146 SCRA 323; G.R. No. L-63419; 18 Dec 1986 LOZANO VS.
MARTINEZ
FACTS:
A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was made, contending that no
offense was committed, as the statute is unconstitutional. Such motion was denied by the RTC. The petitioners
thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. The Solicitor General, commented that it was premature for
the accused to elevate to the Supreme Court the orders denying their motions to quash. However, the Supreme
Court finds it justifiable to intervene for the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash.
ISSUE: WON BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of police power of the State.
HELD:
The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition
against imprisonment for debt.
The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored
upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is
not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The thrust of the
law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation.
An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that
it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do
this in the exercise of its police power.
GR No. 130239, April 15, 2005 MMDA vs. GARIN
FACTS:
Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his driver‘s license was confiscated for parking
illegally. Garin wrote to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his license and expressed
his preference for his case to be file in Court. Without an immediate reply from the chairman, Garin filed for a
preliminary injunction assailing among others that Sec 5 (f) of RA 7924 violates the constitutional prohibition
against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and unlimited
fines and penalties. RTC rule in his favor, directing MMDA to return his license and for the authority to desist
from confiscating driver‘s license without first giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate
proceeding. Thus this petition.
ISSUE: WON Sec 5(f) of RA 7924 which authorizes MMDA to confiscate and suspend or revoke driver‘s license
in the enforcement of traffic rules and regulations constitutional?
HELD:
The MMDA is not vested with police power. It was concluded that MMDA is not a local government unit of a
public corporation endowed with legislative power and it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community.
Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power vested in the legislature to make, ordain,
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances either with penalties of without,
not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for good and welfare of the commonwealth and for
subjects of the same.
There is no provision in RA 7924 that empowers MMDA or its council to ―enact ordinance, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila.‖ It is an agency created for the
purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, People‘s
Organizations, NGOs and private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of services. All its functions are
administrative in nature.
120 SCRA 568 (1983) VELASCO VS. VILLEGAS
FACTS:
Ordinance No. 4964 was enacted for a two-fold purpose. (1) To enable the City of Manila to collect a fee for
operating massage clinic separately from those operating barber shops and (2) To prevent immorality which
might probably arise from the construction of separate rooms. However, petitioner argues that such ordinance
amounts to a deprivation of property of petitioners-appellants of their means of livelihood without due process of
law.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance was unconstitutional.
HELD:
Considering the two-fold purpose of the ordinance, it is clear that such law is a police power measure. This Court
has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. WHEREFORE, the appealed
order of the lower court is affirmed.
G.R. No. L-32312 November 25, 1983
AURELIO TIRO vs. HONORABLE AGAPITO HONTANOSAS
FACTS:
In Civil Case No. 11616 of the defunct Court of First Instance of Cebu, Zafra Financing Enterprise sued Aurelio
Tiro in his official capacity as Superintendent of Schools in Cebu City. It appears that Zafra had extended loans to
public school teachers in Cebu City and the teachers concerned executed promissory notes and special powers of
attorney in favor of Zafra to take and collect their salary checks from the Division Office in Cebu City of the
Bureau of Public Schools. However, Tiro forbade the collection of the checks on the basis of Circular No. 21,
series 1969, dated December 5, 1969, of the Director of Public Schools.
Zafra sought to compel Tiro to honor the special powers of attorney; to declare Circular No. 21 to be illegal; and
to make Tiro pay attorney's fees and damages. The trial court granted the prayer of Zafra but the claim for money
was disallowed on the ground that he acted in good faith in implementing Circular No. 21.
ISSUE: The core issue is whether or not Circular No. 21 is valid and enforceable and the answer is definitely in
the affirmative.
HELD:
The salary check of a government officer or employee such as a teacher does not belong to him before it is
physically delivered to him. Until that time the check belongs to the Government. Accordingly, before there is
actual delivery of the check, the payee has no power over it; he cannot assign it without the consent of the
Government. On this basis Circular No. 21 stands on firm legal footing.
Zafra's claim that the Circular impairs the obligation of contracts with the teachers is baseless. For the Circular
does not prevent Zafra from collecting the loans. The Circular merely makes the Government a non-
participant in their collection which is within its competence to do.
ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ
[101 Phil 1117; G.R. No. L-7995; 31 May 1957]
Facts:
Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” was passed. The said law
provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by foreigners from engaging from
retail trade in our country. This was protested by the petitioner in this case. According to him, the said law violates
the international and treaty of the Philippines therefore it is unconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity
between the Philippines and China was violated according to him.
Issue:
Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power.
Held:
According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then provided that police power
can not be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. The Court also provided that RA 1180
was enacted to remedy a real and actual danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control. If ever
the law infringes upon the said treaty, the latter is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent
law and the same may never curtain or restrict the scope of the police power of the state.
NATIONAL POWER CORP. VS. GUTIERREZ
[193 SCRA 1; G.R. No. 60077; 18 Jan 1991]
Facts:
Petitioner filed an action to acquire a right of way over the land of Respondents for the construction of
transmission lines. Petitioner was adjudged to pay the full market value of land traversed by the transmission
lines. Petitioner argued that it was only asking for a right of way.
Issue:
Whether or Not the acquisition of the right of way constitutes "taking" and such the case will be entitled just
compensation.
Held:
The acquisition of the right of way constitutes taking. It perpetually deprives Respondents of their proprietary
rights. No plant higher than three meters is allowed below the transmission lines. Because of high tension current
conveyed through the transmission lines, danger to life and limbs cannot be discounted. The owner of the property
is entitled to just compensation.
MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE VS. VM REALTY CORPORATION
[292 SCRA 676; G. R. NO. 127820; 20 JUL 1998]
Facts:
Petitioner sought to exercise its power of eminent domain based on a resolution by the municipal council.
Petitioner cites a previous case wherein a resolution gave authority to exercise eminent domain. Petitioner also
relies on the Implementing Rules, which provides that a resolution authorizes a Local Government Unit to
exercise eminent domain.
Issue:
Whether or Not an LGU can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution by its law-making
body.
Held:
Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160), it is stated as the first requisite that LGUs
can exercise its power of eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted by its legislative body enabling the
municipal chief executive. A resolution is not an ordinance, the former is only an opinion of a law-making body,
the latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner involves BP 337, which was the previous Local Government Code,
which is obviously no longer in effect. RA 7160 prevails over the Implementing Rules, the former being the law
itself and the latter only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former.
MANOSCA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
[252 SCRA 412; G.R. NO. 106440, 29 JAN. 1996]
Facts:
The National Historical Institute declared the parcel of land owned by Petitioners as a national historical
landmark, because it was the site of the birth of Felix Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. The Republic of
the Philippines filed an action to appropriate the land. Petitioners argued that the expropriation was not for a
public purpose.
Issue:
Whether or Not the taking or exercise of eminent domain may be granted.
Held:
Public use should not be restricted to the traditional uses. The taking is for a public use because of the contribution
of Felix Manalo to the culture and history of the Philippines.
PUNSALAN VS. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA
[95 PHIL 46; NO.L-4817; 26 MAY 1954]
Facts:
Petitioners, who are professionals in the city, assail Ordinance No. 3398 together with the law authorizing it
(Section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The ordinance imposes a municipal occupation tax on
persons exercising various professions in the city and penalizes non-payment of the same. The law authorizing
said ordinance empowers the Municipal Board of the city to impose a municipal occupation tax on persons
engaged in various professions. Petitioners, having already paid their occupation tax under section 201 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, paid the tax under protest as imposed by Ordinance No. 3398. The lower court
declared the ordinance invalid and affirmed the validity of the law authorizing it.
Issue:
Whether or Not the ordinance and law authorizing it constitute class legislation, and authorize what amounts to
double taxation.
Held:
The Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in its discretion may tax all, or
select classes of occupation for taxation, and leave others untaxed. It is not for the courts to judge which cities or
municipalities should be empowered to impose occupation taxes aside from that imposed by the National
Government. That matter is within the domain of political departments. The argument against double taxation
may not be invoked if one tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city. It is widely recognized
that there is nothing inherently terrible in the requirement that taxes be exacted with respect to the same
occupation by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof. Judgment of the lower court is reversed with
regards to the ordinance and affirmed as to the law authorizing it.
LLADOC VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
[14 SCRA 292; NO.L-19201; 16 JUN 1965]
Facts:
Sometime in 1957, M.B. Estate Inc., of Bacolod City, donated 10,000.00 pesos in cash to Fr. Crispin Ruiz, the
parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of Fr. Lladoc, for the construction of a new
Catholic church in the locality. The donated amount was spent for such purpose.
On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate filed the donor's gift tax return. Under date of April 29, 1960.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for the donee's gift tax against the Catholic Parish of
Victorias of which petitioner was the parish priest.
Issue:
Whether or not the imposition of gift tax despite the fact the Fr. Lladoc was not the Parish priest at the time of
donation, Catholic Parish priest of Victorias did not have juridical personality as the constitutional exemption for
religious purpose is valid.
Held:
Yes, imposition of the gift tax was valid, under Section 22(3) Article VI of the Constitution contemplates
exemption only from payment of taxes assessed on such properties as Property taxes contra distinguished from
Excise taxes The imposition of the gift tax on the property used for religious purpose is not a violation of the
Constitution. A gift tax is not a property by way of gift inter vivos.
The head of the Diocese and not the parish priest is the real party in interest in the imposition of the donee's tax on
the property donated to the church for religious purpose.
CASSANOVAS VS. HORD
[8 Phil 125; No. 3473; 22 Mar 1907]
Facts:
The Spanish Govt. by virtue of a royal decree granted the plaintiff certain mines. The plaintiff is now the owner of
those mines. The Collector of Internal Revenue imposed tax on the properties, contending that they were valid
perfected mine concessions and it falls within the provisions of sec.134 of Act No. 1189 known as Internal
Revenue Act. The plaintiff paid under protest. He brought an action against the defendant Collector of Internal
Revenue to recover the sum of Php. 9, 600 paid by him as taxes. Judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant,
so the plaintiff appealed.
Issue:
Whether or Not Sec. 164 is void or valid.
Held:
The deed constituted a contract between the Spanish Government and the plaintiff. The obligation of which
contract was impaired by the enactment of sec. 134 of the Internal Revenue Law infringing sec. 5 of the Act of
Congress which provides that “no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be enacted”. Sec. 134 of the
Internal Revenue Law of 1904 is void because it impairs the obligation of contracts contained in the concessions
of mine made by the Spanish Government. Judgment reversed.
YNOT VS. IAC
[148 SCRA 659; G.R. NO. 74457; 20 MAR 1987]
Facts:
Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one province to another.
The carabaos of petitioner were confiscated for violation of Executive Order No 626-A while he was transporting
them from Masbate to Iloilo. Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. The
government argued that Executive Order No. 626-A was issued in the exercise of police power to conserve the
carabaos that were still fit for farm work or breeding.
Issue:
Whether or Not EO No. 626-A is a violation of Substantive Due Process.
Held:
The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power, because it is not reasonably necessary for the
purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. It is difficult to see how prohibiting the transfer of carabaos from one
province to another can prevent their indiscriminate killing. Retaining the carabaos in one province will not
prevent their slaughter there. Prohibiting the transfer of carabeef, after the slaughter of the carabaos, will not
prevent the slaughter either.
PEOPLE VS. CAYAT
[68 PHIL 12; G.R. NO. 45987; 5 MAY 1939]
Facts:
“Law prohibits any member of a non-Christian tribe to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink, any
intoxicating liquors of any kind.” The law, Act No. 1639, exempts only the so-called native wines or liquors
which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to take.
Issue:
Whether or Not the law denies equal protection to one prosecuted and sentenced for violation of said law.
Held:
No. It satisfies the requirements of a valid classification, one of which is that the classification under the law must
rest on real or substantial distinctions.
The distinction is reasonable. The classification between the members of the non- Christian and the members of
the Christian tribes is not based upon accident of birth or parentage but upon the degree of civilization and culture.
The term ‘non-Christian tribes’ refers to a geographical area and more directly to natives of the Philippines of a
low grade civilization usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities. The distinction is
reasonable for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non- Christian tribes”
The prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to insure peace and order in and among the
non- Christian tribes has often resulted in lawlessness and crime thereby hampering the efforts of the government
to raise their standards of life and civilization. This law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the
time of the enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exists. The Act applies
equally to all members of the class. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non-
Christians by reason of their degree of culture is not an argument against the equality of its operation nor affect
the reasonableness of the classification thus established.
DUMLAO VS. COMELEC
[95 SCRA 392; L-52245; 22 JAN 1980]
Facts:
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to
the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution.
Section 4 provided that any retired municipal or provincial city official that already received retirement benefits
and is 65 years of age shall not be qualified to run for the same local elective office from which he has retired.
Issue:
Whether or Not Sec. 4 of BP.52 is unconstitutional being contrary to the equal protection and due process rights.
Held:
No. The guarantee of equal protection is subject to rational classification based on reasonable and real
differentiations. In the present case, employees 65 years of age have been classified differently from younger
employees. The former are subject to compulsory retirement while the latter are not.
Retirement is not a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials because there can be retirees who are
even younger and a 65 year old retiree could be as good as a 65 year old official who is not a retiree. But there is
reason to disqualify a 65 year old elective official who is trying to run for office because there is the “need for
new blood to assume relevance”. When an official has retired he has already declared himself tired and
unavailable for the same government work.
WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid.
PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO
[234 SCRA 246; G.R. NO. 109633; 20 JUL 1994]
Facts:
Accused was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession and
sale of drugs, particularly methamphetamine or shabu. After the issuance of the search warrant, which authorized
the search and seizure of an undetermined quantity of methamphetamine and its paraphernalia’s, an entrapment
was planned that led to the arrest of del Rosario and to the seizure of the shabu, its paraphernalia’s and of a .22
caliber pistol with 3 live ammunition.
Issue:
Whether or Not the seizure of the firearms was proper.
Held:
No. Sec 2 art. III of the constitution specifically provides that a search warrant must particularly describe the
things to be seized. In herein case, the only objects to be seized that the warrant determined was the
methamphetamine and the paraphernalia’s therein. The seizure of the firearms was unconstitutional.
Wherefore the decision is reversed and the accused is acquitted.
PEOPLE VS. TANGLIBEN
[184 SCRA 220; G.R. No.L-63630; 6 Apr 1990]
Facts:
Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were conducting surveillance at the San Fernando Victory Liner
Terminal. At around 9:30pm they noticed a person, Medel Tangliben, carrying a traveling bag who acted
suspiciously. They confronted him, inspected his bag, and there they found marijuana leaves. The accused was
then taken to the Police Headquarters for further investigations. The TC found Tangliben guilty of violating sec.4
art. 2 of the RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Issue:
Whether or Not there was an unlawful search due to lack of search warrant.
Held;
No. Rule 113 sec. 5 provides the a peace officer or a private person may w/o a warrant arrest a person when in his
presence the person to be arrested has committed, is committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
In the present case, the accused was found to have been committing possession of marijuana and can be therefore
searched lawfully even without a search warrant. Another reason is that this case poses urgency on the part of the
arresting police officers. It was found out that an informer pointed to the accused telling the policemen that the
accused was carrying marijuana. The police officers had to act quickly and there was not enough time to secure a
search warrant.
GAMBOA VS. CRUZ
[162 SCRA 642;L-56291; 27 JUN 1988]
Facts:
Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant. During a line-up of 5 detainees including petitioner, he
was identified by a complainant to be a companion in a robbery, thereafter he was charged. Petitioner filed a
Motion to Acquit on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice and in the absence of his counsel
violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process. The court denied said motion. Hearing was set,
hence the petition.
Issue:
Whether or Not petitioner’s right to counsel and due process violated.
Held:
No. The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to
counsel. He had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The moment there is a move or even an urge
of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or
innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the
right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive and constitutional right, as
he was duly represented by a counsel. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to
substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the
prosecution had rested its case. What due process abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.
PEOPLE VS. BOLANOS
[211 SCRA 262; G.R. NO. 101808; 3 JUL 1992]
Facts:
Oscar Pagdalian was murdered in Marble Supply, Balagtas Bulacan. According to Pat. Rolando Alcantara and
Francisco Dayao, deceased was with two companions on the previous night, one of whom the accused who had a
drinking spree with the deceased. When they apprehended the accused they found the firearm of the deceased on
the chair where the accused was allegedly seated. They boarded accused along with Magtibay, other accused on
the police vehicle and brought them to the police station. While in the vehicle Bolanos admitted that he killed the
deceased. RTC convicted him hence the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not accused-appellant deprived of his constitutional right to counsel.
Held:
Yes. Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way to the Police
Station where formal investigation may have been conducted, appellant should have been informed of his
Constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, more particularly par. 1 and par. 3.
PEOPLE VS. FORTES
[223 SCRA 619; G.R. NO. 90643; 25 JUN 1993]
Facts:
Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog, Province of Sorsogon, accompanied his 13-year
old daughter, Merelyn, to the police station of the said municipality to report a rape committed against the latter
by the accused. Following this, the accused was apprehended and charged. A bond of P25000 was granted for
accused’s provisional release. The MCTC found him guilty. An appeal to RTC was filed, the request for the fixing
of bond was denied. Now accused assails denial of bail on the ground that the same amounted to an undue denial
of his constitutional right to bail.
Issue:
Whether or Not the accused’s right to bail violated.
Held:
No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules
of Court, as amended, that before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right
when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is
absolute. If the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be
denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of
guilt is strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of
right. If an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court
and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion
on the part of the court.
VILLAFLOR VS. SUMMERS
[41 PHIL 62; G.R. NO. 16444; 8 SEP 1920]
Facts:
Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery. The trial judge ordered the petitioner to subject herself
into physical examination to test whether or not she was pregnant to prove the determine the crime of adultery
being charged to her. Herein petitioner refused to such physical examination interposing the defense that such
examination was a violation of her constitutional rights against self-incrimination.
Issue:
Whether or Not the physical examination was a violation of the petitioner’s constitutional rights against self-
incrimination.
Held:
No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory
testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the
accused is permissible.
