1.

 Amigable vs. Cuenca, 43 SCRA 360, February 29, 1972

Excerpt : 1. VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of
Public Highways and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees.
More Excerpts
Case Title : VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of
Public Highways and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees. 
Case Nature : APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. 

Syllabi Class :Political law|Immunity of State from suit|Relief available to aggrieved owner

Syllabi:
1. Political law;  Immunity of State from suit; Exception.+
2. Political law;  Immunity of State from suit; Reason for exception.+
3. Political law;  Relief available to aggrieved owner; Just compensation.+

Docket Number: No. L-26400

Ponente: MAKALINTAL

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for the
determination of compensation, including attorney’s fees, to which the appellant is entitled as above indicated.
No pronouncement as to costs.

Citation Ref:

360  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 

Amigable vs. Cuenca
No. L-26400. February 29, 1972.
VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of
Public Highways and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees.
Political law; Immunity of State from suit; Exception.—Where the government takes away property
from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of 
361
VOL. 43, FEBRUARY 29, 1972  361 
Amigable vs. Cuenca
expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the
government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its
consent.
Same; Same; Same; Reason for exception.—The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit
cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the
procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only
upon pay ment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender of the party entitled to such pay
ment of the amount fixed, may it “have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned, to
appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment.”
 Same; Relief available to aggrieved owner; Just compensation.—As registered owner, she could
bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is
one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the
government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road
purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and
should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the
price or value thereof at the time of the taking.

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in its Civil Case No. R-
5977, dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint.
Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad
Estate in Cebu City as shown by Transf er Certificate of Title No. T-18060, which superseded
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-3272 (T-3435) issued to her by the Register of Deeds of
Cebu on February 1, 1924. No annotation in favor of the 
362
362  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Amigable vs. Cuenca
government of any right or interest in the property appears at the back of the certificate. W ithout
prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot, with an area of
6,167 square meters, for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
It appears that said avenues were already existing in 1921 although “they were in bad
condition and very narrow, unlike the wide and beautiful avenues that they are now,” and “that
the tracing of said roads was begun in 1924, and the formal construction in 1925.” *

On March 27, 1958 Amigable’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting
payment of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the government. The claim was
indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it in his 9th Indorsement dated December 9,
1958. A copy of said indorsement was transmitted to Amigable’s counsel by the Office of the
President on Janu ary 7, 1959.
On February 6, 1959 Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint, which was later amended
on April 17, 1959 upon motion of the defendants, against the Republic of the Philippines and
Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of
ownership and possession of the 6,167 square meters of land traversed by the Mango and
Gorordo Avenues. She also sought the payment of compensatory damages in the sum of P50,-
000.00 for the illegal occupation of her land, mo ral damages in the sum of P25,000.00,
attorney’s fees in the sum of P5,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
Within the reglementary period the defendants filed a joint answer denying the material
allegations of the complaint and interposing the following affirmative defenses, to wit: (1) that
the action was premature, the claim not having been filed first with the Office of the Auditor
General; (2) that the right of action for the recovery of any amount which might be due the
plaintiff, if any, had already prescribed; (3) that the action being a suit against 
_______________
  Decision, Record on Appeal, p. 12.
*

363
VOL. 43, FEBRUARY 29, 1972  363 
Amigable vs. Cuenca
the Government, the claim for moral damages, attorney’s fees and costs had no valid basis since
as to these items the Government had not given its consent to be sued; and (4) that inasmuch as it
was the province of Cebu that appropriated and used the area involved in the construction of
Mango Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.
During the scheduled hearings nobody appeared for the defendants notwithstanding due
notice, so the trial court proceeded to receive the plaintiff’s evidence ex parte. On July 29, 1959
said court rendered its decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s cause of
action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the portion of her lot in question on the
ground that the government cannot be sued withou t its consent; that it had neither original nor
appellate jurisdiction to hear, try and decide plaintiff’s claim for compensatory damages in the
sum of P50,000.00, the same being a money claim against the government; and that the claim for
moral damages had long prescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction over said claim because the
government had not given its consent to be sued. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed.
Unable to secure a reconsideration, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
subsequently certified the case to Us, there being no question of fact involved.
The issue here is whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government under the
facts of the case.
In the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu,  involving a claim for payment
1

of the value of a portion of land used for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City, this
Court, through Mr. Justice Enrique M. Fernando, held that where the government takes away
property from a private lando wner for public use without going through the legal process of
expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the
government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without
its consent. W e there said: 
_______________

 G.R. No. L-31635, August 31, 1971 (40 SCRA 464).

1

364
364  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Amigable vs. Cuenca
“x x x. If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property taken for public use were
to be respected, as it should, then a suit of this character should not be summarily dismissed. The doctrine
of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a
citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a
complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon pay ment of the compensation fixed by the
judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such pay ment of the amount fixed, may it ‘have the right
to enter in and upon the land so condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the
judgment.’ If there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint
they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what the law
requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is just as important, if not more so, that there be
fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is not too
much to say that when the government takes any property for public use, which is conditioned upon the
pay ment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the
jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be
appropriately invoked.”
Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate
of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the
government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could
bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because
possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said
portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and
has been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due
compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due
compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking. 2

As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest
on the price of 
_______________

 Alfonso vs. City of Pasay (106 Phil. 1017).

2

365
VOL. 43, FEBRUARY 29, 1972  365 
Republic vs. Pal-Fox Lumber Co., Inc.
the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government.  In 3

addition, the government should pay for attorney’s fees, the amount of which should be fixed by
the trial court after hearing.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the
court a quo for the determination of compensation, including attorney’s fees, to which the
appellant is entitled as above indicated. No pronouncement as to costs.
     Concepcion, C.J., Reyes,
J.B.L., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Decision set aside and case remanded to the court a quo for determination of compensation,
including attorney’s fees.
Notes.—For more cases illustrative of the principle of state immunity from suit, see Notes, 34
SCRA 28-29.
For a comprehensive treatment of just compensation in eminent domain or expropriation
proceedings, refer to 29 SCRA 871-884.

————

© Copyright 2023 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.