MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V GSIS

Topic/s: Constitution, Definition, Characteristics & Self-executing vs Non-self-executing

Facts:
● The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program
of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 in December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to
51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corp. (MHC)
● According to its terms, the winning bidder is to provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation
system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.
● In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only 2 bidders participated:
a. Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the corporation or 15.3M shares
at P41.58 per share
b. Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid
of petitioner

● Prior to the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. In a
subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million
Pesos (P33.000.000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, which respondent GSIS refused to accept
● Because of this refusal by the respondent, petitioner came to the Supreme Court on prohibition and mandamus. The SC
issued a TRO enjoining respondents from consummating and perfecting the said sale.
● The petitioner hinged his arguments on Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution. It argued that:
a. Manila Hotel had become part of the national patrimony, having become a historical monument for the Filipino nation;
b. Because respondent GSIS, a GOCC, owns 51 percent of the corporation’s shares, the hotel business of GSIS, which is part of
the tourism industry, is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Hence, the petitioner claimed that the corporation is
clearly covered by the term national economy under the contemplation of Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.

● The respondent, on the other hand, raised the following arguments:

a. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a
self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation
b. While the hotel is indeed historic, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony
c. But even if it is, the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding
shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands

Issue: Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution, is self-executing.

Ruling: Yes. It is a self-executing provision.

● A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by
the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act
is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are
self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would
have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
● Section 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does
not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable.
● DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY: if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or
contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private
purposes is null and void and without any force and effect.
● When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that–qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.
● The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as
a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced.
● Respondents GSIS, MHC, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to
RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to
purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the
necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.
GOLD CREEK MINING CORP. V RODRIGUEZ

Topic/s: General Principles of Construction

FACTS:
● Gold Creek Mining Corp. alleges that it owns the Nob Fraction mineral claim in the barrio of Gomok, Itogon, Benguet,
Mountain Province, and located on public lands. (That said claim was located on January 1, 1929; perfected by virtue of Acts
of Congress providing such unpatented mining claims.)
● Petitioner filed an application for patent with respondents the area of 4.5 hectares in compliance with the requisites of law.
● However, respondents refused to issue such.
● Petitioner alleges that by itself and its predecessors in interest has been in continuous and exclusive possession of the land
● A certificate from a surveyor that more than P1,600 worth of labor or improvements had already been expended by them upon
the land
● That a notice of said application for patent has been posted in a conspicuous place, and affidavits of 2 persons attesting to
such
● That its application was also published once a week for a period of 60 days in the “Philippine Herald”, “El Debate”, and Official
Gazette
● That the sum of 113 pesos was tendered already, as payment for the purchase price
● Respondents on the other hand allege that the Constitution provides that “natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated.” Thus, they are not only under no obligation to approve the application, but actually
duty bound to prevent such issuance.

ISSUE:
1. Whether such applications for patents upon mining claims are prohibited by the Constitution
2. Whether petitioner is entitled to the patents applied for as a matter of right

HELD:
1. No. A constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws.
● When the Constitution became effective on November 15, 1935, the location of the mining claim under consideration
was already perfected prior thereto. A valid location of a mining claim has already segregated the area from the
public domain. (Location: when it is actually located by miners.)
● The moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and perfected his location in
accordance with law, the government’s power to deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment
is gone.
● They became lands that could not be granted to any other person.
● It has the effect of a grant by the government the right of present and exclusive possession, with the right to the
exclusive enjoyment of all the surface ground as well as the materials within.
● A valid location of a mining claim grants to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent
therefore upon compliance with the conditions prescribed by law.
2. No. While the refusal of respondents to act on the application for a patent on its merits was due to their misinterpretation of
constitutional provisions, a mandamus will not lie to compel the issuance. The respondents will still decide on whether they
have complied with the requirements. At most, mandamus will only lie to direct respondents to dispose of the application on its
merits.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Topic/s: Aids to Construction

Facts:
● Petitioners assail the constitutionality of EO 284 which ostensibly restricted the number of positions that Cabinet members,
their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries and other appointive officials may hold in addition to their primary position but
in effect allowed them to hold multiple positions contrary to Art VII, Sec 13 of the Constitution.
● The pertinent provision of the assailed EO read: “Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member
of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition
to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations”
● In averring that EO 284 creates an exception to the rule in Art VII, Sec 13, respondents contend that the phrase “unless
otherwise provided in the Constitution” in said section makes reference to Art IX-B, sec 7(2) insofar as appointive officials
mentioned therein are concerned.
● [Civil Service Commission] Art IX-B, sec 7(2): Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including Government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries

Issue: Whether the prohibition in Art VII, Sec 13 of the Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries are concerned to admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Art IX-B, Sec 7(2) of the
same?

Held:

● No. Art IX-B, sec 7(2) is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to appointive public officials, while Art VII, Sec 13 is
meant to be the exception applicable particularly to the President, Vice-President, Cabinet Members, their deputies and
assistants.
● Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment during their
tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, Cabinet members, their deputies and
assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution.
● EO 284 is thus null and void as it is repugnant to Art VII, sec 13.
● It was noted, however, that the prohibition against the holding of any other office or employment by the Pres, VP, Cabinet
members, and their deputies or assistants during their tenure (provided in Sec 13, Art VII) does not comprehend additional
duties and functions required by the primary functions of the officials concerned who are to perform them in an ex officio
capacity as provided by law.​​
● In the case at bar, there seemed to be a contradiction between Art IX-B, sec 7 and Art VII, sec 13 of the Constitution.
● One section is not to be allowed to defeat another if by any reasonable construction the two can be made to stand together.
● The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family insofar
as holding other offices or employment in the govt or elsewhere is concerned. If the contention of the respondents is adopted,
the aforestated intent of the framers would be rendered nugatory. It must therefore be departed from (Civil Liberties Union v.
Exec Sec, 194 SCRA 317)

LUZ FARMS V SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

Topic/s: Aids to Construction

Facts:
● On 10 June 1988, RA 6657 was approved by the President of the Philippines, which includes, among others, the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.
● Petitioner Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business, avers that it would be adversely affected by
the enforcement of sections 3(b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of the said law. Hence, it prayed that the said law be declared
unconstitutional. The mentioned sections of the law provides, among others, the product-sharing plan, including those
engaged in livestock and poultry business.
● In contention to the law’s definition of “agriculture”: Luz Farms further argued that livestock or poultry raising is not similar to
crop or tree farming. That the land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and represents no more than 5% of the total
investments of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. That the land is incidental but not the principal factor or consideration
in their industry. Hence, it argued that it should not be included in the coverage of RA 6657 which covers “agricultural lands”.

Issue: Whether certain provisions of RA 6657 is unconstitutional for including in its definition of “Agriculture” the livestock and poultry
industry?
Ruling:
● YES. Looking into the transcript of the Constitutional Commission on the meaning of the word “agriculture”, it showed that the
framers never intended to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally mandated agrarian
reform program of the government.
● Further, Commissioner Tadeo pointed out that the reason why they used the term “farm workers” rather than “agricultural
workers” in the said law is because “agricultural workers” includes the livestock and poultry industry, hence, since they do not
intend to include the latter, they used “farmworkers” to have distinction.
● Hence, there is merit in the petitioner’s argument that the product-sharing plan applied to “corporate farms” in the contested
provisions is unreasonable for being confiscatory and violative of the due process of law.
TANADA V CUENCO

Topic/s: Aids to Construction

Facts:
● Pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) was an election protest filed by members of the Citizens Party (CP) who
lost to members of the Nacionalista Party (NP).
● The Senate was at the time composed of 23 members of the NP and 1 of the CP — petitioner Sen. Tañada.
● When the SET was being organized, Sen. Tañada, on behalf of the CP, nominated himself alone. Sen. Primicias, a member of
the NP, then nominated “not on behalf of the [NP] but on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate” Sens. Delgado and
respondent Cuenco “to complete the membership of the Tribunal”.
● This he claims is the mandate of the Constitution which reads: “ Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court and the remaining six shall be Members of the [House] who shall be
chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having
the second largest number of votes therein..”
● Over the objection of Sen. Tañada, Sens. Delgado and Cuenco were chosen to sit in the SET.
● Sen. Tañada now contests them in Court.
● Respondents aver, among others, that the SC has no jurisdiction on the matter as the issue is a political question and not
judicial.

Issue: Whether the issue is a political question beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry?
Held:
● No. The issue at bar is not a political question for the Senate is not clothed with “full discretionary authority” in the choice of
members of the SET.
● The question is said to be political when it is a matter which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity.
It is judicial when it is a matter that has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the
government, with discretionary power to act.
● In short, the term “political question” connotes a question of policy; that is, it refers to “those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the Legislature or Executive branch of the Government.” It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. (Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil 1051)
● The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial
department to pass upon the validity of the proceedings in connection therewith. We have not only jurisdiction, but also the
duty to consider and determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein.
● On the issue of whether the election of Sens. Delgado and Cuenco is valid, the Court ruled in the negative. It was held that the
clear intention of the framers of the Constitution in prescribing the manner for organizing the Electoral Tribunals is to prevent
the majority party from ever controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure thereof be founded upon the equilibrium
between the majority and the minority parties with the Justices of the SC to insure greater political justice in the determination
of election contests.
● Thus, the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate not more than 3 members thereof to the SET,
and the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other 3
Senators.
● The Senate may not elect, as members of the SET, those who have not been nominated by the political parties specified in the
Constitution; hence, the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination

GALMAN V PAMARAN

Topic/s: Aids to Construction

Subject:
● By being forced to testify before the Agrava Board under pain of contempt, the respondents were denied their constitutional
right to remain silent and right against self-incrimination;
● The custodial rights apply to all persons under investigation for an offense, whether they are detained or not; No voluntary
waiver of the right against self-incrimination;
● Since there was no voluntary and effective waiver of the right against self-incrimination, the coerced statements cannot be
used over the objection of the person giving them;
● Right against self-incrimination is not limited to criminal proceedings;
● Testimonies are inadmissible for being obtained in violation of due process; Immunity statutes, two types; PD No. 1886
provides for Use Immunity;
● Exclusionary rule applies not only to confessions but also to admissions;
● Immunity must be offered to the witness before he can be compelled to answer;
● Testimonies deemed immunized even if there was no prior claim of privilege against self-incrimination

Facts:
● On August 21, 1983, former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. was gunned down to death inside the premises of the Manila
International Airport (MIA).
● The suspected gunman, Rolando Galman, was also found dead on the airport not far from the body of Sen. Aquino.
● To investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing, P.D. 1886 was promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact Finding
Board, more popularly known as the Agrava Board.
 ● Among the witnesses who appeared, testified and produced evidence before the Board were the private respondents General
Fabian C. Ver, Major General Prospero Olivas, Sgt. Pablo Martinez, Sgt. Tomas Fernandez, Sgt. Leonardo Mojica, Sgt. Pepito
Torio, Sgt. Prospero Bona and AIC Aniceto Acupido
● The Tanodbayan, after conducting preliminary investigation, filed with the Sandiganbayan two Informations for Murder -(1) for
the killing of Sen. Benigno Aquino (Criminal Case No. 10010) and (2) for the killing of Rolando Galman (Criminal Case No.
10011).
● In both criminal cases, private respondents were charged as accessories, along with several principals, and one accomplice.
● Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty.
● In the course of the joint trial, the prosecution offered as part of its evidence, the individual testimonies of private respondents
before the Agrava Board.
● The respondents, in a Motion to Exclude Evidence, objected to the admission of said exhibits contending that its admission will
be in derogation of their constitutional right against self-incrimination and violative of the immunity granted by P.D. No. 1886.
● The Tanodbayan opposed the motion for exclusion, contending that the immunity relied upon was not available to them
because of their failure to invoke their right against self-incrimination before the ad hoc Fact Finding Board.
● The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution admitting all the evidence offered by the prosecution except the testimonies and/or
other evidence produced by the private respondents in view of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886. Motion for the
reconsideration of the said Resolution having been denied, the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was filed.
● The crux of the instant controversy is the admissibility in evidence of the testimonies given by the eight private respondents
who did not invoke their rights against self-incrimination before the Agrava Board.

Held:
● By being forced to testify before the Agrava Board under pain of contempt, the respondents were denied their constitutional
right to remain silent and right against self-incrimination
1. Although referred to and designated as a mere Fact Finding Board, the Agrava Board is in truth and in fact, and to all legal
intents and purposes, an entity charged, not only with the function of determining the facts and circumstances surrounding the
killing, but more importantly, the determination of the person or persons criminally responsible therefor so that they may be
brought before the bar of justice.
2. As safeguard, P.D. No. 1886 guarantees "any person called to testify before the Board the right to counsel at any stage of the
proceedings." When suspects are summoned and called to testify and/or produce evidence, the situation is one where the
person testifying or producing evidence is undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense and to determine the
character and extent of his participation therein.
3. Among this class of witnesses were the private respondents, suspects in the said assassination, all of whom except Generals
Ver and Olivas, were detained (under technical arrest) at the time they were summoned and gave their testimonies before the
Agrava Board. This notwithstanding, Presidential Decree No. 1886 denied them the right to remain silent. They were
compelled to testify or be witnesses against themselves. Section 5 of P.D. 1886 leaves them no choice. They have to take the
witness stand, testify or produce evidence, under pain of contempt if they failed or refused to do so. The jeopardy of being
placed behind prison bars even before conviction dangled before their very eyes. Similarly, they cannot invoke the right not to
be a witness against themselves, both of which are enshrined and protected by our fundamental law. Both these constitutional
rights to remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself were right away totally foreclosed by P.D. 1886.
And yet when they testified and produced evidence as ordered, they were not immune from prosecution by reason of the
testimony given by them. The custodial rights apply to all persons under investigation for an offense, whether they are
detained or not
4. Art. IV, Sec. 20, 1973 Constitution provides that: “Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right..”
5. It has been categorically declared that a person detained for the commission of an offense undergoing investigation has a right
to be informed of his right to remain silent, to counsel, and to an admonition that any and all statements to be given by him
may be used against him. Significantly however, there has been no pronouncement in any of these cases nor in any other
-that a person similarly undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense, if not detained, is not entitled to the
constitutional admonition mandated by said Section 20, Art. IV of the Bill of Rights.
6. The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to use the term "custodial" by having it inserted between the words
"under" and investigation", as in fact the sentence opens with the phrase "any person" goes to prove that they did not adopt in
toto the entire fabric of the Miranda doctrine. Neither are we impressed by petitioners' contention that the use of the word
"confession" in the last sentence of said Section 20, Article 4 connotes the idea that it applies only to police investigation, for
although the word "confession" is used, the protection covers not only "confessions" but also "admissions" made in violation of
this section. They are inadmissible against the source of the confession or admission and against third person.
7. It is true a person in custody undergoing investigation labors under a more formidable ordeal and graver trying conditions than
one who is at liberty while being investigated. But the common denominator in both which is sought to be avoided -is the evil of
extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense, the very evidence with
which to prosecute and thereafter convict him. This is the lamentable situation we have at hand.
8. All the private respondents, except Generals Ver and Olivas, are members of the military contingent that escorted Sen. Aquino
while disembarking from the plane that brought him home to Manila on that fateful day. Being at the scene of the crime as
such, they were among the first line of suspects in the subject assassination. It is not far-fetched to conclude that they were
called to the stand to determine their probable involvement in the crime being investigated. Yet they have not been informed or
at the very least even warned while so testifying, even at that particular stage of their testimonies, of their right to remain silent
and that any statement given by them may be used against them. Since there was no voluntary and effective waiver of the
right against self-incrimination, the coerced statements cannot be used over the objection of the person giving them.
9. May the fact that the respondents testified be construed as a waiver of their rights to remain silent and not to be compelled to
be a witness against themselves? The answer is yes, if they have the option to do so. But in the light of the first portion of
Section 5 of P.D. 1886 and the awesome contempt power of the Board to punish any refusal to testify or produce evidence,
We are not persuaded that when they testified, they voluntarily waived their constitutional rights not to be compelled to be a
witness against themselves much less their right to remain silent.
10. Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the product of unintentional
statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his
capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion tending to force testimony from the
unwilling lips of the defendant. Immunity statutes, two types Right against self-incrimination is not limited to criminal
proceedings 16. Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two:
11. Petitioner argues that the "right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself" applies only in favor of an accused in a
criminal case. Hence, it may not be invoked by any of the herein private respondents before the Agrava Board.
12. In Cabal vs. Kapunan, involving a forfeiture of illegally acquired assets, the Court sustained Cabal's plea that for him to be
compelled to testify will be in violation of his right against self-incrimination. The privilege has been held to extend to all
proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or
not.
13. Clearly then, it is not the character of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls. If in a mere forfeiture
case where only property rights were involved, "the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself" is secured in
favor of the defendant, then with more reason it cannot be denied to a person facing investigation before a Fact Finding Board
where his life and liberty, by reason of the statements to be given by him, hang on the balance.
14. The provision as originally worded was: "That no person shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself."
As now worded, Section 20 of Article IV reads: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." The deletion of
the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes no other import except to make said provision also applicable to cases other than
criminal. Decidedly then, the right "not to be compelled to testify against himself" applies to the herein private respondents
notwithstanding that the proceedings before the Agrava Board is not, in its strictest sense, a criminal case. Testimonies are
inadmissible for being obtained in violation of due process.
15. The manner in which the testimonies were taken from private respondents fall short of the constitutional standards both under
the due process clause and under the exclusionary rule in Section 20, Article IV. In the face of such grave constitutional
infirmities, the individual testimonies of private respondents cannot be admitted against them in any criminal proceeding. This
is true regardless of absence of claim of constitutional privilege or of the presence of a grant of immunity by law.
16. (a) "Use immunity" which prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with the
criminal prosecution of the witness. (b) "Transactional immunity" which grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for an
offense to which his compelled testimony relates PD No. 1886 provides for Use Immunity.
17. PD No. 1886 belongs to the first type of immunity statutes. It grants merely immunity from use of any statement given before
the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or producing evidence
do not render the witness immune from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the right against self-incrimination. He is
merely saved from the use against him of such statements and nothing more. Stated otherwise, he still runs the risk of being
prosecuted even if he sets up his right against self-incrimination. The dictates of fair play, which is the hallmark of due process,
demands that private respondents should have been informed of their rights to remain silent and warned that any and all
statements to be given by them may be used against them. Thus, they were denied, under the pretense that they are not
entitled to it and that the Board has no obligation to inform them.
18. It is for this reason that we cannot subscribe to the view that the right against self-incrimination must be invoked before the
Board in order to prevent use of any given statement against the testifying witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
Exclusionary rule applies not only to confessions but also to admissions .
19. Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution renders inadmissible any confession obtained in violation thereof. This
exclusionary rule applies not only to confessions but also to admissions, whether made by a witness in any proceeding or by
an accused in a criminal proceeding or any person under investigation for the commission of an offense. Immunity must be
offered to the witness before he can be compelled to answer
20. A literal application of a requirement of a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination as a condition sine qua non to the
grant of immunity presupposes that from a layman's point of view, he has the option to refuse to answer questions and
therefore, to make such a claim. P.D. 1886, however, foreclosed such an option of refusal by imposing sanctions upon its
exercise. Section 4 provides that a “refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness or to subscribe to an affidavit or deposition
when lawfully required to do so may be summarily adjudged in direct contempt by the Board.” Such threat of punishment for
making a claim of privilege leaves the witness no choice but to answer and thereby forfeit the immunity purportedly granted by
Sec. 5. The absurdity of such application is apparent -Sec. 5 requires a claim which it, however, forecloses under threat of
contempt proceedings against anyone who makes such claim.
21. The strong testimonial compulsion imposed by Section 5 of P.D. 1886 viewed in the light of the sanctions provided in Section
4, infringes upon the witness' right against self-incrimination. As a rule, such infringement of the constitutional right renders
inoperative the testimonial compulsion, meaning, the witness cannot be compelled to answer unless a co-extensive protection
in the form of immunity is offered. Hence, under the oppressive compulsion of P.D. 1886, immunity must in fact be offered to
the witness before he can be required to answer, so as to safeguard his sacred constitutional right. But in this case, the
compulsion has already produced its desired results -the private respondents had all testified without offer of immunity. Their
constitutional rights are therefore in jeopardy. Testimonies deemed immunized even if there was no prior claim of privilege
against self-incrimination.
22. The only way to cure the law of its unconstitutional effects is to construe it in the manner as if immunity had in fact been
offered. We hold, therefore, that in view of the potent sanctions imposed on the refusal to testify or to answer questions under
Sec. 4 of P.D. 1886, the testimonies compelled thereby are deemed immunized under Section 5 of the same law. The
applicability of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886 cannot be made to depend on a claim of privilege against self-incrimination
which the same law practically strips away from the witness.
FRANCISCO V HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Topic/s: Aids to Construction

Facts:
● On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct
an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
● On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.”
● The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Suplico, Zamora and Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee
on Justice in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
● The House Committee on Justice ruled that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the
same for being insufficient in substance.
● On October 23, 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., based on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by the above-mentioned House
Resolution.
● This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
● Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al.
● Most of these petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the
provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.”

Issue: Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Art. XI of the Consti.?

Held: Yes.

● The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly revealed that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the
filing of the complaint.5 The vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the
impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint.
● Thus, under the one year bar on initiating impeachment proceedings, no second verified complaint may be accepted and
referred to the Committee on Justice
● The well-settled principles of constitutional construction: First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
● We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning.
● We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin.
● It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained.
● They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails.
● As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be
present in the people’s consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in
common use.
● What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the
courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say.
● Thus, these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.

● Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance
with the intent of its framers.
● A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration.
● Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished
by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied.
● A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under
which the Constitution was framed.
● The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the
purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason
and calculated to effect that purpose.

● Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.

● It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the
others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to
be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
 ● Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of
the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made
to stand together.
● In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every
word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.

● If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available.
● While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to
arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear.
● Debates in the constitutional convention “are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the
reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of
our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law.
● We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face.” The proper interpretation therefore depends
more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers’ understanding thereof.

ORDILLO V COMELEC

Topic/s: Ordinary sense vs Technical sense

Facts:

● On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga Apayao and the
city of Bagnio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic
Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
● The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed that the creation of the Region was
approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the
rest of the provinces and city above-mentioned.
● Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region
has been approved and/or ratified by majority of the votes cast only in the province of Ifugao.
● As a result of this, on March 8, 1990, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting the elections in the Cordillera
Autonomous Region of Ifugao
● Even before the issuance of the COMELEC resolution, the Executive Secretary on February 5, 1990 issued a Memorandum
granting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly created under
Executive Order No. 220.
● Petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act for the Region
● The President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring among others that the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera
Regional Assembly, and all the offices created under Executive Order No. 220 were abolished in view of the ratification of the
Organic Act.
● Petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and
Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit.
● The petitioners, then, pray that the Court:
1. Declare null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259, the memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the
memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 and prohibit and
restrain the respondents from implementing the same and spending public funds, for the purpose
2. Declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly
and other offices to be still in force and effect until another organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been
enacted by Congress and the same is duly ratified by the voters in the constituent units.

Issue: Whether the sole province of Ifugao can validly and legally constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region

Ruling:

● This petition is meritorious.

● The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
● It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that: Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas, sharing common
and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines
● The keywords provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that "region" is to be made up of more than one
constituent unit.
● The term "region" used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces.
● This is supported by the fact that the 13 regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings
of contiguous provinces.
● Ifugao is a province by itself.
● To become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas.
● It joins other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and
other relevant characteristics.
● The Constitutional requirements are not present in this case.
 ● Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 strengthens the petitioner's position
that the Region cannot be constituted from only one province.
● Article III. Sections 1 and 2 of the Statute provide that the Cordillera Autonomous Region is to be administered by the
Cordillera government consisting of the Regional Government and local government units.
● SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for the proper governance and
development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay or ili within the Autonomous Region
● From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the autonomous
region.
● Article V. Sections 1 and 4 of Republic Act 6766 vest the legislative power in the Cordillera Assembly whose members shall be
elected from regional assembly districts apportioned among provinces and the cities composing the Autonomous Region.
● If we follow the respondent's position, the members of such Cordillera Assembly shall then be elected only from the province
of Ifugao creating an awkward predicament of having two legislative bodies - the Cordillera Assembly and the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan - exercising their legislative powers over the province of Ifugao.
● Article XII, Section 10 of the law creates a Regional Planning and Development Board composed of the Cordillera Governor,
all the provincial governors and city mayors or their representatives, two members of the Cordillera Assembly, and members
representing the private sector.
● The Board has a counterpart in the provincial level called the Provincial Planning and Development Coordinator.
● The Board's functions (Article XII, Section 10, par, 2, Republic Act No. 6766) are almost similar to those of the
● Provincial Coordinators (Title Four, Chapter 3, Article 10, Section 220 (4), Batas Pambansa Big. 337 - Local Government
Code), If it takes only one person in the provincial level to perform such functions while on the other hand it takes an entire
Board to perform almost the same tasks in the regional level, it could only mean that a larger area must be covered at the
regional level. The respondent's theory of the Autonomous Region being made up of a single province must, therefore, fail.
● Article XXI, Section 13 (B) (c) allotting the huge amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000,00) to the Regional Government for
its initial organizational requirements can not be construed as funding only a lone and small province.
● These sections of Republic Act No. 6766 show that a one province Cordillera Autonomous Region was never contemplated by
the law creating it.
● The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of the total population of the areas enumerated in Article I, Section 2 (b) of
Republic Act No. 6766 which include Benguet, Mountain Province, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao and Baguio City.
● It has the second smallest number of inhabitants from among the provinces and cities mentioned above.
● There are other provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 which are either violated or which cannot be complied with.
● Section 16 of Article V calls for a Regional Commission on Appointments with the Speaker as Chairman and six (6) members
coming from different provinces and cities in the Region.
● Under the respondents view, the Commission would have a Chairman and only one member.
● It would never have a quorum. Section 3 of Article VI calls for cabinet members, as far as practicable, to come from various
provinces and cities of the Region.
● Section 1 of Article VII creates a system of tribal courts for the various indigenous cultural communities of the Region.
● Section 9 of Article XV requires the development of a common regional language based upon the various languages and
dialects in the region which regional language in turn is expected to enrich the national language.
● The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region is infused with provisions which rule against
the sole province of Ifugao constituting the Region.
● Our decision in Abbas, et al. v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 89651, November 10, 1989), is not applicable in the case at bar contrary
to the view of the Secretary of Justice.
● The Abbas case established the rule to follow on which provinces and cities shall comprise the autonomous region in Muslim
Mindanao which is, consequently, the same rule to follow with regard to the autonomous region in the Cordillera. However,
there... is nothing in the Abba's decision which deals with the issue on whether an autonomous region, in either Muslim
Mindanao or Cordillera could exist despite the fact that only one province or one city is to constitute it.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.

KRIVENKO V REGISTER OF DEEDS

Topic/s: Ordinary sense vs Technical sense

Facts:

● Alexander A. Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc.
● In December of 1941, the registration of which was interrupted by the war.
● In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that,
being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction.
● Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila by means of a consulta, and that
court rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds, from which Krivenko appealed to this Court.

Issue: Whether an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land.

Ruling:

● While the motion was pending in this Court, came the new circular of the Department of Justice, instructing all register of
deeds to accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens.
● The herein respondent-appellee was naturally one of the registers of deeds to obey the new circular, as against his own stand
in this case which had been maintained by the trial court and firmly defended in this Court by the Solicitor General.
● With the circumstance that perhaps the constitutional question may never come up again before this court, because both
vendors and the vendees will have no interest but to uphold the validity of their transactions, and very unlikely will the register
of deeds venture to disobey the orders of their superior.
● Thus, the possibility for this court to voice its conviction in a future case may be remote, with the result that our indifference
today might signify a permanent offense to the Constitution.
● In other words, the Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not only whether it is
actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes.
● But whatever the test might be, the fact remains that at the time the Constitution was adopted, lands of the public domain were
classified in our laws and jurisprudence into agricultural, mineral, and timber, and that the term "public agricultural lands" was
construed as referring to those lands that were not timber or mineral, and as including residential lands.
● It may safely be presumed, therefore, that what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted
the Constitution was this well-known classification and its technical meaning then prevailing.
● That prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of Public Land Act No. 2874, aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used
for industrial or residential purposes, but after the Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right
of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation.
● Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be
alienated," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens.
● "Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines."
● Congress approved Republic Act No. 133 which allows mortgage of "private real property" of any kind in favor of aliens but
with a qualification consisting of expressly prohibiting aliens to bid or take part in any sale of such real property as a
consequence of the mortgage.
● We are construing the Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to
preclude aliens, admitted freely into the Philippines from owning" sites where they may build their homes.
● We are satisfied, however, that aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential
purposes.
● Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is
not forbidden by the Constitution.
● Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to
acquire.
● For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands, including
residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs.
PAMATONG V COMELEC

Topic/s: Self-executing vs Non-self-executing

Facts:

● Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Presidency but was rejected by the COMELEC.
His petition was supported by Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain who believed he had parties
or movements to back up his candidacy.
● Pamatong filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied again by the COMELEC. The petitioner and 35 other
candidates were declared as nuisance on the ground that “they could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not
nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.”
● The petitioner filed a writ of certiorari and argued that it is a violation of his right to “equal access to opportunities for public
service” under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
● Pamatong also contended that he has the capacity to run as a presidential candidate.
● Petitioner also claimed that the form does not provide clear and reasonable guidelines for determining the qualifications of
candidates since it does not ask for the candidate’s bio-data and his program of government.

Issue: Whether COMELEC’s decision to declare Pamatong as a nuisance candidate a violation of his right to equal access to
opportunities and public service

Ruling:
● No. The Court ruled that running for public office is not a constitutional right, but merely a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law.
● The provisions under Section 25, Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing, and does not contain any judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.
● The determination of bona fide candidates is governed by the statutes, and the concept, defined in the Omnibus Election
Code. Thus, there are limitations that might apply to the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office, as long
as they are not enforced with discrimination.
● The Court took in consideration that these limitations by the COMELEC ensure that the electoral exercises are “rational,
objective, and orderly,” and won’t be a “mockery.”
● Furthermore, the Court justified their decision based on the logic that, “the greater the number of candidates, the greater
the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for
the election.”

Note:
● The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is
not before this Court.
● The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and
State Policies."
OPOSA V FACTORAN

Topic/s: Self-executing vs Non-self-executing

FACTS:
● The petitioner, all minors and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and
entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical rainforests,
duly joined and represented by their parents instituted a complained as a taxpayers‘ class suit and prayed for the rendering
of judgment ordering defendant Factoran, then Secretary of the DENR, his agents, representatives and other persons
acting in his behalf to:
1. cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and
2. cease and desist form receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

● The defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint on two grounds:
1. lack of cause of action against him and
2. the issue raised was a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches.

● The trial court dismissed the complaint based on the aforementioned grounds. Thus, the petitioners filed a special civil
action for certiorari seeking to rescind and set aside.

ISSUE: Whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to prevent the misappropriation or impairment of the Philippine
rainforests and have the defendant stop form receiving, processing and approving timber license agreements.

HELD: Yes. The petitioners have a cause of action.

● The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right-the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the
first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.
● Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
● This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in SEC. 15 of Article 2.
● While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and
not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in
the latter.
● Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and
self-perpetuation -- aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners -- the advancement of which may even be said to predate
all governments and constitutions.
● As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind.
● If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that
unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself,
thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and
protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present
generation, but also for those to come -- generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.
● The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.
● E.O. No.192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which serve as the bases for policy formulation
and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR, the primary government agency for the proper use and
development of the country's natural resources.
● The right of the petitioners and all they represent to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR‘s duty to
protect and advance the said right.
● A denial or violation of that right by the owner who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same
gives rise to a cause of action