
this, the
rumors of Pompey approaching through Mauretania died away, which still more encouraged the adherents of Caesar.
In order to provide a nearer means of crossing the Sicoris than the bridge lately builtT and one less liable to interraptioii
than those which the floods had carried away, Caesar,
with his restless ingenuity, devised an artificial ford. Why he did not
rebuild the bridges which had been
destroyed by the high water, or construct others, it is hard to say.
A new flood was improbable.
less
Un-
the water was too high and
rapid,
or unless the
enemy was
more than usually
active in oppos-
ing the construction of bridges, the
labor involved in building several
bridges would have been small compared to that he undertook. Wood
floated
wus not near by, but it could be down from the mountains.
Artificial Ford.
There have been numberless constructions of the passage in the Commentaries which narrates this engineering feat
;
and many clever designs have been made to show how Caesar and produced this celebrated ford. What he really did
there can be no doubt that
is
it
was what
is
now to be
its
explained
as remarkable
by
its
simplicity as
by
ingenuity.
The
Sicoris, a mile or
more above
it
Ilerda, has a wide bed,
in which, in Caesar's day as now,
flowed in three channels,
The island leaving broad, sandy islands between them. nearest the right bank is half a mile long. Here, out of
456
THE POMPEIANS TROUBLED.
managed
to
dart-throwing distance from the enemy, by sinking a number
of drains thirty feet wide, he
draw
off
part of
the current of the Sicoris into the beds of these drains, and
by thus giving the volume of water more channel room, lowered the depth of the river so as to
places.
longer to This energetic and clever piece of engineering discouraged
make it fordable in The plan succeeded well. The horse needed no make the long detour by the San Llorens bridge.
Afranius and Petreius, as
horse had _proved so
much
as the fact that Caesar's
much
the stronger,
and had annoyed
them
so
sorely.
Here, as in the Gallic campaigns, these
The Roman or gallant fetiowrwere one of hi a nna.inHta.va. native cavalry of Afranius and Petreius could by no means
cope with them.
WithCassar in possession of the right bank of the Sicoris, and able to scour the country on the left bank, the Pompeians
threatened to be in evil case.
They must take decided
action,
and that
at once.
After long consultation, the legates re-
solved to retire
y was well liked by"many and feared by
his influence
others,
and where
consequently predominated.
This was partly
\because he had been the
credit of putting
!
down
general who had got the This sentiment led the Sertorius. ^^^^" ^^**
Roman
Pompeians
till
to believe that they could there prolong the
war
winter, whose snows in the Pyrenees would
weaken Cae-
sar^s_comniuiiications with Gaul; and Caesar, being unknown in that region, could not readily make adherents or victual his
army. They therefore collected all the vessels they could in the Iberus at Octogesa (modern Mequinensa), at its confluence
with the Sicoris, and ordered a bridge of boats to be there built.
The nearest and easiest road to Octogesa was along the right bank of the -Sicoris.; but an easy road, jneant-fiasy-pursuit
by
Caesar's cavalry,
and
this the
Pompeians dreaded.
THEY MOVE AWAY.
They decided on
wjifcfr ha.d
457
the more rugged road on the farther bank,
foe advantage of yielding
many
places of ready
defense; but the country liad the very objectionable feature
Only rain-water is there used and the inhabitants store this up in reservoirs. to-day, The Pompeians accordingly transported two legions over (V
of being all but waterless.
the Sicoris,
they
still
retained
tfrp.
stonp.
bridg-^
ancLabfiiit
June 21
fortified _jL_camp_and
twelve feet high on the left
bridgehead with a rampart bank. All their preparations
;
had been some time completed
but
Afranius and
Petreius,
with the slowness bred of lax purpose, had delayed their What they had done, moreover, had retirement too long.
betrayed their intentions.
night, had so far completed with some danger to get
.
Caesar,
by
severe toil
day and
though
his ford as to be able
"thr foot had only their their breast above the water."
\
mounted troops across, but shoulders and the upper part of
his
rnisTake they
had made
in their delay,
The enemy recognized the and saw that they
must speedily move away or forfeit their chance of doing so Afranius and Petreius were growing morally unmolested.
weaker.
Though
their success
had been
fair in their several
encounters with the_jCaesaj-ians, they did not care to face Caesar in a pitched battle in the This looks as if, open. CaBsar had not won a success in the late engagement, though
he had impressed himself strongly on his enemies^ 3i all events, the Pompeians had concluded to" "abandon his front
and
retreat
to
a safer country.
T1<>rfla.
Leaving two auxiliary
^\.
(j
cohorts in garrison_at-
to cover the withdrawal, they /
l*l> ^- ~'*
moved
army on the night of June 23 to the new/ camp across the river. "The legionaries had been ordered "|
their whole
to carry
" sufficient corn to last twenty -two days."
The country from
the Sicoris, was at
Ilerda to the Iberus, on the left
first
bank of
rolling
and
fertile,
then strongly
VS^wa^ *$ iB^f'vl
-
**
-^
-'j
'
^-(,==^Lt
-~
'
-VrsJt-".
iv^S'R
-
jw?x%r.
*
*,
Xr\
-f.
*^>
*
-,
H^r^ ^^J^Wf^X
^ HV
Theatre of Operations near Ilerda.
CHOICE OF ROUTES.
much
459
accentuated, and within five miles or so of the Iberus became
cut
traverse.
up by rocky and mountainous country, difficult The march of Afranins and Petreiua. if
pursuit.
to
d well conducted, might be free from
If
uld get beyond the level and into the mountains, they were
Caesar saw with regret that his prey
Iv chance
now
lav in harassing the enemy's rear with a
iew of bringing them to 4enns
the Sicoristodothis
^^iMWM
"
Ha
ft^-ujg paT-farmerl
croty
efficiently.
When
Afranius
and
Petreius
had
broken up their camp on ^heir fear, and, spreading round them in great appeared numbers, began to retard and impede their march." (Caesar
abouj; the third watch, they suddenly
had given up the idea of forcing "haftlp nn the Pompeians. He saw that it would be better, if it was possible, to conquer
Afranins and Petreius without destroying the Roman legions opposed to him. His hope waa to bring these legions, oratl
.
least
many
of the men, over to his cause.
What would
have
been vacillation in many of his movements may really be He wished to win by ascribed to a aoundjaOitarr, motive.
TfttfiAi*
tftflri
V>y fighting.
Let us see how he
did
it.
On
rather
the left
bank
of the Sicoris, Afranius
and Petreius
and through
had choice
of two routes /^one close to the river
flat country,." .one
by a
circuit inland over the cut
up
This latter they chose for the same reason as they country. left rather than the right bank. chose the But it is evident
that they
even
latter raute J;he
had not carefully reconnoitred their ground, for was not so cut up as to prevent the
cavalry from keeping on their heels. From the e^nencgs on the right bank. oJL the Sicoris
Caesar's
army could watch the operations
of .the horse, nnd
460
see
THE BRIDGEHEAD.
how
greatly
tfrej"
interfered
Afranius and Petreius.
with the movements of The squadrons swept around the
enemy's flanks and rear, thus demoralizing the legionaries, but retired when smartly attacked./ The Caesarians were in
Ithe
forks of the two rivers, Cinga and Sicoris, with their one
circuit would be too bridge twenty -two miles upstream. to enable them to take part in the action ; and the stone long
bridge being, as
we must assume,
well held, they could not join
their comrades except
by the ford, which was up to their necks.
But with the eye of veterans they at once perceived that the enemy was about to escape them and they understood that this meant a long pursuit and a tedious campaign in an
;
unknown
10-
territory.
"They applied
to their tribunes
and
need
centurions,
and entreated them
to inform Caesar that he
;
not spare their labor or consider their danger that they were ready and able and would venture to ford the river where the
horse had crossed."
Caesar took advantage of this enthuand determined to try the experiment. It is neither siasm, stated in the Commentaries that Afranius and Petreius had
broken down the stone bridge, nor that they had left a garrison to hold it; but one or the other must be the fact, or
Caesar would certainly have used
cross.
it
at the present
moment
to
down, he could not do so; unless held by would seem as if Caesar might have brushed many cohorts, away the force at the bridgehead, and have thus frayed himThe habit of the day, to be self a passage across the river.
If broken
it
sure,
was
to avoid assaulting breastworks even
when held by
it
a handful of men, and anything but an immediate assault
would have consumed too much time.
curious,
But
appears
so
when
in his
so
much was
at stake,
and the odds were
greatly
assault
favor, that Caesar should have hesitated to
and capture the bridge.
Roman
legions during the
Punic Wars, and at other times, stormed breastworks held
SPEEDY PURSUIT.
before
461
by large bodies of regular troops; Caesar's legionaries had now stormed town walls, and did so later the defenses
;
of the stone bridge could not have been other than the usual
ditch and rampart.
However
it
may have
lies in
been,
Caesar
if^
preferred the risk pf the ford to attacking the bridge,
still
standing.
Thejmly explanation
the probability,
either that the ford
was easier than assumed by the Commentaries, or that the Pompeian generals had left behind,
In Ilerda,
out^of their Spanish cohorts, a goodly
defenses.
body to hold the bridge the two cohorts were probably enough
soldiers
as a garrison.
,^
'/
Leaving the weaker
and one legion
to
guard the
>' / camp, taking no baggage and stationing horse obliquely J across, above to break the current and below to catch those
who might be swept away,
carried
x>
the legions were
marched down
to_the _ford_jatOd- across the river.
Though a numh.er_jvere
by the horsemen,
their feet, they were all caught
lost.
and not a man was
Caesar ployed his legionaries into three columns, the and adusual three-line order of battle forward by wings, The good will of the men was such that they vanced.
speedily gained the rear of the enemy, whose advance had/
been much retarded by the cavalry. "So great was the ardor of the soldiejcs__that* notwithstanding the addition _of
a circuit of six miles and a considerable delay in fording the three p. M. the river, before the ninth hour of the day v
.a**-"
^^.i
came up with those who had The cavalry had midnight.
of Afranius that his
set out at the third
watch,"
so cleverly harassed the
march
column had been unable to advance
'
,
any considerable ijU*^^^"*
*
stretch,
not more than six MMOTM* miles. *
*^^
The appearance of Caesar's legions in his rear constrained Af ranius to pause In his retreat and to draw up his army
on a rising ground, probably 1 on the chart.
The Commen-
462
COMPROMISE OF LEGATES.
taries give certain hints as to time
helped to locate the operations of the coming days with fair Caesar also called a .halt and gave his accuracy.
to rest
*
I
than twenty miles.
again upon him.
and refresh themselves, for they had marched inure He was loath to attack in earnest; hut m ^^*mmi^^i^^^^ *^**^^
retreat,
whenever Afraiiius resumed his
^
hills to
and distances which have
Caesar advanced
In this manner both armies, in a sort of
skirmishing fight, drifted six miles farther to the southwest.
iBoth finally camped, Afranius on some hills which enabled
\f
|
him
to avoid Caesar's cavalry (2),
and Caesar on an adjoining
had been
to continue his
Jieight (3).
The
original purpose of Afranius
route nearly west over the
Octogesa; but Caesar's
south was a range it ran a
proximity led
him
to fear the effects of further interference
five miles to the
by
his cavalry.
Some
too rough for the operations of hors*e; and through
defile.
If,
by a sudden march, he could reach the mouth of
the defile, he would be safe from pursuit, and could perhaps
cross the Iberus farther
down than Octogesa,
all
or follow
up
its
bank
to that place.
At
events the defile, at less than half
the distance of Octogesa, was a temporary refuge, and the
Pompeian clutched do, and a useless
;
at a straw.
It
was a
vacillating thing to
for Caesar,
off
gesa, could head storm.
him
by marching straight on Octofrom that place but any port in a
;
The position
of Afranius
and Petreius was highly
delicate ;
they had been marching and fending off Caesar's cavalry some sixteen hours. Their men were broken up with fatigue and
the leaders were equally unsettled. Out^of sheerjlread of the cavalry, it was determined not to push for Octogesa by the straight road, but to
make a dash
for the Iberus river by
to this
way
of the defile
and with a view
manosuvre they
reconnoitred the ground*
Caesar, always active,
didjhe
like.
DIFFICULT RETREAT.
Having come
for the
to this conclusion,
to
it
463
folly
was the height of
defile, at all
Pompeians not
push for the
hazards,
" before Caesar could seriously attack; but, fatigued ..by J&e all day and by the labor of their march, they skirmishes
deferred
it till
the following day."
They should have
affairs
sacri-
ficed part of their
rest.
army and
all their
Some
generals never
know when
baggage need a desper-
to save the
ate remedy.
After dark
it
occurred to
Afranius
that he might steal a
march on
Caesar.
The
Gallic
cavalry,
which
continued
J
discovered from some prisoners whom they scoutine^l^igttj took at midnight that the enemy was making an effort to When this fact was retire under cover of the darkness.
him, Caesar ordered the signal for packing " i~~ a certain note on the horns accompanied by a baggage shout to be given in his own camp. Hearing this signal,
reported
<~~
to
and assuming that Caesar was about to break camp, lest his march should be disturbed by Caesar's legionaries as well
as his cavalry,
Afranius
decided not to move.
A night
attack with his large train would be apt to be disastrous.
Next day (June 26), both generals again reconnoitred the country, and Afranius and Petreius held a council of war.
advised to move by night, hoping to escape the more Others argued that as (Caesar's easily in the darkness.
Some
all night, it
would be sure to discover
dark would not
their
fight
(them,
and that the
soldiers in the
by
CU7
any means as well as under the eye of
commanders.
Daylight, said they, raised a strong sense of shame and duty After in the soldiers which they lost in the darkness.
weighing the pros and cons, it was decided to move at daylight on the succeeding morning, and to risk whatever losses
This they prepared to do but it was too late. they must. Caesar had divined the change of plan and decided to make
;
464
an_effort to cut the
CESAR'S RUSE.
enemy
"
1
off
from the
defile.
lie set out
the moment the sky began to grow e|a.r1ipr a long circuit around the enemy's right flank, white," by I for the mountains. He could not -take to the east of them,
considerably
the
main road,
for
Af ranius and
Petreius lav across
it.
He
resorted to a clever ruse.
He
ordered his legions to leare
defile
it
camp by the west gate in the direction opposite to the The movement was perceived by the Pompeians, but
their opinion that Ca3sar
was
was
retiring.
So soon
as he could
move
south.
his legions
under cover, Caesar bore to the east and The road ahead of him was rough and cut up. "Ijis
to cross extensive
soldiers
were obliged
and
difficult valleys.
In several places craggy cliffs interrupted their march, insomuch that their arms had to be handed to one another, and
the soldiers were forced to perform
a great part of their
march unarmed, and were lifted up the rocks by each other. But not a man murmured at the fatigue, because they imgined that there would be a period to all their toils if they ould cut off the enemy from the Ebro and intercept their
injtoys."
The
idea that Caesar was retiring emboldened
Afranius
in con-
and Petreius to take their time.
in high spirits
"Af ranius'
soldiers ran
from their camp
to look at us,
and
tumelious language upbraided us, 'that we were forced, for
want
of necessary subsistence, to
'
Ilerda.
For our route was
different
run -away, and return to from what we proposed,
and we appeared to be going a contrary way." Butjby and by it was perceived that Caesar's head of column had filed to
the right, and that his van had passed the line of their camp.
on to dispatch.
V ^\. defile, their
This at once showed the enemy their error, and urged them If Caesar should cut them off from the
game was
lost.
Af ranius
detailed a guard for
t^
the camp, and set out at a rapid pace with the bulk of his
RACE FOR SAFETY.
forces, wijjjflyfrJ^HftS6 for the defile. .*
465
The enemy's moveand
Caesar's
their march.
ments were somewhat hasty and
horse"
affair
irregular,
"managed seriously to impede was necessarily reduced to this
if
"The
point, with
Expect to
Afranius' men, that
they
first
gained the mountains, which
they desired, they would themselves avoid all danger, but Qould not sa,vft flufljjflggflg-e of their whole arnry\ nor the
cohorts which they had left behind in the camps, to which,
Seing
interceptejjj^^^ffig^srabaoaiis
stated,
could
assistance be given."
As above
Afranius and Petreius had decided,
because the road was more rugged and they thought would better preserve them from the stinging pursuit of the Gallic
horse, to
roja.
head directly south for the
defile of
modern Kiva-
Caesar had divined their purpose and
had pushed for
the same point.
he was compelled to make lay through a very broken country, where there were no roads, such was uTa ^ __ the eagerness of his men and the enforced slowness of
Though the
circuit
iiair
'
ii
-^
Afranius' party, that Caesar first reached the point where he could hold the mouth of the defile. Here he drew up his " army athwart Afranius' path, "in a plain behind large rocks
(5).
u,,'- If
elated with their success
ability of their chief.
Afranius was strategically beaten. The men rested, and more than ever confident of the
The horse continued
It
Afranius' flanks and rear.
to sweep around was one of those cases where
the problem was plain and every
failure.
man
could see success or
Afranius, seeingthe^ miscarriage of his plan, again changed his mind, and determined to push for the road he had originally chosen, due west over the mountains.
He
sent out four
cohorts
of Spanish foot to take possession of one of the
(6),
eminences
which seemed from
its
position to afford a
466
CAESAR MANOEUVRES.
probable opportunity of holding Caesar in check until he But Caesar's could pass in its rear with the main column.
horse was on the alert, and smartly attacked these cohorts ;
eir
"nor were they able to withstand the charge of the cavalry even for a moment, but were all surrounded and cut to pieces
in the sight of the
two armies."
The
occasion was
now
so plainly excellent for
an attack in
force on the enemy, purposeless and held in place
horse, that^Caesar's legates,
by the centurions and tribunes crowded
round him begging him to engage battle, for the men were most eager for it, especially as all could see that the enemy
was demoralized and pressing in irregular groups around their standards as if uncertain what to do. Or if not at the
moment, battle should be prepared for, as the enemy must soon come down from the hill for lack of water. Caesar
plainly saw that a battle
at this
moment meant
fearful
slaughter of the enemy, and was not only anxious to spare
Roman blood, but
his
own
use.
g
He
keep these legions intact if possible, for had the utmost faith in his ability to bring
to to
and Petreius
a surrender without decimation
either
Ms own legions or the Pmyrpeiaa. excited great opposition and discontent among the soldiers,
many
of
whom
would not
openly declared to each other that if Caesar fight when he was so advantageously placed,
perhaps they themselves would not fight when Caesar called on them. But Caesar was not the man to change. He paid
not the least heed to this exhibition of temper, which he knew He had other more really proceeded from soldierly motives.
important things to consider.
retire to their
all the
He
allowed the enemy
to
camp ; and having placed strong outposts on avenues to the mountains so as to cut off every road to the Iberus, he fortified his camps close to Afranius and
Petreius, the better to observe their
movements
(7)
FRIENDLY INTERCHANGE.
467
There were but two places to which these officers could now retire, Ilerda or Tarraco (Tarragona)_Qn^the coast. The
,tter
was too far to attempt
to reach
it.
Not satisfied with merely observing them,
e an effort to cut the
>ut
Caesar
now
his horse to
from water, and sent Pompeians attack the watering parties a which had to go
off
some distance from camp to find reservoirs which were full. This new and serious danger obliged Afranius and Petreius
to put out a line of posts to protect the
march
of the water-
determined them to throw up a raming parties, part (8) from their camp to the water, a work of some
later
and
magnitude and one necessitating the absence of both the generals from camp. "Petreius and Afranius divided the task between themselves and went in person to some distance
from their camp for the purpose of seeing
it
accomplished."
having obtained by their absence a free of conversing with each other," which they opportunity for among the soldiers of both armies eagerly embraced,
soldiers,
"The
there were naturally
many
old friends,
it
was soon ascerdisaffection in
tained
by the
Caesarians- that there
was grave
the enemy's camp.
Many
of the tribunes
and centurions
came over
to see Caesar,
and the intercourse between the
camps quickly became
Th&. Pompeiaiu -soldiers openly expressed their regrets that they were not in Caesar's army. The fraternizing even went so far that the legionaries deputed some centurions" oflhe first rank to visit Caesar
universal.
and
state that they
were ready to surrender their generals
and join Caesar if the latter would spare the lives of Afranius and Petreius. They keenly felt that Caesar had spared them the day before, when they were so. open to attack. "Every
place was filled with mirth and congratulations ; in the one
army, because they thought they had escaped so impending danger; in the other, because they thought they had com'
468
PETREIUS INTERFERES.
a matter without blows ; and Caesar, in pleted so important every man's judgment, reaped the advantage of his former
was applauded by all." The Pompeian generals soon heard this news. Afranius was disposed not to resist the inclinations of the soldiers, but
lenity,
and
his conduct
was ready to accept the situation. Petreius, who had been at a greater distance, on learning of what was going on, either distrustful of Caesar, or from greater native combajizanesA. decided on action,
armed
his domestics
and a few per-
sonal followers, and with the Spanish praetorian cohort and
a few foreign horse flew to the camp, seized and put to death a number of Caesar's men who were still in his lines,
and forced the
their
left
rest to hide or flee.
The
latter
"wrapped
arms
in
their
cloaks,
drew
their
swords and
defended themselves against the Spaniards and the horse." He then by threats, entreaties and tears brought the legions
back
to a sense of their duty,
all
and having administered an
he himself joining
to desert the cause of
oath to Afranius and
in
it,
the officers,
under no circumstances
Pom-
pey, he obliged them to surrender all Caesarians who could be found, many of whom were still within the camp. These
he put publicly to death in the praetorium. Many, however, were kept concealed by the men and allowed to depart at
night over the ramparts.
Caesar was too wise to indulge in
such slaughter.
After searching out all the enemy's soldiers in his own camp, he allowed them to depart unharmed, with
a friendly word to each. number of officers concluded to remain with him. These he "treated with great respect.
The centurions he promoted to higher ranks " (a very unusual step), "and conferred on the Roman knights the honor
of tribunes." Matters reverted to a war footing; but Caesar had certainly gained ground with his enemy's legions. Afranius and Petreius had made a series of blunders.
RENEWED
PURSUIT.
469
Each error bred a Their management was extremely weak. and skiU stan,4 out in flppfoast.. new one. Csesar's energy
11-fs
constant watchfulness ma<3e~both foraging and watering
enemy. The Pompeian legionaries had some corn, having started with a larger than usual supply but the Spaniards and auxiliaries had none, being unused to carrying
difficult to the
;
burdens, and
many
daily deserted to Caesar.
Afranius and
Petreius finally decided to
where they had
bank.
left
make an effort to retire to Ilerda, much victual, and by the nearest
road, which led north to the river
and thence along the left Their old campthere seemed the only harbor of To do this, they set out at daybreak, took their refuge. march along the high ground, to avoid as much as possible
Caesar's cavalry, which harassed their rear as sharply as
could.
it
"Not a moment passed
owing
in
which their rear was not
engaged with our horse."
useless,
to the demoralization
Their own cavalry proved to be bred of the late combats.
They could not be got
prevent their breaking
of the legions.
to face the Gallic squadrons,
and
to
up had
in the finally to be put
middle
Onjhe^march the Pompeian foot would turn at every piece ryf risingjrround from which they could cast iheir darts, anc
engage Csesar's cavalry to advantage, the cohorts which firs reached it turning and defending those which followed; bui
at every descent,
*
it
where the pursuing horse was on higher were obliged to make a violent_.attack_to driv< they back a j*fltP" nA QT d fTFble them to retire at a run to the
pjain
and beyond
plan**
to the next high
ground v where-thev- conk
i't
again
fhArnaplwa
f^n a fighting pgnaTity^ wif,li
ThfiS6
rearguard combats became so dangerous and unsettling to the enemy that they were finally driven to halt and camp on
an cMiinence, having retired but four miles.
Caesar also
hac
camped (9) and sent out
to forage.
But the Pompeians
470
THE POMPEIANS CORRALLED.
only gone into camp as a ruse and had fortified nothing but Caesar fell into the trap and allowed his the front line.
The same day at noon, when they saw foragers to disperse. Caesar's horse was at a distance, the Pompeians endeavored to
escape; but Caesar, on perceiving their withdrawal, leaving a few cohorts to guard the camp and pack the baggage,
followed them sharply up with his legions in light marching order, instructed the foragers to come in at four o'clock, and
the horse to follow as soon as
troopers they made to harass the march
their
may
be.
On
the return of the
way
to the front,
and again began
Caesar kept
left
of Afranius
and Petreius.
on their
on
their heels, incessantly edging in
Sicoris,
and forcing
them farther from the
his cavalry.
to at
----
whose banks he patrolled with
camp ----
manoeuvring he finally forced them By a distance from water, and in a highly "" disadvan~~~
skillful
"5BW*"
He had completed a good day's work. tageous place (10). Caesar did not attack them. He ordered his men to lie on \
their
arms instead of camping, and waited for the still better chance he could see approaching. But he took measures to
confine the Pompeians to this place, as well as to protect his
own
legions
from sudden
assault,
by a wall and trench which
In the course of a day
he extended about them on
all sides.
or two, having no fodder; Afranius and Petreius were obliged
to kill all their baggage cattle.
They perhaps contemplated a sudden push for freedom. On the third day, July making 1, at two P. M., they drew out their army in battle front to Caesar did the interrupt the completion of Caesar's works.
like,
but awaited their attack.
to take the initiative.
Neither army seemed willing Caesar did not care to do so; the
Pompeians dreaded the
the fight at Ilerda.
conflict.
They had
lost
morale since
The camps, say the Commentaries, were not distant from each other above two thousand feet, a space
that gave small
room
for so
many men
to manoeuvre or to
THE POMPEIANS SURRENDER.
follow
471
five
legionsT^rAfranius' five legions were in two lines, and the auxiliary Caesar had three lines in cohorts in a third line, in reserve.
up a
victory,
for
each
army had
--
the following formation: "four cohorts out of each of the five legions formed the first line ; three more from each legion
followed them as reserves, and three otters were behind
those ; the ^lingers and archers were stationed in the centre The battle of the line, and the cavalry closed the flanks."
was not engaged;
both parties at sunset retired to camp.
The next
day, while Caesar was continuing the construction of
Pompeians made a move as if to fray themif and cross the Sicoris by a ford near by, Caesar headed them off perchance they might reach Ilerda. with his cavalry, which he ordered to occupy all the fords *'
his works, the
selves a path
^^
*
patrol the river banks on the other side.
all sides, having no fodder, water, wood or corn, no chance of exit, and lacking resolution to cut their seeing way out, Afranius and Petreius asked for a private confer-
Beset on
This Caesar refused, but granted the Pompeians a public conference to be held in the presence of both armies. The latter took place. Afranius spoke humbly
ence
2.
on July
and asked for easy terms Caesar spoke in his usual persuasive manner, complimenting Afranius and Petreius and their
;
legions for avoiding battle
to
save
Roman
life,
though
;
reproaching them for massacring his soldiers in their camp
paying a tribute to the high qualities of the troops and promising his good offices to all, but yet with a clear hint
that the terms stated were his ultimatum.
He knew
full
well
when
it
to be diplomatically generous-
As
a result of the
was agreed that the legions of the enemy should meeting be discharged from service and sent back to their homes, and
that Afranius
and Petreius should evacuate Spain and Gaul.
Caesar might have obliged the legions to join his cause, and
472
b.e
CJESAR GENEROUS.
to
was anxious
have them do
so.
But he was
ali
l l
too politic
How He,accepted onlv^vfllpitarv f^i| ej|ts. many of these there were we do not know. He disbanded the The Spanish troops were legions and furnished corn to all.
to use force.
discharged at once, and the
the river Varus on the confines of Italy.
Romans were to be discharged at Whatever each man
had lost, which was found in the possession of Caesar's troops, was returned to him, the soldier having captured it being
compensated at a just valuation.
The Pompeian
soldiers
marched
to the
Varus
in charge of four of Caesar's legions,
under Calenus, two in the van, two as rearguard, and there The four escorting legions were subthey were disbanded.
sequently ordered to join the Italian army against Pompey. Thus .ended a series of blunders on the part of Afranius and
Petreius,
oldest
by which Pompey not only and a series of and best legions,
lost Spain,
but his
brilliant
manreuvres
on the part of Caesar.
Caesar retained the other two legions, giving
i
command
of
them
to Cassius, for the purpose of completing the conquest
of Farther V The Spain. these brilliant of
I
rapidity
campaigns has scarce a par-
M Caesar
crossed the Rubicon
"
December
17, B. c.
50,
In two months he victoriously traversed the length of the Italian peninsula, and Pompey, declining a battle, sailed from Brundisium for Epirus.
by the Julian calendar.
Caesar then
the 23d of
moved
his
army
to Massilia
and Spain.
On
May
he reached Ilerda.
..-'After
a manoeuvring
campaign of six weeks, Afranius and Petreius surrendered, July 2. In a period so short as scarcely to afford more time than was needed to make the marches through the countries
named, he had reduced Italy and neutralized Pompey 's
forces in Spain.
Italy
had succumbed so soon as Caesar trod her
soil.
No
RESUME.
473
one had dared fight for her possession against the conqueror of Gaul. While Caesar had turned to Spain, Pompey had
no hand against him. Caesar had not counted on his fortune in vain; but it was as fitting that fortune good should attend so able and vigorous a conduct as that it should forsake the weakness and lack of enterprise of Pomlifted
pey.
In
this instance.
;
smiles of Fortune
made good use of the he had labored when she was willing to
Csesar had
lend her aid
he had avoided her displeasure on the rare occasions, when her back was turned.
;
On
the other hand,
Pompey's
inactivity lay at the root of
the forfeiture
by
his lieutenants in Spain of their seven fine
the entire peninsula ; and of this weakness and leflions_and loss of moral courage Caesar made the utmost use. Pom-
pey's weakness was reflected upon his lieutenants.
of initiative
His lack
to
was such that one can scarcely hold them
blame for not putting to good use Caesar's really grave danLike master, like man. ger after the flood in Ilerda.
Cassjir'sjjomplete accomplishment of his object
by mano3uits
vring instead of lighting
is
one of the best examples of
kind in antiquity.
avoidance of battle.
It stands alone as a
sample of successful
Thejcreation of a ford at the Sicoris has always been considered
a noteworthy engineering feat.
It
certainly
was
bold and ingenious.
The
Italian
and Ilerda campaigns have few parallels except
in other
campaigns by Caesar
XXX.
MASSILIA, GADES, AFRICA.
THE
sorties,
APRIL TO SEPTEMBER,
had been poshed by Trebonius -while and the garrison made gallant was twice beaten by
Caesar's,
49 B. C.
siege of Massilia,
begun by
Caesar,
his chief
was
in Spain.
The
city resisted well,
but
its fleet,
despite reinforcements,
and
the siege works gradually compelled an inevitable surrender.
After the Ilerda
campaign Caesar had subdued the rest of Spain as far as Gades, and had then returned to Massilia, where he received its surrender and spared it a sack but
;
heavy penalties were imposed. Pompey's original plan had been to advance on but Caesar by his speed and ability Caesar in Gaul from both Italy and Spain
;
had anticipated him, driven him out
still
of Italy
and captured Spain.
Pompey was
engrossed in raising additional forces in Greece.
Caesar's luck for once
failed him.
He
sent Curio to reduce Sicily and Africa.
In Sicily Curio suc;
ceeded in restoring to Home its usual and necessary grain traffic in Africa he was defeated by the Pompeians and his army destroyed. This enabled the
aristocrats to
make
their holding in Africa secure.
;
Caesar's
means
of reaching
Greece were limited
likewise
Pompey
controlled the sea.
more than double
Caesar's.
Pompey's land forces were But the moral force was all on the side of
Caesar and his legions.
He now
prepared to attack his enemy in Greece.
WHILE Csesar was settling matters in northern Spain, Trebonius, with his three legions, had been active in collecting material and building ships for besieging Massilia.
Massilia was
founded
600
years
its
refugees, and had grown, owing to
by Phocean unusual position and
B.
c.,
It had spread Greek civiladvantages, to great prosperity. ization in southern Gaul, and taught the barbarians agriculture, learning
and
art.
It
had numerous
colonies,
and an
enormous commerce.
excellent; the
The
port of Massilia
town was
built to
hills.
was naturally the north of it on a point of
ravines, each of which
land crowned by three
Two
TREBONIUS* MOUND.
ran down to the
sea,
475
separated the point from the mainland;
the south of the harbor was covered with factories, arsenals
and works
It
it;
the eastern wall was at the edge of the ravines.
was
solid,
and boasted many towers.
Several gates pierced
the principal one, near the middle, opened on the Via
Aurelia, the main road from Gaul to Spain.
The town was
|U |wf f3l^Xt
'.
w^ v^\\ Sirfi,,/
T'-'"
AM
~~
'' '
**
"v"-'
.y
~->
Siege of Massilia.
fortified
by nature as well as by art, and was difficult of The habits of the people were honest and approach.
simple, and their houses plain;
and temples were noteworthy.
but their public buildings Trebonius established his
camp
opposite the centre of the eastern wall, on
modern
St. Charles hill,
which was somewhat higher than any of the
city hills
ditch,
and looked down on the ravines which served as a
about one third of a mile from the city wall.
As
476
the Massilians
invest the place
A NAVAL BATTLE.
commanded
by
land.
the sea, Trebonius could only The point he chose for his main
attack (a) was just south of the junction of the two ravines
near the main gate. Deeming one insufficient, Trebonius a second point of attack (b), which was nearer the opened
harbor, four hundred yards from the
first
one.
reach the wall across the ravine at the main point of attack Trebonius had been forced to build a mound, which
To
was eighty feet high, and sixty feet wide everywhere. There was such abundance of war engines of great strength in the town that the ordinary material for making vineae was useless. Some of these engines shot iron-tipped
in one place
poles twelve feet long, which penetrated even four rows of
hurdles and went into the ground some depth.
of the vine*
The
roofs
and in
their front
had to be constructed of twelve-inch lumber, was a testudo sixty feet long, very stoutly
against fire to protect the
made and covered
alone could the
men who
leveled
the ground in front of the approaches.
Under such cover
The frequent
sallies
men work with
safety.
from the town were uniformly beaten back, but owing these and the vastness of the works, progress was slow
both points.
Csesar
to at
had remained
at
Massilia,
superintending
the
opening of the siege
up
to about the 6th of
May, when he
found
necessary to go to Spain. Late in the same month there' took place the naval battle
it
mentioned in the
last chapter;
and about a month
after this
event, L. Nasidius reached Tauroentum, near Massilia, with
He brass-prowed galleys sent by Pompey. had passed the straits of Sicily without the knowledge of Curio, Cesar's legate there, had put into Messana and
a
fleet of sixteen
carried off a ship,
and had made
to
his
way
to the vicinity of
Massilia*
Here he got word
Domitius in the town.
HAPPY VICTORY.
advising
477
him
to risk another sea-fight against Brutus, in
which he, Nasidius, would join, and do his share. Massiliots had a large supply of seamen and pilots,
very best of their kind.
The
the
They had covered some fishing
Vicinity of Massilia.
smacks with decks and arranged them to carry archers and engines; had again repaired their war -galleys and built an
equal number of other ships. They at once acted on Nasidius' suggestion, and sailed out to join him at one of the
forts
thus appointed, encouraged by the entreaties and tears of all the old men, matrons, and virgins to succor the state in this hour of distress, they
fleet
named
Taurois.
"
With a
went on board with no
less spirit
and confidence than they
was the 30th of June.
had fought before."
The
Massiliots were to have the right
It
of the line, Nasidius the left.
meet them.
Brutus, with courage always uppermost, was not loath to He had the ships built by Caesar at Arelas
his
(Aries) and six taken from the Massiliots.
having encouraged
men
to despise
"Accordingly, a vanquished people,
478
A BRICK TOWER.
whom
they had conquered when yet unbroken, he advanced Collected on against them full of confidence and spirit."
the city walls, all the population of Massilia watched the
boats which contained the flower of their youth and
manhood
from Trebonius' high pitched camp, the Romans were equally The combat was not lacking in spirit. The Masintent.
Brutus' line was the more fought with great courage. open, which allowed better manoauvring on the part of the
siliots
Massiliots.
The
ships
came
to close quarters and, grappling
to each other, boarded
ship was
all
and fought with desperation. Brutus' but run down in the melee, and escaped only by
a hair's breadth.
But Roman valor again
prevailed.
The
ships of Nasidius, proved to be of little use despite his boasting, soon
five
gave up the fight and fled ; of the Massilian ships were sunk and four captured, one sailed away with
Nasidius, and but one got back to the town.
Those which
This happy victory shut escaped made for Hither Spain. the port and reduced Massilia to a condition of siege.
their
Taught by the frequent sallies from the main gate that wooden siege works were insufficient, the Roman
on the right side of their
terrace, near the
legionaries built,
gate, a thirty-foot square tower of brick or slate, with walls five feet thick, instead of one of wood. Soon this grew in
height to six stories.
It
had an overhanging
roof,
and
this
was gradually raised by screws so as to build the walls of the tower underneath it higher and higher. The outside was
protected by heavy rope mats, hanging loose upon the walls.
These Trebonius found best resisted the
missiles.
From
this
tower the Caesarians built a musculus to the enemy's wall. This consisted of a roof sixty feet long but not very wide,
and
built
of
much
heavier timbers than usual.
It
was
covered with
down by
tiles laid in mortar, to save it from fire thrown the besieged; the tiles were covered with hides, to
A TRUCE.
479
protect them against water which the besieged poured down in spouts to dissolve the mortar; and the whole was topped
by mattresses,
to protect
it
against heavy stones and the iron-
This musculus, when completed, was run on rollers from the brick tower up to the city wall close to the
tipped missiles.
tower selected for breaching, and under cover of the musculus The musculus resisted the the wall began to be undermined.
Works
heaviest
at Massilia.
stones; fire barrels, rolled off
it,
and were then
this
pushed away by poles from within.
soldiers kept
From
tower the
It
up a
to
fire of
darts to protect the musculus.
was intended
sallies
guard the flank of the terrace from sudden
gate.
from the main
As
matters eventuated, the
terrace never was completed.
It
was not long before the wall of the
thirty places,
city,
undermined at
more than
began
to topple, despite the fact that
the citizens had flooded the
placing reservoirs of water where the mines would tap them had countermined and had resorted to every known method to arrest the
;
Roman mines by
approaching
the city,
Fearing then the capture and sack of the inhabitants crowded to the gates, and begged
crisis.
480
SUCCESSFUL SALLY.
till
the soldiers for a truce
the arrival of Caesar, who, in fact,
to suffer the storming of the city,
had ordered Trebonius not
do, put to the
lest the infuriated soldiers should, as
they had threatened to
sword
all
the men, which out of policy he
desired to avoid.
It is evident
and the Commentaries are
full of
from many such items, that Caesar had them,
;
not the best of control over his legionaries
and
if
he himself
could not hold them in hand, his lieutenants could scarcely
expect to do
so.
They were not
the old burgess soldiers,
in their intelligent
who obeyed
orders because they had,
patriotism, the true instinct of discipline; they were profes-
from high grade, who were held down only by the strong hand, and often with difficulty, who broke from The truce begged by restraint whenever a chance occurred.
sionals, of a far
the Massiliots was granted, though the soldiers were hard
to restrain
from plunder and revenge.
proved treacherous.
The
Massiliots
One day
at noon,
towards the end of July, when there was a high wind, the mistral from the northwest, and the legionaries were off
their guard, the inhabitants
utensils,
sallied
forth with
incendiary
and in an instant
set all the
works of the Romans
on
fire.
short hour
consumed the labor of months.
Next
day again the towns-people made a sally, but the Romans were prepared for it, gave them due chastisement, and drove
them back within the
walls.
The
soldiers then set to work, with
loss occasioned
renewed vigor, to make
good the
by the
sally.
The new agger was
constructed with brick walls floored with timbers, which
were shored up at intervals so as to sustain great weight. It was much less liable to be set on fire. In a few days the
Caesarians had replaced what
the
amazement of the
had been destroyed, much to citizens, who saw their engines made
ineffective
by the
solidity of the
Roman
works, their soldiers
VARRO.
driven off the walls by the
towers, and no safety
.
481
in
their equally high course but surrender. any
Romans from
Time-serving Varro, in Farther Spain (Andalusia), had been wavering in his allegiance to Pompey until he heard
rumors of Caesar's troubles before Ilerda and at Massilia, when he began to act with more vigor for his chief. Whereas
he had theretofore deemed
now
loudly denounced him.
prudent to praise Caesar, he He was active in raising money,
it
Farther Spain.
com and
Massilia,
troops,
and
in
some of the corn for Ilerda, some for He added thirty preparing for war.
auxiliary cohorts to his force of two legions.
As
the whole
province was somewhat pronounced for Caesar, Varro proposed to carry on the war from Gades (Cadiz), which lay near
the coast on an island, and, being a prosperous city with a
fine harbor,
was most suitable as a base.
Here he had
built
ten ships, and here, too, he accumulated large materials
and
482
stores.
END OF WAR IN
He
constructed a
SPAIN.
number
of vessels in Hispalis, on
the Bsetis.
He
despoiled the temple of
Hercules, carried
the riches into the city of Gades, and sent six cohorts there
to
guard them under C. Gallonius.
He
laid
heavy taxes on
the states, and
at Ilerda, got
by from the Roman
representing that Csesar was being defeated
citizens of the province eigh-
teen millions of sestercii, twenty thousand pounds of silver
be used in the war.
confiscated
and one hundred and twenty thousand bushels of wheat to He persecuted Caesar's friends and
much
private property.
He made
himself
many
enemies and generally blustered about, instead of taking real
steps to
meet Caesar, who was rapidly approaching, though
although, after the surrender of Afranius and
with only two legions.
Caesar,
Petreius, he felt called to Italy
by the pressure
if
of the
war
and public affairs, yet did not feel as
he ought to leave
Spain without finishing its subjection. From Ilerda, therefore, about July 9, he sent Q. Cassius, the tribune of the the four others had people, with two legions against Varro,
gone to Italy under Calenus as a guard for the captured and, rather than leave the Iberian quesPompeian legions,
tion unsettled, preceded
them
himself.
He
relied
on his
lie
knowledge of Pompey's character, believing that he would quiet till Spain was finally disposed of. Caesar was lucky in his opponent. At the head of an escort of six hundred
horse he marched to Baetica, and notified all the states to
send embassies to meet him at Corduba early in August.
sent representatives to Corduba,
The response was unequivocal. Every town and state and many towns turned out Varro's cohorts or shut their gates on them. Gades, when
the citizens
had heard
of all that
had happened, ejected GalCaesar.
lonius, Varro's lieutenant,
this
and declared for
When
news reached Varro's camp, even one of
his Spanish
SURRENDER OF MASSILIA.
legions mutinied in Caesar's favor
483
to Hispalis.
and marched
Varro withdrew
to Italica, but this, too, declared against
him, and he was reduced to surrender with his other legion.
He
gave up
all
the military stores,
money
collected
and other
booty.
Caesar thanked the towns and inhabitants for their
fealty, conferred honors on the principal citizens, remitted the taxes Varro had raised, and returned property he had
taken.
Then about August 20 he
visited Gades,
where he
restored the
and
left
moneys taken from the temple of Hercules, Cassius in command with Varro 's two legions, promof
ising
his
him two more
new
levies.
Thence he
sailed with
two old legions, on the ships Varro had constructed, to Tarraco, where he arrived the end of the month, and was
Here, also, he conferred honors on those who had sustained his cause. From Tarraco he
to Massilia,
received with acclamations.
marched by land
where he received word
that, in
accordance with his
own
proposition, he
had been created
dictator, under a new law, at the nomination of M. Lepidus. From henceforth he was legally acting for the Roman state.
Massilia
after a five months' siege, but
by
sea,
September 6, Domitius managed to escape The Masand, though pursued, could not be taken.
greatly against the wishes of the enraged soldiery,
had surrendered
to
Trebonius
siliots,
who
desired to sack the town, were spared on account of their ancient reputation; but they were disarmed, their treasure and fleet taken, and a garrison of two legions left in the place. The rest of the troops proceeded to Italy. Caesar
himself set out for Rome.
finally thwarted Pompey's first general plan of on Caesar in his old province of Gaul, from Spain advancing and Italy at once. Originally Pompey had intended to Caesar in the offensive. When Caesar's remarkanticipate
Thus was
able activity resulted in his losing Italy,
Pompey had
con-
484
CURIO IN SPAIN.
ceived the idea of operating offensively from Macedonia as
a diversion to aid his lieutenants in Spain, never doubting that Caesar would consume a year or more in his operations
there.
But Pompey was never rapid
;
in
preparation or
action
in comparison with his present opponent he
was pro-
crastination itself.
tion of his
Before he had fairly begun the organiza-
Macedonia, Caesar had finished the and had robbed him of an entire province Spanish campaign and seven fine legions. Pompey had been permanently
levies in
new
reduced to a defensive strategic role. He took the offensive tactically at Dyrrachium, but he never recovered his strategic initiative.
A misfortune now befell Caesar's arms.
after regaining Sicily,
His legate Curio,
into Africa
had been sent from there
early in July, to reclaim that land from
Pompey's
cause.
Curio, a young but able officer, vigorous and enterprising, was unwise enough to underrate the army of Attius Varus,
the
Pompeian
legate in Africa,
and took with him but two
out of his four legions and five hundred horse. The legions he selected were the ones which had belonged to Pompey, but
had come over
trustworthy.
to Caesar at Corfinium,
Curio crossed,
and were not quite landed and marched to Utica,
where Varus lay.
At
the inception of his campaign he acted
with good judgment, and in a pitched battle with Varus, near Utica, inflicted upon the latter a bitter defeat with loss of
six
hundred killed and one thousand wounded.
The popu-
lation
was largely favorable
to Caesar, but shortly after the
defeat of Varus, king Juba,
who was
friendly to
Pompey and
a personal enemy of Curio's, came to Varus' assistance with
an overwhelming
force.
Curio retired to the Cornelian camp (Scipio's old and excellent position of the Second Punic War), and should have
remained there on the defensive until he had sent for his
JUBA'S RUSE.
485
other legions ; for he had supplies, water and timber at hand,
and everything could
by sea. But being informed that the reinforcing army was only a small one, under command of Sabura, and not Juba's entire force, and
to
come
him
elated with his recent successes, Curio
was tempted out to
Other-
risk another battle without sufficient reconnoitring.
wise intelligent, he was here lacking in discretion. He acted on partial information without testing its accuracy,
FAIR PROM
Utica and Vicinity.
and Rebilus, whom Caesar had given him as "chief of staff," or adviser, did not hold him back. Sabura did, in fact, com-
mand Juba's vanguard, but Juba was not
far behind with his
whole army. So soon as Curio put in an appearance, Sabura feigned retreat, but only to lure the Roman into disadvantageous ground where the king's force lay in wait to surround him.
And
this,
indeed, took place.
Curio followed up Sabura' s
retreat to a distance of over twenty miles
from
his
camp, in
486
POMPEY'S PLAN FRUSTRATED.
another easy victory. He reached the place in careless order, with tired troops and anticipating no The danger, and fell heedlessly into Juba's ambuscade.
full confidence of
king debouched from cover on all hands and took him His entire army was destroyed. He himself unawares.
refused to
fly,
and died in the midst of
his
men
(July 24).
to escape
The
forces left in the Cornelian
camp attempted
by sea, but, owing to fear and careless loading of the vessels, few got away. King Juba put most of them to the sword. This disaster, traceable to Curio's errors of judgment and
over-eagerness to fight, was *a serious blow to Caesar, and
enabled the Pompeian party to gain enough ground in Africa to overawe the entire population of the continent. But Curio had previously taken possession of Sicily, and this
had relieved the threatened
scarcity of corn in Italy.
Pom-
pey's plan of starving out the peninsula
was frustrated.
Mark Antony had been
as
in
command
of
of the
army
of Italy,
propraetor.
The
ports
Sipus,
Brundisium
and
descent by Pompey's
Cisalpine Gaul.
Tarentum had been held by three legions to forestall a M. Crassus was in charge of fleet.
small fleets lay in the Tyrrhenian and Caius Antonius was in northern Illyricum, on the island of Curicta, with two legions. Dolabella, with
Two
Adriatic waters.
forty galleys,
was in the
straits.
To Pompey's admirals
the situation at Curicta afforded a
good chance of action. Octavius and Scribonius Libo, with a much larger fleet, attacked Dolabella, defeated him, and
cooped up Antonius on the island. Despite some reinforcements sent from Italy and the aid of the Tyrrhenian fleet, the
superior
rescue.
skill of Pompey's vessels prevented Antonius' legions had to be abandoned to their The cohorts were finally captured, taken to Macedonia
numbers and
any
fate.
and
incorporated
with
the
Pompeian army.
Octavius
CJSSAR CONSUL.
487
Issa joined his continued his efforts to reduce Illyricuni. but Caesar's adherents held Lissus, and at Salonse cause;
severely defeated Octavius,
who
retired to Dyrrachium.
Caesar found no difficulty in causing himself to be elected
consul the next year, B. c. 48.
Servilius.
His associate was Publius
This gave him a power equal to that of dictator
satisfactorily in
and one which sounded more
Roman ears. He
resigned the dictatorship, and after eleven days spent in passing some essential laws, celebrating the Feriae Latinae
and holding all the elections, began preparations Pompey. Inasmuch as Pompey controlled the
was compelled
ruse.
to
move on
sea, Caesar
to look forward to crossing the Adriatic
by
Pompey, he knew, would not suppose that he was about to expose his army to the dangers of a winter passage,
or to the difficulties of subsisting
it in Epirus during this would believe him too busy with season. His opponent affairs of state, and especially the consulship, to leave Italy so
soon.
For these very reasons, Caesar determined
to steal a
passage of the Adriatic in midwinter.
Caesar had ordered to Brundisium all his cavalry, several thousand in number, and the twelve legions nine old, three
which he now had under the eagles. Of these, four had marched to the Varus under Calenus, escorting Pompey 's
disbanded legions; two had gone to Baetica under Cassius; three had besieged Massilia under Trebonius. Calenus'
legions
new
had
become
available
in mid-August;
those
of
Cassius towards the end of August; those of Trebonius a month later. All had successively been headed for Brundisium, but they had shown signs of discontent and had been
marching slowly.
At Placentia occurred the mutiny of the Ninth legion, which Caesar suppressed by sharp action added to his own He ordered the legions decimated; but personal influence.
488
after a while
CAESAR
AT BRUNDISIUM.
to
commuted the punishment
beheading twelve
of the ringleaders.
What Caesar's army numbered, it is impossible to say. Two of the new legions no doubt had somewhere near the
normal complement? which has been stated at some fortyThe ten old ones, however, had been eight hundred men.
much
depleted,
and while no mention
is
made
of recruiting
them up to normal standard, probably something of the kind had been done. If they averaged thirty-three hundred men,
as
is
not improbable,
Caesar's forces, with light troops
fifty
and
cavalry,
must
still
have been under
thousand men,
aU
told.
Caesar reached Brundisium the 17th of November.
His
means
twelve galleys and about one hundred transports. Barely fifteen thousand men and five hundred horse out of his twelve legions and
ten thousand cavalry could, according to the Commentaries,
of transportation
were very limited,
be embarked on what bottoms he had at command.
this
Why
not very clear. Nearly a .year had elapsed since he ordered vessels to be built in the Italian, Sicilian
is
was so
and Gallic ports and collected at Brundisium and Caesar was wont to look well to the logistics of the future. Some of
;
the ships had been destroyed in Illyricum, but this accounted
for but a part of the proposed fleet.
bella
Hortensius and Dolabuilt
had carried out
their orders,
and had
and brought
together a goodly
number
of vessels;
but the disaster at
Sicily
Curicta, and the necessity of protecting had reduced the quota to this limit.
and Sardinia,
The
size of the
ried over to
seven legions selected by Caesar to be carthe six old ones of Calenus and Epirus
Cassius and one
new one
must have been much smaller
than the above given estimate.
The
authorities, as well as
the Commentaries themselves, are contradictory on this point.
POMPETS INACTIVITY.
"Even
because
these troops
489
their
embarked very short of
many had
fallen in the
number, wars in Gaul, and the long
march from Spain had lessened their number very much, and a severe autumn in Apulia and the district about Brundisium, after the very wholesome countries of Spain and Gaul,
had impaired the health of the whole army." The seven legions probably numbered twenty thousand men; and six
hundred horse went along. Pompey had spent a year in
Caesar was concerned.
inactivity, so far as
meeting
in gath-
But he had been industrious
ering a
fleet,
Athens,
Pontus,
"from Asia and the Cyclades, from Corcyra, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phoenicia and
Egypt, and had given directions that a great number should be built in every other place. He had exacted a large sum
of
money from Asia, Syria and
Achaia
;
all
the kings,
dynasts,
tertarchs and free states of
and had obliged the corof these provinces, of which he himself had the govporations ernment, to count down to him a large sum." He had reached
Epirus from Italy with
full ones of five partial legions
;
he now had nine
Roman
citizens
from Italy or resident in the
one from Cilicia (called Gemella, provinces; because consolidated out of two others) ; one from Crete and
a veteran
Macedonia, of veterans settled in that province after their discharge; two from Asia. "Besides, he had distributed
among his legions a considerable number, by way of recruits, from Thessaly, Boeotia, Achaia and Epirus with his legions he also intermixed the soldiers taken from Caius Antonius,
;
at
Curicta."
He
making
eleven in
expected two more legions from Syria, all. He had a large number of Greek and
other auxiliary bowmen and slingers, probably not less than six thousand, many of distinguished valor, two thousand volunteers and seven thousand horse, all chosen men.
These
latter
comprised Celts from the Alexandria garrison,
490
POMPEY'S ARMY AND FLEET.
Thracians, Cappadocians, Galatians, Armenians, Numidians and mounted archers from Commagene. Some authorities
figure
fact,
Pompey's force as high as ninety thousand men; in it was not more than fifty thousand strong. He had
a vast amount of corn from his various tributary
laid in
provinces,
seaports,
and by holding Dyrrachium, Apollonia and other imagined that he could prevent Caesar from crossHis
fleet
ing
the
Adriatic.
was " stationed along
each,
the
seacoast."
Whatever the
actual
force of
Pompey
had
certainly
outnumbered Caesar
superior.
five
in land troops, while at sea
he was far
The number
of the vessels he
collected
was
Roman and the rest to trust M. Cato, he had furnished by clients. Unwilling this fleet under the orders of Marcus Bibulus, who placed
hundred, of which one hundred were
with one hundred and ten large ships lay near Corcyra.
Under him
the younger
Pompey commanded
the Egyptian
contingent; Dec. Laelius and C. Triarius the Asiatic; C. Cassius the Syrian; C. Marcellus and C. Coponius the
Rhodian; Scribonius Libo and M. Octavius the Liburnian and Achaian. It would seem that this enormous fleet, used
with any kind of energy, must have seriously interfered with Cesar's campaigns in 49 B. c. ; have all but starved out
Italy,
and
in
many ways have manoeuvred
to advantage.
But barring the small operation on the Illyrian coast, it had Under Cato, it would practically accomplished nothing. shown a better record. have
At
the outset
Pompey had
carry on the war.
possessed.
lacked nothing with which to All that Caesar wanted Pompey had
to be sure,
still
But the energy, never splendid
such that in former days it had enabled him to triumph over all enemies, such, says Plutarch, as to have made him
conqueror of three continents,
was now on the wane.
From
POMPEY DRILLS HIS LEGIONS.
491
youth up, Pompey had been used to a life of self-indulgence. At periods he had been capable of successful exertion, and
aided largely by what others had done before him, and unexampled good fortune, had accomplished much; he had
no inconsiderable native
ability,
and had
in a measure earned
But for the past year he had seemed incapable of exertion. His moral force appeared to have shrunk into nothing before the superior energy and
the reputation he possessed.
character of his wonderful opponent, and as he had refused to
meet Caesar in the cabinet, so now he seemed unwilling to face him in the field. In the case of each man the moral
qualities stood in inverse ratio to the material.
Not
that
Pompey had been
absolutely inactive.
He had
drilling and disciplining his troops and in making his forces compact and pliable. Despite his fiftyeight years he had daily taken personal share in the work of
kept busy in
organization, and
had given
his
to his troops in their drill
own countenance and example and manoeuvring at the camp at
this
Berrea, on the Haliacmon.
But
was not war.
It
was not
even preparation for war.
ing his legions, Caesar
While Pompey had been review-
had obtained complete control of Italy and had riven Spain from his dominions. Caesar was working with a perfect army, instinct with a perfect purpose. Pompey was creating a perfect outward military body, but
was doing nothing to breathe that soul into it, without which an army is but a well-drilled mob. Caesar had a definite
object and was working towards
it
was taking
his time, in the belief that
by direct means. Pompey when Caesar finally
confronted him, he would be able to demolish him by mere weight of mass. He imagined that in this civil war a simple
defensive would enable
him
to win.
false conception of the problem.
He had
This was a thoroughly as yet not dared to This of
itself
encounter Caesar.
He
put
off the fatal day.
492
CESAR'S GAIN AND LOSS.
his troops
weakened him, as well as and more.
and
his adherents,
more
He Caesar on the contrary looked at the matter squarely. no doubt felt, and he certainly so held out to the world, that
he only drew the sword to right the wrongs of the Roman And in his course he made no pause, he asked no people.
but carried through his intelligently conceived plan with {Consummate skill and untiring energy. He had now secured
rest,
his rear
by the subjection of Spain; his base was Italy, with Gaul and Spain, and all their resources behind it, and he was
ready to undertake an active offensive against the army under Pompey's personal command. He felt that he was superior
to his opponent in all that
makes war
successful,
except
numbers, and Caesar was not one of those who believed that His the gods were on the side of the heaviest battalions.
faith in his
own
star
was almost blind, and he was willing and
anxious to risk his
own
smaller
army
in a contest with his
bulky but inactive opponent. Since the opening of the civil war,
offensive
Pompey had made no
movement; Caesar, on the contrary, had operated In offensively against Spain, Sardinia, Sicily and Africa.
Spain he had been fully successful; Sardinia had been recovered; in Sicily Curio had succeeded to the extent of
effecting a relief in the threatened famine in Italy
;
in Africa
he had failed.
Pompey had been checked
in all his plans,
save only in the success of his ally, Juba, in Africa, and the So deliberate had capture of Antonius' legions in Illyricum.
he been in his preparations, that, despite the Spanish interlude, Caesar was still able to take the offensive against him
in Greece.
These facts are a fair measure of the men.
XXXI.
EPIRUS.
NOVEMBER,
49,
TO FEBRUARY,
48 B. C.
horse.
C.ESAR had transports enough for but seven small legions and six hundred He set sail, reached Epirus in safety, and landed at an uninhabited
roadstead.
force.
He ran grave risk in thus moving He would have done better to march
against
Pompey with
so small a
with his entire army by way of
of peace to
niyricum, his own province. On reaching Epirus, Caesar renewed his offers Pompey, but was again refused. He then made a bold demonstration
on Dyrrachium, but Pompey returned to this valuable port in season to save it. There was some manoeuvring between the rival armies, but nothing definitive.
Caesar
had brought over but half
fleet.
his
army
the other half was
still in
Brundisium, watched by Pompey's
Antony venture
to sea.
When
finally
Only after many weeks could Mark he reached the Epirotic coast he found
its
himself on the north of Pompey's army, as Csesar was on
clever marching on their side and
south
but by
joined hands.
want of energy on Pompey's the Caesarians Caesar then made some detachments of troops to various provand
allies.
inces of Greece to secure corn
By
a bold maTMEuvre shortly
after,
he cut Pompey off from Dyrrachium, and though he could not capture the town, he established himself south and east of the city, between it and Pompey.
"WHEN
Caesar came to Brundisium he
made a speech
to
the soldiers: 'That since they were
now
almost arrived at the
termination of their
toils
submit to leave their
and dangers, they should patiently slaves and baggage in Italy, and to
embark without luggage, that a greater number
of men might be put on board; that they might expect everything from victory and his liberality.' They cried out with one voice,
'he might give
fully fulfill
them.
what orders he pleased, that they would cheerCaesar's small force was largely veteran,
' '
tried in the
campaigns of Gaul and Spain, hardened by work and accustomed to victory. They believed absolutely in their chief and blindly followed and obeyed him. Caesar
494
CHANCES DELIBERATELY TAKEN.
There had been some could rely on them as on himself. of dissatisfaction in the legions, specially exemplisymptoms
fied
Brundisium.
by the mutiny of the Ninth at Placentia, on its way to But Caesar had put this down by his superior
moral weight.
legions left
So
far as
field
nothing to be desired.
work was concerned, the Those which had lately
mutinied were anxious to rehabilitate themselves.
On
many
and
the 28th of November, 49 B. c., Caesar, after waiting days for a north wind, set sail with his seven legions
six
hundred horse, but without baggage, on some one
hundred transports convoyed by twelve galleys, only four of which had decks. After a lucky passage towards the southeast the
army landed next day on the Epirotic coast north of Corcyra, at a place known as Palaeste (Paljassa), in an unin-
habited roadway.
He had
run considerable
risk,
but had
succeeded in avoiding an encounter with any part of
pey's
fleet.
Pom-
Caesar had no doubt
carefully studied
his
chances of
encountering storms and enemy, and had deliberately taken them. But his thus risking his entire cause, by shipping half
his
army
latter 's
encounter Pompey's threefold forces on the territory, savors more of foolhardiness than the wellto
It again suggests
pondered courage of the great captain.
itself, that to march his entire army through Illyria, and thus base on his ancient province, was preferable to shipping half of it by sea, with a base to create, the chance of capture of
his first convoy,
and the serious question as
to whether the
second would ever reach him.
Illyria had, to be sure,
no
great resources; but Caesar's line of communications would
have been free from danger.
Still Caesar's
venture succeeded, so far as the
ships as were near at
first
went.
Pompey's hundred and ten at Corcyra, thirty-six at Oricum
Such
of
hand
convoy one
had not
CROSSING TO EPIRUS.
known
ments.
of the sailing.
495
They had kept
that he
to the eastern coast'of
the Adriatic and
had
not sought to discover Caesar's
move-
They imagined
was wintering
at Brundisium.
There was not even a squad of men at any point along the This argues as much coast, except in the harbors and towns.
carelessness
listlessness.
on the part of Bibulus as Pompey had exhibited But it was well in keeping with all which had
so far been done, or failed to be done,
by
all
the
Pompeian
generals.
to
Pompey was
confident that Caesar would not seek
open the campaign before spring. When, therefore, his army had been collected, drilled and organized so as to be fit for service, he leisurely broke up his camp of instruction
at Beroea to
and began to move his legions by the Via Egnatia the Adriatic, where he proposed to put them in winter-
quarters, in Dyrrachium, Apollonia
and other coast towns,
while Caesar was
still
at Brundisium.
He
relied so absolutely
on the strength of his numbers that, even if he expected it, which is doubtful, he seemed to care little whether or not
Caesar advanced against him.
overwhelming victory win would recover for him
imagined that a single which he never doubted he should
all
He
the power, all the influence
losing.
which for months he had been
his arrival
As
Caesar alleges,
was unexpected
no preparation had been made
to receive him.
No
sooner had he landed than Caesar sent back his ships
under Calenus for the rest of his legions.
greater security they sailed
But though
for
by night, his fortune no longer attended them; the vessels were delayed by adverse winds, and some thirty, which were driven back, were caught and
who was watching at Corbarbarously burned by Bibulus, with'all the crews on board. The Pompeian admiral cyra,
hoped "by the severity of the punishment
to deter the rest."
He
also
hoped thus to atone for his lack of care in permit-
496
POMPEY STARTLED.
him with
it
ting Caesar's fleet to pass
that Caesar
half the army.
Now
had
effected a landing,
occurred to Bibulus that
he had better close the ports of Illyricum and Epirus and which he did, from Salonae to Oricum. It watch the coast,
had not been lack of courage on his part, but the fact that no one expected Caesar at this season; for now, "having disposed his guard with great care, he lay on board himself
in the depth of winter, declining no fatigue or duty,
and not
waiting for reinforcements, in hopes that he might come within Caesar's reach."
posted his fleet on the coast of Epirus as a behind which to organize and assemble his army. The latter had been strung out from the Haliacmon to Thessalonica, with
Pompey had
curtain
two legions
still
in Syria, recently raised
by
Metellus Scipio. To his headquarters not only came his but his friends and his defeated generals, Domitius levies,
from Massilia, Cato from Sicily, numberless refugees from Rome, men of means and standing. A senate of two hundred members began its sessions at Thessalonica. All this
by no means strengthened Pompey's army. Unlike Alexander, he could not control a court and camp in one body. Nor did his presence near Pella, the ancient capital of Macedon, infuse into his conduct aught of the glowing energy of
Philip or his splendid son.
Having reached Epirus, where he must absolutely and at once either make terms with Pompey or fight him, Caesar
again sent proposals to his opponent to treat for peace and a disbandment of all forces, agreeing to leave the questions
between them to the decision of the Senate and people. He certainly showed every appearance of honestly desiring an
accommodation; and as, indeed, the chances were by no means in his favor, he may have been sincere. The bearer
of these proposals
was Pompey's
legate,
Vibullius Rufus,
CAESAR
MAKES ADVANCES.
Vibullius found
497
whom
Caesar had captured, for the second time, in Spain,
freely forgiven.
garve
and had
Pompey
in distant
Macedonia and
him the
proposals, which, however,
met
Epirus and Macedonia.
with the same fate as previous ones.
received the
first
Pompey had but
just
Already on the so soon as he heard of Caesar's advance, he hurried march, He had until now been so to the coast towards Apollonia.
news of Caesar's lauding.
498
CAESAR PUSHES ON.
slow that CaBsar, despite the Spanish campaign and the siege Startled out of of Massilia, could still take the offensive.
his security, not only
by
Caesar's landing but
by
his activity,
Pompey now
exertions.
sion of the whole seaboard,
conceived the fear that Caesar might get possesand was spurred on to unusual
Caesar
had,
the
same
day he
landed,
November
29,
marched over the difficult mountain paths from Palaeste, on
Oricum, which, after soine show of resistance by Pompey's lieutenant, L. Torquatus, the citizens surrendered to him;
following which the garrison did the like with the citadel.
The
Thence, notescaped to Corcyra. withstanding the fatigues of the previous night's march, Caesar pushed on to Apollonia, a rich town on a branch of
fleet there stationed
the
Via Egnatia, leaving
in
his
new
legion under Acilius and
Marcus
reached Apollonia next day. Straberius, the governor, tried to hold the place for Pompey,
citizens.
Oricum.
He
watching the citadel and striving to control the
But Apollonia likewise gave Caesar admittance, refusing to do otherwise than as the Roman people and Senate had done
in electing Caesar consul.
Straberius
fled.
Caesar headed,
December
2,
for
neighboring states
Dyrrachium. Many and towns, among them
Epirus, followed
suit.
distant
and more
Bullis,
Amantia
and substantially
all
Pompey, meanwhile, thoroughly frightened
at the unex-
pected turn given to matters by Caesar's arrival, forged
ahead by stout marching, day and night, for Apollonia and
His speed tired, as his evident nervousness demoralized, his men. They were not campaign - seasoned, like the Gallic veterans; they had received but the superDyrrachium.
ficial
training of the drill-ground. of Caesar was such in Pompey's
soldiers
It is said that the fear
army
that
many
Epirotic
threw down their arms and deserted so soon as they
DYRRACHIUM NEARLY
learned of his arrival.
LOST.
499
So strong was this sentiment that Labienus, Caesar's old lieutenant and now Pompey's righthand man, was obliged, when they reached Dyrrachium,
December
3, to
subject the
men
to a
new oath not
to desert
Pompey whatever might happen. Though Pompey hastened his march with
the
utmost
it
endeavor, he barely reached Dyrrachium in time to save
from capture. His head of column just anticipated Caesar, who was already on the road towards this to him essential
an intrenched camp south of Dyrrachium, and, learning that his opponent had secured possession of the town, Caesar, no doubt disappointed, but
city.
Pompey went
into
scarcely expecting uninterrupted success,
and in any event
too
weak
to
attack his adversary,
moved backward and
on the south side of
camped
its
in the territory of Apollonia,
the river Apsus.
Pompey,
so soon as his
army had recovered
and thus
tone, thinking to defend the line of this river
hold
Dyrrachium territory intact, shortly camped opposite Caesar and began to call in all his troops to this place. He made his cohorts comfortable, intending, if necessary, to winter here. Each army thus lay somewhat back from the river, facing the other across the Apsus.
Caesar was waiting for his other legions. He protected by his position his new allies in the country south of where he
lay.
the
came and
was midway between the two harbors of Dyrrachium and Oricum, where alone Pompey's fleet, his chief
danger, could find suitable anchorage. Pompey had won the rank of a great soldier without the
herculean labors usually incident thereto and at this period, age or luxury had robbed him of whatever moral energy he
;
He
had once boasted.
He had
never possessed the mental
activity of Napoleon, but like the latter at Waterloo he
lost his old-time
had
bodily activity.
Nothing demonstrates the
500
CALENUS TRIES TO
SAIL'.
weakness of his present condition more than the fact that he remained in this position in front of Caesar two whole
months, vastly Cassar's superior in numbers, and without A bold offensive at this taking any step to attack him.
moment might
half
well have been fatal to Caesar.
forces.
He
had but
Pompey's and might indefinitely be kept there by weather and Pompey's fleet; for the latter was well equipped and by good management ought to control the Adriatic. Now was the
time,
The
rest
were
still
at Brundisium,
lucky circumstance might any day enable Calenus to bring over
Caesar's
if
ever, for
Pompey
to crush his adversary.
other legions.
Nor were
opportunities
wanting.
Holding ward movement of
as he did the entire coast,
his
Pompey by
a simple for-
right, with reasonable precautions,
could scarcely have failed to force Caesar into the interior of Epirus, thus dividing his forces beyond a chance of junction,
and putting
mercy.
his
enemy,
if
it
could be done at
all,
at his
Moreover, Caesar was placed where victualing his was already a serious task and might be made all but army impossible. For he had no fleet.
Calenus, in the port of Brundisium, having been joined by the Massilia legions, had already put the cohorts and
cavalry on board the vessels which had returned from Epirus and had actually set sail, when he received notice from Caesar
to exercise the greatest caution, as Bibulus entire coast
and was awake
to everything that
fleet
commanded the went on. Thus
admonished, Calenus recalled the
rather than run the risk of capture.
did.
and disembarked,
It
was as well that he
Bibulus had left Corcyra and come to Oricum, keenly on the watch for him, and seizing one ship which, on starting, had strayed from the rest and been driven out to sea,
put the entire crew to death. In this position in the roadway at Oricum, while Bibulus
DEATH OF
BIBULUS.
501
kept Caesar from the sea, so likewise Caesar's lieutenants kept Bibulus from the land, and cut him off from wood and All his supplies and water, reducing him to great straits.
even water had to be brought from Corcyra. On one occasion his men were reduced to the dew which they could collect on wool-hides laid upon the decks. Though Bibulus'
men bore
their deprivations with fortitude, these hardships
were the occasion of a stratagem, taking the form of a request by Bibulus for a truce and conference with Caesar.
Caesar had gone with a legion to Buthrotum, opposite Cor-
and gain allies. But he personally returned on hearing from Acilius and Marcus that Bibulus had asked for a truce. The conference was granted, as Caesar had
cyra, to forage
always been anxious to come to terms with Pompey, but the
truce was refused.
Caesar saw through the ruse,
to
that the
his
Pompeian admiral only sought vessels. Bibulus did not come
Libo in
his stead.
revictual
and water
to the conference, but sent
This
officer,
however, offered to bear
Caesar's message to
truce meanwhile.
that he
Pompey, and renewed the request for a This Caesar naturally declined, as he saw
was harassing the fleet more than the fleet was annoying him, and could not afford to give it the opportunity it was seeking.
About
this
command
time Bibulus died from the exposures of a he would not desert, and the several fleets were
permitted by Pompey to remain under their respective commanders without any one head. This was fortunate for
Caesar, as
Pompey 's naval management
thus lacked unity of
action, which was worse than even a half -competent leader.
Caesar's latest messages to
Pompey
life
evoked,
it
is
said,
no
other reply than that "even
or
Rome were
Still
not worth
holding by the grace of Caesar." efforts to bring about a conference.
The Apsus
he persevered in which is
502
A CONFERENCE INTERRUPTED.
alone lay between the camps.
a narrow river
There was
a general understanding among
the soldiers that no darts
should be hurled across, or arrows shot, whenever either party approached the banks, and they freely conversed at frequent
intervals, assembling in groups
on the river shore.
to
This sus-
pension of hostilities
war.
It is not
was similar
what occurred on the
Peninsula, at Petersburg, and other places during our civil
an unusual species of truce, which has always obtained between armies in immediate contact, especially if
speaking the same language. To this meeting-place Caesar, who was still sincerely anxious for a personal interview, and
who no doubt
felt his superiority
over
Pompey
in council as
well as in war, sent P. Vatinius to solicit,
by a publicly pro-
claimed request, "the right for justice and to robbers
to
granted even to fugitives from Koman citizens to send deputies
Roman
citizens to treat for peace."
Thus a conference
;
was arranged between Vatinius and Aulus Varro but when this was being held, and Labienus, who was present, was
,
was interrupted by a shower of Pompeian side, by which many, including three centurions, were wounded. Labienus is said to have
conversing with Vatinius,
darts from the
it
exclaimed, "There can be no thought of peace unless
we
carryback with us Cjesar's head!"
tlement.
apparently seeing in
the temper of some of the troops the impossibility of a set-
Thus
again
were
Caesar's
pacific
's
intentions
defeated and the heated feelings of
ents demonstrated.
Pompey
chief adher-
These are the statements of the Comis
mentaries.
There
and they are lent color by other
no special reason for doubting them, authorities. Caesar was
always careful to keep the appearance of right and reason on his side, and even if he did not desire the peace he asked, he would have been likely, knowing that Pompey would
decline all his advances, to continue to
make them.
ACTIVE ANTONY.
503
Libo, after Bibulus' death, sailed over from Oricum to
Brundisium about the middle of January, and blockaded that port, which was the only exit to sea for Caesar's forces still
occupied the small island at its mouth. Arriving suddenly, he caught and fired some of Caesar's transports and carried off one laden with corn. Landing, he
in Italy.
He
drove in a party of Antony's men whereupon he boastingly wrote that Pompey might haul up for repairs the rest of
;
his fleet, for he could with his
force, unaided, keep Cesar's reinforcements from joining him. Antony was at the time in the town. To oppose Libo, he
own
patrolled the shores
order to come to
and prevented his watering. And in a combat with him, which he could not well
he covered with pent-houses a number of the long boats belonging to war-galleys, armed them with veterans,
do at
sea,
and hid them along the harbor shores. Then sending two three -banked galleys out to the mouth of the port to mano3uvre, he induced
Libo to put
five
four -banked galleys out to
intercept them.
as
if flying,
Antony's galleys retired within the harbor, and induced Libo's to follow. So soon as they
came within the harbor, the long boats advanced, inclosed
the galleys of the enemy, attacked them, captured one and
Libo, seeing that he was unable to accomplish anything by lying off the place, and starved for
drove the others away.
water, which
Antony prevented
his
getting
by stationing
cavalry posts along the coast, finally gave over the blockade.
He Caesar was becoming anxious about his other legions. had waited nearly three months for them, winter was coming
to an end,
and he
felt that
he must run some risk in order to
get them.
condition
He
was, in fact, almost without news of their
;
and that of Italy
for he
had few ships he could
use as couriers.
that the troops
He
wrote to his lieutenants at Brundisium
at all hazards
must be sent
by the
first fair
504
wind, even
vessels,"
if
CJESAREM VEHIS!
some
wrote.
vessels
were
lost.
"I need
It
soldiers, not
lie
Indeed,
lie
attempted himself to go
across on a small twelve-oared boat.
was on
"
this occasion
that he
is
said to have exclaimed to the boatman,
who
feared
to put to sea
owing
to high
running water,
What
dreadest
thou?
Thou
carriest Caesar
and
unable, for all that, to cross.
ous, beset
by the
perils of the
his fortunes !" But he was The voyage was too dangersea and the enemy alike.
all so.
Antony, Calenus, and especially the rank and file, were as fretful to join their chief as Ca3sar was to have them do
The
the
old soldiers could hardly be held in hand, so anxious
were they to be beside their general.
first
On
the blowing of
south wind,
February 15,
they weighed anchor
carried past Apollonia
and
set sail at nightfall.
They were
and Dyrrachium, were seen by the enemy, and, being caught in a lull of wind, were chased by his fleet, under Q. Coponius,
who emerged from
the latter place.
Just as these
war-vessels had all but reached Caesar's transports, the south
wind again sprang up and enabled them to make Nymphaeum,
This port, with the sailing vessels of that day, could be entered by a south but not a southwest wind, and
above Lissus.
Antony's transports had made the roadway, Caesar's luck came in, the wind veered to southwest and not only preafter
vented the enemy from entering, but drove a part of their fleet upon* the rocks and lost them sixteen out of twenty
and many men. Caesar liberated those who were captured. Only one of Caesar's vessels was taken by the
ships
enemy, and though the crew of two hundred and twenty recruits, unsuspicious of the enemy's treachery, surrendered on
promise of being spared, they were every one put to death. One other ship went ashore, but the veteran legionaries
aboard of her declined terms and happily made their way to shore and joined the army.
ANTONY THREATENED.
On
505
landing, the near-by town of Lissus, which Caesar had fortified while Illyria was one of his provinces, received
Antony and
ius,
his
men and gave them
by
all assistance.
Otacil-
Pompey's
lieutenant, took to flight.
From
here
Antony
notified Caesar of his safe arrival
native couriers.
He had
brought the three veteran Massilia legions and one new one, the Twenty-seventh, about eight hundred horse, and some
convalescents belonging to the legions already in Epirus,
something under twenty thousand men.
The
ships were sent
back
to Italy for the rest of Caesar's
army, save thirty trans-
on the chance of their being needed. Pompey received the news of Antony's landing about the same time, perhaps February 18. The ships had
ports, kept
Caesar and
been sighted from both Apollonia and Dyrrachium, but had then been lost to view. The immediate duty of each leader
was
clear.
Caesar instantly but openly broke
camp February
19, and set out to join Antony,
who was
at least four days'
march away
Pompey had
if
secretly
via Dyrrachium, on Tirana, to cut
marched the night before, him off from moving
towards Caesar and
possible fall on
task.
him from ambush.
Pompey had the easier
He
could hold the line of the
Apsus against Caesar, as well as move directly upon the newcomers. Caesar was obliged to go some distance up the Apsus to find a ford and perhaps to force a crossing.
Pompey was not rapid in his march, but nevertheless Febreached the vicinity of Antony one day the sooner, and camped in ambush near the road to which ruary 21,
Antony was limited catch him unawares.
in
marching toward Caesar, hoping to He camped without fires and kept his
proceeding luckily reached Antony through friendly Greeks. He remained in where he was entirely safe, and sent word of his camp,
hiding.
men
close
in
News
of
this
whereabouts to Caesar.
This chief, meanwhile, had passed
506
POMPEY DECAMPS.
the Apsus, twenty miles above his camp, reached Scampa, and on the 22d was reconnoitring to ascertain his lieutenant's
location.
Here he was found by Antony's messengers.
'
On
w PH/C.UM
Caesar and
Antony
join.
the 23d he crossed the mountains and marched on Tirana.
Pompey had no
idea of being caught between the two armies,
and decamped, lest he should be forced into immediate battle. That Pompey should have allowed this junction to be made is as much a reproach to him as a credit to Caesar. But it was
POMPEY'S MISCONCEPTIONS.
of a part with
his phlegmatic character.
507
ability or
The
rather the nerve of the two
men
is
well shown in this, as in
step
other minor operations.
Pompey's every
to
was marked
by
hesitating, not to say timorous, conduct; Caesar's every
step
by good
fortune,
be sure, but good fortune well
utilized.
Pompey
to the
tions.
All the luck in the world could not have helped accomplish his ends when he would not put his hand
to
work
be done, under even the most favorable condi-
Up
to this
ception of
moment, Pompey had been acting on a misconwhat was the proper plan of campaign. He had
wise to seek to confine Caesar to a jjiven territory a by his largely superior cavalry, and thus starve him out, whereas when he had outnum; very questionable possibility
it
deemed
bered him three to one, his manifest duty was to attack If Pompey had hitherto avoided battle, now that him.
Caesar had been reinforced, he had a double reason for so
doing.
clear that
Though
it is
Pompey showed
distinct lack
of enterprise during this period of his great superiority, his
plan of starving out Caesar
may have been
a good one after
the latter's junction with Antony.
During
this time,
Scipio,
Pompey's lieutenant
in Syria,
had, on Caesar's crossing to Epirus, been ordered by Pompey to return to Macedonia and join him there. He apparently did not feel strong enough to cope with Caesar single-handed,
however much he might outnumber him.
Caesar held his
army well
in hand.
and had drawn in most of
thirty-five
his garrisons.
He had joined Antony He had a total of
if
thousand men, and circumstances,
not forces,
were in his favor.
He
was
entirely ready to
come
-ZEtolia
to
decisive struggle with
Pompey.
Thessaly and
had
if
sent ambassadors to him, agreeing to support his cause
he
would send them troops.
Though he could
ill
afford to
make
508
details
CESAR'S FORCES.
from his meagre
force, Caesar
answered these appeals by dispatching a young legion, the Twenty-seventh, and two hundred horse to Thessaly, under L. Cassius Longinus, and
five cohorts
from Oricum and some cavalry into
.^Etolia,
under C. Calvisius Sabinus.
Each
of these lieutenants
had
instructions, in addition to protecting
and gaining the friendly
cooperation of the several provinces, to adopt measures to
Into Macedonia by the Egnatian provide Caesar with corn. he sent the Eleventh and Twelfth legions and five highway
hundred horse, under Domitius Calvinus, to head off the corps of Scipio, which would soon approach from Thessalonica.
When
these detachments were all made, Caesar
had but
the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, seven legions, Thirteenth and Fourteenth, say twenty-two thousand men, but his situation was vastly improved. He undertook to try
conclusions with
Pompey and determined to hold him on the seacoast near Dyrrachium, and thus cut him off from Greece. It was Caesar, though far weaker, who began to force the
He saw through Pompey's intentions, and, like a bold player, met his adversary, though with but half his
fighting.
strength,
on
his
own ground.
"dislodged the enemy from Calydon and Naupactus, and made himself master of the whole country." Cassius found two factions
in Thessaly,
Calvisius was well received in JEtolia,
Petreius favoring Caesar.
Hegasaretus in power and favoring Pompey, This made his work more difficult.
the
While Domitius was marching on Macedonia from
west, Scipio
When
the latter
was moving on the same province from the east. came within twenty miles of Domitius'
army, instead of manoeuvring against it he suddenly filed off southerly towards Longinus in Thessaly, hoping to catch this general napping, and to interfere with his reduction of the
country.
In order to do
this the better,
he started in light
THE LIEUTENANTS CROSS SWORDS.
509
marching order, having left his baggage with eight cohorts, under M. Favonius, south of the Haliacmon, ordering him to
strongly fortify himself there.
to fall
He sent Cotus'
cavalry ahead,
on Longinus' camp. Longinus, whose force was fresh and weak, at once retired towards the foothills, intending to cross to Ambracia, and
was vigorously followed up by Scipio's cavalry. Domitius, however, was expert enough to make an immediate demonstration against Favonius.
danger obliged Scipio to return to his lieutenant and baggage-camp, which
off
The rumor of
this
he only reached in season to head
Domitius, whose van
was already in sight. "The dust raised by Domitius' army and Scipio's advance-guard were observed at the same instant."
Domitius was
still
north of the river.
Scipio shortly
crossed
by a ford above him and camped. There was a plain six miles wide between the camps.
up in front of his camp. Domitius advanced him and invited battle. After some skirmishing and towards
an advance and show of
battle, Scipio,
Scipio drew
the Haliacmon to close with his enemy, concluded
though he had crossed it to be
best to decline the engagement with Domitius' legions, which
were very eager for the fray, and to retire across the river In two cavalry combats which supervened to his first camp.
in their
officer
mutual reconnoitring, Scipio was worsted. Each endeavored to lure the other into some stratagem, but
Domitius apparently had the best of the
situ.
neither succeeded.
interchanges.
Both remained in
Caesar, wishing to concentrate, left but three cohorts at
Oricum, under Acilius, to protect the shipping which was in the bay, and drew in the rest of his garrisons to the main
army.
Acilius blocked
in
chantman
up the harbor by sinking a merthe mouth and anchoring a war-vessel near by.
fortunate.
But he was not
Pompey's
son,
Cna3us,
whom
510
POMPEY AVOIDS CONFLICT.
meet
in Spain,
we
shall later
and who commanded the Egypdistinguish himself, sailed for
tian contingent, anxious
to
the place, captured the man-of-war, raised the sunken ship,
and made his way into the harbor. Here he burned the main part of Caesar's fleet, and leaving Decimus Lselius to
blockade the port and hinder the entering of corn, he sailed to Nymphaeum and up the river to Lissus, where he also
burned the thirty transports Antony had kept there. These losses were highly disadvantageous to Caesar, for they took
all
the vessels he had on the east of the Adriatic.
In land-
ing at Lissus, young
Pompey
had, however, less fortune,
being foiled in his effort to capture the place.
But
it
would
appear that Cnaeus possessed the spirit of enterprise, which at this time seemed to have deserted his father.
,
After the failure of his ambuscade at Tirana,
retired
Pompey had
on Dyrrachium. In pursuance of his plan of avoiding armed conflict, he then determined to defend the line of the Genusus, just south of Dyrrachium, and moved to
Asparagium, a town whose location
is variously stated, but which, to accord with the operations detailed in the Commen-
taries,
must have
lain
some ten miles up from the mouth of
After joining Antony, had conducted a raid up Scampa,
the
that river
and on the south bank.
to
Caesar had returned
the Genusus, for the sake of capturing the capital of
Parthenians (a place which cannot be identified at this day) with its Pompeian garrison, and had then followed Pompey
to
In three days' march he reached a position Next day he moved out of opposite Pompey and camped. drew up in order and offered battle, Pompey declined camp,
Asparagium.
to accept Caesar's challenge, emerging, to be sure,
from camp, but remaining on his heights, where he could not be attacked without much danger.
Caesar, never at a loss for a plan,
and determined
to leave
A QUICK MARCH.
Pompey no
rest,
511
conceived and executed one of those bold
operations which show the head and
hand
of the master.
He
determined to cut
Pompey
off
from Dyrrachium.
By
a long
rugged road, he set out, March 3, to move about Pompey 's flank straight on his base of sup-
and
secret circuit over a
plies.
His route lay over a
difficult
bly with but the barest roads, (modern Pelium), and across the mountains which separated
the Genusus from the
of Dyrrachium, thence
wooded country, probaup the Genusus to Clodiana
is
modern Arzen, whose mouth
north
river
down
the latter river.
From
CAMP
*-_J
v.
Caesar's
March
to Dyrrachhun.
to river he
must ascend and descend the
affluents of either,
by a circuit of some forty-five miles, which distance, with the route so badly cut up, could not be made at a greater rate
than two miles an hour,
if that.
At
the same time, speed
was imperative.
on Caesar's keeping Pompey in ignorance of his intentions during a whole day,
Success depended
512
POMPEY HEADED
his
OFF.
and on
making the march
in not
much
over twenty -four
hours; for Pompey's road to Dyrrachium was straight and easy and less than twenty -five miles long.
Pompey had no
corn.
tion,
idea that Caesar was heading for his com-
munications; he thought he was moving camp for lack of
When, by
his cavalry scouts reporting Caesar's direc-
fact, though he was on a shorter line, which he at once took, it was too late. Caesar, by vigorous efforts and by stopping but for a short rest at night, reached
he awoke to the
Theatre of Dyrrachium.
the Arzen, followed
it
down
to
where
it
turns northwesterly
along the coast, and thence pushing rapidly towards the seashore, seized the adjoining heights, "when the van of Pompey's
army was
visible at
from approach
to
a distance," and shut Pompey off Dyrrachium, where the latter had stored
DYRRACHIUM.
all his
513
Caesar
war material and much
provision.
camped
north of the Arzen, on slightly rolling ground. He had conducted an operation of remarkable boldness and brilliancy. Cut off from Dyrrachium, though his garrison still held
aggrieved, camped and intrenched on rising ground at Petra, south of the Arzen, where was a
the place, Pompey,
much
harbor for small ships, by the use of which he could
victual at Dyrrachium.
still
Dyrrachium describes a bow whose chord runs northwest and southeast. As you approach the coast from
The bay
of
the sea you have a perfect coup d'oeil of the entire theatre but the details you must study on the ground. Back of this bow, in an irregular semicircle, runs the watershed of the
;
streams which feed the Arzen or descend to the sea.
This
bow is threefold. The outer curve make a rugged frame for the scene of
difficult; the
is
of lofty hills, which
the coming operations ;
the next inner one consists of irregular chalk-hills, rough and
inmost curve is one of rolling upland, well covThe entire ered by verdure and occasional bunches of trees. country is more or less accentuated. The population of
Epirus to-day
is
smaller than in Caesar's time.
This terrain
was probably much then as now. The bolder hills of this watershed, from three hundred to twelve hundred feet in
height, advance to the sea about the centre of the bow,
and
form a
over one third of a mile in length between the water and the cliffs, which latter are in places almost
defile of
erect,
but are wooded at the summits.
At
the south of the
bow the hills slope down into The ground contained within
in parts
the plain of the
modern Cavaia.
is
bow
of the watershed
;
cut up, rocky, full of ravines and gorges at the back
wooded
;
and with a
fertile
fair
show of cultivation in the centre
rolling and
near the sea, with a long, wide beach. Dyrrachium lies on a point of land at the northwest end
514
FABIAN GENERALS.
by lagunes
to a long triangular stretch
It can
it
of the bow, confined
of ground, bold and rocky at the seashore on the west.
be besieged only by
sea, for a force attempting to besiege
by land could itself be shut into the triangular foreland by fortifying the narrow land approaches at either end of the
lagunes.
Now
new
all
the more confirmed in his plan of starving Caesar
in Epirus,
and not of fighting him, Pompey ordered to Petra To provisions from Asia and other tributary countries.
Caesar, on
get these was comparatively easy, as
ships.
Pompey had plenty of the contrary, experienced difficulty in
providing corn for a protracted campaign, for Illyricum was not a grain-bearing country, Epirus had little beyond its scant needs, and Pompey had already used up all there was
on hand by foraging or devastation. Nor could Caesar get any supplies from Italy, for Pompey ruled the sea. In view of
that
all
these factors in his problem,
it
may be
said
Pompey was
method of gauging the
less
not entirely short-sighted in his present It is only probabilities of the war.
in contrasting his slowness
and lack of
initiative to the rest-
energy of Caesar, that
of Great.
Still,
we
feel like
denying him his cog-
nomen
the Fabian generals of the world are
not without their justly earned laurels ; nor must we underBut even if we esteem his rate the ability of Pompey.
present plan of starving out Caesar to be a proper one, it is by no'means to be admitted that Pompey was otherwise than
lax in not forcing a decisive battle on Caesar
ter lay opposite
when
the lat-
him with but a third
his force.
xxxn.
DYRRACHIUM. MARCH TO MAY,
C.SSAR lay between Pompey and Dyrrachium
;
48 B. C.
but Pompey could reach the
town from
his
camp by
sea.
Caesar began to inclose
a hazardous
around
sulted.
his
task, as he
was much the weaker.
camp to inclose as much ground as Pompey could victual plentifully from
Pompey in siege lines, Pompey seized many hills possible. Many skirmishes rethe sea
' ;
Caesar
had
diffi-
culty in gathering corn from the poor
country in his rear.
water and better forage for his animals, while able to
pey's water-supply
But he had good cut off .much of Pomhis lines to the sea.
by diverting streams which ran through
In the fighting during the erection of the siege works, neither side won any marked advantage. Caesar's veterans rather surprise us by not proving superior
to
Pompey's newer
his lines, but after
advantage.
During an absence of Caesar's, Pompey attacked a long and heavy struggle the Caasarians won a decided Caesar's left reached the sea, but it was not strong.
cohorts.
tion, Csesar
IF Pompey lacked boldness in his conception and execumay be said to have been overbold. No sooner
in thus cutting
had he succeeded
Pompey
off
from Dyrra-
chium than he undertook measures for blockading him in the About Pompey's camp lay the position he had taken up.
threefold chain of hills already described; but his outlying
parties
had occupied no part of the watershed proper. As many of the hills of the outer curve as were available, Csesar took, and on them built redoubts, twenty-six in all were
eventually constructed,
and these he began
to join
by a
chain of earthworks more or less elaborate, according as the
In inaccessible places this nature of the ground dictated. work was easy ; in places less well defended by nature, art
was
called into play.
Each end
of the line
was intended to
lean on the seacoast;
the north end at his
camp
east of
516
CESAR'S LINES.
Dyrrachiuin ; the south end at any place he could, in the
course of the operations, most conveniently reach.
Pompey
at once perceived Caesar's intention, but instead of resorting
to active measures, he adopted the policy of one already
besieged and endeavored to crowd Caesar outward as much as practicable ; and as Pompey still sought to avoid a general
engagement, Caesar was able to establish a fairly good line; not one, however, which prevented Pompey from holding, on the surrounding hills, an all but as good interior line.
Caesar's object in this proceeding
was to prevent Pompey,
his convoys, of
who was strong
in cavalry,
from cutting out
corn from Epirus or from devastating the country, for he
needed the corn himself; and he desired to reduce Pompey 's horse by want of forage. Again, he felt sure he should gain
in reputation
and Pompey correspondingly lose,
if
he
hemmed
to
him
in,
and thus showed that Pompey had not the vim
fight him.
Caesar had for some time prescribed to his legions a set
order of battle or encampment ; and they
tion accordingly.
legions
centre ;
now took up posiThe Tenth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth formed the right wing; the Sixth and Seventh, the the Eighth and Ninth, the left wing.
by Caesar was nearly sixteen miles
The
line thus traced
long, a vast stretch for twenty -two thousand men to defend. Pompey was anxious enough to regain Dyrrachium, for all
was there; but he could not bring himself to hazard the battle which was necessary to arrest the complehis material
tion of Caesar's works.
He
likewise seized on as
in such a
many
hills
as he could,
and
fortified
them
way
as to oblige
Caesar to divide his forces.
He
thus managed, by his
own
inner lines facing Caesar's, to inclose a space of about fourteen miles in circuit, in which he was able to get quite an amount of forage for his cavalry. This inclosed line he for-
Dyrrachium Theatre of Operations.
518
tified
POMPEY'S LINES.
by twenty -four redoubts and a
less
line of ramparts.
Pom-
pey somewhat
sallies,
first
completed his works, having a greater force and
extent to fortify.
an
efficient
Roman
haircloth, tarpaulins
but used his slingers body, in a very harassing manner; and the soldiers made themselves "coats or coverings of and rawhide " to resist the darts. " In
He made no organized and archers, of whom he had
seizing the posts, each exerted his utmost
power
Caesar, to
Pompey within as narrow a compass as possible ; Pompey, to occupy as many hills as he could in as large a
confine
circuit as possible."
;
Pompey had
inclosed something like
sixteen square miles Caesar twenty. It was on the terrain thus inclosed that there were constructed the most remark-
able fortifications in antiquity.
It is not to be supposed that
skill.
Pompey
exhibited want of
On
the contrary, whenever he put his hand to the
work he showed
it at every turn. With an ordinary oppowith even an able one, he might have proved himself nent,
the* general of old,
who had conquered
half the world.
But
Caesar's matchless energy and skill overrode all his efforts; Pompey's morale was so much less than Caesar's that he could not show to advantage. Pompey and Caesar had long
known each
other,
the stronger hand,
and though he had for many years held Pompey no doubt recognized his superior,
and was cautious accordingly. He simply remained inert. Pompey's situation was markedly better than Caesar's.
He
outnumbered him to a dangerous degree.
He had much
more cavalry. His ships brought him corn and material with ease and regularity from Dyrrachium and elsewhere. His position was central, each flank and all points being
approached from the others by radial lines. And yet Pompey dared not make a determined attack upon his foe, even while the intrenchments were but half done.
easily
THE NINTH IN TROUBLE.
519
During the erection of Caesar's line of contravallation, The Ninth legion occupied the skirmishing was constant.
out towards the sea. then left of the works which Csesar was gradually stretching On one occasion when it had been
hill that
ordered to take a certain
Caesar desired to inclose,
and had begun works (A on the
and
chart),
the adjoining heights to the west, set
seriously
Pompey's men seized up a number of engines,
with archery.
annoyed Caesar's men with their missiles and Their light troops could advance across the
The connecting hills to near the position of the Ninth. reason for disputing Csesar this height was that its possession
would afford him a chance of cutting Pompey off from access to one of the streams most essential to his water supply (B), and confine the Pompeians within too narrow bounds. Caesar's manifest purpose was to extend his left to the sea
along this stream.
He
found
it
necessary to retire
the
Ninth legion from the place, and Pompey followed up Caesar's legionaries vigorously and inflicted some losses, on
them.
The
retreat
was down the rugged slope to the
difficult.
east,
and gradually became
It
is
reported that
Pompey
"that
said that day in triumph to his friends about him,
he would consent to be accounted a general of no experience, if Caesar's legions effected a retreat without considerable loss
advanced,"
from that ground into which they had rashly an utterance which sounds as if Pompey still
possessed something of the old spirit.
At
were
this backset Caesar
exhibiting
unusual
became uneasy, for his veterans lack of nerve. Hurdles were
brought, and under their cover a trench was dug and the ends fortified with redoubts. This is one of the earliest recorded
examples of
retreat.
field-fortifications
made under
fire for
the pur-
pose of temporarily holding a position, or of covering a The stand thus made was maintained for a period,
520
GALLANTRY OF THE NINTH.
later slingers
and
to
and archers were thrown out
so as to cover
a further retreat.
file off,
The legionary
cohorts were then ordered
but Pompey's
men
"boldly and tauntingly pursued
and chased"
trench.
Caesar's, leveling the hurdles
and passing the
Fearing that this might be the cause of serious
\.
*'}
''*
? ^
-'Zr
*
r\ %-.
&&-'*
Hli-u V,
~?
7
''"*
^j J
*l
'vx.
Combat
of Ninth Legion.
demoralization in the army, and that retreat might degenerate into stampede, Caesar ordered Antony, who was in
command, when in his withdrawal he reached a given place, This was gallantly done. At the to turn and charge.
trumpet signal, the Ninth legion came to a right-about, closed their files, they were evidently still well in hand,
paused but to cast their javelins, and then rushed upon the enemy with the sword. Though as at Ilerda they were
charging up a steep incline, they drove everything before them, and Pompey's men "turned their backs," retired in
confusion,
and with no
little loss,
for the hurdles
and trench
Five
say the
lay in the path of their retreat
legionaries of
and tripped up many.
Caesar's were killed; of Pompey's,
EFFECT OF THE COMBAT.
Commentaries,
521
and
fortified,
many more. Another hill (C) was selected Pompey retaining the one from which he had
The
loss of this hill
driven Caesar.
disaster
was the
first
step in the
which was bound to result from Caesar's over-confi-
dent undertaking in thus inclosing Pompey in siege lines. It enabled Pompey to occupy a larger extent of ground than
make
him to, and obliged Caesar to own the greater by nearly a half and moreover it compelled him to close his left by a long line across an
Caesar had hoped to confine
his
;
extended plain (D), where later Pompey found his weak spot. Had Caesar been able to close his lines along the brook which
has
its
sources at the hill just lost, there would have been
of success.
more chance
ception,
doomed
to failure.
But the operation was, from Across the plain, when
and garrisoned
its init
was
with
reached, Caesar erected works,
a ditch fifteen feet wide
it
and a parapet ten feet high and wide, the Ninth legion.
The small
loss in the late
tenacious fight; but the retreat was as well
Caesar's part as the attack
combat does not bespeak a very managed on
The number
rarely given.
of the light troops killed or
had been smart on Pompey's. wounded is very
sometimes express a material
lost in killed
Only the
legionaries killed are counted ; so
that a very small figure
total loss.
may
In this case the cohorts probably
and wounded
making
the light troops perhaps as many, ; fifty one hundred casualties in a force of not over four
,
men
thousand men, say two and a half per cent. smart fighting.
showing fairly between
to
There was not what we should
the two camps, but Pompey's
call picket-fighting
men would
often go out
a place where they saw camp-fires at night, and suddenly discharge at random a flight of arrows and stones towards it.
Caesar's soldiers were obliged to light fires in a place aparb
522
HARDSHIPS OF CAESAR'S MEN.
this
from where they mounted guard, to rid themselves of dangerous annoyance. Petty war was constant.
novel.
This entire Dyrrachiurn proceeding, on Caesar's part, was Blockades are usually for the purpose of cutting off
supplies,
and are always conducted by larger forces than
Caesar,
those inclosed or against an
But here was
enemy demoralized by with an army one half the
defeat.
size
of
Pompey's, and himself in need of supplies, blockading by exterior lines Pompey, who had supplies of everything brought to him by sea. The lines were long, and the Csesarians
had
to of
work constantly
them.
to
perform the guard-duty
their
required
They
stood
deprivations
well.
They
lived on barley, pulse,
and on rare occasions
^
beef,
and
on a certain root named char a of which they made mush and bread, and remembering the scarcity at Ilerda and Alesia
and Avaricum, which had preceded great and important
victories, lost not heart.
The
soldiers said to the
when they exchanged
from
their hands."
salutations
Pompeians on picket, that "they would
rather live on the bark of the trees than let
Pompey escape The corn was beginning to ripen, and
there was promise soon of plenty.
And
while the Pompeians
had provisions in greater abundance, they were in serious want of water, for Caesar had turned or dammed up all the springs
and brooks which he could reach, and had obliged them to sink wells or rely on the brackish water of low, marshy pools. Pompey's men were not used to work, and it told on
men was perfect, owing to the had for camping; that of Pompey's, cooped large space they up in a small area and overworked, was questionable.
them.
health of Caesar's
to send his cavalry to
The
So short for forage was Pompey that he was constrained Dyrrachium by sea. Here it could
be readily fed, and could, moreover, sally out in rear of Caesar's lines and interfere with his foraging parties.
CAESAR TRICKED.
Caesar was
time.
523
his
now
called
away from
army
for
a short
At
is
this point in the narrative of the
Commentaries
there
a gap, which we are compelled to supply by a hint or
two in Appian and Dion Cassius, and by construing what is said in a fashion little short of guess-work. It is more than probable that Caesar was on a diversion against Dyrrachium, to which he was led to believe that he would be given access if he -essayed an attack out of hand. At the head of
Caesar before Dyrraeliium.
a sufficient body of troops he advanced on the city, crossed the narrows at the south end of the lagunes, left his troops
in hiding,
and advanced with a small escort towards the
walls.
But his hopes were not realized.
Instead of meeting a friendly
reception from the party that had agreed to act with him, the Dyrrachium garrison issued from the gates suddenly and
with hostile intent.
the narrows to cut
part took ship and sailed around to
him
his right to prevent his
Another party moved around making his way up to the north end
off.
of the lagunes.
A third party attacked him in front.
Caesar
quickly rallied his men, met these three attacks with three
detachments from his forces, and a smart combat began with
524
each body.
POMPEY'S ATTACK.
The combat was without
result. Fighting in which he did without
his rear compelled Caesar to retreat,
meeting any particular difficulty. Caesar had left Publius Sylla in command of the big camp. Antony, though senior, was too far off on the left to exercise
general control.
Pompey, apparently soon made aware
of
the situation, seized the occasion as a good one to break
through Caesar's lines, reach Dyrrachium, and perhaps catch Caesar near the city and shut him up with his small force in
the Dyrrachium peninsula.
Having a much
on the legions
left
larger
army
under Sylla was a comparatively easy matter. Pompey's plans were well conceived. Whenever he went at a tactical problem he
interior lines, this attack
and
did good work.
siege lines.
He
organized
three
attacks on Caesar's
These were so nearly simultaneous to the ones
it
opposite Dyrrachium that
looks as
if
Pompey
purposely
led Caesar into an ambush,
by himself dictating the false
promise of opening the gates of that city. The attacks were all against redoubts, and were so managed
as to time,
numbers and
localities, as to
make
it
probable
that no reinforcements would be sent from one part of the
line to the others.
They were
at points
which lay east of
Pompey's camp. There were two columns, of four legions in all. One column advanced up the ravine E, the other up
by way
of those
marked
and G.
Arrived on the high
ground near H, the legions divided into three columns. By two of these columns attacks were only partially delivered.
In one of the assaults, three of Caesar's cohorts under Volcatius Tullus easily beat back a legion which formed one column and in another, the German auxiliaries made a sally from
;
the lines, defeated another legion with
much
loss,
and
retired
These were but demonstrations on Pompey's part. safely. The third or main assault was severe. Pompey's third
HANDSOME
VICTORY.
525
column of two legions had attacked in force at one of the forts which was held by the second cohort of the Sixth legion
three hundred
legionaries
men under
the centurion Minucius.
The
resisted
the assault with
great
stubbornness.
Pompey's
cohorts
had scaling ladders, mural hooks and a
Attack on
Sylla.
ram.
They
assaulted the towers of the castellum, tried to
set fire to the hurdles, filled
up the
trench,
and exhibited the
utmost determination to break down the defenses.
But the
Caesarians held on so stubbornly and for so long a time that
Sylla was enabled to gather from adjoining works and to
up two legions to drive back the Pompeians. The latexhausted by their efforts, did not stand the charge, but ter, so soon as the front line was struck yielded ground. Sylla had an excellent chance to bring on a general engagement
lead
under auspicious conditions, and was loudly criticised in the army for not having done so. But he deemed that he had
526
FIGHTING UPHILL.
sus-
no right to deliver battle in Caesar's absence, and was
tained by his chief.
The Pompeians, beaten back, had
good
their retreat.
difficulty
in
making
(I);
They were passing over a ridge
halted on the top, not daring to retire down it on the other side, lest he should be overwhelmed on the slope
Pompey
by Caesar's men. He prolonged the combat till nightfall, and then seized an eminence out of engine-range from Minucius' redoubt (N) and fortified it. Caesar's men remained
in his front, hoping to have
him
at
a disadvantage when
fifteen feet,
he should
retreat.
During the night and following days
and carried the works up
Pompey
built turrets
facing the exposed side with mantelets, so as to retire under
their protection.
On
the fifth night, a cloudy one, at the
third watch, he stole a
in his front,
march on
his old
Caesar's cohorts which were
and regained
camp.
Defenses played a great role in those days. general who wished to avoid battle had only to shut himself up in his camp, where, so long as provisions lasted, he was safe.
But
if
his rival
came forward and
it
ing his legions,
sense of honor to
offered battle by marshalwas considered as wanting in the nicest do less than accept it, by emerging from
in line,
unless, indeed, there
camp and drawing up
were
If, preponderating and sufficient reasons for not so doing. a general had camped in a plain, he might have therefore, battle forced on him on terms in which his only advantage
lay in the proximity to his camp, to which he could retire
at will. He was better placed if encamped on a height, with a slope down from the praetorian gate, so that when he drew up, the enemy, if he attacked, must do so uphill. The
heavy-armed legionary did not like to fight uphill, as he got out of breath by the ascent, had to cast his missiles up at
his enemy,
who, meanwhile, hurled his own down to better
RETREATING DOWNHILL.
effect,
527
and being
fresh, could at the proper
moment rush
in
a counter-charge down upon him with perhaps fatal effect. This action of Pompey's is another proof of the extreme
difficulty experienced
in
hand when
retiring
by the ancients in holding their men from an enemy pursuing them down
in retiring downhill the equal loss of
a slope.
In attacking uphill the elan was helpful in overdifficulty
;
coming the
To avoid being attacked on a descent was as important then as to avoid The being enfiladed by the enemy's batteries is to-day.
confidence bred a disastrous condition.
position which afforded the soldier the chance to cast javelins
downwards
be readily forfeited. The bulk of all fighting was at javelin range. In theory, after casting their javelins the two first ranks fell to with the
at the
to
enemy was one not
sword; but practically the lines faced each other and substantially remained in place for hours, with swayings to and
fro as one or other side
won a temporary
advantage, or the
rear ranks and lines
moved
to the front to relieve the weary.
Although there were many duels among the more enterprising in each line, it was as a last resort that the sword was
drawn by all. A charge with the gladius was then much more frequent than charges are to-day with the bayonet but If this failed, it was hard it was the last act in the drama. to restore the confidence of the men, and it was not lightly
;
undertaken.
If the second or third line
if these,
was
still
fresh, they
sword in hand, were driven the battle was not easily redeemed, and as troops of back, olden days were quite as much subject to demoralization as
could be called on ; but
our own modern soldiers,
slope
if
not more
so,
a retreat down a
to be
was one
of those critical
movements which had
conducted with scrupulous care. The Caesarians had gained a marked advantage. Pompey had lost nearly two thousand men, many emeriti and centu-
528
rions,
KILLED AND WOUNDED.
and
if
six standards, while only twenty Caesarians
were
in
missing,
the Commentaries are to be believed.
But
Minucius' redoubt, not a soldier escaped a wound. In one cohort four centurions lost their eyes, a curious coincidence.
The centurion
Scaeva,
who had been
largely instrumental
in saving the fort, produced to Caesar his shield,
which had
two hundred and thirty holes in it. Cassar presented Scasva with two hundred thousand pieces of copper money, about hundred dollars, and promoted him from eighth thirty-six
to first centurion (primipilus) as
gallantry.
There were
fort.
counted
a reward for his exceptional thirty thousand arrows
thrown into the
The
soldiers
who had defended
it
were rewarded with double pay, clothing and rations, and
with military honors. Here is a curious discrepancy in the proportion of wounded
to killed.
Among the
ing a general ratio
Greeks there was something approachten or twelve to one among the Romans
;
there was scarcely any regularity.
In a
late instance in the
Curio's battle in Africa, the losses were Commentaries, as six hundred killed and one thousand wounded. In given
one we have a loss of only twenty legionaries killed along the whole line, and yet every man wounded in the fort
this
which was most stoutly
difficult
assailed.
Such
statistics
make
it
to
compare ancient losses with modern.
In old
times wounds must often have been as slight as missiles
In those days of hand weapons and good lacked in power. armor, lines could fight at casting or shooting distance for a long while with but small loss. Had Scaeva's shield been
struck by two hundred and thirty bullets he would scarcely
have lived to enjoy his munificent reward.
xxxm.
CESAR'S DEFEAT.
POMPEY
-was not
MAY,
He
48 B. C.
learned through certain
in
abashed by his
late defeat.
deserters that the left of Caesar's line
was not yet completed, and was
any
this
event weak.
quarter.
With
excellent skill
and by night he prepared an assault at
rear.
He
sent a large force of cohorts to attack the front of Caesar's lines,
and
auxiliaries
and light troops to attack the
to accident, partly to
The
assault
was stoutly
given,
and owing partly
poor preparation, partly to an
unexpected demoralization among the legions, Caesar suffered a galling defeat, with loss of one thousand killed. He had rashly ventured on the impossible,
and met the necessary consequence. Pompey considered the war at an end. Not so Caesar, whom disaster never abashed ; not so his men, who drank in his
unconquerable
spirit.
DURING
the weeks occupied
rachium, JEtolia,
Acarnania
by these operations at Dyrand Amphilochis had been
reduced by Longinus and Sabinus. Caesar, desiring to gain a foothold in the Peloponnesus, sent these officers under the
orders of Calenus to take possession of Achaia.
this threat Rutilius Rufus,
To meet
began to
Calenus
Pompey 's
lieutenant,
fortify the Isthmus to prevent Calenus from entering Achaia,
for Caesar
had no
fleet to cross
the Corinthian Bay.
recovered Delphi, Thebes and Orchomenus by voluntary submission. large part of Hellas was under Caesar's
control.
In order to leave no part of the responsibility for civil bloodshed upon himself, Caesar had still again made pro-
Pompey for an adjustment through their mutual He sent friend Scipio, when the latter reached Macedonia. who was also an intimate of Pompey's, to Scipio. Clodius,
posals to
630
CESAR'S PROPOSAL.
like the others, this effort at
effect.
But
accommodation remained
without
cause Caesar
alleged
Whether these approaches were made beknew they would not be accepted, as has been
from a sincere desire for peace,
fact remains that Caesar did
by
his detractors, or
will never
be known.
But the
him.
make
the proposals and that Pompey refused them.
left
Nothing
but the sword was
Every day after the defeat of Pompey's late attack, Caesar drew up his army on the level ground between the camps (K) and offered battle. He even led his lines up almost to the
Pompeian ramparts,
the engine-missiles.
at least to the edge of the zone of
Though Pompey, to save his credit, would lead out his men, he would post them with the third line close against his camp, and under protection of the fire
of the light troops from the ramparts.
This precluded an
attack
by
Caesar.
above related, the bulk of Pompey's horse had been " sent to Dyrrachium. Caesar, that he might the more easily
As
keep Pompey's horse inclosed within Dyrrachium and prevent them from foraging, fortified the two narrow passes already
mentioned,
i.
e.,
the narrows at the ends of the lagunes on
the east and the northwest of Dyrrachium
(L and M), with
strong works and erected forts at them." This was about May 20. But when fodder thus became particularly hard to
get and
Pompey
derived no advantage from his cavalry, he
it
brought a large part of
a free access to
back to his camp by
sea.
While
shut off from Dyrrachium by land, his vessels allowed him it by sea, which Caesar could not prevent.
where even the young wheat had been was difficult to keep them, and they were fed largely on leaves and plants. Barley and fodder were brought from Corcyra and Acarnania, but not in
Within
his lines, too,
eaten by the horses,
it
sufficient
quantities.
When
even
this
supply gave out,
FATAL DESERTIONS.
Pompey was
About
to
left
531
sally.
with no resource but a
later come.
To
this
he
saw that he must sooner or
this time,
Caesar, the first
though Pompey 's men daily deserted to noteworthy desertions from Caesar's camp
Pompey' s occurred. But these were fatal ones. Two Allobrogians, commanders of cavalry, who had been of
great service to Caesar in Gaul and were
telligence
men
of birth, in-
and courage, but, as pay
it
careful in their accounts of
to task
says, to
to their
happened, had not been men, on being held
by
Caesar, though mildly, for Caesar preferred, he
make no scandal
of the matter, deserted to
Pompey,
partly from shame and partly from fear, and conveyed to him Such a desertion detailed information about Caesar's works.
being rare (the very first, says Caesar), Pompey made much of these men and took pains to exhibit them in every part of
his lines.
Acting on the information obtained from these men, which was exact and thorough, Pompey gathered together a large
amount
of material for assaulting works, and at night trans-
ported his light troops
of Caesar's works
and the material by sea to that part on the extreme left which was nearest
the coast and farthest from Caesar's greater camp. On the same night, after the third watch, sixty cohorts drafted from the north
camp and
the lines were
marched
to
the
same
point, and the war-galleys were sent down the coast to anchor The foot soldiers were ordered to make ozieropposite.
shields to
wear on their helmets.
Stationed here was the
Ninth legion under Lentulus Marcellinus, the quaestor, with Fulvius Posthumus second in command. Antony had of the left wing. The contravallation works general charge
consisted of a rampart ten feet high
and ten feet wide covered
by a trench fifteen feet wide ""fronting the enemy," i. e., towards the north. Some six hundred feet back were similar
532
but
POMPEY SKILLFULLY ATTACKS.
less strong defenses
line.
backing on the others
the usual
circumvallation
Caesar had anticipated an attack from
the side of the sea and had recently erected these latter
defenses.
The works which were
left of
to connect these
i.
two ram-
parts
and defend the
the line,
e.
those facing the
ascer-
sea, were not yet finished, and tained from the Allobrogians.
this fact
Pompey had
Pompey's attack was prepared at night and delivered at daybreak on the weakest part of Caesar's lines, was excellently planned, stoutly given,
The archers and
very active,
slingers
and was a complete surprise. who attacked from the south were
and poured a galling fire upon the unprepared At defenders, whom they outnumbered six or eight to one.
Battle of Dyrrachiom.
Pompey's Attack.
the same
moment
the sixty legionary cohorts
made a
des-
perate onslaught from the north, using their weapons and
engines to great advantage ; and began to set up their scaling ladders after filling the ditch with fascines. The danger was
imminent enough, owing to the front and rear attack; but
to
ANTONY TO THE RESCUE.
make
the unfinished defenses on Caesar's extreme left,
533
the situation hopeless, a party of light troops discovered
and making
a gallant dash in between the two lines, took the legionaries of the Ninth absolutely in flank. The Caesarians appear to have been slenderly supplied with missiles, for their chief defense, thus taken unawares, was stones; and the ozier headgear of the Pompeians saved them from the effect of
There appears clearly, from the Commentaries, to have been a lack of readiness, against which, after the desertion of the Allobrogians, one would have supposed that
these.
Caesar would have provided.
spot, he
He knew
his
own weakest
knew
that the deserters
guessed that an attack would be
knew it, and he might have Caesar had made here.
grown to believe that Pompey was loath to fight, and perhaps was careless in consequence. In any event, Pompey's wellHis men came on conceived attack was fully successful. with such a determined rush that the Caesarians broke and
could not be rallied, and such cohorts as were sent to their
by Marcellinus, whose camp was near the left, also caught the infection and retired in confusion. The Pomrelief
peians pressed on; the Caesarians were suffering serious losses, all the centurions but one of the leading cohort being
killed.
He
happily
was the primipilus, and managed to
save the legionary eagle.
The Pompeians did not
line of hills
stop until
they reached the camp of the Ninth legion.
was met debouching from the
cohorts,
There Antony where had been
erected the circuit of castella, with a bold front of twelve
and his brave stand on the enemy's flank checked the latter 's onslaught, drove back the enemy, rallied the runaways, and put an end to the present danger.
Caesar, hearing of the disaster
by the
signals,
which were
columns of smoke, usual in such emergencies, also came speedily to the ground from the main camp with several
534
POMPEY INTRENCHES.
But
it
cohorts collected from the castella on the way.
was
too late to save the day or the tactical loss.
Pompey had
got a foothold from which he could not be ousted and from which he could move in and out at will to forage, or to
attack Caesar's rear.
nugatory. At the end of Caesar's late lines,
The work of months was rendered The blockade was practically broken.
Pompey
at once
in-
trenched a new and strong camp, utilizing for the purpose Its location was not part of the works Caesar had erected.
far
from the seashore and somewhat over a mile south of the
river along which lay the right of his line.
Opposite this daunted and with the hope to neutralcamp, Caesar, nothing ize the defeat by a success yet won before the day should
close, sat
down and intrenched near Pompey.
He
had with
Antony's force and what he could safely and quickly draw from the neighboring forts some thirty-five cohorts. He
placed his
men between
the two lines of circumvallation
and
contravallation, the former on his right, the latter on his
left,
and threw up a line between and perpendicular to them within five hundred yards of the enemy. Pompey's attack had been made at daylight and his initial
victory
had been quickly won.
It
was yet early
in the day.
There were many hours to retrieve the disaster. Pompey had no doubt that the battle was over for that day not so
;
Like Sheridan at Winchester, he determined to recover the field. Each of the armies was now
thought Caesar.
divided into two parts. the main camps on the
One
of each confronted the other at
north ; one of each lay in fighting
contact with the other at the lines on the south plain.
There was near by this place an old encampment which had an inner work. The latter had been a smaller in-
camp of Caesar's during the operation of the Ninth a week or two back (A), and tLe outer wall had been legion
trenched
CAESAR TRIES AGAIN.
535
added by Pompey when Caesar in changing his lines had been compelled to abandon it and Pompey had occupied it
with a larger force.
Later again Pompey had himself given
Battle of Dyrrachium.
Caesar's Attack.
up this double camp. "This camp joined a certain wood and was not above four hundred paces distant from the sea."
When Pompey
ment from the
left
occupied the place, he "carried an intrenchangle of the camp to the river about four
hundred paces, that his soldiers might have more liberty and less danger in fetching water," while Caesar's men and
his
were daily skirmishing over the ground each sought to It was now a sort of occupy in constructing their lines.
redoubt, and was half a mile distant from Pompey's camp.
into this
This general threw the legion commanded by L. Torquatus camp as a convenient link between his north and
make a wider front and to save his men the new one. Torquatus marched to the place back of the wood in question. Caesar, who learned of this movement from his scouts,
south camps, to
labor of constructing a
lought he might attack this post with a good chance of sue-
536
cess,
SHARP ATTACK.
and by a
brilliant stroke repair the effect of the disaster
of the morning.
Pompey's had
their tools,
not,
His men had finished their works, but and it would take them some time to drop
make ready for battle, and reach the camp. Speed might serve him to crush Torquatus. He headed for this camp with thirty-three cohorts, some ten thousand men, among them the Ninth legion, much reduced by the recent He left two cohorts in the trenches, which made fight.
enough of an appearance of working actively at the rampart
to quiet
Pompey's apprehensions, and, marching quickly but
cautiously, reached the fort before
Pompey
could have notice
of an advance.
two wings, each in two lines. The wing was opposite the camp to be attacked; the right wing opposite the intrenchment which ran to the river.
Caesar marshaled his
left
men
in
Attacking with the
left
wing, which he
commanded
in person,
Ca3sar carried the outer works with a rush, and pushing in,
though the entrances were well barricaded by an
ericius, or
gate full of sharp spikes, forced the Pompeians from the So far the attack had front rampart of the inner one.
succeeded.
The
right wing, however, in search of a gate
by which to enter what they supposed to be part of the wall of the redoubt, and misled by following the new rampart which ran from the fort down to the river and was ten feet
high, got separated from the left so far as to produce a serious
gap in the
line
and make mutual support impossible.
followed by the cavalry.
After
following this river rampart a small distance, they climbed
or broke through
it,
This placed
in its
them no nearer the redoubt than they had been when front, and separated them from the left wing.
soon learned of the attack on Torquatus, and recalling his five legions from their work of intrenching he marched to the rescue of his lieutenant. The garrison, now
Pompey had
SUDDEN PANIC.
sure of the support of Pompey,
Caesar's left
537
stout resistance to
made a
wing
at the
decuman gate and charged on the
Caesarians with a will, while Pompey's cavalry advanced
Caesar's rightagainst Caesar's cavalry and his right wing. soldiers by some strange fatality, or else seeing themwing
selves cut off
from their leader, were seized with a sudden
panic.
disaster
first
They had not had time to recover from the morning's and their work was not crisply cut out. The cavalry
fell
caught the infection and
back through a breach
in
the river rampart which they had
left the infantry of the right
made and entered
at.
This
and
it,
too, drifted to the rear even before
wing unsupported by the horse, it had come within
sight of the enemy's line,
and in retiring over the river ram-
part in disorder lost a vast
number
of
men by being
trodden
underfoot in the trenches.
"Most
of them, lest they should
be engaged in the narrow passes, threw themselves down a rampart ten feet high into the trenches and the first being
;
trodden to death, the rest procured their safety and escaped over their bodies." Others, with no better result, tried to get
round the north end of the river rampart.
stampede.
It
was
clearly a
The men
of the left wing,
made aware
that the
right wing and the cavalry were melting away, thus leaving their own flank naked while they themselves had the garrison to contend with, perceiving from the wall the advance of
and steady front, and fearing to be inclosed between the outer and inner ramparts, were seized with like terror and fell back in like confusion
Pompey
in line of battle with bold
before the
enemy had hurled a
single spear.
Not even when
Caesar laid hold of an eagle and personally called upon his men to follow him could the panic-stricken troops be rallied.
One man, on whom
sense of duty,
is
Caesar laid hands to restore
lifted his
him
to
even said to have
him
in the violence of his fright.
The men
sword against "continued to
538
LOSS OF EIGHT PER CENT.
run in the same manner; others, through fear, even threw away their colors, nor did a single man face about. At the
praetorian gate of the outer redoubt the'
same scene of confu-
But as good luck would have an ambuscade and did not rapidly it, Pompey suspected So sudden a success from so sudden a defeat conadvance.
sion
and
disaster was repeated.
strained
him
to caution.
His cavalry, eager to pursue, could
not push through the breaches of the river rampart or the camp gates, which were all choked up with dead and wounded
men.
Caesar was enabled to get the rest of his troops out of
action without incurring the penalty of a pursuit, though he
came up, only
saved his cohorts from the enemy's cavalry, which finally just in time behind the contravallation wall.
In the two actions of this day Caesar's losses were nine hundred and sixty men, several Roman knights, thirty-two military tribunes and centurions, and thirty- two maniple Most of the men had been crushed to death in the ensigns.
ditch.
put to
All the prisoners who fell into Pompey 's hands were death by Labienus with cruel taunts. Such was
the hatred of the
man whom
Caesar had delighted to honor.
This heavy list of casualties, about eight per cent, in killed, cannot be counted as a battle loss in comparison with other
The men had scarcely fought. general engagements. had been cut down or perished in their flight. The
description of these two actions
is
They
somewhat lacking
in clearness in the
Commentaries.
The
terrain explains the
story, however, and the few items given enable us to sketch out the scene of the combat very distinctly. This much is Caesar was badly beaten, worse than he had ever certain,
been before.
He
himself came near losing his
life.
His
troops had become utterly demoralized and could not be
rallied,
and as he
is
himself reported to have said, had
Pompey known how
to
win a
victory,
he would have been
DEMORA LIZA TION.
fatally
539
an attempt in the Commentaries to gloss over the matter. The two battles of this day had been reverses which had been saved from
defeated.
is
There
not even
by Pompey's lack of Excuse enough for the defeat existed in the enterprise. disparity of forces; there was no excuse for the demoralizabecoming
tion of the troops.
irretrievable disasters solely
All old soldiers know how irrational
is
the conduct of a
his
mass of
fleeing soldiery ;
and
all
idea of discipline
how each man seeks is for the moment
all
own
safety,
lost.
Caesar's
descriptions give one a picture of an
alized.
There
is
a tendency in
of
their
old writers to
army very badly demormake the
very
is
light
and
shade
sketches
marked.
The
gallantry displayed in unimportant affairs
fear in slight reverses
is
brilliant; the
this habit of
excessive.
Whether
is
statement overdraws the matter or not
doubtful.
Disciin all
plined and seasoned troops have been much the same
eras.
Cesar's
men
unquestionably lost heart at times in a
discreditable way.
in
hand and
to
But Caesar was always able to hold them shame their defeat into an encouragement for
the troops lose in honor, Caesar gains in
the future.
What
skill.
courage and
By
his temerity in attempting a task, the impossibility of
earlier
which he should
have recognized, Caesar had
lost three
good months and all power of offense at this place. He was back at his starting point, and with his communications with
Italy severed.
He had
failed in every sense, strategically
and
tactically,
and with Pompey's large force
of cavalry
released he might be logistically compromised.
His oppoHis
nent's all but blameworthy deliberation had proven successful.
Time did not work
against
him
as against Caesar.
troops had behaved well; he had every reason to believe they would do so again; and he could now credit Labienus' asser-
540
CAESAR'S SITUATION.
had disappeared. If Pomrouse himself for once and push home, Caesar pey should might be fatally struck. But Pompey did not do so. Fortion that Caesar's Gallic veterans
tune stood by Caesar as she never has by any one; and the character of the two men now plainly appeared.
Aquilifer.
XXXIV.
RETREAT FROM DYRRACHIUM. MAY,
his
48 B. C.
C.ESAK retired from Dyrrachium with great skill. He so markedly impressed own bearing on his soldiers as to shame them into the desire again to meet
enemy and retrieve their unsoldierly conduct. Pompey sought to pursue, Cresar picked up his detachments and headed but was not rapid enough. towards Thessaly to concentrate all his legions and try conclusions afresh.
the
Heretofore-friendly Greece
ture
now turned
cities
against
him
and he was forced
to cap-
Gomphi by
assault
vring between the rival
opened their gates. After some manoaulieutenants of either, Pompey and Caesar both concenOther
Caesar
;
trated their forces and reached the neighborhood of Pharsalus.
had
some
thirty-five
thousand
men
all told
Pompey,
at least twice as
many
while
his cavalry
ority,
was seven thousand
to Caesar's one thousand.
Despite this superi-
Pompey
waited for Caesar to move upon him.
vened for position near Pharsalus. Caesar He battle, but could not do so on even terms.
Some mano3uvring superendeavored to bring Pompey to
wfcs
about to shift his ground,
when Pompey showed a
challenge.
disposition to fight.
Caesar at once accepted the
THIS double victory so elated Pompey and his party that he imagined the war already over. He was saluted as Imperator.
He
did not consider the difference in forces or the
Caesar,
attendant circumstances.
elasticity of the great soldier,
on the contrary, with the rose to the occasion. By no
means disheartened, he determined to change his plan, and He was not slow to recognize that he had failed in at once.
his object.
He was
afraid to risk another battle here, lest
from the recollection of the prior defeats his men should again grow demoralized. Even his hardened legionaries had shown
that they were not above disgraceful panics.
to give over what, after
all,
He
concluded
was practically an
impossibility,
542
PUNISHMENT OF COWARDS.
much
smaller force of shutting
to lure
the task with a
in his lines ; to
Pompey up
move away and
him out
into the plain
country where he might out-manosuvre him as he could not on the intrenched hills. In the open field he felt a superi-
had been unable to show at Dyrrachium, where lines and redoubts of such vast extent limited his movements and
ority he
his capacity to develop his resources.
Caesar could not overlook all the acts of cowardice which
had been at the root of the Dyrrachium defeat. He selected those on whom reliance was wont to be placed, but who in
this
instance had failed in their duty, and punished sev-
eral of the standard-bearers
by reducing them
to the ranks.
This sufficed as an example. He then addressed his men in such wise as to rob them of the sting of defeat and inspire them with fresh confidence. Indeed, so soon as Caesar's
legionaries
had recovered from
their first
demoralization,
They begged they became themselves and eager for a battle. Caesar to lead them against the enemy instead of leaving
Dyrrachium,
selves.
promising to give a good account of themtheir
to
it,
But Caesar mistrusted not their good will but steadiness; he deemed his own plan wiser and adhered
promising his
men a
victory the next time they struck the
of victualing was, moreover, becom-
enemy.
ing
The question
difficult, and it was time to move away. After taking only such few hours as were necessary to collect and care for the wounded, Caesar quietly massed on his
left all his
men and
material,
and sent forward
at nightfall
on the day of the battle all his baggage and the wounded and sick, in conduct of one legion, to Apollonia, ordering them Then keeping two to make the distance in one march.
legions under his
orders as rearguard in the camp, he started the other seven on several roads, before daylight of
own
the next day, in the same direction, without signals or sound
CLEVER RETREAT.
of any kind.
543
When they had got well on the way, he gave the usual signal for decamping, broke up with his two legions
and rapidly followed the column.
is
This sensitiveness as to
the point of honor involved in giving the signal for the march
interesting.
Caesar was unwilling to slink
It
away
but he
came very
to do.
close to doing so.
was the only wise thing
victorious
Caesar had a perilous task before him, to retire from a over two bridgeless rivers, the Genusus and enemy
Apsus, both with rapid flow and steep banks. He reached the Genusus after about a five hours' march. Pompey sent his cavalry in pursuit, and followed with the entire army.
accomplished nothing. Caesar detached his own horse, intermixed with some four hundred legionaries, against Pomit
The But
horse reached Caesar's rear of column near the Genusus.
pey's cavalry and threw
then put his legions across the Genusus, which was done without too much This was the day's march he had planned, and difficulty.
it
back with
loss.
He
he was now safe from Pompey 's immediate pursuit, whose cavalry could not readily cross, as Caesar had collected all the
boats and the banks were very steep.
in the old
He
took up his post
opposite Asparagium, camp, whose wall and ditch still stood, with unusual precautions. He must steal another
march on Pompey
if
he was to elude him.
To induce Pom-
would stay where he was for a day or pey two, his horse was allowed to go out to forage but it was
to believe that he
;
soon quietly ordered in again. The infantry had been kept in camp ready to march. Pompey, who had followed Caesar
across the river, and
at Asparagium,
had likewise camped
in
effect.
in his old defenses
was deceived
when Pompey 's men were
resting,
About midday, and many of them had
strayed back towards the old camp to collect their hastily left chattels, and were generally dispersed, owing to laxness
544
POMPETS CHANCE.
march on the enemy, and, making some eight miles before dark, got that much start. Then
of discipline, Caesar stole his
after a brief rest, at the opening of the night Caesar sent for-
ward
his baggage,
this
And
and followed by daylight with his legions. he did on the third day also, "by which means he was
enabled to effect his march over the deepest rivers and through the most intricate roads without any loss." On the
fourth day,
over the pursuit, Caesar having steadily out-marched him, and returned to Asparagium. Immediately after the battle, Pompey had the choice of
Pompey gave
several plans
by which
to
make
use of his victory.
He
might
cross to Italy, where he could count on a better reception
now
fail-
that Caesar was defeated.
He
it
might sharply pursue Caesar's
it
army and perhaps destroy
ing to reach
before
it
before
could recruit, or,
it, might follow it inland and bring it to battle had recovered its tone. Having begun by pursu-
ing Caesar, though to no good plan of a campaign in Greece.
effect,
Pompey kept
it
to the
But he deemed
wise to
reassemble his forces, which the pursuit had much scattered. Caesar had stopped at Apollonia only to leave his wounded
under a suitable garrison and arrange for an indefinite absence. He left there June 1. He had determined to
join Domitius, who, with the Eleventh
and Twelfth
legions,
had succeeded
in recovering all Macedonia,
its
Caesar hoped not to forfeit, as
a conquest would enable possession
him
to concentrate his forces in a friendly country.
Domitius was on the Haliacmon, where he had towards the end of April been anticipating the arrival of Scipio from Syria with two legions and cavalry which the latter was
bringing to Pompey.
vicinity of Domitius,
Scipio, about
May
1,
had reached the
to surprise
and had then turned south
Longinus, who was in
in Thessaly.
command
of only a legion of recruits
He
left his
baggage under Favonius on the
CAESAR'S CHANCE.
Haliacmon, near Servia.
retired across the
545
Longinus, catching the alarm, Pindus Mountains to Ambracia. Scipio,
sure of his prey, was about to follow,
him back
to present resistance to Domitius,
when Favonius called who was threat-
ening him.
in several slight passages of arms, in
Returning thither, Scipio and Domitius indulged which Domitius showed
himself the more ready for combat; but nothing came of This was about the time when Caesar had these exchanges.
reached Apollonia.
So
was
far as the general strategic scheme went, Caesar's duty
If
plain.
fleet
Pompey pursued him, he would be
cut off
from his
war
his depot at Dyrrachium, from corn and and be thereby placed on equal terms with material, If Pompey crossed to Italy, Domitius and Caesar Caesar.
and
would be forced
to follow
him through Illyricum
to defend
If Pompey attempted to Italy, however difficult the task. take Apollonia and Oricum, Caesar would attack Scipio and compel Pompey to come to his relief. No other alternatives
were apt to complicate the problem.
Caesar left four cohorts at Apollonia, one at Lissus, and This left him three at Oricum, not counting the wounded.
seven old legions, one of which had had three cohorts taken
from
it,
say eighteen thousand men.
;
more legions from Italy
He expected two but these were intended to guard
Illyricum under Cornuficius. Pompey, on June 2, ascertained Caesar's movements and
elected to join Scipio.
against
his
if
lieutenant
feared that Caesar had designs and proposed himself to cut off
He
Domitius
he could reach him before Caesar.
Many
of his
lieutenants strongly advised crossing the Adriatic
and recon-
quering Italy, which they said would be the death-blow to Caesar; but Pompey felt that he could not abandon Scipio
and the many persons
of note adhering to his cause
who were
546
still
ODD SITUATION.
in Thessaly
and Macedonia.
The majority approved
his
course.
Accordingly, leaving Cato with fifteen cohorts and three
hundred vessels to guard the seashore and Dyrrachium, Pompey started from Asparagium June 3, towards Macedonia.
Caesar's
prompt action had forced Pompey
to follow
PELLLA
3
'A M
'
METROPOLIS
B R At
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Situation June 6.
him.
It
was he
still,
and place
will.
of future manosuvres.
who, despite defeat, imposed the time Pompey's was the weaker
The
situation
about June 6 was curious.
Pompey was
Caesar
marching along the Egnatian highway to join Scipio.
was marching up the river Aous by a
difficult
road to join
CAESAR'S ROUTE.
547
The latter, in search of victual and ignorant of Domitius. the recent events at Dyrrachium, was on the point of falling
into
Pompey's clutches by a march on Heraclea. The exaggerated rumors of Caesar's defeat had weakened
His messengers had been seized, and it had been impossible for him to communicate with Domitius. Pompey, marching on the direct
the allegiance of
many
states in Greece.
road, reached Heraclea on
June
8.
As we have seen, Domitius
had been facing Scipio on the Haliacmon. When the latter declined to come to battle, Domitius, pressed for rations, had
headed for Heraclea, where he thought he could revictual. On the 9th of June he was close to the place. But just as he was about to blunder into Pompey's column, some of the
Allobroges who had recently deserted to Pompey, and who were with the latter's scouting parties, were captured by DoDomitius' vanguard and revealed to him all the facts.
mitius quickly changed his course and filed south towards
Thessaly.
Ca3sar had marched with clear purpose and corresponding
rapidity.
His route was somewhat the same as that pursued by Alexander when marching on Thebes. He reached the watershed of the Aous and Peneus, and descended to ^Egi-
nium
13.
in Thessaly,
June
7.
Here Domitius joined him June
Pompey had followed with for him unusual speed. Fortune was kind to both. The threatened lieutenant of
neither was compromised.
The
situation
had cleared
itself.
Having joined his lieutenant, Caesar had nine legions, of in all some twenty -four which one was short three cohorts, thousand men. He had a few light troops and one thousand
horse.
He
decided to remain in Thessaly to recruit the
physique and morale of his army. He was where at need he could rally his legates under Calenus, who had fifteen cohorts.
The
alluvial plain of Thessaly.
was broad and well watered
548
by the Peneus and
ship of either
A BOLD ASSAULT.
its affluents,
was
fertile
and
well-fitted for
the operations of armies.
Pompey
The towns were active in partisanor Caesar, and as Scipio, on learning
the movements of the rival generals, had marched to Larissa, Caesar could scarcely count on
defeat.
much support
after his late
On
debouching from the mountains he was con-
fronted with four strong places lying on the foothills of
Pelinaeum, Trieca, Gomphi, Thessaly athwart his path, a quadrilateral of importance, but less then Metropolis, than it would assume to-day.
Caesar left JEginium June 15 and marched to Gomphi,
Here he found the gates shut on him, the news from Dyrrachium having in fact changed the minds
twenty miles distant.
of
many
of the Thessalians,
who
previously had been his
allies.
inhabitants had sent for help to Scipio and but Scipio had marched to Larissa, and Pompey Pompey; had not yet reached the border of Thessaly.
The
His men had made a longer march than usual that day and had intrenched the camp but he determined to assault Gomphi without delay. The men showed
Caesar camped.
;
great alacrity.
defeat
They were anxious to prove that the late came not from lack of stomach. They prepared pent-
houses, scaling-ladders
o'clock.
and hurdles, and were ready by four After exhorting his cohorts to retrieve themselves, and win reputation and the provisions they needed at the same moment, Caesar commanded an assault of the town, though it was protected by very high walls and in the three
;
remaining hours of the afternoon captured
it.
Then, as an
it
example, and as encouragement to his men, he gave
plunder.
up
to
Next day he
inhabitants at
fate of
marched to Metropolis. Here, too, the first shut their gates, but on hearing of the
to change their minds.
Gomphi, were wise enough
CAESAR CHEERED.
549
Caesar scrupulously spared the place, and thereafter all towns
in Thessaly, except those near
Larissa, where Scipio
of
was
quartered,
awed and persuaded by the examples
their gates
Gomphi
and Metropolis, opened
on his approach.
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OTH R Y ^^.i-w
Plain of Thessaly.
Caasar was cheered
by the conduct
of his men,
and
felt
that he might again trust to their steady bravery.
He made
up
his
mind
troops.
He
Pompey's arrival, while resting his headed to the east, crossed the Apidanus at
farther into the level country and
to await
Pyrgo, moved on
camped
550
CJESAR DICTATES MAN(EUVRES.
peus.
north of Pharsalus in the plain on the left bank of the EniThe camp appears to us to have been illy chosen, but
Csesar's reasons for placing
it
where he did are not given. Pompey, when he found that Domitius had escaped him and that Scipio was safe, kept on his course with slow
marches, southeast towards Larissa.
that he
It is hardly probable
marched by way of Pella, as has been assumed. He at least knew that Scipio had been on the Haliacmon, and had probably heard that he had marched towards Larissa.
The event proved that Pompey would have been wiser to move into Italy. But he not unnaturally looked upon another victory as the certain consequence of his last, and we
can but commend his purpose in following up an enemy whom every indication warranted him in believing he could overwhelm.
and sequence of the campaign were dictated by Caesar's movements. Pompey might, by a diversion on Italy, have had things his own way, but he
see that the plan
Again we
was too lax and
opponent too
indecisive.
Even now he was giving
21, at Larissa,
his
much time
to recruit.
Pompey joined command of both
Scipio
June
and assumed
the armies.
Why
Caesar had not attacked
Scipio before Pompey's arrival has been frequently asked. But such an act was not in accordance with ancient practice.
Larissa was too strong a town to assault, and a siege was not possible at the moment when speed was of the essence.
There may have been political grounds which we do not know. To attack a divided enemy, as we understand the
phrase,
is
rather a device of the
It
modern
art of
war than a
habit of Caesar's days.
had been done by Hannibal and
by Alexander, but more often such an opportunity was Moreover, Caesar was reluctant neglected than improved. to assault a well-defended city. Larissa, with Scipio 's two
LABIENUS COUNSELS.
1
551
its
legions,
was a
different task
from Gomphi with
native
population.
At
all events,
Caesar remained in situ and awaited his
enemy. Larissa was but twenty miles distant. The harvest was near at hand. His supplies were now certain and he was in open country where he could manoauvre at will. On
the other hand,
legionaries,
Pompey was
in
command
of fifty thousand
light troops,
seven thousand horse, and
many
a force large enough to justify his belief that Caesar was at his mercy. So certain was every one in Pompey's
camp
of victory, that already they
saw their chief
at the
head
of the
Eoman
state,
and quarreled about the disposal of
The estates of the rich honors, offices and spoils. Caesar's camp were cut up and divided, on paper.
wrangling was the
Caesar grew
result,
men in Much
alike.
and the
cries to
be led against
among
soldiers, politicians
and courtiers
Labienus appears to have been the very worst of counselors
for
Pompey.
Whatever
his motives
for
his
present
hatred of Caesar, the feeling was pronounced. scarcely himself believe, but he certainly led
believe, that Caesar's troops
He
could
to
Pompey
were not of the best; that there
were few Gallic veterans in the ranks; and that his young soldiers teste Dyrrachium would not stand fire. He
dwelt on the fact that Pompey's cavalry was undoubtedly superior to Caesar's; and alleged that with the preponderance
of
numbers there could be no doubt whatever
It is certain that
of victory so
soon as Caesar was attacked.
firmly convinced that he must
Pompey was
there existed
now
win.
And
abundant reason for his conviction.
premise in his argument.
his front,
There was but one weak
He
forgot that he had Caesar in
in war.
and that the personal factor is always the strongest He took no steps to counterbalance the weight
would have in the coming
fray.
Caesar's personality
The
552
defect in
THE FORCES OF EACH.
Pompey's army was the lack of one head, one purcontrol and direct events.
pose to
on the other hand, was his army. The whole body was instinct with his purpose. From low to high all worked on his own method. He controlled its every mood
Caesar,
and
act.
He was
now
the mainspring
and balance-wheel
alike.
And
as he
felt that
perhaps better than before their late defeat,
to bring
he could again rely upon his legions, he proposed
Pompey
to battle even
though he had but half the
force of his opponent.
Both armies had as by mutual consent approached each
other and lay in the vicinity of Pharsalus.
Caesar, as
we
at
have seen, had
first
moved
to this place
and been followed
an interval of a few days by Pompey. The forces of each can be fairly estimated.
ties
Some
authori-
claim that between three and four hundred thousand
field.
men
all
faced each other on this
This
is
absurd.
Nearly
the ancient historians agree that
and ten cohorts, Caesar, some auxiliaries. Pompey, whose cohorts were nearer the
normal strength than Caesar's, had not far from fifty thousand legionaries (the Commentaries state them at forty -five
Pompey had one hundred eighty-two cohorts, and that each had
thousand men), some four thousand bowmen, seven thousand a total certainly exceedcavalry, and a host of auxiliaries,
ing sixty thousand men. Caesar's cohorts were small, scarcely more than three hundred men each. They had been much
depleted and he had not been able to recruit them up to normal strength. He numbered in all not over twenty-five
thousand legionaries (the Commentaries say twenty -two thousand), had but one thousand mounted men, and fewer auxiliaries
than Pompey,
a total of some thirty thousand.
All
authorities are agreed that
stantially
Pompey
outnumbered Caesar sub-
two to one.
THE PLACE OF BATTLE.
There
is
553
again, as so frequently occurs in ancient battles,
some dispute as to which bank of the river the battle of A study of the topography of the Pharsalus was fought on.
makes the matter perfectly clear. Pompey had come from Larissa, which lay north from Pharsalus; Csesar had come from Metropolis, which lay to the
country and the
field
west.
These facts must be borne in mind; as also that the
Enipeus, according to Strabo, springs from
Mount Othrys and
flows past Pharsalus; that the battle, according to Appian,
was between Pharsalus and the Enipeus and that according to the Commentaries Pompey's right and Caesar's left flanks
;
leaned on the river.
We must find a
site
on which Pompey
could suitably camp his large army and build certain castella we are told about, and a battle-ground between the rival
camps which
fits
the relations which have
come down
to us.
Unless we satisfy these points, as well as military probabilities,
we
are all at sea.
The following theory
and no other
of the battle is It has been
consistent with all these facts,
is.
the custom to throw aside one or other of these statements as
inconsistent with the rest; but that theory which agrees with
all of
them
is
with the terrain.
to discard
manifestly the best; especially when it accords As in the case of Cannae, there is no need
The Enipeus
until
it
any fact given by any reliable authority. flows from its source through deep ravines
emerges into the plain of Pharsalus.
Here
as
it
turns
to the west
and
six
incloses heights to-day
known
Karadja
Ahmet, some
sides, except
hundred
feet
above the river-bed.
plain, rises a
On
all
on the west towards the
heavy net-
work
from
of mountains.
West
of Karadja
Ahmet
there projects
this network the hill of Krindir, and between the two bounded on the south by the mountains and on the hills, north by the river, is a smaller plain, four miles long by two
miles wide.
554
PHARSALUS.
The Cynocephalae Mountains
peaks
lie to
the north.
On
a range of gray, serrated his way from Larissa Pompey
had come across the plateau, leaving the Cynocephalae hills on his left. He could not have camped here, with a view to
battle,
as alleged
by Mommsen
it
was
far too rugged for
Pompey needed a battle-ground on which he could use his large body of cavalry. He sought a place whose slope was such that he could induce Caesar to attack
operations.
him, which on the rough and cut-up heights of Cynocephalae Caesar would certainly not have done. His enemy was al-
ready encamped in the narrows between the Enipeus and Krindir, with the citadel of Pharsalus perhaps Homer's with heroic memoPhthia, dwelling of Achilles frowning,
ries,
from
was natural to do; he moved camp. down and across the Enipeus, and pitched his camp on Kait
two-peaked Pompey did what
its
hill
five
hundred
feet
above his
radja Ahmet, where he had in his front a suitable slope, with his flanks protected by the river on one side and the hills on
the other, and with a good ford across the Enipeus at his
back.
On
the flanking hills to the left of his
of redoubts.
camp he threw
five miles
up a number
apart.
Caesar faced east,
Pompey west.
The camps were
Caesar was intent on bringing
Pompey to
battle.
He
had kept his touch on the pulse of his army, and found that This capacity to test its beat was again strong and regular. the tone of an army's system is distinctly a proof of the great
captain.
Despite his late defeat, Caesar was not misled in
despite his victory,
his estimate of his soldiers;
Pompey's
confidence in his cohorts was misplaced.
To bring Pompey to an issue, Caesar each day led out his men and set them in array, at first on their own ground not
far distant
from Pompey's camp, but on succeeding days advancing up to the foot of the slope on which lay his power-
POMPEY INVITES BATTLE.
ful antagonist.
555
compared
to
His horse, of which he had but a handful Pompey, he mixed with the most active of the
to this species of
light troops,
and habituated them
combat
by
daily skirmishes.
The
felt
cavalry, thus sustained, though
its
numerically weaker,
confidence in
conduct, and in
one of
its
outpost combats defeated the enemy, killing one of
Caesar's
the Allobrogian deserter-chiefs.
in self -poise
men
thus gained
Pompey
from day to day. did not leave the
hill
his
camp
lay on,
but
uniformly drew up on the lower slope, hoping that Caesar would attack him at this disadvantage ; but from his much
greater strength, Caesar was far too
better shows
Pompey
's
wary to do so. Nothing weaker morale than his indecision
here though every element was in his favor.
said that
Nor can*t be
Pompey was
still
out Caesar by non-action. or yielding to the importunities of his friends, he had come
hither especially to give Caesar, sore hit in the late disaster,
acting on his old theory of tiring For, whether of his own free will
the coup de grace.
Unsuccessful in his attempt to bring
Pompey
to battle
on
556
CAESAR ACCEPTS.
He equal terms, Caesar was about to change his tactics. determined to shift his ground from day to day, and thus endeavor to catch Pompey under adverse conditions on the
march.
For Pompey's men were not used to hard marching, as were Caesar's, and would be harassed by a series of forced
manoeuvres.
moreover, Caesar, by keeping in motion, could more readily supply himself with corn without detailing
#,
And
heavy force from camp each day.
Csesar proposed to put his
On
the very morning
into execution he
when
his
new plan
if
noticed that
Pompey had advanced farther than usual from
the slope, as
willing finally to test the
camp and down
issue.
This was actually the case, for Pompey's friends had
battle.
unanimously demanded
sciousness
Pompey, though giving way
to pressure, in his inner con-
still clung to the value of his defensive views. This came partly from lack of initiative, partly from the fact that he was a good enough soldier to see that the victory at
Dyrrachium had not been wholly without accident, that Caesar's troops were really better than his own, and that to
keep up a Fabian policy was safe, and more apt to win in the end, even if less commendable on the score of enterprise. This was a healthy view; but his lieutenants combated it,
and Pompey's vanity yielded
to their insistence.
Seeing Pompey's advance, Caesar deferred his march to test the intention of the enemy and drew up over against
them.
It
was the 29th of June, 48
B. c.
Coin with Civic
Crov:r>.
XXXV.
PHAESALUS. JUNE
THE
won the
Pompeians
last fight.
felt confident of victory.
29,
48 B. C.
to one,
They were two
and had
Pompey
believed that by throwing his cavalry upon Cae-
sar's flank,
he could rout
his legions before they
were able to close for
battle.
Pompey 's
right rested on the
Enipeus, Caesar's left; the cavalry was on the
Each army had three lines, but Csesar made a fourth line, perhaps a sort of a column of chosen troops, and posted it back of his right to hold head The legions against Pompey's cavalry. Pompey allowed Caesar to attack.
outer flanks.
soon closed in fierce struggle.
sar's right, defeated his small
Meanwhile Pompey's cavalry rode round
Cae-
in
body of horse, and, confident of victory, pushed on the flank of the legions. But they were unexpectedly met by Caesar's
;
fourth line and checked
alone left.
and, lacking cohesion, dispersed.
Its charge
The
was
legions were
Caesar ordered in his third line.
stout,
and the
Pompeians gave way.
Pompey
force.
fled.
Following up his victory, Caesar captured
his
or dispersed the entire
Pompey made
way
first
to Asia Minor,
thence to Egypt, where he was assassinated.
Caesar followed him.
vauntingly declared to his men that he would make Caesar's legions fly before their infantry came to action, and was unwise enough to explain to them how he
POMPEY had
proposed to do it. His plan was to place his heavy body of cavalry in one column on his own left wing and have it sally
out and envelop Caesar's right and rear, and charge in on the of which all Romans had a dread, uncovered side, before Caesar's legions could reach his line of foot.
It
was
his
cavalry in
an
idle
which he particularly gloried. Nor did this seem boast, for his horse was seven to one of Caesar's and
much
Had
of it was supposed to be and was indeed of high quality. he been an Alexander, and had he handled the cavalry
himself as the Macedonian did at the Hydaspes, his theory
558
CAESAR RECONNOITRES.
practice.
would Have been carried out in
Labienus, too,
addressed the soldiers and told them that not only had the Caesar of all his best men, but fight at Dyrrachium robbed
that none of his old legionaries
had come back with him from
the officers took an oath to
Gaul.
Pompey and he and
all
return from the battle victorious or to perish.
peians were in the highest elation and confidence. Caesar carefully reconnoitred Poinpey's position.
instead of
The Pom-
Pompey,
remaining on
his
left
descended to the plain and
rear.
inexpugnable heights, had his camp over a mile in his
Caesar saw that Pompey's right wing leaned on the where were steep banks which, with a force of six hundred cavalry from Pontus, abundantly, protected it. This
river
wing under Lentulus was composed of the Cilician and Spanish cohorts; these latter Afranius had brought from
those discharged at the
river Varus.
Pompey
considered
these his steadiest troops.
His
left
wing, under Domitius
Ahenobarbus, contained the two legions sent him in the previous year by Caesar, numbered the First and Third, and
was accompanied by Pompey in person.
near the rising ground.
The
left flank
was
Scipio held the centre with the two
Seven cohorts guarded the camp, which, as Syrian legions. was flanked by some redoubts. stated, Many auxiliary and
volunteer cohorts, including two thousand veterani, were interspersed in the line.
Pompey's
cavalry, under Labienus,
left
and
his archers
and
slingers,
were on the
wing, which
was in the
air, for the hills were too easy to be
ular protection.
The
entire force comprised one
any partichundred
and ten complete cohorts of heavy troops numbering, according to Caesar, forty -five thousand men in line, and stood
in the usual three lines
alry,
half.
and ten-deep formation. The cavlight troops and auxiliaries swelled this number by one "Hercules Invictus" was the password.
560
Caesar, as
CAESAR IN LINE.
was
his wont,
drew up
his legions in three lines
of cohorts, four in the
first line,
three in the second and
eight deep.
third lines.
The men may have stood
At
all
events, Caesar must have deployed his cohorts so as to extend
his front to equal that of
Pompey. Had he not done so, the Commentaries would have stated the fact, as it would have
effect
had a marked
regretted that
front,
on the
tactics of the battle.
It il to be
we do not know how
so little,
Caesar covered so
much
line.
Pompey
for the force
its
each had in
heavy losses, and the Ninth legion on the left. The depletion of the latter had been so severe that he placed the Eighth close by Two to support it and make up, as it were, one legion.
right,
Caesar placed the Tenth legion, despite
on the
cohorts
or as some think two thousand men, say six or
guarded the camp. Antony commanded Caesar himthe left; Sylla the right; Domitius the centre. with the Tenth. He had self took post opposite Pompey,
seven cohorts
eighty -two cohorts, including those in camp.
Those in
line
numbered twenty -two thousand men, as he states in the Commentaries. With his cavalry, light troops and a few
he may have had thirty thousand men facing The two lines stood within some three hundred the enemy. Caesar was outnumbered two to one. paces of each other.
auxiliaries,
His situation and purpose
will of
.recalls vividly to
mind the
iron
Frederick who
so constantly faced these
and yet
greater odds, and
by unmatched determination wrested vicfrom the very jaws of disaster. tory Caesar foresaw that the main danger would come to his for his left leaned right flank from Pompey's cavalry force, on the steep river banks and was safe from such attack.
Pompey
at all events should not take
nizing the
him unawares. Eecogmade up a fourth line by drawdanger, he quickly
ing a choice cohort from the third line of each legion except
5*1
562
A CORPS D'^LITE.
the Eighth and Ninth, and placed this fourth line of six cohorts in support of his small body of horse on his right,
with his wishes."
"opposed them to Pompey 's cavalry, and acquainted them He gave this corps d' elite to understand
that on their steadiness, courage
and rapid action would
also distinctly required
depend the result of the day.
of his
He
main
lines that they should not charge until ordered;
and especially
an unexpected
so the third line,
strictly in reserve, lest
which he proposed to hold he should have need of it to repair
disaster.
He
then, as
was
usual, addressed
his army, exhorting
them
to display their ancient courage;
which had won on so many hotly contested fields, and called on them to witness that it was not he who spilled Roman
blood, but peace.
Pompey, who
his overtures of persistently refused
We have no record of his words,
was marked.
It
but the enthusiasm
of the legionaries
was well typified by one
primipilus of the Tenth,
Crastinus, a volunteer
who had been
who, stepping from the ranks, voiced the ardent spirit of the rest: "I will so act, Caesar, that thou shalt be grateful to
me, living or dead,"
life.
which promise he redeemed with his The trumpet signal for battle was then sounded. The
battle-cry
was "Venus Victrix."
There was space enough between the armies for each to advance part way upon the other, as was the usual manner
in ancient battles.
But Pompey had ordered
his legions to
await Caesar's onset and to strike when the enemy should reach them tired with the rapid charge and with ranks pre-
sumably disordered. Pompey thought "that the javelins would fall with less force if the soldiers were kept on their ground, than if they met them in their course at the same
;
time he trusted that Caesar's soldiers, after running ovei double the usual ground, would become weary and exhausted
by the fatigue."
But Caesar knew
well the value, moral and
THE INITIAL CHARGE.
physical, of impetus.
563
a certain impetuosity of spirit alacrity implanted by nature in the hearts of all men, which is inflamed by a desire to meet the foe. This
is
"There
and an
a general should endeavor not to repress, but to increase; nor was it a vain institution of our ancestors, that the trumpets should sound on all sides,
and a general shout be
raised,
by which they imagined that the enemy were struck with terror, and their own army inspired with courage." Every
great general nas understood this.
Caesar
knew that
his
men
from
could endure the fatigue and that they would be the more
inspired
fear.
by Pompey's
line awaiting their attack, as if
The
on the
Caesarians rushed forth with great bravery.
It
was
Crastinus, with one hundred
right,
and twenty chosen volunteers who charged first. This was the place of
honor, given to such
all
men
as,
having discharged to the
still
state
their military obligations,
preferred the career of
arms.
The
Caesarians, perceiving that
not advance of their
own
Pompey's men did and with the experience accord,
bred of many battles, paused as with one consent midway, "After a lest they should reach the enemy out of breath.
short respite
"
they again advanced.
When
within distance
javelins,
they paused to let the front
rank men cast their
"instantly drew their swords, as Caesar had ordered them," again sent their battle-cry resounding to the clouds and
rushed upon their foemen with the cold steel. Pompey's received them manfully and with unbroken ranks, legions
The battle hurling their pila and quickly drawing swords. was engaged with stanchness on either side. The two lines
mixed
in one, each intent on
breaking down the other's
guard, and swayed to and able to wrest from the other an advantage which foretold
success.
fro in the deadly struggle, neither
564
POMPEY'S HORSE FLEES.
the instant of the crash of meeting legions, the cavalry
left
At
was launched from Pompey's
of horse, followed
by
his whole host of archers
upon Caesar's small body and slingers.
The
effect of the
superior to courage.
impact was never doubtful. Weight was Caesar's cavalry was borne back, slowly
but surely.
It fought well,
its
remembering the many
but
it
fields
on
which
soon began to lose formamelt into a disorganized mass, and finally broke up. tion, to The enemy, believing success within their grasp, commenced
it
;
had held
own
to
file off
in small troops to get into the rear of the army.
critical.
The moment was
The
came
Was
it
a battle lost or
his
won?
His
foresight of Caesar
now proved
salvation.
fourth line of six cohorts, hitherto held behind the other three,
into play.
We must presume them
to
have been either
deployed, or so disposed that they could readily deploy, to face
the probable direction of the
charge of Pompey's horse. And cohorts such as they were had no dread of mounted men, in whatever number. Rushing forward at Caesar's command
when
the
of men,
Pompeian cavalry approached, this splendid body who knew not fear nor ever doubted victory, charged
with desperate purpose upon the front of the Pompeian cavalry, which, unsuspecting and in lapse order, were wheeling in
on the flank of the Tenth as
if
they believed the battle won.
The Pompeian
horse, startled at the unexpected sight of this
firm array, at once drew rein.
They were made up
of
many
bodies from countries scarce knowing each other's names;
and however
effective as separate columns, they
were bound
checked,
together by no
their
again to launch them on the foe. Each squadron looked at the bold Who front of Caesar's advancing men, paused, balanced.
is lost. Caesar's bold cohorts kept on until they reached the line of horse, and then, instead of hurling their
common purpose. Their speed once momentum was gone. There was no one
hesitates
RESERVES INTO ACTION.
pila,
565
they closed with the enemy and, using them as spears, struck at the horses' breasts and the men's legs and faces.
of
all
Not a man
the
seven thousand stood.
Discounte-
nanced, the squadrons, losing their heads, turned and fled towards the hills. Pompey's right arm was paralyzed. What
a contrast to the cavalry at the Hydaspes, which, under Alexander's tremendous impulse, charged, and charged, and
charged, and yet again charged home, until they pounded
the flank of'Porus' huge
to a jelly!
army
The cavalry disposed of, the six cohorts immediately advanced upon the slingers and archers, who, deprived of their mainstay, could offer no resistance, fell savagely on
them and cut them
to pieces
where they stood.
Then once
more wheeling about upon the Pompeians' left wing, while the main lines were still locked in their bloody struggle, this
gallant body furiously attacked the enemy's foot on the left
and
rear.
The
tables were turned.
Caesar's plans
tune.
had been welcomed by the smile of ForThe Pompeians, astonished beyond measure at the
defeat of the horse, were visibly wavering under the blows
of the flank attack.
The second
lines
had already advanced
into the fighting front.
home-thrust.
his corps
Caesar,
The moment had arrived for the who had until this moment directed
d 'elite, now
it
galloped over to his reserve third line
and ordered
Advancing with steady stride and perfect front upon the enemy, while the first and second lines fell back through the intervals and sustained them from
into
action.
the rear, these fresh and undaunted veterans deployed into
battle order,
can do
it,
and with one charge, delivered only as veterans broke through the Pompeian line as if it were but
it
lacework, and tore
into
shreds.
It has
been said that
Caesar's orders to his third line were to cut at the faces of
the Pompeians,
many
of
whom
were young
Roman
fashion-
566
ables,
A LUXURIOUS CAMP.
who dreaded a
visible scar
worse than a deadly wound. This lacks the semblance of truth; but true or false, no
further resistance was attempted.
the camp.
Nor was
this all.
Every man fled towards When Pompey "saw his cav-
alry routed and that part of the army on which he reposed
his greatest hopes
rest,
he quitted the
to his
thrown into confusion, despairing of the field and retreated straightway on horseto
back
his tent in apathy
camp," ordered the gates closed and retired and despair.
The
taken.
battle
was won.
Pompey was
not only beaten but
still
incapable of
further action.
his
But the camp must
be
Exhorting
men
them
to attack its intrenchments.
not to pause midway, Caesar led Though wearied by the
heat, for they
had fought from morn to midday, the legionThe cohorts aries obeyed with their wonted cheerfulness. left in Pompey 's camp fought well, but the best defense was
made by the Thracians and auxiliaries, for the Pompeians who had taken refuge in it had mostly thrown away their weapons and standards, intent on further flight. The camp
was captured, the foe Ahmet.
fleeing to the hills
beyond Karadja
The camp was
full of the evidences of security
and luxury.
Tables loaded with plate and viands, tents covered with ivy and floored with fresh sods, testified to their false estimate
of Caesar's
men, "distressed and suffering troops, who had always been in want of common necessaries." Pompey, so soon as the Caesarians had forced the trenches, throwing aside
his dress of general,
mounted and
fled to Larissa
and thence
to the coast,
embarked.
which he reached with but thirty horse, and He felt that his men had betrayed him.
Caesar once again urged his legions not to pause for plunder, but to make an end of the whole war by capturing those
who had
fled to the
mountain.
In the 'persistency of his pur-
VIGOROUS PURSUIT.
suit
567
Pursuit was
upon
this field
he resembles Alexander.
not as a rule his strong point.
to discipline.
The men were most amenable
followed Csesar,
They left Pompey's camp unplundered and who set about drawing a line of works at the
runaways had taken refuge.
Fore-
foot of the hill where the
seeing their danger, as Caesar's
men
threatened to surround
"
?'
V "* M "
-n->-<<
V,
'
ve.v
After the Battle of Fharsalus.
them and were advancing on three
on the
hills,
sides, there
the
Here they hoped to cross and get on the road to Larissa, in which place they might undertake renewed defense under another leader, or failing this, might better plead for terms. But Caesar, leaving a force in
the river where
it
Pompeians makes a bend.
sought to retreat
being no water by a circuit to
Pompey's camp and another
in his own, took four legions,
568
LOSSES AND PRISONERS.
the river along the plain, and at a
made a smart march up
from
this retreat.
distance of six miles from his
of the
same
hill.
camp cut the fugitives off also The mass took refuge on still another part Though Caesar's men were greatly exriver
hausted, having fought and marched all day, he encouraged
them
to
draw a work between the
and
hill at
the only
enemy from getting water during the night. This brought the Pompeians to immediate terms. They sent to treat for surrender. A few leading
available approach, to prevent the
men
of senatorial rank escaped.
all
Next morning
ency.
were ordered down from the
hill
and bid
to pile their arms.
Expecting retribution, they found clemCaesar pardoned all, and forbade the soldiers to harm
man
or take from
his
weary troops to forward to Larissa.
them anything they had. camp, and taking fresher
Then, sending
ones, he pushed
In
this
two hundred men killed,
while of Pompey's
noted battle Caesar lost but thirty centurions and a noteworthy proportion of officers,
army
there fell fifteen thousand
men;
twenty -four thousand prisoners were
made
one hundred and
Domitius eighty standards and nine eagles were taken. Ahenobarbus was killed while fleeing. The prisoners were
sent to Asia
and organized into new legions by Domitius
Calvinus.
This splendid victory was won by Caesar's admirable dispositions, the lack of
vigor of Pompey's soldiers, and the want
of steadfastness of
its
duty the victory would have been
Pompey's cavalry. Had this body done more dearly purchased.
Caesar's quick detection of the
weak point
of his line; his
disposal of the six chosen cohorts to resist the cavalry;
and
upon
their
Pompey's It was entirely unexpected by Pompey, who believed
left flank,
overthrowing this body, his hurling them on was a superb exhibition of grand tactics.
his left
CAESAR PURSUES POMPEY.
flank to be his winning one,
It
569
and upset
all his calculations.
shows how a small, body of determined men, well handled and thrown upon the foe at the critical instant, can change
the tide of battle.
During this time at sea, Brundisium had been blockaded by Decimus Laelius, one of Pompey's admirals; and another of them, Cassius, had captured the harbor of Messana in
had destroyed by fire Pomponius' fleet and had later captured Vibo in Italy and in like manner damaged the fleet of Sulpicius. All these places would have fallen to the
Sicily,
Pompeians but for the news of the victory of Caesar at Pharsalus, upon receiving which Laelius and Cassius speedily
decamped with
their respective fleets.
and Bosotia; and after Pharsalus, Calenus and Cornuficius remained to complete the conquest of Greece and Illyria.
Calenus, meanwhile, reduced
of Phocis
much
From
Larissa Caesar pursued
Pompey with
his cavalry to
Amphipolis. Here he saw that Pompey had escaped him. The Sixth legion having come up, he kept on along the shore
of Thrace;
collect
reached the
;
means of crossing
Hellespont July 24; stopped to and finally put over in frail barks,
a most foolhardy operation. On the passage hazard of Pompey's minor fleets of ten galleys threw in his way one
under L. Cassius.
By good
rights Caesar should have suc-
cumbed
but the news of Pharsalus so utterly stupefied the Pompeian that Caesar, with his matchless audacity, took
;
the whole squadron prisoners.
This windfall facilitated his
progress to a degree.
Pompey had
hoping in dreaded to
and Asia Minor, each place to run across friends and help. He encounter Cato and his other lieutenants, after his
fled to points in the ^iEgean
disgraceful flight from Pharsalus.
Caesar felt that he must
fly,
pursue him whithersoever he might
and
finish the
war
570
DEATH OF POMPEY.
without allowing him the opportunity to collect a fresh army. He marched on his track as fast as he was able, but was
hampered by being
left
tied
Mark Antony behind
down to an infantry column. He to command the army, with orders
enemy's
fleet
to cross to Italy so soon as the
would permit
it,
and hold the peninsula. Caesar took with him only the Sixth legion, and ordered Calenus to send him while en route
another legion of young troops.
horse.
He had
a few hundred
In his
polis,
flight
Pompey
stayed one day, July 2, at
Amphi;
where he issued a proclamation calling all men to arms and collecting moneys from the tax-farmers there, set sail
and thence to Pamphylia, Cilicia and Cyprus. Antioch having refused to receive him, he gave up a halfconceived design of going to Syria and thence to the Parfor Mitylene,
thians; but collecting in
military use,
Cyprus more money, and brass for and raising two thousand troops, he sailed to
Pelusium in Egypt, which he reached toward the end of September. Here he found the ten-year old Ptolemy, son of
Ptolemy Auletes, engaged in war with his sister Cleopatra, who was seventeen, for the sole possession of the Egyptian
throne.
Cleopatra had taken refuge in Syria, and Ptolemy
was
her.
Pelusium holding the approaches to Egypt against Their respective armies now lay near the desert. To Ptolemy, Pompey applied for a refuge in Alexandria.
at
application with openly expressed but fearing to associate with misfortune, he, or kindness, rather his tutor, the eunuch Photinus, caused Pompey to be
Ptolemy received his
put to death by Achillas, captain of the king's guard. Lentulus was likewise assassinated.
L.
Thus miserably died in his fifty-ninth year, Pompey, surnamed the Great when but twenty-six years old. He had been the popular hero of the Romans. He had conducted
POMPEY'S CHARACTER.
seventeen successful campaigns.
571
thrice
He had
entered
Rome
in triumph.
He had
thrice been consul.
sar he could have divided the world.
With CaeTo what a pass had
otherwise of
he come, indeed!
"A
good
officer,"
says
Mommsen, "but
mediocre gifts of intellect and heart, fate had with superhuman constancy for thirty years allowed him to solve all
brilliant
laurels
had permitted him to pluck all planted and fostered by others had presented to him
and
toilless tasks;
;
all the conditions requisite for
obtaining the supreme power,
only in order to exhibit in his person an example of spurious greatness to which history
knows no
parallel."
This contest for sovereignty between Caesar and Pompey shows marked characteristics of the men themselves.
great efforts to keep the appearance of right on his side, and succeeded in so doing.
Whether
In
right or wrong, Caesar
made
this sense
were made his reiterated appeals to Pompey for
first
a personal interview. He may, soon after the refusal of the one, have seen that his appeals would be fruitless, but
he nevertheless persevered, and no doubt his persistency, coupled to success, gave him the shadow of right in the eyes
of
many who had
all
previously opposed him.
For the same
was generous
purpose of persuading people to his cause Caesar towards
Roman
citizens
who came under
his control, as
prisoners or otherwise, even when they had been active foes. Caesar was not less inhuman than other Romans, but he was
wont
to
be
politic in his actions,
and he knew when and
how
to be generous.
trasted.
In warlike qualities the two generals are distinctly conCaesar's broad and solid views, foresight and power
of reasoning out his course of action, were as
marked
as his of
persistency, his
his Gallic
wisdom and
his strength.
During much
campaign he had foreseen and been preparing for
572
CAESAR'S RAPID WORK.
between Pompey and himself.
this final struggle
And
he
had not reckoned in vain on the splendid legions he had created, nor on Gaul, which had afforded him his base for
Even Caesar's foolhardy exploits never operations in Italy. carried him out of the generally wise scope of his original
plan.
Pompey, on the contrary, while anticipating the coming struggle with equal certainty, had done absolutely nothing to enable him to cope with Caesar. He had apparently
not comprehended that he must undertake to hold Italy or
forfeit the first
and most important innings of the game.
He had made
had
failed to
do so at the centre of the empire.
preparations elsewhere for resistance, while he He did not
make
use of his resources
when
collected.
Instead of facing
Caesar and forcing him to pay dearly for success, he allowed him to snatch Spain from his lieutenants with apparently no
effort to
One can scarcely imagine conduct more impotent than this. One can scarcely recognize the Pompey who conducted the war against the pirates.
check him.
Caesar's directness of purpose in contrast to this
derful.
is
won-
In sixty days from crossing the Kubicon, he had
conquered Italy. Then, shielding himself by a curtain of forces on the Adriatic, he turned to Spain in order to protect
and base from Pompey's legions in the peninsula. In six weeks more after reaching Iberia, this gigantic labor was also accomplished, and his course against Pompey was
his rear
Then followed a period during which his hands clear. were tied by Pompey's control of the sea. It was many months before he could cross both his detachments to Epirus,
made
them and stand face to face with his foe in command of such a force as would warrant him in fighting. Caesar knew his enemy. Though he was justified in relyjoin
ing on his inertia, he was unquestionably rash in moving with half his force, as he did, across the sea and running the
CESAR'S FAULTS.
573
chance of being beaten in detail. For if Pompey had but put forth his strength in a creditable manner, he could have
crushed Caesar and
all his
hopes.
The
position of Caesar at
Dyrrachium was a
tory of Pharsalus,
false one,
rather than judicious ; and though
it
brought on by conduct rash its outcome was the vic-
must
be
distinctly
condemned as
This can scarcely be called the policy. art of a great general, whose province is to play a bold but not rash part. Nor did Caesar accomplish any substantial
unsound military
good by
his haste in seeking
Pompey
in Epirus.
The same
time spent in Italy would have enabled him to prepare means of shipping his entire force at once to Greece, and thus have
saved the grave risk he ran. Or better still, in much less he could have marched through Illyricum. The legions time,
he needed
in the
all
Padane country
if
came from Spain and Gaul they concentrated it was not much farther from there
;
to Epirus than to Brundisium.
He
would,
indeed, have
saved time
from
this latter place
he had made the overland
march through Illyricum. This was his true road, for Illyricum was committed to his interests while Pompey held the
There was no real danger of Pompey's crossing to Italy when he knew Caesar was advancing to meet him in Greece. It was not his way. Good fortune alone saved
Adriatic.
Caesar from the disaster which all but followed on his rash-
ness in crossing to Greece by sea.
Caesar's boldness in endeavoring, with his small force, to
blockade
Pompey near Dyrrachium,
its
while
it
compels our
unwonted audacity, was none the less a reckless undertaking which of necessity sooner or later
admiration for
must and actually did come to
grief.
It entailed the loss of
a large part of the flower of his army, not to mention the demoralization which it took no less than Caesar's fluent
tongue and able discipline to overcome.
To undertake such
574
PICK AND SHOVEL.
an operation shows rather an excess of animal than a wellor else an inexpertness in gauging balanced moral courage,
which we know Caesar was not subject to. In this operation, Caesar was conducting war more on the physical It was not a case of necessity, than on the intellectual plan.
his task
which always excuses a desperate
cessfully tried another
act, for
he afterwards suc-
Pompey
into the
override his
and better scheme, that of luring open country. His allowing his valor to discretion met with its proper check. Nothing
It
but his luck saved him from fatal disaster.
was well that
he was released from his false situation by a defeat which
was not a
final one.
An
is
interesting circumstance in the campaigns of Caesar,
itself
which cannot but impress
the handiness exhibited
of pick
on every American
soldier
soldier,
by
Caesar's legionaries in the use
and
shovel.
Every Roman
knew how
expert.
to use
a spade.
But
Caesar's
men were even more
These
intrenching tools,
quite apart from the daily camping-work,
their shields.
seemed to be as important to the legions as their weapons or They dug their way to victory on more than
one occasion.
The
best illustration of Caesar's character in the campaign
against
Pompey
is
his determination to fight at Pharsalus.
is
Not every general
sive battle,
called
upon or
is
ready to fight a deci-
army
order.
of twice his strength.
which must make or mar his cause, against an In this determination .one must
recognize character sustained
by
intelligence of
the
first
Caesar had taken post at Metropolis, expecting to
mano3uvre with Pompey until he could place him at a disadvantage. Pompey, however, moved on him, and Caesar without hesitation determined to take the initiative.
boldly did; his
This he
men backed
his courage
by
their gallantry,
and leader and legions won.
Pompey, on the contrary,
CLEMENCY AND CRUELTY.
while his plan of battle was good, showed in
its
575
execution
that there was no stamina in his men, no such esprit de corps
as emanates from contact with the great commander.
His
cavalry lacked the
It
first
elements of stanchness or discipline.
had no unity of action in the absence of a proper commander; and this was Pompey's fault. Orientals could not
have behaved worse.
And
there appears to have been no
on the
mutual confidence which might be called on to resist disaster field. So soon as the first contrary incident occurred,
there was neither head nor heart to stem the tide of defeat.
Pompey beaten showed
stricken herd.
of the
himself incapable of further exertion, mental or moral; his adherents decamped like a terrorCaesar's loss in killed measures the fighting
this
Pompeian army, and
measures the
loss of
morale
of the great general.
In eighteen months from taking up arms Ca3sar had made himself master of the world by defeating the only man who
claimed to dispute this
salus
title
with him.
The
battle of Phar-
was fought just seven months from the landing in
Epirus.
It
must be
said in Caesar's
honor that few conquerors of
the ancient world
he.
made use
value,
of clemency after victory as did
He knew
its
no doubt, but we must believe that
all feelings of
with victory disappeared
animosity.
This side
which urged him unnecessarily and by treachery to slay four hundred and thirty thousand defenseless Germans in one day.
of his character stands in curious contrast to that
The most marked
result of the victory of Pharsalus
was
the transfer of allegiance
by
the provinces from the van-
quished to the victor. These all recalled their military and naval contingents and refused to receive the refugees. Juba
was the only man of consequence who stood to his guns. Most of the leading men escaped from Pharsalus and made
576
their
THE ARISTOCRATS.
way
to
Cato at Corcyra, part of them by sea, part Here was held a conference at which over the mountains.
Scipio,
Labienus, Afranius,
present.
Cnaeus
Pompey and
was
lost.
others
were
Greece
manifestly
whereabouts were unknown ; large parts of the
recalled
fleet
Pompey's had been
by
their respective provinces.
On
the other hand,
Spain was largely favorable to Pompey. In Africa Juba was a strong centre-point; the Pompeian fleet was still larger
than Caesar's.
was one chance
left in
there There was no chance in surrender, a partisan war. But the Pompeians
It
no longer existed.
war.
was the
aristocrats
who continued
the
ffl
XXXVI.
ALEXANDRIA. AUGUST,
full.
48,
TO MARCH,
47 B. C.
C.ESAR now committed another of those foolhardy acts of which his career is He followed Pompey to Alexandria with but four thousand men, and
attempted to dictate the succession to the throne of Ptolemy, about which Cleopatra and her brother were disputing. He was resisted by an Egyptian army
of five times his force, and found himself beleaguered in Alexandria.
He had
great difficulty in holding himself.
to
He
sent for reinforcements,
and managed
keep the eastern harbor and the Pharos tower. He burned the Egyptian In a naval battle he fleet, and utilized his own fleet to great advantage.
defeated the Egyptians.
pumping sea-water
self
into the canals
These then essayed to cut off his water supply by which supplied him but Caesar saved him;
by digging
wells.
One
legion soon reached him, and
some
;
vessels
from
Rhodes.
In a second naval battle he was again successful
tured the entire island of Pharos.
island
But
in a fight
and he then capon the mole between the
Finally,
and
city Caesar
was defeated,
as also in a third naval battle.
Mithridates of Pergamos, with an
army
of relief,
came
to the Nile; Caesar
marched up the Delta, joined him, and, in a battle of considerable difficulty, decisively defeated the Egyptians, and recovered all the ground he had so nearly
lost.
But he had wasted the
better part of a year
by his
carelessness in
moving
to Alexandria with so insufficient a force.
CAESAR, in pursuit of Pompey, whom he thought to find in Ephesus, had crossed to Asia Minor. Here he heard that
Pompey had been
to Egypt.
He
and divined that he had gone had with him the Sixth legion, and the one
in Cyprus,
Calenus had been ordered to send him joined him August With these and eight hundred horse, he 8, at Rhodes.
set
out for Alexandria.
He had
The
ten ships of war from
foot
Rhodes and a few from Asia.
thirty -two
amounted
to about
hundred men; the
rest of the legionaries, "dis-
abled by wounds received in various battles, by fatigue and
578
CAESAR IN ALEXANDRIA.
the length of their march, could not follow him."
With
the
eight hundred horse he boasted a bare four thousand men.
"Relying on the fame of his exploits, he did not hesitate to set out with a feeble force, and thought he would be secure
in
any place." Reaching Alexandria about August 20, he was informed
C&SAR IN DANGER.
of the death of
579
than two months
Pompey.
This was
less
after the battle of Pharsalus.
He
anchored in the Great or
eastern harbor, and took possession of the royal palace, which
was half a
fortress, situated
near Cape Lochias, to the east of
the artificial mole which divided the old and
new
harbors,
and likewise of the
arsenal, which was close by.
Caesar
had
supposed that to the conqueror of Pompey many troops would be unnecessary, but he was speedily and rudely undeceived.
The tumult
the land
of the populace caused
made even
Caesar unsafe.
by the troubles raging in His entry into the place,
preceded by the consular fasces, had in fact almost bred a riot,
deemed such a display an infraction of their Caesar was called on to send immediately king's prerogative. to Asia Minor for more legions, which he ordered collected
as the populace
by Domitius from some of the disbanded levies of Pompey. Meanwhile Caesar found himself in a most embarrassing
The troops he had sent for might be a long time He himself had been detained by the periodreaching him. ical winds. But he was not the man to look back when his
situation.
hand had been put
to the plow.
With
the scanty means at
his disposal, he determined to hold his ground.
He
could
have at once retired before allowing a quarrel to breed. But Csesar always settled all civil questions which came under his
hand,
pan passu
with the military.
He had
undertaken to
dictate a settlement of the troubles
between young Ptolemy and Cleopatra. The late king had left his kingdom jointly to Ptolemy and Cleopatra, as king and queen, and had made
the
Roman
people executors of his will.
Caesar, as consul representing the
Roman
this ground deemed that people,
On
he had the right to order these princely claimants to plead their cause before him and to disband their armies until he
decided between them.
turbulent city, full of able men.
Alexandria was a large, independent, The population at once
580
took alarm.
EGYPTIAN IMBROGLIO.
It is possible that Caesar
might not have been able to get away had he been so inclined he had run some personal danger from the populace in landing and the Alex; ;
andrians had a large fleet, while he had next to none. Othe* motives than the Ptolemy-Cleopatra quarrel, or than the
desire to gain his point,
may have been
the prevailing ones.
CAESAR SEIZES PTOLEMY.
581
Cleopatra shortly arrived from Syria, and Caesar's mandate was at first accepted; but Ptolemy and the eunuch Pothinus,
his tutor
and regent during
his minority, soon adopted a less
peaceful policy, secretly appointed Achillas, the captain of the guards and intimate friend of the king, commander of the army at Pelusium, and ordered it to advance on Alexandria.
While the
succession was
being pleaded before
all the
Caesar, news came that the king's army and were marching on the city.
cavalry
Achillas had a motley force of eighteen to twenty thousand
foot
slaves
and two thousand horse, largely made up of freebooters, and runaways, but among these were many of Pom-
pey's disbanded legionaries.
tion
The Roman army
of occupa-
had been largely Pompeian, and easily sided against Caesar. "Caesar's forces were by no means so strong that
if
he could trust to them
outside the city.
he had occasion to hazard a battle
His only resource was
town
in the
most convenient places."
keep within the So soon as Caesar
to
learned of the approach of Achillas he caused the king to send envoys to him. On these being assassinated by Achillas without even a hearing, Caesar saw through the plot
and
seized on the persons of both
left
Ptolemy and Pothinus, who
had not
Alexandria, and held them as hostages, "both supposing that the king's name would have great influence with his subjects and to give the war the appearance of a
scheme of a few desperate men, rather than of having been begun by the king's command." Pothinus was later executed by Caesar. Achillas had five times Caesar's force, but the material of
his
army was
poor.
The
old legionaries even,
by long
Still
resi-
dence in Egypt, and
many
intermarriages with the native
women, had
las
lost all ideas of
Roman
discipline.
Achil-
was
able to take possession of the larger part of the city
582
ALEXANDRIAN LIBRARY.
section
of Alexandria, all except that small
which Caesar
as his
had occupied on
handful of
his arrival,
and which was as much
men
could defend.
The part he occupied
Caesar
at once put in
a state of defense.
He
saw that
his situation
was questionable. However illy disciplined the Egyptian army, it was formidable in more than one way, and it was
backed up by public sentiment. Achillas' first effort was to force the palace, but he was unable to do so. Caesar had occupied and barricaded all the
streets leading to
it.
At
the same time there was a desultory
and obstinate combat at the port side of the town, fought in many streets at once and along the wharves, and difficult to
Achillas attempted to get possession of the Alexandrian war -galleys in the harbor, of which there were
manage.
seventy -two, including
many
triremes and quinquiremes, but
fall into
was
foiled in his efforts.
For fear they should
the
enemy's hands, as he could not well guard the vessels, Caesar
put the torch to the entire fleet. It was in the conflagration thus begun, that the Alexandrian library perished, together with
many other
public buildings and treasures.
Had
Achillas succeeded in getting hold of the ships, he could have closed the harbor and cut Caesar off from receiving reinforce-
ments or victualing the palace. Caesar's act, however disastrous in its results, was a necessary method of protecting his
position.
The
action at this point
spirit
"Accordingly that
was fraught with grave danger. was displayed which ought to be
shown when the one party saw that a speedy victory depended on the issue, and the other their safety." Caesar held his
own, and took early occasion to occupy the Pharos tower. At that time, the Pharos was "a tower on an island, of prodigious height," claimed by a later historian to have been four hundred ells, or nearly six hundred feet, "built with
THE PHAROS.
amazing works and taking
its
583
the island.
name from
This
island, lying over against Alexandria, forms a harbor; but on the upper side it is connected with the town by a narrow
way
eight hundred paces in length,
made by
piles
sunk in
the sea, and by a bridge.
tians have houses
In
this island
and a
village as large as a
some of the Egyptown and what;
ever ships from any quarter, either through mistaking the channel or by the storm, have been driven from their course
plunder like pirates. And without the consent of those who are masters of the Pharos, no vessels can enter the harbor, on account of its narrowness.
upon the
coast, they constantly
Ca3sar being greatly alarmed
on
this account, whilst
the
enemy were engaged in battle, landed his soldiers, seized the Pharos, and placed a garrison in it. By this means he this point, that he could be supplied without danger gained
with corn and auxiliaries
countries to
;
for he sent to all the neighboring
demand
supplies."
By
holding the Pharos tower
Caesar
commanded
the entrance to the harbor, which secured
his rear.
But though Csesar had gained a footing in the harbor, he could gain nothing in the town. Here Achillas had a more
than equal holding, Caesar merely keeping what he had got, and fortifying the most necessary posts. Achillas, who,
through the inhabitants, held
to push the attack on Caesar
devise.
all
the Pharos island except
the tower, as well as the Heptastadium, or mole, continued
by whatever means he could
Caesar strongly fortified the theatre as a citadel,
and th6 adjoining wing of the royal palace, so as to command the avenues to the port and docks. Meanwhile Ptolemy's youngest daughter, Arsinoe, fled to Achillas in the camp, hoping herself to control the succesBut Achillas and she soon quarreled, which bred sion.
dissension in the native army,
much
to Caesar's advantage.
584
CAESAR'S COOLNESS.
Caesar saw that he was in a perilous case, and that he must
speedily gather
more
troops, or he could not rescue himself.
By
his utter lack of caution he
had again blundered
into a at
dilemma similar
Dyrrachium.
to the one he
had barely escaped from
But Caesar had one singular quality, a He was capable of the most reprehensible recklessness. But when, from the results
certain test of the great captain.
such conduct, he had forfeited almost every chance of success, he always rose to the occasion with a force, an intelof
ligence which
commanded
the situation.
When we
have
all
but
lost patience
with his heedlessness, Caesar compels our
admiration by his energy, his courage, his resources. He was indomitable. When another man would have considered
the question of surrender, Caesar began to exert his splendid Doubt as to evenforce, his absolute reliance on himself.
tual success never found rest in his unflinching soul.
So now.
At
the head of the
Roman
state,
he had at his
disposal the forces of the world; yet he
four thousand
men
in one of the client-cities of
was cooped up with Eome. But
Caesar was not for a moment doubtful of his ability to cope with the Egyptians. In how great soever danger he actually His demeanor was was, he gave no sign of it to his troops.
at all times calm
and
self -poised,
and no one could have read
in his countenance or actions the least doubt as to the issue of the matter.
He
sent to Rhodes, Syria and Cilicia for all
his fleet; to Crete for archers,
and
into
Arabia Petrsea, to
Malchus, king of the Nabatheans for cavalry. Domitius, from whom he expected two legions from Asia Minor, was to
send at the same time victual, material of war and military
engines.
to
Caesar called on Mithridates, king of Pergamos,
march an army by way of Syria to his aid. set to work to make ballistic machines and to
every source corn and
soldiers.
He
himself
collect
from
In Alexandria he took
ENERGY OF ALEXANDRIANS.
means
to hold himself until relief should come.
585
He
razed
many houses to the ground in order to gain elbow-room, and fortified the streets leading to the arsenal and palace, or
wherever his line seemed weak, with sheds and mantelets,
thus inclosing the entire smaller part of the town he had The walls were perforated for rams and misoccupied.
The town, being built of houses whose floors were all vaulted, without wood of any kind, was peculiarly adapted
siles.
to creating a
good scheme of defense.
The smaller part occupied by Caesar was " separated from
by a morass towards the south." This was a low and narrow piece of meadow land running north and south from the sea to Lake Mareotis, between the low hills on which
the rest
mainly situated. This lowland could be made to furnish the army both water and forage if it could be conthe city
is
trolled.
it
By
dint of pushing forward works on either side of
from his own position southerly, Caesar gradually gained a
Its possession in entirety
hold on a part of this lowland.
would
result in his being in a central position between the
two wings of the enemy.
The Alexandrians, thoroughly roused by the seizure of their young prince, were equally active in collecting troops and material of war. From every part of Egypt which they
could control, they levied troops.
They accumulated and
manufactured vast quantities of darts and engines in their part of the town, and increased their forces by a great multitude, including peasants
and
slaves.
The raw
levies they
stationed in the least dangerous parts of the inclosing line ; the veteran cohorts in the open squares. They shut up all
the avenues and passes
feet high,
and
built
by a triple wall of hewn a number of ten-story towers
equally
tall
stones forty
in the lower to
part of the town.
Some
flat
ones were
made
move
on wheels along the
Alexandrian streets by horse-power.
586
ACHILLAS AND ARSINOE
The people were very ingenious, and not only imitated the Romans in all they did, but devised many new things themThe old art of the days when Archimedes studied selves.
here was far from having died out.
They had resolved to be rid, for once and all, of the Romans, who they felt were trying to reduce Egypt to a mere province, as they had so
many
other lands.
And
their chiefs led
them
to believe that
Caesar would soon be starved into surrender, because the
stormy season prevented him from getting supplies by sea. Caesar made an attempt to conciliate the Alexandrians
through the mediation of the young king ; but the Alexandrians believed that what
dictation, arid
Ptolemy said was at Caesar's
him.
would not
listen to
now murdered by the machinations of Arsinoe, assisted by the eunuch Ganymed, her governor, whom she raised to the command of the army. Ganymed was a man
Achillas was
of fertile invention.
He
determined to cut
off Caesar's
water-
supply.
A good-sized
canal or branch from the Nile Delta
ran into the quarter of the city held by the Alexandrians,
and yielded them abundance of water, though rather thick and muddy. The supply of Caesar's part of the town was stored up in cisterns which were filled through aqueducts,
likewise leading from the Nile.
settle
The water was allowed
to
and
clarify in the cisterns.
Caesar's narrow system of
defense had cut him off from the canal and reduced him to
use the cisterns alone.
scale.
He
Ganymed went to work on a large diverted the river water from these aqueducts and
reservoirs,
by which he also cut off his own cistern supply, and was forced to rely on the canal water. But this was not
a grievous hardship. Then, by water-wheels and other he raised sea water in large quantities and poured it engines,
in a steady stream into the aqueducts leading to Caesar'3
cisterns.
By
this clever
means
all the cisterns in the
upper
A WATER FAMINE.
587
town became gradually tainted and unfit for use. The water in that part of the lower town which was occupied by Caesar
was not reached by the
unhealthful.
salt water,
but became brackish and
The impending danger occasioning a panic among
difficulty in allaying.
of a water famine
came
close to
the troops, which Caesar had some
could not safely retreat, for his small force, so soon as he left his defenses to embark, would
He
be at the mercy of the Alexandrians, whose multitude could
easily crush the retiring Caesarians.
"
Caesar labored to remove his soldiers' fears
ing and reasoning with them.
by encouragFor, he affirmed, 'that they
might easily find fresh water by digging wells, as all seacoasts naturally abounded with fresh springs that if Egypt
;
was singular
from every other soil, yet still, as the sea was open and the enemy without a fleet, there was nothing to hinder their fetching it at pleasure
in this respect
differed
and
in their ships, either
from Paraetonium on the
left,
or the
island, Pharos, on the right, and as their two voyages were in different directions, they could not be prevented by adverse winds at the same time ; that a retreat was on no account to
be thought of, not only by those who had a concern for their honor, but even by such as regarded nothing but life that it was with the utmost difficulty they could defend themselves
;
behind, their works ; but
neither in
if
number or
to
situation
they once quitted that advantage, would they be a match for the
time,
enemy; that
embark would require much
and be
attended with great danger, especially where it must be managed by little boats that the Alexandrians, on the con;
trary, were nimble and active, and thoroughly acquainted
with the streets and buildings that, moreover, when flushed with victory, they would not fail to run before, seize all the
;
advantageous posts, possess themselves of the tops of the
588
houses, and,
REINFORCEMENTS.
by annoying them
in their retreat, effectually
prevent their getting
' '
on board; that they must, therefore, think no more of retreating, but place all their hopes of
safety in victory.
The wonderful
confidence of the troops
in their leader put an end to fear. Caesar's promise was redeemed by setting all hands which could be spared to digging wells. These he knew would be an effective means, and in fact, during the very first night, the wells yielded plenty
"The mighty projects and painful good water. attempts of the Alexandrians were, with no great labor,
of fresh,
entirely frustrated."
The Thirty-seventh legion, part of Pompey's forces which had surrendered to Caesar, and were sent by Domitius Calvinus with full equipment of victuals, arms and enginery,
now
arrived off the coast from Rhodes; but adverse east
winds kept it from making the harbor. It got blown westThe ships could, however, safely ride erly from the mouth. at anchor, and the commander sent a rowing galley to notify
Caesar that they had arrived, but were in want of water.
The
winds made no great odds to the rowing galleys. The transCaesar ports, which relied upon sails, were at their mercy.
determined to go to the
it
fleet to
take proper measures to bring
land forces at their posts, He embarked, and set out unwilling to deplete the garrison. with such galleys as he had ready, in search of his transports.
left all the
into port.
He
Sending some men on shore for water, as he was cruising along the coast near Point Chersonesus, some seven leagues
west of Alexandria, these were captured, and the Alexandrians learned that Csesar was on board the squadron, and
without legionaries.
Ganymed
collected
Here was too good a chance to miss. all the available ships and sallied out
from the Eunostos or western harbor, which the Alexandrians had always held, to attack and haply capture him. Caesar
A NAVAL BATTLE.
589
other things.
would much have preferred not to fight, as he was intent on When, on his return towards Alexandria
fleet,
with his
the combat, as
he encountered the enemy, he at first declined it was towards nightfall, and the enemy knew
the coast better than he did.
He, moreover,
felt that
he
could get better work out of his
men by
daylight, and he had
no
soldiers
on
his war-galleys.
The Thirty-seventh
legion
was in the transports. He drew in towards the shore. But circumstances forced him to do battle. One Rhodian
galley rashly separated from the
several of the enemy's ships.
relief,
fleet,
and was attacked by
Caesar was forced to go to her
"that he might not suffer the disgrace of seeing one
of his galleys sunk before his eyes."
The Rhodians, always
noted for naval pluck, here outvied each other in- their galThe Alexandrians could hold no head against them. lantry.
The
by the good conduct of Euphranor, the Rhodian admiral, was complete. The enemy suffered grievCaesar would have destroyed the enemy's entire ous loss.
victory, largely
fleet
but for the approach of night.
The adverse winds hav-
ing happily abated, the transports, under convoy of Caesar's
galleys,
.
reached their moorings in the Great harbor of Alexandria without mishap. Caesar had now nearly doubled his force both on land and at sea.
At
first this
disaster to the Alexandrians appeared irremelost
diable.
They had
one hundred and ten vessels since
Caesar came to Alexandria.
They were
peculiarly disheart-
ened, because their defeat was not by soldiers but by seamen, and they prided themselves on their skill at sea. They
"retired to the tops of their houses, and blocked up the entrances of their streets as if they feared the Caesarian
fleet
might attack them on land." But this people was naturally a maritime race, and with great zeal, under the cheering words of Ganymed, they set to creating a
new navy.
690
ALEXANDRIAN PLUCK.
They saw that to blockade Caesar by sea was their only sure means of reducing him. They brought together all the old vessels which could be refitted and made seaworthy, all those
used as custom-house ships in the mouths of the Nile, and from whatever source they could gather craft, and equipped them as best they might, putting into use everything which
could float in the harbor.
To
find material for oars they
unroofed the porticoes, academies and public buildings, and
made use
of the plank thus obtained.
They expected
to
fight in the port,
where craft useless at sea would do well
fitted
out twenty -two quadriremes, five quinquiremes and a vast number of small
enough.
In a few days they had
These were manned by excellent seamen and the Caesar had but ten quadproper complement of soldiers.
craft.
riremes, five quinquiremes and, counting smaller ones with-
out decks, thirty -four
sail in all.
Of
these, nine
were the
five
Rhodian (one had been wrecked), eight from Pontus, from Lycia, twelve from Asia.
Cassar carefully
for he
made ready
for a fresh naval engagement ;
saw that the Alexandrians, unless their fleet was dispersed, might succeed in blockading him in the harbor.
He
represented to all his troops the necessity of conquering.
In case of defeat he showed them that each and every man was unquestionably lost. After due preparation, he sailed
round Pharos and drew up in line facing the enemy opposite the Eunostos harbor. The Rhodians had the right, the
Pontus galleys the
left.
Between these wings he
left
a dis-
tance of about four hundred paces for manosuvring, and
marshaled the rest of his vessels in reserve, appointing to each ship in the fighting line another in the reserve for
succor.
The Alexandrians brought up
their fleet, greatly
more numerous, with abundant
confidence.
The twenty-two
quadriremes were in front; the rest were in a second line.
A SECOND NAVAL BATTLE.
591
A vast
number of small craft accompanied the fleet. They had prepared a supply of flaming darts and combustibles on board the small craft to set Caesar's vessels on fire.
Between the
fleets lay certain
shallows through which were
<</
Secoud Naval Battle.
crooked channels.
They
are the same to-day.
Each
side
waited for the other to pass these shallows, as each deemed it The fleet to be dangerous to fight with them in their rear.
of Caesar
had been
was commanded by Euphranor the Rhodian, who so useful in the late naval contest, and who was a
man
of no little ability
and courage.
After some hesitation,
and Euphranor allowed the Rhodian galleys to lead the way through the The rest of the fleet followed hard upon. When shallows.
Caesar, at
's
suggestion, resolved to attack,
the lines
came
it
into
action,
there
was
so little space
to
became a question of bravery alone. This was an advantage for the Romans. The fight was witnessed from the housetops of Alexandria by Romans and Egyptians,
manoeuvre that
people and soldiers alike.
for existence.
The Romans were
really fighting
If they lost this battle they
shut off from the sea.
would surely be This knowledge spurred them on to
592
THE PHAROS CAPTURED.
After a long and rather
exceed even their accustomed valor.
irregular battle, the Egyptians, despite their well-earned
reputation for gallantry at sea, and their far greater
of
number
ships, were signally defeated. quinquireme and a bireme were taken with all on board, and three were sunk,
without loss of a ship to the Romans. Measured by the loss, the battle does not appear to have been as severe as
one
is
apt to infer from the wording of the Commentaries.
The
rest of the Egyptian craft were driven into their port, where they took shelter under the protection of the bowmen on the mole and ramparts.
To
deprive the
determined to
enemy of this resource in the future, Caesar make himself master of the entire island of
it
Pharos, and of the Heptastadium, which connected He already had the Pharos tower. the mainland.
so far finished his
with
He had
works in the town as to think himself
able to hold his position there, and the mole and island as
well.
He embarked
of light troops,
in small vessels ten cohorts, a chosen
and some Gallic horse especially fit for body the work, and sent them against the south side of the island, while with a few of the vessels of his fleet he attacked the
north side, promising rich rewards to those who should first make themselves masters of it. The bulk of the ships had
to
harbor.
and keep it in the western Pharos village was stout, slingers and bowmen being stationed on the tops of the houses along the shore, and it was difficult for the cohorts to land.
watch the Alexandrian
fleet
The defense
at the
coast was rocky, and every crag and inlet was defended boats and men, while five galleys patrolled the shore. by But at last a footing was secured, and the Pharians driven
to the town.
The
On
the harbor side of the island they had also
resisted the landing parties with
some success
but Caesar's
men pushed on
vigorously,
and though the town walls were
A
fairly strong
NEW
PLAN.
593
and flanked by many towers, and the legionaries
fascines, a panic
had no ladders or
itants
ensued among the inhab-
and they yielded up the town, with considerable loss in Caesar gave over the town killed and six hundred taken. to plunder, and ordered it to be razed.
There was a fort on the island next the mole.
took and garrisoned.
This Caesar
But
the fort on the mainland at the
Battle at the Mole.
south end of the mole was held by the Alexandrians. It was stronger than the other and situated in a large open place
outside the city proper.
This he
of the
felt that
he must have, for
by holding both ends
mole he would substantially
594
FIGHT ON THE MOLE.
Next day he attacked
it.
control both the harbors.
At first
by a heavy fire of missiles he drove the garrison out of the fort and towards the town and landed three cohorts to occupy
the mole
boats.
to
and intrench, leaving the
rest of his force in the
There was not room on the mole for a larger force The mole had near each end a operate to advantage.
bridge built over an arch, through which the vessels could pass to and from one harbor to the other, by which means
the Alexandrians could keep the Great port in a constant
state
of uneasiness.
Caesar threw
up a work below the up the
arch, so as to
south bridge and set the men at cut off this communication.
filling
was being done, the Alexandrians sallied out, deployed in an open space opposite the end of the bridge, and attacked the working party and force protecting it at
this
While
the bridgehead they
had made.
At
the same time they sent
the ships which they had in the west harbor alongside the mole to attack the Romans on it, and seek to set fire to the
fleet
on the other
side.
The
Caesarians held the mole
and
bridge; the Alexandrians
attacked from
the
open space
facing the bridgehead and the ships.
While
the
Caesar's affairs were thus
some additional men
rowers and mariners
working to his advantage, landed from
This diversion
Roman
galleys on the mole, unordered.
at first materially aided the enterprise, for the
men drove
off
the enemy's ships, but being after a while taken in flank
by
some enterprising Alexandrians who seized a footing on the mole from small boats, this party, not under control, made a
hurried escape to their ships. Seeing the success of this flank attack, more Alexandrians landed on the mole and took
Caesar's three cohorts at the bridge in the rear.
The
soldiers
in the galleys, seeing the Alexandrians in force on the mole,
and fearful that they might board the
galleys,
withdrew the
BETWEEN TWO
ladders and put off from shore.
their rear of necessity produced
FIRES.
595
in
The unusual commotion
among
the three cohorts at
the bridge a flurry of which the Alexandrians were not slow
to take
Cassar's
advantage; and
pushing in heartily they forced
men back in marked disorder. They now had Caesar and his small force between two
fires,
and though Caesar himself was with them, the old spirit of panic came up. Perceiving that the ships were shoving off
from the mole, and fearing that they would be
fate, the cohorts began to fall back.
flight,
left to their
Eetreat soon became
each
man
for such galleys as were
into
Some made endeavoring to reach a vessel. still alongside the mole and crowded
numbers
as to sink them.
them
in such at
Some swam
out
to the galleys
shields.
fleet.
Some
anchor, buoying themselves upon their cast away their arms and swam out to the
Caesar did his best to hold them in hand, but their
demoralization was as complete as at Dyrrachium.
He
qui
could
pent.
not arrest
the panic.
It
was another
sauve
Reaching his own galley, he found that so many had crowded aboard her that she could not be got off the shore, and afterwards in
effect she
went down with
all
on board.
Caesar was
life
himself obliged to dive from the mole and swim for his
out into the harbor to another ship.
It
was
this occasion
on
which he
with one hand, holding aloft a manuscript in the other lest he should lose it. Reacha galley, he sent small boats to the rescue of those who ing
is
said to have
swum
were floating in the water. mole more were drowned.
;
Many
In
as
all
were cut to pieces on the the loss was four hundred
the great
of sailors
legionaries, twice as
victory of
perished.
bit the dust at many Pharsalus. More than that number
had
This was the usual fate of the defeated in ancient
times, whether in a
combat or a pitched battle. This victory enabled the Alexandrians to retake and thenceforth to hold
696
SERIOUS DEFEAT.
the fort at the south end of the mole, the defenses of which
they
made
it
too
assault.
They
strong with enginery and works to again then reopened the bridge so as to have access
through
to the east harbor.
The Roman soldiers appear to have been more ashamed than disheartened by this untoward defeat and anxious to wipe out their disgrace. They became so bent on fighting
they assaulted on every possible occasion by sallies and cut off whenever they ventured beyond their works, that Caesar was compelled to restrain
the Alexandrians, rather than encourage them.
whom
For
this quality of quick re-
covery from the demoralization of a defeat, Caesar's legionaries were always distinguished. They had shown it markedly before Dyrrachium.
spirit of Caesar.
They had caught the recuperative
which enables troops to recover their equipoise after a repulse, no soldier has ever equaled
elasticity
In the peculiar
the
American volunteer.
All veterans of our
after being driven
civil
war
will
remember occasions where,
position or an assault, in a
back from a
Border
apparently
fatal, the line,
having reached shelter, would of its own accord recover, and in a few minutes be ready to renew the charge or retake the Nor was position, in better spirits than before the repulse.
this so
much due
to the efforts of the officers as to the natural
character of the men.
legionaries.
So, in a lesser degree, with Caesar's
speedily
They did get demoralized; but they
recovered their tone.
Seeing, then, that defeat neither weakened the enemy nor him off his guard, some of the Alexandrians
success threw
sent a secret deputation to Caesar to ask that their
young king
be restored to them, for they were weary at the government of a woman and the tyrant Ganymed, promising that if they could have Ptolemy back they would shortly place them-
PTOLEMY RELEASED.
selves in a position to
597
make terms with
Caesar.
To
this they
solemnly bound themselves.
Caesar had
if
little
faith in these promises, but thought that
the king were returned to the Alexandrians these would
less well led
than they now were by Ganymed, He could not see in what in case they continued the war. manner he profited by Ptolemy's retention. Moreover, he
probably be
had
fully espoused the cause of Cleopatra,
and with the young
king well off his hands, he could the better place her in authority when he should have reduced the Egyptians to
reason,
do.
as he never for a
moment doubted
that he could
Many
thought that Caesar had been overreached in these
negotiations, but he probably
clean-cut purpose.
young king left But no sooner had he returned friendly.
saw through the matter with gave Ptolemy his freedom, and the him with tears and vows to be grateful and
He
to his people than
he in reality became more bitter than any one of the Alexandrian chiefs. As the courage of the Alexandrians was by
no means raised by the recovery of their king, nor that of the Romans lowered, the surrender bore no part in the events
which ensued.
The Alexandrians heard about
this time a true
rumor
of
an army marching overland to Caesar's assistance, and a false rumor that a convoy of troops and victuals was on its
way to him by sea. They ordered their
ments.
to fall
They took
steps to intercept the latter.
fleet to cruise
it
before the Canopic branch
of the Nile, where they thought
could best watch
its
move-
Hearing of their expedition, Caesar sent out
the Egyptian squadron, placing Tiberius
his fleet
Nero in upon command. Aboard the Rhodian galleys, which were with the fleet, was also Euphranor, who had rendered such exceptional
services in the last naval battles.
But fortune was unkind.
coming into each other's
In an action ensuing upon the
fleets
598
vicinity,
MITHRIDATES ARRIVES.
Euphranor behaved with conspicuous gallantry and own vessel to advantage; but for some reason
handled his
not clearly set forth, he was not efficiently aided by the rest He was surrounded by the Alexandrian vessels of the fleet.
and went down with
his galley.
The
action
had no
partic-
ular result in affecting the war.
In January, 47, after Caesar had for four months been carrying on this luckless war, which had been thrust upon
him against
his will,
but as a result
of his
carelessness,
Mithridates of Pergamos arrived across the desert from Syria with reinforcements for the Romans. This man, who had
taken his name from Mithridates, king of Pontus, whose son he claimed to be, had warmly embraced Caesar's cause in the
War, and enjoyed the raised his army in Syria and
Civil
consul's confidence.
Cilicia.
He
had
Among
the soldiers
was a large body of Jews under Antipater. Mithridates began his campaign by assaulting and capturing Pelusium,
where the Alexandrians had a small
force,
and leaving a
garrison there, marched up the right bank of the Pelusian Branch towards Memphis, which was the nearest point where
he could to advantage cross the Nile on his way to Alexandria, conciliating the regions he traversed, and gaining their
allegiance to Caesar
"by
that authority which always accom-
panies a conqueror." He soon approached the head of the Delta. King Ptolemy, on learning of his coming, dispatched a force from Alexandria, partly by boats up the Nile, partly
up the
left
bank, to check Mithridates, whose advent threat-
ened to transfer the balance of power into Caesar's hands. This force crossed to the right bank, fell upon Mithridates
in his camp, which he had fortified according to the Roman method, some thirty miles below Memphis. After repulsing them, Mithridates sallied out and inflicted on them a crush-
ing defeat.
But
for their knowledge of the country and their
CAESAR JOINS HIM.
vessels,
599
Mithridates was then none would have escaped. enabled to get word to Caesar of what had happened. This
was near the end of January Caesar and Ptolemy, on receipt of
.
this news,
both
set out,
Caesar to aid, Ptolemy to
destroy, the
new
arrival.
Mithridates,
meanwhile,
marched to the head of the
Delta
Nile.
his
and
crossed
the
The king had sent fleet up the Nile with
bulk
of
his
the
army.
well
Caesar
could
not
march that way.
Leaving a suitable garrison in his works at Alexandria, his
fleet
conveyed him along
shore
to
the
the west,
where, disembarking at a convenient place on the
coast,
he marched around
the south of
tis,
Lake Mareoand
across the desert,
joined Mithridates. on the
fourth day, before the king could attack him, or was,
indeed, aware of Caesar's
Battle of the Nile (Terrain).
whereabouts.
How considerable
an army he now commanded
protected by the Nile on
we cannot
tell.
Ptolemy had encamped on a one side, by a morass on the
third.
this
hill
other,
and steep access on a
Such a place is found near modern Alcam. Between camp and the road upon which Caesar was marching was
600
CAESAR
MARCHES ON PTOLEMY.
"a narrow river with very steep banks," probably one of the numerous canals into which the Nile channel is constantly To this river, seven miles from his camp, Ptoloverflowing.
emy
sent his cavalry
and some choice
light infantry to oppose
Caesar's crossing and annoy him from the opposite bank. This force "maintained an unequal fight from the banks,
where courage had no chance to exert itself and cowardice ran no risk." Caesar found it an annoying undertaking to cross in the face of these troops, but he speedily sent some
German
cavalry upstream to
make
their
way by swimming
and the
trees across the
to the other shore and to take the
legionaries, at the
enemy
in reverse,
same time,
felled
some
stream and forced the passage. The enemy's cavalry fled in The light confusion, but were overtaken and mostly killed.
troops were cut to pieces.
Caesar followed them up and at
assault their
first
camp, as they seemed too
blush thought he might much demoralized to
it
defend
it
stanchly; but on arrival he found
so strongly
intrenched, and the troops so alert, that he declined to risk the operation for the moment. He camped. There was a
village
and
fort near
by communicating with Ptolemy's camp
Caesar next day
by a
line of works.
made a demonstration
here and forced an entrance to the village. In the confusion in the Alexandrian camp from this unexpected resulting
mano3uvre, he ordered a general assault upon the latter. The camp had but two approaches, one in front from the
plain
and a narrower one facing the Nile. The former was held in great force, as it was here the attack approach
was anticipated the latter was exposed to darts from the hill and from the ships in the river, on which the Alexandrians
;
had stationed a large number of bowmen and slingers. When the troops made no headway, despite their utmost
ardor, Caesar, noticing that that side of the
camp which had
ATTACKS HIS CAMP.
rugged sides
the
the southerly one
all
601
"for
was
illy protected,
crowded to the other attacks, partly to have a share in the action, partly to be spectators of the
enemy had
issue," ordered a select force
under Carfulenus, a soldier of
Battle of the NUe.
and experience, to scale the rocks in that place, where an attack would be apt to fall on the defenders quite unpreability
pared.
With
the greatest effort the
men were
able to
it
make
the ascent at
all,
but they succeeded in doing
in secrecy.
Taking the Alexandrian
camp
in reverse, they produced a
602
MARCH ON ALEXANDRIA.
panic that enabled the legionaries who were delivering the front attack to succeed beyond expectation. The enemy
fled in
marked
disorder,
and
in rushing over the ramparts
towards the river, where they hoped to escape to their fleet, the trench was filled by men who fell and were trampled to
death.
There was fearful slaughter of the fugitives before
they reached the river, and in the attempted escape to their ships a yet greater number perished by drowning. Among
these
stricken
was the king, whose ship was loaded down by men and sunk.
sooner,
terror-
No
was
the battle over than
Caesar advanced
straight overland with his cavalry to Alexandria.
Here the
garrison and inhabitants, on hearing of the king's defeat, opened the gates of that part of the city which they had
and humbly sued for pardon. Caesar placed the younger son and Cleopatra on the throne, as Ptolemy the late king had by will requested should be done, banishing
held
Arsinoe.
sary,
After remaining two months longer than neces-
held, according to many ancient authors, by the blandishments of Cleopatra, Caesar departed by sea for He left the two legions which Syria with the Sixth legion.
had been with him, and a third one from Syria, under Rufio,
to sustain the
new government
of Egypt, for the
young mon-
archs were unfavorably regarded by the people.
The Alexandrian war
five
lasted six months. During the first months Caesar had been forced to hold himself on the
defensive.
offensive-defensive
This method he had largely transformed into by his activity at sea. In the sixth
month, on the arrival of reinforcements, he had assumed the He offensive and ended the war by the battle of the Nile.
had
not,
the toils
on leaving for Egypt, anticipated being caught in of a war but from its inception he had foreseen
;
that, with his mere handful of men, he would be cooped up
THE ALEXANDRIAN CAMPAIGN.
until lie could receive reinforcements.
first to
603
his plans
He made
defend himself and then to carry on such accordingly, would forestall the offensive of the Alexanan offensive as
drians.
As
six
usual, he
himself was the moving spring of
action of both parties.
months thus spent, owing to Caesar's lack of and the two additional months given perhaps to caution, Cleopatra, perhaps to political demands we do not know,
afforded the
The
Pompeian party a breathing
spell,
and the
opportunity of taking firm root in Africa.
This necessitated
two additional campaigns, one in Africa and one in Spain.
Had
Pharsalus, turned sharply upon Pompey's adherents; or had he taken four or five as he should have done in any event legions with him
Caesar,
immediately after
to Alexandria;
or had he for the
question of the rule of
moment put aside the a temporizing policy and Egypt by
turned to the more important questions pressing upon him, he would have saved himself much future trouble.
The
force he carried with
him was
so inadequate
as to
savor of foolhardiness.
By
crass
good fortune alone was he
It
able to seize the citadel and arsenal, and the tower on the
Pharos, and save himself from utter ruin.
after he
was a month
army came from Pelusium and sat down before Alexandria. His own first reinforcements reached him shortly after. There seems to
arrived
before the
Egyptian
be nothing marvelous about the campaign, says Napoleon. And in view of the two months of unworthy dalliance, after
the long and uncalled-for campaign had been ended, and other
campaigns had become imperatively necessary, Egypt might well have become, but for Caesar's wonderful good fortune,
the very grave of his reputation.
XXXVII.
VENI, VIDI, VICI.
MAY AND
JUNE, 47
B. C.
PHAHNACES, king of Bosphorus, taking advantage of the civil broils of Rome, had seized territory not his own. Caesar's lieutenant had advanced against him and been defeated. Caesar sailed from Egypt with a mere handful of
men
along the coast of Syria and through Cilicia to Pontus.
With such
all
troops as he collected on the way, he
had but a few
cohorts, of
which
but
one thousand
men were raw
But
Caesar's
levies.
With
this corporal's
guard he
set out to
subdue the
unnecessary.
rebel,
another of his foolhardy operations, doubly
so,
because
luck did not desert him.
In the battle of Zela, at
great risk and with splendid courage, he snatched a victory and settled the
Pontus question. Once on the ground, it had taken but four days. When he reached Rome, he found matters in Italy in much confusion. He suppressed a
mutiny of the
chiefs
legions,
sonable in their demands.
who, deeming themselves the masters, had become unreaHe was then called to Africa, where the Pompeian
full sway.
had rendezvoused, and, owing to the defeat of Curio, had There was here a gigantic problem to solve.
PHARNACES, son of the great Mithridates, king of Pontus, had some years before risen against and made war upon his
father,
and on surrendering himself to Pompey had been
of Bosphorus.
made king
On the
outbreak of the Civil War,
Pharnaces deemed the occasion suitable for acquiring further dominion, and had taken to threatening Armenia and Cappadocia.
He had
already
made
considerable headway with
his conquests,
which he became
when Pompey was defeated at Pharsalus, on still more hardy, and laid his hands on Deiotarus, king of Armenia everything within his reach.
and tetrarch of Galatia, and Ariobarzanes, king of Cappadocia, appealed for help to Domitius Calvinus, whom, from Epirus, Caesar had sent to Asia, after the great victory.
PHARNACES.
605
Domitius, who had detached two of his three legions to Ca3sar and was correspondingly weakened, sent a deputation to
Pharnaces, commanding him to withdraw from Armenia and Cappadocia; and, knowing full well that the command alone
Asia Minor.
would be
arms.
ineffectual,
He
in
he at once backed up the embassy by rendezvoused, the end of October, 48 B. c., at
Comana
Pontus, with the Thirty-sixth legion and two others which Deiotarus had drilled in the Roman fashion ; he
sent P. Sextus to C. Plaetorius, the qua3stor, for a legion
which had been raised in Pontus, and Quinctius Particius in quest of auxiliaries in Cilicia. He had but two hundred
606
horse.
A NEAT RUSE.
To Domitius' message Pharnaces returned answer
Armenia
and that he would submit
to Caesar's
that he had quitted Cappadocia, but that he claimed
as his inheritance;
decision
when he should personally arrive.
credit to these protestations.
He
Domitius gave no saw that Pharnaces had
forces
merely vacated Cappadocia the better to concentrate his on ground in Armenia, which was more easily defended.
He
sent the monarch word that he would wait only when matters were put on their old status, and at once marched on Armenia. This was in the winter of B. c. 48-47.
The route lay along the very rugged mountain chain which from Comana runs east and west, parallel to and south of the river Lycus, and is a spur of Anti-Taurus. Domitius chose
because he would be less apt to be surprised on the road and could the more readily victual from Cappathis route
Pharnaces sought to conciliate him by various flattering and costly presents, but Domitius kept on his way and in due time reached a point west of Nicopolis, in Lesser
docia.
Armenia, and camped seven miles from the town. lay in a plain flanked by mountains.
defile.
Nicopolis
Between the Roman camp and Nicopolis lay a dangerous Here Pharnaces placed his cavalry and best foot in
ambush, but kept the flocks and herds in sight, so that if Domitius "entered the defile as a friend, he might have no
suspicion of an ambuscade," "or
if
he should come as an
ranks to pillage,
"
enemy, that the soldiers,
quitting their
a neat ruse quite in might be cut to pieces when dispersed the style of Hannibal. Meanwhile he sent repeated messenDomitius kept to gers to Domitius to allay his suspicions. his camp, fancying that negotiations might avail, and Pharnaces' clever design to entrap
In a few days Domitius advanced on Nicopolis and intrenched a camp near by. Pharnaces drew up his army in line in front of the camp,
failed.
him
FIELD INTRENCHMENTS.
"
forming his front into one
line,
607
according to the custom of the country, and securing his wings with a triple body of No reserves," rather a curious order of battle for that day.
action supervened.
Rumors now
arrived from Alexandria that Caesar was in a
PHARNACE.S
Battle of Nicopolis.
strait
and had recalled Domitius
via Syria to Egypt.
move
to his aid, ordering him to Pharnaces, who had learned the
news from captured
couriers, thought to embarrass
Domitius
by deferring
as Caesar.
battle, for delay
would compromise him as well
He
intrenched his position near the town with
feet deep,
two ditches four
and between them daily drew up
his foot in one long
phalanx sustained by three bodies of reserves, with his cavalry on his flanks beyond the ditches, where they could charge to advantage. This was a clever
defensive scheme and lacked not originality. Domitius, more concerned for Caesar than for himself, felt
that he could not retreat without forcing and winning a battle
against Pharnaces, equally as a measure of reputation and
608
security.
DOMITIUS DEFEATED.
accordingly drew up in front of his camp. Thirty-sixth legion was posted on the right, that of
left
He
The
Pontus on the
deep order in the centre. His front was narrow and his wings were protected with the
in
and Deiotarus
cavalry and the cohorts not belonging to the legions named. Battle engaged. The Thirty-sixth seems to have been a fine
body of men.
Rushing upon
the
demolished Pharnaces' cavalry,
as Caesar's fourth line
enemy, they entirely had
done Pompey's at Pharsalus, and drove it back to the walls of the town then, turning, struck the foot in the very
;
rear.
The Pontus
legion,
on the
left,
was
of
no such
stuff.
Its first line quickly
gave way, and the second
circuit
to
its
support and making a
first
was, though at
line, advancing around the enemy's flank, successful, finally overwhelmed by the
multitude of darts.
spectable resistance.
Deiotarus' legions offered scarcely a re-
Pharnaces' victorious right wing then swung round on the flank of the Thirty-sixth. Thus abandoned, this gallant body, undismayed, drew up in a circle,
and, though with great loss, successfully retired from the field and retreated to the slope of a neighboring mountain, where
Pharnaces, abashed by
It
its
firm aspect, did not
fifty killed
see
fit
to
and many pursue. Roman knights. The legion of Pontus was cut off and for the most part destroyed, as well as the bulk of the men of had
lost
two hundred and
Deiotarus.
Amid
great hardships, Domitius retreated to
the difference between stanch and poor
Roman
In
Asia.
this battle,
troops was
made apparent.
Pharnaces, expecting that Caesar
would
be destroyed in Egypt,
now marched
into Pontus, in-
flicted cruelties
on the Romans and leading Pontic
in his
and mutilations of the most galling atrocity citizens, and reestablished
the ancient limits of his father's kingdom.
at Pharsalus
own name
defeat of
The
Pompey
by no means broke up
TROUBLE IN ILLYRICUM.
the combinations of the
aristocrats.
609
While
Cffisar
or rather of the Pompeian party, was still working out the Egyptian
problem in Alexandria, the
fatal check in Illyricuin.
Roman arms
all
but received a
Q. Cornuficius, with two legions,
strongly and
had established
himself
prudently in that
region, where hordes of runaways from the beaten army at Gabinius was sent from Italy Pharsalus threatened trouble.
by Caesar to join him with two additional legions, newly raised. But Gabinius, undertaking an ill-advised winter campaign, was so harassed by the small- war of the Illyrian
Illyricum.
auxiliaries of
defeated with a loss of two thousand
Pompey, that he was brought to battle and men and many officers,
to Salona with the in while Octavius,
and was happy to make good his retreat relics of an army. Here he was shut
Pompey's
lieutenant, overran half Illyricum.
The
situation
610
CAESAR
MOVES TO PONTUS.
collected boats,
was, however, retrieved by the vigor of Vatinius, then at
Brundisium.
This
officer
made
his way,
despite the fleet of Octavius, to Illyricum with a small force of convalescent veterans from the hospitals, and obliged
Octavius to raise the siege of Epidaurus.
Isle of Tauris,
inflicted
Then, near the
though much weaker in numbers and vessels, a very on his opponent a stinging naval defeat, noteworthy act, as he had only a few hastily fitted merchantmen to oppose to Octavius' war-vessels. Thus having
he
cleared the coast, Octavius retiring with a few vessels to
Greece and thence to Africa,
province to Cornuficius
Vatinius
turned over the
Illyr-
and returned
to Brundisium.
icum was saved to Caesar.
Alexandria, as already stated, Caesar had taken ship He arrived at Antioch May 23. Here was not to Syria.
From
sundry political disputes and encourage the states in their dependence on the democratic on himself. He paused only when he must, i. e. party,
to
much
do except to
settle
for his presence
the affairs in
Rome demanded
was not only urgently needed in Pontus, but his coming; and he must
dispose of the Pontus question before he could return to the Leaving Sextus Caesar in command of the legions capital.
in Syria, he sailed to Cilicia
on the
fleet
he had brought
from Egypt.
Summoning
for
the states to meet
him
at Tarsus,
he transacted the necessary business of the province
started at once
and
Pontus, via Mazaca in Cappadocia. aside to Cappadocian Comana, he appointed a new Turning
priest for the temple of Bellona,
pardoned and received again
into favor Deiotarus, of
Pompey. Caesar and the two legions he had drilled in the Roman manner, but which had behaved with so little courage at
his cavalry
who had been seduced to join the cause required him to join the army with all
Nicopolis.
The
relics of these
had been
collected
and again
POOR PREPARATION.
recruited
this
611
up
to standard.
With
the Sixth and Thirty-sixth,
made a
force of four legions,
two thirds of question-
able stuff.
Of
Caesar's few
men
been reduced to one thousand
paigns, were veterans.
only the Sixth legion, which had men by the drain of its cam-
Pharnaces, nevertheless, fearing a
terrible retribution, at once sent in his submission
and begged
hard for forgiveness.
This Csesar
granted upon certain
But Pharnaces, promises of good behavior and restitution. that Caesar must soon leave for Rome, felt that he foreseeing
could afford to be slack in his performance, for he intended
none of his promises. Caesar, well understanding his treachery, determined summarily to punish him, despite
to keep
the fact that he had only the one thousand reliable
men
of
the Sixth legion as a leaven to a small force of other troops
to oppose to Pharnaces'
considerable numbers.
This was
quite in Caesar's style
tion.
it
it
accords well with his bold disposi-
he had anything to do he felt that he could do with the means at hand, a marked characteristic of the
When
great captain.
When
the able leader can readily concentrate
When he has but a larger numbers, he prudently does so. limited force and work which must be done, he supplements his numerical weakness by his moral intelligence and strength
instead of waiting for impossible reinforcements.
But Caesar
so illy
is
was much
equipped. blamable.
at fault in entering into this
campaign
It was not necessary, and to this extent he
No
feature in his life
is
more peculiar than
this
habit of insufficient preparation.
north of the town of Zela.
father, Mithridates,
Pharnaces lay encamped in a strong position, some miles Here was the field on which his
of Lucullus.
Zela,
had vanquished Triarius, the lieutenant fifty miles westerly of Comana, was a
artificial strength, in
town of great natural and
a plain
among
612
THE PROBLEM ATTACKED.
the mountains, but with walls built
upon a natural eminence. Ca3sar approached, and camping, June 11, five miles from Pharnaces, and south of
Zela,
reconnoitred
the
ground. that near the height fortified by Pharnaces was a hill
it by a steep and very suitable ravine, He was imfor defense.
He
ascertained
separated from
pressed by its natural tactical advantages, as well as
felt
that
its
possession
would yield him a certain moral advantage over Pharnaces; for the latter's father,
Mithridates,
battle
in
his
victorious
against
this lat-
Triarius,
had held
ter hill; but Pharnaces
had
neglected to occupy it. Ca3sar caused quietly
everything to be prepared /
for
quickly intrenching
\%
Theatre of Zela.
camp, and then by a night march passed over the Zela
plain and, approaching the
debouches on the other
side, seized the height in question,
unknown
to Pharnaces.
The material was
by
speedily carried
over to the
new
location
the camp-followers, while the
legionaries to a
man worked on
the fortifications.
Caesar's
idea was probably to prepare a thoroughly strong camp, from which as usual he could develop his plans and seek to wrest
PHARNACES ASSAULTS.
613
an advantage from the enemy. Pharnaces, seeing the noncombatants carrying material, thought it was the legionaries who were thus engaged, and deemed the occasion good
enemy. Secure in his preponderating strength, and anxious to attack before Caesar could complete his intrenchinents, he drew
to surprise the
up
and advanced down his own slope and up the one on which Caesar was at work, expecting to overwhelm
in four lines
He felt him, though the position was strong (June 12). that the fortune of his father would run in his favor; he remembered
his
in his sacrifices.
At
first
and he had had good omens was a foolhardy one. Caesar declined to believe that the attack was
late victory,
Still the act
own
a mere threat to interrupt his intrenching, and made the very natural mistake of only
intended.
He
considered
it
The Romans were almost unpreordering out his first line. pared when the shock came. They had really allowed themselves to be surprised.
The enemy's scythed chariots opened the action, but their advance was partially arrested by a heavy fire of darts. Caesar's new troops were much alarmed at the suddenness of
the attack, and threatened to
naces' infantry line soon closed in.
become unmanageable. PharThe men came on with
if
the utmost impetuosity, shouting their war-cry, as
victory
was already secure. The impact was legion, on the right, stood like a stone
recoiled
severe.
wall,
The Sixth
and the enemy
first line
from
it
but in the centre the shock of the chariots
Caesar's
had immediately broken through
followed up
and,
by
the infantry, the rush placed the
it
the gravest danger;
required all Caesar's
Romans in presence of mind
and
to
skill to
keep the troops on the left flank at work, and
After a long and obstinate contest, the discipline of the Sixth legion though
fill
the gap thus
made
in the centre.
614
PHARNACES' DEFEAT.
but one thousand strong prevailed over all odds; these brave men clung to their ground with a tenacity beyond words to praise, and by their example held the rest of the
line to its work.
Pharnaces, despite the splendid energy of
*t
i
^CSI^^v ^Ov. \ ^^
^r--,
<s/
a
Battle of Zela.
his cohorts, could
no longer maintain his ground, and was
driven
down
the hill with great slaughter.
The
steadiness of
this mere apology for a legion shows what a handful of good men may accomplish in the face of almost certain disaster. The
Roman
its
troops pursued the
enemy
to the camp, which, despite
Pharnaces strong location, they captured out of hand. His army was annihiescaped with a small troop of horse. to plunder and the lated. the Caesar
gave
enemy's camp up
it.
men found
considerable spoil in
The
defeat was complete.
CAESAR'S JOURNEYS.
615
later,
The king's army was
Pharnaces
quite broken up.
Some months
rule.
lost his life in battle against his brother-in-law,
Asander, who had risen in opposition to his
Having thus by the intervention of rare good fortune put
an end to what promised to breed serious complications, Csesar left two legions under Cselius to guard Pontus sent the Sixth legion to Rome as a reward for its distinguished
;
services; disbanded the cohorts of Deiotarus,
and started the
day after the battle with a cavalry escort for Rome. He paused only so long on the way as was essential to leave
matters well settled in the several states through which he passed. Among other executive acts, he appointed Mithridates,
who had served him
so well in Egypt, king of Bos-
phorus and tetrarch of Gallograecia/practically investing him with the dignities of Pharnaces.
It
in a letter to his friend
was with reference to the Pontus campaign that Ca3sar, Amantius in Rome, made use of the
"
Fern, vidi, vicif"
words,
he, "these are the enemies, for overcoming surnamed The Great! "
"Happy Pompey I" exclaimed whom thou wast
In going
Csesar always
made
great speed in his journeys.
haste,
from Italy to Gaul and back, when in
he had the habit
of traveling in a chariot or litter, and, alternating with rid-
ing or walking, moved day and night at the average speed of four miles an hour, or one hundred miles a day. Probably
he did the same thing elsewhere. In the East he could get No doubt litter-bearers were then, over still more ground.
as now, good travelers.
Athens (July
18),
His route was via Nicea (June 30), Tarentum (July 30), and Brundisium
arrived in Rome August 11, much sooner (August 2). than he was expected. It was nearly two years since Caesar had been in Rome
He
when he again trod
the sacred
soil.
It
was time he should
616
return.
tor,
MUTINY.
The Senate was
his tool.
He had been made
dicta-
and Antony was
his magister equitum, so that the latter
during his absence had exercised full sway. But Antony, though officially a good servant, had subjected himself to grave reproach for many breaches of decorum, legal, social
and there was widespread discontent. The legions which had fought in Gaul and Greece had not been To be sure they had all agreed to trust Caesar for paid.
and
political,
end of the war, but there was no doubt cause for complaint. The Second legion refused to
their largesses until the
march
to Sicily; others followed its example.
Caesar arrived
in the midst of all this tumult. to settle the difficulties.
He
at once took measures his presence sufficed to
For a time
still
restore quiet, but shortly a
graver trouble broke forth.
The
legions which were stationed near
officers,
Rome
mutinied, mur-
dered a number of their them, seized their eagles
who had
tried to appease
and marched on Rome.
They had
conceived the notion that Caesar could not continue in power without them that they really were the fountain of author;
perhaps they flattered themselves that they could gain greater rewards and more speedy payment by their threats.
ity ;
The
old legions which
had placed Caesar on the pinnacle of
fame and power
the earth.
they were, in a fashion, masters of Under Caesar's sole charge they were tractable
felt that
and ready; under his lieutenants they had grown self-opinionTheir officers grew to fear them, and ated and overbearing.
acts of violence even
against these
had become common.
The luxury
their
Campania had done them more injury than all campaigns, more than Livy alleges that sensuous Capua
of
did to Hannibal's veterans.
Grave danger was imminent.
A spark might light the fire in
diers
this body of combustible soland inaugurate a reign of terror. Ca3sar, on learning of their approach, caused the gates of
CAESAR PUTS IT DOWN.
617
the city to be shut upon them and guarded by some cohorts Antony had at hand ; but when the legionaries asked leave to
assemble on Mars'
field
they were allowed to enter without
helmets, breastplates or shields, but wearing each his sword.
Disregarding the advice of his friends and scorning personal danger, Caesar at once went out to them, and, facing the turbulent, seething mass, asked their leaders sternly what
it
was
they desired.
"We
are covered with wounds," cried they,
the world, and
"we have been long enough dragged about
have " I
spilt sufficient of
it
our blood.
We
ask our discharge."
give
you," replied Caesar, with chilly deliberateness.
He then
added that in a few weeks he was going on a new campaign, that he would defeat the enemy with new legions,
and that when he returned and triumphed with a new army, they, the old ones, should have the presents which had been
beside.
promised them "on his triumph," and unpromised land Expecting nothing less than that they would actu-
ally be discharged,
and thus
forfeit participation in the glo-
ries of Caesar's triumph,
the one thing to which every Ro-
and awed by the cold commander, the legionaries at once showed signs of weakening. As Caesar was about to go, the legates begged him to say a few kind words to his veterans,
looked cravingly forward,
man soldier
demeanor
of their great
who had shared
to
so
many dangers
with him.
Caesar turned
as "Citizens!
them again, and
quietly addressed
them
"
!
"
(quirites) instead, as usual, as
"Comrades
(commilitones).
"We
"
we
are not citizens," they exclaimed, interrupting Caesar, are soldiers !" Their ancient devotion to the splendid
chieftain
who had
so often led
them
to victory
came welling
soldiers
up
the cutting
of
all,
word of
quirites, to
them who were
first
and who had
republic, in
lost all pride in
being burgesses of
the
Roman
an instant changed the current of
their purpose.
A single word had conquered them whom arms
618
RINGLEADERS PUNISHED.
could not; Caesar's indifference was their punishment. They could not bear that he should go forth to war with other troops.
forgiveness and permission to continue in service and to accompany him whithersoever he might go. Caesar, it is said, forgave all but the
They crowded round him, and begged
whose mutiny he could not All the ringleaders had a third docked from their condone. and he threatened to muster out the Tenth. But largesses,
Tenth
legion, his old favorite,
later the
Tenth followed him
Still
to Africa,
and there did
its ser-
one sees in after days that it was no more the Old Tenth of the times of the Gallic War.
vice as of yore.
mutiny do not strike one as being so dramatic as Arrian's story of Alexander's suppression of the mutiny of his Macedonians, which But as both are threatened to be of even graver danger.
of the suppression of
this
The accounts
but embellished
scarcely be
statements of
an actual
fact,
they can
And
each case was characteristic.
compared as a measure of the men themselves. It was certainly a great
man to appear before and control scores of thousands by the mere force of his disdain and his iron will.
role for one
Triumphal Car.
XXXVIII.
RUSPINA.
commanded
OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER,
the resources of the world
;
47 B. C.
yet he entered on the Afri-
can campaign with his usual reckless disregard of suitable means.
peians had assembled their forces in Africa, had accumulated a huge
The Pomarmy and
had been joined by King Juba as ally. Caesar got together and set sail for Africa without giving his fleet any place
storm dispersed his
his legions in Sicily
as rendezvous.
vessels, and he landed on the coast at Rnspina with bat three thousand men, the rest having been blown he knew not whither. For
weeks he lay on the seashore awaiting the rest of hebetude of his enemies, in a state of greatest peril.
negligence,
his forces, and, but for the
Despite this blameworthy
we
are forced to admire the remarkable
manner
in
which he im-
posed on his enemies and saved himself harmless from attack. From his camp near Rnspina he sent in all directions for victual and troops, and by and by with Caesar's own luck the scattered fleet turned up, and ended the suspense.
A battle shortly supervened, in which Caesar
peril
ably rescued himself from
coming from too distant an advance inconsiderately undertaken. Scipio soon after came up with the bulk of the Pompeian forces. More serious a grave
work then supervened.
AT
this time the northern part of the
African continent,
which alone was known to the Romans, was divided into Mauretania (Morocco), Numidia (Algiers), Gaetulia (the Great Desert) and so-called "Africa" (Tunis). Libya was
sometimes used as a name for
all Africa,
Egypt and Ethiopia.
Utica.
ents.
"Africa" was now a Roman province, ruled by a praetor in The country was in the hands of Pompey's adher-
The sovereign
of Numidia,
King Juba, was committed
to the interests of the
Pompeian party and held a large place
in its councils.
Because Pompey was dead there was no reason why his
followers should not assert the rights which he
had repre-
620
sented.
ARISTOCRATS IN AFRICA.
Whatever
coalition of
their dissensions
were a unit in opposing Caesar.
among themselves, they The chiefs of the party,
Pompeians, had
lost in strength they
now a
aristocrats rather than
severally fled to Africa.
What
they had
gained in fanaticism. They could expect to make no terms with Caesar. After Pharsalus, Metellus Scipio had collected
North Africa.
Pompeian army and shipped them to Africa and Cato, Labienus, Cnaeus and Sextus Pompey, Afranius, In Petreius, Octavius and others had joined him there.
the relics of the
;
Leptis, which they reached after great privations, these
Pom-
peians spent the winter. his quarters in Utica.
Cato became praetor and took up
unwisely declined the command in chief, luckily for Caesar ; for though Cato was not a soldier, he was a man of exceptional strength. Scipio was made com-
He
mander of the armies. A new senate of "three hundred" was elected and convened. Juba was independent, but lent
SCIPIO'S CHANCES.
*
621
friendly assistance.
This coalition of the aristocrats sum-
marily called for Caesar's presence in Africa. The Pompeian army, as Caesar was informed, consisted of
a vast cavalry force ; four legions, armed and drilled Eoman fashion, under Juba, and a great number of light -armed
troops; ten legions under Scipio, eight of which were from
refugees and conscripts ; one hundred and twenty elephants ;
under Octavius, Varus and Nasidius controlled the African and Sicilian shores and con-
and a numerous
fleet,
which
tained fifty-five war-galleys.
sea,
This force, both on land and
Caesar had thus far paid
was capable of immense mischief.
so little heed to the gathering danger that his enemies in
Kome
had feared that Scipio would invade Italy. This would have if been practicable had Scipio worthily borne his name, his opponent had not been Caesar. While Caesar was in
Alexandria and Asia Minor, what might not these legions, well led, have accomplished in Sicily and Italy ? By a descent
on Sicily and the occupation of
practically nullified Caesar's
its
waters, Scipio could have
attempt to cross to Africa.
But boldness was no part of Scipio's programme. He contented himself with a mere holding of the African province. For this purpose his plan was to gather all obtainable
victual in his cities, so as to rob Caesar of the
his troops,
and
to fortify all the coast towns.
power to feed He was, howof the towns
ever, unable to carry through his plan.
Many
were distinctly in Caesar's favor, and Scipio's measures lacked both decision and efficacy.
main army, Scipio lay near Utica, protecting his Afranius, Petreius and other old Pompeian magazines.
his
With
generals were stationed on the coast within concentrating distance. The cavalry scouted the seashore for many scores
of miles.
The
fleet
was cruising partly on the African and
Apparently these precautions
partly on the Sicilian coast.
622
>
CAESAR SAILS TO AFRICA.
But neither the
fend
;
were well taken.
fleet
sufficiently alert to
off
Caesar's
nor the cavalry were attack. It was not
numbers they lacked
it
was
discipline
and proper command.
There was not that push from headquarters which alone
keeps subordinates to their work. Before leaving Rome, Caesar divided up the provinces. Allienus received charge of Sicily, Sulpicius of Achaia,
Sextus Caesar and Dec. Brutus of Syria and Transalpine Gaul, and M. Brutus of Cisalpine. After collecting all the
transports he could lay his hands on, towards the end of October, B. c. 47, Caesar gave a rendezvous to
them and
to his
army raw levies and
at Lilybaeum.
six
had at the time but one legion of hundred horse at this port. He expected
He
four legions to come to Africa from Spain, to work in conThe wind nection with Bogud, king of west Mauretania.
was contrary, but such was his anxiety
to reach Africa that
he kept his men in the ships ready to sail, and himself watched them from his tent pitched on the seashore. After
some days of impatient waiting, his levies and ships gradually began to come in. He soon had assembled six legions and
two thousand
body.
horse,
among
the legions the Fifth, a veteran
Leaving Allienus, the praetor, strict orders to forward more troops without delay, and having rendezvoused his
vessels at
October 30, for the promMercury (Cape Bon), hoping to land well south of The troops were Scipio, whom he knew to be at Utica. embarked in light order, without servants or camp-kits, the
set sail,
Aponiana, he
ontory of
foot in galleys, the horse in transports.
The
irregular winds of the season
they blow to-day as
He had failed to give they did then separated his fleet. orders to his captains where to assemble in such a case, a author of very reprehensible oversight. He was, says the
"The African War,"
in the Commentaries,
unaware of the
HIS FLEET DISPERSED.
location of the enemy's forces,
623
vous.
"Some blamed
his conduct
and could not give a rendezon this occasion, and
charged him with a considerable oversight, in not appointing a place of meeting to the pilots and captains of the fleet, or
them sealed instructions, according to his usual custom; which being opened at a certain time, might have directed them to assemble at a specified place. But in this
delivering
Caesar acted not without design ; for as he knew of no port in Africa that was clear of the enemy's forces, and where the fleet might rendezvous in security, he chose to rely entirely
upon fortune, and land where occasion offered." This is a lame excuse, which Caesar himself would never have made.
While he could not perhaps have assigned a very definite rallying point, he knew where lay the bulk of the enemy's
and in any case he might have given better instructions than none at all. He himself, after four days of tossing on the treacherous
forces, and, therefore,
what ports
to avoid
waters of the Mediterranean, came in sight of land, attended by a few galleys, sailed south along the coast past Clupea,
where he saw the cavalry of the Pompeians and about three thousand Moors scouting the shore, past Neapolis,
and anchored near Hadrumetum (modern Sousa), November 3. Here was a Pompeian garrison of two legions and
seven hundred horse, under C. Considius.
Having recon-
noitred the coast and seen no enemy, though he had in his
company but
three thousand
horse, the rest
men and one hundred and fifty having been blown he knew not whither, he
concluded to land.
It
fell,
was here
and
the
lest
on shore, Caesar accidentally the omen should dispirit the legions, he arose
that, in leaping
with
"
cry,
Africa,
have
embraced
thee
"
!
He
encamped where he had landed (a). He then made a reconnoissance, in person, of Hadrumetum, whose inhabitants at
CAESAR'S DANGER.
625
once manned the walls and prepared for defense. Desirous not to offend the population, he forbade any plunder to be
taken by the men. L. Plancus, one of the legates, attempted to treat with Considius, by letter, but the advances were
rejected
"
The
rest of the forces
by the sturdy Pompeian. had not yet arrived
his cavalry
was
not considerable; he had not sufficient troops with him to invest the place, and these were new levies neither did he
;
think
to
it advisable, upon army wounds and fatigue; more especially as the town was strongly fortified, and extremely difficult of access; and a
his first landing, to expose the
great body of horse was said to be upon the point of arrival
to succor the inhabitants; he therefore thought
it
advisable
not to remain and besiege the town,
lest,
while he pursued
that design, the enemy's cavalry should
come behind and
surround him."
town, Caesar retired
After remaining a day and night before the down the coast to a more suitable place
to his interests, or
to collect his scattered fleet, perhaps thinking that he
find
some
city already committed
might which
might be persuaded to join his cause. He was in fact in a graver danger than at Alexandria.
Considius' legions were ten thousand strong, and this force
was soon increased by the arrival of Cnaeus Piso with three thousand horse. The enemy had happily not attacked Caesar,
It was part but had adopted means of defense themselves. of his good fortune even Alexander never boasted such
that he
met
so lax opponents
on his
first
landing.
retiring, Considius made a sally from the town, seized on the camp he had left and followed him up,
On
Caesar's
sustained
by Juba's
cavalry, which
had
just
come
in to
draw
their pay; but Caesar halted, and throwing his small body of horse sharply upon the Moors he drove them back to the
town.
"An
incredible event occurred, that less than thirty
626
MOVES TO
LEPTIS.
Incredible
Gallic horse repulsed
two thousand Moors."
Mixing some cohorts of infantry with his horse as a rearguard, Caesar retired to Ruspina (modern Monastir), a well-located and prosperous town on a headland, and
indeed
!
camped
invited
(b).
its
It
was the 5th of November.
Thence Caesar,
inhabitants, next day removed to Leptis, "a by free city governed by its own laws," but far from a good
place for defense, being situated on a
shore.
flat
part of the seaCaesar posted
Leptis opened
its
gates
to him.
guards to protect the
town from the
(c).
soldiery,
between
it
and the seashore
He
board the transports, to prevent their plundering the inhabitants, whom he wished to
and camped kept his cavalry on roaming about and
conciliate,
matter which speaks poorly for the discipline under which he held them. Many towns came forward, furnished him
victual,
and assured him of
their fidelity.
Caesar had
by
luck escaped the most serious danger. Shortly, a part of the fleet came up by the merest accident and reported the rest to be probably on the way to Utica, supposing Caesar
crass
to be in that vicinity.
Utica, since the destruction of Car-
thage, was the principal city on the coast, and, it will be remembered, was a usual place for a Roman army to disemCaesar's failure bark, when invading Africa from Sicily.
to give a rendezvous to his ships
was sending them into the
very clutches of the enemy.
The Moorish horse appeared to keep afoot, and on one occasion fell from ambush upon a watering party from Otherwise there were no armed exchanges. Caesar's ships.
Caesar was compelled to remain near the coast to collect
his scattered
vessels,
a fact which prevented his foraging
largely in the interior,
short.
and threatened
to
cut his victual
But he kept
actively at work.
vessels in search of the missing fleet.
He dispatched ten He sent into Sardinia
RETURN TO RUSPINA.
and elsewhere for men, corn and
to
stores,
627
comply with his requisition. come he emptied and sent back to
troops.
with stringent orders The vessels in which he had
Sicily for a
new load
of to
He
gave
strict orders to his
men by no means
leave camp.
He
sent out a naval force to take possession
of the well-filled magazines on the island of Cercina. He reconnoitred and informed himself from natives and deserters of the status of Scipio's
army.
On
mand
the 7th of November, finding Leptis less available than
it,
he had thought
to Ruspina, steps to
Caesar left six cohorts there under com-
of Saserna,
and with some nine thousand men returned
"whence he had come the day before." He took make this a depot for corn, of which he collected a
large supply
all their
by using his soldiers and the inhabitants with wagons and sumpter-animals to forage. He was
have an ample supply ready against his fleet should be collected. Ruspina was much more suitable for
anxious to
his purposes.
It
was nearer
Sicily.
It stood well out to
sea so as to give a free view to a considerable distance.
The
anchorage, then as now, was on the south, and protected vessels from the north and west winds, which are those to be
most dreaded.
Caesar began to foresee trouble from the non-arrival of his
vessels.
He made up
his
mind
to leave the bulk of his
men
Ruspina and Leptis and to go himself in search of the missing fleet ; failing to find which he would sail for
in garrison in Sicily to bring
more
legions.
On
the same day, therefore
(November 7), the ten galleys sent after his fleet not having returned, Caesar took seven of his choice cohorts, some of
those which had behaved so well in the naval actions under
Sulpicius
and Vatinius, and embarked.
He
fully understood
the danger in which he had placed himself.
of his
He said
nothing
destination to his army, which consequently
felt
much
628
CAESAR'S LUCK.
troubled at this proposed absence.
For "they saw thema foreign coast to the mighty forces of selves exposed upon a crafty nation, supported by an innumerable cavalry. Nor
had they any resource in their present circumstances, or
their
expectation of safety in their own conduct; but derived all hope from the alacrity, vigor and wonderful cheerfulfor
ness that appeared in their general's countenance;
he
was of an intrepid spirit, and behaved with undaunted resolution and confidence. On his conduct, therefore, they and hoped, to a man, that by his skill and entirely relied,
talents all difficulties
would vanish before them."
Just as Caesar was on the point of sailing next morning, This event was a the fleet appeared unexpectedly in view.
fair
sample of Caesar's luck, to which he owed so much throughout his life. To whom else did such things ever
happen?
The
troops were disembarked and
of but close to Ruspina,
and near the
coast.
encamped west His situation
was now improved, having twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse but it was still far from satisfactory. He
;
was no longer
in grave peril,
but
it
seems inexcusable that
he, practically the ruler of the world, should,
by
his
own
default, be so far beneath his opponents in strength.
Scipio,
Caesar knew, was in Utica, nearly one hundred miles distant.
The whole
and back
coast here
is flat.
From
the beach back there
runs, as a rule, a line of slight hills, fifty or sixty feet high,
of these, a flat country very slightly accentuated.
no greater than the average of prairie land. Ruspina stands higher than most places on the coast. So soon as the camp had been intrenched, on November 8,
roll of the plain is
The
Caesar, with thirty cohorts, one
hundred and
marching
fifty archers,
and four hundred horse
in light
order, set out at
nine A. M. on another foraging expedition, and "advanced into the country." He could not send small parties, lest
LABIENUS TURNS
they should be cut
of coast hills.
off.
UP.
629
Due
south from Ruspina runs a line
is
West
Easy
of these hills
flat plain,
once the
bed of an
described
section,
inlet of the sea.
it.
It is to-day just
what Caesar
to a fertile
to
march along and leading
miles out from
he chose this plain for his advance. Some three camp a great dust announced the approach of
an army. The Pompeians had moved up to his vicinity, camped, and were now coming out to meet him under com-
mand
of Labienus, Petreius
and other lieutenants
of Scipio.
Caesar's scouts
and an advanced party of cavalry had but
just discovered and reported this fact.
The scouting
service
was apparently far from being good. It was well for Caesar that Scipio had not been able to collect his force and reach
the field a day or two before,
troops.
territory
when he was disembarking
his
legions had been occupying an extensive and had needed time to concentrate. He had heard
Scipio 's
of Caesar's arrival
He
fancied he had an easy prey.
Caesar to
from Considius, and of his lack of troops. He had probably expected land near Utica, and had only watched the gulf of
late to retire.
Carthage.
It
was too
Nor was
by
it
Caesar's way.
Order-
ing the horse forward, supported
archers, of
whom
but a
few had accompanied the column, Caesar himself rode out to reconnoitre, and ordered the legions to follow in line of battle
(d).
He
soon saw that he had to do with a very large part
of the enemy's force,
and instructed the men
to prepare for
battle. total number present was perhaps twelve thousand men. The Pompeians had marched with such precaution as not to be discovered, and had surprised Caesar
His
with an overwhelming body of men, stated in the Commentaries at ten thousand five hundred horse, forty-four thousand
foot
and a large array of
light troops
which were mixed
in.
the line of battle with horse.
Labienus was in command.
630
CAESAR IN DANGER.
conducted his march with
ability.
He had
Despite the defeat
courage and believed He proposed to use that he could crush Caesar by numbers.
at Pharsalus,
full of
Labienus was
his
hereditary fashion, by skirmishing round Caesar's foot and tiring it out without even coming to combat ; and fight was the very thing the
Numidian cavalry
in their
own
legionary must do,
if
he would succeed.
Labienus had trapped
clear
his
Ca3sar on the level, where his
Caesar sent back
for
work was
rest
and
easy.
the
of
horse,
sixteen
The terrain was a perfectly flat, open somewhat over one and a half miles wide, and growing plain
hundred in number.
wider in Caesar's front.
hills
On
Caesar's left were the
slight
of
relics
Ruspina; on his right was marshy ground, the of the old inlet. The enemy was drawn up in deep
heavy bodies of cavalry on the wings and Numidian horse interspersed with the light-armed Numidians
order, with
Labienus intended to put horse rather than foot into action. His line was much longer
in the centre.
and bowmen
than Caesar's and overshot his flanks.
Caesar imagined that he would have only infantry to fight in the enemy's main
but the latter had mixed horse with the foot so cleverly that at a distance it looked like an infantry line. To gain
line,
space, his
numbers being
in one line.
small, Caesar
was obliged
to
draw
up
his
army
by
This he did by moving the fifteen
cohorts of the second line
up
into the intervals of the first,
or else
opening intervals between the cohorts, or
to take
by order-
ing the
men
open order.
His
line
was covered by
archers, out as skirmishers, and flanked by Caesar's few horsemen on the wings. These were ordered to be particularly careful not to charge to a distance or to allow
selves to
them-
be surrounded.
His
line
was probably about a
mile long.
His
Ruspina
hills,
wing and Labienus' right leaned on the but these were so very slight in elevation that
left
NOVEL TACTICS.
631
Why Caesar did not send they afforded scant protection. back to camp for the balance of his force is not explained.
may be of a part with his usual over self-reliance. Or he may have thought that in case of disaster he would be better
It
off to
men
it
have in camp a strong force of fresh and undemoralized on which to retire. At all events, he concluded to fight
out against the odds before him. Caesar, owing to his limited numbers, was unable to take
the offensive, but waited for the
that he must depend
strength.
enemy
to advance.
He
saw
more on
left to lap
tactics or stratagem
than on
Presently the Pompeians began to extend their
line to the right
and
Cesar's flanks and surround
holding
its
his horse,
which soon had
difficulty in
ground.
At
the same time the centre of horse, interspersed with foot,
tactics, the
adopted a new
horsemen rushing forward and
cast-
ing their darts and, so soon as opposed, retiring
the infantry through their intervals.
5t>
under cover of
the legionaries
When
COHORTS
632
THREATENED DEMORALIZATION.
men
to advance
Caesar was obliged to forbid the
more than
this
four feet beyond the line of ensigns,
which from
we
should imagine to be in the first rank.
Soon Labienus' force swept so far beyond Caesar's flanks was crowded back upon the foot, many of the horses being wounded. The movement continued until
that the cavalry
the entire
army
of Caesar
hybrid squadrons.
was surrounded by the Pompeian The cohorts "were obliged to form into
Battle of Ruspina (second phase).
circle, as if inclosed
by
barriers."
and
in good order. Despite all advanced to hand-to-hand fighting
This they did rapidly which, the battle had not yet
;
for these operations
had
been accompanied by only a skirmishing contact) and what Caesar's men desired was to get at the enemy with the sword.
They were placed
attack.
at a grave disadvantage
by
this
method of
Caesar's position
was
difficult
and dangerous in the highest
The young soldiers appeared to be much demoraland looked only to him for countenance. Many, no ized, But they doubt, thought of the massacre of Curio's army.
degree.
found that in Caesar's bearing which gave them confidence in him and in themselves. He was omnipresent, cheerful,
encouragement. From him and the few old soldiers interspersed in the ranks the new levies took heart,
active, full of
and bore themselves
like
men.
Labienus made himself conspicuous by advancing beyond
A CLEVER MAN(EUVRE.
the line and taunting Caesar's men, over
633
he imagined he was surely to obtain a complete and telling victory. In this vainglorious boasting he all but received a fatal check
soldier of the old Tenth legion, who advanced, hurled a javelin at him, and wounded his horse. But Labienus was slow in attacking his old chief. He probably waited for a break in the lines so as to-turn defeat into massacre. Caesar
whom
from a
saw that he must undertake some manoauvre
to extricate his
cohorts from their dilemma, or that he would soon succumb
from some unexpected accident. As it was, it was becoming a question how long he could hold his new men in hand.
Cesar's brain was
fertile in expedients.
What
he did
is
manner
explained at length in the Commentaries, but in such a as to be susceptible of several readings. In fact,
many
tactical
Caesar's
movement.
manoeuvres have been constructed to explain Riistow and Gbler have each made an
little
elaborate evolution, savoring, perhaps, a
too
much
of
the drill-ground, of what was done.
One
thing
may
be as-
sumed
as certain.
With new
troops, Caesar
undertake no very difficult tactical
would be apt to manoauvre; but to do that
likely to
which was the simplest, and therefore most under the rather demoralizing circumstances.
work
The cohorts were huddled together
he must break the
so
much
that the
men
could not use their weapons to advantage. Caesar saw that circle of the enemy, and was well aware
that his interior position, so long as the cohorts kept their
head, was
much
the stronger.
He
ordered alternate cohorts
its
to face to the rear,
and back up each against
neighbor, so
as to
form two
fronts.
The
flank cohorts, presumably, as
usual, of old troops, pushed their
way
to right
and
left, so
as to give greater intervals
to the centre cohorts;
and by
vigorous charges by horse and foot together, the circle of the
enemy was ruptured
at its
two extremes.
There were now
634
A BOLD CHARGE.
two bodies of the enemy, which could not act together, and Caesar could see that they, in their turn, were growing
uneasy, while his
own men, cheered by
success,
began to
recover their elasticity. Seizing the proper moment, Caesar The ordered both fronts to charge the enemy with a will.
C3 C)
uu a PPpcpqacp pcpcpcpcpcpcppqa
O
o o a o o o
C=3
1^
Ci)
Cb Cb
lJ
u a
LINE
Battle of Ruspina (third phase).
result justified the order.
The Pompeians turned and
fled
in all directions.
Caesar then faced the cohorts of the ori-
ginal front, which he had personally
commanded, to the rear, and retired towards camp. This manoeuvre produced a temporary lull in the battle.
It looked as if Caesar could extricate himself.
Just at this
juncture a considerable body of foot and a select and fresh column of eleven hundred Numidian horse under M. Petreius
and Cnaeus Piso came up and rehabilitated matters for the enemy. Caesar, during the lull, had begun to retire upon
his
camp
in order of battle,
and with unbroken ranks.
The
enemy's newly arrived cavalry endeavored to harass his retreat and disorganize his line; but Caesar's men had gained
confidence in their chief, and in their
own
fighting capacity.
Far from being nervous under the stress of their difficult situation, they promptly and cheerfully obeyed every order.
There was no sign
At command they giving way. sharply faced about and made bold to renew the battle in the
left of
middle of the plain. Labienus pursued the same policy of not coming to close quarters, but kept up a sharp skirmish-
LABIENUS DEFEATED.
635
Despite his boast, he seemed careful not to get ing attack. His presence was, within the reach of his old chief's arm. however, harassing to a degree. Caesar saw that a supreme effort was essential
if
he would
keep his forces so well in hand as to permit a retreat to camp. His cavalry was all tired out. On a given signal, and with a vim which only the true commander could impart,
the whole force
made about
face, paused,
and moved as one
line,
man
forward at charging pace upon Labienus'
carelessly dispersed.
which
was now somewhat
at this bold front
Taken by surprise an enemy they supposed beaten and by
its
were waiting to see dissolve
completely broken, and
the west of the plain.
ranks, the Pompeians were
retired with loss
beyond the
hills
on
The
possession of an eminence, held
Csesarians followed, and, taking it until they could retire in
order of battle.
tion.
They then returned to camp in good condi"The enemy, who in this last attack had been very
fortificai.
roughly handled, then at length retreated to their
tions,"
e.,
their
camp.
The
battle
had
lasted
from eleven
o'clock
till
sunset.
Caesar's tactical manoauvre has been
worked out by
Riis-
tow
be something like this. From his one line of thirty cohorts he withdrew the even-numbered ones into a temporary
to
thus affording him a more open order which could better mano3uvre. These latter cohorts then wheeled
second
line,
two columns, those of the right wing to the right, those wing to the left and so soon as they were ready to charge, the horse retired around their flanks to the rear.
into
of the left
The odd-numbered
cohorts,
now
alone in the
first line, also
wheeled into column right and left, thus making two heavy columns facing outwardly to each flank. At the word of
command
these columns charged
home
right
and
left
upon
the wings of Labienus which had outflanked Caesar's line,
636
STRENGTHENING THE CAMP.
Meanwhich had retired behind
driving them well back but not advancing too far.
while, Caesar collected the cavalry,
the columns,
into
two bodies in the centre, and charged
Labienus' centre to create a diversion there.
of the whole manoeuvre, particularly
The
surprise
enus thought were all success. So soon as the enemy had been thrown back, the cohorts again returned to their places in double line, and
Caesar began to withdraw.
accurate.
It
is
by troops which Labibut defeated, was what gave it its
It cannot
be said that this
is
one plausible explanation of the tactical
fits
manoeuvre, and
as indeed
the description of the Commentaries,
will do.
more than one
But the manoauvre
first
given
more probable, as being simpler. Many deserters came to Caesar's camp.
is
that
Caesar's
Labienus had expected to surprise new troops by his unusual tactics, and then cut them
These reported and demoralize
to pieces as Curio
had been.
He had
own
relied
on his numbers
rather than on discipline and his
ability,
and had miscal-
culated Caesar's resources of intelligence and courage
when
pressed. yet he knew his old chief full well. Caesar had not won a victory, but he had, after being surprised, saved his army from possible annihilation by a
And
very superior force.
"Had Ruspina
bow
not been near, the
Moorish javelin would perhaps have accomplished the same
result here as the Parthian
sen.
at Carrhae," says
Mommit
But Caesar was not a Crassus.
Caesar
now
fortified his
camp with
great care, inclosing
with intrenchments flanked by towers which ran from the
outer flank of Ruspina and that of the
sea, beside joining the
camp down
to the
safely receive victuals
town and camp (e). He could thus and enginery of war and have safe
his
access to his fleet.
However strong Caesar might make
works, the strength of his position lay in the
man
himself.
LACK OF VICTUAL.
637
His own legions recognized his confidence and partook it; and in the enemy's camp, it may be presumed, the aristocrats
equally felt the presence over against them of a great captain. Caesar did not deem it expedient just now to risk an attack
Needing light troops, he armed many of the Gauls, Rhodians and other mariners in the fleet as slingers and archers, and drew from the fleet
on the enemy in the open
field.
many Syrian and
iners.
Iturean bowmen, who were serving as marnot very effective, they added a certain value Though
to the army.
He
put up workshops to make engines, darts
and leaden
for
bullets,
and sent
to Sicily for corn, hurdles,
wood
him-
rams and other material of war.
He
insisted
strictly
on the performance of guard duty, saw to every
detail
self, constantly visited the outposts, encouraged his
men, and
looked out for their wants with the utmost energy. But Caesar was unfortunate about his victual.
Corn
in
all the laboring population was under could not forage in the neighborhood; no corn had been left by the enemy. Many of his transports were
Africa was scarce, for
arms.
He
taken by Scipio's fleet, for, not knowing where Caesar was, the transports were uncertain where to land. Caesar had to
keep part of his
incoming
the utmost.
fleet
vessels.
The question
hovering along the coast to guide his of subsistence taxed him to
The motif of the entire African campaign be said to be the lack of victual in Caesar's camp.
Scipio was heard to be on his
may
way
to reinforce
Labienus
with eight legions and three thousand horse. Caesar, with his late arrivals, had less than thirty thousand men. Scipio
late battle,
and Labienus together had thrice the number. After the Labienus had sent his sick and wounded, many in number, to Hadrumetum, and made ready for a junction
with Scipio. He posted cavalry outposts on all the hills around Ruspina to prevent victual from reaching Caesar.
638
Scipio's intention
SCIPIO ARRIVES.
had been
to attack Caesar before he got
intrenched at Ruspina, but he was tardy.
Caesar's expedition
was too great to allow of much delay by Scipio upon the march. Scipio had left Utica with a strong garrison and marched
Ruspina Gamp.
to
Hadrumetum, where he arrived November
13.
Thence,
few days, he joined the forces under Labienus and Petreius, and all three fortified a camp about three miles
after a
south of
Caesar's works
(x) before
Ruspina.
too
Scipio,
no
doubt, reconnoitred, but apparently did not care to attack
Caesar's
intrenchments.
They were
formidable.
He
thought he would try on Caesar the same proceeding Caesar had tried on Pompey at Dyrrachium, In this blockade. he had a fair chance of success with his overwhelming odds.
But he did not carry out his purpose with acumen nor with sufficient force. His guard-duties were laxly performed, and
he had not the eye to seize on the salient topographical advantages of his position, though he established, apparently, a cordon about Caesar's
lines.
Still,
what he did soon began
YOUNG POMPEY.
to interfere with Caesar's foraging,
639
a serious matter, as no
provisions had yet arrived from
Sicily or Sardinia, and Caesar
which to get corn. credit on Scipio's
"did not possess above six miles in each direction" from That he kept so much reflects small
activity.
Just what "six miles"
may
mean
is
subject to question.
The
circuit of Caesar's inclos-
ure was about six miles, but that he could forage much beyond is improbable in view of Scipio's great force of cavalry.
The horses and
cattle
were largely fed on seaweed
washed in fresh water, a fact which proves the considerable difficulties he was under. Caesar was blockaded in earnest.
Young Pompey, meanwhile, in Utica, urged by Cato to do something worthy of his name, got together thirty sail, and, embarking two thousand men, invaded the land of
King Bogud
in Mauretania.
Landing near Ascurum, the
garrison allowed
him
to approach ; then, sallying out, drove
him back with
Balearic Isles.
confusion.
Disheartened, he sailed to the
earnest support to Caesar,
Bogud was merely irritated into giving more who made use of every means to
P. Sitius, a soldier of fortune
which he could put his hand.
expatriated by the Catalinian fiasco, had collected a force of
motley legionaries and served various African potentates for Him Caesar set to influence King Bogud to invade pay.
Numidia, whose king, Juba, was on the march to join Scipio. In this he succeeded. Sitius and Bogud advanced into Numidia, took Cirta (Constantine), put the citizens to the sword,
and captured Juba's stronghold of provisions and war material. Juba was summarily called to defend his own territory.
This defection was a serious blow to Scipio. Juba left but thirty elephants with the Pompeian army, out of the large
number he had brought.
add the
of
last
Juba's approach had threatened to straw to the load Caesar had to bear ; his change
mind
distinctly modified the danger.
XXXIX.
f
INTRENCHED ADVANCE.
of his legions.
DECEMBER,
47 B. C.
C.ESAR strongly intrenched himself in Ruspina to await the arrival of the rest The country towns and people were mostly favorable to him, but
under the control of the Pompeians. Scipio lay in a large camp three miles down the coast, with an outpost in Ucita, a small town in the middle of a plain
surrounded by rolling hills. Caesar was anxious to bring Scipio to battle, but on his own terms. All through this campaign he appeared to avoid a general
engagement.
west, a
He moved
the bulk of his forces out to the heights east of Ucita,
in the plain
and intrenched.
Between him and Ucita,
and on the
hills
on
its
number
of skirmishes ensued, but no approach to a battle, though Caesar
it.
frequently offered
Caesar determined to capture Ucita, which
had been
made
from
the centre of Scipio's defensive line.
his intrenchments
He
advanced a
series of fieldworks
on the
hills across the plain
towards the town, so that
if
he might not be attacked in flank.
Scipio's, Caesar, for
With a
force all but equal,
not quite, to
some
reason, did not force the fighting, though he restlessly
manoBuvred against the enemy.
So
arrival in person,
soon as the province of Africa was convinced of Caesar's this had not been believed, owing to the
allegations of the
until Caasar
enemy that only a legate was in command, communicated with the important towns himself, many persons of rank sent in their offers of allegiance and
complained bitterly of the cruelty of the Pompeian coalition, which had sucked the life-blood out of the land by their
rapacity.
Caesar determined to undertake active operations
as soon as the season
the prsetor
would admit, and sent word to Alienus, in Sicily, that the troops must be forwarded,
he was to preserve Africa from utter he himself was so anxious and impatient, that
if
whatever the weather,
ruin.
"And
from the day the
letters
were sent he complained without
CJSSAR'S OVERHASTINESS.
ceasing of the delay of the
fleet,
641
and had
his eyes night
and
day turned towards the sea."
Meanwhile, the
enemy
contin-
ued to ravage the country, which Caesar was forced and could not prevent owing to his small force.
to watch,
But he
increased his works, and made his camp almost impregnable with redoubts and defenses, and carried the lines quite to the
sea.
.
Caesar's constrained position
was due
to his
own overeager
means.
act in attacking the African
problem with
insufficient
However
justly
we may admire
Caesar as perhaps the greatest
man
of ancient days, as indisputably one of the world's great
captains,
we cannot
justly overlook his errors.
Caesar must
be tried by his peers. His habit of undertaking operations with inadequate forces was a distinct failing from which only
"Caesar's
fortune" on
many
occasions
saved him.
This
characteristic of his military life cannot but
It is
be condemned.
beyond question that all the danger and delay to which
he had been subjected since sailing from Lilybseum were attributable to a carelessness which militates as much against his
character as a captain as his subsequent splendid efforts to
save himself from ruin and to defeat his enemies redound to
his credit.
His energy and
skill in
saving himself from
self-
imposed dangers are thoroughly admirable.
A great captain
tions
when
it is
essential.
must face any odds of numbers or condiBut sound preparation is one of
Foolhardiness
the corner-stones of his reputation.
may show
courage ; but
ness
is still
it
worse.
shows equal lack of discretion. OverhastiIn the mixed caution and boldness of the
captain,
Hannibal far outranks Caesar.
But Hannibal had
not the help of Fortune as Alexander and Caesar always had. It would seem clear that Scipio's best policy was the one
which Cato urged upon him,
if
to
move
into the interior and,
possible,
lure Caesar away from the coast to a point where
642
he would find
FRIGHTENED SQUADRONS.
it
not only harder to victual, but to keep his But Scipio was not gifted with array up to fighting level. sense. Instead of this course, he garrisoned Hadmilitary
rumetum and Thapsus, and sought to shut Caesar in. He spent much time in drilling his elephants in mock battles so
,as
to train
them
to face the enemy.
He knew
that, as
rule, elephants in battle
had proved as dangerous to one
army as
to another,
but Scipio could not give up his desire
to put these beasts to use in his line.
As
(
usual, the cavalry outposts of the
two parties continu-
ally skirmished,
sionally
and the German and Gallic cavalry occaexchanged greetings on a prearranged truce.
Labienus tried on several occasions to surprise Leptis, but was beaten off by the three cohorts then in garrison under
Saserna.
The town was
strongly fortified and well supplied
with catapults and
ballistas,
it
on the
flat
seashore where
which made up for its situation had no natural defenses.
one of these occasions when a strong squadron was before the gates, their chief was slain by a shaft from an
engine which pinned him to his own shield. The whole body, terrified, took to flight, "by which means the town was
,
On
delivered from any further attempts,"
a fact which argues
illy for the cool-headedness of Labienus' squadrons,
and
is
a curious commentary on the value of the nomad cavalry of When such a man as Hannibal headed it, it was antiquity.
alone effective
;
and then
it
When
to
Scipio had
finished his preparations
was an arm of exceptional power. and felt strong
.enough to fight Caesar, he began about the 20th of November
draw up on successive days some three hundred paces from his own camp and to offer battle. This was invariably
declined.
Caesar was awaiting his veterans and supplies, and could not be provoked into paying any attention to Scipio's
taunts; and his works were impregnable.
This "forbear-
HOW
CAESAR
GAVE ORDERS.
643
ance and tranquillity gave him (Scipio) such a contempt of " Caesar and his army that on one occasion in a boastful
spirit Scipio
advanced with his whole army and towered
elephants up to Caesar's very ramparts. ordered in his outposts of horse when the
But Caesar merely enemy advanced to
his
dart-throwing distance, called in his fatigue parties, posted men, ordered his reserve cavalry under arms, and awaited
if they were foolish enough to make it. "These orders were not given by himself in person, or after viewing the disposition of the enemy from the rampart
the assault
but such was his consummate knowledge of the art of war, that he gave all the necessary directions by his officers, he
himself sitting in his tent and informing himself of the motives of the enemy by his scouts." This is the first
instance in ancient military books where a
commanding
in to
general
is
described as managing a battle just as he would
do to-day.
person.
Caesar
The Roman general was always at the front knew that the enemy would not dare
had cross-bows, engines and other missile-throwing devices, besides abatis and trous de loup in plenty; but he was ready to receive them should they
assault his works, for he
really attempt the storm.
He
did not desire a battle until
he could make
a crushing defeat, and to insure this he waited for the veterans who were to arrive on the next
it
embarkation.
Scipio, out of this caution,
made loud a claim
and promthem speedy victory. Caesar resumed his work on the fortifications, and "under pretense of fortifying his camp, inured the levies to labor and fatigue."
of cowardice against Caesar, exhorted his troops
ised
But meanwhile many
came
to Caesar
deserters,
Numidians and Ga3tulians,
"
because they understood he was related to
C. Marius, from whom their ancestors had received consid" erable favors during the Jugurthan wars. Many of these
644
returned
cause.
CORN ARRIVES.
home and wrought up
their friends to favor Caesar's
Caesar had spies in Scipio's
camp
in plenty
and kept
of
abreast with his purposes.
Many
tribes sent
in offers
allegiance. Deputies came from Acilla, "which perhaps has been identified with El Alia, some twenty miles south of
Thapsus, and from other towns, requesting garrisons and promising supplies. Caesar sent a. small force to Acilla
under C. Messius, who had been
aedile.
On
the way, this
body was all but intercepted by Considius, who was apparently on a general reconnoissance from his headquarters at
Hadrumetum, with
eight cohorts; but the garrison reached
the town before him.
Considius returned to Hadrumetum,
his
whence, securing some horse, he again made Acilla and laid siege to it.
way
to
About November 26
had sent
thither ;
there arrived a large supply of corn
fleet of
from Cercina on board the
transports which Caesar
and equally to be desired, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth legions, eight hundred Gallic horse, one
thousand archers and slingers, and a great deal of war mate-
from Alienus, the praetor at Lilybaeum. The fleet laden with these troops had had a favorable wind and had made
rial
the passage in four days,
a distance of somewhat
less
than
sol-
two hundred miles.
diers
This double arrival "animated the
and delivered them from apprehensions of want." The cohorts, after a proper rest, Caesar distributed on his works.
which had not yet arrived were only detained by adverse winds, and that none had been taken by the enemy.
also ascertained that those of his ships
He
This failure to move greatly puzzled Scipio, all the more from Caesar's usually all but abnormal activity. He sent
two Gaetulians as
spies in the guise of deserters,
and with
promises of great rewards, into Caesar's camp to discover what they could about the pitfalls and entanglements Caesar
BREAKING LOOSE.
had made
;
645 meet the elephants,
This only resulted
in what
manner he proposed
to
and what his dispositions were for
in the
battle.
men remaining
But
in Caesar's service
and
in increasing
the
number
of real deserters.
large number.
recruits he sent
these there was daily a Cato at Utica supplied these gaps by the
Of
from
Africans or slaves.
These were mostly freedmen, The neighboring towns aided Caesar as
there.
Tysdra (modern El Djem), a town thirty miles to the south, pointed out to him a store of three hundred thousand bushels of corn belonging to Italian mer-
much
as possible.
chants, which he was, however, unable to seize.
still
P.
Sitius,
active,
made an
important castle of
Numidia and captured an King Juba's, holding much victual and
incursion into
war material.
Caesar
now
dispatched six of his transports to Sicily for
the remainder of the troops.
Though
still
far
weaker in
numbers he had enough men to face the enemy, and determined to manoeuvre for a good chance to bring him to battle.
South of Caesar's works at Ruspina lay "a fine plain, extending fifteen miles and bordering upon a chain of mountains of moderate height, that
is
formed a kind of theatre."
It
same to-day as Caesar describes it (f). The width of the valley is from two to five miles. The hills surrounding
the
it
vary from three hundred to six hundred feet. The northern outlet leads to a marsh near the sea. Six miles from the
coast, in the centre of the plain, lay Ucita,
strong garrison of Scipio's.
On
a town held by a the highest of the hills were
watch-towers, and at various points of the valley Scipio had infantry guards and cavalry outposts. Caesar did not propose
to allow Scipio to inclose
him
in siege lines;
he must break
the growing circle, and this was a good place to do it. If Caesar could gain possession of this plain it would also go
far towards cutting Scipio off
from Leptis, which he could
US PI MA
CJESAR
MOVES AWAY.
647
then reach only by a long circuit and make it easier to hold this place. This would secure him two good harbors, Rus-
pina and Leptis.
As
Caesar's
good fortune would have
it,
Scipio was hard
up for water in his camp south of Ruspina, and determined to move to a point where there was a better supply. He gave up his camp November 27, and made for the hills on the west
of the Ucita plain (s
nity,
s).
This afforded Caesar his opportu-
and he followed.
main purpose was probably to feel the enemy and a series of movements seek to put him at a disadvantage by so as to draw him into battle on terms helpful to himself.
Caesar's
Accordingly, on the last day of November, leaving a suitable force in the Ruspina lines, he broke camp at midnight with
the rest of the infantry
and
all
the cavalry and marched (t t)
seashore, left in front, and,
away from Ruspina along the
the south along
striking the hills on the eastern side of the plain, he filed to
them
until his
head of column neared Scipio 's
careful to avoid the plain, for
cavalry outposts (g).
fear of the
He was
Numidian
cavalry, of which he
had had
so serious
a taste in the last encounter.
Here Caesar began
to fortify
the most available line "along the middle of the ridge, from
the place at which he was arrived to that whence he set out; that
is,
"
he threw up works (u) crowning the slope of the
hills
and facing substantially west. He was so placed as to prevent the enemy from cutting him off from Ruspina.
The "mountains" Caesar
in the triangular theatre of
refers to in all these operations
Hadrumetum, Thysdra, Thapsus,
and from very evident geological condiThere has been no change of topotions never did exist. since Caesar's day. The highest point in this theatre graphy
do not
exist to-day,
is
six
hundred
feet; the highest point
is
on which operations
ridge Caesar occu-
were conducted
half that height.
The
648
pied
is less
SCIPIO ATTACKS.
than one hundred and
fifty feet
is
above the Ucita
valley.
Where
Caesar drew his lines
half
way down
the
To ridge, which here is cut up by ravines and is very stony. read the Commentaries without knowledge of the topography
is
very misleading.
When dawn came on,
of Caesar's operations. of the valley,
Scipio and Labienus became aware
Scipio's
new camp was
to the west
and Labienus appears to have had a supplementary camp near Ucita, between that town and the hills.
The Pompeians at once determined to They advanced their troops in two lines,
intercept the work.
the cavalry in front
lV3T^
?!
***
*)****&\j|
Fight at Ucita.
about a mile from their camp opposite Euspina, the infantry one half mile in its rear. Scipio imagined that Caesar's men
would be exhausted by the night's work, and would fall an When Caesar saw that they had easy prey to an attack.
come within
fifteen
hundred paces,
a mile and a half,
a
the
distance too small for
him
safely to continue his
work on
intrenchments, he ordered some of his Spanish cavalry and
AND GETS DEFEATED.
archers to attack the party of
649
Numidian cavalry which held
a post on a hill near his own left, but on the enemy's right. This was done in good form and the Numidians were quickly
driven
off.
Seeing
this,
Labienus led
all his
horse from the
right wing
of his advance line to the assistance of this retir-
detachment was separated from the main army of Scipio, Caesar threw forward his own left wing to intercept them, and advanced a body of cavalry
ing force.
So soon as
this last
to the right.
In the plain east of Ucita was a large villa and grounds (v) which lay west of the hills where the cavalry skirmish
had
just taken place.
These grounds happened to hide from
Caesar's
Labienus the view of the movement of
cavalry.
Under cover of this obstacle Caesar's horse advanced, and when Labienus had passed beyond the villa, presenting to
his naked left, it wheeled round upon his flank and rear, and charged home with a will. The astonished Numidians at once broke and fled; but a body of Gallic and German cavalry which Labienus had induced to accompany him from
it
Gaul, having stood their ground, Caesar's men fell upon this detachment, surrounded and cut it up. The sight of this defeat so demoralized Scipio's legions that they could not be
held in hand, but retired in disorder from the plain and even
His loss had been very large. 'Caesar did not but retired to his lines and again set to work to compursue,
the
hills.
plete his intrenchments.
This was an auspicious beginning. Caesar had gained of a foothold in the plain and a marked moral possession
advantage over Scipio.
entire
About December 4 he moved
Ruspina garrison,
into
his
army,
except the
the
new
intrenchments, which completely covered Ruspina and practically Leptis.
Next day Caesar marched out from the new
lines,
drew up
650
ATTEMPT ON
offered battle.
UCITA.
He was anxious to see what Scipio would had gained a strong point the day before and wanted do. He to assert it for the influence on his young troops. But the
and
Pompeian, discouraged by his defeat, declined the offer. Ca3sar marched along the foot of the hills to within a mile
by a coup de main ; for not had Scipio accumulated great stores in the town, but only here, too, were the wells from which he drew the bulk of his
of Ucita, hoping he might take
it
Lines of Battle at Ucita.
supply
it
was for
and good water was so scarce along the coast that this he had left his old camp.
Perceiving Ca3sar's movement, Scipio, fearing to lose the place, at once marched out with his entire army to its defense,
and drew up in four deep
lines,
"the
first
of cavalry, sup-
ported by elephants with castles on their backs."
His depth
Caesar
made
it
impossible for
him
to
outflank Caesar.
ever, keeping Ucita as
stopped and waited for Scipio 's advance. The latter, howif it were a fieldwork in his centre,
FIDELITY OF CESAR'S MEN.
651
merely advanced his two wings on either side of the town, and remained in line. He had none too great confidence in
his troops.
Caesar did not see a good chance of attacking
it
both the town and the army on either side of
time,
at the
same
and as
it
was now sunset and
his
men had
fasted since
morning, he withdrew to the intrenchments. But one good result of the last few days' manoeuvring by Caesar was to constrain Considius to abandon the siege of Acilla, ably defended by Messius, from which he retired with some loss to Hadrumetum by a long circuit "through the kingdom of Juba."
Nothing exhibits the
galley with
to Scipio,
fidelity of Caesar's soldiers better
than
the capture about this time of one of his transports
and a
who
some legionaries on board. These men were sent offered them freedom and rewards if they
would join
his banner.
Among them was
a centurion of the
Fourteenth legion.
He
answered Scipio's promises by a firm
refusal to serve against Caesar.
He
told the
Pompeian that
he quite underrated Caesar's
soldiers,
and
in proof challenged
him
to pick out the best cohort in his
army and give him
but ten of his comrades, and he would agree to destroy the
cohort in open fight.
The penalty
of this faithful boldness
was the death of
all these veterans.
of this transport, Caesar broke the officers
Incensed at the capture whose duty it was
to patrol the coast to protect the landing of his vessels.
campaign, as already stated, were So strict had he been in preunprovided with baggage. order that even officers had been forbidden to scribing light
Caesar's forces
this
on
Moreover, he shifted his ground few days, and thus prevented the men from thoroughly every housing themselves from the weather, as they would have
take slaves or camp-kit.
done
if
put into winter - quarters.
They were reduced
to
making huts of brush, and to employing clothing or mats or
652
KING JUBA ARRIVES.
One
as
rushes as tent covering.
in
severe hailstorm
is
mentioned
the Commentaries,
which destroyed
rations, laid the
all the huts,
December, occurring early put out the fires, soaked the
in
whole camp under water, and obliged the soldiers to wander about with their bucklers over their heads
to protect themselves
from the
hailstones.
It reminds one
of the great storm which came so near demoralizing the phalanx of Alexander in the Hindoo Koosh.
Despite his numbers, Scipio
earnestly
felt that
he was weak, and he
urged King Juba
to join him.
The
latter,
well
aware that he ran greater danger from Caesar's winning in Africa than from any efforts of Sitius, left Sabura with part
of the
army to protect his territory against this partisan chief and King Bogud, and started with three legions, eight hundred regular and much Numidian horse, thirty elephants and
a vast number of light troops towards the Pompeian camp. His arrival had been heralded with loud boasts which pro-
duced a certain uneasiness in Caesar's camp, where daily deserters spread all the rumors of Scipio's. But when, about
December
20,
Juba
actually arrived, the legionaries, after a
glimpse at his undisciplined rabble,
despise his numbers.
saw that they might
Scipio, however, celebrated this rein-
forcement by drawing up in line with the entire joint forces
and
ostentatiously
offering
battle
to
Caesar.
The only
lines
response of the latter
was a quiet advancement of his
along the ridge towards the south.
Scipio
(j).
Juba camped north
of
Scipio had
now
received all the reinforcements he could
expect and Caesar believed that he could be brought to battle. He had camped opposite Ucita, between two ravines, each
He "began to advance along the ridge with his forces, secure them with redoubts, and
of which protected a flank.
possess himself of the hills between
him and Scipio," who
LABIENUS IN AMBUSH.
still
653
had outposts on the east slope of the valley, south of Caesar. The lattter could gain marked advantages by obtainHe would be rid ing possession of this entire range of hills.
of the cavalry outposts of the
enemy which
u
interfered with his
"">'
'
^
.
'
''.
A
-i
~*.
"
vV"
Ravine Fight.
watering parties. He would secure his desired to advance against the enemy.
left flank in case
he
He
could seriously
impede the enemy's offensive movements, and perhaps, out of
some of the minor encounters, develop a general engagement
under favorable conditions.
This advance of Caesar's lines
654
AMBUSH
FAILS.
Labienus sought to arrest by fortifying one of the hills beyond Caesar's left (h). To reach this hill Caesar had a
rugged, rocky valley to pass, at the bottom of which was a
thick grove of old
olives.
Here Labienus, anticipating
Caesar's manoeuvre, about
some horse and
foot,
in
December 24 placed himself, with an ambuscade under cover of the
valley,
grove, which lay well to the rear of the
and sent a
so so
body of cavalry to lie in hiding south of the fortified hill as to be able to debouch on Caesar's rear if he -advanced
far as to attack
it. Unaware of either ambush, Caesar sent forward his cavalry, but Labienus' foot soldiers, fearing to encounter Caesar's horsemen in the plain, began too soon to
break out of cover in the olive wood in order to oppose them on the south bank of the ravine, where they had the advanThis utterly upset Labienus' stratagem. tage of height. Caesar's horse easily dispersed this body of infantry in its
scattered formation; the cavalry
ambuscade
also
went wrong,
and Labienus barely made good his own escape. Thisretreat having drawn from hiding the whole of Labienus'
party, the Caesarians captured the hill beyond as they
had
set
out to do, and there Caesar at once threw up a work and
garrisoned
His camp was now inexpugnable. Caesar made up his mind to capture Ucita, a town which " stood between him and the enemy, and was garrisoned by a
it
strongly.
detachment of Scipio's army." But Scipio, with his numbers, was able to protect the town by such a long line of
battle, that Caesar's flanks
would be exposed in advancing on Ucita across the plain. This led him to undertake another of those remarkable feats of field fortification for which the
time was noted, and in which he especially excelled and carried out in all his campaigns. It is curious to see how
Caesar,
to
who was capable
to Africa with a
of doing such hazardous things as
come
mere handful of men, would
resort
CAESAR'S CAUTION.
to such hypercautious
655
when
his
means of accomplishing an object, strength was greater, if properly gauged by
quality, than the enemy's.
We
are not able to weigh all
the existing conditions ;
we do not know them.
the Commentaries as the basis of our information,
But taking we are as
at his
much
surprised at Caesar's caution here as
we were
boldness in the operations at Dyrrachium. Still, we understand the situation fairly well the topography and facts are
;
before us, and
we can only
ascribe Caesar's caution either to
mood
or to distrust of his newly raised legions. To give orders for a battle is as often a matter of inspiration as of
calculation
and preparation.
Here Caesar had an
easier task
than at Pharsalus, in luring Scipio into battle on the Ucita In plain; and Scipio's troops were no better than his own.
Alexander there was but one mood
1'audace, toujours de 1'audace!"
"
:
de 1'audace, encore de
In Hannibal's caution,
always a consistent reason
when we know the
facts, there is
and one which appeals
to us.
Caesar's caution
put to it to explain. It was not perhaps so of Ucita at which Caesar was aiming, as the chance in some
we are often much the capture
up
manner
risk.
of placing Scipio at a disadvantage so as to lead
to his defeat in a decisive engagement,
without too
much
to
carry out his plan, about December 26 Caesar began throw out westward two parallel lines of works, facing north and south, from his camp at the foot of the slope across
the plain in such a direction as to strike the outer corners of the town of Ucita. This, say the Commentaries, he did so
that he might have his flanks amply protected from the enemy's vast force of cavalry in case he should besiege or
assault the
To
town
or, indeed,
to outflank him.
The proximity
enemy
from any attempt by Labienus of these works facilitated
desertion from the
to Caesar.
Within these
lines
he
656
DIGGING
AN ADVANCE.
hills,
could sink wells, the plain being low, and he was in want of
water at his camp upon the
tance for
it.
and had
to send to a dis-
The prosecution
of the
work was protected by a body
of
horse backed by some cohorts, which fended off the Numidian
^
s,
a
~ '
^5Wv%k
'i,
?%,
rr^m *$$
ATPrr-.
f,M-,vO.\.i
&.j-'4*$8b
.1
?.!?
'-.
ov
jpm, ^^
rr
*'
=v.
<?<
vv."
Ucita Lines.
cavalry and archers. dark, and was
to be occupied
The intrenchment was begun
after
so far completed
on two successive nights as
During
enemy's
this
by the troops before the succeeding morning. work his men held frequent intercourse with the
as, indeed, at all
soldiers,
times
when they could
desertions
safely approach each other,
the result of which was almost
invariably desertion
to
Caesar.
But
of
from
Caesar there
may be
said to have been none.
The Commen-
taries at least acknowledge,
no desertions, and their number
*A. number of cavalry exchanges took place, in the majority of which the troops of Caesar had the upper hand. Scipio's horse was much more numerous,
was in any event small.
but far from being as well drilled or steady.
Nor had
it
A SMART COMBAT.
657
that instinct which enables cavalry under a born leader to
accomplish the wonders it sometimes does. One day towards evening, it may have been December
29,
as Caesar was drawing off the fatigue parties, Juba,
all their
Labienus and Scipio, at the head of
troops,
fell
horse and light
upon
the cavalry outposts and drove
them
in.
But Caesar quickly collected a few cohorts of legionaries, who always had their arms at hand, and leading them up to
the assistance of the horse, reestablished the combat.
See-
ing themselves well supported, the cavalry turned with a brilliant charge upon the Numidians, who were scattered
over the plain by the pursuit they had just undertaken, slew a large number, and hustled the rest into rapid flight. Juba
and Labienus barely escaped capture under cover of the dust. The result of this handsome interchange was that still more
numerous deserters from the Fourth and Sixth legions came
over to Caesar, as well as a large number of Curio's horse. Gaetulia, roused by the leading citizens whom Caesar had
sent back to their
homes
for this purpose,
now
revolted from
This monarch, with three wars at once on his was constrained to detach a considerable part of his hands, force to protect his own borders. But he himself remained
King Juba.
Pompeian camp with the remainder and made himself obnoxious by his insolence, meddling and vanity.
in the
The Ninth and Tenth
legions,
on the
last
day of the year,
arrived from Sicily, after a narrow escape from capture as the result of their own imprudence. The relics of their old
spirit of
mutiny were
fill
still
evident in their undisciplined con-
duct.
had gone one transport exclusively with his own slaves and camp-equipage. The legions had too long been on easy
of the military tribunes, C. Avienus, so far as to
One
duty near Rome.
In order to bring these men under curb, Caesar resorted to sharp and decisive measures, and took the
658
CAESAR EQUALS SCIPIO.
case of Avienus as a pretext.
He
broke this and one other
tribune and several centurions, and sent them out of Africa under guard. Among the Romans, to be cashiered was all
but the heaviest penalty which could be
inflicted.
It
was a
deprivation of all the culprit's civil rights, honor and character.
The
cohorts of the Ninth and Tenth were put into the
trenches, with no
more equipage or
arrivals,
five
rations than the other
men.
Counting in the new and
Caesar's heavy infantry
force of five veteran
new
legions
quite equal to Scipio's.
The
latter
was nearly if not had more light troops,
but these were practically worthless in battle. Caesar still looked for two more legions from Sicily, and Juba, having
been obliged to send away part of his army, depleted Scipio's numbers. The new year opened with Caesar's chances fully
equal to those of the enemy.
Ancient Helmet. (Louvre.)
XL.
UCITA.
THOUGH
Caesar's lines
JANUARY,
46 B. C.
still
had reached Ucita, he
waited for more of his
These shortly arrived, though harely escaping capture. Each of the troops. commanders daily drew up for battle, but neither attacked and mean-while
;
further fortifying was their only activity.
victual his army.
fro.
It
had become
difficult for Caesar to
In foraging he was often reduced to fighting his way to and
Finally, between lack of corn and lack of a chance of battle on favorable terms, Ca3sar gave up his designs on Ucita, and moved down the coast to near
Leptis.
Scipio
had won the game.
His intrenchments had been made for naught. To all appearances In a bold raid on Zeta, in which he ran an excep-
tional risk to procure victual, Caesar
nothing decisive came of
thrust home.
it.
He was
had a brisk combat with the enemy but still aiming to get a certain chance to
;
Scipio neither gave
him an opening nor improved
his advantages.
Finally Caesar determined upon a siege of Thapsus as a means of compelling
Scipio to battle, and
marched
thither, reducing several
towns on his way.
IN the early days of January, 46 B. c., having finished works up to a point just beyond dart-throwing distance from Ucita, Caesar built a line across the head of the works,
his
mounted on the parapet and towers a number of military He engines, and constantly plied these against the town. five legions to the west end of the lines from the brought
large
long.
camp
at the east.
The
lines
were almost two miles
skill
It speaks well for Caesar's
activity,
and care
that he was able to build
and man such extensive works
without affording an opportunity to Scipio to break through at any one point while incomplete. But Caesar was the ablest
engineer of his age, almost of any age.
When
erally
the lines were finished he was secure.
to capture
It
was gen-
deemed impossible
well-manned intrench-
660
NEW
TROOPS ARRIVE.
have seen ments, and Scipio was not the man to try. Caesar was to attempt such an assault, even how reluctant
We
when
the defenders were savages.
The
successful
comof
pletion of the lines produced other desertions of
men
decided consequence to Caesar's camp, and at the same time furnished him with one thousand more horse. Scipio, meanwhile,
was not
idle.
He
also undertook to fortify all avail-
own front, and prepared for a vigorous and stout defense when Caesar should attack Ucita. The Seventh and Eighth legions now sailed from Sicily,
able and useful points on his
and Varus
at Utica thought there
was a promising opporfifty-five
tunity to intercept them.
vessels for this purpose
He
and
weighed anchor with
sailed to
Hadrumetum.
Caesar
had sent twenty-seven sail, under L. Cispius, to Thapsus, and thirteen sail under Q. Aquila to Hadrumetum with orders to anchor, watch for, and protect the convoys.
Aquila' s part of the fleet being unable to double the cape, they took shelter in an inlet near by. The mistral, or west
wind on the Mediterranean, has always been a
of annoyance.
fruitful source
To-day, large steamers often cannot land either Sousa (Hadrumetum) or Monastir (Thappassengers at The balance of the fleet at Leptis was left riding at sus).
anchor; but the mariners were mostly ashore, some buying a matter indicating provisions, some wandering about,
poor discipline.
deserter notified
at night,
Varus of these
facts.
He
left
Hadrumetum
the mistral blew in his
9,
favor,
and next morning, January
reaching Leptis,
came suddenly upon Caesar's fleet in the same unprotected condition, burned all the transports, and carried off two fivebenched galleys, "in which were none to defend them." Caesar heard of this misfortune while engaged inspecting
his
works at Ucita.
victuals,
Roused at the prospect of losing
his
men and
he summarily took horse and rode to Lep-
CJSSAR AS A PARTISAN.
tis,
661
happily only six miles distant, went aboard the most available galley, ordered his fleet to follow, joined Aquila, whom he found much demoralized in his retreat, pursued
Varus, who, astonished, tacked about and made for Hadrumetum, recovered one of his galleys with one hundred and
thirty of the
enemy aboard, took one
of the enemy's triremes,
'--..^oi/re
"*-.
Caesar
and Varus.
which had fallen astern, and drove Varus into Hadrumetum. Caesar could not double the cape with the same wind, which
suddenly shifted ; but, riding at anchor during the night, on the next day, when the east wind sprang up, he sailed near the harbor of Hadrumetum and burned a number of the ene-
my's transports lying outside. Aboard the captured galley was P. Vestrius, a Roman knight, who had been in Spain under Afranius, and after being paroled, had again joined Pompey in Greece, and later Varus, without exchange or ransom.
Him
Caesar ordered to be executed for breach of his oath.
662
SCIPIO OFFERS BATTLE.
This fact shows that the paroling of prisoners was well understood, with at least some of its rights and liabilities.
This short expedition of Caesar's exhibits the marvelous audacity, decision and skill of the man. Everything he undertook in person was carried through with an active intelWhomever he attacked he ligence which insured success.
was sure
to defeat.
Had
he not done just this and done
it
in person, probably his transports, his fleets, his corn, his en-
ginery, his legions would all have been liable to be cut
off.
minor expeditions of Caesar show that if he had not been a great general, he would have made the very
of these
Some
pattern of a partisan officer.
occasionally,
All the more wonder that
Caesar was
as
now
before Ucita,
almost a
McClellan for his want of incisiveness.
Each commander now essayed
on advantageous terms.
Scipio,
to bring the other to battle
completion of Caesar's lines,
on a day shortly after the marshaled his January 7,
army on a
a parallel
slight elevation
the brook which bisected the plain.
rise in the
running along the west bank of Caesar did the like on
the floor of this valley can
of these eminences.
ground, but awaited the attack. On now be seen but slight indications
It is nearly level.
But a very
little
slope in the
soldier,
ground was of marked advantage to the Roman and the Commentaries often speak of hills which we
Caesar in numbers ; they had a strong
his
should scarcely notice.
The enemy exceeded
garrison in Ucita opposite
right wing,
so that
if
he
defeated them and pursued beyond Ucita he might be compromised by a sally from the town the ground in front of
;
The Scipio was rough and thoroughly bad for a charge. Where the brook had worn valley in places is very stony.
its
way
it
was more
so;
cross the broolc.
The
required Caesar to two armies were marshaled within
to attack
and
IN LINE.
663
three hundred paces of each other. Nothing divided them but this slight depression in the ground. Scipio's left
leaned on the town, which was an advanced redoubt, as
were, affording
it
His own and Juba's it ample protection. were in the front, the Numidians in a second line in legions
In Line of Battle.
reserve, but in
an extended thin formation.
"At
a distance
line of
you would have taken the main body for a simple
legionaries doubled only on the wings."
left at
On
the right and
equal distances Scipio placed elephants supported by
light troops
and auxiliary Numidians.
The regular cavalry
was on the right in one body, not being needed or available The Numidian and Gsetulian horse, near Ucita. irregulars,
"without bridles,"
sustained
by a great body
of light
troops,
formed a flying right wing one thousand paces from
6,64
NO ATTACK MADE.
Scipio's inten-
his right extending out towards the hills.
tion
was to envelop
it
Caesar's left
with
all his
cavalry and
the action
"throw
into confusion
by
their darts,"
when
should begin.
In Caesar's front line the Eighth and Ninth veteran legions were on the
left,
to-day the post of danger ; the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth, Twenty-sixth and Twenty-eighth, in the
centre ; the Twenty-ninth and Thirtieth on the right, leaning
on the Ucita works.
His second
line
new
levies,
mixed with cohorts
line,
was composed of the from the legions above
composed of the third-line cohorts withdrawn for the purpose and replaced by some new cohorts, extended only from the centre of the line to the left, as the right was so strongly posted at the
of the right legions,
named.
His third
intrenchments opposite Ucita as to need no reserve. His All his right wing was thus .in two, his left in three lines.
cavalry stood on his
left,
opposite the enemy's,
mixed with
these,
on light foot; and because he put no great reliance the Fifth legion was placed in reserve in their rear.
archers were principally on the wings, but bodies of
The
them
stood in the front.
The two armies thus drawn up remained
in line all day,
but three hundred paces apart, neither party willing to advance across the low ground, a most unusual spectacle.
It strikes
one as curious, indeed, that Caesar, who was so
prompt
in his attack at Pharsalus, where he
had but half
Pompey's force, and where excellent Roman legions under an able leader confronted him, should have been so slow at
opening the battle here, when he was about on a par with his antagonists, a large part of whose troops were far from
good either in quality or discipline. This is especially so as Pompey had recently beaten him at Dyrrachium, and in any event was far superior to Scipio in ability. Fighting a
CAVALRY COMBAT.
battle
is,
665
with any commanding general, often a matter of temporary vigor or lack of it, and Caesar's indecision on this
occasion
may have depended on
his state of health.
An
inspection of the terrain shows that there was nothing in any
respect as disadvantageous to Caesar as the hill at Pharsalus.
And we
seem to have
all the details.
The simple
fact is that Caesar, in tactical attack,
had far
inferior initiative than
Alexander, or than Hannibal, so
long as the latter's conditions gave
him anything approaching an equality to the Romans. In almost all Casar's battles, unless forced on him, he was slow in attack. In strategic
initiative,
on the contrary, Csesar was admirable.
It
was
one constant, never-ceasing push.
At
the
night,
when
Caesar was retiring to camp, the flying
cavalry wing of the
hill.
enemy moved out towards the works upon The heavy horse under Labienus remained opposite
Seeing
this,
the legions.
part of Caesar's horse and light
foot sallied out without orders to attack the Gaetulians,
and
advancing through a morass, probably made by the brook, but which does not to-day exist, were driven in with a loss
of
a number of
men and many
horses wounded.
Scipio,
rejoiced at this success, retired to camp.
This check was
compensated for next day, when a party of Caesar's horse, on their way to Leptis for corn, killed or captured an hundred of the enemy's troops who were straggling from camp. Both armies now busied themselves with advancing their
lines
and intrenching new positions opposite each other. Scipio sought to strengthen his holding on the hills back of
Caesar's especial endeavor
hills
Ucita.
off
was to cut
Scipio's right
from the
on his own
left.
He
therefore "carried a
ditch and rampart along the middle of the plain to prevent the incursions of the enemy." This phrase has been translated "quite across the plain," but that cannot be explained
666
NEAT STRATAGEM.
to have been done.
by anything which the probabilities or later events show us There is no evidence that a ditch and
rampart were carried across the Ucita plain from east to The passage probably west; nor was there reason for it.
means that opposite Ucita Caesar extended the head
SCiP
of his
Labienus' Stratagem.
works in a long
the plain."
line north
and
south,
"
along the middle of
Scipio sought to anticipate any attack by Caesar.
The cavalry skirmished every day between the two parties. The inhabitants of Africa, then as now, were wont to keep
their corn in little caches or
time of war.
underground vaults for safety in Caesar, who was in constant want of victual,
NEATLY
sent out a party of two legions
FOILED.
667
and some cavalry one night,
fruitful region south
which within a radius of ten miles in the
of
Agar collected a large supply of corn from these hidingLabienus, expecting that places and returned to camp. Caesar would again pursue the same road for the same purpose, laid an
ambuscade for him on January 12 about seven
miles from the plain where operations were being conducted. This was presumably in the vicinity of Tegea, where the
plain narrows between two lines of hills (k). Caesar became aware of this stratagem through the of deserters.
medium
waited a few days until Labienus' men should become a trifle careless. Sending forward part of
He
his cavalry, he followed with eight legions
and the
rest of the
squadrons.
The cavalry came unexpectedly upon Labienus'
outposts of light troops, which were taking their ease in their
cover and paying small heed to
duty they were sent on, fell on them and broke them up with a loss of five hundred men. Labienus, near by, hurried up to their assistance
tlje
with his own horse, and, by weight of numbers, had routed Caesar's cavalry, when he suddenly ran against Caesar's line
of legions, which compelled to the west.
cified all the
him
to beat a
His ambuscade had been a
failure.
summary retreat Juba crucollect the
Numidian runaways
as an example.
Caesar, despite all his efforts,
was unable to
corn he needed to feed his men.
shift his
He
was reduced
either to
ground or
else to
make an
attack on Scipio in his
defenses.
On
estimating the chances, Caesar
deemed the
risk of the assault greater than the possible loss of morale
incident to a change of base and the abandonment of the
Besides, position gained by so much exertion and sacrifice. he knew how easy it was to him to persuade his army that they retired with honor, and the labor had really been useful
in hardening the legions.
668
LACK OF INITIATIVE.
is
The whole matter
somewhat puzzling.
Caesar must
have long ago foreseen that his supplies would be precarious. He had gone to incredible exertions to create works from
which he could
fight
a battle with Scipio to advantage.
The
army opposing him was by no means as good and scarcely He had pushed his manoeuvring at larger than his own. Ilerda; he had boldly attacked Pompey at Pharsalus, who
had a superiority much more marked; here he declined the
combat.
It is unlike the Caesar
we
are apt to believe in ;
and yet not unlike the
real Caesar.
The
best explanation
lies in the probability that his intrenchments
had been made and
in the hope that he could lure Scipio out into the open
there defeat him; that Scipio had erected excellent works and that Caesar did not care for an assault. must
We
remember, too, that Caesar did not have the same splendid
body of men he had trained
he
still
in the
wars in Gaul and which
commanded
at Pharsalus,
though relatively he was
now better placed than then. The lack of initiative looks much like that of Napoleon in his later years. Was Caesar
tiring of
war?
the
all
Or was war
garrisons
sapping Caesar's energies?
Leptis, Ruspina
Leaving which were
at
and
Acilja,
fleet
strongly fortified, Caesar
ordered his
under Cispius and Aquila to blockade Hadrumetum and Thapsus and narrowly watch the coast to forestall attack on
coming transports during his movements, set fire to his camp at Ucita, and started, January 14, before daylight, in column left in front and with baggage-train between his
column and the
between the
sea,
and marched
easterly along the coast
hills and the shore to Agar, a town near Leptis, on the southerly slope of the first line of small coast-hills. He was thus basing on Leptis rather than on Ruspina. He
camped
In the neighborhood he found a large supply of barley, oil, wine and figs, with
in the plain before
Agar
(i).
LACK OF VICTUAL.
some wheat.
669
Scipio did not attempt to disturb the retreat, or even send his horse in pursuit; but soon followed along
and, reaching the vicinity, camped a few miles away and farther from the sea (1). His evident purpose was His to shut Caesar out from getting corn in the interior.
the
hills,
March
to Agar.
force lay in three
camps about
six miles
from Caesar's on the
The heights which stood back of the town of Tegea (1 m n). Numidian cavalry was posted on all advantageous heights,
to
head
off foragers
from Caesar's camp.
But, for all their
care,
Caesar was able
to collect a fair supply of victual,
by
sending out large bodies on this duty.
from the Commentaries, but from the circumstances narrated, that Caesar was very close-pressed
It is evident, not only
for rations; for, in order to
fill
his depleted magazines, he
all
now undertook one
his campaigns.
of the
most hazardous operations of
The town
of Zeta (modern Bourdjine) in
rear of the
enemy was ten miles from Scipio 's camp, some
Deeming it secure beyond a peradhad made it a great magazine of corn and venture, Scipio had sent two legions to those parts to forage and protect the corn collected. Of this fact Caesar had notice by a deserter.
seventeen from Caesar's.
670
A BOLD RAID.
his
He made up
his purpose
mind
to try
a raid on Zeta.
To
accomplish
he was forced to make a flank march past
Scipio's
camps and
perilous road.
by the same or an equally Only famine staring him in the face, and
to return
the fact that supplies could not.be got in sufficient quantity in the region to the south of Thapsus, explain the risk he
took.
of
He
established his
men
in a
new camp on a
hill east
Agar (o) for greater security to the comparatively small number he was to leave behind in it, broke up January 17 at
three o'clock A. M., with his entire cavalry force and a large
body
passed around Scipio's camp unobserved, reached and took the town of Zeta out of hand, with a
of foot,
number
of prominent Pompeians, loaded
an enormous
train,
including twenty-two camels, with breadstuffs, and put a
garrison under Oppius in the place, with instructions to shift
Zeta Raid.
for itself as best
might. Not content with this success, he moved on to attack the two foraging legions ; but, on reaching their vicinity, Caesar found that Scipio had learned of
it
his diversion,
and had marched to
their support with his
whole army. He wisely desisted from attack and began to retire with his booty. Caesar was obliged to pass near by Scipio's camp on the
CAESAR HARASSED. way back
and
placed by
hills
671
to his
own.
Here a heavy
for
force of
Numidian horse
light troops
under Labienus and Afranius had been
Scipio in
ambush
about modern Djemmal. them they sallied out and attacked his had had extraordinarily good luck, but
him among the neighboring Just after he had got beyond
rear.
So
far, Caesar
this diversion threat-
ened trouble.
He
at once faced his cohorts towards the
rear,
enemy, and, moving the baggage to their
he threw his
cavalry out in their front, and prepared to defend his rearward march. No sooner did Caesar's cavalry, sustained by
the legions, fall boldly
upon the enemy than the troops
of
Labienus and Afranius turned and
fled; but when Caesar
resumed his march they renewed the attack. These Numidians were wonderfully active and expert at their own method
of
fighting.
They
so
effectually
harassed
Caesar in his
he "found he had not gained a hundred paces in four hours." Moreover, he lost many horses, which he could ill afford to spare. The enemy's purpose was to
effort to retire that
force
him
to
camp
till
in that place,
where there was no water
to eat
and
Caesar's
men had had nothing
from their
start at
now, about three of the afternoon. Finally his cavalry grew so exhausted with its efforts that he was compelled to send it on ahead and make his rearguard of
three A. M.
infantry,
which could better impose upon the Numidians.
The
though the ground was not much cut up, were really more fitted for rearguard than the tired horsemen. The baggage was hurried on ahead. Caesar was thus
legionaries,
able to advance, though with extreme slowness.
For,
if
only
a handful of the legionaries faced about and flung their darts, thousands of the Numidian light troops or cavalry would fly
but so soon as the march was resumed, these warriors again approached and showered darts, stones and arrows upon the
rear of column.
Some
of these
worked
their
way around
to
672
EXAGGERATED
LOSSES.
the flanks and van of Caesar's column, and gave
greatest trouble.
inclose
him
the
Labienus and Afranius made an
effort to
Caesar's
through the hills to head
army by marching round his wings and him off, but unsuccessfully. Caesar
preserved his formation, which may have been the square "Thus Caesar, at usual in such cases, in unbroken order.
one time moving forward, at another halting, going on but slowly, reached the camp safe," about seven in the evening,
a total march of over thirty-six miles, with a loss of only ten
men wounded. To judge from
the description in the Commentaries one
loss
would have gauged the
historian.
an hundred-fold
is
this
sum.
It is
not improbable that the number
erroneously given by the
Labienus, he says, had thoroughly tired out his
troops and lost three hundred men, beside the wounded.
The
disparity in
numbers
is
incompatible with the descripin a position to lose the larger
tion of the raid.
Caesar was
number.
The
distance marched in sixteen hours seems incredible.
Assuming that the capture of Zeta, the loading of the train and the diversion against Scipio's two legions consumed but two hours, we have a large army, harassed by the enemy part
of the
way back, and delayed four hours by fighting, making a march of thirty-six miles in the remaining ten hours.
is
Few bodies of probably exaggeration somewhere. foot can cover three and one half miles an hour except for a
There
short stretch.
Still,
that the
march was made from
is
shortly
before day to some evening hour Scipio and Caesar.
scarcely to be denied.
This raid exhibits in marked contrast the character and
ability of
It
is
probable that Caesar
would not have dared undertake such a movement against an opponent more his equal. Scipio distinctly showed want of power
to seize
an advantage.
Caesar had passed over a range
WAS IT A DEFEAT?
of hills to the plain of Zeta,
673
same path to regain camp. Scipio to draw up his forces on suitable slopes and, by disputing his passage, bring him to battle on disadvantageous
terms?
and must return through the What more natural than for
an engagement, which Caesar would be forced to accept, Scipio had two legions at Zeta which could fall upon his rear. But instead of this simple
during such
plan, Scipio, apparently losing his head,
assistance of the
And
marched
off to the
opened have closed.
to Caesar the very road of retreat
two legions on such an eccentric line that he which he should
skillful.
Nor was Labienus any more
He
should have disputed Ca3sar's passage of the
ing his head of column and not his rear.
hills
by
attack-
Instead of so
doing he allowed Ca3sar's column to regain the road to camp, and contented himself with simply attacking his rearguard. It looks a trifle as if Csesar had really sustained something
more of a defeat than the Commentaries are willing to But the defeat was not a fatal one. Caesar acknowledge. had a way
In
of extricating himself
from desperate
is
straits.
it
justification of Caesar's
movement on Zeta
may be
said that the character of the country
such as to afford
surface of the
more than one route
land
is
for retreat.
The whole
covered with carriage and mule roads now, and pre-
sumably was so then, when the population was larger and even more intelligent. He could have returned by way of
modern Zermadina, Scipio being left at Zeta. He could have moved north along the Ucita plain to his old camp and thence to Agar, for on his left he would have Ruspina,
strongly garrisoned by his
own
troops, as a refuge in case of
danger.
Caesar's
own luck and
the paltry conduct of his foes had
again saved him harmless. It is all the more strange that, with such contemptible opponents, this great captain, who
674
NEW
TACTICS.
was daring enough to undertake expeditions which might compel him to do battle with all the chances against him, should have so long delayed forcing on his enemy a decisive
engagement which might terminate the war. For he now had twelve legions, and the difficulties of subsisting them
were enough to make him above all desire a definite outlet to the matter. He indeed shortly undertook it in a way
he had not before attempted. While Labienus was fighting
Scipio, after
Caesar
on
his
retreat,
returning from Zeta, had apparently drawn up before his camps, while Caesar was filing by the flank in his front laden with baggage. But on Caesar's approach
he withdrew.
entire conduct.
This lack of force
is
of a part with Scipio 's
Caesar had run a grave danger, but at all events his
legions
had
refilled their corn-bags.
Caesar was obliged to instruct his
men
in
meet the new conditions thrust upon him. light troops were so nimble as seriously to annoy the heavyarmed legionaries in a mere skirmish; and he deemed it
wise to bring some elephants from Italy to accustom the troops and horses to their sight, and drilled the men in the
best method of attacking them.
new tactics to The enemy's
had met a frank, courageous fought hand to hand on the field; here they had
devices of a crafty foe
In Gaul, Caesar's troops enemy who came out and
to resist the
who
relied
upon
artifice,
not courage.
The Commentaries acknowledge that Caesar's horse was no match for the enemy's when sustained by light foot, and
frankly confess that Caesar was not certain that his legionThis again aries were equal to the enemy's in the open.
are wont to think that Caesar's raw seems inexplicable. levies soon became seasoned; Hannibal's did; and we have proof that Scipio 's troops were none of them well disciplined.
We
GRAND REVIEW.
675
Caesar constantly marched his troops about the country, not only to drill and harden them, but in hope of compro-
mising Scipio by some manoeuvre and of bringing him to
He drew up, three days after the Zeta raid, near Scipio's camp in the open plain south of Agar (p), but this general declined to come out and Ciesar
battle against his will.
did not care to assault his works.
As
a rule Caesar was
fortunate in securing the towns in the vicinity of which he
was campaigning. Vacca sent to him for a garrison but in this case Juba anticipated him, captured and razed the town.
;
Too great
the
fault should not
It
be found with Scipio's appar-
ently inactive method.
was Fabian.
work
of
many
a victory.
But
it
Famine was doing was half indecision,
half method, which governed Scipio's movements.
On
his
the 22d day of January Caesar held a grand review of
army, which now numbered some forty thousand legionaries, three thousand horse and some auxiliaries, and on the
succeeding day, well satisfied with his legions, marched out to a distance of five miles from his camp and to within two
miles of Scipio's
camp north
of
Tegea
(q)
and offered
battle.
But again Scipio declined
offering battle,
it.
Caesar saw that he was wast-
ing his time in trying to lure Scipio into the
open by merely he planned a series of attacks on Scipio's strong places and depots, such as Sar-
and as a
last resort
Tysdra and Thapsus, to provoke him to activity. Thapsus was on the coast southeast of Leptis, a large magazine of military stores and a highly important point for
sura,
Scipio, which he
had strongly garrisoned and in whose harto attack Thapsus
bor was a large number of vessels, at present blockaded by
Caesar's fleet.
But
was to play the great
game
for which Caesar
was apparently not yet ready.
He
an
preferred to raid the smaller towns, not only as being
easier prey, but above all because he
needed the corn with
676
RAIDS ON DEPOTS.
It is altogether probable
which they were well supplied.
that at this
moment
Caesar's legions were all but starving.
He was on
tion
The strategy of the situaa tramp for victual. must yield to the logistics. Caesar broke up from Agar January 23 and marched on
Sarsura over the eastern slope of the hill below Tegea. To Sarsura he was followed by Labienus who harassed his rear.
Caesar had on this occasion detailed three hundred
men from
each legion as rearguard. These do not, however, appear to have been able to hold Labienus in check, for this officer
was able
to cut out
some
of the train
from the rear of
col-
umn
Caesar could capture Sarsura.
probably animals which were ready to load in case In a rearguard engagement
which ensued, the Numidians proved overanxious to secure They booty and were severely punished by Caesar's troops.
lost
a number of men, and thereafter Labienus kept his distance, following along on Caesar's right upon the hills.
Arrived at Sarsura, Caesar stormed and took
eyes of Scipio
it
under the very
and Labienus, put the garrison to the sword, and found a goodly supply of corn, which he distributed to
Scipio observed
the soldiers or loaded.
him from above,
not offering to interfere.
Thence Caesar marched next day
to Tysdra, which he did not attempt to assault, the place
having been very strongly fortified by Considius, a brave and stubborn officer who held it with his cohort of gladiators.
There was no time, nor even engines, for a siege had already got a fairly good supply of victual.
Caesar started back and
and Caesar
camped over night
at the stream
which ran midway between Tysdra and Sarsura (r). Thence he made his way to his camp at Agar, January 26, probably by a circuit round the foot of the hills he had marched
across.
Scipio did the like.
XLI.
THAPSUS.
THE
try conclusions with Scipio.
FEBRUARY,
47 B. C.
he was ready,
if
rest of Caesar's reinforcements having arrived,
ever, to
After some strategic manoeuvring, Caesar marched on Thapsus, and sat down hef ore it. Scipio and Juha followed, lest they should
Caesar completed his lines. Scipio essayed to break through these on Caesar's right, failing which, he tried the left, near the sea, and began to intrench a camp near his lines. Caesar drew up for attack, while
lose this valuable city.
Scipio
was at work, and compelled the
;
latter to
do the
like.
The
Caesarians
to attack,
were
in high spirits
not so the Pompeians.
The former were eager
But the
seeing the indecision of the enemy.
legion,
Caesar delayed.
restless
Tenth
gave a trumpet blast without orders, and this beiug down the line, the whole army advanced on the Pompeians. These repeated troops held their own some hours but victory was finally won, and the ensuing
on the
right,
slaughter was terrible.
fled.
The
entire
army
of Scipio
was destroyed
the leaders
Caesar
had no
difficulty in reducing Africa to his sway.
The African
campaign had been the direct result of Caesar's going to Alexandria with an and it was often insufficient force and of the loss of time there encountered
;
characterized
by a lack
of decisiveness unlike Caesar.
his
The
victory of Thapsus,
" which Caesar prepared, but
men won,"
rectified all his errors.
ABOUT
these days Thabena, a
town on the seacoast
at the
King Juba's dominion, rose against its garrison, murdered it, and sent a deputation to Caesar asking for proconfines of
tection,
"as they had revolted from Juba's rule and therefore
deserved well of the
the tribune
Roman
people."
Caesar detailed thither
M.
Crispus with a cohort, some archers, and a
of the legionary soldiers who,
number The balance
of engines of war.
leaves of absence, or other causes
by had been detained
sickness,
in Sicily,
arrived towards the end of January in one embarkation to
the
number
of four thousand men,
and with them four hun-
678
C^SAR OFFERS BATTLE.
bowmen and
slingers.
dred horse and one thousand
all his forces in hand, Caesar
Having
for not
had no further excuse
forcing Scipio to a decisive battle.
siege of Thapsus,
Before resorting to the
which he had long contemplated, but had been prevented from undertaking on account of the necessity of procuring corn in towns more easily taken, he made one
r*H
m KPfi
HTegea.
bring Scipio out on the open, and on the last which day of January moved from his camp to a plain
effort to
more
the Commentaries say was eight miles from his
own and
four
from
two
Scipio's, but the distances are actually less than six
and
not far from Tegea (y) and awaited the enemy. The town of Scipio was not willing to take any chances.
Tegea lay below his camp. Its garrison of four hundred horse he* drew up on the right and left of the town, and
formed his legions on a
hill
somewhat lower than
his
camp
SMALL INTERCHANGE.
679
and about one thousand paces from it, as a reserve, the cavalry on both flanks, but so placed as to be able to sustain
the Tegean horse in their front.
From
this place Scipio
would not budge, nor Caesar attack him in it. Finally, to tempt him out Caesar sent some squadrons, about four
hundred men, supported as usual by light troops, to charge To meet this partial attack, Labienus the cavalry at Tegea.
sent some of the cavalry of his second line around the right and left of this body to take it in reverse. Caesar ordered
forward three hundred of the legionaries habituated *to sustain the horse. Caesar's men, not only greatly outnumbered but
threatened in flank, began to give ground. Each side undertook to throw forward supports, and it looked for a short
period as
line
if
the battle might become general.
When
Caesar's
but overwhelmed, a further opportune reinforcement of foot carried the day. After a stout struggle
appeared to
be
all
Scipio 's horse was broken and pursued, with loss of
officers,
many
three miles to the mountains.
Caesar kept his legionaries in line all day; but the enemy's foot, though the occasion appeared to be favorable to Scipio,
he being on higher ground, could not be induced to come
down
were
to the plain to accept a general battle.
all directed to
Caesar's efforts
his position.
trying to lure Scipio
from
This, however, he could not accomplish, and as usual he was
unwilling to attack equal numbers on ground above him.
Though Fortune was wont
to be on his side, he
was mani-
festly disinclined to tempt her too far.
Caesar finally withdrew his
of a
men
to
camp, "without the
loss
man," while "the enemy had many of his best officers either killed or wounded." A corresponding loss in men is
to be presumed.
This statement shows that the historian of
the African
was subject to the weakness, observable in most chroniclers of modern contemporary military events, of
War
680
MARCH TO
THAPSUS.
understating the losses of his own side and overestimating When a combat is presented in conthose of the enemy.
and severe fighting is reported, we must assume some loss in killed. In most cases the wounded are
siderable detail
not taken into consideration.
Except
in the case
of
massacre, there are rarely large losses on one side without
some equivalent on the
'use of his shield, the
other.
It must, however,
be rememskill in
bered that with his good defensive armor and his
the
Roman
legionary could fight, sometimes
for many* hours, without a wound.
So long as ranks were
safe.
kept unbroken, he was comparatively
The
siege of
Thapsus now appeared to be the only means
left of forcing Scipio into
such activity as to give Caesar a chance of fighting on at least even terms. If anything would bring Scipio to battle, the danger of losing this town and port
would do
water
so.
And,
being scarce
*
near Scipio's Tegean S location, so that he
could not
before
sit
down
there,
him
Cassar broke camp in the night of Febru-
ary 3-4,
" marched
sixteen miles
beyond
is
Agar
the
really
to Thapsus,"
distance
ten,
and
Thapsus and
Vicinity.
seizing the elevations
back of
ately
it,
immedilines of contravallation about the city to
began to draw
it,
invest
as well as lines of circumvallation with redoubts in
it
proper places to prevent succor from reaching
(A).
SCIPIO FOLLOWS CAESAR.
681
Thapsus is situated at that point in the coast where, after having run to the southeast from Hadrumetum, it turns suddenly south. It was an old Carthaginian city and very
strong.
The
ruins found to-day on the site of the city proper
It had triple cover nearly one hundred and fifty acres. walls, and its harbor, natural and artificial, was excellent.
The town
lay on low land, but hills up to one hundred feet in height ran to the west and to the south along the coast. o o
Thapsus could be approached only from the south or west, on account of a large salt lake three miles inland and seven
miles long.
Caesar's
movement on Thapsus drove Scipio
into action,
sitani
"to avoid the disgrace of abandoning Virgilius and the Thapwho had all along remained firm to his party." After
several councils of
war in the Pompeian camp,
it
was deterand to
mined
to follow Caesar along the line of the hills,
This avoid an attack unless on ground favorable to them. was done, and the enemy intrenched eight miles south of
Thapsus in two camps, one for Scipio and one for Juba (B). There was, as stated, west of the town of Thapsus a saltwater lake, the modern Sebka di Moknine, separated
from the sea by a strip of dry land from one to two miles Caesar had camped and thrown up his line around wide. the entire town, but along this strip of land between the lake
and the sea Scipio imagined that there was still access from his camps and that he could carry succor to the inhabitants.
After renewed councils,
in force
it
was determined
in
to
up
that way,
Juba remaining
and had
make a move his own camp to
had
anti-
protect both.
But Caesar with
his usual foresight
cipated this very manoeuvre,
forestalled Scipio
by
the erection of a fort (C) in the centre of the strip of land
and had placed a
triple garrison in it
which was ample to
check the approach of an enemy as cautious as Scipio.
682
CJSSAR BLOCKADES THAPSUS.
narrow
Scipio broke camp, and marching right in front up the strip in question with his back to the sea, instead of
being able to penetrate to Thapsus was astonished to run
against Caesar's redoubt.
It
is
altogether
probable that
fort,
vigorous measures might have captured or
masked the
but
its
presence so entirely brought Scipio out of counte-
nance that he scarcely knew what course to adopt. He remained in situ, taking no action of importance during the entire day and night, but probably returned to his camp
south of the lake.
He now
resolved to try the approach from
the north, and early next morning he advanced round the
lake to near Caesar's camps.
Here, had he acted with vigor,
he might have cut Caesar
an attack on his
from Leptis and Ruspina, or by works have added immensely to his task.
off
But Scipio dallied, gave Caesar time to finish ments, and undertook no diversion whatever.
Caesar, in a
his intrench-
day or two, got his army well intrenched and
extended in a semicircle around the whole town from shore
definitely excluded from Thapsus. about constructing two camps north of the lake (D), one for Juba and one for himself, having done which, he marched his troops to a point about fifteen hundred paces
to shore.
The enemy was
Scipio set
from the sea and an equal distance from Caesar's lines, and there, on the 6th of February, he began to intrench still
another
camp
(E).
Just what his object
may have been
does
not appear from the relation in the Commentaries, or from
the topography.
nite.
Scipio 's manoeuvres were apt to be indefi-
given to vigor,
There were plenty of things to do, but Scipio was not and he was loath to approach Caesar except
under cover of heavy works. Ctesar could not permit an intrenched camp to be placed in such dangerous proximity to his own lines, and determined
to attack Scipio at once, though he
would have preferred to
SCIPIO
defer a battle
till
MAKES A THREAT.
The time
683
for
he had taken Thapsus.
attack was manifestly before Scipio had completed his
new
works.
to look after the trenches of Thapsus, Caesar
Leaving Asprenas, the proconsul, with two legions, drew out and
rest of his forces.
marched upon Scipio with the
to sail out
One
half
of the fleet he left before Thapsus, but ordered the other half
beyond Scipio's camp, make in near the shore, and, upon a proper signal, to begin a noisy demonstration in Scipio's rear by shouting and getting ready to land men.
Scipio was
drawn up before the
half -made intrenchments
;
which only was at work the elephants, sustained by light troops, were displayed before his The Numidian cavalry was on the left, right and left wings.
in three lines, the third of
the rest of the cavalry and light troops on the right.
left all
His
but reached the coast.
Caesar advanced likewise in
three lines, with the Second and Tenth legions on the right,
the Eighth and Ninth on the
centre.
left,
and
five legions in the
His flanks opposite the elephants he covered each
by five chosen cohorts of the Fifth legion aided by archers and slingers. His cavalry was mixed with light foot. He
himself went on foot from legion to legion to encourage the
veterans
by reminding them of their past victories, and to stimulate the new levies by urging them to win equal glory.
finally the battle
All perceived with glowing ardor that
to
was
come
for which they
had striven for so many weeks.
Scipio's
Not
so the enemy.
men were
seized with the
trepidation of a surprise; they saw Caesar about to attack
when
their
camp was but
half finished.
They had been
There
see the
weakened by being kept behind intrenchments. seemed to be no head or order. Caasar's men could
lines
and out of place as if entirely unprepared moving for the deadly work at hand. His legionaries and officers for an instant order to advance, for they saw in this begged
in
THE MEN BREAK AWAY.
uncertainty a sure sign of victory.
685
Csesar was anxious to
be deliberate, for the elephants were strange and awful to the
young troops, the Numidiau cavalry was vast in number, and had bred all but disaster at Ruspina, and the light troops
army were brave and nimble. While the captain was thus hesitating, the men acted; the attack was actually precipitated by a trumpeter of the right wing, whom the soldiers of the Tenth legion compelled to give the signal before Csar
of the
commanded
it.
This
is
one
of
the most extraordinary
It reminds one
instances of slack discipline in all history.
of the charge
latter
on Mission Ridge, though, indeed, at the place there was no actual breach of orders, but only
spirit in carrying
an excess of
them
out.
The
signal being repeated in the usual
manner down the
line, the cohorts rushed forward, and could not be restrained.
Csesar gave
Seeing this and taking advantage of his troops' enthusiasm, "Good fortune" (Felicitas) as the battle-cry,
The archers joined the fray. and slingers and the cohorts on the right flank, set for this
"spurred on his horse
particular duty
"and
and now well-trained
to encounter elephants,
speedily overwhelmed these brutes with a shower of darts
and
stones, and drove them trumpeting back upon their own lines, where they trampled numberless men under foot, made their
camp, closed up the entrances, and utterly demoralized the Mauretanian horse in the left wing, which fled
way
to
incontinent.
The
lines of foot
now
clashed.
That the PomdemonIt
peian legions despite their surprise fought well is
strated
by the fact that they held their
own some
hours.
was sunset before Caesar's legions could call the day their own. But after a gallant struggle, Scipio's right wing partook the growing demoralization; then followed the centre. In a short time thereafter the entire line was melting away
towards the half -completed camp (E).
The
legionaries of
686
Caesar's right
VICTORY.
and
left
wings
soon wheeled around the ene-
my's flank and captured the intrenchments which there was The principal officers, fearscarcely an attempt to defend.
ful of their
own
fate if captured
by
Caesar,
and appalled at
men,
this sign of disaster, without
an
effort to rally their
themselves fled from the
field.
Perceiving this desertion
by
their chiefs, the whole army, seized with utmost panic, dis-
way from the field The struggle at the new camp was a short as best it might. The soldiers of Scipio were cut down en masse; all one. who could still flee started towards the old camp north of the
its
solved into formless squads and
made
lake (D).
The garrison
along the shore,
of
Thapsus had, meanwhile, made a
sally
wading through the surf to aid their friends ;
but were beaten back by the camp-followers and non-combatants in the siege lines, which Caesar had left to attack Scipio.
Caesar's legionaries
followed hard
in
pursuit.
Scipio,
Labienus, Afranius, and other generals had
already got
away; no sign of defense was made; their army was a mass of fugitives. The men endeavored to rally at the old camp,
where they could still have shown a stout resistance, but there was no one to head them. Seeing none of their officers
at this spot, they imagined that they
had gone
to Juba's
camp near by (J), and made their way thither to seek them. Finding this camp already in the hands of Caesar's men, who had flanked them on their left, they at once fled to an adjoining
hill
(H), intending to defend themselves.
On
the ap-
proach of their pursuers they became panic-stricken, "cast down their arms, and saluted them in a military manner,"
i.
e.,
made
the usual signal of surrender.
Caesar's soldiers were too
But surrender availed naught.
much wrought up
to heed the signal.
The Roman people
all
were by nature cruel ; in common with
men
of their trade
MASSACRE.
in ancient days, Caesar's
687
legionaries partook the national
;
had spirit and had long reproached him for clemency they been at war three long years they now proposed to put an
;
end to the matter, and broke quite beyond control. Caesar, though anxious to spare Roman blood, was unable to stem
The legionaries, glutted with passion and blood, not only slaughtered the armed men, pursuing them in every direction and cutting them down wholesale, but in their
the tide.
frenzy they killed a
number
of
Roman
citizens in their
own
whom the cry was raised that they were the authors of the war, or secret adherents of Pompey's cause.
camp, against
"This made several Roman knights and senators
the battle, lest the soldiers,
retire
from
who
after so signal a victory
assumed an unbounded
hopes of impunity to
license, should
wreak their fury on them
be induced by the In likewise.
short, all Scipio's soldiers,
though they implored the protec-
tion of Caesar, were, in the very sight of that general,
in spite of his entreaties to his
and
men
to spare them, without
exception put to the sword." This escape from control by his legionaries
is
the most
serious criticism on their discipline which can exist.
One
can scarcely associate such laxity with cohorts which had been even weeks under Caesar. Plutarch says that several authors
have claimed that Caesar was not in
this battle at all,
but
was down with an attack of epilepsy. This scarcely accords with the facts elsewhere set down, or with the probabilities;
anything lends countenance to it, it is the remarkable lack of hold upon his men shown by Caesar on this field, both
but
if
at the inception
and
close of the
engagement.
to
slain
Their conduct
it.
at Pharsalus stands out in
marked contrast
At
least
ten thousand
men were
and sixty-four
Scipio's whole force was annihilated. elephants were taken. Caesar's army, it is claimed in the Commentaries, lost not
688
over
fifty
FLIGHT OF LEADERS.
killed
and
some
wounded.
Fancy a
decisive
battle in the nineteenth century
won by an army
!
of forty odd
thousand men
at such a paltry cost
The
flight of the leaders,
Scipio, Juba, Labienus, Afralittle.
nius, Petreius and the others, availed them
Most
of
them were unable
sea,
to escape pursuing fate,
and
either fell that
day or within a few weeks.
whether by land or Labienus
made
his
way
to Spain.
Scipio reached his shipping, but
was overtaken by bad weather, driven into Hippo, attacked by Sitius, and fell in the ensuing action. Some lesser chiefs
reached Utica.
did not surrender after this signal victory, though formally summoned to do so, with a display of the captured elephants, Caesar left the proconsul C. Rebellius
As Thapsus
with three legions to continue the siege, sent Cnaeus Domitius to invest Considius in Tysdra with two, and having been
lavish in praises
and rewards
to his troops,
the Fifth legion
he set out for was allowed to adopt an elephant as ensign, Ucita and Hadrumetum, which he took February 10 and 11, and where he found Scipio's stores and much military
treasure.
manding Cato and a number
refuge to its walls.
the cavalry in the van.
Thence he marched on Utica, with Messala comHe was anxious to capture
of Scipio's lieutenants
who had
fled for
foot could not,
body from the battle as the and started for Utica. On the way they were refused entrance to the town of Parada, but forced the place.
Scipio's cavalry escaped in a
In revenge for the refusal, they built a huge fire in the forum and into it cast the whole population bound hand and foot,
with everything which they could not carry away as plunder. After this signal act of barbarity they marched to Utica,
where they in like manner began to plunder and slaughter, and were only stopped by being bought off with money by
CAT&S SUICIDE.
Cato and Sylla Faustus.
inhabitants to resist Ca3sar, but, unable to accomplish
689
Cato endeavored to arouse the
more
than to gain permission from the city for all adherents of Pompey to leave for Spain, on February 12 he committed
suicide.
he not yielded the military command to Scipio, Caesar might not have put so easy an end to the campaign. After his death, L. Caesar,
his qua3stor, determined to
Cato was Caesar's most able opponent.
Had
throw himself and the town on
Caesar's clemency.
Sylla collected a
body of men and
retired
into Juba's territory.
and placed guards
his heels.
Messala, with Caesar's cavalry-van, soon reached the city, at the gates. Caesar followed close upon
Reaching Utica February 16, he was easily prevailed on to pardon the rebels their lives, but he amerced
them
in a
sestertia
citizens,
heavy money penalty of two hundred thousand to be paid the republic for having, while Roman furnished Varus and Scipio with funds.
King Juba and
Petreius
made
their escape together,
and
hiding by day and traveling by night reached Zama, where were all Juba's treasures and his family. His subjects
refused
for
him admittance and appealed against him to Caesar, Juba had threatened to consume himself, all his goods,
the Zamians in one
and
all
great conflagration should he
return from this war other than victorious.
this
On
receiving
message Caesar himself set out towards Zama.of Juba's officers
On
the
way many
in
and nearly
all his
and surrendered.
adherents.
Caesar's pardon of all
cavalry came made them his
firm
Juba and Petreius
killed
each
other.
Reaching Zama March 6, Caesar confiscated all the king's goods and those of Roman citizens who had borne arms
against
him and turned the kingdom into a province, leaving Crispus Sallustius as proconsul in command.
690
COALITION BROKEN
UP.
Considius, meanwhile, had abandoned Tysdra.
On
the
retreat his forces assassinated him, seized his treasure
and
Thapsus surrendered to Caninius. dispersed. Sitius defeated Sabura, and on his return to Caesar ran across
Virgilius at
Faustus and Afranius, who had escaped from Utica with the body of troops which tried to plunder the place, some
hundred strong, surrounded and captured the entire The two chiefs were slain in a mutiny which occurred a day or two after. The services of Sitius were recognized by the gift of Cirta (Constantine) in which to settle his irregfifteen
force.
ular cohorts.
Caesar confiscated and sold the estates of the rebels in all
the towns which had opposed him;
Hadrumetum and
their merchants fifty thousand
and fined Thapsus and and eighty
thousand sestertia respectively. Other towns were fined in He then embarked, April 14, for Sardinia, proportion.
where he went through the same form of amercement of his enemies, and thence sailed for Rome, which city he reached
on
May
In
25.
He had
been absent six months, of which four
.
and a half
in Africa. to
Rome from June
November, Caesar celebrated four
triumphs, for his victories over the Gauls, Pharnaces, Egypt and King Juba. No triumph, under the Roman constitution, could be had for victories in civil wars. During the days of
the triumphs Caesar gave to the
Roman
people the most
magnificent spectacles that had as yet been seen.
Over four
hundred
lions
and
fifty elephants fought in the arena.
The
promised largesses were distributed to the soldiers, some nine hundred dollars to each old legionary, the centurions
and the chief of cavalry quadruple. lands were distributed, though they had not been promised. For the next year, B. c. 45, Caesar was
double, the tribunes
Besides
this,
elected consul
and was made
dictator for ten years.
But
his
A PERPLEXING WAR.
stay in
691
Rome was
short.
Seven months after his return
B. c.
from Africa
November, 46
he was called to Spain
in that
to suppress the relics of the
Pompeian insurrection
peninsula.
The African war
of view
it
is
perplexing to gauge.
From one
point
undertaking have taxed Caesar's ability to the utmost. From another, when we note the low quality of the generals and
seems to have been a most
difficult
and
to
the legions opposed to him and the unusually cautious manner in which he handled his problem, it does not appear to That the be a campaign as marked in excellence as others.
African war was ever waged was due to Caesar's being caught
in unnecessary political
and discreditable personal
toils
in
Alexandria.
This delay gave the Pompeian conspirators the
better part of a year to hatch out their
means
of resistance,
and enabled them
in Africa
and carry through a campaign another in Spain. Both these campaigns could have been avoided if at once on Pompey's death Caesar
to organize
and
still
had turned against Cato and Scipio, his stoutest opponents or if he had at the outset gone to Alexandria with a number
;
of legions instead of less than one.
We
are not estimating
an ordinary man.
We
are gauging the
work
of perhaps the
greatest man the world has ever seen, few peers. What would escape notice
eral, forces itself
of a soldier
who has
in the average gen-
on our attention in the case of Caesar.
At
the root of all this lies Caesar's reprehensible habit of
undertaking work with insufficient means. He moved to Greece with half his force, and was compelled to wage a
defensive
war
for months.
He
sailed for
Alexandria with
but four thousand men, a reckless act which gave rise to a He moved into Pontus long and arduous struggle there.
with a ridiculously insufficient force and was saved from disaster as by a miracle. He came to Africa under circum-
692
C&SAR'S NEGLECT.
own
luck,
stances which, without Caesar's
in his defeat.
must have resulted
This more than foolhardy conduct brought in its train vastly greater complications than could have resulted from a careful opening of each campaign. If the months
be counted,
it
will
be seen that more than half of
all Caesar's
campaigns were consumed in extricating himself from the
results of his
It
own
mistakes.
was
either
unnecessary delay or uncalculating haste
which made most of Caesar's campaigns essential. At the same time we cannot forget that it was these campaigns
which brought out his great qualities as a
taught us so
soldier,
which have
many
lessons in the art of war.
to the danger of the African im-
When
Caesar
woke up
broglio, his impatience to seize
matter led him to
upon and carry through the He neglect the commonest precautions.
must have known, or at all events he could have ascertained, But apparently the numbers opposed to him in Africa.
without consideration, just as he had before started from Brundisium against Pompey with half his force, he now set
from Lilybseum with but six legions and two thousand horse, on a weaker fleet than Scipio's, at a season of the year
sail
when storms were common, and, most extraordinary
of
all,
without a rendezvous if the transports should be separated, It needed as was not only probable but actually occurred.
all Caesar's
luck to overcome such carelessness.
It
would
have been a much more expeditious plan to wait till he got his forces together, till a season of better winds prevailed; he could then have crushed out the opposition with a blow.
Most
of the African campaign
vring to
ness,
was taken up with mano3uavoid the natural results of Caesar's numerical weak-
Caesar's,
who
controlled the vast resources of
Rome,
or else in search of corn which he should have collected for shipment before he himself set
sail.
In this particular
DARING AND CAUTION.
693
lack of preparation Csesar stands on a characteristic lower plane than any of his compeers. None of the other great captains was so unnecessarily reckless, ever tempted
fortune so far; none ever had the fortune to be extricated
from such dilemmas.
There
is
so curious a mixture of daring
and caution
in
Caesar that
we
are often tempted to believe that
we do not
The
of stating
understand the conditions under which he worked.
historian of the African
War
has an indefinite
way
things which obliges us to complement
much
of his
meaning
by a study of the terrain. That the man who was bold enough to blockade Pompey at Dyrrachium with half his
force, to attack
Pompey
uphill at Pharsalus with like odds
against him, should be unwilling to attack Scipio under
more favorable, is hard to explain. That the man who undertook and carried through the Zeta raid the
conditions far
operation of a partisan corps by an entire
army
like that of
Alexander at the Persian Gates
should have been unwill-
ing to cross the valley at Ucita, or at least to attack Scipio when he had dug his way across, we can scarcely understand. underStill the historian and the topography agree.
We
stand the conditions better than those under which Hannibal
and Alexander worked.
hesitancy to
We
are forced to ascribe Caesar's
mere mood.
was always good. His reason for instead of fighting, is harder to comprehend. intrenching, Caesar was a fighter, in his way ; not like Alexander, not like
Caesar's manoeuvring
Frederick, but
still
an able and antagonistic
tactician.
But
often, without reason, he appeared to be disinclined to fight, even when his men were in the very tone to command success.
He was
for the
so clever at manoeuvring that he apparently desired
mere
art of the thing to
bad position before he attacked him.
manoeuvre his enemy into a His pausing at Thap-
694
SHORT CAMPAIGN,
was his men who won
sus has led to the remark that, while he prepared for the
battle, it
it.
When
;
Caesar was
weak
in numbers, his caution
was
justifiable
but his caution was
often less great with a handful than when his force was His opponent in Africa was far from being an respectable.
able
man;
Scipio's legions were less stanch than Caesar's;
yet hypercaution gives Caesar distinctly the appearance of
having had more
difficulty in
coming Pompey
largely of his
the Great.
creation.
What
mastering Scipio than in overdifficulties he had were
own
It is because he
was Caesar that
we wonder
This
is
at his hesitation.
one aspect of the case.
On
the other hand,
Caesar's activity, his intelligence, his skill
in the
and
brilliant
dash
minor operations, his broad conceptions of the strategic
necessities of the case, as well as the execution of all his
plans, stamp
him with
the seal of genius.
And
if
we
con-
sider the element of time, Caesar is unapproachable.
In the
Civil
War, from
his arrival
on the
field,
the Italian campaign
lasted but sixty days; the Ilerda
campaign six weeks; the Epirotic seven months; the Alexandrian six; the Pontus
a
little
campaign a bare week; the African months; the Spanish an equal time. in the Epirotic and Alexandrian wars
hastiness which
ord,
over three
note that
When we
it
was Caesar's overthis rec-
consumed the bulk of each period,
added to the splendid work
in Gaul, in this sense stands
unequaled in the history of great captains.
XLH.
SPAIN.
DECEMBEK,
46,
TO AUGUST,
45 B. C.
THE Pompeians had taken root in Spain, in doing which Caesar's lieutenants had aided them by mismanaging his affairs. Pompey's sons, Cnceus and Sextus,
were
in
command
of large forces there.
ceeded to Spain.
The
first
Caesar, after triumphing in Rome, promanoeuvring was near Corduba, with no marked
advantage on either side, though Caesar suffered a defeat in a combat near the bridge over the Baetis. Caesar then moved away and attacked Attegua, and
around this town there was a long interchange of
conflicts.
hostilities,
with frequent
Ucubis was the next point of contest. Caesar, as usual, skirmished for an opening, which Pompey was clever enough not to give. But unsuccessful at all points, and having been worsted in a bat-
Attegua
finally surrendered.
tle of
no great importance at Soricaria,
Pompey finally determined
to leave thia
part of Spain and retire to Carteia in the south.
SPAIN was divided by the Romans into Tarraconensis, or Hispania Citerior and Ulterior, in the north, Baetica in the
south,
Lusitania in the west.
In
this
peninsula,
while
Caesar had been preparing the defeat of Pompey in Greece, Q. Cassius Longinus, who, as tribune of the people, had so
ably served him in the early months of the Civil War, and whom Caesar had left in command, with the legions of Varro,
after its conquest,
had been acting with grave
indiscretion.
He had
fallen
into serious disfavor with
the population,
though he had kept the affections of the veterans in the army a course tending to the destruction by exceptional largesses,
of discipline.
He
had, for some time,
by
cruel extortions
from the people, been raising moneys, which he squandered in needless equipments for his troops, and in supplying them
with absurd extravagances. He had raised a fifth legion and three thousand horse, which he sumptuously paid and
696
clad.
CASSIUS.
Some time
before the battle of Pharsalus,
Cassius
received orders from Caesar to
Numidia, where Juba was
still
march through Mauretania on in Pompey's favor, and was
raising fresh troops to aid the cause.
He was
getting ready
to do,
to march, for he lacked not vigor if there
was work
when he was
injured.
all
He
but assassinated by some of the was, however, rescued, and caused
men he had
all
the con-
spirators to be tortured
whom
and put to death, except some few he allowed to purchase their lives for sums varying
Spain.
from ten thousand to
this experience
fifty
thousand
sestertii each.
After
he became more tyrannical than ever.
mutiny and revolt ensued, which threatened to place Spain in the hands of the Pompeian faction; for these atrocities
by one
of Csesar's lieutenants
to the front.
had brought the adherents
of
Pompey again
At
the request of his Spanish
friends, Caesar sent Trebonius, the conqueror of Massilia, to
CN^EUS POMPEY.
displace
697
Cassius.
The
latter,
in
sailing
away from the
province where he had earned so much hatred, was drowned in the Ebro.
Young Cnaeus Pompey,
after
sailed for the Balearic Isles,
his^asco in Mauretania, had and finally reached and taken
possession of Baetica in southern Spain, where he had been well received by the larger part of the people whom Cesar's
lieutenants
had alienated, and had been saluted Imperator. driven Trebonius out of that part of the country. By seizing the wealth of many private citizens and by general rapacity and high-handed measures, he managed to collect a
He had
large army.
fugitives
After the defeat
his brother Sextus, to
at Thapsus, many of the Labienus and Varus among
them -7- managed
make
their
way
to
young Pompey, with
such small relics of the army as they had saved. By all these collected and means a nucleus of parts of thirteen legions was
put under supreme
command
of Cnaeus, then a
young man of
twenty -four, by no means lacking in boldness or ability. In Baetica, which is a territory much cut up by hills and rivers, with excellent resources, and strong towns and
positions, there
was a promising chance for Pompey to drag This out a war of defense for an almost indefinite time.
necessitated Caesar's at once leaving
Rome.
He
had im-
an end, but he was rudely undeceived by the news from Spain, received during October and November, 46 B. c. He first dispatched Q. Fabius and
agined the Civil
to be at
War
Q. Pedius to Spain with troops, and Didius with a fleet. Didius beat Varus at sea and drove him into Carteia. Caesar
left
Rome
early in December, 46.
By what
route he went
is not known. Appian, Strabo and Eutropius assert that he reached his camp in Obulco (Porcuna) in twenty - seven days from the city. It is thought that the trip was by sea
to
Saguntum, which he reached
in
somewhat
less
than three
698
CJESAR'S RAPID JOURNEY.
weeks, and thence to Obulco in a week more.
One
thing
alone seems clear, that he reached Spain in less than a
after starting
month
from Rome, certainly before he was expected,
and
in advance of his troops.
He
was on the ground prior
to the
rumor of
On
his approach. Caesar learned by ambassadors from Corduba arrival,
MARCH ON CORDUBA.
699
(Cordova) that the town was weakly defended by Sextus Pompey and might be captured out of hand. Pompey had
sent out scouts to ascertain Cesar's coming, but these
all
had
Ulia
been captured.
Cnaeus
Pompey was
besieging
(Montemayor, twenty miles south of Corduba), the last town which had held out against him in Baetica. To the relief
of Ulia Caesar sent a force of eleven cohorts of horse
under L. J.
Paciecus,
man
well
and a good body known and
Paciecus managed to enter acquainted with the province. a storm which was accompanied by such the place during darkness that the enemy was careless and readily deceived
as to his presence
son,
and purpose. With this additional garriUlia could probably have held out in any event; and
moreover, to draw
Pompey from
the
siege,
Caesar,
about
January
8,
of capturing out of hand.
marched on Corduba, which he had some hope He sent his cavalry on ahead,
accompanied by a body of chosen heavy -armed foot, and adopted the stratagem of mounting a number of these behind
the cavalrymen
when they approached the
city, so that their
The Cordubans presence was not perceived by the enemy. sallied forth to attack what they supposed to be thereupon
The infantry, only horse intent on ravaging the country. and forming, fell on the enemy with such effect dismounting
that few returned to the town.
result.
But
the victory obtained no
The presence of Caesar near Corduba and the relief
of Ulia,
obliged Cnaeus to raise the siege when Ulia was on the point of surrender and to march to Corduba, which was important
as being the capital of the province,
and which
his brother
Sextus had sent him word he feared he could not hold against Caesar. It is very apparent that Cnaeus had illy prepared
for opposing, as well as little anticipated, Caesar's arrival.
The
description of the events which
now took
place
is
700
given in the understand.
OBSCURE HISTORY.
Commentaries in a manner very difficult to These Commentaries, like the African War,
were formerly ascribed to Hirtius Pansa, but it is certain that he did not write either ; their author is unknown. One
must decipher the matter as best one can.
text is devoted to utterly trivial details,
The bulk
of the
and the important
movements are passed over with a word or altogether omitted.
The topography
is
the only reliable guide so far as one can
M &*/ *MF^rj"*&s3!i*azssF\t ^^^&mn &C5WB8S& ? -
^J|^sK >^^
Corduba.
guess the localities or as they have been established by careful research and comparison of data. Few excavations have
been made.
to the text in
It is necessary, sometimes, to
do slight violence
some one place in order to make the statements coincide with others equally positive. On the whole, however,
we may
feel reasonably sure of
our general ground;
but the details are wanting and any narrative of the campaign somewhat lacks sequence. When, about January 10, Caesar reached the Baetis (Gua.
dalquiver), he found that the
Pompeians held the only bridge
INTRENCHED RACE.
(A), and that the river was too deep to be forded.
701
He
;
accordingly built a
number
of piers for a bridge below the
town (B) by sinking for foundations baskets of stones and laying his roadway on these, crossed to the right bank in
three successive divisions (C,
D, E) and camped each
(F).
in a
suitable location strongly fortified.
bridgehead on the
left
bank
He then built When Cnaeus
a good
arrived
from Ulia, he camped over against Caesar's bridgehead, on the heights south of the town (G), hoping to get access to Corduba by the old bridge.
Caesar began operations
the the
by an
effort to cut Cnaeus off
it.
from
town and prevent
his entering
"
He
ran a line from
as firmly to
camp
to the bridge
"
(H)
in such a
manner
hold his bridgehead while threatening to cut Pompey off from easy access to the city and thus from his provisions.
He
might, perhaps, have thrown a force, by a night surprise,
;
on the south end of the bridge and have quickly fortified it but Caesar was always fond of the security of earthworks.
He
ran his lines along the river towards the bridge at the foot of the hills on which sat Pompey.
Pompey 's plan was
of course to obtain control of his
end
of the bridge, whose farther
end was near a tower of the
his access all the safer.
It
town, a fact which would
make
would have been a simple matter for his brother Sextus to fortify the bridge at its southern extremity, but he kept
comfortably within
works,
bridge
it
the town
walls.
Perceiving
his
Caesar's
to the
Pompey began a
(I).
line of his
own from
camp
So long
as neither cared to fight for the bridge,
became a question of speed in building works.
As a result of
this intrenched race, a series of serious strug-
gles occurred for the possession of the bridge.
Skirmishes
near by were of daily occurrence, in which neither side could But it is evident that finally, about boast the upper hand.
\.c
'
**
^ijt"
^/j
If^^/ sli^
Corduba
to
Munda.
CJESAR ATTACKS ATTEGUA.
703
January 20, Cnaeus broke down Caesar's defenses by an attack in force and fought his way to the bridge. The
battle here
was desperate.
The
legionaries fought
hand
to
hand.
falling
Hundreds perished not only by the sword but by from the bridge into the river. " On either side were
heaps of slain."
Despite stout fighting, it seerns clear that Caesar was defeated. Cnaeus gained the bridge, and his
Caesar stayed on awhile, hoping to an open-field engagement, which might
entrance to Corduba.
force
Pompey
to
terminate the war ; but finding that he could not bring him to battle on advantageous terms, he gave up the hope of
capturing Corduba, and, as a long siege was not advisable, he drew off his forces. When Caesar left, Pompey strength-
ened Corduba by many engines. Caesar rightly believed that he could make better headway by attacking Pompey 's minor strongholds to the south, and
perhaps seize an opportunity for battle during the operations. Moreover, to get hold of some of these depots of provisions
was the
easiest
way
to ration his
army.
Southeast of Cor-
duba lay Attegua (modern Teba), a town well fortified in a This place he selected naturally strong and high position. for a first attempt. On the 20th of January he quietly drew
in his forces, after lighting the usual evening fires in the
enemy, crossed the river by night and marched on Attegua. There were plenty of provisions in the The country was place, and as usual Caesar lacked rations.
camp
to deceive the
hilly
river
and the town lay on a height a mile or so back from the Salsum (modern Guadajoz), a narrow and not deep stream. Caesar reached the place next morning and at once
he camped on the structed strong lines about it with
it
;
laid siege to
hills to its
many
west (A), conredoubts to afford a
shelter to the cavalry
(B), brought
up
his
and infantry outposts, cast up a mound vineae and engines and made ready to
cv.TT
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0. *"
rs x
i.
K
j-
4^ N
vV
;*&t.;o>
^.a-vx;>\
,J
'
^l
-I
CVr ^-
v-
?%&
:
?*
ijo lc ^H...!*?*
<
^P;S
'/
\f
POMPEY REACHES ATTEGUA.
storm.
the old
rians
705
The watch-towers built on nearly every height by inhabitants as a means of security against the barbareadily into play in Caesar's work.
came
Pompey, on ascertaining next morning that Caesar had decamped, at first entered Corduba amid much rejoicing.
he had scored a point against the great soldier. Moreover, having possession of most of the towns, the winter season would work in his favor and not Caesar's.
felt that
He
Attegua, against which he guessed Caesar had marched,
was strong and could hold out. But when he heard that the place was actually invested he followed Caesar up and reached
Attegua a week vanced too far.
later, before the
siege operations
had ad-
By his sudden arrival on a foggy day he caught some stray parties of Caesar's outpost horse and cut them to pieces. Not wishing to lose his communications
with Corduba, he pitched his first camp on the hills to the west of Caesar (C), but still north of the river Salsum.
Changing
fire to this
his
mind next day, perhaps January
of Attegua,
28, he set
camp, crossed the Salsum, and took
camp (D) south
south.
and
in
up a new view both of it and of
Ucubis (modern Espejo), another of his strong places to the
But though his presence near Attegua with thirteen legions gave Caesar and his troops much work, if not anxiety, Pompey could bring no assistance to the town, and in the
outpost conflicts the Caesarians generally had the best of
it.
Pompey,
to be sure,
"had the emblems and standards
of
thirteen legions," but none of these were full, nor were they of good material.
Two were
had deserted
to Caesar,
had been under Varro, had been given by him to Longinus
native,
and Trebonius, from whom they had revolted in favor of Cnaeus Pompey one was recruited among the Roman col;
Spain one had been in Africa with Afrani us ; the rest were mostly made up of fugitives from Pompey's old
onists in
;
706
NATURE OF THE COUNTRY.
army, deserters and Spaniards. Thus four of his legions may be said to have been veteran, the rest raw. He had some thousands of horse, and about twelve thousand auxiliaries.
Csesar had eight legions, and with later reinforce-
ments eight thousand cavalry. His light troops were probably of better quality and quite as many as those of Pompey.
Each general had some fifty thousand men, not counting auxiliaries. The feelings of the old and weary legionaries
were very
bitter.
The war promised not
is
to lack atrocity.
The nature
of the country, which
mountainous, with the
towns built on easily defended heights, was such that Pompey was able to camp in positions to make an easy and protracted defense.
sive
Spain has always been noted for
its
defenitself
wars.
The sharply accentuated country
lends
peculiarly to defense.
Every small place remote from cities on an eminence, was fortified, and sentinels were kept constantly on the lookout. Whomever the native population befriended had strong and able allies.
was
built
Standing on any one of the numerous watch-towers of the country, one sees on every hand numberless round, woodless
las."
eminences, "like an immense city whose roofs are all cupoNearly all these hills are fit for camping, and at every turn is a position easy to hold, difficult to capture.
In order to strengthen his own position, keep a good outlook, and hold more territory, Caesar had taken possession of
a suitable eminence
Castra Postumiana
some four miles
from
^rom
to
main camp and fortified it (E). It was separated own camp by the river Salsum and was so placed as be a threat to Pompey 's camp. This general harbored
his
his
the idea that Caesar could not readily come to its relief in case he attacked it. It could be approached from his camp
through the valleys without the troops being seen. He planned to fall upon this fort by night, as a means of creat-
POMPEY RETIRES.
707
ing a diversion in favor of Attegua, and, moving at midnight of February 4, reached the place without the cohorts
But before it was too late the garrison being discovered. took alarm, flew to arms, and rained such numberless missiles
on the Pompeians from the walls that Pompey was much
Caesar learned quickly of the delayed in his operations. attack, and with three legions hurried to the fort, already manfully defended by the garrison, where he inflicted a heavy
loss
on Pompey 's troops and drove them
off.
Caesar at this time received reinforcements, especially of
cavalry.
Caesar's position might enable
seize it out of
Pompey, who again appears to have feared that him to move on Corduba and
hand, once more
on February 6
set fire to
his
camp and made
signs of retiring in the direction of that
place, crossing the
his first
Carchena and actually camping south of He had been much harassed by Caelocation (F).
from Corduba, and he appears to have retired the more readily to ration his men, for Most of all his provisions were sent to him from the capital.
sar's cavalry in bringing victual
these convoys reached him, but Caesar's cavalry on one occasion intercepted a train
and pursued the guard back to the
very walls of the
city.
Caesar pushed his works against Attegua.
castella to his lines,
He
daily added
and his terrace, surmounted by a tower,
to fire
would shortly be able
walls.
upon the defenders
of the city
To
destroy these works the besieged
made almost
nightly sallies from Attegua, but these always resulted in
their being
driven back with
loss.
They employed every
Pompey,
device to set fire to Caesar's towers and engines.
who had
not really left the vicinity, made sundry efforts to The interfere with the siege, but to no serious effect.
besiegers proceeded with their operations, undermined and
threw down a good part of the wall.
708
ROMAN CRUELTY.
continued his activity.
Pompey
He
seized a height on
fort (G),
Caesar's side of the river
and erected a
hoping to
place Caesar at a disadvantage, and in many skirmishes near the town showed himself to be an efficient and capable soldier.
select
body of
his infantry one
for some of Caesar's horse
These troopers dismounted to good infantry as cavalry, were as a consequence driven in nearly to Caesar's lines; but being here reinforced they rallied
day lay in ambush and suddenly attacked them. fight on foot, and, not being as
and pushed back the enemy with a
loss of
some hundred
men.
The The
lest
garrison in the town was not only active but very
obstinate
and
cruel.
Caesar's
garrison consisted of
men were none the less so. Roman soldiers, and, mindful of
The
soldiers
the massacre of Thapsus, they dreaded any terms with Caesar
he should not be able to control his men.
murdered a great number of the citizens who were favorable to Caesar, throwing some headlong from the walls. Flaccus,
the
commander
of the garrison, organized the defense with
missiles
skill,
and a vast number of darts and
all
and much
inflammable stuff was thrown at
times from the ramparts
at a time agreed upon with he being able occasionally by shooting darts or Pompey, slinging bullets into the town to communicate with the garri-
upon Caesar's works. One sally on February 15,
son,
was made with particular
vigor.
for object to cut its
way out
to join the
fire-pots
The garrison had main force. After
and flaming arrows
having thrown a large number of
upon the besiegers' lines at various places to create a diversion and uncertainty, they issued at midnight by the gate
nearest
Pompey's camp, carrying fascines to fill up the ditch, and mural hooks and fire to destroy Caesar's works and the
barracks of the men, which latter were mostly built of reeds.
ATTEGUA SURRENDERS.
They were
silver sly
fine
709
enough
and
them a large supply of with the intention of scattering these apparel
to carry with
valuables in places where they would divert Caesar's
from
their
work
of resistance
pey was
all
in the fort he
by thoughts of plunder. had erected on the Attegua side
his part in the fray.
men Pom-
of the
river Salsum,
and bore
He
remained
night in line to protect the retreat of the Atteguans,
should they cut their
way
out.
The
military enginery of the
town proved very efficient. was battered so severely as
One
to give
of Caesar's
wooden towers
the third story,
way above
and an adjoining tower. But the gallantry of the besieged was of no avail. The courage of the men and Caesar's good leadership sufficed to drive
and
in fact the besiegers fired that
them back
into their lines
and
to hold
Pompey
in check at
the same time.
The
inhabitants
now
sent
ambassadors to ascertain
if
Caesar's clemency could be procured,
and at the same time
Pompey
determined that he could do no more to afford the
a result, on February 19, the gates of Caesar behaved with the town were opened to his army.
garrison relief.
As
conspicuous generosity. When Cnaeus learned of the surrender of Attegua, he felt He moved convinced that Caesar would advance on Ucubis.
his
camp again up the river to a point northeast of the place, where he threw up works on all the hills around it which appeared to lend it strength. His weak conduct in not
relieving Attegua
had bred lack
of confidence in him,
and
induced numberless desertions.
to punish.
He
These Pompey determined selected a number of citizens of Ucubis sup-
posed to be
death.
favorable to Caesar's cause and put them to In all the towns and territories controlled by him
similar cruelties were practiced.
This was a short-sighted
policy on his part, and materially helped Caesar's cause.
710
BATTLE OF SORICARIA.
He
was
After the capture of Attegua Caesar moved his camp up
the river nearer to and opposite Pompey's (K).
puzzled
how
to proceed to
draw Pompey
into battle, which
he sought as keenly as
Pompey avoided
it.
Pompey, under
-
the guidance of Labienus, was wisely avoiding open
field
work and seeking to reduce Caesar by famine. ence of Africa and Greece was telling.
The
experi-
Caesar within a few days (March 4) moved his camp somewhat nearer Pompey's, but still on the other bank (L), and his men drew an intrenched line to the river (M). This
work, the object of which
not apparent, gave while, to some heavy outpost combats.
is
rise, after
Pompey had intrenched a depot at Aspavia, south of this place. The stores therein Caesar wished to divert to his own uses. He moved to Soricaria, crossed the Salsum, and. established a
Caesar's line
On
was the town of Soricaria.
camp (N) whose
his
position resulted in cutting
communications with Aspavia. endeavored to reach the place, but found Caesar athwart his
path and intrenching his camp. Cnaeus, thereupon, determined to offer battle, though on unequal terms to Caesar's troops, as he sought the protection of the higher ground, in
Caesar's front
Pompey off from Pompey broke camp and
(O).
But Caesar was on the
alert.
He
sharply advanced on Pompey's cohorts, which were climbing the hill from the west, attacked them smartly, drove them
from the heights and downward to the
plain, occupied the
upper ground himself, and, following down the slope, fell upon them as they were crossing the valley back to camp and
defeated them with a loss of five hundred killed.
On
the next day,
March
6,
Pompey, intending
hill,
to retrieve
its
himself, advanced on the
possession,
same
anticipated Caesar in
and sent
his cavalry to attack Caesar's
working
at their
camp.
men, still marched out and, drawing up Caesar
POMPEY'S SUBTERFUGE.
711
on lower ground, invited Pompey to battle. This Pompey After thus remaining some time, Caesar retired to declined. camp. Pompey attacked bis rear with his cavalry, which
bred a very severe combat, in which Caesar's light troops had The battle went no to mix to extricate the squadrons.
farther.
Soon
after this action,
Pompey
retired to
and held himself
in Ucubis,
and daily skirmishing was kept up between the
in
armies, chiefly
by the cavalry. Desertions from Pompey grew
number alarmingly.
To
arrest these
Pompey
which
resorted to perversion of facts
still
to the towns
by writing held to him that Caasar would not
and
fight,
come down
to the plain
but stayed on the
hills
where he could not be attacked on anything like equal terms. Pompey was in his way energetic, and would have liked
battle
;
but he was afraid of Caesar.
to town, encourage
He
determined to move
others,
from town
to gain
some and punish
hoping
some advantage by drawing out the war.
ivomaii Cuirass.
XLIH.
MUNDA. MARCH,
THE
they are
45 B. C.
Commentaries are very inexplicit on many of the facts of this campaign ; made up of shreds and patches, which can be put together into one
whole only by a knowledge of the topography. Caesar followed up Pompey, and heading him off from crossing the Singulis, forced him to retrace his steps.
Following him to Munda,
it is
usually assumed,
Caesar attacked
which place cannot well be at modern Monda, as Pompey, and in a battle which came very
close to being lost,
decisive victory.
five
The
by a happy accident cleverly utilized he eventually won a It still took some entire Pompeian army was destroyed.
to finish the settlement of Spain.
months for Caesar
He
then returned to
Rome.
10th of March, Pompey, according to the Commentaries, which here become exceedingly sparse of
the
details
ABOUT
and unsatisfactory, broke camp and marched toward Hispalis, a place which, despite the name, cannot be modern
Seville.
Caesar destroyed the
camp
at TJcubis, took Ventisto Carruca,
still
ponte, and following Pompey, marched seeking opportunity to bring him to battle.
to
Pompey moved
camped over against him. It is greatly to be regretted that the historian gives us no details of these manoeuvres. Caesar was evidently trying his
Munda.
Caesar followed and
best to drive
Pompey
into
some position where he could have
him
at
a disadvantage.
And
that he finally succeeded in
so doing is evident
Munda.
But the reasons
from Pompey 's concluding to fight at for the marches and counter-
marches, as even these themselves,
itively finally
we have no means
is
of pos-
knowing. succeeded in forcing
All that we are sure of
that Caesar
Pompey into a
position where the
LOCATION OF MUNDA.
latter
713
Mm;
saw that subterfuge and retreat would no longer avail but that, in order to hold his allies to his cause, he
battle for
it.
must do
We
are put to our inquiry from the
topography and the probabilities. Let us see whether we can supply the gap left by the historian of the Spanish War and reconstruct these manoeuvres.
The
interest of
the campaign justifies a digression
from our narrative.
First
we must disprove some
of the
theories already advanced as to the location of Munda.
entire Spanish campaign is involved in difficulties. soon as we approach the battle of Munda, these difficulties The question where Hannibal crossed multiply indefinitely.
The
As
the Alps
is
sufficiently puzzling,
route of the Little St.
established.
though it seems that the Bernard may be considered as fairly
In any event, there are but a few passes over which he could possibly have frayed a path. But within a
radius of one hundred miles from Attegua and Ucubis there
is
scarcely a ruin-surmounted hill with a brook at its foot
which has not laid claim to being the scene of Cesar's great Spanish victory. And there are all but as many heights
crowned by Roman ruins in Spain as in
Italy.
The
location of the battle of
Munda
has been the source of
hundreds of essays and books, some indeed crowned by the Spanish Academy; it has been the subject of many topographical surveys and researches by the engineers of the
Spanish army; it has been the cause of endless controversy. There is good reason to believe that the locality was not so far from that of the operations around Attegua and Ucubis
as
it is
wont
to be placed; certainly not so far as
modern
Monda, Osuna, or Ronda.
(Xenil), rather than south of
There are dominant reasons for
the belief that the battle was fought north of the Singulis
it.
Let us glance
at these.
Caesar was constantly on the offensive,
Pompey on
the
714
defensive.
PROS AND CONS.
This was Caesar's strategic habit,
or, at least, it
was
his habit to actively push his enemy by operations of some nature until he could force him to battle under suitable
conditions.
With none
of his enemies did he long dally on
the side of defense.
We
may
fairly
presume that
this rule
of conduct obtained in the present case. As we learn from the Commentaries, after the battle of Soricaria, " since which
the
enemy had been under continual alarms," and the
suc-
ceeding operations, Pompey decamped. "afterwards laid siege to Ventisponte, which surrendered;
Caesar followed, and
and, marching thence to Carruca, encamped over against Pompey, who had burned the city because the garrison refused to open the gates to him." Thence "Caesar, still pur-
suing his march, arrived in the plains of Munda, and pitched
his
camp opposite to that of Pompey." Now, none of these places have been
and
it is
identified
by excavato a
tions or otherwise,
well not to give
much heed
similarity of names.
bilities
It is safer to rely
little
on military proba-
and
to
weigh each
item and word in the very
short
to us.
and unsatisfactory accounts which have been preserved
is
There
value,
an
infinite
number
of
arguments of more or
less
which can be framed to explain or sustain any given theory of the movements of the rival armies at this time.
characteristics of the
Let us keep in mind the leading statements concerning and campaign lest we go astray. These all
point to the battlefield of
Munda
being not far from Cor-
duba.
would not unnaturally determine so as to have the proximity of his
After his lack of success in the late operations, Pompey to retire towards the sea,
fleet to
lean upon.
Caesar
to
had a keen eye
for the intentions of the enemy,
and
have
Pompey
thus escape him would be the last thing he desired.
NORTH OF
It is altogether probable that
SINGULIS.
715
sary and sought
so to
he narrowly watched his advermanoeuvre as to head him off before
;
he could cross the Singulis which was a marked barrier between Pompey and the sea. Caesar based on Obulco, and could hope to succeed better if he penned Pompey in the
triangle
It
is,
made by
it
with the rivers Singulis and Baetis.
therefore, a fair assumption that, so soon as
definitively retiring
Pompey
showed the intention of
so
from the theatre
river Singulis to
marked
out, Caesar
marched towards the
head him
off at the fords
and compel him
to
do battle before
he got away.
Had
the rival armies passed
to
the Singulis, the historian
would have been likely
mention the fact as he does the
He does not mention the passage of passage of the Baetis. the Salsum, because the latter is easily forded in many The Singulis has few fords, and at that time had places.
doubtless few bridges, and
:
is
more or
less difficult to cross.
Munda, Again we are told, took refuge in the cities of Munda and Corduba. Naturally enough in Munda, which they had at their back during the battle; but if we allow that Munda was far
beyond the Singulis,
after the battle of
the beaten Pompeians,
and that Pompey was
retiring
from
Corduba, while Caesar followed him, how could large numbers of the Pompeians reach Corduba, through a country cut
up by mountains and
forces?
rivers
and in possession of Caesar's
Would
they not rather have taken refuge in the
battlefield,
towns nearer the
still
held to
Pompey 's
many, most of which, in fact, cause? That a very considerable
plainly from what
is
number did reach Corduba appears
stray fugitives from
told
us about the siege of the town following the battle.
battle have often been
A few
to reach
lines,
known
very out-of-the-way places even through the enemy's but not large bodies of men.
716
DISTANCE FROM CORDUDA.
text of the Spanish
meaning them Valerius fugitives among This alone would reached Corduba the night of the battle. Munda to be near Corduba. The text might also be prove
that
The
War
is
susceptible of
some
of
these
battlefield to
held to imply that part of Cesar's army marched from the Corduba between the evening of the morrow
of the battle
and the next following noon, showing that but
a short distance intervened.
The
text
may be
read to
mean
that Valerius escaped to Corduba, and that Cnaeus took the road in the other direction, to Carteia (near modern Gibraltar),
as if one hundred and seventy miles from Corduba, Munda was near Corduba and Carteia very far away. But
the text should not be forced.
items.
Let us consider some other
Cnaeus Pompey, after the battle was lost, "attended by a few horse and foot, took the road to Carteia, where his fleet
and which was about one hundred and seventy miles He arrived there exhausted, showdistant from Corduba."
lay,
ing that he had made a long journey, as his taking but a small party implied that he had a difficult march to make,
one
much more
tedious than the road from
be.
modern Monda
to Carteia
would
Now,
if
the battlefield was not near
Corduba, at least in the province of which Corduba was
the capital, but far south of the Singulis, why should the historian give the distance of Carteia from Corduba, and
not from some other well-known city nearer the battlefield? Again: as Pompey 's intention, unquestionably understood
in the ranks of his
army, was to make his way to Carteia, if he had passed the Singulis on his way thither, it seems certain that the fugitives would have sought to reach Carteia
rather than distant Corduba.
But except Cnaeus,
the histo-
rian speaks of no soldiers reaching
any places other than
Munda and Corduba.
NOT MONDA OR RONDA.
The
historian gives no
to
details whatsoever of the
717
march
to
from Ucubis
Munda, except
to say that Caesar
went
Had the distance been great, Ventisponte and Carruca. would not he have said something about it, especially as to
pass the Singulis with an
is
army
is
quite an operation, and the
country beyond very mountainous? He does describe the near Attegua, and when he comes to speak of Munda country he says " as we have observed before, this country is full of
:
which run in a continued chain without any plains vening," as if Munda were still in the same section.
hills
:
inter-
battle
Again Corduba surrendered easily after the news of the had reached it, as if from panic arising upon the pres-
ence of Caesar's army near by. Orsao (Osuna), on the connear which town many place Munda, stood a siege. trary, May it not be assumed that it was too far off to be subject
to immediate panic ?
As
tion,
to
modern Monda, neither the topography of the
sec-
nor the narration of the Spanish War, can be held
to justify
is
making
or
it
the locality of the battle.
Mommsen
both
clearly
Ronda
reasons.
wrong in this. Ronda la Vieja are
still
less available for
A few only have advocated these places.
This will
The
gested.
vicinity of the
Rosa Alta mountains has been sugnot do, because had this been the theatre
of the battle, the
town of Orsao would certainly have been a
refuge for the beaten army.
Nor does
the topography of any
told of the
particular place there correspond to
battlefield.
what we are
Again:
Many
have claimed that
Munda must
be near
Orsao, because the military engines used at Munda were " Fabius Maximus, whom he had left to brought to Orsao continue the siege of Munda, conducted it with great zeal;
:
so that the enemy, seeing themselves shut
up on
all sides,
718
sallied out,
NOT NEAR
ORSAO.
loss.
but were repulsed with great
Our men
and
seized this opportunity to get possession of the town,
took the rest prisoners, in number about fourteen thousand. Thence they retreated towards Orsao, a town exceedingly
strong both by nature and art, and capable of resisting an enemy. Besides, there is not, within eight miles of the
any spring but that which supplies the town, which was a decided advantage to the besieged. In addition to all
place,
wood necessary for building towers and other machines had to be fetched from a distance of six miles.
this,
the
And Pompey,
down
all
to render the siege
more
difficult,
had cut
it
the timber round the place, and collected
within
the walls, which obliged our
for carrying on the siege
men
to bring all the materials
they had subdued."
from Munda, the nearest town which But the Roman military engines were
not difficult to transport. Alexander always carried his The legionary engines with him, like our field artillery.
onagra were carried.
Within
six miles of
Orsao there was
framework, so that to carry all the of the big engines from Munda to Orsao was optional, parts and the operative parts could be carried almost any distance
with ease.
wood
left for the large
Orsao
is.
moreover, not on the road from Cor-
duba
from
to Carteia, the line of
Seville
Pompey 's
retreat,
but on that
to Malaga,
so that
it.
Munda
can scarcely be
refer to
assumed to have been near
The Commentaries
Orsao as "the nearest town which they (i. e., the besiegers of Munda) had subdued." But this does not necessarily
imply that Munda was in the vicinity of Orsao. These two towns appear to have been the stoutest in their resistance to Caesar. Had they been close to each other, it is probable
that Caesar would have done
more than leave the
sieges of
Munda and Orsao
town should
to the
management
of Fabius, lest the one
interfere with the siege of the other.
MILITARY PROBABILITIES.
So much
719
for the most important of the various places which can adclaim to be the scene of this great battle. lay duce only negative evidence at best to disprove their claims.
We
The
military probabilities furnish a stronger argument.
is
There
noticeable a certain similarity in some of Caesar's
a type, which it campaigns, showing a method of work, allowable to appeal to as a guide when we can find may be
no certainty in the narration
left to us.
For
instance, in
the Ilerda campaign, Caesar constantly kept Afranius and
Petreius within certain bounds by manoeuvring.
He
did not
permit them
all his
to get
beyond
his easy reach.
In Africa, too,
manoeuvres were within a comparatively small area. Without proof positive that the battle of Munda was fought
south of the Singulis, may we not by analogy claim that it is more like Caesar to have kept his opponent within the
boundary prescribed by the Baetis and the Singulis? If Pompey crossed the Singulis and made for Carteia, and
Caesar followed
him and forced
battle
on him, how had he
time to besiege Ventisponte on the way? For while he was doing so, Pompey would have certainly escaped him. Does
it
off
not seem more probable that Caesar had headed Pompey from crossing the Singulis on the way to Carteia, and
had thus gained time for the siege? Is it not much more according to a Caesarian model to imagine the great captain
mano3uvring Pompey into a place where he must to consider him as conducting a stern chase ?
fight,
than
altogether probable fought north of the Singulis. The town of Montilla has been pointed out as a probable location. The topography is as satisfactory as we can ask,
Such considerations as these make
it
that the battle of
Munda was
in view of the fact that the historian's description is not very
close ;
and the
strategic features tally well with
what we may
imagine Caesar to have done.
In order to construct a homo-
720
MUNDA PROBABLY MONTILLA.
geneous whole out of the shreds of historical statement, we are compelled to assume something.
For the purpose, then, of planning a campaign which shall tally both with probability and with what we are told, let us
assume that the three unidentified locations are: Ventisponte,
;
modern
Puente
Vieja;
Carruca,
modern
Puente
Xenil Munda, modern Montilla. The two former places are the only fords over the Xenil in this section, and have ruins
of
Roman
bridges ; the latter has a battlefield which chimes
well with the narrative of the Spanish
War.
towards Carteia after the battle of Soricaria,
way Pompey was
On
his
heading for the bridges or fords of the Singulis. He chose Carruca for' a crossing, but was stopped there by the garrimeanwhile, moved on Ventisponte, took it, and moved against Pompey to Carruca. Thus cut off from
son.
Caesar,
his retreat towards Carteia,
alternative, turned
Pompey
chose the only other
in
his tracks
towards his old capital, Corduba.
Caesar
and headed by his left met this manoeuvre
off
which Caesar may have been hoping to drive him. Pompey had told his allied cities so frequently that Caesar would not fight when he offered him
plains to
by moving by his right Around modern Ecija are
to cut
him
from that
city.
compelled to make good his word. It is not impossible, too, that he saw no means of longer avoiding Caesar's pursuit. In this way both armies reached Munda.
battle
felt
on equal terms, that he now
Caesar had no special hope that
Pompey would
stand, but
was surprised to see that his enemy had determined on battle. This was the thing he welcomed of all others.
The assumption thus made bears the stamp
more
It
closely with the military probabilities.
of accuracy,
for it accords closely with the historian's relation,
and
still
No
other does.
was on the 15th of March that Pompey camped under
722
the walls of
THE BATTLEFIELD.
Munda.
Caesar arrived next day and
to the eastward, on a brook, to-day the Carchena.
camped Back of
Pompey
lay his
own intrenched camp and
the town of
Munda
as a retreat in case of disaster.
position was disadvantageous.
He
did not feel that his
The next day
after Caesar's arrival,
March
17, as he
was
for he did not believe Pompey preparing for the route, would fight, he learned from spies that Pompey had been standing in battle array ever since midnight waiting for his
approach. "
raised
Caesar "at
once
ordered the standard to be
Pompey had so long alleged that Caesar not to come to battle because his troops were raw preferred levies that he had ended by half believing it; which idea,
for battle.
coupled to his present excellent tactical position, made him the more ready to chance matters on the result of a general
engagement.
The town
of
Munda
lay on a hill sloping towards the east.
Between the two camps lay an undulating plain about five miles in width, through which ran a small rivulet, the modern
Cristobal.
Caesar had had in
mind some other plans
for
outmano3uvring his opponent, but on hearing that Pompey had prepared for battle, he himself drew up in line and
waited for the enemy to descend to the plain, as he believed
he would do; for Pompey had some cavalry which on the But plain could act to better advantage than on the slope.
Pompey kept
close to the hill
and near the town on which
His position was exceptionally strong, and he did not propose to forfeit it. He had all his thirteen
his legions backed.
legions in line.
The
cavalry was on his wings with six thou-
sand light infantry and six thousand auxiliaries. He had probably been able to make good his losses, and may have
still
numbered
fifty
thousand men.
The
slope on which the
to
Pompeians lay was rugged, excellent
defend, bad to
CAESAR PAUSES.
attack.
723
At
its foot,
on Caesar's
right,
was low and marshy
ground, fed
by
the brook.
Caesar had eighty heavy armed
cohorts and eight thousand horse,
thousand
effective.
His
light
any event under forty troops may have been eight
in
thousand more.
As Pompey did not show any sign of advancing, Caesar, on his part, marched across the plain to a point opposite Pompey, as a means of luring him forward. When the
had reached the low ground and the brook, beyond which the hill where Pompey was posted began to ascend,
legions
and before crossing the brook, Caesar halted the line and, calling together his officers, pointed out to them and to his
troops the disadvantage under which they would attack
if
they did so now.
As we have
seen, Caesar never favored
attacking positions, and was reluctant to undertake an assault
here.
He had
caution in certain contingencies equal to
Han-
nibal's;
but, unlike Hannibal, he alternated hypercaution
with the extremity of recklessness.
"The army murmured
greatly as
if
they had been kept
back from a certain victory, when this was told them." The men were in excellent spirits and demanded but a chance to
fight.
The order
to advance
was accordingly
issued,
and the
line
promptly moved forward as with the will of one man, and crossed the brook. The pause which had thus occurred
in the advance of the Caesarians encouraged the
believe that Caesar's legions were hesitating from fear,
enemy to and
induced
Pompey
to order his line to
move a
short distance
down
the hill ; but though they thereby yielded part of the strength of their position, the advantage still remained indis-
putably with them.
mile in their rear.
this city as
tection of the walls of
Nor did they advance far from the proMunda, which was not exceeding a Pompey proposed in any event to have
a harbor of refuge.
724
Caesar's
APPALLING OUTLOOK.
Tenth legion was on the right; the Third and Fifth legions were on the left with the cavalry and the auxil-
drawn up beyond them. The other legions held the The battle was engaged with extraordinary enthusiasm. The shout on each side came from men determined
iaries
centre.
and expecting
quarter.
to conquer,
men who proposed
hill
to give
no
Cesar's legions charged up the
with consum-
mate gallantry.
Caesar's
Pompey's
line
met them
at javelin-throw-
ing distance by a storm of pila and a counter
charge.
men were
superior in discipline
and went
at their
work with cheerful courage; Pompey's troops fought with
clenched teeth, in the belief that their only salvation de-
pended on winning
this battle.
They remembered Thapsus.
At
there
it
the instant before the impact the shower of darts was
so heavy
was
from above that the young troops wavered, and serious danger of Cesar's line being broken before
engaged the enemy.
had
fairly
Then came
the charge
down from
a ram.
the higher ground which struck like the blow of
Its
momentum
fairly staggered Caesar's line; the
lines,
onset was checked.
The two
like wrestlers, with
firm
hold,
swayed to and fro in
fierce opposition.
This each
lasted while the successive ranks
and
lines
relieved
other and fought with lance and sword.
But the
position of
Pompey's men was much
Caesar's cohorts hard.
fighting, Caesar's line
in
their
favor.
They pressed
After
many
hours, of this close-locked
began to show serious signs of weariness; there were hints of that disintegration which appals Caesar was taken aback. So the stoutest-hearted leader.
grave, indeed, was the danger at this instant, that Caesar
afterwards stated that while he had often before fought for
victory, this, his last battle,
was the
first
occasion on which
he ever fought for his life. He had forgotten the Sabis. But that wonderful magnetic energy of his was roused to its
CAESAR IN THE VAN.
highest pitch
725
Never, since
by the imminence
of disaster.
the day
when
the Nervii all but annihilated his legions,
save perhaps at Alesia,
had he been
called
upon
to
his every power, physical
and moral, as now.
some,
He
put out rushed
shaming stimulating others, reproaching the backward, praising the brave, and rousing He fought, as at the courage of his men by every appeal. like a common soldier, with sword and shield the river Sabis,
through
in
the
ranks,
the front rank before
the
ensigns.
By
his
personal
endeavors the
men were kept
at their work.
no question that victory or defeat, for hours perIt was Caesar, and Caesar alone, who haps, hung by a hair. kept the cohorts from stampede. It has been alleged by some
There
is
historians that at the most dangerous period of the battle Caesar, in despair,
was about
to take his
own
life.
But
it
this is
so thoroughly unlike the
man
that
we cannot accept
as true.
Caesar was capable of falling at the head of his legions, but
not by his
own hand
in battle, unless
Evening was approaching. had been put in. Not a cohort of reserves was
battle
he was taken prisoner. The last man on both sides
left.
The
was anybody's. No one could predict the result. Caesar's men had rallied, but they were fighting uphill, and
their
Pompey's men had been encouraged by holding The auxiliaries on both sides had fled. long.
own
so
There was
no chance for manoeuvring. It was a mere question of disciAn accident might break either line, and pline and valor.
such a breach would be surely fatal. Caesar was still omniHis efforts had never slackened. He clung to his present.
ground
like one possessed.
He would
not face defeat.
He
made a last appeal to his old favorite, the Tenth legion. "Are you not ashamed to deliver your general into the
hands of boys?" he cried to his veterans.
quick by the taunts of their general, for
Stung
to the
whom
they had
726
CHANCE DECIDES.
many
times before,
wrested victory from desperate straits so
these battle-scarred
men now
rose to their old standard of
enthusiasm, and pressed the enemy hard.
line
The
rest of the
gained courage for redoubled effort. Pompey was compelled to draw a legion from his right to help sustain his left, which was battered by the heavy blows of the Tenth.
upon this depleted wing and created a distinct impression. The fighting "was hand to hand, foot to foot and shield to shield." On whose
Caesar's cavalry of its
fell
own motion
banners was victory to perch? Finally chance decided the day.
Numidians, after the charge of the cavalry,
King Bogud with his made a circuit of
Perceiv-
the Pompeian right and marched upon their camp.
ing this, Labienus, who commanded on this wing, detailed five cohorts to head him off. Catching sight of these troops to the rear, Caesar, who was in the thickest of the moving
fray,
though he comprehended the mano3uvre, seized on it as " Look an omen and shouted to his men you, comrades, the " The Pompeians at the same moment saw this enemy flees
:
!
rearward movement, and conceiving the idea that their line was somewhere broken, began to waver. This bred confusion
in their ranks
will often
and enthusiasm
in Caesar's,
as small things Caesar's oppor-
do upon the
battlefield.
Here was
It
tunity.
Under
the
his powerful influence, the line
effort.
was roused
all that
to one
more almost superhuman
effort
was
was
required;
prevailed;
the
Csesarians broke the
Pompeian line and drove the enemy towards the town. The victory was won, but the battle was not yet ended. Caesar's eight thousand cavalry, which had so far done small
work, now put in
its
heartiest blows,
and soon broke up the
Great slaughter ensued; thirty thousand Pompeians were cut down, among them Labienus and Varus, and three thousand Roman knights. Caesar lost,
cohorts of the aristocrats.
FEARFUL MASSACRE.
727
according to the Commentaries, but one thousand killed, and five hundred wounded. This last item is another of those
curious discrepancies between
killed
and wounded which
make
it
so difficult to
to those of
modern
times.
gauge the Roman losses in comparison In some battles it can, from their
understood
peculiar
tactics,
be
how
there might be less
wounded than
plainly appear.
fighting,
killed; but at
It
Munda
the reason does not so
to the hand-to-hand
may have been due
which gave a wounded man small chance of getting
to the rear.
Caesar took the eagles of the thirteen Pompeian legions, an immense number of standards, and seventeen higher officers. The victory was overwhelming; the massacre decided the
war.
Most
it
which
from Pompey's army made for Munda, became necessary to besiege. So heated were the
fugitives
passions of the Csesarians, that the dead bodies of the slain
were used as ramparts, and their javelins as palisades, and on these their bucklers were hung as breastworks. The
heads of
many were
stuck on pikes and placed along the in-
vestment lines to strike terror into the besieged. At Pharsalus Caesar lost, according to the Commentaries,
two
hundred
killed;
at
Thapsus,
fifty;
at
Munda
one
thousand.
entire
figures
The enemy, on the
in
contrary, practically lost their
army
may
not be accurate,
each of these engagements. While these it remains true that in ancient
battles the vanquished lost to
Defeat always meant massacre,
an extent impossible to-day. There except to a Caesar.
was no attempt to restrain the troops. To kill was one of the main purposes of an ancient battle to-day, killing is an unfortunate incident of war, which is ended as soon as the
;
army
of the
enemy
is
for the campaign.
losses of a
put as far as may be beyond usefulness Despite such fearful slaughter, the total
campaign in ancient times were apt to be much
728
less
FATE OF THE LEADERS.
than they are to-day, when constant deadly fighting, with daily loss on both sides, is going on.
Cnaeus
Carteia,
distant
Pompey
fled
from the
field
towards his
fleet
at
"which was about one hundred and seventy miles
from Corduba," one hundred and forty -five from Munda; but, after some time, was overtaken and killed.
Maximus, and marched Here Caesar to Corduba. Sextus Pompey had decamped. was arrested some time by the gallant defense offered by the
Caesar left invested by Fabius
Munda
Thirteenth legion.
operations.
fire to
We
Ca3sar
have no details whatever of the
of Caesar within the walls set
his
But the adherents
the place.
made
way
in,
and slew twenty-
two thousand men, many of them runaways from the battlefield of Munda. This slaughter was uncalled for. It adds
to the list of holocausts for
The
tion.
battle of
Munda
which Caesar was responsible. had by no means crushed out opposi-
Pompey's adherents defended themselves to the last. This occupied Hispalis was the next city to be reduced.
some time. Asta and Munda followed.
'
Each was a task
of
some
difficulty.
Carteia had seized Cnaeus Pompey.
;
One
party in the town wanted to give him up one to assist him. His adherents got the upper hand, and, laying hands on all his adversaries, remorselessly slaughtered them. Cnaeus
escaped by sea, but Didius followed him up with Caesar's fleet, and, after a series of romantic adventures and a brave
he was captured and killed. Didius' success was, however, short-lived; he was shortly after caught in an ambuscade and his fleet destroyed by the Lusitanians.
fight for life,
Fabius, after a long siege, took Munda, and later the city of Ursao fell to the Caesarian arms. But the stanch defense
of the towns adhering to
that
it
took Caesar or his
shown by the fact lieutenants many months to accom-
Pompey
is
best
plish their reduction.
THEIR QUALITY.
The Spanish war was
Having reduced the whole
started for
lived.
729
the last in which Caesar was engaged.
of Spain, there
was now no organ-
ized opposition to his rule in
any
quarter of the world.
He
Home
the end of July.
But
his glory
was
short-
He was
sons of
assassinated next Ides of March.
The
Pompey had many
conditions in their favor at
the beginning of the Spanish campaign, but they did not use them to advantage. One of their chief errors was of a kind
not unusual at that day; they devastated the land and robbed This conthe population of a country already half Caesar's.
duct incensed both their friends and foes, and enabled Caesar
to
tamper with Pompey 's adherents, who listened the more readily to him for having suffered at the hands of Pompey. Cnaeus, who was the ruling spirit, conceived his military
projects in a in
still
manner
worse form.
from perfect and carried them out When the execution of a plan of camfar
paign brought either Cnseus or Sextus into the presence of Caesar, he seemed to be still less capable of intelligent action.
Few
generals shine
when they
are opposed to
men
like
Alex-
ander, Hannibal or Caesar. Except Vercingetorix, scarcely one of Caesar's opponents came out of the struggle with military reputation unscathed. Pompey had been a great man;
but he was no longer such in Caesar's front. Caesar never had to face such men as Marcellus, Nero and
Scipio.
Even
in contrast with the greatest captain of anti-
quity, perhaps of all time, these
Romans earned an abiding
Caesar was never called on to oppose such generals ; nor, indeed, such legions as were made up of the burgesses
fame.
of the
Second Punic War.
Caesar encountered semi-barbaric tribes
much
as did Alex-
ander, but not in as overwhelming numbers; he never en-
countered civilized armies under conditions by any means as unequal as Hannibal.
730
REDUCING SPAIN.
in ancient times between the great
A marked distinction
men
and the mediocre captain lay in the ability of the former to rescue himself from disaster if he happened to suffer defeat;
to keep his
within the bounds of demoralization
to save
failure.
them from a massacre.
Zama.
Alexander scarcely knew
face,
Hannibal often looked defeat in the
until
but never disaster,
Caesar always rescued
himself from defeat.
Disaster never overtook him.
If, after
the battle of
Munda, Cnaeus had not
lost his head,
he might have saved a portion of his army ; have retired to one of half a dozen provinces or cities, and have raised troops
to continue the struggle.
alter the
it
He might not have been able to outcome of the war, but he could have protracted indefinitely, at this time a highly undesirable thing for
who was needed
at
Caesar,
Rome
to allay serious political
troubles, and could not well afford military difficulties. Neither Cnaeus nor Sextus were in any sense worthy antagonists of Caesar.
The former must not be underrated.
He
had some good points, and, under better conditions, might have shown for more. Sextus must be gauged lower. They
could not expect to equal Caesar ; but they might have his task a harder one.
made
after
The
fact that Caesar took to reduce
from March
to
August
Munda
Spain to complete subjection shows
how
Pompeian element had got upon the and proves that a good soldier, despite defeat, peninsula, might well have held out an indefinite time. While it is
strong a grasp the
true that Caesar's luck generally pitted mediocre
men
it
against
him during
the Civil
War,
his genius
was demonstrated as
was in
much
in taking advantage of their shortcomings as
his so cutting out
and doing
his
work
as to reduce the length
of his campaigns to such exceptionally short limits.
XLIV.
THE MAN AND SOLDIEE.
but strong and uniformly well. He was a good in athletic sports. His features were large but In his last years he showed his age and grew bald. His dress was refined. always elegant. Cicero was his only superior as an orator in ordinary converse he was unequaled. His power of work and endurance were wonderful.
was
tall
and
slight,
fencer and rider, and well
up
is charged with many liaisons, but they were the custom of the day. His domestic habits were simple, but he was extravagant in art. Some ancient authors charge him with many vices he was, indeed, not perfect but
; ;
He
the
sum
of all
is
a well-balanced character.
He was
a good friend and bore no
malice to enemies.
did.
He had
no bigotry
his intellectual
equipment was splen-
He
did more cruel things than Alexander, but he was personally kind
and generous.
He had
projected
many
great works in addition to those he had
already performed
when
the end came.
As a
soldier, Caesar's art
logistics.
;
was inborn.
The
ancients
knew nothing beyond
Caesar
tactics
and
Strategy was not a
recognized science.
errors.
was
his
own pedagogue
he learned from his own on as high a plane
;
The conception
;
of the plan of the Civil
its
War was
as
its
execution
the rapidity of
campaigns has no equal
but
it
was marred
by repeated
was due
instances of overhasty action barely pardonable in a tribune, inex-
cusable in a great captain.
to these mistakes.
large part of the time
Caesar's objectives
invariably struck at the key-point.
consumed by his work were always well chosen; he His manoeuvres and blockades were on a
he never
lost
big scale.
In adversity he was elastic;
;
morale.
His
tactics
was simple
bal,
we
such battle-tactics as that of Epaminondas, Alexander, Hanninever see. His strategy was broad. Caesar's opponents were not as a
;
rule strong
but he made good use of their mistakes.
Pompey was
able
he
was never
great,
and
Caesar's morale overrode him.
;
Caesar's influence over his
men was marked.
cipline.
In peace he allowed laxity
in
war he demanded
strict dis-
With few
exceptions his legions reflected his
own
splendid qualities.
"CAESAR was born
to do great things," says
Plutarch.
First of all a statesman,
arms were to Caesar a means of
carrying out his political scheme, rather than statecraft an
732
CAESAR'S
APPEARANCE.
The
portrait of this great
aid to his military policy.
man
It is
has been painted by able hands and in
only sought to
many
colors.
add to
this portrait
some touches which perConhis
tain to his military career.
Caesar was tall and of slight but well-knit frame.
stant exercise
and exposure had made him hardy; and
and nervous strength could not be overtaxed. Except that he had at times attacks of "the falling sickness," no illness save quartan ague is recorded of him during a life
constitutional of infinite
toil.
He
was
skillful as
a fencer, and in
many
of
his battles exhibited
an ability to wield arms, coupled to a and magnetic power rarely shown by the personal gallantry
captain.
To
his boldness in
swimming he owed
his life in his
Egypt.
He was
fine
horseman.
As Alexander had
Bucephalus, so Caesar owned and rode in the Gallic War a much prized horse of his own raising who allowed no other
man
to
said, resembled a
mount him, and whose "divided hoof," which, it is human foot, made him singular, if adding no
That Caesar had great physical
is
value to his other qualities.
endurance
He
if
shown by the exceptional speed of his journeys. often traveled day and night and worked on the road as
he had quietly sat in his tent. Refinement and strength rather than beauty of feature His portrait busts show a strong characterized Caesar's face.
intellectual
and
in
some of them there
development with an abundance of will-power; is a singularly sweet expression of
its force.
the mouth; but this detracts naught from
last
In the
severe strain to which he
his carriage
few years he showed in the deep-cut lines of his face the had so long been subjected and
;
was not as erect nor
his gait as elastic as that of
life,
many men
his hair
of his age.
;
In middle
much
to his regret,
grew thin
and as he never quite
lost the instincts
of the dandy, he
combed
his locks forward with noticeable
HIS MANNER.
care,
733
to
and to conceal
his baldness
was glad
wear upon his
head the golden wreath of laurel voted him by the Senate. His eyes are variously spoken of as dark gray, or black and His face was pale when not bronzed by exposure piercing.
;
his dress
had a touch of elegance all through life. constant bather and never lost his liking for the
Caesar
He was
niceties of
the toilet.
may
not have possessed the grace of demeanor of
Alexander; but he had the force of Hannibal, and a power of impressing himself on all who approached him in which
neither the Macedonian nor the Carthaginian was his supe-
His simple directness, his aptness at saying the right word in season, his persuasiveness, his broad culture and
rior.
and language charmed every one who was cast with him, whether the barbaric king of Gaul or the queen of Roman society. As an orator he was
immense resources
of thought
confessedly second to no one but Cicero
his voice
was high-
pitched and his manner animated. was, perhaps, the
first
man
In personal converse he His high-bred courof his day.
He was gifted tesy and an easy manner never forsook him. and power of concentration; he with a remarkable memory
often dictated to two or more secretaries at the same time ;
and we can conceive how such a memory, stored with all that Greek culture and extensive travel could bestow, and
drawn on by eloquent lips, must have lent an attractiveness none could approach. He was versatile without an effort he
;
attained the highest excellence in all he undertook.
Caesar has been blamed for his relations to women.
habits were those of the day.
his fidelity to Imilcea ;
His
Hannibal may be praised for
Alexander for his scrupulous respect of Statira, the consort of fugitive Darius; but Caesar is scarcely blameworthy for being a man of the world when
what we
call morality
was not considered a
virtue,
and
to be
734
HIS LIAISONS.
It is no
continent or scrupulous was to be out of fashion.
doubt true that Caesar's liaisons extended far and wide.
is
He
charged with intrigues with the wives of many of his friends; but, whatever the truth, it seems clear that his
friends
in his
and he did not quarrel. He was assuredly not gross amours and his bravery in refusing to divorce his wife
;
at Sulla's nod, in
It
when other and then greater men did so, and taking the consequences, scores a high mark in his favor. is impossible to say how much of what has been charged
is
against Caesar
due to the
idle gossip of the
Roman
salons.
Caesar's domestic habits were not pretentious.
When
he
was
virtually king of
Rome, when he had been
is
called "the
Divine
"
by an obsequious Senate, he
said to have lived
manner
simply, though Plutarch speaks of the general splendor of his of life, and he was extravagant in the purchase of
He kept statues, pictures, gems, and other objects of art. a generous table, of the best to be had, but without ostentation. As custos morum he enforced the sumptuary laws with
some
severity.
One
of his tables
was
laid for his political
friends, one for his military.
He
himself was moderate in
food and drink, but enjoyed the mental friction of enlivening table-talk. That he had indulged in a youth of pleasure
cannot be gainsaid ; but that
it left
no trace on his body or
his
mind
is
equally true.
No
vices
had sapped
powers
his
physical and mental structure rendered
their effects.
him proof against
Caesar owed much to his mother, Aurelia ; and he repaid her by the same devotion which Frederick showed to "the
queen mother."
death.
Aurelia lived under her son's roof until her
The
this
Caesar exhibited equal affection for his sister. ancient authorities vary greatly in their estimates of
man.
credited
charged by some with all the vices; he is by others with all the virtues ; still others ascribe all
is
He
WHAT SUETONIUS
vices
SAYS.
735
and virtues to him.
It has
been the habit until of
late years to look
many -headed in
Rome
upon Caesar as "the monster," which the once dubbed him. The pendulum has
now swung back, and we are threatened with forgetfulness of what many Roman authors tell us. Among others, Suetonius
informs us that Caesar exhibited great animosity as a judge; that he resorted to bribery ; that he was hasty and violent ;
that he was suspected of ridding himself of an
enemy by
poison
that he lent
friendship ;
money without interest in order to cater that he plundered Lusitania at the point of the
sword and robbed temples in Gaul; that he was rapacious in character and extravagant in language; and that he
incurred the suspicion of heading a conspiracy to murder his opponents in the Senate and resort to a coup d'etat.
certain
Other authors give us many similar items. means of weighing these allegations.
all
There
is
no
We
must note
them
what Caesar was.
told us
and give them a proper place in our estimate of But after so doing, the sum of all that is
character, quite apart
force.
;
makes up a well-poised
from
Caesar's gigantic intellect or
moral
From youth up
means
Caesar avoided quarrels
he had other
of settling disputes,
and could
either assert his view
with reasonable insistence or persuade his opponent by his When angry he was easily appeased. When superior skill.
worsted he bore no malice.
Caesar's friendships were sincere
and durable, honest and
generous and kind. To sick Oppius he gave up his couch and slept on the ground. With few He had no exceptions his friends remained his friends.
above board.
He was
room
for suspicion in his broad affection.
believe that Labienus
meant
to desert him.
He would not When he did so,
in his
if
Caesar offered any friends of
Pompey who might be
service free conduct to join his opponent
they so chose.
736
HIS REALISM.
;
clung to his friends, not from calculation but affection though he made use of them as he himself was useful to them.
He
When
of ill-will.
he had pardoned an enemy, there was no further relic He took as much pride in restoring the statues
and Pompey as he had exhibited courage in replaon the capitol-hill the trophies of Marius. cing Had he been nothing but a soldier, Caesar would still be
of Sulla
the equal of the other great captains.
Taking him as the
statesman
who
tions of the
on the ruins of the Republic the foundaEmpire, as the patron of learning who founded
built
libraries in all the great towns,
and
filled
Rome
who
with
men
of
science, culture
and
letters, as the legislator
drafted laws
which
still
control the jurisprudence of the world, as the pro-
found scholar who dictated the correction of the calendar, as
the thinker, for the grasp of whose
intricate,
mind nothing was
too
most
man
the
nothing too broad, Caesar was, indeed, "the forein all this world."
Of
Caesar.
men of that generation, no one clung to fact as did As Carlyle says of Napoleon, "the man had a cer-
tain instinctive, ineradicable feeling for reality."
He
was
no
idealist,
yet he had an abundant fund of imagination, as
He coolly dissected things, every creative mind must have. and could look at them as they actually were. From a given
array of facts Caesar rarely failed to draw the correct conclusion. Traditions were of value to him for their influence on
weaker minds.
nor over-liberal.
As pontifex maximus, he was neither bigoted The cult of the Roman gods had on his
influence,
mind the proper
to the state ; of
no more.
It
was of
distinct value
no particular value to the indivdiual.
;
his
and character Caesar was exceptional was rarely at fault. He was of a reasonable judgment turn of mind, and the harmony and consistency of his life
In
gifts of intellect
were marked.
In
politics
he was persuasive rather than dog-
HIS HOLOCAUSTS.
matic, but he
737
his point.
had a way of carrying
His
intui-
tions as well as his
power of gauging men and of guessing
their actions were keen.
While allowing
all this, it
must not be assumed that Caesar
was perfect in character. It is possible to make a glaring He was array of faults with which he may be charged.
means he employed when he a fact not palliated do a given thing, because it may be said to have been the fault of his age. He would allow nothing to stand in the way of the accomutterly unscrupulous as to the
his
made up
mind
to
When he deemed the thing he plishment of his purpose. aimed at worthy to be done, every means was proper. He
borrowed immense sums of money without other means of payment than what he anticipated might be ground out of
the government of a province.
kindly habit, he
Personally of a generous, with holocausts before which chargeable the devastations of Alexander shrink to naught. It is said
is
of
him
that he never
murdered a Clitus or savagely mutilated
;
a Batis, or burned a Persepolis but he executed Acco with extreme if legal cruelty he put to death the whole Venetan
;
Senate for their patriotic resistance he again and again visited awful vengeance on the Eburones for the sins of Ambio;
rix; he cut the
hands
off all the prisoners
taken at Uxello-
dunum, and in treacherous cold blood he massacred four hundred and thirty thousand defenseless men, women and children in the course of a short afternoon. The sum of his
massacres in Gaul overruns a million souls, paying no heed to those who perished by a worse fate than the edge of the
Yet, though we view all these things in their proper we cannot withhold from Caesar's personal character light, the meed of our respect and admiration.
sword.
Up
to middle life, Caesar
was purely a statesman.
He
then had the fact brought home to him that he could no
738
HIS HONORS.
longer win the success he sought unless he had at his command Those the military resources which his enemies boasted.
place Caesar on the plane of pure patriotism, who claim that the regeneration of Rome and Greece was his leading
who
object,
must
still
allow that he sought
it
elevation.
What
he sought he won.
He was
mainly by his own a born ruler,
and he became a republican king. The honors and titles which were heaped upon him were lavish to absurdity. The
heretofore military title of Imperator became a prefix to his
name and was made
Pater Patriae.
hereditary in his family.
He
was saluted as Divus Julius.
He was styled He -was
made consul
for ten years.
His statue was erected in every
his honor.
town and medals were struck in
and gilded chariots were presented to arches arose in his honor, and a temple of Concord or Clemency.
it
Chairs of gold him. Triumphal
He
was invested with tribunician honors which made
sacrilege to injure his sacred person or character.
It is
hard to say what part of all this proceeded from the gratitude of the Senate, what part was fulsome and empty
to sap hard to say how much Caesar enjoyed this worship, and how much he He declined some of the honors; he accepted despised it.
adulation,
what part the work of enemies who sought
It is
the autocrat's popularity with the people.
others.
He
;
of
Eome
of Alba.
added his own to the seven statues of the kings he appeared in public in the garb of the old kings About all he did there was a certain ceremonial,
Caesar was sole ruler
despite his natural personal simplicity.
and the Senate became a mere council.
political functions.
He assumed
was
their
new
patrician nobility
created.
Augustus was no more Emperor than Caesar.
It is probable that Caesar at heart cared little for
all this tinsel
;
much
and
of
it is
certain that he felt out of place
far
from secure in the
city.
And
yet he was covetous of honor;
HIS PROJECTS.
he enjoyed the applause of the multitude.
certain habit of simplicity is undeniable.
739
That he had a
He
went about
alone and unarmed, though well aware
his enemies.
how numerous were
He refused the crown which was offered him, because he saw therein a snare. Had he lived perchance he would no doubt have openly become what Augustus was, but he bided his time and the time never came.
had good cause to be satisfied with what he had accomVast as his work had been, it had borne good plished.
fruit.
He
Despite
its
fearful depopulation,
Gaul was again
flourishing and commerce and agriculture were on the increase. His changes in the laws were solid, "the political
life of
nations has during two thousand years again and again
reverted to the lines which Caesar drew."
As
custos
morum
and in
his other judicial characters, he punished severely but
judiciously,
tially.
It
and despite Suetonius we must believe imparis certain that Rome was the better for his adminwhich he
laid.
istration, at least for the foundations
On
Caesar's final return to
Rome,
his physical strength,
;
which had been upheld by nervous tension, sensibly declined but his energy remained intact. He made vast projects for
purposed to drain the Pontine marshes, to make a new channel for the Tiber, to improve the roads, to
the future.
cut through the Isthmus of Corinth.
He
He
projected a cam-
paign against the Parthians and was intending soon to start in order to secure this frontier of the state, as he had all the
others
when
the end came.
At
the risk of repeating what has already been said in run-
ning comment, it is well to sum up the soldier. Caesar had the inborn qualities of the great captain. When he received
Gaul as
his province he
had had no training
in the duties of
a general officer except that gained in the Lusitanian camThere was no training for the larger operations of paign.
740
HIS MILITARY ABILITY.
to the ancients.
war known
The management
of a
campaign
of a
depended solely on the
military problem
ability of the leader.
The grasp
came purely from
is
is
his personal equipment.
To-day, instruction
phases,
given to students of
war
in its broader
and precept
manders.
We
hear of no such teaching
enforced by the example of great comamong the ancients.
its
Instruction there was, and perfect of
kind; but
it
went
not beyond the tactical
and
logistic requirements of an army.
It must Strategy was still unknown as a teachable science. not be assumed that to be an adept in the book -lore of strat-
egy will make a great captain. Character counts for more The personal equation is the one that tells. But than half.
character coupled to a well-trained intellect are essential to
produce the greatest results.
officer is efficient; it
To-day only the highly -trained
but intellect
will.
was
less so in ancient days,
then won as
it
does
-l-Csesar was his
his
now and always own pedagogue in
war.
He
taught himself
trade in Gaul.
He
accomplished this self -training
by
In the Civil War, Ca3sar committed fewer, and these were generally from overanxiety to get at His operations, all things considered, were wellhis work.
dint of
many
errors.
nigh faultless. have already considered the strategic plan of the Gallic War and incidentally that of the Civil War. Let us reca-
We
pitulate the latter.
war Caesar wisely chose Italy, the centre point of the empire for which he was contending,
this
In
as his first objective.
This accords with his uniform habit
of selecting for attack the
most important point.
He
never
His blows were always aimed at the key-point. In sixty days from crossing the Rubicon he had, by his directness and the moral ascendant which foladopted indirect means.
lowed his vigorous
peninsula.
initiative,
acquired possession of the
HIS STRATEGY.
Once seated
in Italy, Caesar
741
found the enemy on three He had gained a in Spain, Greece, Africa. sides of him, If he could hold central position from which to operate.
himself in Rome, he could attack each of his enemy's divisions in
turn.
To
hold
Rome and
carry on an offensive,
demanded two
things,
counting out essential adversary ; in the latter he proved himself far superior.
In the former, legions and speed. detachments, he was weaker than his
Caesar's better plan
We have assumed that
was
at once to
force.
move on Greece, where Pompey stood with
This was of a part with Caesar's
directly at his
his
main
common
habit of aiming
enemy's army.
tell
We
are forced to gue'ss at
the Commentaries are
Caesar's reasons for doing otherwise,
not
specific.
They
us that
sea and that Caesar feared that
to gather a fleet ; that to inactivity,
Pompey had command of the it would consume much time
meanwhile not only would he be forced but that Pompey 's veteran legions might "coninvade Gaul from Spain,
Caesar
firm Spain in his interest," gather large levies, and, more
dangerous
still,
and arouse an
enemy
in his rear.
temperament
correctly.
knew Pompey and gauged his He could more safely rely on Pom-
pey's keeping quiet in Epirus than on Pompey's lieutenants doing the same in Iberia. This reasoning does not convince
us ; but action under
it
was crowned with success
sufficient.
it
may,
therefore, be deemed to have been
The Spanish campaign and
rapid, took long
the siege of Massilia, however
enough
inopportune season.
back to Italy at an But Caesar could never wait. Driven
to bring Caesar
by
exhaustless energy, he crossed the Adriatic to Epirus with
half his army, because he
had not transports for the whole. That he would have been wiser to march through Illyricum
seems
clear.
It
was
his
own
province.
From
the
Padus
through Illyricum to Epirus was almost as short a march as
742
to Brundisium,
HIS ERRORS.
and the bulk of
his
army had rendezvoused
Beaching Epirus with limited forces, Caesar and unequaled good fortune held his ground with energy until, after the lapse of five months, he was joined by Mark
on that
river.
Antony.
safety to
How
Caesar would have fared with an abler oppois
nent in his front
a matter of conjecture.
laxness.
He owed
his
Pompey's Why Antony was not ordered to march by Illyricum when his presence was so essential in Epirus is explainable only in that Caesar and he both hoped
from day
to
day that chance would afford him the opportunity
at
to cross the Adriatic.
for Caesar, directly
Dyrrachium resulted in a marked defeat due to his undertaking an operation which He could succeed only by virtue of a miracle or an accident. was able to rescue himself from disaster because he was Caesar
and had Pompey opposed to him. Having saved his army from this danger, he skillfully manoeuvred to join Domitius,
which done, with an audacity worthy of a Frederick, he
attacked and beat
The operation
Pompey
at
Pharsalus.
All this
is
so
splendid, the errors are so completely swallowed up in the well-deserved success, that criticism is put to the blush.
Upon
guard
to
this decisive victory followed Caesar's overhasty
and
uncalculating
pursuit of
Pompey with a bare
corporal's
Alexandria ;
his political mistake in
up
Egyptian affairs stake; his being blockaded in Alexandria by a horde of barbarians, whom three of his old Gallic legions might have
in petty
mixing himself when the world was still at
overwhelmed
released
his holding himself his
by Mithridates;
by pure stubbornness until two months' dalliance with
were daily gaining strength. Add to these delays the essential campaign in Pontus, and there was again a year consumed, during which the PomCleopatra while his enemies
peian party had
acquired
control of
Africa.
However
HIS OVERHASTINESS.
743
much we may admire
through
the skill exhibited in the details of
the Alexandrian campaign, as well as the courage to see it to a successful issue, it is clear that Caesar for the
moment
lost sight of
the broad plan of his mighty
game
which had the world for a theatre of operations. This error was the origin of the bitter struggle which it cost to reduce
the
Pompeians
to terms in the succeeding years.
Again, when
Caesar was compelled to take up arms to bring
Africa into subjection, his hyper-activity drove him to ship over to that continent at one of the worst seasons of the year,
and
this without giving a rendezvous to his fleet ;
neglect the same untoward situation the African coast which had happened a year before on the
Epirotic.
by which was brought about on
The man who held
state
in his grasp the resources of
to a petty defen-
the
Roman
was reduced for months
sive scarcely befitting a legate, until he could gather forces
go over to the offensive; and during all this time he was in a danger which an able opponent might have rendered fatal. It was Caesar's luck which placed Scipio in
sufficient to
command
instead of Cato.
To
this situation
and the
diffi-
culty of procuring corn
must be traced the narrowness
a wonderful measure.
of his
movements.
At
the same time his danger showed
up
his
fertility in resources in
recruited
up
his forces to a proper standard,
Having again we are led to
look for an immediate and vigorous offensive. But we are a less good army, and by Though opposed by disappointed. For the moment trivial generals, Caesar hazarded nothing.
all his
audacity disappeared. Hannibal was forced to play
played the game which when he was facing thrice his
;
He
numbers of superior troops under consummate leaders
and
he appears to small advantage when contrasted with the CarBut when the opportunity for which he had long thaginian. manoauvred had come, and Scipio had been brought to battle
744
A WAR OF CONQUEST.
on advantageous terms, Caesar, or rather Caesar's army, made
work of him in the brilliant victory at Thapsus. Then came the Spanish campaign, to crush out the relics The clever manosuvres on the of the Pompeian party.
short
followed by the hard-won battle of Munda and the know ensuing sieges, again took more than half a year.
Baetis,
We
less
about these movements than we could wish.
What we
do know
shows Caesar
up
in brilliant colors.
It is clear that the Civil
through in half the time
it
might have been carried consumed had Caesar been actually
War
more
judicious.
But he
started with only a moiety of his
;
army
he committed precisely the same error in opening the African war ; the Alexandrian and Pontus campaigns came in between the other and more imfor Epirus at a
bad season
portant ones and prevented the prosecution of the latter in due season. These events had depended upon Caesar's own
volition.
fall of 49,
Had
had he
he marched to Epirus overland before the in the spring of 48 gone with a respectable
force to Africa, this year would probably have seen the
end
mistakes he Pompeian Tl^,t despite these was victorious in each campaign in so comparatively short a
of the
coalition.
time he owes to his extraordinary ability, his simply astonishIt is, ing good fortune, and the weakness of his opponents.
perhaps, hypercritical to suggest errors in a record which And yet the errors are glaring; history can scarcely equal.
they are such as Hannibal was never guilty of not be traced to Alexander.
such as can-
Speaking broadly, the Civil
much
ical
as the Gallic.
was a war of conquest as Caesar was content with no less than
In accomplishing this end his
polit-
War
sole control of
Rome.
He
and military management were, as always, admirable. was constantly on the offensive. Except as the result of
an overeager movement, he was never put on the defense.
HIS METHOD.
His constant endeavor, as in the Gallic War, was
his opponents before they
745
to surprise
were ready.
It
may
be claimed
as a valid reason
why he
latter,
did not march overland against
Pompey, that the
being master of the sea, would have
It
ascertained his movements and prepared for them.
may
be claimed that it was to take the enemy unawares that Caesar moved on Pompey in Epirus in the winter season. It may be claimed that to surprise the aristocrats was the object of the winter movement on Africa. For as a rule Caesar was
careful to put his troops into winter-quarters.
But
to allow
these claims does not palliate the lack of preparation.
Caesar's scouting system
was always good.
In the Civil
he could more readily gather information of his enemy's plans than in Gaul. He was in countries where he had many
adherents, sometimes the bulk of the population, in his favor.
War
Deserters were more frequent from the enemy. Pompey had The tide of desertion similar advantages in a lesser degree.
was apt to
set in Caesar's favor.
Caesar used his light cavalry
for scouting purposes to better advantage
and was generally
the
more
active in collecting information than his opponents.
Though Caesar was always numerically
weaker, his
He troops were of a higher grade in discipline and morale. He felt that his legionaries had not many auxiliary troops.
were stronger without them. He kept enough for an efficient skirmishing: line, but did not care for the hordes of them O
which were usual at
In the Civil
his day.
War
He
rarely
made
Caesar kept his troops well concentrated. detachments from his army except those
Spanish campaign he four left three legions in Massilia and took six to Spain remained in Sicily, one in Sardinia, and the rest in Italy.
necessary for foraging.
In the
first
With
less
than these he could not hold the territory he had
already conquered.
While Caesar concentrated
his
own, his
746
HIS OBJECTIVES.
make
his opponents divide their so as to beat
constant endeavor was to
forces or to keep
in detail.
them from concentrating,
them
v
His objectives were well chosen. They were generally the In 49 it was Brundisium, where Pomforces of his enemy. pey was in force, seeking to leave Italy. Being the chief
seaport,
it
had the advantage
of protecting
Kome
if
he drove
Pompey across to Epirus. Later objectives were the passes of the Pyrenees, to open his route to Spain; Ilerda, where Afranius and Petreius lay in force Dyrrachium, to rob Pom;
pey
of his base of supplies ; Pharsalus, or in other words, the of the
army
enemy; Alexandria, to which place he thought Pompey had fled; the upper Delta, where Ptolemy was in force Zela in Asia Minor, where he coul,d strike Pharnaces
;
without delay Ruspina, as a secondary base near the enemy Ucita and Thapsus, the enemy's depots; Ulia, Corduba and
; ;
Attegua, important cities held by the enemy in force and Munda, where he could force a decisive battle upon Cnaeus; each and every objective he chose was a thrust at the heart
;
of his adversary.
Caesar never looked askance at his work.
to the very centre.
His look, thought and act went vidi, vici might well have been
Fern,
his motto, instead of being
applied to one campaign. Caesar was frequently in distress for rations.
In victual-
ing he was less apt than Alexander, less careful than
nibal.
Han-
Overanxiety to get into the field lay at the root of
the evil; but, though often with difficulty and risk, Caesar
always managed to keep his
paigns the
men
in food.
In offensive camCaesar was
enemy
in
is
apt to control the supplies.
fairly careful
victualing, but his movements were not wont to be controlled by the question of rations unless famine
stood at the door.
sisting
He
was ready to take
his chances of sub-
on the country or of capturing his enemy's supplies.
STRONG IN ADVERSITY.
Not infrequently he made a mistake.
a good provider.
747
On
the whole he was
As
in
Gaul
so in the Civil
War,
Caesar preferred combat
was at times compelled to sit down and to waste time in besieging them. before fortified places According to the custom of the time, he drew up near the
in the open field; but he
enemy
in the open in nearly all his battles.
He had
none of
the sublime audacity of Frederick or Alexander; he was cautious not to be lured into
cult positions; but
an attack on intrenchments or
diffi-
Caesar's manoeuvring
he was not slow to accept equal battle. and blockades were on a large scale.
The
the
object of his manoeuvring
was for
enemy was more frequent than in Gaul; Caesar had gained
fidence.
or to reach his magazines.
battle, to compromise In the Civil War this
self-con-
The
earliest
example of able manoeuvring
was
at
Herda.
A good example was the operation at Zeta. In adversity Caesar was strong and elastic. He never weakened in morale; he was never disastrously defeated.
After Dyrrachium he marched away rather like a victor than a badly beaten man. He showed no sign of loss of self-confidence he cheered his legions by explaining away their de;
feat ; he raised their courage
by sundry small operations
like
the one at Gomphi, until they again felt that they could cope with the Pompeians even if outnumbered two to one. This
ability to cope with adversity is
of Caesar's genius.
No
one ever exhibited
more than any other a mark it as Hannibal
did ; but
it
was a
distinct characteristic of Caesar.
The
that he
less
tactics of Caesar in the Civil
War
the same as in Gaul, somewhat altered to
was substantially conform to the fact His attacks were
had Eoman
soldiers in his front.
summary than on the
Gallic barbarians.
At
ILerda the
cohorts fought five hours with the spear before ,they took to
the sword.
748
HIS TACTICS.
battle,
flank movements were common. The general each commander was to rupture the enemy's line or break down one of its flanks. The tactics of Caesar was
In
effort of
There are few examples in his battles of splendid tactical formations like Epaminondas' oblique order at Leuctra or Mantinaea, Alexander's wedge at Arbela, or Hannisimple.
bal's
withdrawing salient at Cannae.
Caesar's one instance
ef battlefield manoeuvring
was at Kuspina.
This was good,
profit
but not on an extensive
scale.
Why he did not
by the
tactical lessons of other captains is not clear.
He
did not
appear to think the grand-tactics of battle available for his purposes. Nearly all his engagements were in simple parallel order, coupled with prudent forethought against unusual
danger, as in the creation of a fourth line at Pharsalus.
What
one admires in other captains as original grand-tactical combinations are absent in the case of Caesar. The more
usual combinations
we do
find.
The
orbis
or square
we
saw used at Zeta with excellent
Caesar march in order of battle a
effect.
At
Ilerda
we saw
and
much
longer distance than
usual, showing exceptional steadiness in his formation
In marching by the flank in two or three lines, discipline. peculiar heed was given to the flank which was toward the
enemy;
it
was so formed that
it
could readily come to a front
against a sudden attack.
Caesar's ordinary formation
was in three
lines;
but the
accomplishment of the fourth line at Pharsalus is peculiarly noteworthy. Scarce another instance exists in which so great
an effect has been produced by so small a body of men used at the right time in the right way. The Fifth legion at
Ucita was a sort of fourth line
the same legion at Thapsus ; acted in a similar capacity against elephants; and we notice at Ucita that Caesar had two lines in his left and three in
his right wing, or with the Fifth legion really four.
It
was a
HIS CAVALRY.
species of a strengthened left wing,
749
though not for the usual
purpose of such a reinforced wing. In formation for battle Caesar's line of ten to twelve legions was generally divided into a centre and two wings, each of
these under a legate.
He
had not enough legates
to place
the battle.
of each legion. One or other wing opened This duty was most frequently performed by the Tenth legion, whose post was wont to be on the right. Caesar
one in
command
was always with the opening wing and gave the
signal.
From
this there sometimes arose a sort of oblique order, because the
wing which opened the
rest of "the lines,
battle pressed forward faster than the
in the
battles; but this
same way as in Alexander's was not an oblique order in the same sense
able in the use of
much
as the formations at Mantinaea or Leuthen.
The Romans were never
mounted men.
was massed in one heavy body Pompey's on one wing and should have gained the victory but it was badly organized and commanded. Caesar's small corps was
cavalry at Pharsalus
;
employed to better advantage. Caesar's Gallic and German horse of which at times he had large bodies was, in its
way,
Occasionally as many as four thousand men rode in one column. There had been an improvement in the
efficient.
cavalry since the Punic Wars, principally due to the employment for that arm of the natives of countries which
Roman
made a
specialty of cavalry.
But on the whole,
Caesar's
It did not act the legitimate part of cavalry was defective. It was often mixed with foot. cavalry. Nothing in Caesar's
battles even faintly approaches the magnificent use of cavalry
by Alexander or Hannibal.
A general is
often
gauged by
his opponents.
Pompey had
;
long ranked as a great soldier ; but he had ceased from war he was resting on his laurels. He had never been noted for
initiative,
and the
political intrigues of
many
years had un-
750
fitted
HIS GROWTH.
him
for the field.
Caesar had just emerged from an war in perfect training. His political scheming eight years' had gone hand in hand with war and had not weakened his
soldier's habit.
Add
to
each man's
equipment his own
in
peculiar qualities
and Caesar could scarcely help winning
all
the contest,
versary.
if
he had means at
equal to those of his ad-
There needs no proof of Caesar's ability to cope with the difficulties which lay before him; and that Pompey looked quietly on at Caesar's conquest of Spain is proof
enough of the
training, actual
latter 's hebetude.
Caesar had had the best
himself.
war under, in this instance, the best master, His experience was bred of the errors he had
made and
to
intelligently profited by.
errors.
Not
that he
now
ceased
first
commit
at
water.
Caesar needed a back-set to teach
;
Dyrrachium was a blunder of the him caution.
He
got
Dyrrachium and won. scheme,
it
he at once adopted a more rational
From
the beginning Caesar
grew
in every department of
the art of war.
sieges, logistics,
His
ability in strategy, tactics, fortification,
his career
was more marked at the end of
than at any other period. It is a question as to whether his aggressiveness did not decrease towards the end of his campaigns.
It
would have been strange had
it
not done
so.
To
owed all they knew and all sometimes lacked the spirit of discipline, They but they were remarkable for toughness, force, adaptiveness, patience in every matter of difficulty and self-denial, endurCaesar's personality his soldiers
they were.
ance and courage in battle, attachment to and confidence in
their general.
Caesar's legionaries were an equal honor to
Caesar and to
Rome.
They were a standing reproach
's
to
Roman
them
his
rottenness.
Pompey
men
could not compare with
any sense, and this was because Pompey had created soldiers and Caesar had created his.
in
HIS OPPONENTS.
751
Pompey had never shown
it
the highest order of ability, but
will not
do to underrate him.
He had
at small outlay
won
his salute as
title
Imperator ; he had yet more easily come by his
Still
Magnus. when he actually
idea that
dier,
of
set to
some of Pompey's work was work and good luck ran in
it
excellent,
his favor.
In what has been said
Pompey was not
fell
has not been intended to convey the still a good, perhaps a great solIt is
though he
short of being a marvelous one.
in comparison only to Caesar that he pales.
Had
a lesser
man opposed
him,
degree the qualities he
Pompey might have shown in higher may fairly be credited with possessing.
But Caesar overshadowed him
to a degree which made him not only seem but be less than himself. He dwindled because he met a moral force which bore him under. Caesar,
on the contrary, was and always will be simply Caesar, symbol of all that is greatest as a captain and a ruler.
Scipio lacked both energy and ability in any
marked
de-
was merely a military hack. Solely as Pompey's gree. father-in-law it was that he came by his command. Cato, who was really the superior of all the Pompeians,
refused the supreme
He
command
in favor of Scipio,
made no
use of his unquestioned powers, and avoided disaster by com-
mitting suicide.
Labienus showed much energy, but his skill was weakened by hatred of Caesar. He was a fair sample of the excellent He had been a worthy and lieutenant, but poor captain.
able soldier under Caesar; against Caesar he sank to a less
than
second-rate position.
In
every encounter with his
ancient chief he lost his head.
young Pompeys showed at first some promise. But when taxed, Sextus dropped back to a low grade of skill.
of the
Both
Cnaeus exhibited more but not marked ability. a dangerous opponent.
Neither was
752
"SCENTED DANDIES."
rest of the generals
The
opposed to Caesar were distinctly
of a low order.
Caesar's abilities stand out in singular contrast to all of
Tried by the ability of his opponents, which is a tempting theme, but neither a fair test nor a fruitful subject,
these.
Caesar ranks lower than Alexander, vastly lower than
nibal.
Han-
But
as one of the
marks
of the great captain is to
utilize the
errors of opponents
who
lack high qualities, a
thing which he always did, the soldier Caesar cannot be His wonderful power of placed on a level other than theirs.
mind and
touched.
will
produced a marked influence on everything he Every one relied on him, all looked to him as the
centre of motion.
As
has been before said, the test of greatapplied by seeking the general
ness in a campaign
may be
who
was
is
the mainspring of the movement, the motive power
which keeps the rest at work. This in all his campaigns Caesar. It was not what his enemies did, but what
Caesar did, which furnished the keynote of all that happened. Caesar was generous in rewards, praise and largesses to his
soldiers.
He was
ever ready to distinguish the brave and
thus incite others to imitate them.
He had
the rare capacity
of winning his men's devotion to himself, both as a soldier
and as a man; and this without losing his power or deHe dressed scending from the dignity of his position. and equipped his legions well, distinguished many by giving
them weapons ornamented with gold and silver, took pride in seeing his men well-mounted and handsomely attired.
Though his soldiers were dubbed "scented dandies," they In this they were like their leader. yet knew how to fight. Beware of underrating dandies. Some of the stoutest hearts and clearest heads have lurked under a foppish dress.
Caesar never lacked a pleasant word for his men, remembered the face of any one who had done a gallant deed, and
HIS DISCIPLINE.
when not
ments,
in
753
in the presence of the
enemy encouraged amuse-
which
he
not
infrequently personally joined.
After the disaster to Sabinus and Cotta, Caesar allowed his
beard and hair to grow and vowed he would not cut them This till his soldiers had revenged their comrades' death.
to us trivial act
had
its
meaning
to Caesar's
legionaries.
Such things wrought up
worship almost fanatical.
,.
the feeling of his soldiers to a
However lax when danger was not near, in the vicinity of He the enemy Caesar demanded discipline of the strictest.
required the most unheard-of exertions and sacrifices; he allowed no rest, day nor night; season or weather had no
recognition.
A
in
Every man must be ready at all times for duty. willingness to do and suffer all this Caesar comprehended " It was his use of "citizens the name soldier. instead of
of the
"comrades" that broke up the mutiny
Tenth
legion.
He was
generous in overlooking smaller faults, but severe
beyond measure in punishing larger ones.
requiring of
He was
the
more
His
the
to
man
the higher
he stood in
as
office.
severest punishment
was
dismissal,
in the case of
tribunes and centurions of the Tenth legion
Africa.
when
it
came
In the
Roman
state this
officers
was
political
and
social
excommunication.
Caesar's
were capable of more
under his command than under any other conditions. WitThis was ness Labienus in Gaul and Labienus afterwards.
owing not only to his gigantic personality but to the fact that he was ready and able at all times to do thrice the
work
that any one
else could do.
No
one in the army
it
labored so hard as Caesar.
Caesar's
All this makes
escaped from
stranger that
men more than once
his control in
manner which showed a limit
to their discipline.
Thapsus was the most noted example.
Of The same may be
this
said of their occasional demoralization, as at Dyrrachium.
754
THE PERSONAL FACTOR.
marked degree how
Caesar's career as a soldier shows to a
factor of personal character. Caesar's great in war is the art was not a thing he had learned from or could impart to
others.
It
seal of his splendid
was the product of his vast moral force.
intellect
and bore the
Caesar as Pontifex
Maximus.
(Vatican Museum.)
XLV.
ALEXANDER, HANNIBAL, CAESAR.
ALEXANDER had
is
the most beauty
we
think of him as the Homeric youth
of Hannibal and Caesar as in sober maturity of years.
In
all his qualities, Caesar
the most splendid
man
of antiquity
as a soldier he equals the others.
Alexander's ambition and Caesar's was coupled to self;
Caesar the
all
Hannibal's pure.
man was
kindly
Caesar the soldier ruthless.
;
In capacity for work
;
culating.
were equal. Alexander's will was fiery Hannibal's discreet Caesar's calIn battle Alexander was possessed of divine fury Hannibal was
;
cool but bold
Caesar
had not
their initiative.
;
In influence over
men Hannibal
was supreme. Caesar was an orator Alexander and Hannibal spoke simply and to the point. As statesmen, Alexander built on a mistaken foundation
;
Hannibal's work was doomed to fail; Caesar's
is
everlasting.
For perform-
ance with slender means and against great odds Hannibal stands the highest.
Alexander had luck, but used it Hannibal had no luck Fortune smiled on Caesar as on no other man. The strategy of each was the same. In extent of
; ;
conquest Alexander was the most distinguished
ance, Hannibal.
in speed, Caesar
;
in endur-
the others
in
Alexander was the cavalry-leader in tactics Caesar was below As men Alexander and Hannibal stir us with sieges, Hannibal.
Caesar evokes our admiration
;
the touch of nature, as Caesar does not.
Alex-
ander and Hannibal our sympathy.
IN beauty of person and stateliness of presence the ting of Macedon was more distinguished than the Carthaginian general or the
Roman
imperator.
Few
of the heroes of history-
appeal to us in the physical sense so distinctly as
Alexander ;
and, adding youth to splendid achievement and royal bearing, the conqueror of the Great King- stands out the most
In bodily strength and endurance Hannibal was his equal; Caesar, while gifted with unsurpassed
lustrous of mortals.
nervous force, and physically able, does not wear the Homeric garb with the right of Alexander. Nor had he the youth
756
THE GREATEST MAN IN ANTIQUITY.
our thoughts up Caesar or Hannibal, we are apt to see in our mind's
of warlike glory of the son of Hamilcar.
call
When
eye the mature man, superb in his power of intellect and character; Alexander stands before us clad in a blaze of
divine strength and youthful fervor.
All Alexander's portrait-busts are those of the hero who subdued the world and
died before he passed his youth; those of Caesar and the sole authentic one of Hannibal show us the man of middle age,
all the
more powerful, perhaps, but
less the
demi-god than
the son of Philip.
If
we take him
as statesman, jurist, author, thinker, solIf
dier, Caesar
has no peer in antiquity.
we take him merely
There are things
as the soldier,, he stands beside the others.
which can be neither weighed nor measured. In intellectual activity and moral force these captains varied as their temperaments varied. In uprightness of purpose and purity of life neither Alexander nor Caesar in any sense approached the unselfish, model patriot, whose ambition was Hannibal,
solely for his country,
whose
life
whose appetites were always curbed, was one long and earnest effort, whom pleasures
could not seduce, nor position warp, nor flattery turn.
Alexander was rash in temper and succumbed all too often to his love of wine. His ambition was a dream of personal
greatness coupled to the hope of Hellenizing the world ; and
around
this
he cast the atmosphere of his all-pervading
intel-
lect, his boundless ability to conjure
up mighty
projects, his
fabulous power of compassing the impossible.
Caesar was
by nature cool and calculating.
succumbed
to temptation.
He
neither resisted nor
To him
It
there was no temptation;
what he craved he took.
was
his boundless egotism
;
which
made him
not
Caesar.
His ambition was Rome
its
but
Rome
without Caesar as
guiding
star.
Rome was With many of
the noblest personal qualities, which he manifested at every
POWER OF WORK.
turn, Caesar
757
had not a
glint of patriotism in its finest sense.
All that he did or aspired to do was coupled to self. He could not serve Rome, as Hannibal sought to serve Carthage, though he himself was swallowed up. Generous and kindly
by nature, he yet has
one's heartbeats.
the man.
If he felt a
to his charge holocausts
which stop
Caesar,
Caesar, the conqueror,
knew not
qualm
at the treacherous butchery of
nearly half a million souls in a few hours, no one ever
it.
;
knew
Alexander was warm-hearted but hasty generous at one moment, violent at another. Hannibal had that gentle fibre
whose human kindness to
of their race.
fallen
foemen overcame
his hatred
Caesar was gracious in his dealings with per-
sons, ruthless to insensibility in his treatment of peoples.
Intellect
and moral force alone do not
suffice to
make a
great man.
will ever do.
Work
is at
the root of all that
man
has done or
In his capacity for work Alexander drew on If in any a body and mind which never knew fatigue. Alexander came near to being the demigod he loved respect
to be thought,
it
was in
his
superhuman
ability to labor.
No
was his superior in arms or games; no had a clearer grasp of any new or knotty probphilosopher lem no soldier was ever so truly instinct with the gaudium
professional athlete
;
certaminis as he ; no one ever performed so
much
in so short
a life. Hannibal, in his youth, was much like Alexander ; but maturity early sat on Hannibal's brow; eternal youth Csesar we only know ever shone from Alexander's visage.
in youth as the in
manhood
all
as
dandy who was noted for bold political acts the sublime orator, and as the statesman who
;
overrode
with
whom
he came in contact; in middle age as
the magnificent soldier, but the soldier whose boldness was not Alexander's nor his caution Hannibal's; in old age as
the legislator, the governor, the creator of what to-day
we
look upon as the foundation of our civilization.
758
WILL-POWER AND COURAGE.
of Alexander
fiery
The will-power
was that of a man who
purpose respected neither who would destroy even
brooked not restraint ; whose
bosom friend nor ancient
will never outran
servitor ;
himself in seeking to compass his chosen end.
Hannibal's
an inborn discretion which subordinated
do not know what Alexander might have become at the age of Hannibal's greatest power; we do
even Hannibal.
We
know what Hannibal was
performance.
ties,
at the age of Alexander's greatest
brilliant
forties.
Alexander did his
in the thirties
work
in the twen-
Hannibal
and
Caesar was well
on in middle
When
salus,
life before he wore the purple paludamentum. he won his most splendid battle on the field of Pharhe had by two years passed fifty his best work fol;
lowed
this.
His will-power was of a different kind.
What
little,
he
set out to do,
he did, with the courage of Alexander, the
persistency of Hannibal; but he could yield here a
insist there
little,
cajole,
command, weave
his
way
into
opposition or tear
its
fabric into shreds, without for a
mo-
ment losing
purpose.
sight
of his once conceived, never forgotten
The courage of each was unsurpassed. So soon as battle was engaged, Alexander was possessed of a divine fury In the death scarcely sobered by his divine intelligence.
struggle of legion and phalanx Hannibal never for a
lost his quiet
moment
power of seeing and doing the proper thing;
never failed to take advantage of the least error of his opponent, nor to force the fighting at the critical moment. In
the execution of his projects he was obstinately bold; deliberate
tell.
when
doubtful, rapid at the instant
when a blow would
to
power push a strategic advantage than in the longing to meet and annihilate the enemy. Alexander and Hannibal, like
Frederick, never counted numbers ; unless forced into action,
Caesar's courage as a soldier lay rather in the
INFLUENCE OVER MEN.
Caesar
fought.
759
sought to get the chances on his side before he
Alexander's influence over others as a man, was marked;
was supreme. He would have been the chief of any assembly had he not been king but his royal character Hannibal had no equal in his added to his manly force.
as a king,
;
power over men.
He who
could hold together a motley array
instincts
of diverse tribes, with clashing
and
aspirations,
weld them into an army and, though outnumbered many times by superior troops, could with it keep his clutch on the
throat of
Rome
for half a generation, has
it
no peer.
By
just
fact
did.
what method he did
suffices.
Csesar
we do not know; but the bare his influence much as Napoleon won
His gigantic grasp,
to those
his fluent tongue, his plausible method,
his suggestive mind, his appearance of reasonably yielding
whom
he desired to control, carried every point.
He
was truly Caesar Imperator, embodiment of all which should be czar and emperor, which, alas, so rarely is.
Csesar was by nature and training an orator.
direct, convincing ; his
His style was
manner animated
he held his audiintellectual
ence.
Alexander and Hannibal were both
and
cultured; neither
had studied rhetoric as an
art; but each
had the power of saying the right thing at the right moment and in such fashion as to sway his hearers and to compass his ends. None of these great men dealt in mere words.
What
Who
they said proceeded from the glowing thoughts within. None of these men thinks clearly speaks clearly.
effect.
spoke without due
Whoso
listened
was convinced,
Alexander spoke as the master; persuaded, or silenced. Hannibal as the diplomat, with peace or war in either hand ;
Caesar,
man
however powerful, never lost his plausibility. No ever conjured right to his side, ever made the worse
appear the better reason, more surely than he.
760
AS STATESMEN.
trace of
That Alexander's statesmanlike projects left a permanent Hellenism on every country he overran is praise
Hannibal was sagacious and far-sighted. Had he enough. not been endowed with the craft of a Talleyrand as well as
the purity of a Washington, he could never have
close to
come
so
upheaving the foundations of the
basis.
Roman
republic.
But
it
as a statesman Caesar's
had the better
work was the more enduring, as He built on what was left of the
;
solid
Roman
character ; his corner-stones were well laid
his
superstructure lasted for generations ; the inner meaning of
his
work has modified
all
human endeavors towards
civiliza-
tion
from his own age to ours. Alexander wrought like a Traces of his work still stand, giant, but on a mistaken plan.
like the
last
;
pyramids of Gizeh.
Hannibal'
work could not
the Carthaginians were bound by the rule of progress
to disappear
endure
from the world's economy. Baal could not no Punic structure but must perish. Caesar had a
groundwork prepared for
rational, honest thinkers,
him by twenty generations of who builded even better than they
and wisdom erected what
knew.
On
this his perspicacity
will ever
Roman
fabric
be the pattern of growth in statecraft. That the Empire did not last was due to other causes. The
wrought by Caesar the statesman can never perish. as a soldier simply no perApart from other work formance with slender means can equal Hannibal's. Alexander started worse handicapped than Hannibal, but circumstances favored him and, once he had attacked his problem,
his material resources
grew as he advanced
into the bowels
first;
of the land.
Hannibal's resources dwindled from the
he was forced to create everything he had. He made bricks without straw he himself forged every weapon with which he
;
slew a
Roman.
We
shall never see such soldier's art again.
Caesar's resources
were ample.
He
could have drawn on
FORTUNE.
more than he put
to use.
761
result of his
Vast as was the
is
achievements as a soldier, there
no part of
his
work which
can be fairly compared to the record of Hannibal.
is not the test of military skill.
To win
Alexander had a way of courting Fortune so that she One's fancy readily ascribes her always smiled on him.
fidelity to his fascinating influence
;
in truth,
it
was that he
The never neglected a chance the fickle goddess offered. He never called smallest favor he on the instant put to use. on Hercules until his own shoulder was at the wheel. How
could Fortune be fickle with such an ardent wooer?
To
Hannibal the youth, Fortune was kind; on Hannibal, past his youth, she turned her back, and never again smiled.
And
yet this noble soldier wrought as persistently as
in her favors
if
he
had basked
from morn
to sunset.
No man
ever
tempted Fortune as did Caesar.
He was
successful
beyond
any
in his devotion to
women
he obtained before he asked.
So with Fortune.
She who forsook watchful Hannibal never
turned from reckless Caesar.
Always
at
hand and kinder
the more Caesar neglected what she requires in all others, she
saved him a thousand times when his schemes deserved to
come
History furnishes no instance of a great man being so beholden to her whom he rarely sought to court. Foolhardiness which in others Fortune would leave to the
to naught.
punishment which ought to follow, in Caesar she would favor.
He
could not overtax her patience. And knowing that Caesar was happy in his conquests of women, we must allow
that his greatest was the easy conquest of this wont-to-be
hard-won goddess. Though Alexander was outnumbered as no one
fought
only
barbarians
else,
he
he
and
semi
civilized
armies ;
attacked an effete monarchy without cohesion, a structure
already, toppling.
Caesar fought barbarians
first
and then
762
troops of his
THE ART OF EACH.
own kindred, though not so well equipped The barbarians Caesar showed less aptness
or
in
commanded.
handling than Alexander or Hannibal; in the Civil War he had stancher forces to oppose him than Alexander. Hannibal fought barbarians in Spain, and in Italy troops far better than his own, the stoutest then on foot, under leaders
who had been taught by himself and who had
method.
lessons
assimilated his
Marcellus and Nero and Scipio learned Hannibal's by heart as the Archduke Charles and Blucher and
Wellington had mastered the art of Napoleon. Hannibal was overtaxed as no captain in the history of war has ever
been and held his own a moment.
The more we compare
Hannibal with any other
of his genius.
soldier, the brighter the effulgence
The
art of each of these captains
was based on a rare
;
combination of intellect
and moral force
and
in the case of
each the third element, opportunity, was not wanting. Each had a method ; he saw distinctly the point at which he aimed,
and he drove
his shaft straight
and unerringly into the target,
;
and through it. Each was careful of his base each saw and sought the enemy's weak spot; each kept his army well in hand. Alexander and Hannibal were better providers than
Caesar,
his problem,
whose army, from his overanxiety to grapple with was often on the point of starvation. Alex-
ander won by bold strokes, the brilliancy of which can be found on no other historic page. Hannibal won by a careful study of the when and where to strike ; his blow when delivered never failed to cripple the enemy. Caesar was less bold than Alexander; in a way he was more cautious than Hannibal ; but with his caution was mixed a precipitancy which
should in
many
cases have wrecked his schemes.
Alexanfell
der's first glance told
him where
to strike,
and the blow
with lightning speed and force.
Hannibal was deliberate;
THE SPEED OF EACH.
763
he lured his enemy into a false position and annihilated him. Caesar, while never failing to grasp the whole, and to act on
a method fully abreast of the problem, was so lax in
luck which often comes like a deus ex machina.
many
of the parts that to succeed required the intervention of a
Alexander
would not
a victory ; Hannibal was the master of stratCaesar was by turns Quixotically bold and a very agem; Fabius for lack of tactical enterprise. Yet finis coronat
steal
opus; Caesar won, and he stands beside Alexander and
Hannibal.
The element
of speed in accomplishing a task is a test not
to be overlooked.
Caesar took eight years to conquer Gaul ;
Alexander in eight years had conquered a vast territory of neighboring barbarians, had ground Hellas under his heel,
had restored to the -ZEgean cities their independence, and had overrun Asia to the Jaxertes and India to the Hyphasis. In
the Civil
War,
Caesar was second in extent and rapidity of
conquest only to Alexander.
another standard.
In
five
Hannibal must be tried by years he subdued half of Spain,
crossed the Alps to Italy and, though reaching the Po with but twenty-six thousand men, throttled the gigantic power
of
Rome,
men.
a city which could levy three quarters of a mil-
lion
This record for speed against odds excels that of Alexander and Caesar. And when we take up the question
of endurance,
the
and cast on
his
own
forsaken by his own people sole resources, could hold Rome at bay
dissolution for fifteen years has not, can-
man who,
and on the verge of
not have a peer.
Alexander had no confidant but Hephaestion. Hannibal never had a confidant. Caesar had many friends to whom he
confided his schemes in part; the whole he kept strictly to
himself.
Caesar trusted
men
so far as he could use them.
But though on
the surface plausible, frank
and open
as
few
764
AS CAVALRY LEADERS.
ever are, no one
men
knew
Caesar's ulterior purpose.
all
he aimed at as the result of
he did, no one divined.
What He
was an adept at concealing
dor.
It befits Alexander's
;
his intentions
under a
veil of can-
sunny character to have a Hephseskey to
his pur-
tion
it befits
Hannibal's vast and trying task as well as his
patient isolation that he should alone hold the
pose.
It befits Caesar's versatility
and
self-reliance that
he
should use
many
friends to aid his kaleidoscopic plans.
But
a well-kept counsel added to his chances of success. Hannibal is said to have worn masks to conceal his person ;
under
all
Caesar's face
was always masked when
it
came
to his inner
motives.
Alexander's strategy was gigantic in conception the theatre of his campaigns was the world. Hannibal's strategy
;
differed
but
if
it
from Alexander's as the problems of each differed was equally skillful and bold in a certain sense keener
; ;
was always noteworthy. His apprehension of the strategy of the Gallic problem was as fine as his judgment of what was required by the condinot so vast.
Caesar's strategic push
tions
which faced him as he stood on the bank of the RubiIt could not
con.
be better.
As a
cavalry leader Alexander cannot be equaled.
No
one ever repeated charges with the same body of horse on the same place in the enemy's line as he did at the Hydaspes.
No
stand unrivaled in history.
interval,
one ever trained such squadrons; the "Companions" Next to him, but with a distinct
came Hannibal with
his Numidians.
Alexander's
Companions won with naked
blade in hand ; the Numidians
by
clever tactics.
Caesar never
knew
the uses of cavalry in
this sense.
His Gallic and German horse were each excelmentioned beside the others.
lent ; but they cannot be
Alexander's tactics was audacious and clean-cut.
thrust
He
home on
the instant, and blow succeeded blow until his
THE GALLANTRY OF EACH.
enemy was a wreck.
with deliberation
;
765
Hannibal studied his
till
tactical
he thrust not
by
skillful feints
problem he had
found the weak side of his adversary's defense. But when he thrust, his blade never failed to find an opening. Caeneither the audacity nor persistence of Alexander; he had none of the originality His battles were not won because of his own of Hannibal.
sar's tactics
was not strong.
He had
perfect plan, but because of the
weak behavior
of the
still
enemy.
farther
As
a tactician Caesar
is
far below Alexander;
Alexander was boldness personified ; Hannibal was careful in plan, strong in execution; Caesar was
below Hannibal.
neither.
When
Caesar was forced to fight
as at the Sabis,
he fought nobly; but he never fought as if he liked the task. Pharsalus is the only battle boldly planned
or at
Munda
and boldly carried through; and
laxness as
this
much
as
by
Caesar's courage
was won by Pompey's and good judgment.
In personal bearing, Alexander was, as he strove to be, an Achilles. Hannibal's gallantry in youth is testified to
by Livy, but we forget it; we look on him as the thoughtful soldier, running no unnecessary risks, calculating his chances closely and then striking a blow marvelous for its
Caesar never appeals to us as the beau sdbreur; he is In the few instances in which his the intellectual captain.
effect.
personal conduct was called upon he was acting in selfdefense. He never led his men, as Alexander did at the
city of the Malli,
from sheer exuberance of courage. won by brain tissue backed by strong moral force. not Homeric in his heroism.
Caesar
He was
In the history of sieges, Tyre and Alesia stand side by side. Hannibal never did such work. Saguntum, though
fine, is
on a lower
level.
Alexander's opponents were far below him in capacity;
Caesar's rank higher.
Vercingetorix was able ;
Pompey had
766
AS MARCHERS.
been great, but his powers had waned. Neither Alexander nor Caesar faced such men as Marcellus and Nero, Fabius
and
Scipio, or such troops as the burgess-legion.
Tried by
this standard
Hannibal
is
the pattern of patterns.
;
his
In marches Alexander holds the record for great distances Hannibal is unpursuit of Darius is hard to equal.
skillful
matched for craft and
eluding of the enemy.
Caesar's marches are remarkable.
to the -ZEduan
Some of The march from Gergovia
miles in twenty -four
is
army and back
fifty
hours, with a force of fifteen thousand foot
only equaled
by the Spartan march to Marathon. Alexander's passage of the Hindu-Koosh is like Hannibal's crossing of the Alps.
Caesar was never called on
to
do such work.
Alexander
was cautious on the march; Hannibal still more so. It was from Hannibal that the Romans learned to march an army.
by being careless; but surprises taught him he ended by conducting his marches in the ablest caution; manner.
Caesar began
Alexander demanded of his men the severest exertions, without regard to season or circumstances, but took excellent
care of
them whether
at
work
or rest.
Hannibal was never
out of bread, though living most of the time on the enemy's On occasion, as in crossing the Alps or the Arnus country.
marshes, he called on his
men
for labor untold.
Caesar was
not always a good provider; the African campaign was He was more apt to put his largely a tramp for victual. men in winter-quarters than Alexander or Hannibal.
exhibited the highest power.
In exerting influence over his men, each of these captains That each was the hardest
in the
worked man
do every part of
army was apparent to all; each could a soldier's duty in a manner no man in his
Justice, generosity and high approach. them the example all strove to imitate.
command
character
could
made
THE ONE TOUCH OF NATURE.
Each
inculcated a spirit of emulation
767
among
his
men each
;
rewarded gallantry and good service as they deserved. As simple man, Hannibal far outranks the others in his
purity of
life
and
his elevated patriotism.
;
Alexander had
two sides
in its
the one lovable, admirable
self-control.
the other lamentable
want of
Ca3sar the
man
lacks the one
touch of nature.
One can
truthfully say a thousand admihis
rable things of him.
Quite apart from his greatness,
reasonableness, his
qualities of his
testify,
warm
friendships, his generosity, the fine
mind, the
many
noble traits to which all
commend him
is
to our
admiration, to our regard.
And
yet there
to Caesar, as there is to Napoleon,
an
arti-
ficiality
which one never can forget.
He
wears an armor we
cannot penetrate. say much to praise him, but the Alexander, in his love for epithets lack an inward meaning. in his violence to Clitus, was a man. HanniHephaestion,
bal, in his hatred of
We
Rome, in his self-immolation at the was a man. Gustavus, the Christian Carthage, king, falling at the head of his squadrons at Liitzen, and Frederick, the monarch of iron, writing poor French verses
altar
of
as a relief
from his defeat, are both
full of
human
nature.
Caesar and Napoleon impress us as characters in history.
Each
calls
out a thrill of admiration; neither calls out a
human sympathy. Tried solely by the standards of the soldier, these equal captains, if one may pronounce between them, stand Hannibal the peerless ; Alexander the Homeric Caesar the un vanthrill of
: ;
quished.
Taken
antiquity.
in all his characters, Caesar is the greatest
man
in
XLVL
THE ART OF WAR OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE.
AUGUSTUS formed from
standing
the relics of the legions of the civil ware a
strong,
new
army some
three hundred thousand
which was distributed
mostly on the frontiers.
The Empire
praetorian
rested on the
army
hut Augustus'
method was good. power and used it
good army
the ranks.
;
guard gradually increased, acquired great Later on, when there was a good ruler there was a illy. under weak emperors, the army was bad. On the whole the
;
The
material degenerated
service
was avoided, even by mayhem
barbarians
;
filled
The
use of the sword decreased in favor of jactile weapons
line of battle
;
engines
were employed in
elephants and trained wild beasts were used.
Intervals decreased so that
the legion
again became
a phalanx.
Tactics
reached a high point, but the soul of the army was not there.
Baggage and
non-combatants reached Oriental proportions.
Pay and
largesses were enor-
mous.
expert.
Camps were more
fleets.
strongly fortified.
;
Fortification
and sieges were
Theory was developed
practice retrograded.
Standing armies called
out regular
sive means.
of our era
Declining soldierly spirit was supplemented by petty defenThere were many and able generals during the first five centuries but there was no growth in the art of war.
FROM
that
it
the history of the
army of Julius Caesar we have seen
was the genius of the captain and not the personal qualities of the rank and file which won his splendid victoCaesar Augustus became sole ruler of Rome, military matters were not long in being put on a new footing.
ries.
When
The ancient army
had been a burgess-militia, and it is only necessary to recall the events of the Second Punic War to show that, rather than the ability of any one
of the republic
leader,
was the steadfastness of the Senate and army for the army was the people that saved Rome from anniit
hilation
by Hannibal.
civil broils of
During the
Rome,
professional soldiers and
THE
NEW
;
ARMY.
769
mercenaries had gradually crept in until they formed the bulk of the rank and file and these had prepared the way for the standing army which was now to form a part of the
equipment of the empire, in peace and war alike. Augustus went to work in a systematic way.
forty-five
From
the
legions
civil
and
fifteen
thousand cavalry remaining
over from the
ilk
wars, the slaves, freedmen and all of that
were discharged. Some one hundred and twenty thousand volunteers and veterans were settled in twenty-eight colonies
on the lands in Italy donated
to them.
The remainder, mostly
were consolidated into twenty-five legions and a number of bodies of auxiliaries. These new legions
citizens,
Roman
and the cavalry attached to them were quartered in permanent camps, principally on the Rhine, Danube and Euphrates,
to hold
head against the inroads of foreign hordes.
cities.
These troops were thus removed from the temptations of too
great proximity of the capital or larger
Auxiliaries
were raised in large numbers for service in their respective
provinces.
For the protection
of Italy there were raised ten praetorian
cohorts, of one thousand
men
each.
This was the famous
body-guard of the emperor.
the garrison of
Three of these cohorts formed
Rome
the seven others those of the principal
near-by
cities.
The sum
at three
total of all this standing force has
been estimated
hundred thousand men.
The
soldier's oath
had
in early days been to the republic;
it
from the time of Marius down
to the general
had been taken individually
who was
or to
make war upon
his province raising legions to hold the neighboring nations ; now that the
:
" In the name of the Emperor emperor was the state, it ran I swear unconditionally to obey him, never to leave the ensign, nor spare my life for Emperor and State."
770
A DEGENERATING ARMY.
of service varied
The term The
from twelve
to twenty years,
fill
and every third
gaps.
y.ear a careful levy was held to
the service
excessive privileges which the soldiers
had en-
joyed during the civil wars and gradually claimed as a condition of military life, were restricted,
and a
special fund,
under the emperor's sole control, was created from which to
pay, clothe and ration the troops. Thus was the power of the
Roman emperor
of the republic
as firmly
had been ^grounded on the army as the power on the burgess-soldier; and while the exceptional grounded
personal qualities of Augustus
benefit to
made
this reorganization
Rome, the army, under later and less worthy rulers, became a curse. The ten praetorian cohorts were all drawn
in to
Rome by
and by
his successor,
and from thence on remained and tyranny grew
first
there,
their corruption
to
be the
terror of the land.
Nearly the entire
century of our era
was made unquiet by the antagonism between people and
army.
During the second century, from Nerva to Marcus Aurelius, the army was held in better leash. But luxury and lax political
morals had been doing their work in people and army alike. Both were degenerating. The citizens avoided mili-
tary service to such a degree that the habit of self -mayhem
became common.
sions
The succeeding period
of threatened inva-
by Germans and Parthians again obliged the emperors
and these among the barfallen practi-
to resort to raising mercenaries,
barians, a necessary but dangerous practice.
The
third century
saw the power of Rome
prffitorian guards,
cally into the
hands of the
at will.
who made and
unmade emperors
Though
their abuses were some-
what reformed by Septimius Severus, the gulf between peoThe army was largely Gerple and army had grown apace. the Roman Republic was fast drifting to its fall. man,
CAVALRY AND ARTILLERY.
The ancient arms and equipment
until the second
771
of the legionary were not
century, though the use of the changed sword was steadily decreasing in favor of the spear. As
the material of the arms-bearing class decreased, the latter
weapon grew lighter. rank and file waned,
were
still
As
the discipline and character of the
so whatever intervals between cohorts
and in the third century, under Caracalla and Alexander Severus, an organization like the
left decreased,
Grecian phalanx was adopted, though but temporarily.
The
general tendency was to make all weapons lighter, for the man himself had ceased to be the well-trained, strong and
able citizen of old.
close with the foe,
The
legions were
no longer expected to
jactile
and the men carried additional
weapons, rather than those of hand-to-hand conflict.
Cavalry was still as of old heavy, with man and horse in armor or light, using only darts for weapons.
;
accompany the legions. remembered was no new thing. Alexander
Artillery began to
his
;
This
it
will
be
in the prime of
power had employed field artillery in their decline the Greeks had employed it in line of battle to protect their foot. The same thing now occurred with the Romans. At first
be only for use on the walls of the perma-
this purported to
But later, in the third century, the onager or smaller ballista was transported on a two-ox cart, and the hand-ballista on a one-horse wagon. Each was served by
nent camps.
eleven men.
They could
cast stones
and darts three
to four
hundred paces.
They were placed in line of battle, between the legions, to save these from too sudden or close contact
with the enemy.
Elephants again appeared, and trained wild beasts and dogs were occasionally used against the enemy. These artificial
aids exhibit the declining value of the legions.
The strength
of the legions
grew
to be
somewhat greater,
772
CHANGED LINE OF BATTLE.
Armies
at the normal from six to seven thousand men.
rarely
numbered more than eight or ten
legions.
Flags replaced other ensigns, sometimes cut into dragonshape ; and the bust or likeness of the emperor took the place
of the eagle.
flute.
To
the old military horns was added a peculiar
of changes, owing largely to the new enemies encountered as well as the less good material of the legions,
number
gradually took place.
so as to strengthen the
The
first,
third line of battle was given
up
and each
line
had
five cohorts.
The first cohort was doubled in number, was often as high as twelve hundred strong, and was composed of the best men. It was not infrequently divided into halves so as to be placed on the right and left of the first line, or the fifth cohort was made
equally strong, so that a powerful body was on each
The cohorts of the second line extremity of the first line. stood behind the intervals of the first so long as they existed, and these at a time not well settled appear to have been
diminished by half.
entire
This was the Hadrian formation.
The
question of intervals and of the space occupied by the
men
is
a puzzling one.
;
Tribunes now commanded cohorts
legates legions
fects, the
the praetorians were led by praetorian
praestaft'-
army
by imperial or consular legates.
The
officers
were quaestors and procurators. Trajan introduced still another system.
The ten
first
cohorts
of the legion were placed in one line.
The
had nine
hundred and sixty chosen men in ten centuries and two hundred and forty cavalry. The others had four hundred
and eighty men in
six centuries.
in eight, Vegetius in six ranks.
The
Arrian says the men stood front ranks were of the
heavier and older legionaries ; the rear ranks of the younger
and
lighter.
Each man occupied
three feet in width, and
the ranks were six feet apart from back to breast.
Light
'
ORDER OF MARCH.
The
773
cohorts stood in
troops stood behind the legionaries.
order from one to ten with very small, next to no, intervals, and these were filled by horizontal-fire engines. Behind the
line
were engines of high trajectory which could fire above Behind the flanks were special troops, such as the line.
the praetorians,
and cavalry and bowmen were on the flanks. This formation had its advantages against barbarian
and Germans.
It
nations, such as the Dacians, Parthians
suited either the offensive or defensive,
any kind of ground,
It
and could be used against cavalry or infantry.
tain
had
cer-
features
of
the old
class
ordering
of
the
legion.
Hadrian and Trajan were
legion thus formed.
specially apt
at utilizing the
It seems to have
been an attempt to
reconcile the useful side of the class organization of old
burgess times with the necessarily growing phalangial idea.
Armies appear
to
have
drilled,
manoeuvred and marched
much
as of old. The tactics of the parade-ground often reached a high point. But that old instinct for war which enabled a Koman consul to raise his army of citizens and
leave
Rome
in one
day was not present.
for marches, on open plains and sudden attacks, remained common. It was a safe against defensive formation. The wedge or hollow wedge was successfully put to use.
viri,
The hollow square
An
instance of this was seen at Tre-
70 A. D.
armies.
Josephus narrates how Vespasian and Titus disposed their In the former's march from Syria to Galilee in 67
A. D., the
column was as follows: the
light troops
(bowmen
and
by a small body of heavy foot and some horsemen, in the van; following them the mechanics
slingers) sustained
(fabri) like our pioneers, to repair bridges and roads then the officers' baggage with cavalry, the emperor and staff, the the legions in military engines ; then the bulk of the army,
;
774
DEFENSIVE SCHEMES.
a column of sixes; next the army-train. Last came the mercenaries, mixed with legionaries and cavalry to steady
them.
Up
idly ;
to the third century the
Roman
armies marched rap-
the speed and distances then decreased markedly, owing
good material, in part to the greater amount of baggage and enginery. An army was marshaled for battle in much the same
in part to the less
and occasionally the position of the When the army was in one legions was determined by lot. The the light troops and enginery opened the action. line,
manner
as a legion,
heavy foot then advanced, and the light troops retired as there were no intervals, by the eventhrough them,
number men stepping
for the
moment behind
the odd.
The
front ranks of legionaries closed and couched their spears,
though these were not formidable, and the rear ranks fired above their heads. The light troops and engines which were
in the rear aided the front lines
by
their fire.
The mounted
archers
moved from point
farther the
to point
and the cavalry operated
its
on the wings.
The
Roman army grew away from
old self-
it was sought to supplement this by enand defensive tactics of various useless sorts. The ginery assault with naked weapon was now rarely seen. Distance
reliance the
more
weapons were preferred. Instead of the Koman soldier being more than a match for the barbarian so soon as he
was now the case. The German could laugh in earnest at the Roman legionbulky Under able emperors this was not so apparent; but ary.
closed with his man, the reverse
before the end of the third century the old-fashioned
organization, bravery
Roman
and
reliability
had vanished, as had
happened in Greece five hundred years before. In the same measure as the evidences of the ancient
PAY AND LARGESSES.
Roman
the
775
gallantry in war, there disappeared from the legions sense of discipline, order and good conduct. Caesar
Augustus had somewhat reestablished the old Roman miliThe pay of the tary virtues but it was only for a time.
;
troops rose as their value decreased,
and largesses became
is
enormous.
Under Domitian
the foot soldier
said to have
received four gold pieces (about twelve dollars) a month, the
centurion eight, the mounted
man
or praetorian twelve ; and
the deductions for arms, equipment and rations were given This seems excessive, in view of the value of gold. up.
Allowances were increased to a luxurious extent and the
trains
and non-combatants correspondingly increased, until they reached Oriental proportions, and of the nimbleness of
the
ally
Roman army
there remained but a tradition.
Occasion-
a vigorous emperor or an energetic general improved
these conditions, but only during his period of control.
The
tendency was downward.
Augustus had brought back military gymnastics and drill and under Vespasian, Titus and Antoninus these were
;
encouraged ; but in the third century they again disappeared. The drill-marches which Augustus compelled the legions to
make
the
three
times
doubled
and over
all
sometimes month, with baggage kinds of country, were forgotten
;
army manoeuvres which were then conducted on
as large
a scale as to-day in Germany or France became onerous and were dropped; and the splendid public works, especially
military roads, were no longer built.
The
troops mutinied
against such labors.
were
So far as military science and study were concerned, they less practical and more pedantic. Though the empire produced numberless writers on military matters, there were
none to approach Polybius or Caesar. They admirably wrote up details, but they failed to give the soul of the matter.
776
SKILLFUL FORTIFICATION.
far as the moral tone of the
So
army was concerned,
that
is
it
could not be worse.
If the ancient burgess -legion of the
all
Second Punic
War
was the type of
it
excellent
from
may be said that the army of the later empire represented all that was vicious. It was a monster whose work was to destroy the structure of the ema military standpoint, so
pire,
even, as its predecessor
had been the creator of the
power and greatness of Rome. The army may be said to have been held together solely by a system of fearful punishments and unreasoning rewards.
Up
to the era of Gratian,
toward the end of the fourth
the rule and was
century, the daily
camp was
still
made
to
conform to the ground with much skill, the ditch and wall The permanent camps were like being deeper and higher.
regular fortresses, and enginery was
much more abundant on
the parapets. system of such permanent camps was sometimes constructed as a military frontier, like Hadrian's wall from the Tyne to the Sol way, or Trajan's wall from the Dan-
ube to the Euxine.
On
the whole, while no works exceeded
in ability Cassar's wonderful defenses, fortification
skill as
grew
in
troops grew increased in size. Titus built four huge terraces opposite
in worthlessness.
Terraces and rams
Jerusalem, and Vespasian had a ram which weighed one hundred tons and required fifteen hundred men to set it in
motion and one hundred and
fifty pairs of
it.
oxen or three huncleverly
dred pairs of mules to transport
Mines were
The subterranean war at Jerusalem designed and executed. in 70 A. D. was remarkable. Double tortoises for assaulting
walls and the use of inflammables in ballistics are to be
noted.
The number
of engines
accompanying an army was
This would be called
of equal size to-day.
huge.
Titus had, says Josephus, before Jerusalem, three
hundred catapults and forty ballistas. a very large artillery force for an
army
REGULAR FLEETS.
In a certain
sense, during this period, the art of
Ill
war was
theoreti-
not on the decline but rather on the increase.
cal
The
was more highly developed, the practical simplicity was The ancient Roman habit of winning by hard knocks less. had given way to a system which protected the soldiers who were no longer ready to expose life and limb for the public
The gain in theoretical knowledge was but a cloak to cover the loss of the old military virtues.
weal.
Standing armies soon called for regular
fleets.
had two,
at
Ravenna and Misenum,
in the Adriatic
Augustus and
third was later placed on Tyrrhenian seas respectively. Flotillas were on the Rhine, Danube and the coast of Gaul.
other rivers.
The type
of vessel
was
Illyrian,
and
it
had
from one
to five
rows of oars.
Many
light boats for recon-
noitring and scouting and dispatch-bearing were in use. The Slaves and criminals material of the fleets was of the worst.
made up
as
it
the crews.
The
tactics
remained as of
old, so far
could be utilized.
in organization of the last
The changes
the
two centuries of
Roman
same end,
empire have no interest. They all tended to the to sustain a declining soldierly spirit by petty
in tactics,
ballistics
defensive inventions
and
fortification.
The
old offensive tone of
soldier
Rome had
disappeared.
The Ro-
man
no longer felt that if he could but get at the with sword and shield, he was more than a match for enemy him. Everything tended to invite an attack by the enemy,
and
to
an attempt to destroy him before he reached the line
of battle.
To recapitulate, chronologically, the changes by which the old quincuncial legion of brave burgesses became the one
line
phalanx of unsoldierly mercenaries : Marius, a century before the Christian era, changed the class-rating of citizensoldiers to
one of mere physical capacity, and began to intro-
778
LEGION BECOMES PHALANX.
Caesar fully matured
duce a lessening of the intervals.
rius' plan,
Ma-
deployed his
men
for battle so that the front line,
and perhaps the second, had no intervals, and changed the cohort from a body in three lines, with light troops and cavalry pertaining to
it,
into a
eight or ten
men
deep.
body of heavy foot in one line His legion was habitually set up in
century A. D. the ten legionary cohorts were set up in two lines, five in each, with whatever intervals there existed filled with ballistic machines. In the
three lines.
first
In the
second and third centuries the cohorts were gradually marshaled in one line without intervals, and the spears were
In the fourth and fifth centuries the legion lengthened. .became absolutely a phalanx and a very poor one. As we
remember, the courageous and enterprising Roman citizens of the early republic had adapted the old Dorian phalanx to
their
own
ideas of a quincuncial
form
the gradual decline of
it
the imperial
army
had, by converse causes, brought
back,
not to the phalanx of Miltiades, Epaminondas and Alexander,
but to the phalanx of the degenerate Greece of the second This was a noteworthy but a perfectly natural century B. c.
series of events.
during the five first centuries of the Christian era, there were many able generals, both among the Romans and their barbarian opponents and that
It
that,
;
must not be forgotten
there was a skillful adaptation of
is
means
to end.
But there
war which
Arminius,
nothing in the
way
of
improvement
fact
to the art of
claims
our notice.
The
that
Augustus,
Civilis the Batavian, Tiberius,
sian, Titus,
tine, Julian,
Drusus, Germanicus, Vespa-
Trajan, Marcus Aurelius, Diocletian, ConstanTheodosius, Stilicho, Aetius, Ricimer, Odoaker,
Belisarius
Alaric,
Attila,
commanded huge
armies,
con-
ducted far-reaching campaigns, displayed military talents of a high order, does not concern us here. Many of the lesser
NO GAIN IN ART.
lights of
779
war
at the inception of its story are of
first
more con-
sequence because in what they did we
discover some
It is principle which had its bearing on subsequent events. not wars, but the art of war whose history we are tracing.
And
volume we devote but a passing notice to the entire period from the fall of the Roman empire to
if
in a subsequent
the invention of gunpowder,
we
shall not interrupt the se-
which have brought the art of war from its crude beginnings in the age of Cyrus to its wonderful develquence of events
in our
opment
own nineteenth
century.
Triumphal Car.
APPENDIX
A.
781
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APPENDIX
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INDEX.
212, 225, 228. Achillas, 581, 586. Acilla, 644, 651. Aduatuca, 191, 193et seq. ; retreat from, 195 ; massacre near, 196, 219. Aduatuci, town of the, 122 surrenders, 125. 211. ^Edui, 58, 66, 82, 206, 231, 242, 248-9, 257, 267-8, 269, 306. Afranius, 29, 435, 440 et seq.; defeats Caesar, 444 badly placed, 456 ; determines to retire. 456 his route, 456-7 uncertain in plan, 465-6 ; surrenders, 471 620, 688, 690. Africa* 619.
; ; ; ; ;
Acco,
Caesar, 85 ; asks confidence, 91 ; his alleged treachery, 91 ; outflanks Caesar, 92 ; declines battle, 94 ; escapes, 97 ; army cut to pieces, 97. Aristocrats, 401, 576, 609, 620.
meet
Army,
353
;
; professional, maniples, 354-6 ; cohort, 354 ; strength, 355 space for legion, 355 men, 355 depth, 356 music, 357 ;
; ; ; ;
Cfesar's, 352 et seq.
African campaign, 624 Agar, 668, 676.
et seq.
Agendicum, 235-6.
Alesia, siege of, 283 et seq. ; location of, 284 ; defenses of, 285 ; forces at, 286 ; camps at, 288 ; cavalry fight at, 288 ; works at, 291 et seq. ; first battle at, 297 ; second battle at, 298 ; third battle at, 300 et seq. Alexander, 251, 266, 269, 312-3, 350, 386 compared to Csesar and Hannibal,
;
755-67.
Alexandria, 578
;
siege of, 580
destruction of library, 582 ; graphy, 584-5 operations in, 585 water diverted, 586; first naval battle, 588 ; second naval battle, 591 battle at the mole, 593 ; third naval battle, 598.
; ;
et seq. ; its topo-
pack, 357 light and heavy armed, 358 general staff, 359; antesignani, 359 ; pay, 360; offensive formation, 360 method of setting up legion, 361 ; defensive formation, 362 ; square, 363 fourth line, 363 auxiliaries, 363 ; cavalry, 363 et seq., 370, 377 ; turma, 364 ; ala, 365 orders of march, 365 et seq. ; ployments and deployments, 368 marches, 370 step, 370 formation of march, 371 van- and rearguard, 372 ; train, 373 ; battle-order, 373 ; retreat, 373 ; flank marches, 373 crossing rivers, 374 ; bridges, 374 battles, 374-5 ; why it excelled, 376 independence of legions, 376 light troops, 378 ; centre and wings, 378 ; acts of a battle, 379 ; defensive battles, 380. Arretium, 413. Arsinoe, 583, 586. Art of war of Roman Empire, 768 et
;
baggage, 357
soldier's
seq. ; on increase, 777. Artillery accompanies legions, 771.
AUubroges,
66.
Arobiorix, 190 et seq. ; 193 ; attacks Sabinns' camp, 194 ; ambushes Sabinus and Cotta, 196 ; treachery of, 197 ; marches on Cicero, 197 besieges Cicero, 199 211, 212, 216 ; pursuit and escape 224-5 322. of, 218
; ; ; ;
Aiidaematunum,
235.
;
Arverni, 82, 230, 234, 249, 252, 269, 306. Attegua, 703 et seq. Augustus, 769 et seq., 775, 777. Aurelia, 38, 734. Avaricum, siege of, 239 et seq. ; mound assault and capture of, 247. at, 245 Axona, the camp on, 105 ; bridgehead on, 105; battlefield of, 107; battle
:
Antesignani, 8, 359 Antoninus, 775.
445.
of, 108
victory, 109.
Antony,
503
;
312, 322, 329, 407, 413, 434, 486. sets sail, 504 ; lands, 504. Sextise. battle of, 18 et seq. ; 51. Aquitania, campaign in, 143.
Balbus, 148.
Ballistics, 12 et seq.
Aqute
Belgians, 54 how divided, 55 99 gin and forces, 103-4 ; retire
; ;
ori-
from
Arausio, battle of, 16. Archelaus, 22-4. Arduenna forest, 54, 217. Ariovistus, 49, 52, 82 et seq.
Axona,
110.
et seq. ;
Bellovaci, 112, 310
clever strata-
declines to
320 retire, 321. Bibracte, 74 et seq., 258.
of,
;
gem
784
Bituriges, 231, 240, 244, 269, 312.
INDEX.
gions, 134
639,
Bogud,
TM.
of, 159
;
Boulougne, 166, 180. Bridge, Caesar's, location
second landing
in, 182.
con;
struction, 159 et seq. Britain, 164 et seq. ; its inhabitants, 166
Britons, oppose landing, 170 ; attack Seventh legion, 171 ; their chariots, 172 ; sue for peace, 173 ; their warfare, 184.
Brundisium, Caesar and
et seq.
Pompey
at,
423
Brutus, D., 134 ; fine conduct in battle against Veneti, 138 435, 452, 477. Burgesses, 2 ; how classed, 3 ; avoid ser"vice, 4, 5.
Caesar, birth, 37 ; his forbears, 38 ; mothas a er, 38 ; his looks and habits, 38 as a dandy, 39 ; his gymnast, 38 as an orator, 39 ; bookishness, 39 general appearance, 40 ; priest of Ju40 ; marries, 40 his quarrel with piter, Sulla, 40 ; in Bithynia, 41 receives civic crown, 41 ; his prosecutions, 42 captured by pirates, 42 ; studies in Rhodes, 42 pontifex, tribune, quaesreckless in tor, a^dile, judex, 43 money matters, 43-4 in Lusitania, 44 et seq. ; imperator, 46 ; his civil administration in Lusitania, 47 ; ambition, 47 ; his triumph, 48 consul, 49 ; his new provinces, 49 ; his marriage, 49 ; his provinces, 50 ; his method in Gaul, 53 ; anticipates war, 60 ; goes to Geneva, 62 ; tricks Helvetii, 62 his wall at Geneva, 63 ; places troops on Rhone, 66 j destroys one third Helvetii, 69 bridges Arar, 70 ; follows
; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
Helvetii, 71 ; his caution, 71, 98, 107, his rations, 72 ; his strata655, 664 gem against Helvetii, 72 at Bibracte, 76-9 his tactics, 79 his conduct at first battle, 80-1 desires war, 84 ; invites Ariovistus to meet him, 85 his
; ; ; ; ; ;
legal authority, 85-6 ; moves on Ariovistus, 86-91 ; his secret service, 87, 243 reassures army, 89 cut off, 92 ; regains communications, 93 ; invites makes new camp, 93-5 battle, 93 forces battle, 95 ; his victory, 97 his
; ; ; ; ;
ability against Ariovistus, 98 ; legions, his lieutenants, 101 ; 101 ; moves against Belgians, 102 ; his objective, 102 ; makes diversion, 104 ; his forces, 104 relieves Bibrax, 106 ; intrenches,
;
follows Belgians, 110 beaten at Npviodunum, 111 ; moves against Nerat batvii, 113 ; his carelessness, 114 tle of Sabis, 116 et seq. ; almost defeated, 118-9 his victory, 121-2 ; attacks town of the Aduatuci, 123 et sea. ; ability and mistakes, 125-7 ; in Illyricnm, 131 determines to punish Veneti, 132 his reasons, 133 ; his le; ;
;
106
his slow campaign against determines on battle, Veneti, 136 137 ; bis cruelty to Veneti, 139 ; campaign against Morini, 148 moves on Usipetes, 152; his treachery to Usipetes, 153; massacres Usipetes, 155; was he cruel ? 156 ; builds bridge across Rhine, 158; wisdom of the step, 158 his bridge, 159 et seq. ; accomplishes nothing, 163 ; moves to Britain, 164 et seq. ; description of Britain, 165 ; lauds near Dover, 168 ; his fleet damaged by storm, 170 ; rescues Seventh legion, 172 ; returns to Gaul, 173 his invasion useless, 174 ; his carelessness, 175-6 ; builds new boats, 177-8 his legions, 180 lands, 181 ; advances into Britain, 182 his fleet injured by storm, 183; repairs same, 183 ; advances inland, 183 ; wins victory, 185 forces Thames, 186 defeats Britons, 187 reretires, 188 crosses to Gaul, 188 had accomplished nothing, 189 ; spreads legions in winter-quarters, 190 ; fails to give rendezvous, 193 ; marches to Cicero's relief, 202 his lack of preparation, 202 ; his march, 202 ; attacks Nervii, 203 defeats Nervii, 204 raises new legions, 210 his winter campaign, 212 calls congress, 212 moves against Menapii, 213 again crosses Rhine, 216 subdues Eburones, 219; holds council, 225; leaves no one in general command, 228 hears of insurrection, 232 ; reaches province, 232; secures province, 232 ; crosses Cebennae, 233 ; hurries to his legions, 235 captures Vellaunodunum and Genabum, 236-8 ; marches to Avaricum, 239 ; besieges Avaricum, 240 et seq. ; avoids ambush, 244 ; captures Avaricum, 247 gives his men a rest, 248 ; forces Elaver, 250-1 camps at Gergovia, 254 ; capmarches tures Roche Blanche, 256 on ^Eduan army, 257 ; and back, 259 ; disingenuous, 259 prepares assault, 260 defeated, 261 et seq. ; his lack of energy, 266 retires from Gergovia, 267 ; cut off from Labienus, 268 forces his way through, 269 joins Labienus, 276 ; his legions, 276 moves towards province, 277 ; defeats Vercingetorix, 281 ; follows him to Alesia, 282 ; reaches Alesia, 286 ; seizes hills around Alehis works at Alesia, 291 et sia, 286 his activity at Alesia, 301 et seq. ; seq. ; his fortune, ability at Alesia, 306 308 seventh year in Gaul, 308-9 winter campaign, 311 ; dislikes them, 313 ; moves against Bellovaci, 315 ; his camp at Mt. St. Pierre, 316 his defollows Bellovaci, fenses at, 317-18 319 defeats them, 322 marches to Uxellodunum, 330 begins siege of, 330 ; captures Uxellodunum, 332 ; r*
; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
;
INDEX.
snim' of his Gallic campaign, 334-6; his fortune, 339 his general plan, 340 his politics, 340 ; his ambition, 340 capacity, 340 cruelty, 341 his state341 his strategy, 341 et sea. ; craft, his legionaries, 344; his care of his men, 344-6 his scouting, 344 ; his his objective, 345 ingenuity, 345 his base, 346 his method, 347 his secrecy, 348 his opponents, 348 his camp, 349 ; his battles and pursuit, 350 ; his winter-quarters, 350-1 his energy, 351 ; his_jirmy, 352 et seq. ; a democrat, 405 ; quarrels with PoTnpey, 406; at Ravenna, 406 location of his legions, 406 ultimatum to Rome, 407 ; crosses Rubicon,407; his f oolhardiness, 407 his plan, 408 takes Ariminum, 409 offers terms to Pompey, 409 his forces, 409 his lieutenants, 411 size of legions, 412 marches on Auxinium, 413 ; gains recruits, 414 ; moves down Picenum, 415 marches to Corfinium, 416 besieges Corfinium, 417 et seq. ; offers terms to Pompey, 423 marches to Brundisium, 453 his operations at
; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; j ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
785
;
builds lines around Pompey, 516 his morale superior to Pompey's, 518 Ninth legion engaged, 519; cannot complete lines planned, 521 his men on short rations, 522 his men healthy, 522 tries to take Dyrrachium, 523 his operations in
Dyrrachium, 511
; ;
Brundisium, 423 et seq.; has gained changes plans, 427 orbe made, 427 his lieutenants occupy Sicily and Sardinia, 428 determines to go to Spain, 431 what he should do, 431-2 in Rome, 433 despoils treasury, 433 his forces
all Italy, 426 ders fleet to
;
; ;
in Spain, 437 ; his plan of raising money, 437 : his activity, 441 ; offers battle to Afranius, 441 camps in plain, 442 tries to capture hill, 443 fails, 444 ; drives back enemy, 445 et seq. ; prevents enemy's foraging, 448 his bridges swept away, 448 et seq. ; convoy cut off, 449 ; his want of victual, 450 ; rescues convoy, 451 able to forage, 454 makes artificial ford, 455 crosses ford and follows Afranius, 461 annoys Afranius severely, 462; cuts Afranius off from retreat, 465 refuses to attack, 466 cuts Afranius off from water, 467 his soldiers fraternize with enemy, 468 ; pursues and harasses
; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
Afranius, 469 j
;
surrounds Afranius, ; opens siege of 476 subdues western Spain, Massilia, 482 ; goes to Massilia, 483 spares Massilia, 483; loses Africa, 484 et 487 ; orders troops to ; seq. consul, at forces, 487 Brundisium, 487 Brundisium, 488 ; has no fleet, 488 what he had accomplished, 492 sails for Epirus, 494 his fleet, 495 his advances north, 498 position, 496 blockades Pompey's fleet, 501 offers terms to Pompey, 501 ; conference, 502 attempts to cross, 504 ; moves towards Antony, 505 ; joins Antony, 506 detaches forces to Greece, 508 his forces, 508 ; cuts Pompey off from
his_jajjidityj 472
; ; ; ; ; ; ;
; ;
Greece, 529 makes proposals to Pompey, 530 ; first desertions, 531 his left his left broken, illy prepared, 533 534 attacks again, 535 is def eateti, 536-7 ; losses, 538 not disheartened by defeat, 541 ; punishes cowards, 542 men anxious for battle, 542 ; starts for Apollonia, 542 ; outmarches Pompey, 543 his plans, 545 crosses to Thessaly, 547 ; captures Gomphi, 548 ; captures Metropolis, 549 camps near Pnarsalus, 550 his forces, 552 determines to manoeuvre, 556 accepts battle, 557; draws up his forces, 560 ; his skillful dispositions, 560 ; his men confident, 562 attacks, 563 ; his fourth line, 564 j orders in third line, 565 his pursuit, 567 ; his losses, 568 : his audacity, 569 ; contrasted with Pompey, 572 ; his faults, 573 ; his strong qualities, 574-5 ; follows Pompey to Egypt, 577 his trouble in Alexandria, 579 ; mixes in Egyptian affairs, 579 besieged in Alexanin bad case, 584 sends for dria, 582 reinforcements, 584 digs wells, 587 receives reinforcements, 588 obliged to do battle, 589 defeated Alexandrians, 589 captures Pharos, 592 dehis losses, feated at the mole, 593 595 ; panic, 595 surrenders Ptolemy, 597 ; relieved by Mithridates, 598 ; marches to meet him, 599 defeats Ptolemy, 602 captures Alexandria, 602 ; starts for Ppntus, 610 ; his forces, 611 ; his insufficient preparation, 611 ; attacks Pharnaces at Zela, 612 defeats him, 614 returns to Rome, 615 suppresses mutiny, 617 in Sicily, 622 ; sails for his plans and forces, 622 Africa, 622 ; gives no rendezvous, 623 ; his fleet dispersed, 623 in grave dan626; returns to Ruspina, 627; Ser, turns up, 628 his camp at Ruseet pina, 629 his clever tactics at Ruswant of victual, 637 ; pina, 630-6 blockaded in Ruspina, 638-9 ; his difficulties in Africa, 641 ; his defense, 643 reinforced, 644 follows Scipio, demon647 wins initial fight, 650 strates against Ucita, 650 ; fidelity of his legionaries, 651 avoids ambush, 653 ; makes intrenched lines towards Ucita, 655 desertions to, 656 receives reinforcements, 658 rescues neet, 660 ; draws up opposite Scipio, 663 intrenches, 665 avoids stratagem, 667; in want of rations, 667 moves to Agar, 668 ; his raid on Zeta, 670 et seq. ; his losses,
; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
;
786
672
tle,
;
INDEX.
his
;
new
675
tactics, 675 ; offers batraid on Tysdra, 675 et seq. ;
defeats him, 686; marches to Utica, in Rome, 691 ; his reck; triumphs 691-4 ; his lieutenants in Spain, 695 et seq. ; reaches Spain, 697 ; at Corduba, 700; besieges Attegua, 703 et seq. ; his forces, 706 ; his manoenyres at Attegua, 707 et seq. ; captures Attegua, 709; manoeuvres south of 322. Attegna, 710; at Soricaria, 710; dehis operations Considins, 625, 644, 651, 688, 690. feats Pompey, 710 about Munda. 712; similarity in his Convictolatavis, 258. campaigns, 719 ; heads off Pompey, Corduba, 699. 720 attacks at Munda, 723 ; his men Correus, 314, 321-2. anxious to fight, 724 ; his victory hard Cotta, 101, 168, 173, 193 et seq., 208, 226. won, 726 his opponents, 728-30 ; apCrassus, M., 44, 48, 101, 131, 143 ; subpearance and bodily strength, 732 733 socially, 733 ; his liaidues Aquitania. 144 et seq. ; his batdemeanor, tle, 145-6; 212, 214, 400 ; in Syria and sons, 734 ; domestic habits, 734 ; as estimated by old authors, 735 ; his Partheia, 402; at Can-hse, 403; defriendships, 735 ; as a captain, 736 ; feated, killed, 404. his realism, 736 ; his judgment, 736 not perfect, 737 ; his cruelty, 737 ; his Discipline, in transition state, 10. honors, 738 his projects, 739 ; in Gaul, Dmtiacus, 52, 82, 90, 104, 112. 740 1 in civil war, ill et seq. ; his over- Domitian, 775. hastmess. 742 his ability afl a captain Domitins, Ahenobarbus, 27, 406, 416, 745 et seq. ; his logistics, 746; as a 434, 452, 568. fighter, 747-8 ; >uaj^iij. 748-9 ; his Domitins, CaL, 508, 544, 547, 604 et seq., 749 ; his opponents, 750 et 608. cavalry. as an jinny commander and dis- Dover, 168. seq. ciplinarian, T5? flf seq. ; compared to Drappes, 326. Alexander and Hannibal, 755-67. Dumnorix, 64 et seq., 71, 179-80. Calendar, 500. Dyrrachinm, description of, 513 ; operations about, 515 et seq. ; siege of, 515 Camps, important role played by, 526 ; under Empire, 776. et seq. ; theatre of, 517 ; novelty of Camps, Caesar's, location, 381 ; pitching. blockade, 522 ; condition of rival 382 ; defense of, 382-3 ; ditch and wall troops, 522 Caesar tries to capture, of, 383 ; time taken in making, 384 ; 523; operations on the left, 532-3; Caesar defeated at, 534 et seq. pickets, 385 ; watches, 385. Caninius, 322, 324 et seq., 326. 270 et seq. Camulogenus, Eburones, 193, 210 et seq., 217 et seq. ; Carnutes, 212, 228, 230, 237, 312, 326. punished, 221, 322-3. Carrhae, battle of, 402 et seq. . ,580. Carruca, 712, 720. ,ver, passage of, 251. Carvoeiro, 45. Elephants, 7, 771. Cassivellaunus, 177 et seq. ; his killed, Engines, 7. 184 ; draws out the war, 185 defends Epirns, 497. the Thames, 186; his allies desert Eporedorix, 257, 267-8, 296. him, 186. Ennostos, 590. Cativolcus, 193. Euphanor, 591, 597. Cato, 427, 620, 689, 751. raised from foreigners, 6 im- Fabius, 101, 200, 212, 214. 322. 324 et seq., Cavalry, provement in, 7 ; position of, 10 ; Gal326, 433, 435, 439 et seq., 728. Caesar's in Gaul, 67 : Caesar's Fieldworks, 23, lic, 57 153 ; Caesar's unable to land Fleet, increased, 13 how manned, 13 ; defeated, in how managed, 14 et seq. ; battles of, Britain^l70 ; Caesar takes to Brit15 et seq. ain, 179 ; Vereingetorix', 248 ; Caesars German, 276, 456 German, at Alesia, Ford, Caesar's artificial. 455 et seq. 304 ; Caesar's follows Fortifications, improved, 11, 12. j^^^r^L^WT:,
offers battle at Tegea, 678 ; moves to Thapsus, 680 ; attacks Scipio, 685 ;
690
lessness,
Centurions, 16. Chajronaea, battle of, 22 et seq. Cicero, 101, 197 et seq. ; refuses to treat with Ambiorix, 197 ; his gallant defense, 204; 208; 212; at Aduatuea, 220 ; Germans attack him, 222 ; poor defense, 223. Cingetorix, 179, 216. Classes for service, 2. Cleopatra, 579, 581, 603. Cohorts. Marius', 8. Commins, 167, 170, 214, 296-7, 315, 318,
sar's,
749
Celtiea, how divided, 55. Celts, 54.
of fempire,
77L
Galba, his Alpine campaign, 129
134, 167.
et seq.
Ganymed,
586.
INDEX.
Gaul, how acquired and divided, 51, 53 ; climate, topography, turbulent, 52 population, feudalism, 54. Gauls. 51 et seq. ; their appearance and as soldiers, 57 general habits, 56 inconstant, 130, 143 ; assembly, 82 of, 228 ; 192, 232 conspiracy rising of, destroy their towns, 240 ; their fortifications, 245 gallantry of, 246 raise army for relief of Alesia, 296; new idea of war, 310 subjugated, 334,
; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
787
Roman. 1 War.
;
Legates, 10. Legion, early
4
;
Caesar's, 2,
2,
of Second Punic
Mariof,
us',
changes
;
in, 7 et seq.
numbers
7: intervals in Caesars, 9; strength degenerate under Empire, of, 276-7 768 et seq. ; strength of, under Empire, 771 changes in, under Empire, 772
;
tactics of, 773.
Legionary, armament
Genabnm,
230, 236.
of, 4; belong to general, 11 ; cleverness of Caesar's, 185 energy of Caesar's, 242.
Lentulus, 406, 413. Geneva, 60 ; wall at, 62 et seq. Leptis, 626, 627, 642. Gergobina, 236-7. Gergovia, 230, 249, 252 et seq. ; its natu- Lager, the fleet built in, 131. ral defenses, 255 ; works, 255 et seq. ; Losses in battle, 447. assault on, 259 tails, 265 et seq. Lucterius, 326 et seq. Lucullus, in the East, 32 et Gomphi, 548.
;
Gymnastics,
10.
work and
seq.
his
ability, 33-6.
et seq.
Hadrumetum,
623, 688.
Lositania, campaign in, 44 Lutetia, 212.
Haliacmon. operations on, 509. Hannibal. 251. 266, 313; compared to Mamnrra, 148. Alexander and Caesar, 755-67. Marches, 258, 672, 774. Harbors, 14. Marius, C., 4 ; gives all free-born citizens right to serve, 5 his changes in Helvetii, 50 et seq. ; want to emigrate, 58 choice of routes, 59 rendezvous, army, 6 his marches, 9, 12 as a 60 send ambassadors. 62 to barbasoldier, 16 sent to Gaul, 17 try rians attack camp on Rhone, 18 folforce exit, 64 get into Gaul, 66 their lows and attacks them, 18 victorislow march, 66 cross Arar, 69 send ambassadors. 70; rearguard fighting, ous, 19, 20. 71 Caesars ambuscade, 74 Massilia, 51, 434 naval battle at, 452 escape attack Caesar, 76 are defeated, 77-8 ; description of, 474 et seq. : siege of, 475 et seq. ; second naval fight, 477 ; surrender, 80- number of, 80; sent back to their home, 80-1. sally from, 478 ; works at, 479 Ro28 et seq. man works burn, 480. Herennius, Hirtuleins, 28 et seq. Matrona, shipbuilding in, 179.
; ;
;
;
;
Hispalis. 712.
Iurium,
413.
Ilerda, 436 ; ripprarifina n^ar. 438, fif i*tf?- > terrain, assault of, 458 ; operations
Menapii, 147, 168, 211, 213. Mercenaries, 6, 16, 768 et seq. Metellus, in Spain, 27 et seq. Metropolis, 549.
Militia, disap'pears, 16.
south of, 460 et seq. niyricum, 178, 610. Indutiomaras. 179. 206.
Intervals, decreasing. 7 et seq. ; in Caesar's legion, 9 ; under Empire, 734:.
Mines, 12. Mithridates, 22, 32
et seq.. 41.
Mons Herminium.
Morini, 147
;
44
attack
Roman party,
et seq.
173.
Mounds,
714 713
12.
et seq. ; battle of, 713 et seq. ; of, 713 et seq. ; near Corduba,
Mnnda, 712
Juba, 484
et seq., 619, 639, 652, 657, 677,
location
688,689.
Killed and wounded, 528.
et seq. ; arguments as to locality, et seq.; probably near Montilla, 712, 720 ; battlefield of. 721 ; descrip-
Labienus, T., 65, 98, 101, 133, 167, 180, 1-3, 201, 204; defeats Indntiomarus, 207 213 ; attacked by Treviri. 214 defeats them, 215 219, 249, 268-9 his campaign against Lutetia, 270 et seq. ; advances on Lutetia, 272 bears defeat at Gergovia, 272 attacks Camulogenus, 273 ; defeats him and retires, 274; joins Caesar, 275; 303-4,
; ; ; ; ; ;
tion of. 722 ft seq. ; forces at. 722 their position, 722 ; Caesar attacks at, 723 ; narrowly wins victory. 726 ; massacre and losses at. 72<!. Mutiny, 11 ; of Ninth legion, 487 ; of the legions near Rome, 616.
;
Napoleon. 207. 269. 340. 3W.
Xervii, the, 113 etseq. : their ambuscade, 114 their splendid attack, 114 ; 193-8.,
;
306, 323, a*e. 414.
Feq., 637, 642,
.">!. 5.\8.
;
i20. fi29 et
211.
648-9 his ambush. 652 etseq.;\u& stratagem, 666 ; 670-3, 676,
688, 697, 726, 751.
Nicopolis. 606 battle of, 607. Nile, battle of the, 599 et seq. Noviodunum, 110, 238, 268.
;
788
pire, 769.
INDEX,
; gains foothold 534 defeats Caesar badly, 538 elated at his victory, 541 ; follows Caesar, 544 starts to join Scipio, 545 in Larissa, 550 advances to Pharsalus, 552 ; his forces, 552 will not attack Caesar, 555 offers battle, 557 his plan of battle, 557 ; awaits his cavalry fails, 564 ; attack, 562 flees from the field, 566 ; his camp, 566 his losses, 568 ; his flight, 569 ; his death, 570 his character, 571 contrasted with Caesar, 571, 751. Pompey, Sextus, 620, 697, 702, 729, 730,
Oath, personal to general, 6; under EmObulco, 697, 715.
sar's left, 531 et seq.
left,
;
on Caesar's
Octodorus valley, campaign, 129. Orchomenus, battle of, 24.
Orgetorix, 58.
Panic at Dyrrachium, 538-40. Parada. 688. Pas de 1'Ecluse, 59, 66. Pay, of soldier doubled, 10 761. Petreius, 435, 440 et seq., 620, 688-9. Phalanx, Hannibal's, 2. Pharnaces, 604, 608, 612-14. 741. Pharos, 582, 592. Pharsalus, battle of, 553 et seq. ; topo- Praetorian cohorts, 769-70.
; ; ; ; ;
rival forces at, 558 of, 553-4 their position, 558 ; plan of, 559 ; field 561 ; Caesar's attack, 563 ; failure of, of Pompey's cavalry, 564 ; victory and pursuit, 565 et seq. ; losses, 568. Pharsalus plain, 555. Plancus, 101, 192.
graphy
Province, the, 52, 232, 275. Ptolemy,.579, 581, 597, 598-9, 601.
Pulfio, 199.
Quincunx, 3, 9. Quinquireme, 14.
Pompey
Cnaeus, 620, 639, 697; defeats Caesar at Corduba, 703 follows Caesar to Attegua, 705 ; his forces, 706 defeated at Soricaria, 710 ; starts for Carteia, 716; cut off from retreat, moves back on Corduba, 720; flees, 728 ; his death, 728-9 ; 730, 741. Pompey the Great, his ability and character, 24 et seq. ; in Pisenum, 26 imperator, 27 in Sicily and Africa, 27 saluted magnus, 27 in Spain, 28 defeated by Sertorius, 29 his work in Spain, 30 ; subdues pirates, 31 et seq. ; supplants Lucullus, 34 ; follows Mithridates, 34 et seq. ; how his success was won, 35-6, 48 governing Rome, 400 dictator, 401 ; an aristocrat, 405 his forces, 412 ; abandons Rome, 414 ; his plans, 415 ; goes to Luceria, 415 ; determines 'to leave Italy, 419 his procrastination, 420 ; at Bnmdisium, 422 sends part of army to Epirus, 422 escapes from Brundisium, 426 his legions in Spain, 428 ; his stratehis lack of force, gic plan, 428 429 his Spanish legion, 436 his forces in Spain, 436-7 inactivity, 473 his general plan thwarted, 483 captures two of Caesar's legions in IIhis forces, 489 lyricum, 486 fleet, 490 ; inert, 491 ; his drill camp, 491 what he had accomplished, 492 hurries to the coast, 498 ; saves Dyrrachium, 499 ; what he should have done, 499; moves against Antony, 505 ; his plan, 507 ; camps near Caesar, 512; plans not to fight, 514; makes inner line, 516 ; his skill, SIX superior position, 518 ; defeats Ninth legion, 520 ; his lack of water, 522 ; attacks Caesar's lines, 524 beaten back, 325-6 sends horse to Dyrrachium, 630 ; desertions to, 531 ; attacks Cae; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
Remi, 103, 206, 225, 313. Rewards and punishments,
;
10, 11.
Roscius, 101. Ruspina, 627 camp at, 629 629 camp at, 636.
;
battle at,
Rutilius, P., 5.
Sabinus, 101, 134, 139 et seq. ; his clever defeat of Unelli, 140-1 ; 167, 173, 193
et seq., 208.
Sabura, 485, 690. Samarobriva, 152
Sarsura, 676. Sathohay, 68.
council at, 189, 191.
Scaeva, 528. Scipio, 434, 507, 545, 620; his forces, 621 ; his plan, 621 ; joins Labienus, 637 blockades Caesar in Ruspina, 638 ; his proper policy, 642 drawn
; ;
up before Ruspina, 647
moves on
Caesar, 648; attacks Caesar's fatigue parties, 657 ; offers battle, 662 ; in-
trenches, 665 ; attacks Caesar on rehis laxness, 673 declines treat, 671 battle, 675 follows Caesar to Thapsus, 681 ; manoeuvres in front of Thapsus, 682-3; camps, 683; defeated, 687; massacre of his army, 688, 751. Scribonius, 406.
; ; ;
Senones, 212.
Sequana, fleet building on, 178, 270. Sequani, 58, 64, 82.
Sertorius, Q., in Spain, 27 et seq. ; assassinated, 31. Servius Tullius, 2. Ships, kinds of, 13 ; officers of, 14. Sieges, improved, 12 ; antiquity of, 386 ; walls to be attacked, 386-7 ; towers,
387, 393;
mounds, 388; circumvalla-
tion and contravallation, 388 ; terraces, enormous size of, 390 ; rams, mantelets, 391 ; 390, 394 vineae, 391 musculi, 391 teleuon, 396 ; engines,
; ; ;
INDEX.
397 ; breaches, 398 398: 776.
;
789
et seq. ; position,
;
steps of a siege,
Uxellodunum, 326
et seq.
;
siege of, 327 et seq.
defense
of,
327 ; 330
Signaling, 230. Singulis, 715 et seq. Sitius, 639, 688, 690. Slope, importance of, in battle, 527. Soricaria, battle of, 710-11. Spain, 695 et seq., 698.
capture
of, 332.
Varenus, 199. Varro, 435, 481. Yarns, 406, 413, 661, 726.
Vellaunodumun,
236.
Square,
9.
Suevi, 18, 150, 157, 162, 217. Sulla, 12, 16 as a general, 21 ; at Athens, 21 at Chaeronsea, 22 bis ability, 24 ; 27.
; ; ;
Sulpicius, 168.
Tegea, 678. Teutones and Cimbri, 16-20. Thapsus, 675, 677 et seq., 681
684 et seq. ; 690. Thessaly, plain of, 548. Tigranes, 32 et seq.
battle of,
Tigranocerta, 33. Time, division of Roman, 385. Titus, 773. Trebonius, 101, 185, 200, 212, 219, 236, 313, 319, 433, 475 et seq., 696. Tribunes, 10. Triumvirate, 48, 400 ; end of, 405. Triumvirs, at Luca, 401.
Veneti, seize ambassadors, 131; their country, 132 ; their trade with Britain, 133; their towns, 135; their ship, 135-6 ; battle against, 138 : their boats and tactics, 138-9 their defeat, 139. Ventisppnte, 712 et seq., 720. Vercassivellaunus, 296. Vercingetorix, 227 et seq. ; his character, 230 his recruiting, 231 his ability, 231 ; opens campaign, 231 moves on Caesar, 234 moves back, 236 follows Csesar, 238 ; his new plan, 239 ; camps near Avaricum, 240 lays ambush for Csesar, 243; his difficulties, 244; defends Elaver, 250; at Gergovia, 255 et seq. ; rouses ^Edui, 258 attacks camp, 258 ; raises new troops, 275 faces Csesar, 278; is defeated, 280; retires to Alesia, 282 ; sends away cavalry, 290 ; at Alesia, 293 et seq. ; surrenders, 305 ; his ability, 309, 729.
; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
Tysdra, 645, 676, 688, 690.
Ubii, 151, 157, 162, 217. Ucita, 645-6, 659 et seq., 688.
Veromandui,
Vesontio, 87
;
116.
panic at, 88, 98, 101, 277.
Viridomarus, 257, 267-8, 296. Volusenus, 166-7.
Winter-quarters, 98, 126, 149, 174, 191,
205, 225,
;
Ucubis, 712.
Ulia, 699.
Usipetes and Tenchtheri, 151 et seq. ; send ambassadors, 152 ; their massacre, 155 Utica, 688.
;
3(Ki,
333.
et seq.
its location, 155.
Zela, 33 battle of, 612 Zeta, 669.
LIST OF DATES.
Caesar joins his legions
Late Winter, 53-52
52 52
Harius begins the Army Changes Battle of Aquae Sextiae
110 102 101 Battle of Vercellae 100 Birth of Caesar 86 Battle of Chaeronaea 85 Battle of Orchomenus 84 Caesar made priest of Jupiter in Picenum 83 Fompey 82 Pompey in Sicily and Africa 81 Caesar in Bithynia 78 Caesar in Cilicia in Spain 77 Pompey Lucullus in the East 74-66 69 Battle of Tigranocerta 67 Pompey subdues the Pirates Caesar Quaestor iu Spain 67 66-G1 Poinpey in the East 66 Battle on the Lycus 65 Caesar ^Idile 64 Caesar Judex Quaustionis First Triumvirate 60 59 Caesar Consul Helvetian Campaign 58 Operations at Geneva March, 58 Battles of the Arar and Bibracte .... June, 58 Campaign against Ariovistus.. Aug. -Sept. 58 Battle of the Axona Spring, 57 Battle of the Sabis Aug. 57 Galba's Campaign in Alps Winter, 57-56 Veneti seize hostages Winter, 57-66 Campaign against Veneti Spring and Summer, 56 Sabinus in Normandy Spring, 56 Crassus' Campaign in Aquitania. Summer, 56 56 Meeting of Triumvirs at Luca 5o Battle against Veneti Fall, Campaign against Morini and Menapii Late Fall, 56 Usipetes and Tenchtheri invade Gaul Spring, 55 Caesar moves against them April, 55 Massacre of Usipetes and Tenchtheri. June, 55 Caesar builds bridge and crosses Rhine Mid. June, 55 First Expedition to Britain. Aug., Sept. 55 Expedition against Treviri June, 54 Second Crossing to Britain July 20, 54 End Aug. 54 Recrpssing to Continent Ambiorix attacks Sabinus and Cotta Nov. 54 Ambiorix attacks Cicero Nov. 54 Battle against Ambiorix Nov. 54 Indutiomarus attacks Labienus. Winter, 54-53 Campaign against Nervian Allies. .March, 53 The Treviri attack Labienus March, 53 Caesar again crosses Rhine Spring, 53
.
.
Noviodunum, Avasicum Early Spring, March to, Siege of and Retreat from Gergovia
Spring,
. .
Breach between Caesar and Pompey Pompey Consul with dictatorial powers Labienus' Campaign against Parisii. Spring, Caesar joins Labienus Late Spring, Battle of Vingeanne Early Summer, Summer and Fall, Siege of Alesia
Battle of Alesia
Fall,
52 52 52 52
52 52 52 51 51 51 51
Campaign against Bellovacian
Battle against Bellovaci Siege of Uxellodunum Caesar inspects Gaul
Allies
Jan. to April,
April,
Spring,
Summer,
Breach widened between Caesar and Pom51-50 pey 50 Caesar declared Public Enemy Tribunes flee from Rouse* Dec. 12, 50 of Rubicon Dec. 17, 50 Passing Dec. 20, 60 Antony takes Aretium
Consuls leave
Rome*
Pompey
at Lavinium Caesar at Ancona*
Dec. 23, Dec. 30,
Jan. 5, Jan. 8, Jan. 11, Jan. 18, Jan. 24,
Auxiinum taken Asculum taken
at Corfinium* Corfinium taken* Pompey arrives at Brundisium*. .Jan. 28, Feb. 9, Caesar arrives at Brundisium* Feb. 17, Pompey leaves Brundisium arrives at Capua* Feb. 25, Caesar Mar. 2, Caesar arrives at Rome Mar. 9, Caesar leaves for Gaul* Mar. 25, Cato abandons Sicily* of Massilia opened* Siege Apr. 4, Fabius camps at Ilerda Apr. 20,
Camp
. .
Campaign against Ambiorix
Summer and
Germans attack Aduatuca
Battle of Carrhae Vercingetorix opens
Fall, Fall,
53 53 53
Campaign
Late Winter, 53-52
Caesar leaves Massilia May 6, Caesar reaches Ilerda* May 23, Combat at Ilerda May 27, Naval Battle at Massilia May 28, Inundations begin in Spain May 29, Bridge built at San Llorens. June 10-11, June 17, Work begun on canal Af ranius marches towards Iberus June 25, Caesar cuts Afraniusfrom Iberus. June 27, Second naval battle of Massilia. June 30, Afranius capitulates July 2, Curio defeated at Bagradas July 20, Caesar arrives at Corduba Aug. 5, Caesar arrives at Gades Aug. 15, Caesar leaves Gades Aug. 23, Caesar arrives at Tarraco Aug. 28, Surrender of Massilia Sept. 6, Caesar arrives at Massilia Sept. 21, Oct. 11, Caesar arrives at Placentia Oct. 28, Caesar arrives at Rome Nov. 17, Caesar arrives at Brundisium Caesar sails from Brundisium*. ..Nov. 28, Nov. 30, Caesar arrives at Dyrrachium Dec. 1, Caesar arrives at Apollonia
. . . . .
50 50 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49
49 49
49 49
49 49 49
LIST OF DATES.
Potnpey arrives at Dyrrachium. .Dec. 3, Caesar with one legion marches through Dec. 5-25, Epirns Dec. 5, Caesar camps on Apsus All January, Caesar remains on Apsus and Pompey remain on Apsus Caesar Feb. 1-14, Antony sails from Brundisium .Feb. 15, Feb. 16, Antony lands at Nymphaeum
.
49
40
4'.)
'
48 48 48 48
I
Manoeuvres of Caesar, Pompey and Antony Feb. 18-23, Pompey and Caesar at Asparajfium Feb. 25 to Mar. 2,
Caesar cuts
4S
48
Pompey
off
from Dyrrachium
Mar.
4,
4S
48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Caesar invests
Pompey
near Dyrrachium Mar. 4 to May 15,
.
.
Caesar cuts off Dyrrachium. .May 17-21, May 26, Pompey attacks Caesar's line Caesar retires from Dyrrachium.. May 27, Caesar at Apollonia May 29-31, June 1, Caesar leaves Apollonia June 7, Caesar arrives at JSginium June 13, Caesar joined by Domitius June 15, Caesar takes Gomphi Caesar takes Metropolis June 16, June 18, Caesar camps at Pharsalus arrives at Larissa June 21, Pompey
June 1, Caesar arrives at Mazaca June 3, Caesar arrives at Comaua Caesar arrives at Zela ........... June 11, Battle of Zela* .................. June 12, Caesar arrives at Nicea .......... June 30, Caesar arrives at Athens ......... July 18, Caesar arrives at Tarentum ....... July 30, Caesar arrives at Brundisium ---- Aug. 2, Caesar arrives at Rome ........... Aug. 11, Caesar puts down mutiny ........ Aug. 29, Caesar leaves Rome .............. Oct. 10, Caesar arrives at Lilybaeum* ...... Oct. 23, Caesar leaves Lily baeum for Africa. Oct. 30, Caesar arrives at Hadrumet um Nov. 3, Caesar arrives at Ruspina* ....... Nov. 5, Caesar arrives at Leptis* ......... Nov. 6, Caesar arrives at Ruspina ........ Nov. 7, Caesar's convoy comes up ........ Nov. 8, Battle of Ruspina ............... Nov. 8, Nov. 13, Scipio arrives at Hadrumetum Scipio offers battle ........... Nov. 18-22, Messius takes Achilla ........... No v. 23, Arrival of 13th and 14th legions. .Nov. 26, Scipio goes to Ucita ............. Nov. 27, Caesar seizes hills opposite Ucita*
. . .
47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47
47 47 47 47
. .
47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 46 46 46 46 46
16
Nov.
30,
48
48 48 48 48 48 48 48 18 48 48 48 48
Pompey camps on
Enipeus. Caesar offers battle Battle of Pharsalus
June 25, June 26-28, June 29,
July 2, July 6, July 8, July 18, July 28, Aug. 6, Aug. 11,
Pompey Pompey
at Amphipolis at Mityleue
Caesar at Amphipolis Pompey in Attalia Caesar reaches Hellespont Caesar crosses Hellespont
Pompey
at
Cyprus
Caesar sails for Egypt from Asia Minor
Death of Pompey in Pelusium*. Caesar leaves Rhodes
Aug. 14, Aug. 16, Aug. 17, Caesar arrives at Alexandria Aug. 21, Caesar debarks in Alexandria Aug. 22, Riot in Alexandria Aug. 22-24, Aug. 29, Ptolemy reaches Alexandria
. .
48
48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Cleopatra reaches Alexandria. ..Sept. Achillas marches on Alexandria. Sept. Caesar seizes Ptolemy Sept. Achillas reaches Alexandria Sept. Achillas attacks Alexandria Sept.
.
1,
11, 23, 26, 27,
48 48 48 48 48
48 48 48
Bittle Sept. 27-28, Caesar executes Pothinus Oct. 3, Oct. 18, Ganymed in command Caesar digs wells .Oct. 24, Arrival of 37th legion Oct. 26, Naval Battle to rescue 37th legion Oct. 27, Cato reaches Africa .Nov. I, Battle of Nicopolis defeat of Domitius
. .
Caesar burns Egyptian fleet
Nov.
captured
Caesar releases Ptolemy Naval Battle of Canopus Cato reaches Leptis Mithridates arrives at Pelusium Battle at Jews' Camp Caesar leaves Alexandria to dates Battle of the Nile Surrender of Alexandria
13,
48 48 48 48 4*
47 47
Battle opp. Eunostos Harbor and Pharos
Nov. 20, Dec. 1, Dec. 19, Dec. 29,
. .
Caesar intrenches ............... Dec. 1-4, Storm .......................... Dec. 4, Juba arrives .................... Dec. 20, Scipio offers battle .............. Dec. 21, Labienus' ambuscade ............ Dec. 24, Caesar begins lines towards Ucita. Dec. 26, Scipio attacks ................... Dec. 29, 9th and 10th legions arrive ....... Dec. 31, Caesar begins siege of Ucita ...... Jan. 3, Caesar and Scipio stand in line of battle Jan. 7, Caesar's raid against Varus ....... Jan. 9, Arrival of 7th and 8th legions ---- Jan. 11, Libienus' 2d ambuscade ......... Jan. 12, Caesar moves to Agar Scipio to Tegea Jan. 14, ZetaRaid ....................... Jan. 17, Caesar offers battle .............. Jan. 19, Caesar offers battle* ............. Jan. 22, Caesar takes Sarsura* ............ Jan. 23, Caesar takes Thysdra* ............ Jan. 24, Caesar reaches Agar* ............ Jan. 26, Arrival of 4,000 reinforcements.. Jan. 27, Caesar offers battle .............. Jan. 31, Caesar marches on Thapsus and invests it* Feb. 3-4, Scipio marches on Thapsus ...... Feb. 4-5, Battle of Thapsus ............... Feb. 6, Caesar takes Ucita ............... Feb. 10, Caesar takes Hadrumetum ....... Feb. 11, Cato commits suicide ............ Feb. 12, Caesar arrives at Utica . ........ Feb. 16, Caesar arrives at Zama ........... Mar. 6, Caesar arrives at Utica .......... Mar. 14, Caesar leaves Utica .............. Apr. 14, Caesar arrives at Sardinia ........ Apr. 16, Caesar arrives at Rome ........... May 25, Caesar triumphs in Rome and organizes government ................ June-Nov. Cuaeus Pompey conquers Baetica
;
.
46 46 46 40 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
46
46 46 46 45 45 45 45
45 45
.Jan. 16,
Jin. 28,
meet MithriJan. 29,
Cato reaches Utica Caesar leaves Alexandria Caesar at Antioch " "sar at Tarsus
Feb. Feb. Apr.
3,
6,
4,
May 9, May 23-25, May 27-29,
47 47 47 47 47 47 47
Oct.-Nov. Caesar leaves Rome for Spain ..... Dec. 3, Caesar arrives at Obulco ......... Dec. 29, Julian calendar adopted .......... Jan. 1,
Caesar relieves Ulia .............. Jan. 4, Caesar arrives at Corduba ........ Jan. 10, Pompey arrives at Corduba ...... Jan. 12, Works and combats at Corduba Jan. 13-20, Caesar arrives at Attegua ......... Jan. 21,
f'
LIST OF DATES.
Jan. Pompey arrives at Attegua Jan. Pompey changes camp Pompey attacks Castra Postumiana
Caesar's cavalry arrives
28, 29,
45 46
Pompey
Caesar Battle Caesar Caesar
at
at
of
Munda* Munda* Munda*
Pompey
camps near Corduba
Capture of Attegua
Pompey approaches Ucubis Combat across Salsum* Combat of Soricaria* Pompey goes to Hispalis
Caesar takes Ventisponte Pompey at Carruca
Feb. 4, Feb. 5, Feb. 6, Feb. 19, Feb. 20, Mar. 4,
Mar. 5-6, Mar. 10, Mar. 12, Mar. 14,
;
45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
takes Corduba arrives at Hispalis
Mar. Mar. Mar. Mar. Mar.
Surrender of Hispalia Caesar arrives at Asta
Caesar arrives at Gades Assembly at Hispalis Caesar returns from Spain to Caesar arrives at Rome Caesar's triumphs Caesar's death
Rome Aug.
. .
15, 16, 17, 19, 26, Apr. 4, Apr. 10, Apr. 12, Apr. 22,
beg. Sept. beg. Oct.
Mar.
15,
45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 44
* marks a certain date
others are approximate or estimated.
'.
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
LIBRARY
Acme
Under
Pat.
Library Card Pocket " Ref. Index File."
Made by LIBRARY
BUREAU
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