Contingent Axioms of Language:

A Comparison between Nāgārjuna and Derrida

J.D.A. Kumara1

Abstract

One of the central teachings of Nāgārjuna is Śūnyatā, which is

a doctrine that asserts the transcendental nature of Ultimate
Reality. Nāgārjuna’s thinking paves the way to reject
structuralistic and logocentric view of language; putting signs
or words as the center of a system is inherently flawed as there
is no universal truth to a signifier, no meaning outside of the
signs and their perceived meaning by the user or context.
Jacques Derrida who developed a form of semiotic analysis
known as deconstruction, rejected the binary structure of
language. Views of both Derrida and Nāgārjuna are not
logocentric, not absolute.

Keywords: Nāgārjuna, Jacques Derrida, Language, Relative

Knowledge, Śūnyatā, Deconstruction.

Introduction: Derrida's Deconstruction and

Nāgārjuna's Sunyata
Claims about the life of Nāgārjuna have resulted many contradictory
conclusions among different scholars. Some scholars claim that he lived in
the second century, sometimes specifying the latter half of it. K. R.
Subramanian who conducted serious archaeological research concluded in
his 1932 publication that Nāgārjuna flourished within the period A.D. 50-
120. At the same time, David Kalupahana assigns Nāgārjuna to A.D. 150-
250 (Kalupahana, 1992).

It is believed that Nāgārjuna was born in the ancient kingdom of Vidarbha

in the southern part of India (Murty, 1978). Upon being presented with the
newborn baby, the Soothsayer observed auspicious signs of a holy being
but also made an ominous prediction that the baby would not live past the
seventh day. However, he added that the parents could prolong the baby‘s
life by up to 7 years if they made offerings to a hundred Buddhist monks.
Naturally, the parents obliged and the young Nagarjuna lived to seven years

1
Postgraduate Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences (PGIHS), University of
Peradeniya
2 Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 1 (1) 2018

of age with his parents. During his seventh year, Nagarjuna‘s parents feared
for his life and they decided to send him to the renowned Nalanda
Monastery, where he met the great master Saraha (or Rahulabhadra).
Tibetan sources also confirm that Nagarjuna had to leave his home as his
parents feared his premature death. Accordingly, Nagarjuna entered to the
Buddhist order and practiced the aramitayurdharani under the guidance of
his teacher Saraha (Raman, 1987).

Nāgārjuna philosophical interpretation on the Pratītyasamutpāda of early

Buddhism led to the development of the concept called Śūnyatā; it
explicated that all phenomena are free from eternal substance and created
by a natural consequence of dependent origination. Nagarjuna in his
magnum opus, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, describes about dependent
origination which leads to emptiness or Śūnyatā.

Whatever arises dependently

Is explained as empty.
Thus dependent attribution
Is the middle way.

Since there is nothing whatever

That is not dependently existent,
For that reason there is nothing
Whatsoever that is not empty. (Rinchen, 2006: 21)

Jackie Élie Derrida or Jacques Derrida (July 15, 1930 – October 9, 2004), a
well-known twentieth century philosopher, is renowned for being the
father-figure of the strategy called "deconstruction" in 1960s. He was born
in El Biar, French Algeria (Glendinning, 2011). Derrida made himself a
key thinker of modern times who made ground-breaking explorations into
the subtexts, as his theory of deconstruction, particularly, granted the
philosophy scholarship some new insights. He has revolutionized Western
thought in many disciplines including Phenomenology, Psychoanalysis,
structuralism, linguistics with his deconstruction strategy – that examined
Philosophy, literature, and the human sciences in a fresh way. Derrida
defined an originality as compared to his predecessors (Bennington and
Derrida, 1999). Almost every part of humanistic scholarship of the last
century wanted Derrida‘s contribution to re-read their long-held
conceptions. Derrida challenged the Western thought as a "metaphysics of
presence‖ and pointed out that being has been mistakenly assumed as
presence in the Western thought; being as the objectivity present to the
sight or to subject‘s mind; being as self-presence and self-proximity of
 Contingent Axioms of Language 3

cogito, consciousness, subjectivity (Taylor and Winquist, 2003). Looking

for a definitive foundation or meaning or rather truth is linked with the
Western acceptance of substance, essence, origin, identity, truth, or
eventually "Being."

Philosophers of language have been endeavoring to examine the relation of

language and meaning to truth and the world. According to philosophers of
language, for example, Donald Davidson‘s idea of ―intrinsic nature" of
language need to be dropped, instead we have to encounter the contingency
of the language (Malpas, 1992). The truth is subject to vary in accordance
with the user of the language or the language itself. Truth is different from
language to language or speaker to speaker, hence, contingency is a feature
enshrined in the language.

An axiom or postulate is a statement or proposition which is regarded as

being established, accepted, or self-evidently true. It works as a premise or
starting point in reasoning or arguments. It is argued here that the axioms
used to create knowledge is contingent due the nature of language as it is
open to many truths and lead to relativism. Deconstruction; the strategy
introduced by Derrida and Śūnyatā by Nāgārjuna serves to investigate
contingent axioms of knowledge generated by language.

Nāgārjuna's Philosophy of Śūnyatā and Relativism

Taught in Mādhyamika Tradition
Nāgārjuna's major thematic focus is the concept of Śūnyatā, which brings
together other key Buddhist doctrines, particularly Anātman "not-self" and
Pratītyasamutpāda "dependent origination", to refute the metaphysics of
some of his contemporaries. For Nāgārjuna, as for the Buddha in the early
texts, it is not merely sentient beings that are "selfless" or non-substantial;
all phenomena are without any Svabhāva (Sebastian, 2016).

Different terms have been used to translate the term ―Svabhāva‖ into
English: ―inherent existence‖ and ―intrinsic nature‖ have been selected by
many translators so far, ―substance‖ and ―essence‖ have also been proposed
(Westerhoff, 2009). The full complexity of the term has not been
comprehended by any terminology given in translations, nevertheless.

Meaning given to Svabhāva in orthodox Indian texts is far different from

the meaning found in Nāgārjuna‘ teaching: the meaning found in orthodox
literature is closer to "own-being" or "own-becoming" -- the intrinsic
nature, essential nature or essence of living beings. An epistemological
examination of the term Svabhāva gives it a sense of something self-
4 Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 1 (1) 2018

subsisting and independent of external conditions -- Svabhāva is something

which bears its own (Sva) existence (bhāva) (Schalow, 2011). Svabhāva is
a concept that can be found both in Hindu and Buddhist traditions, for
example Avadhūta Gītā of Advaita Vedanta, Uttaratantraśāstra or
Ratnagotravibhāga of Tathāgatagarbha literature of Mahayana Buddhism,
Dzogchen of Tibetan Buddhism, etc. Technically, all of the traditions prior
to Nāgārjuna conceived Svabhāva in absolute sense, where it was
considered as the essence of living beings.

Svabhāva, in terms of essence, has to be considered a property an object

that cannot be lost without ceasing to be that very object: the Svabhāva of
fire is to be hot, the Svabhāva of water to be wet: whatever ceases to be hot
is no longer fire, whatever ceases to be wet is no longer water (Westerhoff,
2009). But, Nāgārjuna‘s mission was to prove non-existence of substance;
as all phenomena is subject to conditionality in their momentary nature that
leads to continuous evolution. The average cognitive process of the people
erroneously speculates Svabhāva as part of human experience or something
with substance. Nāgārjuna destructs metaphysics of substance or essence in
phenomena. Some Buddhist schools, for instance, Sarvāstivāda believed in
some elementary factors that can be identified with Svabhāva; according to
them Svabhāva is the metaphysical foundation of all beings that make
beings intelligible (Liu and Berger, 2014).

Language and Śūnyatā

If Svabhāva is not a substance that exists in the world nothing intrinsic can
also exist in the world, it becomes a being empty of essential nature
(Gowans, 2014). Nāgārjuna in Mūlamadhyamakakārikā points out that all
is possible when emptiness is possible and nothing is possible when
emptiness is impossible.

sarvaṃ ca yujyate tasya śūnyatā yasya yujyate

sarvaṃ na yujyate tasya śūnyaṃ yasya na yujyate (Kalupahana, 1999: 337)

In Nāgārjuna‘s interpretation nothing can hold a structure that is intrinsic to

it; so, language itself would not have an intrinsic nature. Moreover, the
Mādhyamika, the school which was formed by Nāgārjuna gives a different
interpretation to the Theory of the Two Truths that was practiced by many
ancient Indian philosophers. In Theory of the Two Truths, two levels of
satya of truth are recognized. The two truths labeled as conventional truth
(saṁvṛti-satya) and ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya). In these Mahayanic
traditions a fixed view of emptiness or existence was upheld. The
Mahayanists related the two truths to two different objects of knowledge.
 Contingent Axioms of Language 5

They also taught that Buddha preached saṁvṛti-satya for pedagogical

purposes and believed that the two-truths have been divided only by human
cognition. Hence, the division of the truths cannot be grounded
ontologically. Accordingly, someone needs to transcend the phenomenal
truth to realize the ultimate truth. Hence, conventional truth only exists for
pedagogical necessity (Thakchoe, 2007).

But in Mādhyamika of Nāgārjuna tradition structured existence of saṁvṛti-

satya is refuted, as reality is not revealed by linguistic expressions.
Nāgārjuna describes in Mūlamadhyamakakārikā that ―the Dharma taught
by the Buddha is precisely based on the two truths: a truth of mundane
conventions and a truth of the ultimate‖ (Cowherds, 2015). He also
explains that those who do not understand the distinction between the two
truths do not understand the Buddha‘s teaching too. As Nāgārjuna sees
without using the conventional truth, the meaning of ultimate cannot be
taught. Hence, the theory of two truths plays a pivotal role in Buddha‘s
teaching as per the Mādhyamika tradition. Saṁvṛti-satya or conventional
truth would serve as the mirror that reflects the meaning of the Buddha's
teachings. Therefore, the two truths serve as epistemological truths. The
phenomenal world is accorded a provisional existence. The character of the
phenomenal world is declared to be neither real nor unreal, but logically
indeterminable. Ultimately, phenomena are empty (Śūnyatā) of an inherent
self or essence but exist depending on other phenomena
(Pratītyasamutpāda) (Matilal, 2002). The Buddha's ever poignant
existential and soteriological concerns about the reality of things and of life
are interpreted with the two truths. Mādhyamika tradition rejects any
absolutism with the two truths where nothing is ultimate, unchanging or
absolute. All the truths come under the relative realms. Mādhyamika
philosophers debunk metaphysical assumption of the truths. Nāgārjuna's
seminal works, for instance, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Śunyatāsaptati,
Vigrahvyāvartanī and Yuktiṣaṣṭikā attack foundationalism of conventional
truth where pride of place was accorded to conventional ontological
structures in case of revealing the ultimate truth.

Ancient Hindu teachings like Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkya, Yoga, Mīmāṁsā,

Vedānta supported some foundationalism that is needed to realize ultimate
reality. But, Nāgārjuna refuted Dravya that is the foundation that holds the
conventional ontological structures where the ultimate reality is speculated
as a fixed or irreducible entity which is independent of the conventions. But
as Nāgārjuna has argued in detail the causal relation itself is conceptually
constructed. But if causation cannot be regarded as a relation that functions
objectively, independent of the concepts we employ, then it can hardly be
6 Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 1 (1) 2018

regarded as a mind-independent way of founding the relationship between

language and the world (Thakchoe, 2007).

This brings the idea of Nāgārjuna‘s view on language which rejects the
atomistic or structuralist view of language and also rejects objectively
existent structural similarities of sentences or mere words. Nāgārjuna has
argued in detail the causal relation itself is conceptually constructed
(Mansueto, 2010).

Nagarjuna explains that a word or sentence is linked with past and present
and will also evolve in the future. Hence, one-to-one existence between
individual word and pieces of reality cannot be expected; it can only be
realized in a relativistic structure. According to Dissanayake (2007)
Nagarjuna categorically demonstrates that there is no reality prior to
language; reality has to be understood as a linguistic construct. This
thought can be inclined to post-structuralism where reality is considered as
a linguistic construct and not a fixed and irreducible reality. In conventional
truths of the two truths theory of India and Saussurean linguistics posit
language as an instrument, very often transparent, that makes
communication possible. Dissanayake (2007) further explains that this
approach to verbal communication promotes the idea that what language
does is to transport thoughts and ideas that have already been formed from
the communicator to the receiver. He says Nāgārjuna challenges this view
of language, maintaining that thoughts and ideas are conceived and take
shape only within language; in other words, he rejects the transportational
model of communication in order to foreground a constitutive one.

Strategies of Deconstruction:
Derrida Against Absolutism
Derrida paid profound attention to speech and writing. According to
Derrida, thinkers as different as Plato, Rousseau, Saussure, and Levi-
Strauss, have all denigrated the written word and valorised speech, by
contrast, as some type of pure conduit of meaning. Their argument is that
while spoken words are the symbols of mental experience, written words
are the symbols of that already existing symbol (Reynolds, 2004).

Ferdinand de Saussure tried to restrict the science of linguistics to the

phonetic and audible word only. In the course of his inquiry, Saussure goes
as far as to argue that "language and writing are two distinct systems of
signs: the second exists for the sole purpose of representing the first".
Language, Saussure insists, has an oral tradition that is independent of
writing, and it is this independence that makes a pure science of speech
 Contingent Axioms of Language 7

possible (Holdcroft, 1991). Derrida vehemently disagrees with this

hierarchy and instead argues that all that can be claimed of writing - eg.
that it is derivative and merely refers to other signs - is equally true of
speech. But as well as criticizing such a position for certain unjustifiable
presuppositions, including the idea that we are self-identical with ourselves
in 'hearing' ourselves think, Derrida also makes explicit the manner in
which such a hierarchy is rendered untenable from within Saussure's own
text.

Derrida argued that the binary oppositions, for example, Reason/Passion,

Man/Woman, Inside/Outside, Presence/Absence, Speech/Writing, etc.
were arbitrary and inherently unstable. The structures themselves begin to
overlap and clash and ultimately these structures of the text dismantle
themselves from within the text. In this sense deconstruction is regarded as
a forum of anti-structuralism. Deconstruction rejects most of the
assumptions of structuralism and more vehemently ―binary opposition‖ on
the grounds that such oppositions always privilege one term over the other,
that is, signified over the signifier (Coward, 1990).

Derrida wanted to deconstruct all binary oppositions. He gives a prominent

place to language in the deconstruction strategy: he inquires basically the
relationship between text and meaning. Deconstruction is meant to reveal
the structural ―fault lines‖ of texts. The purpose of deconstruction is to
expose that the object of language, and that which any text is founded
upon, is irreducibly complex, unstable, or impossible (Grenz, 1996).
Derrida's critique on the oppositions or violent hierarchies has been
inherent in Western philosophy since the time of the ancient Greeks.
Derrida saw that the hierarchies are still present with Saussurean
structuralism and he put forward the poststructuralist approach.
Structuralist theory has passed down a whole current of logocentric
(speech-centred) thought that originated in the time of Plato (Guillemette
and Cossette, 2007). Derrida takes an example from classical Greek
literature of Plato with the view of revealing logocentricm that prevailed in
the Western thought. In ―Plato‘s Pharmacy,‖ Derrida deconstructs Socrates‘
condemnation of the written word. Derrida throws light on Plato's Phaedrus
by placing questioning the attribution of an essential "undecidability" to the
word "Pharmakon (Kakoliris, 2013). Pharmakon, serves as a drug, a
poison and a cure. Derrida does this by reinterpreting the myth of the origin
of writing as described in The Phaedrus. Derrida understands Pharmakon is
something like writing which is far from governed by Plato‘s hierarchical
oppositions (McCance, 2014). In his most celebrated work, Of
Grammatology, Derrida endeavors to point out that the structure of writing
8 Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 1 (1) 2018

and grammatology are more important and even 'older' than the supposedly
pure structure of presence-to-self that is characterized as typical of speech
(Reynolds, 2004). Derrida coined a new term: difference. It was meant to
give the idea of both difference and an act of deferring. Derrida explained
that meaning is shaped by the production of differences amid words. Since
the sense of a word is at all times a function of differences with the
meanings of other words, and because the meanings of those words are in
turn dependent on contrasts with the meanings of still other words (and so
on), it follows that the meaning of a word is not something that is fully
present to us; it is endlessly deferred in an infinitely long chain of
meanings, each of which contains the ―traces‖ of the meanings on which it
depends. Derrida thought that the disagreement between speech and writing
is an indicator of ―logocentrism‖ of Western value system. He saw the
logocentric conception of reality as inherent preconception in Western
thought, which he identified as the ―metaphysics of presence‖.

To ‗deconstruct‘ philosophy, thus, would be to think—in the most faithful,

interior way—the structured genealogy of philosophy‘s concepts, but at the
same time to determine—from a certain exterior that is unqualifiable or
unnameable by philosophy—what this history has been able to dissimulate
or forbid, making itself into a history by means of this .motivated
repression (Noonan, 2004: 14).

Derrida casts off all metaphysical history with its hierarchies and
dichotomies that have survived to the present day. Derrida has rejected
structuralism, and as a result, the Saussurean schema (the signifier/signified
relationship) has been rethought. He has elaborated a theory of
deconstruction (of discourse, and therefore of the world) that challenges the
idea of a frozen structure and advances the notion that there is no structure
or center, no univocal meaning. The notion of a direct relationship between
signifier and signified is no longer tenable, and instead we have infinite
shifts in meaning relayed from one signifier to another (Guillemette and
Cossette, 2007).

Moreover, Derrida, throughout in his gamut of work, explored the way

metaphysics is linked to a specific view of language. The assumption,
Derrida contended, is that the spoken word is free of the paradoxes and
possibilities of multiple meanings characteristic of written texts. He called
this assumed primacy of the spoken word over text "logocentrism," seeing
it closely linked to the desire for certainty. His task was to undo
metaphysics and its logocentrism. Yet Derrida was also clear that we
cannot easily escape metaphysical thought, since thinking outside it is to be
 Contingent Axioms of Language 9

determined by it, and so he did not affirm or oppose metaphysics, but

sought to resist it.

"Deconstruction", the word he transformed from a rare French term to a

common expression in many languages, became part of the vocabulary not
only of philosophers and literary theorists but also of architects,
theologians, artists, political theorists, educationists, music critics,
filmmakers, lawyers and historians. Resistance to his thinking, too, was
widespread and sometimes bitter, as it challenged academic norms and,
sometimes, common sense.

Deconstruction is a way of reading any text and thereby exposing the

instability of meaning which the text tries to cover up. At the basic level
this instability results from the endless chain of meanings which a word is
capable of generating all throughout the existence of that word: its archaic
meanings, its modern connotations and denotations, and ever-changing
implications in changing contexts. Apart from semantics, it also takes one
into other aspects of meaning-construction, like phonetics, syntax,
grammar, etc. In short, it reveals how the text is always already internally
conflicted and is far from the serenity of any definite meaning.

Comparison between Derrida and Nāgārjuna

Comparing the philosophical views on language of Nāgārjuna and Derrida
who lived in different ages of the history and different contexts is worthy as
both of them were against structuralism and accepted contingencies of
knowledge created by language. Nāgārjuna‘s teaching throws a huge light
on the historical background of linguistics in the oriental contexts. This
study was basically focused on comparing Western and Eastern thoughts on
knowledge and human thinking. Rediscovering thoughts of an ancient
teacher like Nāgārjuna is important to form a new scholarship in
comparative studies in linguistics. As the Derridean and the Madhyamika
theories disagree over language with the idealist form and both of them
wanted to demolish the ontotheological interpretations that lead to
metaphysics. Derrida rejects a whole range of idealists from Plato to
Heidegger who held a made-up notion of language; who invoke the logos, a
linguistic sign, as an intermediary between the transcendental and sensible,
the divine and the human. Similar to Derrida, Nāgārjuna made an attempt
to abolish not only the central opposition of Being and Non-being, but all
its duplicities and triplicities (Park, 2006).

By and large, linguistic knowledge that arose in connection with the truth-
theoretic semantics have an axiomatic structure, with the axioms specifying
10 Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 1 (1) 2018

the meanings of the atomic elements of the language which are logically
derived from the axioms specifying the meanings of the sentences; an
axiom or postulate is a statement that is taken to be true, to serve as a
premise or starting point for further reasoning and arguments.

In this study it is argued that knowledge generated by the axioms of

language is contingent and which is neither necessarily true nor necessarily
false; in accordance with both teachings of Derrida and Nāgārjuna. Their
claims of knowledge go against certain cognitivist approaches.

Methodology
Literature survey has been used as the primary method of the research.
Texts of Nāgārjuna and Derrida were used as the primary sources. For
instance, Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā (Fundamental Verses of the Middle
Way), Śūnyatāsaptati (Seventy Verses on Emptiness), Vigrahavyāvartanī
(The End of Disputes), Vaidalyaprakaraṇa (Pulverizing the Categories),
Vyavahārasiddhi (Proof of Convention), Yuktiṣāṣṭika (Sixty Verses on
Reasoning), Catuḥstava (Hymn to the Absolute Reality), Ratnāvalī
(Precious Garland), Pratītyasamutpādahṝdayakārika (Constituents of
Dependent Arising), Sūtrasamuccaya Bodhicittavivaraṇa (Exposition of
the Enlightened Mind), Suhṛllekha (Letter to a Good Friend),
Bodhisaṃbhāra (Requisites of Enlightenment) were used as primary texts
for the research in the case of inquiring into the works of Nāgārjuna.
Speech and Phenomena, Of Grammatology, Deconstruction Engaged: The
Sydney Seminars, Heidegger: The Question of Being and History were
used as primary texts for inquiring into Derrida‘s theories. This research
used a method that is basically critical, speculative, and has a significant
historical perspective. In both Social Sciences and Physical Sciences, the
empirical method is a way of gaining knowledge by means of direct and
indirect observation or experience. The methodology of this research which
comes under Humanities is not singular and uses conceptual analysis and
textual criticism.

Discussion
Nāgārjuna who taught Śūnyatā, declares the phenomenal world to be void
of all limitations of particularization and eliminates all concepts of
Dualism. As per the Śūnyatā doctrine, no phenomenon has an eternal
substance. According to Nāgārjuna‘s teaching, no objective reality lies
outside language. Hence, past, present and future do not operate coevally.
Nāgārjuna categorically demonstrated that there is no reality prior to
language; reality has to be understood as a linguistic construct. The
knowledge people produce should be understood in a relativistic
 Contingent Axioms of Language 11

framework and Nāgārjuna rejects the atomistic view that single words bring
pieces of reality.

Nāgārjuna‘s thinking also paves the way to reject structuralistic and

logocentric view of the language; putting signs or words as the centre of a
system is inherently flawed as there is no universal truth to a signifier, no
meaning outside of the signs and their perceived meaning by the user or
context.

Jacques Derrida who developed a form of semiotic analysis known as

deconstruction, rejected the binary structure of language, and explained that
meaning goes beyond the simple opposition of signifier/signified. It is
ostensible that the signified is never identical to the signifier: there is
fluidity, adaptability and uncertainty as to the meaning of that which is
signified. Jacques Derrida's critical outlook over the relationship between
text and meaning claimed that contradictions are neither accidental nor
exceptions; they are the exposure of certain "metaphysics of pure
presence", an exposure of the "transcendental signified" always-already
hidden inside language. Derrida wanted to deconstruct polarities that are
derived by language.

Derrida came up with a concept named Différance which is the systematic

play of differences, of the traces of differences, of the spacing by means of
which elements are related to each other, that takes into account the fact
that meaning is a question not only of synchrony with all the other terms
inside a structure, but also of diachrony, with everything that was said and
will be said, in History, difference as structure and deferring as genesis.
Différance is a powerful modification of the ordinary notions of identity
and difference. Difference intervenes all the conceptual oppositions of
metaphysics to the extent that they ultimately refer to the presence of
something present become non pertinent. Différance does not mean simple
differentiation.

Derrida is critiquing Western thought as it is based on a hierarchy of binary

oppositions: man/woman, birth/death, good/evil/ speech/writing, etc
(Hölbling, 2007). In all such binaries, the left side of the slash Derrida sees
as superior, favored, or privileged over the right, which is relegated to an
inferior or subordinate position. With the view of deconstructing the
inequality, he wanted to destabilize the binary opposition, by causing the
entire process of ascribing dominance of one side over the other to become
blurred so that it would be impossible for either side of the slash to claim
superiority.
12 Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 1 (1) 2018

Conclusion
Both Derrida and Nāgārjuna pointed out that meaning given by the
language is contradictory and does not bring pieces of reality. Views of
both Derrida and Nāgārjuna are not logocentric, not ‗absolute. All in all,
both of them resort to the fact that language is limited to conventional truth
and cannot represent ultimate reality.

Rediscovering thoughts of Nāgārjuna would expand the philosophical

understanding of the language as his work is paralleling some poststructural
claims of language. Nagarjuna's argument on the implications of pratitya-
samutpada is applicable to language and the scholars will be able to read
the function of language in Śūnyatāvada understanding.

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14 Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 1 (1) 2018