A Critique of the Pluralist Model

Author(s): K. Newton
Source: Acta Sociologica , 1969, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1969), pp. 209-223
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4193725

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

Sage Publications, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Acta Sociologica

This content downloaded from

152.118.24.31 on Tue, 05 Sep 2023 07:26:16 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 A Critique of the Pluralist Model
K. NEWTON

University ofBirmingham

In 1958 Robert Dahl published an important article in which he picked out the defining
characteristics of a ruling elite and attempted to specify a method which could be used to
test for the existence of a ruling elite.1 The theory and empirical study of political power
was never quite the same again, for Dahl showed that there were crucial faults in much
of the power elite literature. It became clear that many of the power elite studies, and those
of C. Wright Mills and Floyd Hunter in particular, suffered from inadequate conceptualiza-
tion, questionable assumptions, and a somewhat casual methodology. As a result many
sociologists became convinced that the case for the power elite was not proven, although as
W. J. M. McKenzie has pointed out: "-The fact that the Power Elite School has not proved
that there is a Power Elite in the U.S.A. does not prove that there is not a Power Elite in
the U.S.A."2 Nevertheless, Dahl must take a great deal of the credit for improving the
quality of studies of political power and stimulating a small flood of research reports which
claim to have found little evidence to support the power elite model and a considerable
body of evidence to support the pluralist model. Curiously, however, the concepts, assump-
tions and methods of the pluralists have received little critical attention. Larson has rightly
pointed out that, "Surprising as it may seem, political analysts have not been much in-
clined to search out for close analysis the essential details that make up a pluralist system ...
Correlatively, few pluralists have subjected their assumptions to critical empirical scrutiny"."
Bachrach and Baratz, Kariel, and Anton are among the very few who have attempted to
question the recent community power literature,4 and the pluralist model is now widely
accepted as a close approximation to the way in which power is structured and desicions
taken not only in American national and local political systems but also in the political
systems of most industrialized societies in the West. It is time that the new orthodoxy
was questioned.
Much of the so-called pluralist literature is not so much pluralist as anti-elitist; the studies
represent a reaction against the elitists rather than a positive option for pluralism, and in this
sense they are demolition jobs which are mainly concerned to prove the elitists wrong
but much less concerned, and also less well equipped, to prove the pluralists right. Scoble's
excellent work on the power structure of Bennington is a good example.5 He carefully
examines the evidence for the existence of a power elite in the town and finds it wanting.
He shows that Bennington did not have a single power elite but a set of more or less cohesive
elites which competed with one another, and that Bennington's 'power structure' varied
from issue to issue. Although he is congratulated for his pluralist presumptions about the
nature of the political system,6 Scoble does not show, and nor is it his concern to show,
that Bennington has a pluralist power structure. Before one can show that a given political

209

This content downloaded from

152.118.24.31 on Tue, 05 Sep 2023 07:26:16 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 system is more pluralist than elitist it is necessary to define the concept and Scoble himself
does not even use the term. Many others do, however, and they employ it in a number of
different ways. In tackling the problem of pluralism it is perhaps both necessary and inevit-
able to start at the very beginning and consider how the concept can be most usefully defined.
Political philosophers like Gierke, Cole, Laski, Figgis and Maitland were pluralists and
while their use of the term can be closely related to the empirical theory of more recent
writers like Dahl, this paper is concerned with the latter's view of pluralism as a working
model of political decision-making and not with the prescriptive pluralism of political
theorists. There is also the pluralism of contemporary American sociologists who are con-
cerned with the cultural assimilation or differentiation of immigrant groups in the United
States, but the term, as they understand it, has no special political relevance although political
and cultural pluralism may be closely related in some instances.7 Thirdly, writers like Polsby
and Anton treat pluralism both as a type of political system and as a method used by socio-
logists to investigate political systems.8 To use the same term to refer to a method of the
social sciences and to a type of political system seems to be unnecessarily confusing and so,
as a matter of purely personal preference, the method which Polsby advocates for studying
power and decision-making in the community will be called the issue-outcome method.
Pluralism, as the term is used here, will be reserved to refer to a particular type of political
system.
Many social scientists use the term to refer to a political system in which there is not one
center of power but many centers of power. Robert Dahl writes: "The fundamental axiom
in the theory and practice of American pluralism is, I believe this: Instead of a single center
of sovereign power there must be multiple centers of power, none of which is or can be
wholly sovereign."9 From this point of view any political system which is not ruled by a
power elite and which has different centers of power is guaranteed the title pluralist. The
opposite of pluralism, when the term in used in this way, is monism. This use of the term
has considerable difficulties for, as Shils has pointed out, all large-scale societies are pluralistic
to some degree because they are all too complex to be governed from one center of power.10
The Soviet Union has different centers of power but it would not qualify as a pluralist
society in the minds of most 'pluralists'. After reading their literature it becomes quite clear
they mean something much more than different centers of power when they use the term.
Pluralism, in fact is the way in which they conceive of democracy in operation. Their pluralist
model is inextricably linked with democracy, for it is a model of the political system with
all the social and political characteristics thought necessary to achieve democratic decision-
making in modern industrial society. In most cases when the sociologist asks "Is this a plura-
list political system?" he seems to be asking "To what extent does this political system
measure up to the expectations of a democracy?" When the term is used in this way the
opposite of pluralism is not monism but totalitarian democracy.
In order to keep the terms analytically separate we shall use the term pluralism in the way
in which Dahl has defined it. A pluralist system is the opposite of a monist system and the
requirements of pluralism are met wherever there are two or more centers of power in
a society. Pluralist democracy, which we believe is what most contemporary sociologists
mean when they use the term pluralism, will be used to refer to a particular form of de-
mocracy in which power is shared between many different bodies. When used in this sense,
the opposite of pluralist democracy is totalitarian democracy. The term pluralist democracy
must be treated with great caution and precision, therefore, because it can easily become
a highly emotional and value laden term.
Many of the basic ideas of pluralism and pluralist democracy have been discussed and
empirically investigated at great length in the community power and community decision-
making literature which has appeared since Floyd Hunter published his Commnunity Power

210

This content downloaded from

152.118.24.31 on Tue, 05 Sep 2023 07:26:16 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Structure. They have also been discussed in a more general way by a number of other in-
fluential social scientists, although each has used his own special vocabulary and each has
approached the same basic ideas from a slightly different perspective. Riesman, Glazer and
Denney have outlined their highly generalized veto-group theory of the American power
structure. Galbraith has discussed the notion of countervailing powers. David Truman
has elaborated A. F. Bentley's group theory of politics. Kornhauser contrasts pluralist
politics with mass politics. Norton Long talks in terms of "an ecology of games". On a
slighdy different level Lindblom discusses "-democracy through mutual adjustment".11
All these writers have contributed significantly to the theory of pluralist democracy but
none of them has pinned down the concept or its actual workings with any systematic
thoroughness. The general body of theory is supported on one side by the empirical work
on the causes and consequences of cross pressures and on another by a well established body
of theory about cross-cutting lines of conflict. There is no lack of ideas about pluralist de-
mocracy but there is a lack of co-ordination between the ideas.
In many ways the development of an interest in pluralist democracy was the breakdown
of what Schumpeter calls 'the classical doctrine of democracy' and of the growing belief
that the presence of elites in a political system does not necessarily preclude it from
being democratic. It was asserted that leaders, decision-makers, or elites of some
kind or another are inevitable in large scale industrial society and that whereas one
single unified elite dominated all major decisions in a totalitarian dictatorship, the pluralist
society had not one elite but a plurality of elites, and not one center of power but many
centers of power. De Tocqueville pointed to the role of secondary associations in maintain-
ing democratic stability in the United States. Lord Acton stated that "Liberty is possible
only in a society where there are centres of organisation other than the political". Within
this line of argument it is only a short step to saying that a pluralist democracy is a political
system in which political power is divided among different elites. As Rose states, "Pluralism
is a theory of the power structure in which power is conceived of as dispersed and different
elites are dominant in different issue areas".12 This may be an adequate definition of plura-
lism, but it is not an adequate definition of pluralist democracy because it is still possible,
within the terms of Rose's definition, for each elite to dominate one particular area of political
activity. This pattern of power is found, very roughly, in New York City where, according
to Sayre and Kaufman, "no single elite dominates. . . The city government is most accurately
visualized as a series of semiautonomous little worlds each of which brings forth official
programs and policies through the interaction of its own inhabitants . . . each decision center
in the city's government and politics has attained a high degree of self containment . . ."13
New Haven before 1953 had a power structure similar to New York's. It was made up of
a number of seperate elites which Dahl calls "petty sovereignties" each of which went its
own way without interference or competition from the others.'4 This type of power structure
based on highly specialized and self-contained elites can be dangerous for democracy be-
cause, as Sayre and Kaufman state, there is a possibility that each "island of power" will take
decisions in its own interests and not in the interests of the wider community.'5
If pluralist democracy does not consist only of a plurality of elites then perhaps it consists
of a plurality of competing elites. Schumpeter makes the competition of elites the hallmark
of his revized theory of democracy and, in fact, seems to stress it to the point of denying
major importance to the other characteristics of democracy. Others seem to have followed
his lead. Larson writes: "Generally speaking political pluralism may be defined as that system
which decrees that political policies should be the consequence of open competition between
a multiplicity of interest groups".16 Schattsneider has defined democracy with a similar
stress on the importance of competing elites - Democracy is a political system in which
people have a choice among the alternatives created by competing political organizations

211

This content downloaded from

152.118.24.31 on Tue, 05 Sep 2023 07:26:16 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
and leaders"."7 Again, these are inadequate definitions of pluralist democracy. The Wars
of the Roses were fought between competing elites and the people hlad the choice of support-
ing either Yorkist or Lancastrian, but this did not give England a democratic pluralist system.
By the same token, the intrigues of medieval European courts were fought out by competing
elites but that did not guarantee democracy.
It would be easy to prolong this cat-and-mouse game of setting up definitions in order
to knock them down again, but the end result of it all would be that it is impossible to
define complex concepts like pluralist democracy in terms of one sentence, no matter how
carefully the sentence is worded. Pluralist democracy can only be defined in terms of a
large number of characteristics and a given system is only a pluralist-democratic one to the
extent that it partakes of all or most of these characteristics. A large number of elites per se
is not a necessary condition of a democratic political system except insofar as it is recognized
that there is rarely a single 'general will' in any society but a large number of varying and
conflicting wills instead. Therefore, it is necessary for society to sustain a large number of
elites capable of expressing and defending the full range of political demands in a society.
A plurality of elites is an indication that society might be organized into a large number of
different groups, each of which is capable of defending its own material and ideal interests
against the threat of encroachment of other groups. Similarly, competing elites are not
a necessary condition of democracy except insofar as political competition is a technique
by which the accountability of the rulers to the ruled can be maintained. The importance
of a pluralist political system lies not in the number or competitive nature of elites but in the extent
to which elites are responsive atid responsible to the not-elites. The pluralist assumption widely
held is that non-elites will be able to maintain their control over elites if, and only if, the elites
compete with each other for non-elite support and if, and only if, there is a full range of
organized groups sufficient to express and protect the full variety of political demands in any
society. To the extent that these assumptions are reasonable, a political system will be more
or less democratic if it has a large number of competing elites.18
A major deficiency of many 'pluralist' studies is that they tend to rest content with
an examination of the number of elites in the community and rarely examine the relation-
ship of elites to non-elites. They tend to overlook the fact that it is theoretically possible,
if empirically extremely unlikely, to achieve a totalitarian democracy in which the single
elite is highly responsive to the non-elite. They also tend to overlook the fact that a number
of competing centers of power in a society does not necessarily mean that the society is a
democracy. A society in which elites are higly responsive and responsible to non-elites is
the end product of a democratic pluralist system.19 This will be kept very much in mind in
the next part of the paper which will examine the claims to have found a democratic pluralism
in the United States.

Responsibility of Elites to Non-Elites

High Low

Centers One Totalitarian Totalitarian

(Monism) Democracy Dictatorship
of
Many Pluralist Petty
Power (Pluralism) Democracy Sovereignties

Robert Dahl is undoubtedly the most able, the nmost syst

convincing critic of elitism and exponent of pluralism am
latest book he states the bare outline of his argument in t

212

This content downloaded from

152.118.24.31 on Tue, 05 Sep 2023 07:26:16 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Political power is pluralistic in the sense that there exist many different sets of leaders; each set
has somewhat different objectives from the others, each has access to its own political resources,
each is relatively independent of the others. There does not exist a single set of all powerful leaders
who are wholly agreed on their major goals. Ordinarily, the making of govemment policies requires
a coalition of different sets of leaders who have divergent goals. In this situation, it is probably easier
for leaders to be effective in a negative way, by blocking other leaders, than in a positive way, by
achieving their own goals.20

Dahl produces a massive quantity of data and carefully argued theory to support his
general conclusions, but I believe that there are certain difficulties with his theory of pluralist
democracy in the United States and I wish to show that there may be difficulties and flaws
in his argument within his own pluralist terms of reference. Dahl's work on pluralism has
been selected for special attention because it is the strongest link in the pluralist chain and,
therefore, a fault in the strength of his argument is a fault in the entire pluralist position.
His work is examined not because it is bad, but, on the contrary, because it is very good
indeed.
Dahl's pluralist case can be briefly but we hope not too crudely paraphrased in the follow
ing way. Modem American society is a pluralist system which consists of a wide variety
of organized groups each with its own set of interests, each with its own political resources,
each with its own leadership.= Each and every group is able to gain access to the decision-
making areas of politics where it can use its political resources to gain some influence over
issue outcomes. Political resources are not distributed equally but the inequalities are not
cumulative. A study of decision-making shows that most ordinary citizens have little or no
direct influence over political affairs but Dahl claims that they do exercise indirect influence
by virtue of their voting powers. The political stratum of active politicians and decision-
makers can be penetrated fairly easily. Although each separate group in the pluralist system
may be oligarchical, pluralist democracy is preserved because each oligarchy has to compete
with others. The end result is not a perfect democracy in operation but it is a system which
eliminates the worst abuses of injustice and forces compromise solutions to political problems
which give some satisfaction to all the interested groups. In contrast to Dahl's pluralist
case I want to show that some sections of society are not organized into pluralist groups,
that some political inequalities are cumulative, that some political groups are considerably
weaker than others, that some groups are denied access to the decision-making processes
and to the political stratum, that those with little or no direct influence may also have no
indirect influence, and that a set of competing oligarchies does not make a pluralist system.
The end result is a political system that does not distribute power at all equally and con-
sequently a system that heavily favors some groups or sections of society against others.
Dahl starts off with an important and wholly acceptable statement when he writes that
"'at a minimum, it seems to me, democratic theory is concerned with the process by which
ordinary citizens exert a relatively high degree of control over leaders".2 He formulates
a theory of 'polyarchy' or 'Pluralist democracy' as a reasonable and practicable solution to
this problem of the relationship between political leaders and ordinary citizens in large scale
industrial societies and says that "The fundamental axiom in the theory and practice of
American pluralism is, I believe, this: Instead of a single center of sovereign power there
must be multiple centers of power, none of which is or can be wholly sovereign . . . Because
constant negotiations among different centers of power are necessary in order to make
decisions, citizens and leaders will perfect the precious art of dealing peacefully with their
conflict, and not merely to the benefit of one partisan but to the mutual benefit of all the
parties to a conflict".23 After carefully sifting and weighing the facts Dahl concludes that
New Haven and America as a whole, though far removed from the textbook ideal of
democracy, are fairly close to the practicable ideal.

213

This content downloaded from

152.118.24.31 on Tue, 05 Sep 2023 07:26:16 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 "Like every other political system, of course, the political system of New Haven falls far short of
the usual conceptions of an ideal democracy; by almost any standard it is obviously full of de-
fects. But to the extent that the term is ever fairly applied to existing realities, the political system
of New Haven is an example of a democratic system, warts and all"."m
"Nearly every group has enough potential influence to mitigate harsh justice to its members,
though not necessarily enough influence to attain a full measure ofjustice".S6
"The system rarely yields unchecked power to leaders, and rarely leaves any group of citizens
powerless. To this extent, the accent of the system is not so much on power as on consent ... few
groups in the United States who are determined to influence the government - certainly few if any
groups of citizens who are organized, active and persistent - lack the capacity and opporturnit to
influence some officials somewhere in the political system in order to obtain at least some of their
goals"."

One of the main planks of Dahl's argument is that very few citizens are lacking totally
in political resources and that although these political resources are not distributed equally
the inequalities are not cumulative. "In the political system of today, inequalities in politica
resources remain, but they tend to be non-cumulative. The political system of New Haven
then, is one of dispersed inequalities' '.27 Dahl argues that a citizen with less of one politica
resources will probably have more of another. "Though he has less money, he may have
more time, more energy, greater popularity, stronger ethnic ties".28 It seems to me tha
these statements fly in the face of empirical evidence which strongly suggests that there is
a tendency for some, but not all, political resources to be distributed unequally and for th
inequalities to be cumulative. Research shows that those with more money often have
more time to give to politics, have more political skills, and fill more official positions than
those with less money. In addition the nonpartisan ballot used in many American local
elections gives those with money, status and visibility in the community better chances o
electoral success than those without these qualities.29 Rcsearch has shown over and over
again that, compared with working class people, middle class people are more likely to
participate in politics, better informed about politics, more interested in politics, more
likely to join political and other organizations, have a higher sense of political competence
have more political skills, are more likely to vote, and are more likely to attempt to influenc
the course of political events.30 Moreover, research carried out by Allardt, Almond and Verba,
and Rokkan and Campbell, indicates that these factors are cumulative.31 Political resources
whicb seem to be closely associated and probably distributed witlh cumulative inequality
in many cases are time, money, political skills and knowledge, political awareness, sense
of political competence, and official position. As Dahl himself writes: "-Thus money and
influence have a certain interdependence. The poor man is not likely to gain high influence
but if he does, somehow along the way he is no longer a poor man".32 And, "Participation
and political confidence evidently reinforce one another".33 The connections between other
political resources like money or education and popularity and ethnic ties may be more
tenuous and probably nonexistent in many cases.
The important political resources of time, money, status, political skills, and political
office are not only distributed with noticeable inequality but also with cumulative inequality.
The fact that these resources are not distributed in this way in all cases does not detract from
the fact that they generally are. More than this, the inequalities are not only cumulative but
they feed on one another so that they tend to cuimulate in geometric progression. If the
citizen uses his time, money, and political skills carefully he can reach political positions
which will help him to gain authority, more time, more money and more political skills.
"He uses the authority of the office to acquire power and then he uses the power to acquir
more power, and ultimately more authority".34 The end result of this process is not necessarily
a single power elite within society but it nmay tend to produce a fairly small number of men
who are constantly more powerftul than other men.

214

This content downloaded from

152.118.24.31 on Tue, 05 Sep 2023 07:26:16 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Dahl states that the power of the vote is one resource which everybody has and every
body, therefore, has some indirect influence over political leaders even if only a small propor-
tion of the population has any direct influence over political decisions.35 He argues that
"A few citizens who are non-voters, and who for some reason have no influential contact
with other voters, have no indirect influence".36 Later in the book the "few" non-voters
take on rather more disturbing proportions for Dahl writes that "a large proportion of the
adult population of New Haven does not even vote".37 Even this "large proportion" is an
underestimation because "the sample, drawn as it was from the registered voters, greatly
under-represented the number of non-voters in the adult population".38 Dahl damages his
own case when he says "The apathetic citizens disfranchise themselves; the active citizens
gain power. Among Americans, as among other people, these differences are pronounced".39
The politically apathetic who disfranchise themselves are not a small minority. Between
35 percent and 40 percent of adults were non-voters in tle American Presidential elections
of 1952, 1956 and 1960 and these were all high turnout years. Between 54 percent and 58
percent of all adults did not vote in Congressional elections in 1950, 1954 and 1958.40 Between
50 percent and 70 percent did not vote in mayoralty elections in eighteen large American
cities between 1948 and 1952.41
The case against Dahl's pluralist argument is further strengthened when it is realised
that the non-voters who do not use their source of indirect influence are precisely the people
who tend to have few or no other political resources. Almost all voting studies have found
that the non-voter is least likely to have the political resources of money, eduction, status,
political skills, political office and political confidence. That is why they are non-voters.
Political inequalities are cumulatively distributed in that those who use their voting rights
as a source of indirect political influence are also likely to use their direct sources of political
influence, while those who do not vote are empirically unlikely to attempt to influence
political affairs directly. The majority of non-voters are not, of course, formally deprived
of their voting powers but the fact remains that a fair proportion of manual workers in
Western industrialized societies feel politically powerless, are politically apathetic and are
unwilling and unable to use their direct and indirect forms of political influence.
Dahl's argument about direct and indirect influence assumes that election results do have
indirect influence over elected representatives. Dahl argues that elections are a rough and
ready mechanism by which political leaders can be controlled. ",Yet surely Congressmen
are right in thinking that they would place themselves in serious jeopardy at the polls if they
were to vote counter to the views of the majority of their constituents on any matter that
is salient and important to a sizeable share of voters at home' .42 "-Yet it would be unwise to
underestimate the extent to which voters may exert indirect influence on the decisions of
leaders by means of elections".'3 Over and over again Dahl is forced to fall back on the
argument that although the majority of citizens have little or no direct influence they always
have indirect influence over leaders by virtue of their voting power. There can be little doubt
that elections can have an enormous impact on political leaders but it would be unwise to
over-estimate their impact for two reasons which Dahl himself raises and for two others
which he does not. Firstly, Dahl points out that -,Indirect influence might be very great
but comparatively difficult to observe and weigh"."" In fact it is difficult to know how the
social scientist could observe or weigh the subtle forces of indirect influence at all. Voting
for a candidate or a party is part of a package deal and there are many combinations of issues,
priorities and political solutions tied up in the package. There are many different factors
which help to explain variations in the packages offered and even more alternatives which
might help to explain why a particular package was chosen by a majority of voters. Observ-
ing the whole range of these factors is difficult, sorting them out is extremely difficult, and
weighing them is impossible. At the very best the indirect influence of the electorate can be

215

This content downloaded from

152.118.24.31 on Tue, 05 Sep 2023 07:26:16 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
dealt with in only the vaguest of terms like 'considerable' or 'insignificant', 'great' or 'mode-
rate'. At worst it must be treated as a totally unknown factor in any political situation.
Although he rests a great deal of his case for pluralist democracy on the argument that
indirect political influence is exerted through past election results and anticipated future
results, Dahl never substantiates his argument and it is difficult to see how it could be empiric-
ally substantiated.45
Secondly, Dahl points out that it is almost impossible to say with mucb confidence what
an election tells us about the preferences of majorities or minorities." Elections seem to be
a haphazard mode of control over political leaders because the leaders themselves have
considerable difficulty in interpreting the results. "-Political leaders usually make their deci-
sions in an atmosphere charged with uncertainty; among the questions they are most uncertain
about are the attitudes of the voting public".47 Periods between elections are even more
uncertain for, "even when the views of political leaders are known it is difficult to speak
with confidence about the development of 'public opinion' in a severe conflict"."l The
article which Dahl cites concludes that representatives are strongly influenced by their own
preferences and by their perception of the preferences of their constituents, but the representa-
tive has very imperfect information about the preferences of his constituents and the con-
stituents know very little about those of their representatives. The political leader may want
to respond to the demands of ordinary citizens but it seems that it is sometimes very difficult
to know what these demands are even immediately after an election.'9
Thirdly, in some cases political leaders can afford to ignore the voting power of some
social groups. In Atlanta, the mayor gave the Negro practically nothing in return for his
vote. In El Paso, the Latin vote is decisive in the city, but the Latins have little to show for it.
In Philadelphia, the Democratic Party can afford to cold-shoulder the unions. In Detroit,
the left wing trade unions, despite their tight organization and militant spirit, have had
little success in local elections.50 In Chicago the mayor can use a device to get unpopular
policies through elections. -If an unpopular expenditure is to be voted upon, he can have
it put on the ballot at an election for minor office when the vote is light and only the party
regulars come out".51 Lastly, Sayre and Kaufman point out that it can be difficult to assign
responsibility for unpopular policies and that popular control over some 'islands of power'
in New York City is largely ritualistic for elected officials do not always achieve full command
over policy which is controlled, in some cases, by permanent officials.52 The situation is
picked out most clearly in the account one councillor gives of a sub-committee meeting
to review the city budget in Boston. The first witness of the hearing was the police commis-
sioner who was asked if he would like to give the broad outlines of his program for the
coming year. His reply was forthright and simple. "-No", he said, -I would not"."
Another main plank of Dahl's pluralist case is that all groups have some point of access
to the political system and that all groups have at least one form of political resource which
can be used to achieve at least some of its goals, or at least force a compromise solution to
a political problem. However, it seems that some groups labor under such disabilities that
they are rendered practically powerless.

The professionals, of course, have access to extensive political rcsources which they employ
at a high rate with superior efficiency. Consequently, a challenge to the existing norms is bound to
be costly to the challenger, for legitimist professionals can quickly shift their skills and resources into
the urgent task of doing in the dissenter. As long as the professionals remain substantially legitimist
in outlook, therefore, the critic is likely to make littlc headway. Indeed, the chances are that anyone
who advocates extensive changes in the prevailing democratic norms is likely to be treated by the
professionals, and even by a fair share of the political stratum, as an outsider, possibly even as a
crackpot whose views need not be seriously debated. No worse fate can befall the dissenter, for unless

216

This content downloaded from

152.118.24.31 on Tue, 05 Sep 2023 07:26:16 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
he can gain the attention of the political stratum, it is difficult for him to gain space in the mass media;
if he cannot win space in the mass media, it is difficult for him to win a large following; if he cannot
win a large following, it is difficult for him to gain the attention of the political stratum.

Dahl elaborates further on the political and social factors which ensure the isolation
of some groups in New Haven. In order to bring an issue to the notice of the general public,
groups are dependent to some extent on the goodwill of the political stratum - that is,
the individuals who are more highly involved in the political thought, discussion and
action than the rest of the population.56 The difficulty is that the political stratum seems
to have certain powers to decide what is to become a public issue and what is not.

Indeed, a political issue can hardly be said to exist unless and until it commands the attention of a
significant segment of the political stratum."

And

As long as a matter is not a salient public issue -and whether it is or not depends partly on how
the political stratum handles it - the question is substantially determined within the political stratum
itseff."'

The obvious tactic for a group faced by an unsympathetic and uncooperative political
stratum is to force its way into the political stratum. At one point Dahl refers to ",the ease
with which the political stratum can be penetrated,"58 and to the fact that "the political
stratum is easily penetrated by anyone whose interests and concerns attract him to the
distinctive political culture of the stratum".69 But at another point in the book Dahl seems
to say that membership of the political stratum is reserved for certain socio-economic groups
within New Haven.

First, there exists a social thrcshold beyond which low standing is a severe handicap in gaining
high influence over key govemmental decisions; this threshold occurs approximately at the line
dividing white collar fromblue collar occupations.'0

And

Thus money and influence have a certain interdependence. The poor man is not likely to gain
high influence; but if he does, somehow along the way he is no longer a poor man."1

In connection with the last but one quotation, it should be pointed out that no less
than 45 percent of the New Haven population is classified by Dahl as having skilled, semi-
skilled, or unskilled manual occupations.0 In other words, just under half of the city's
population is severely handicapped in any attempt to gain high influence.
There are, however, methods of overcoming this handicap. The most inexpensive way
of bringing political injustices to the notice of the general public is to gain space in the mass
media. But this strategy is also denied some groups.

What is essentially correct, however, is that the amount of time and space devoted by the mass
media to views openly hostile to the prevailing ideology is negligible. An American who wishes to
find criticism of the basic social, economic and political structure can indeed find them; but he will
have to search outside the mass media. And, naturally, the number who are strongly motivated
enough to do so is relatively small. Hence the general effect of the mass media is to reinforce the
existing institutions and ideology."

With a few crisp sentences Dahl seems to have relegated some social groups to live in
the desert beyond American pluralist democracy - those who are out of favor with the
prevailing ideology of the political stratum, those who cannot get into the political stratum,

217

This content downloaded from

152.118.24.31 on Tue, 05 Sep 2023 07:26:16 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
the vast majority of the working class population who are "severely handicapped" in
any attempt to gain direct influence over political affairs, and all 'fringe' groups who have
the temerity to question the American way of life. It is no wonder that Banfield writes in
Big City Politics that "In most of the chapters that follow it is asserted that newspapers and
organized businessmen have a great deal of political influence and that labor and minority
groups have little"." The pluralist system, it seems, fits where it touches, but who knows
where it touches?
Besides those who are organized but denied access to the workings of pluralist democracy
there are also those who are relatively poorly organized and who, in spite of their numbers,
carry relatively little weight in the pluralist process of political bargaining. Compare, for
example, the political power of the relatively small membership of the Law Society in
Britain with that of the much larger number of old age pensioners in the country. For
financial, social and organizational reasons lawyers are considerably more successful in
promoting their own interests than old age pensioners. Lawyers can afford to pay for an
efficient, well organized and watchful association; old age pensioners cannot, and the less
they can afford to protect their own standard of living, the lower their standard of living
is likely to sink. Lawyers are excellently equipped with the social and political skills and
contacts necessary to wage a successful political campaign. Many of their number are already
in the highest political positions. Old age pensioners, because of their age, and their tendency
towards illness, and immobility, are scarcely in the best position to fight an active political
campaign. Old age pensioners cannot go on strike and so are deprived of the ultimate
weapon of industrial and political action. Lastly, an old age pensioners' association is much
more difficult to organize than the Law Society, for old age pensioners are scattered all over
the country and this makes them difficult to contact. Lawyers are very easy to contact and
organize because they are obliged to contact a central organization before they can even
start to practice their profession. The Law Society knows exactly where it can contact
all its members and can ask them to pay a high annual subscription. The old age pensioners'
equivalent has none of these advantages. All this does not add up to the conclusion that old
age pensioners are totally powerless, or that lawyers form the British power elite, but it
clearly adds up to the conclusion that lawyers are much more powerful in political affairs
than the much larger number of old age pensioners. Hence old age pensioners make up a
sizeable portion of the British population living below the poverty line. Lawyers do not
figure largely in poverty statistics.
The lawyer-old age pensioner comparison is not an isolated one. Producers and
consumers have been compared in much the same way. ",There are, it is said, powerful
rival groups representing business and workers, but these are both "producer" groups;
there is nobody in a position to speak for consumers and to press their cause. . . the con-
sumer may reflect, a little bitterly, that businessmen and industrial workers have powerful
organizations, as well as votes, to promote their interests, and do not rest in a thicket, waiting
for their needs to be sniffed out ... the general implications of the analysis here presented
are pessimistic: the prospects for consumer power are not rosy".65 Like old age pensioners,
consumers are not totally powerless by any means but their interests are clearly less well
protected than those of producers. Similar cases can be made out for many other comparisons
-vagrants and the police,66 immigrants and landlords,67 community newcomers and the
well established,68 conservatives and reformers,69 and if what has been said already about
the American working class and middle class is valid, the rich and the poor. The last com-
parison, of course, has serious consequences for the pluralist case.
It is a habit of pluralists to consider the workings of organized groups in politics
and to overlook that section of the population which is unorganized. There are millions
and millions of clubs, associations, organizations and groups in America, but there are

218

This content downloaded from

152.118.24.31 on Tue, 05 Sep 2023 07:26:16 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
also millions and millions of individuals who do not belong to any of them. V. 0. Key
quotes evidence that almost a third of one sample of American adults did not claim member-
ship of any secondary association.70 The Civic Culture survey found that 43 percent of Ame-
rican adults do not belong to a single voluntary association.7' Lazarsfeld, Berelson and
McPhee produce similar figures.72 Larson quotes figures for American nonjoiners of be-
tween 25 percent and 50 percent.73 All these figures are probably on the low side for they
include a proportion of nominal memberships, particularly of churches. The figure for
non-joiners in modem America seems to be somewhere between one third and a half of
the adult population, but whatever the particular figure it seems that Blackwell is right
when he says that the practice of joining is not as widespread as many American social
scientists used to believe.74 What is more, it is clear that the non-joiners are mainly the
lower socio-economic groups. A large section of the American population is outside the
pluralist system of intergroup competition. According to Schattsneider, "The business and
upper class bias of the pressure system shows up everywhere. . . large areas of the popula-
tion appear to be wholly outside the system of private organization ... The vice of the
groupist theory is that it conceals the most significant aspects of the system. The flaw in the
pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper class accent".75 The
mere presence of millions of poverty stricken amid American affluence is a sure sign that
the pluralist system includes some people out, that it works to the benefit of a particular
section of society, and that the rest are not powerful enough to get the minimum justice
which Dahl claims the system provides.
Dahl recognizes that the groups which make up the pluralist system are not necessarily
democratic and may well be oligarchical. He argues that this is not particularly significant
because competition between oligarchs is sufficent to stustain different centers of power
and hence constitute a pluralist system.
But how much does intemal party democracy really matter? Political parties are sometimes
likened to business firms competing for customers - the customers being in this case the voters.
And just as business firms are driven by competition to satisfy consumers, even if they are internally
not governed by consumers in the way that a consumers' co operative is, so, it is sometimes argued
competitive parties will fulfill all the essential functions of democratic control.. . even though
each party is intenally controlled by its leaders."'

Dahl's faith in competing oligarchies is partially justified if all his other arguments for
pluralist democracy in the United States are valid. If these arguments are not necessarily
valid in all cases, as we have tried to show, then there is cause for concern about the compet-
ing oligarchies argument. Elections seem to be the main form of control over oligarchies
in political parties.77 Those who don't vote have no control at all, therefore. Those who
do vote may be able to rule out certain possible courses of action, but are quite powerless
to influence the choice of a wide variety of others. If there is an entrenched oligarchy of
non-elected permanent officials, the powers of the electorate will be further eroded.
Besides this, it is not at all clear that the oligarchies do compete in New Haven. Before
1953 the oligarchies formed what Dahl calls "petty sovereignties", which did not compete
because they rarely encroached on each other's ground. "But with the exception of the poli-
tical parties, most of the time each of the petty sovereignties went its way without much
interference from the others".78
Government by petty sovereignties in New Haven gave way to government by "execu-
tive-centered coalition" under the leadership of Mayor Lee, but there is no indication that
this restructuring of power increased the amount of competition between oligarchies.
Assuming that they did compete with each other, it must be admitted that a number of
competing oligarchies are considerably better than a single ruling oligarchy, but it should
also be said that a series of competing and democratic elites is better still.

219

This content downloaded from

152.118.24.31 on Tue, 05 Sep 2023 07:26:16 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 If Dahl has not shown the presence of a rough and ready pluralist democracy in New
Haven and the United States, what has he shown? 79 It seems that his New Haven data indicate
the presence of a number of benevolent despots. The city seems to be ruled not by a power
elite with unchallengeable power but by a relatively tiny number of individuals who are
more or less laws unto themselves, whose power and control is not effectively challenged,
but who seem to have what they believe to be the good of the community at heart. The
vast majority of New Haven citizens are poorly informed about local affairs and politically
inactive for most of the time. Their vote is their main means of influencing decisions. Many
don't vote and those who do exercise only indirect influence of the most oblique nature.
Political decisions are mainly in the hands of a very small number of men who would bc
responsive to the majority if there was something to respond to and if they knew what
it was. Dahl's own statements, all taken from Who Governs, speak for themselves.

In the apolitical strata, citizens rarely go beyond voting and many do not even vote. Individuals
in the political stratum exert a good deal of steady direct and active influence on government policy;
in fact, some individuals have a quite extraordinary amount of influence... (p. 91). Although
political issues are sometimes generated by individuals in the apolitical strata who begin to articulate
demands for government action, this occurs only rarcly ... (p. 92). We shall discover that in each
of a number of key sectors of public policy, a few persons have great direct influence on the choices
that are made; most citizens by contrast seem to have rather little direct influence. Yet it would
be unwise to underestimate the extent to which voters may exert indirect influence on the decisions
of leaders by means of elections. . . (p. 101. Dahl's emphasis) most citizens use their resources scarcely
at all. To begin with, a large proportion of the adult population of New Haven does not even votc ...
(p. 276. Dahl's emphasis). Yct the direct influence of the electorate on key decisions involving redevel-
opment has been negligible compared with the direct influence of a few leaders. In onrgins, conception,
and execution, it is not too much to say that urban redevelopment has been the direct product of a small
handful of leaders ... (p. 115. Dahl's emphasis). If one analyses the way in which influence in these
three issue areas is distributed among citizens of New Haven, one finds that only a small number
of persons have much direct influence in the sense that they successfully initiate or veto proposals
for policies... (p. 163 Dahl's emphasis) there exists a social threshold beyond which low standing
is a severe handicap in gaining high influence over key govemment decisions; this threshold occurs
approximately at the line dividing white-collar from blue-collar occupations... (p. 229-30).
Thus the fact that a large number of citizens do not believe in the political norms actually applied,
particularly extending political liberties to unpopular individuals and groups, has slight effect on the
outcome. The belief; of ordinary citizens become relevant only when professionals engage in an
intensive appeal to the populace. Even then, the actual outcome of the appeal does not necessarily
reflect majority attitudes at all accurately. These are not always known; they are guessed at in a
variety o maccurate ways, and they have to be filtered through the tighter mesh of the political
stratum and the professionals before they can become public policy (p. 324).

Conclusion
In some ways Dahl's New Haven findings are not so very different from those of the
elitists. In this light it is interesting to compare Dahl and Hunter, the two main protagonists
of the elitist-pluralist debate. Besides the infinitely better methodology used by Dahl, one
of the main differences between the two writers is the way in which they interpret and
particularly the way in which they appraise their data. Hunter is highly critical of politics
in Atlanta and obviously believes that the city falls far short of the democratic ideal. He
writes that his concem for the future of democracy prompted his study of power in Atlanta.80
Dahl is much less critical of New Haven politics and believes that it is not so very different
from a reasonable man's expectations of democracy in operation. He holds the view that
over-optimism about democratic possibilities in modem large scale industrial societies will
only breed cynicism about democracy."1 New Haven may not operate in the way that
perfect textbook democracies should operate, but that is all pie in the sky, and New Haven
is a good example of what a real, feasible democratic system looks like, warts and all. The

220

This content downloaded from

152.118.24.31 on Tue, 05 Sep 2023 07:26:16 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
differences between Hunter and Dahl lie not so much in what they claim to have found
but in what they hoped to find. Hunter seems to have set his sights higher than Dahl and
is disappointed. The debate is not so much between social scientists as between ideologists.
Dahl might call Hunter unrealistic; Hunter might call Dahl complacent.82 Whether Dabl
is complacent or not is beside the point of the present paper. We hope to have shown that
neither New Haven nor America as a whole conform as closely to the model of pluralist
democracy as Dahl says they do.

NOTES

1. R. A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," American Politi

1958), pp. 563-469.
2. W. J. M. McKenzie, Politics and Social Science (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967), p. 229.
3. C. J. Larson, "An Analysis of the Concept of Political Pluralism," Paper presented to the Annual
Meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, August 1967.
4. P. Bachrach and M. S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review, 58
(December, 1962), pp. 947-952; Bachrach and Baratz, "Decisions and Non-Decisions: An
Analytical Framework," American Political Science Review, 57 (March, 1963), pp. 632-642;
H. S. Kariel, The Promise of Politics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 103-113;
T. J. Anton, "Power, Pluralism and Local Politics," Administrative Science Quarterly, 7, (March,
1963), pp. 424 457. Anton's criticism is wide of the mark and not notably successful- see Dahl's
reply, A!dministrative Science Quarterly, 8 (1963), pp. 427-457, and also Anton's rejoinder, pp.
257-268. Bachrach and Baratz have also been criticized in their turn - see R. M. Merelman,
"On the Neo-Elitist Critique of Community Power," American Political Science Review, 52
(June, 1968), pp. 451-460 and also the two letters which followed in the Review, 52, (December,
1968), pp. 1268-1269.
5. H. Scoble, "Leadership, Hierarchies and Political Issues in a New England Town," in M. Jano-
witz, (ed), Community Political Systems (Glencoe; Free Press, 1961), pp. 117-145.
6. N.W. Polsby, Conimunity Power and Political Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963),
pp. 112.
7. See, e.g. M. R. Haug, "Social and Cultural Pluralism as a Concept in Social System Analysis",
AmericanJournal of Sociology, 73, (Nov. 1967), pp. 294 304 and H. S. Morris, "Some Aspects
of the Concept Plural Society," Man, 2, (June, 1967), pp. 169-184.
8. N.W. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven: Yalc University Press, 1963);
T. J. Anton, "Power, Pluralism and Local Politics," op. cit.
9. R. A. Dahl, Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Consent (Chicago; Rand McNally,
1967), p. 24. Because it will be cited so frequently the title of this book will henceforth be abbrevi-
ated to P. D.
10. E. A. Shils, The Torment of Secrecy (London: Heinemann, 1956), p. 154.
11. D. Riesman, et al., The Lonely Crowd (New York: Doubleday, 1953), pp. 246-58; J. K. Gal-
braith, Americin Capitalism (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1961);W. Kornhauser, The Politics of
Mass Society (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960); A. F. Bentley, The Process of Govern-
ment (Blooniington: The Principia Press, 1949); D. B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New
York: Knopf, 1951); N. E. Long, "The Local Conmnunity as an Ecology of Games," American
Journal of Sociology, 64, (Nov., 1958), pp. 251-261; C. E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Demiocracy
(New York, Free Press, 1965).
12. A. M. Rose, The Power Strticture (New York; Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 282.
13. W. S. Sayre and H. Kaufman, Goveming New York City (New York: W. W. Norton, 1965),
p. 710.
14. R. A. Dahl, Who Governs? op cit., p. 190.
15. Sayre and Kaufman, op cit., p. 719.
16. Larson, op cit., p. 2.
17. E. E. Schattsneider, The Semisovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart andWinston, 1960),
p. 141.
18. Presthus produces data which suggest that the assumptions might not be altogether safe ones -
R. Presthus, Men at the Top (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).
19. This does not lead to the simple-minded conclusion that democracy is government according to
the wishes of the majority of the people.

221

This content downloaded from

152.118.24.31 on Tue, 05 Sep 2023 07:26:16 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
20. R. A. Dahl, P. D. pp. 188-9. This formulation comes very close in many ways to Riesman's
veto-group model of the American power structure - D. Riesman, ct al., op (it. Dahl's state-
ment may be criticized not for what it says but for what it does not say.
21. Political resources are the means by which one person can influence the behavior of others and
Dahl includes money, time, political skills, status, voting strength and official position in his list.
22. R. A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 3.
23. P. D, p. 24.
24. Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 311. Hereafter the title of this bo
is abbreviated to W. G?
25. R. A. Dahl, "Equality and Power in American Society," inW. V. D' Antonio and H. J. Ehrlich,
(eds.), Power anduDemocracy in America (Notre Dame: University of Notre Damc Press, 1961), p.
89.
26. P. D., p. 190, p. 386.
27. W. G?, p. 85. Dahl's italics.
28. P. D., p. 378.
29. C. R. Adrian, "Some General Characteristics of Nonpartisan Elections," American Political
Science Review, 46, (Sept., 1952) 'pp. 766-76.
30. It is not possible to cite all sources here but most of them are summarized in R. E. Lane, Political
Life (Glencoe: Free Press, 1961), and L. W. Milbraith, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand
McNally, 1965).
31. E. Allardt, et al., "On The Cumulative Nature of Leisure Time Activities," Acta Sociologica, 3,
(fasc. 4), pp. 165-172; G. A. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Littlc Brown &
Co., 1965); S. Rokkan and A. Campbell, Citizen Participation in Political Life: "Norway and
the United States of America" International Social Scienc Journal, 12, (Part 1), 1960, pp. 69-99.
32. W. G?, p. 245.
33. W. G?, p. 287.
34. E. C. Banfield and J. Q. Wilson, City Politics (Cambridge ,Mass.: Harvard University Press and
M. I. T. Press, 1963), p. 104.
35. P. D., p. 130, pp. 325-6; W. G?, pp. 101-2. It is noticeable that while Dahl stresses the indirect
influence which he believes the ordinary citizen has, he does not consider the possibility that
economic and social notables without direct influence will have indirect influence, and he does
not consider the combined effect of both direct and indirect influence which some people might
have.
36. W. G?, p. 164.
37. W. G?, p. 277.
38. W. G?, p. 338.
39. P. D., p. 67.
40. F. I. Greenstein, The American Party System and the American People (Englewood-Cliffs: Prcnti
Hal, 1963), p. 11.
41. Caty Politics, op. cit., p. 225.
42. P. D., p. 135.
43. W. G? p. 101, His emphasis. See also p. 163, p. 140.
44. W. C?, p. 89. See also p. 218.
45. Presthus makes much the same point - Men at the Top, op cit., p. 167.
46. Dahl, Preface To Demoratic Theory, op cit., pp. 129-131.
47. W. G?, p. 259.
48. P. D., p. 287. See also p. 106.
49. W. E. Miller and D. E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," American Political Science
Review, 57, (March, 1963), pp. 45-56.
50. E. C. Banfield, Big City Politics (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 30, p. 71, p. 76, p. 117,
p. 60, p 61.
51. Banfield andWilson, op cit., p. 106.
52. Sayre and Kaufman, op cit., pp. 719-720.
53. E. C. Banfield, Big City Politics, op cit., p. 41.
54. W. G?, p. 320. In effcct, Dahl is discussing in this passage what has come to be called 'the mobili-
zation of bias.'
55. W.G?,p 90.
56. W.G?, p. 92.
57. W. G?, p. 321.
58. W. C?, p. 92.
59. W.G?,p.91.
60. W. G?, p. 229-230.

222

This content downloaded from

152.118.24.31 on Tue, 05 Sep 2023 07:26:16 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
61. W. C?, p. 245.
62. W. G?, p. 230.
63. P. D., p. 337, Dahl repeats the same sentences in his section of Political Oppositions in Wester
Democracies, [R. A. Dahl, (ed.) (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 47-8]. In both Ca
scs hc also quotes V. 0. Key - "Extraordinarily few [American] journals, either newspapers o
magazines, act as agencies of political criticism. They may dig to find the facts about individua
acts of corruption, but the grand problems of the political system by and large escape thei
critical attention." - V. 0. Kcy, Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1965), p. 381.
64. E. C. Banfield, Big City Politics (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 12.
65. L. Tivey, "The Politics of the Consumer," The Political Quarterly, 39, (April-June, 1968), p.
181, p. 193,p. 194.
66. Baneld andWilson, op cit., p. 32.
67. J. Rex and R. Moore, Race, Community and Conflict (London: Oxford University Press, 1962).
68. T. J.Wood, "Dade Country: Unbossed and Erratically Led," Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, 353 (May, 1964), pp. 64-71. Rates of geographical mobility in
America make this quite an important comparison.
69. P. D., p. 379.
70. V. 0. Key, op cit., p. 502.
71. G. A. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture, op. cit., p. 247.
72. B. R. Berelson, P. F. Lazarsfeld,W. N. McPhee, Voting. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1954), p. 51.
73. C. J. Larson, "An Analysis of the Concept of Political Pluralism," Paper presented to the Annual
Meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, August, 1967.
74. G.W. Blackwell, "Community Analysis," in Approaches to the Study of Politics, R. Young, (ed.),
(Evanston: Northwestem University Press, 1958), p. 306.
75. E. E. Schattsneider, The Semisovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart andWinston, 1960),
p. 31-35.
76. P. D., p. 248.
77. P. D., p. 248-9.
78. W. G?, p. 190.
79. Studies of political power at the community level may be irrelevant to studies of power at the
national level. However, a great deal of Dahl's discussion of power in the United States in
Pluralist Democracy is based on conclusions reached in the New Haven study, and so the two books
have been treated together.
80. F. Hunter, Community Power Structure (New York: Anchor Books, 1963), p.l. See also Chapter 9.
81. See P. Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967). p. 85.
82. A similar view is expressed by A. Rosenbaum, "Community Power and Political Theory:
A Case of Misperception," Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 1967, pp. 91-116.

223

This content downloaded from

152.118.24.31 on Tue, 05 Sep 2023 07:26:16 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms