ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES

Judicial Review

Honourable Justice Anup Singh Choudry v Attorney-General

- Before the High Court; HCT Civil Miscellaneous Cause No. 0057 of 2012

This was an application under Rule 5(1) of the Judicature (Judicature Review) Rules No. 9 of 2009;
sections 96, 98 of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 51 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules as well as
Article 42 of the Constitution for orders that:

1. The time within to file an application for Judicial Review be extended for 14 days or other time
deemed fit by this Honorable Court from the date of granting the orders sought in this application.

2. Provision be made for the costs in this application. The application is supported by the applicant
and founded on the following grounds:

1. That the applicant was not notified by the judicial Service Commission that it had indeed
issued a report against him until 5th April 2012 when he read The Uganda Law Society Vs.
Attorney General, Constitutional Petition No. 11 of 2012 which was attached to the memo
from the principle Judge.

2. That the applicant was denied a hearing contrary to article 28 of the Constitution and section
11 (a), (b) and (c) and section 12 of Judicial Service Act.

3. That the applicant was not told the reasons for the decision of the Commission under section
11 (d) of the Judicial Service Act and Article 42 of the Constitution.

4. That the applicant will suffer irreparable harm if the application is not granted.

The gist of the applicant’s case was that he was not afforded the chance to cross examine the
complainants and was never summoned to attend the hearing which resulted into the JSC’s report against
him to the President and recommendation that he form a tribunal to look into his removal from the bench.
This was allegedly in contravention of section 11 of the Judicial Service Act, which codifies the rules of
natural justice.

Court considered the question whether this provision was applicable while the JSC was acting under
Article 144(4) of the Constitution; in other words, before the JSC refers a Judicial Officer to the President
for investigation, what is the proper procedure it is supposed to have done?

1. Is the Commission expected to carry out an inquiry envisaged under section 11 of the Judicial
Service Act? Or

2. Is it expected to first carry out an investigation upon which it concludes that the question for
removal of a judicial officer has a risen requiring reference of the case to the president to appoint
a tribunal to investigate the matter?

3. Once a complaint warranting the removal of a Judicial officer is brought to its attention and
without doing any other thing the Commission can simply refer the matter to the president for
investigation by the tribunal appointed by him?
The trial judge found that these questions warranted consideration by the court and held that it was a
proper case to allow the extension of the time to file an application for judicial review of the decision of
the JSC. There was no order as to costs.

Pauline Nakabuye v URA, Miscellaneous Cause No. 372 of 2019

An application by notice of motion under s. 14, 33, 36 and 39 of the Judicature Act, s. 64 and 98 of the
Civil Procedure Act and Rules 3, 3A, 4, 5 and 6 of the Judicature (Judicial Review) Rules 2009 for
prerogative and judicial reliefs:

 An Order of Certiorari, to quash Regulation 7(1), 7(3) and 7(4) of the Tax Procedure Code
(Stamps) regulations 2018 for being ultra vires;

 An Order of Prohibition, restraining and preventing the respondent, its officers, servants, from
directly or indirectly or in any other way, enforcing Regulation 7(1),7(3) & 7(4) of the Tax
Procedure Code (Stamps) Regulations 2018;

 Injunction, prohibiting the respondent from enforcing regulation 7(1),7(3) & 7(4) of the Tax
Procedure Code (Stamps) Regulations 2018;

 A declaration that regulation 7(1),7(3) & 7(4) of the Tax Procedure Code (Stamps) Regulations
2018 is ultra vires the Tax Procedure Code Act, 14 of 2014;

 A declaration that regulation 7(1),7(3) & 7(4) of the Tax Procedure Code (Stamps) Regulations
2018, is illegal, irrational and unfair;

 Costs of this application.

Applicant’s arguments:

- Regulation 7(1) of the impugned regulations required a manufacturer and or importer of goods to
which tax stamps are to be applied to purchase the said stamps from the Commissioner-General
of the respondent at a fee specified by the Commissioner-General by notice in the gazette and a
newspaper of wide circulation.
- Regulation 7(3) of the impugned regulations required the tax stamps fee to be paid before the tax
stamps are issued to a manufacturer.
- Regulation 7(4) of the impugned regulations empowers the respondent to maintain a bank
account into which revenue from sale of tax stamps is to be deposited for purposes of paying the
printers of the tax stamps and for defraying expenses of managing the system.
- Regulation 7(1),7(3) & 7(4) of the Tax Procedure Code (Stamps) Regulations 2018 are ultra vires
the Principal Act and it is illegal, irrational and unfair;
- The fee amounted to a tax levy without the authority of any law, and or is non-tax revenue, which
by law must be collected into the Consolidated Fund and only expended with authority of the
Parliament of Uganda.
- Implementation of regulation 7(1),7(3) & 7(4) of the Tax Procedure Code (Stamps) Regulations
2018 would have an illegal effect vis a vis the Public Finance Management Act.
As a consumer of exercisable products that are required to be stamped, the applicant would suffer the
reasonable and unnecessary increase in price of locally manufactured goods to her detriment.

Respondent’s Arguments

- The manufacturers and importers of prescribed goods are required to purchase tax stamps at a fee
specified by notice in the gazette and news paper of wide circulation.
- The respondent has not published the tax stamps fees by notice in the Gazette or news paper of
wide circulation.
- The regulation 7(30 is rational and the applicant has not demonstrated any proof of the alleged
risk of income inequality.
- The regulations 7(1),7(3) & 7(4) of the Tax Procedure Code (Stamps) Regulations 2018 are valid
provisions of the law and the same have not been found to be unconstitutional by the
Constitutional court of Uganda.
- The regulations are rational, reasonable, legal, fair and where lawfully passed by Parliament.
- This application is misconceived, bad in law, frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of court process
because the application is time-barred.
- That the implementation and enforcement of the Tax Procedures Code Act and Tax Procedures
Code (Tax Stamps) Regulations 2018 are lawful.

Issues before court:

- Whether the applicant was entitled to prerogative orders and judicial reliefs sought in the
application for judicial review.
- Whether the applicant was entitled to costs.

Preliminary points by respondent.

- Whether the application for judicial review is time barred?

Rule 5 of the Judicature (Judicial Review) Rules sets out a mandatory timeline to make an application
for judicial review before the court within three months from the date on which the grounds arose.
The Tax Procedure Code (Stamps) Regulations came into effect on October 2, 2018. The application
was filed beyond January 2019 and was thus time-barred: URA v Consolidated Properties CACA 31
of 2000; Okoth Umaru v Busia Municipal Council & 3 Others HCMC 12 of 2016.

Applicant contended that she became aware of the regulations in July 2019 and sued in September.
There was no bar in applying for extension of time after the application is filed nor was there a fetter
on the power of the court under section 98 of the Civil Procedure Act to ensure that the needs of
justice are served.

Court held that it was clear that she was out of time by the time the applicant filed the application and
did not seek leave of court to extend the time within which she could file the application. She should
have advanced the reasons for delay. ‘he rule of laches is not a rigid rule which can be cast in a strait-
jacket. The courts do not follow a rigid, but a flexible, measure of delay. It should be emphasized that
the rule that the court may not enquire into belated and stale claims is not applied in a rigid manner.’

It did not accept the contention that time limits are technicalities and should be dispensed with:
‘Time limits set by statutes are matters of substantive law and not mere technicalities and must
strictly be complied with.’ – Court of Appeal in URA v Uganda Consolidated Properties Ltd, CACA
31 of 2000. Also see Musota, J in IP Mugumya v AG HCMC No. 116 of 2015: ‘…an application for
judicial review has to be filed within three months from the date when the grounds of the application
first arose unless an application is made for extension of time…the time limits stipulated in the Rules
apply and are still good law.’

‘The court ought not to consider stale claims by person who have slept on their rights…
Inordinate delay in making an application for judicial review will always be a good ground for
refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction of this court to entertain the application.’

Court dismissed the application for being filed out of the statutory period of three months.

- Whether the applicant has exhausted the remedies available to her?

Respondent: Rule 7A(1)(b) of the Judicature (Judicial Review)(Amendment) Rules 2019 provides for
exhaustion of existing remedies. Under Section 24 of the Tax Procedure Code Act, a person who is
dissatisfied with a tax decision may lodge an objection with the Commissioner-General – Rabbo
Enterprises v URA, SCCA No. 12 of 2004.

Applicant: this was not a matter of assessment or a discretionary decision of the Commissioner-
General, it was a matter of examining allegedly ultra-vires regulations.

Determination: court agreed with the applicant to the extent that the application intended to challenge
regulations made and in the circumstances, there ws no cush decision made by the Commissioner-
General. The Rabbo case was cited out of context and had no application to matters of judicial review
made by a Minister of Finance. ‘The Rabbo case decision was only intended to avoid circumventing
the jurisdiction of tribunal established to resolve tax disputes not to determine the questioning of the
wrongful exercise of power under judicial review in order to uphold the rule of law. The Tax Tribunal
does not have powers of judicial review and the remedies sought from the tribunal are not similar to
the prerogative writs or judicial review remedies available under section 36 of the Judicature Act to
the High Court only.’

‘Therefore, whenever there is a wrongful exercise of power or abuse of authority or arbitrariness,

Court also listed instances in which courts may waive the rule of exhaustion of internal remedies:
special circumstances such as breach of rules of fairness/natural justice, jurisdictional errors, blatant
abuse of power/authority or arbitrariness in the exercise of power. This rule does not oust the
jurisdiction of the High Court to grant judicial review reliefs or have supervisory powers over the
exercise of powers by the executive.

Preliminary objection overruled.

- Whether the respondent is the wrong party to the judicial review application?
 Respondent: the impugned regulations were passed by Parliament. URA did not make the said
regulations and its role under the URA Act is to administer and give effect to tax laws. The right party
to sue in this case would have been the Attorney-General – pursuant to Article 119(4)(c) of the
Constitution.

Court held that the respondent was not to blame for the purported ultra-vires regulations. The
Attorney-General was the proper party to sue, not the implementing agency. Any attempt to entertain
the application without the proper party would amount to condemning them unheard which is against
the cardinal principle of our constitutional order. ‘In an application for judicial review, necessary
parties must and proper parties may be impleaded. A necessary party is one against whom
relief is sought, and without whom no order can be made effectively by the court. The High
Court ought not to decide an application for judicial review without the presence of
respondents of those who would be vitally affected by its decision. Therefore, in the absence of a
necessary party, the application is incompetent.’

- Whether the applicant is entitled to prerogative orders and judicial reliefs sought in this
application for judicial review.

Court held that the application was incompetently brought against the respondent, since it was not
responsible for making the regulations. There was no need to delve into the main issue raised for trial.

Dismissed with costs.

Grace Bamurangye Baroroza & Others v Dr. Kasirivu Atwoki & Others, Civil Application No. 44
of 2008 before the Court of Appeal

An application by Notice of Motion under Rules 2(2), 6(2), 42(2) and 43 of the Court of Appeal Rules
and article 162(2)(e) of the Constitution seeking orders that:

“1. The Court grants an order for a temporary injunction restraining the respondents or their agents or
authorised servants or in any other way from evicting the appellants from their land and/or for the
maintenance of the status quo in Buliisa until after the determination of the appeal of the ruling arising
out of Civil Application No.347 of 2007.

2. Costs of this application abide the results of Appeal.”

The applicants had filed an originating motion in which they sought orders of prohibition and
certiorari against the six respondents. They also applied to amend the summons to include the Attorney
General as a respondent and to include a few other remedies. At the hearing of the motion to amend the
originating summons, Mr. Ebert Byenkya, learned counsel of the 4th respondent objected to the
application to amend on two grounds-
a. The matter they sought to include in the amendment was not supported by evidence (affidavit).
b. The originating motion would still be incompetent in as much as it sought to review a directive of the
President which according to him could not be subjected to prerogative orders of the High Court. Hon.
Justice Akiiki Kiiza, J who heard the motion upheld the submission and dismissed the motion with costs
to the respondents. The applicants then appealed in Civil Appeal No.45 of 2008 of this court from
which this application arises.

Arguments of counsel

Applicants: the purpose of their case was to obtain a temporary injunction restraining the respondents
from evicting the applicants from Buliisa pending the decision of the appeal in court. Three conditions
must exist for this to succeed:

i. The applicant must have a prima facie case with a probability of success; their
application was dismissed without a hearing on its merits. They had unchallenged
occupation of land for two to seven years with nobody suing them. It was against the
laws of natural justice to evict them without granting them a fair hearing.
ii. It must be shown that evicting the applicants would cause irreparable damage if the
order is not granted; they were being evicted without compensation and anywhere to
go. The proposed temporary location belonged to the army and was not a suitable
substitute. The presidential directive was unsigned by the President and it could not
be a valid basis to review the illegal acts of the respondents.
iii. If the order cannot be granted on these two grounds, the court can apply the balance
of convenience test.

Respondent:

a. The application for review of administrative actions cannot be made against individuals as was
requested in this case. It can only be made against a court decision, a tribunal or a decision of a
statutory body – King v Electricity Commissioners [[1924] KB 171.
b. Only one of 53 applicants’ identity was known i.e. Grace Baroroza. The court could not grant
remedies to nonexistent entities.
c. There was no evidence to support the applicants’ contentions that they had homes and properties
in Buliisa.
d. The land in question was neither described nor defined – an order of injunction granted would in
the circumstances be unenforceable.
e. As the applicants had produced no evidence of ownership or possession, the eviction could not
cause any irreparable damage to the applicants.
f. The presence of the applicants in Buliisa had caused detriment to the native population.
g. The application before the court was incompetent because it was not made first in the High Court
pursuant to Rule 42(1) of the Court of Appeal Rule – J.W.R. Kazoora v M.L.S. Rukuba, Civil
Application No. 4 of 1991.
h. There was no prima facie case disclosed and the appeal to the court had no chance of success –
Reamaton Ltd. v Uganda Corporation Creameries Ltd, Civil Application No. 53 of 1997.

Applicant in rejoinder: this case was about the right of the applicants to be protected from eviction
without giving reasons or a fair hearing. They were being treated as a generic tribal entity yet they were
individuals who had rights under the constitution. the presidential order did not mention the name of
persons liable to being evicted.

Merits:
Court noted that the originating motion was supported by the affidavit of Grace Baroroza, which had also
been used to support the successful application for leave to review. When the applicants tried to amend
the originating summons to include the AG, and include more remedies, they did not file an
accompanying affidavit to support the proposed amendment. To this end, the trial judge ought to have
dismissed the amendment and proceeded to hear the motion – an error upon which the Court of Appeal
could rely to allow the appeal.

Regarding the trial court’s holding that a presidential order could not be subjected to judicial review,
which was not issued by a statutory or judicial body and therefore certiorari and prohibition could not lie:
court cited R v Manchester Legal Aid Committee [1931] 2 KB 480 at 487. This decision goes further to
state; ‘…the duty to act judicially may arise in widely different circumstances, which it would be
impossible, and indeed, inadvisable to attempt to define exhaustively…’

Court found (after considering affidavits and newspaper reports) that the president did constitute a
committee chaired by the first respondent to evict the Balaalo after which it would establish who they
were and how they came to Buliisa. The natural procedure should have been to inquire into how they
came and if they were found to have no rights there, to remove them and relocate after due hearings. In
thic context, the committee had the duty to act judicially and since it did not, it became liable to
proceedings in judicial review of certiorari and prohibition. The decision of the trial court to dismiss the
application on this ground was therefore questionable.

The appellants’ appeal had merit and disclosed a prima facie case.

Regarding irreversibility of damage: court held that every Ugandan has a constitutional right to acquire
property anywhere in Uganda as long as they do so lawfully and in accordance with the laws and customs
of the people in the area. The applicants claimed to live in Buliisa for varying periods of time between
two and six years. They filed their application for review to be able to establish that they were in Buliisa
in accordance with the constitution. the committee headed by the first respondent refused to hear them.
The High Court dismissed their suit without giving them a hearing. The fact that they were not indigenous
did not give anyone a right to evict without investigating their status. This would contravene Article 42 of
the Constitution.

The second test of irreversibility of damage was established beyond doubt.

Balance of convenience test: the court has to decide whether to issue a preliminary injunction stopping
the defendants’ allegedly infringing or unfair practices, weighting the benefit to the plaintiff and the
public against the burden to the defendant(s).

Court found that the applicants established good grounds to justify the grant of an order of temporary
injunction. Justice A.E.N. Mpagi-Bahigeine did so.

Remedies

Re an Application by Bukoba Gymkhana Club before Reide, J in the High Court of Kenya

The Bukoba Gymkhana Club held a liquor licence for about 34 years. It applied for renewal under s. 9 of
the Liquor Licensing Ordinance to the Bukoba Township Liquor Licensing Board. The board rejected its
application on the ground that the club’s constitution was ‘”still largely discriminatory”.
The club’s president and trustees applied to the High Court for a writ of certiorari to quash the order
rejecting the renewal of their license and a writ of mandamus that the board hear and determine the
application according to law.

They relied on the following grounds that the board:

(a) had failed to hear and determine the application according to law and had failed to act judicially:

(b) in purporting to determine the application had failed properly to exercise the discretion vested in them
by the Ordinance: the discretion of the board was limited to the matters prescribed in s. 40 of the
governing statute. Counsel later abandoned this ground. He turned to the position that there was no
element of discrimination in the club rules on which the board could exercise its discretion.

(c) in purporting to determine the application were actuated by or purported to be actuated by extraneous
circumstances, namely, the rules providing for election of members to the club.

The board contended that:

a) the board was “an administrative rather than a judicial body” and therefore its determinations could not
be challenged: court held that this was the case, however it had legal authority to determine questions
affecting the rights of subjects. As such, ‘writs of certiorari and mandamus will issue to bodies and
persons other than courts stricto sensu’ – Halsbury’ at para 114. Also see; R v Woodhouse (2) [1906] 2
K.B. 501 and 512. Court held the body to be one amenable to writs.

(b) the board had an “unfettered discretion” to reject an application for a license: court held that where the
board fails to exercise its discretion judicially, or acts capriciously or unreasonable, the writs may be
invoked.

(c) the board’s order not being a “speaking order” the court could not on certiorari enquire whether it had
come to a right conclusion on the facts.

It was further argued that if the proceedings were regular upon their face, and the board had jurisdiction,
the court could not grant certiorari on the ground that the board had misconceived a point of law, and
could not purport to exercise an appellate jurisdiction by varying the board’s order.

Court noted that the phrase “largely discriminatory” – the ground on which the application was based -
was ambiguous. From the applicant’s affidavits, it would appear that the objection to issue a club liquor
license was based largely on the fact that applicants for membership had to be proposed and seconded by
a member. A temporary license was issued to the club until October 18, 1962. Subsequent to that, the club
had no license.

Court found that there was no machinery of appeal against the board’s decision, and the club’s only
remedy lay by way of this application.

It went on to hold that the word ‘discrimination’ as used in the application did not connote racial
discrimination, but only in the sense that members have to be proposed and seconded. Counsel for the
respondent argued that this requirement deprived all persons that would wish to join the club of an equal
opportunity to do so – since they may not know two members that were ready to propose and second
them. This inequality of opportunity amounted to discrimination. Court responded that this construction
of the word ‘discriminatory’ was bizarre and wrenched the word out of its ordinary meaning. This word,
when applied to qualifications for membership of clubs such as the one in the suit must be given a
different meaning, subject to the socio-political and social context in which rules discrimination on
grounds of race or creed might not in some cases be valid grounds for the rejection of a license
application. “…a club whose purposes are social and recreational has for one of its objects the creation
and maintenance of a membership of persons who in a wide sense have common interests and whose
company will be agreeable to one another. It is to my mind most natural and reasonable that such a club
should be able to exercise some control to ensure that these legitimate objects are achieved…”

Court then turned to make it clear that the discrimination alleged was not discrimination in the ordinary
sense of the word and therefore not a proper ground for the exercise of the board’s discretion under s. 6 of
the governing ordinance.

- The writs of certiorari and mandamus” (says Halsbury (3rd Edn.), Vol. 11, p. 53) “are a means of
controlling. . . bodies of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights
of subjects and having the duty to act judicially . . . The degree of control which can be exercised
is limited: provided that the tribunal keeps within its jurisdiction and obeys the rules of natural
justice, and refrains from setting out in its record the reasons for its decision, the court cannot
interfere.”

With particular reference to certiorari:

- When the inferior tribunal has jurisdiction to decide a matter it cannot (merely because it
incidentally misconstrues a statute, or admits illegal evidence, or rejects legal evidence, or
misdirects itself as to the weight of the evidence, or convicts without evidence) be deemed to
exceed or abuse its jurisdiction. If, however, an administrative body comes to a decision which no
reasonable body could ever have come to, it will be deemed to have exceeded its jurisdiction, and
the court can interfere.”

Court referred to Lord Greene MR’s judgment in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v.
Wednesbury Corporation (1), [1947] 2 All E.R. 680, where the plaintiffs appealed from a refusal of the
High Court to grant a declaration that a condition attached to a permission for Sunday performances
granted by the defendants, the licensing authority, was ultra vires. He discussed the principles on which a
local authority may exercise its discretionary powers and circumstances in which the court will interfere
with the exercise of those powers:

- Discretion conferred by statute upon local authorities can be challenged in the courts in a very
limited class of case. The court in such an instance is not a court of appeal. There are certain
principles on which the discretion must be exercised – within the limits of those principles, the
discretion is absolute and cannot be questioned in any court of law.
- The exercise of such discretion must be a real exercise: if the prescribing statute specifies matters
to which the authority must consider in exercising this jurisdiction, it must do so. Conversely, if
the statute makes it clear that certain matters should not be considered, the authority must
disregard the matters described.
- Authorities are obligated to exercise their discretion reasonably. They must direct themselves
properly in law and limit their attention to matters that they are bound to consider.
- Where the authority has come to a decision, taking into account all relevant factors, that no
reasonable authority could have come to, court may interfere.
 Regarding mandamus:

- The court will not question by mandamus the honest decision of the tribunal, even though
erroneous in matters of fact or law, on matters within its jurisdiction.
- Where a tribunal has, in substance, deliberately ignored the application made to it and determined
an application not made to it, it will be held to have exercise its jurisdiction and a mandamus will
issue ordering it to hear and determine.
- Mandamus may issue where the tribunal/authority has been influenced by extraneous
considerations or rejected legal evidence; in such a case, they are deemed not to have exercised
their jurisdiction.

In the current application, the circumstances for both writs were present. There was both an excess of
jurisdiction and a failure to exercise jurisdiction – the writs certiorari and mandamus were therefore
appropriate. The board construed discrimination where there was none, did not give the applicants an
opportunity to present their case or meet the board’s objections. The board acted in an unreasonable
manner.

“…a failure of justice does not depend on the period during which the club was unlicensed or the
inconvenience to which it has been put in bringing these proceedings. The failure of the justice derives
from and is created by the board’s improper determination of the application. That determination gave
rise, at the moment it was made, to a right to a remedy by way of the writs, no matter for how short a
period the board’s order was in operation.”

The court went on to grant the writs of certiorari and mandamus as prayed.
Proceedings against the Government

Muwonge v Attorney General of Uganda [1967] 1 EA 17 before Newbold P, Sir Udo Udoma
CJ and Duffus JA at the Court of Appeal at Kampala
The appellant’s father was killed during a riot. The shot which killed him was fired by a
policeman who had seen the appellant run towards a house, had concluded that the appellant was
a rioter and, having followed him, fired wantonly into the house not caring whom he killed or
injured. At the time, stones were being thrown and shots were being fired nearby.
Court determined that the principles governing the liability of the AG are the same as those
relating to the position of a master’s liability for the act of his servant.
Court went on to fault the trial judge for applying the test of honest belief: “Did the policeman
who shot Matovu honestly believe that in firing into his house he was executing his master’s
orders? I think the answer to that question must be in the negative”. He had found in the
negative.
The court stated: “The test is ‘Were the acts done in the course of his employment or, in this case
within the exercise of the policeman’s duty?’ The acts may be so done even though they are done
contrary to the orders of the master.” It went on to hold: “The test of a master’s liability does not
depend upon whether or not the servant honestly believes that he is executing his master’s
orders; if it were so, the master would never be liable for the criminal act of the servant, at any
rate when the criminal act is towards benefitting the servant himself. It is dangerous to lay down
any general test as to the circumstances in which it can be said that the person is acting within
the course of his employment. Each case must depend on its own facts…”
Court noted and approved of the trial judge’s inference that “…some member of the police force
seeing the plaintiff running towards the house, concluded that he was a rioter, followed him to
the house, and fired wantonly into the house not caring whom he killed or injured.”
Court reasoned that the police officer who shot Muwonge Sr. was acting in the course of his
duty. The police officers had been sent to quell a riot, armed with rifles, found that firing had
already taken place and stone throwing was still going on. Their seniors must have contemplated
their use of the rifles. It then held that the act of the particular police officer who shot Matovu
was wanton and unlawful. A police officer may still be acting in the course of his duties if the
manner in which he carries out his duty is a wrong one; but nevertheless he is still carrying it out.
Counsel for the respondent referred to the “frolic of his own” class of case – such as the
possibility of somebody taking advantage of a situation to vent his own spite and kill an enemy.
Court held that such a situation is an act out of the course of his employment and there is no
suggestion that such was the position in the instant case.
Court then overturned the decision of the trial court that the police officer had acted outside the
course of his duty and declared that it was only an improper manner of carrying out his duty.
That being the case, it found the Attorney General liable and gave judgment and damages (Shs.
4200) for the appellant, in addition to the costs of the suit.
Sir Udo Udoma and Duffus JA agreed with Newbold P’s judgment.