Implications of the
Russia-Ukraine War
The Russia-Ukraine war has implications for the Middle East, Europe, and Asia and of course
for U.S. foreign policy. In this speech I addressed them briefly.
Addressing the Hertog Forum in Tel Aviv on February 24, I summarized
my view of the implications of the Russia-Ukraine war on a panel with
Natan Sharansky (who addressed Israel's own role). Here is an edited
version of my remarks:
This war has told us some important things about international politics,
which I’ll cover first, and then turn to U.S. policy.
More on:
Russia
European Union
The War in Ukraine
U.S. Foreign Policy
In Europe, the war has certainly concentrated people’s minds about
defense—and as soon as that happened, NATO and the United States once
again emerged as the providers of security for Europe. It’s not that the EU
has been irrelevant; it has been useful in coordinating European reactions
and providing funds to Ukraine. But as has happened repeatedly since
1945, we have seen that Western Europe cannot defend itself and turns to
NATO and the Americans. France’s efforts to develop an independent
European military capability have clearly failed and they have no prospect
of success. It seemed briefly a few months ago that Germany would truly
change its policy on defense, but the change has been at best partial and is
very slow, as we saw when it refused to provide Leopard tanks or even to
allow other nations to supply them until it could hide behind the American
announcement about Abrams tanks. And even now no one can say when
the German tanks will actually be given to Ukraine.
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The Baltic nations and the East Europeans have turned to NATO and the
United States because there is no alternative—and there isn’t going to be
one. So this is the first point I would make: there is still something called
“The West” and it is still led and defended by the United States and its
military power. This is as true today as it was when Israel was created in
1948.
I think we can also say that while fear of Russia has risen because of
Putin’s aggression, respect for Russia has declined.
No one thinks of Russia any more as a first-rate power, on the level of the
United States or China. Putin has made it China’s junior partner,
possessed of one great asset—nuclear weapons—that may not even be
useful weapons. Putin’s brief nuclear threats have not much affected
European, US, or Ukrainian conduct so far. Russia’s poor military
performance has changed its position in the world; it is now dependent on
Iranian and Chinese weaponry, and Chinese technology. And Putin has
managed to devalue deeply what used to be Russia’s other great asset—
energy. In just one year he has managed to lose Russia’s closest and best
and richest customers for gas and oil, in Europe, as well as permanently
damaging his own economy.
What about the Middle East? Here I would argue that there have been two
significant effects of the Ukraine war.
First, because of Russia’s troubles in Ukraine there is a growing alliance
between Russia and Iran. It started with the export of Iranian drones but
may expand to include weapons production inside Russia and export of
other munitions. That alliance is of great significance in the context of the
Iranian nuclear weapons program. In the past there were moments of
considerable unity among the US, China, and Russia and the EU-3 against
Iran’s nuclear weapons program. This new Russia-Iran alliance has
changed that; it is questionable now whether Russia really opposes the
Iranian program and how it would react if the UK, France, or Germany
tried to invoke snapback, for example.
Second, Russia’s debilitated position means that in the Middle East it is
devalued as an ally. Is anyone wondering now whether Gen. Sisi will
reorient Egypt away from the United States and to Russia? There can of
course be cooperation with Russia on certain issues and Putin can send the
Wagner group to fight in small wars, but Russia is no one’s idea now of a
permanent and valuable ally and world power.
In Asia, one could say Ukraine is far away and the impact of the war is
slight—but I think that would be inaccurate. Russia’s aggression, and the
leadership of the United States to resist it, have added to the impact of
China’s own aggressive stance under Xi Jinping and have pushed Japan,
South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia closer to the United States.
India too—a country that for decades was closer to Russia. We see a new
choreography of coalitions such as the Quad—Australia, India, Japan and
the United States—become even more significant. Same for AUKUS, the
US-UK-Australia security arrangement.
As for China, it has gained from having Russia more dependent on it for
oil sales (at a big discount, one has to add) and for geopolitical support.
But that alliance is now with a devalued Russia, a military ally that is still
very important but today has the ability only to make trouble, not to shape
the world of the coming decades.
And of course one has to wonder what Xi makes of the failures of the
previously untested Russian military, and of US-EU solidarity in
sanctioning Russia, as he himself contemplates military action against
Taiwan.
Now let’s turn to the United States. In the United States, there has been
considerable bipartisan support for this action to back Ukraine—but it is
slipping. There is now a deep partisan division between Democratic and
Republican voters on continuing aid to Ukraine at the current very high
levels. We can debate why, and I think myself that as time goes by this
becomes (in many eyes) Biden’s war—and many Republicans become
more skeptical about it for that reason alone. Much of the Senate
Republican leadership, behind Sen. McConnell and Sen. Cotton, has been
very staunch. Still, there is a clear lack of leadership. President Trump
isn’t saying much—and that may be best because no one can really be sure
what he would say. It will be interesting to see how Ukraine factors in the
race for the 2024 Republican nomination.
The problem with U.S. policy is President Biden’s reluctance to give
Ukraine the support it needs when it is needed—not six or twelve months
later. There are no irresistible political pressures causing these delays;
they are simply a Biden-Blinken-Sullivan policy choice, and a bad one.
This policy not only prolongs the war, which means more destruction and
death in Ukraine. It also risks sending a message of reluctance and fear to
Putin. If the Russian effort in Ukraine stalls and Putin begins to look even
more like a loser, we all run the risk that he will not pull back in a
compromise settlement or be overthrown—but instead double down. That
could mean other military moves, in Georgia or Moldova, or more
fatefully a move to grab a small portion of Estonia or Latvia that is very
heavily Russian. He would say he is defending Russians, and threaten
military escalation if challenged. The best way to deter such a move is to
reinforce our support of Ukraine—which is also the best way to deter
China over Taiwan. The Biden administration gets a passing grade here,
but does not get the A that we all need.
I’ll conclude: the main impacts of the Ukraine war has been to weaken
Russia, to make Europe more or at least more visibly dependent on the
United States, and to suggest quite clearly that only two countries really
have the ability –the power—the shape world politics in the coming
decades, and they are China and the United States. The war in Ukraine has
reminded us that Europe and Russia are not truly world powers despite
whatever influence, and real military or economic assets, they may have.
In that sense, the Ukraine war has shown us that we are back, after 30
years, in a bipolar not multipolar global system.
