SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 199537. February 10, 2016.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ANDREA TAN,
respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J : p
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Republic of the
Philippines (Republic) from the May 29, 2009 decision 1 and October 18,
2011 resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No.
00702. The CA denied the Republic's appeal from LRC Case No. N-144 3
wherein the Municipal Trial Court in Consolacion, Cebu, granted respondent
Andrea Tan's application for land title registration.
Antecedents
On October 2, 2002, Tan applied for the original registration of title of
Lot No. 4080, Cad. 545-D (new) situated in Casili, Consolacion, Cebu (the
subject lot). She alleged that she is the absolute owner in fee simple of the
said 7,807 square-meter parcel of residential land she purchased from a
certain Julian Gonzaga on September 17, 1992. Her application was
docketed as LRC Case No. N-144.
After complying with the jurisdictional requirements, the land
registration court issued an order of general default, excepting the State
which was duly represented by the Solicitor General.
During the trial, Tan proved the following facts:
1. The subject lot is within Block 1, Project No. 28, per LC Map No.
2545 of Consolacion, Cebu;
2. The subject lot was declared alienable and disposable on
September 1, 1965, pursuant to Forestry Administrative Order
No. 4-1063;
3. Luciano Gonzaga who was issued Tax Declaration Nos. 01465 in
1965 and 02983 in 1972 initially possessed the subject lot.
4. After Luciano's death, Julian Gonzaga inherited the subject lot;
5. Andrea Tan purchased the subject lot from Julian Gonzaga on
September 17, 1992;
6. She, through her predecessors, had been in peaceful, open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject lot
in the concept of an owner for over thirty (30) years.
On 28 April 2004, the land registration court granted Tan's application.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2022 cdasiaonline.com
The court confirmed her title over the subject lot and ordered its registration.
The Republic appealed the case to the CA, arguing that Tan failed to
prove that she is a Filipino citizen who has been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot, in the
concept of an owner, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding
the filing of her application. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-CV
No. 00702.
On May 29, 2009, the CA denied the appeal. The CA observed that
under the Public Land Act, there are two kinds of applicants for original
registration: (1) those who had possessed the land since June 12, 1945; and
(2) those who already acquired the property through prescription. The
respondent's application fell under the second category.
The CA noted that before land of the public domain can be acquired by
prescription, it must have been declared alienable and disposable
agricultural land. The CA pointed to the certification issued by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) as evidence
that the subject was classified as alienable and disposable on September 1,
1965, pursuant to Land Classification Project No. 28. The CA concluded that
Tan had already acquired the subject lot by prescription.
On July 2, 2009, the Republic moved for reconsideration. Citing
Republic v. Herbieto , 4 it argued that an applicant for judicial confirmation of
title must have been in possession and occupation of the subject land since
June 12, 1945, or earlier, and that the subject land has been likewise already
declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945, or earlier. 5 CAIHTE
On October 18, 2011, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration
citing the then recent case of Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Rep. of the
Philippines 6 which abandoned the ruling in Herbieto. Malabanan declared
that our law does not require that the property should have been declared
alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945, as long as the declaration was
made before the application for registration is filed. 7
On January 5, 2012, the Republic filed the present petition for review
on certiorari.
The Petition
The Republic argues: (1) that the CA misapplied the doctrine in
Malabanan; and (2) that the CENRO certification and tax declarations
presented were insufficient to prove that the subject lot was no longer
intended for public use.
Meanwhile, the respondent insists that she has already proven her title
over the subject lot. She maintains that the classification of the subject lot as
alienable and disposable public land by the DENR on September 1, 1965, per
Land Classification Project No. 28, converted it into patrimonial property of
the State.
From the submissions, the lone issue is whether a declaration that
Government-owned land has become alienable and disposable sufficiently
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2022 cdasiaonline.com
converts it into patrimonial property of the State, making it susceptible to
acquisitive prescription.
Our Ruling
We find the petition meritorious.
All lands of the public domain belong to the State. It is the fountain
from which springs any asserted right of ownership over land. Accordingly,
the State owns all lands that are not clearly within private ownership. This is
the Regalian Doctrine which has been incorporated in all of our Constitutions
and repeatedly embraced in jurisprudence. 8 Under the present Constitution,
lands of the public domain are not alienable except for agricultural lands.
9
The Public Land Act 10 (PLA) governs the classification, grant, and
disposition of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It is the
primary substantive law on this matter. Section 11 thereof recognizes
judicial confirmation of imperfect titles as a mode of disposition of alienable
public lands. 11 Relative thereto, Section 48 (b) of the PLA identifies who are
entitled to judicial confirmation of their title:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. Those shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (As
amended by PD 1073.)
The Property Registration Decree 12 (PRD) complements the PLA by
prescribing how registrable lands, including alienable public lands, are
brought within the coverage of the Torrens system. Section 14 of the PRD
enumerates the qualified applicants for original registration of title:
Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945,
or earlier;
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provision of existing laws;
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or
abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under
the existing laws;
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2022 cdasiaonline.com
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other
manner provided for by law. 13
The PRD also recognizes prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership
under the Civil Code. 14 Nevertheless, prescription under Section 14 (2) must
not be confused with judicial confirmation of title under Section 14 (1).
Judicial confirmation of title requires:
1. That the applicant is a Filipino citizen; 15
2. That the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-
interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the property since June 12, 1945; 16
3. That the property had been declared alienable and disposable as
of the filing of the application. 17 DETACa
Only private property can be acquired by prescription. Property of
public dominion is outside the commerce of man. 18 It cannot be the object
of prescription 19 because prescription does not run against the State in its
sovereign capacity. 20 However, when property of public dominion is no
longer intended for public use or for public service, it becomes part of the
patrimonial property of the State. 21 When this happens, the property is
withdrawn from public dominion and becomes property of private ownership,
albeit still owned by the State. 22 The property is now brought within the
commerce of man and becomes susceptible to the concepts of legal
possession and prescription.
In the present case, respondent Tan's application is not anchored on
judicial confirmation of an imperfect title because she does not claim to have
possessed the subject lot since June 12, 1945. Her application is based on
acquisitive prescription on the claim that: (1) the property was declared
alienable and disposable on September 1, 1965; and (2) she had been in
open continuous, public, and notorious possession of the subject lot in the
concept of an owner for over thirty (30) years.
In our 2009 decision and 2013 resolution 23 in Malabanan, we already
held en banc that a declaration that property of the public dominion is
alienable and disposable does not ipso facto convert it into patrimonial
property. We said:
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that
the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service
or the development of the national wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial. Without such express
declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or
disposable, remains property of the public dominion,
pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition
by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands
are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth that the
period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration
shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law. 24
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2022 cdasiaonline.com
While a prior declaration that the property has become alienable and
disposable is sufficient in an application for judicial confirmation of title
under Section 14 (1) of the PRD, it does not suffice for the purpose of
prescription under the Civil Code. 25 Before prescription can even begin to
run against the State, the following conditions must concur to convert the
subject into patrimonial property:
1. The subject lot must have been classified as agricultural land in
compliance with Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII of the Constitution;
2. The land must have been classified as alienable and disposable;
26
3. There must be a declaration from a competent authority that the
subject lot is no longer intended for public use, thereby
converting it to patrimonial property.
Only when these conditions are met can applicants begin their public
and peaceful possession of the subject lot in the concept of an owner.
In the present case, the third condition is absent. Even though it has
been declared alienable and disposable, the property has not been
withdrawn from public use or public service. Without this, prescription
cannot begin to run because the property has not yet been converted into
patrimonial property of the State. It remains outside the commerce of man
and the respondent's physical possession and occupation thereof do not
produce any legal effect. In the eyes of the law, the respondent has never
acquired legal possession of the property and her physical possession
thereof, no matter how long, can never ripen into ownership.
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition. The May 29, 2009
decision and October 18, 2011 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CEB-CV No. 00702 a r e REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondent's
application for Land Registration is DENIED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Del Castillo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Leonen, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Separate Opinions
LEONEN, J., concurring:
I concur in the result.
Respectfully, I disagree with the ponencia's statement that "the State
owns all lands that are not clearly within private ownership." 1 This
statement is an offshoot of the idea that our Constitution embraces the
Regalian Doctrine as the most basic principle in our policies involving lands.
The Regalian Doctrine has not been incorporated in our Constitution.
Pertinent portion of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2022 cdasiaonline.com
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State[.] 2
Thus, there is no basis for the presumption that all lands belong to the
state. The Constitution limits state ownership of lands to "lands of the public
domain[.]" 3 Lands that are in private possession in the concept of an owner
since time immemorial are considered never to have been public. 4 They
were never owned by the state.
In Cariño v. Insular Government: 5
The [Organic Act of July 1, 1902] made a bill of rights, embodying the
safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends
those safeguards to all. It provides that "no law shall be enacted in
said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal
protection of the laws." § 5. In the light of the declaration that we
have quoted from § 12, it is hard to believe that the United States
was ready to declare in the next breath that . . . it meant by
"property" only that which had become such by ceremonies of which
presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had heard, and that
it proposed to treat as public land what they, by native custom and
by long association, — one of the profoundest factors in human
thought, — regarded as their own. aDSIHc
xxx xxx xxx
. . . It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when,
as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by
individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to
have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest,
and never to have been public land. 6
Hence, documents of title issued for such lands are not to be
considered as a state grant of ownership. They serve as confirmation of
property rights already held by persons. They are mere evidence of
ownership. 7 The recognition of private rights over properties that have long
been held as private is consistent with our constitutional duty to uphold due
process. 8
The state cannot, on the sole basis of the land's "unclear" private
character, always successfully oppose applications for registration of titles,
especially when the land involved has long been privately held and
historically regarded by private persons as their own. 9
This case can be resolved without resort to the fiction of the Regalian
Doctrine.
Respondent Andrea Tan's application for registration was granted by
the land registration court. 10 The Court of Appeals affirmed the land
registration court's Decision based on the certification issued by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) that the land
was already classified as alienable and disposable. 11
By submitting the CENRO's certification, therefore, respondent
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2022 cdasiaonline.com
applicant admitted that prior to her possession, the land was part of the
public domain. However, she failed to clearly show that the land was
classified as alienable and disposable public land.
In several cases, we have clearly ruled that the CENRO's certificate is
not sufficient.
ACCORDINGLY, I concur that the Petition should be GRANTED.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 37-44. Penned by Associate Justice Florito S. Macalino and concurred
in by Associate Justices Stephen C. Cruz and Rodil V. Zalameda.
2. Id. at 31-35. Penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Ingles and concurred in by
Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr.
3. Id. at 45-48. Through Presiding Judge Jocelyn G. Uy-Po.
4. G.R. No. 156117, 26 May 2005, 459 SCRA 183, 186.
5. Rollo, p. 52.
6. 605 Phil. 244 (2009).
7. Id. at 269, citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144507, 17 January 2005,
448 SCRA 442.
8. La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Sec. Ramos , 465 Phil. 860, 866 (2004);
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap, G.R. No. 167707, 8
October 2008, 568 SCRA 164, 200; Republic v. Ching, G.R. No. 186166, 20
October 2010, 634 SCRA 415.
9. Art. XII, Section 2, 3, PHIL. CONST.
10. Commonwealth Act No. 141 (as amended), [THE PUBLIC LAND ACT], (1936).
11. Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of
only as follows:
1. For homestead settlement;
2. By sale;
3. By lease; and
4. By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles:
(a) By judicial legalization
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent)
12. Presidential Decree No. 1529, [PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE] (1978).
13. Section 14, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE.
14. See CIVIL CODE, Arts. 712 and 1106.
15. Section 48 (b), PUBLIC LAND ACT.
16. Section 48 (b), PUBLIC LAND ACT; Section 14 (1), PROPERTY REGISTRATION
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2022 cdasiaonline.com
DECREE.
17. Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines, 704 SCRA 561, 581
(2013); Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 7.
18. Art. 1113, CIVIL CODE.
19. Art. 1113, CIVIL CODE.
20. Art. 1108, CIVIL CODE.
21. Art. 422, CIVIL CODE.
22. Art. 425, CIVIL CODE.
23. Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines, supra note 17.
24. Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Rep. of the Philippines, supra note 7.
25. Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are
acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.
Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe
through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without
need of title or of good faith.
26. Sec. 6, PUBLIC LAND ACT.
LEONEN, J., concurring:
1. Ponencia, p. 3.
2. CONST., art. XII, sec. 2.
3. CONST., art. XII, sec. 2.
4. CONST., art. XII, sec. 2.
5. 212 U.S. 449 (1909).
6. Id. at 459-460.
7. See Cariño v. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449, 457-460 (1909).
8. CONST., art. III, sec. 1.
9. See Cariño v. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449, 457-460 (1909).
10. Ponencia, p. 2. The registration was granted on April 28, 2004.
11. Id. at 2-3. The Decision was dated May 29, 2009.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2022 cdasiaonline.com