Risk ID & Assessment Training Course DNV Consulting

Module 13: SWIFT for Hazard Identification

MODULE 13

SWIFT

STRUCTURED
WHAT IF CHECKLIST
TECHNIQUE

FOR HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

SWIFT is a DNV trade mark for its Structured What-If Checklist Technique for Process
Hazards Identification

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CONTENTS

13. SWIFT (STRUCTURED WHAT-IF CHECKLIST TECHNIQUE FOR HAZARD

IDENTIFICATION) ..............................................................................................................1

13.1 Introduction to SWIFT ...........................................................................................1

13.2 SWIFT Study Methodology....................................................................................2

13.3 Planning and Preparation.........................................................................................9

13.4 SWIFT Reporting, Documentation and Follow Up................................................11

13.5 SWIFT Study Mechanics ......................................................................................11

13.6 SWIFT Example ...................................................................................................12

13.7 SWIFT for Non-Continuous Operations................................................................19

13.8 SWIFT Analysis of Procedures .............................................................................20

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13. SWIFT (STRUCTURED WHAT-IF CHECKLIST TECHNIQUE FOR

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION)

SWIFT is a DNV trade mark for its Structured What-If Checklist Technique for Process
Hazards Identification. DNV acknowledges the contribution of GE Plastics to the
development of this technique

13.1 Introduction to SWIFT

The Structured What-If Checklist (SWIFT) study technique has been developed as an efficient
alternative to HAZOP for providing highly effective hazards identification when it can be
demonstrated that circumstances do not warrant the rigor of a HAZOP. SWIFT can also be
used in conjunction with or complementary to a HAZOP.

The Structured What If Checklist (SWIFT) is a thorough, systematic, multidisciplinary team

oriented analytical technique.

How does the SWIFT technique differ from HAZOP? HAZOP examines the plant line by line,
vessel by vessel, etc. SWIFT, on the other hand, is a systems-oriented technique which
examines complete systems or subsystems. To ensure comprehensive identification of hazards,
SWIFT relies on a structured brainstorming effort by a team of experienced process experts
with supplemental questions from a checklist.

SWIFT like HAZOP requires the input of a team of process experts to evaluate the
consequences of hazards which might result from various potential failures or errors they have
identified. When answering all the questions raised about realistic deviations from the normal
intended operation of a process unit, the team assesses the likelihood of an incident, the
potential consequences and the adequacy of safeguards to prevent or mitigate it should it
occur. The "What-if?" questions, which can be posed by any team member (including the team
leader and recorder), are structured according to various categories. When the team is no
longer able to identify additional questions in a category, a category specific checklist is
consulted to help prompt additional ideas and ensure completeness.

The technique is efficient because it generally avoids lengthy discussion of areas where the
hazards are well understood or where prior analysis has shown no hazards are known to exist.
Its effectiveness in identifying hazards comes from asking questions in a variety of important
areas, according to a structured plan, to help ensure complete coverage of all the various types
of failures or errors which are likely to result in a hazard within the system being examined.
The SWIFT analysis is further strengthened through the use of the checklists at the conclusion
of each question category resulting in an additional level of thoroughness.

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13.2 SWIFT Study Methodology

Just as with a HAZOP study, adequate preparation is vital to the success of a SWIFT analysis.
Important aspects of planning and preparation are covered in a later section.

Initial Discussions

Once the preparations are completed and the SWIFT team assembles, the leader should spend
a brief period of time reminding or training the team as necessary in how the SWIFT analysis
will be conducted. Next he or she should orient the team to the basics of the process or
process area under review. In many cases, the study is likely to involve the analysis of a
proposed change in some part of the process or its mode of operation. If such is the case, the
details of that change should be discussed. To ensure compliance with the OSHA Management
of Change provision, this pre-analysis discussion should focus on, but not be limited to:

• The technical reason or basis for the change.

• The expected impact the change might have on safety and health.
• The need to change or modify operating procedures.
• The intended duration of the change and if possible an estimate of how long its start-up is
likely to take.
• Relief system design basis and calculations.

As a result of this discussion, the ground rules for the study can then be established. At a
minimum these should include setting the boundaries of the system(s) to be examined,
specifying the types of on site and off site issues of concern (safety, health, environment,
quality, productivity), and clearly defining any other objectives of interest to the company.

Selecting a Study Section

As necessary, the system to be examined should be divided into an appropriate number of

smaller subsystems. Examining the unit at a systems level often makes it easier to recognise
interactions of various components within the system or with other systems in the processing
unit. However, since each line, vessel or piece of equipment is not being individually treated as
in a HAZOP, caution should be exercised so that any error is on the side of being too detailed.
Usually, a team should be able to review unit operation size sections with no trouble. Some
systems representative of those which typically can be analyzed successfully as a single section
might include:

• Complete hot oil system.

• A batch reactor with its overhead condenser, associated piping, pump, external heat
exchange loop and transfer line to storage.
• All logically associated equipment on a single P&ID.

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However, smaller sections may need to be considered if:

• Unusually high hazard materials or extreme conditions are present.

• The system or its controls are very complex.
• Unusual types of equipment are involved.

It is also certainly appropriate to use HAZOP to evaluate specific subsections meeting these
criteria should the study leader consider it advisable.

Just as when picking nodes or sections for a HAZOP, experience will enable the leader to
become adept at choosing systems for study which ensure both efficient use of team time and
effectiveness in identifying the hazards.

Conducting the Discussions

Once the section is defined and marked on the P&ID, the design intent, process conditions and
other appropriate details should be discussed and entered into the study log. Except for the
structured posing of "what if" questions, the discussion during a SWIFT review should be
similar in all aspects to those encountered during a HAZOP study. All team members should
participate and all should be permitted to express their opinions and concerns. Although the
leader will also be a participant in a SWIFT study, he or she must be careful not to dominate
the discussions nor intimidate any other members of the team.

The leader should begin the discussion by asking for and summarising team input for each of
the regulatory requirements listed below:

• Hazards of the process.

• Previous incidents with catastrophic potential.
• Engineering and administrative controls.
• Consequences of failures of engineering and administrative controls.
• Facility siting/layout.
• Qualitative evaluation of safety and health effects.
• Other regulatory issues.

Next, he or she should begin the discussion by stating the category of questions for discussion
and then by either asking for ideas or offering an initial question.

The structure for questioning is provided by the following categories:

• Material Problems (MP).

• External effects or influences (EE/I).
• Operating errors and other human factors (OE&HF).
• Analytical or sampling errors (A/SE).
• Equipment/instrumentation malfunction (E/IM).
• Process upsets of unspecified origin (PUUO).
• Utility failures (UF).
• Integrity failure or loss of containment (IF/LOC).

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• Emergency operations (EO).

• Environmental release (ER).

Table 13.1 summarises the intent of each of these question categories. If needed, a leader or
team member may obtain additional ideas of the types of questions which are appropriate for
each category by consulting the Structured Checklists (Appendix I of the Combined Process
Safety Management Practice: Process Hazards Analysis and Process Modification
Guidelines). It is best, however, for the team to initially "brainstorm" each category
individually and then to use the questions on the corresponding checklist to help ensure
completeness. This approach will help minimise the tendency for the team to become
dependent upon the SWIFT Checklists as a sort of "cheat sheet" which could stifle team
creativity.

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Table 13.1 What-If Question Category - Summary of Intent

MATERIAL PROBLEMS (MP)

This question category provides an opportunity to explore the known or documented potential hazards and the special
conditions which may need to be maintained in order to safely store, handle and process the raw materials, intermediates
and finished products which will be present in the process.
EXTERNAL EFFECTS OR INFLUENCES (EE/I)
This question category is intended to help identify the effect of outside forces or demand scenarios which might result in
the development of some of the hazards identified during discussions of material problems (MP). Included might be
natural phenomena ranging from volcanoes which could send hot mud flooding into the plant, to freezing weather which
might cause a polymerisation inhibitor to precipitate from a monomer (ultimately leading to a runaway reaction and
subsequent environmental release) or freezing in a line (which could lead to integrity failure or loss of containment). Also
to be considered are man-made random events such as arson, civil disturbances, or a nearby explosion which might in
some way impact the unit being reviewed.
OPERATING ERRORS AND OTHER HUMAN FACTORS (OE&HF)
For each mode of operation (e.g. charging, start-up, shutdown, reaction, stand-by, etc.), the SWIFT team should imagine
itself in the operator's role and devise questions related to every conceivable way to mistreat the process represented on the
flow sheets. It is important to remember that many operating errors are the result of inadequate training or poorly written
or incomplete instructions.
ANALYTICAL OR SAMPLING ERRORS (A/SE)
The team should consider and devise questions related to all potential analytical or sampling requirements or operations.
This category of questions could range from the importance of controlling slime in a cooling tower loop, to failing to obtain
critical process control data, or even injuries occurring to lab technicians who must analyse a thermally unstable
intermediate.
EQUIPMENT/INSTRUMENTATION MALFUNCTION (E/IM)
The team should consider and devise questions related to all potential significant mechanical and instrumentation failures.
Many of these failures will probably be obvious because of the equipment shown on the P&ID or as the result of previous
operating errors and other human factors (OE&HF) discussions. In fact some (OE&HF) inputs may also be recognised as
demands which may result in equipment/instrumentation malfunction (E/IM). It is important to examine instrument and
control system failures which might be significant. It is crucial for the team to take note of protective devices and systems
which must remain operative if the various mechanical and human demands are to be prevented from causing a hazard.
Protective system proof testing schedules should also be reviewed.

PROCESS UPSETS OF UNSPECIFIED ORIGIN (PUUO)

This question category is intended to be a "catch all" for additional demands, hazards or scenarios which were some how
overlooked (may not have been obvious, or just did not fit into any of the previous categories) during discussions of other
question categories. This category also should serve as a reminder that the materials and process conditions within a
system or subsystem may be directly influenced by the conditions at the point of interface with other systems or
subsystems. A brief review (even a mini HAZOP if the team considers it necessary) is made by the team to determine
whether "anything else" is important.
UTILITY FAILURES (UF)
This question category is straight forward but care should be taken to note that external effects or influences (EE/I),
analytical or sampling errors (A/SE), operating errors and other human factors (OE&HF) and electrical/instrumentation
malfunction (E/IM) demands and hazards which may directly cause a utility failure (UF) type hazard to develop.
INTEGRITY FAILURE OR LOSS OF CONTAINMENT (IF/LOC)
This question category should draw heavily upon all the preceding categories. Additional care concerning the accuracy and
detail of the logical interaction of previous errors and/or failures with each other should be considered. Integrity failure or
loss of containment (IF/LOC) hazards certainly can introduce some additional considerations such as normal and
emergency venting. However, some combination of the demands and hazards previously identified will probably represent
the major basis for those scenarios which could result. It should also be noted that vessels, lines, pumps and various other
components need to be considered in this discussion, and the size of such failures should be specified (small leak,
catastrophic failure, etc.)

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EMERGENCY OPERATIONS (EO)

If the team has been thorough in its analysis of the ultimate effects of the various consequences relating to all the previous
categories, new issues will rarely be discovered at this stage. It is, however, very important to consider emergency
operations independently because errors or failures related directly to the emergency condition or emergency procedures
may not have been readily apparent when the emergency was discussed in the context of the precipitating events. Possible
escalation of minor situations during emergencies should also be evaluated by the team. Consider how the process will be
operated or shut down if such conditions should occur.

ENVIRONMENTAL RELEASE (ER)

The most obvious release will be that caused by integrity failure or loss of containment (IF/LOC). However, correctly
functioning emergency vents, various mechanical failures and operating errors must also be considered. Resultant effects
such as toxic clouds, fires or explosions scenarios which are identified as occurring external to the process may need to be
developed further as fault trees or event trees with the identified environmental release (ER) causes as the starting points.

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The "What if" Questions

The "What-if" questions often may often begin with the words "What-if" but they don't have
to. "How could", "Is it possible," or any other form of question is perfectly acceptable. The
intent is to ask questions which will cause the group to carefully consider and think through
the potential scenarios and ultimate consequences that such an error or failure might
precipitate. When the multi-disciplinary team is unable to draw upon or extrapolate their
experience to imagine any additional "What-if" questions in a given category, they should
consult the SWIFT checklists to prompt additional questions as appropriate.

Although the questions can be answered as they are raised, it is usually best to pose and record
as many questions as possible in a "brainstorming" manner before trying to answer them.
Interrupting the train of thought when brainstorming may result in questions being forgotten
or perhaps never even being posed. Additional questions can always be added to the
discussion list as they are raised. The SWIFT study leader needs to be aware that this is not an
unusual occurrence during the discussions of the initial questions.

Answering the Questions

When the flow of ideas subsides, the leader should ask the recorder to read each "what if"
question in turn and ask the team to comment on how the system, adjoining systems or the
whole unit is likely to respond. The recorder should enter a brief summary of the discussion in
the logsheet just as would be done during a HAZOP. Similarly, the possible consequences are
then examined and if the team considers current detection/safeguards or mitigation to be
sufficient, the next question should be discussed.

By applying his experience, the leader may further reduce the study time by selectively
changing the order of discussion of the questions posed by the team. By first considering those
questions which appear to involve the most severe potential consequences, the team can often
make a more comprehensive recommendation which covers many of the same issues which
will be identified during the discussion of the remaining questions. When this approach is used,
however, care must be taken to adequately consider all of the "what-if" questions on the list to
ensure that every known important issue has been raised, discussed and necessary
recommendations written.

Using the SWIFT Checklists

As previously described, when the SWIFT team is unable to imagine any additional "What-if"
questions in a given category, they should consult the SWIFT checklists to prompt additional
questions. The recommended strategy for use of these lists is to consult them at the conclusion
of answering all the initial brainstormed what-if questions for the current structured category.
For example, the team may have raised and answered 9 what-if questions during the initial
discussions of the Material Problems (MP) category. Before moving on to brainstorm for new
what-if questions in the next category, External Effects or Influences (EE/I), the MP Checklist
should be consulted to determine whether it contains or inspires additional questions which
should be addressed by the SWIFT team before leaving the MP question category. Depending
upon the experience level of the team and leader, the team may either be asked to review the
MP Checklist, or the leader may choose to quickly run through each item on the list while

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asking the team, " Does anybody have any additional Material Problem concerns related to,
flammability, thermal instability, flash points, etc.," until he or she has read through the
complete list. Perhaps the team will identify 2 additional questions. These should be recorded,
discussed and answered as before. Finally, only when the leader is confident that no more MP
issues exist, should he or she change to the next structured category, External Effects or
Influences (EE/I). This approach should be repeated during the discussion for each category
until all 10 categories in the structure have been completed.

Recommendations

Just as in a HAZOP, if the team is not satisfied with the level of protection or otherwise
perceives a need for further analysis, recommendations for further action should be proposed
for management consideration. Such recommendations need to include a brief description of
the potential hazard, a description of what equipment, instrumentation or procedures currently
in place are relied upon to prevent the development of the hazard and finally, the objectives
which must be achieved to provide a solution to the potential problem. Care should be taken
to provide enough factual information but not too many specific details of how the correction
should be implemented. This provides the designers with as much flexibility as possible in
providing a solution which will meet the objectives necessary to eliminate or manage the
potential hazard.

It is important to remember that the SWIFT team, just like a HAZOP team, has only the
responsibility of identifying and adequately explaining to management what hazards might be
present.

Recommendations should always remain flexible. They should clearly state the perceived
deficiency and the objectives which the team considers important for eliminating or managing
the hazard. Ideas for a potential modifications which came to mind during the discussions can
and should be documented, however, care must be taken not to state them in such a manner
that can be construed as the only solution to the identified problem or as binding upon
management.

Completing the Analysis

The procedure described above should be carried out for each question category. After the last
category is discussed, the leader should ask the team if there is "anything else" which comes to
mind that just didn't come up in the discussions. If so, the questions should be posed and
answered. When the analysis of a system or subsystem is complete, the procedure is repeated
for any remaining sections until the agreed upon scope has been completely and satisfactorily
addressed. To wrap up the study of the major process section, the leader should direct the
team in reviewing and updating their thoughts on each of the regulatory requirements which
were used to initiate the discussions. Finally, the review of an entire unit or plant may consist
of a series of several studies, each having a scope comparable to the typical major section just
described.

As with a HAZOP, the team should agree on the "top 10" (nominally) issues to provide
management with a clear understanding of the most significant issues to be addressed. The

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report format for a SWIFT analysis should be no different from that of a HAZOP, and the
recommendations should be prioritised, tracked and completed in the same manner.

13.3 Planning and Preparation

A team comprised of from 4 to 8 members including the leader and technical recorder is
recommended. In contrast to HAZOP, the leader of a SWIFT review does not have to refrain
from participation in the team discussion. Depending upon the circumstances, a leader with a
high level of expertise in the process can benefit the efficiency and effectiveness of the study.
However, the leader should have HAZOP leadership training so he/she can recognise the
importance of issues, control the flow of the study, and keep it on track. Also, he/she must still
be careful to ensure that he/she does not assert undue influence over the direction and
outcome of the proceedings, particularly because he/she is now a "participant".

For studies of narrow scope, it is also acceptable for the leader to double as the technical
recorder. When recording is performed with the correct level of detail, a study requiring more
than a half a day to complete probably would be more efficient and effective if the proceedings
are transcribed by qualified individual other than the leader.

At a minimum, the team should consist of one or more persons who have expertise in process
technical issues (process engineer, chemist, etc.) and one or two who have relevant operating
experience (lead operator, foreman, etc.). Depending upon the precise nature of the process or
the change being examined, additional team members might include representatives from
maintenance, instrumentation, quality control, safety, and other disciplines.

The reference documents (see Table 13.2) necessary for conducting a SWIFT review are
identical to those required for HAZOP. Just as with a HAZOP, the more comprehensive and
up-to-date the data available to the team, the more efficient and effective the analysis.

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Table 13.2 Reference Materials for Conducting a Swift Review

Required by OSHA/EPA regulations (in USA)

1 Information pertaining to hazardous chemicals in the process: Toxicity information, permissible
exposure limits, physical data, reactivity data, corrosivity data, thermal and chemical stability
data, and hazardous effects of inadvertent mixing of different materials that could foreseeably
occur. Such information is usually available in the Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) system
2 Block flow diagram or simplified process flow diagram.
3 Process chemistry, maximum intended inventory, safe upper and lower limits of process
parameters, and an evaluation of the consequences of deviations from those limits including those
affecting safety and health of employees.
4 Piping and Instrument Diagrams (or engineering flow diagrams, depending on nomenclature);
P&IDs listed, with a key to symbols.
5 Materials of construction, electrical classification, and ventilation system design.
6 Relief system design and design basis.
7 Safety systems (e.g., interlocks, detection or suppression systems).
8 Material and energy balances for processes built after May 26, 1992
9 Design codes and standards employed.
10 Incident reports.
Optional Documents
1 Operating procedures, including startup and shutdown.
2 Schedule of alarm and trip settings and cause-and-effect charts.
3 Equipment and main piping layout and elevation drawings.
4 Electrical single-line diagram.
5 P&IDs for vendors' packages.
6 Systems design philosophy and process description.
7 Instrumentation philosophy.
8 Engineering design data sheets for all plant items, including vendors' packages.
9 Design data sheets for instruments and control valves.
10 Utilities specifications.
11 Mechanical integrity data.
12 Emergency response plan.
13 Outstanding recommendations from previous audits.

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13.4 SWIFT Reporting, Documentation and Follow Up

The SWIFT analysis is recorded on a log sheet very similar to that used for HAZOP
recording. The organisation of the report and follow up should be handled in a manner
identical to that used for HAZOP.

13.5 SWIFT Study Mechanics

The SWIFT study team will need the same sort of facility for conducting its review as those
required by a HAZOP team. The need for adequate space for spreading out drawings, flip
charts, markers and appropriate refreshments is identical. The major difference is that the
SWIFT review probably will not last as long as most HAZOP studies and will utilise a smaller
study team.

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13.6 SWIFT Example

It is planned to take delivery of bulk petrol on a site. A system of receipt, storage and transfer
is to be developed. Assume we are at the very early stages of the design (conceptual) and we
wish to identify the major hazards or design problems that this activity might create.

At the moment we have no drawings but do have a sketch of a typical system, which the fuel
supplier has provided us with. This is shown in Figure 13.1.

This is a good example where the use of the What-If or SWIFT technique would be
appropriate.

We are interested in safety, operational and environmental hazards as well as information,

which would be useful to us for the detailed design of the system.

It is planned that the tank will be installed in a bunded area alongside a site road. The pump
will be positioned outside of the bund on a concrete hand-standing area. The road is drained to
surface water system on-site, which then discharges to the local river.

Figure 13.1 Fuel Loading Example for SWIFT

LAH

LSH

LI

To Process

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Table 13.3 Example SWIFT Study Node Description Sheet

Project: Fuel Transfer and Storage System Revision: 0 Node: 001 Page: 1
Date: 30/06/97 Time:
Session: 0 Team:

Node Description: Leader: Recorder:

Delivery truck, fuel receipt, delivery and storage system including the storage tank,
pipework, pump & other equipment, the truck and truck movements on site.
Organisation: XYZ

Location: Various

Design Intention: P&ID’s Rev #’s:

To transfer petrol from the road tanker to the tank via the installed pump, to store the
petrol safely on site and to dispense as required on site.

Normal Process Conditions (Range):

Temperature: Ambient
Pressure: Static head from truck.
Flow rate: 500 litres per minute (advised by supplier)
Capacity: Truck capacity 30,000 litres, storage tank capacity 200,000 litres

Team Members:

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Table 13.4 Example SWIFT Study Logsheet

Project: Node: 001 Page: 2

Fuel Transfer and Storage System
Node Description:
Delivery truck, fuel receipt, delivery and storage system including the storage tank, pipework, pump & other equipment, the truck and truck movements on site.
QUESTION WHAT IF CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS REC# RECOMMENDATION
CATEGORY
Material Fire near or around storage Potential escalation of fire to engulf the Fire water main onsite with
Problems area. storage tank. This could create a major several monitors placed near
incident on site, possibly resulting in to the storage tank.
further escalation. Foam fire fighting equipment
will be provided on site.

External Truck collides with storage Damage to storage tank and associated Competent suppliers will be R1 Review the route to be taken by
Factors or tank or with other facilities pipework/ equipment and potential leak. used. the truck and provide suitable
Influences on site. Also possible damage and leak of truck on Storage tank will be in a crash barriers to protect
site. Possible fire and environmental concrete bund and therefore vulnerable areas from possible
pollution if petrol discharges in to the is protected from impact. impact by the truck. Ensure
surface water system and then to the river. that the equipment and
pipework around the unloading
area are mechanically
protected.

Operating Truck drives away while Damage to pipework. Possible leakage of Driver/supplier competence. R2 Check with the supplier
Errors and still connected to pipework. petrol and subsequent fire. Other site whether there are interlocks on
other Human damage by trailing pipework. their trucks to prevent the truck
Factors from driving of while still
connected to the pipework.

Truck delivers the wrong Contamination of petrol in storage tank. Ordering procedure with R3 Check with the supplier how to
material e.g. fuel oil instead Therefore cannot use the petrol on site, supplier will specify petrol is check that the correct material
of petrol. which would cause operational/production to be delivered is delivered. This may be by
delays. Also will need to dispose of double-checking with the driver

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Project: Node: 001 Page: 2

Fuel Transfer and Storage System
Node Description:
Delivery truck, fuel receipt, delivery and storage system including the storage tank, pipework, pump & other equipment, the truck and truck movements on site.
QUESTION WHAT IF CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS REC# RECOMMENDATION
CATEGORY
contaminated petrol (disposal cost). or by sampling.

R4 Ensure storage tank and

connections are clearly labelled.

Analytical or Material is not sampled The wrong material may be delivered to Operator training and R5 Review the hazards associated
Sampling before transfer to the storage site and transferred to the storage tank. competence. Labelling of with transfer of petrol to a
Errors tank. Possible contamination of the product in tanks on site. different product storage tank
the tank. Possible reaction with material in on site. Following this review
the tank. Impact on production due to it may be necessary to
contaminated product. implement procedures to avoid
this type of mistake, e.g. by
sampling prior to discharge.

Equipment/ Storage tank leaks. Loss of product. Potential leakage to Tank will be installed in a
Instrumentation drain/surface water with environmental concrete bund. This will be
Malfunction contamination to local river. impervious and fitted with
interceptor for removing
product spillages to a slops
tank. Uncontaminated
rainwater will be discharged
to the surface water drain.

Process Upsets Increased demand from Possible shortfall of material in storage Tank capacity is sized for 5
process for product. tank for use by production. This could days supply at normal
cause production delays. demand. Deliveries are
possible within 1 day’s notice
This is considered adequate.

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Module 13: SWIFT for Hazard Identification Page 16

Project: Node: 001 Page: 2

Fuel Transfer and Storage System
Node Description:
Delivery truck, fuel receipt, delivery and storage system including the storage tank, pipework, pump & other equipment, the truck and truck movements on site.
QUESTION WHAT IF CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS REC# RECOMMENDATION
CATEGORY

Utility Failures Power failure on site. Cannot transfer product to tank due to lack Site power supply is reliable
of power to transfer pump. with back up diesel
generators.

Loss of Hose ruptures Discharge of material on the roadway. Visual inspection of hoses R6 Ensure receipt area is bunded
Integrity This would discharge to the surface water before use. 6 monthly test as such that spillages are
system and would possibly cause major part of planned maintenance. contained and cannot discharge
pollution to the local river. Operator can stop the transfer to the surface water system.
pump locally and isolate
using the manual valves.

Pump casing fails due to Discharge of fuel on tanker. Potential fire Annual pump inspection R7 Check that fuel transfer pump
cold weather. and pollution incident. will not be cast iron (cast iron
pumps have been found to
crack in cold weather). If the
pump is cast iron it should be
replaced.

Emergency Emergency on site while Potential escalation if driver/operator does Site emergency procedures. R8 Review the site emergency
Operations product is being transferred not know what to do. procedures and update if
to the storage tank. necessary to include what
action the truck driver should
take in a site emergency.

Environmental Excess firewater is Possible discharge of contaminated Tank is in a bund. R9 Review the capacity required in

P:\2004 Contracts\21506545 PetroVietnam HAZOP+QRA Course\CD-ROM\Word files\Module13.doc © 2004 DNV. All rights reserved
Risk ID & Assessment Training Course DNV Consulting
Module 13: SWIFT for Hazard Identification Page 17

Project: Node: 001 Page: 2

Fuel Transfer and Storage System
Node Description:
Delivery truck, fuel receipt, delivery and storage system including the storage tank, pipework, pump & other equipment, the truck and truck movements on site.
QUESTION WHAT IF CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS REC# RECOMMENDATION
CATEGORY
Release necessary to fight a fire on firewater to the surface water system and the surface water interceptor to
the product storage tank. to the local river. ensure this is adequate for
foreseeable quantities of
contaminated firewater.

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Risk ID & Assessment Training Course DNV Consulting
Module 13: SWIFT for Hazard Identification Page 19

13.7 SWIFT for Non-Continuous Operations

When SWIFT is applied to batch, semi-batch, and in some instances startup or shutdown
operations, the non-continuous process should be divided into systems or subsystems as with a
continuous processing unit. However, it is likely that there will be fewer subdivisions involving
specific groupings of process hardware. The more important division will be to consider the
operation during each major processing step within the systems of interest. For a given system
and for each major processing step carried out within that system, "What if" questions should
be posed for each category in the same manner described for a continuous process.

The leader should be aware of several potential differences which may require added attention
when changes in non-continuous operations are being analyzed using SWIFT. These include
but should not be limited to the following:

• Hardware changes directly contact several processing steps and may therefore impose
consequences or impact during one or more operating steps.

• Changes in raw materials or catalysts will most likely result in impacts only upon the step
where they are introduced or in subsequent steps. However, it should be realised that it
may be possible for residual materials to be carried back to earlier steps or enter other
process areas though leaks, misrouting errors or the recycle of recovered solvents, etc.

• Although associated changes in procedure/parameter/software may only impact the step in

question, care should be taken to consider whether subsequent steps may be impacted
differently (by errors or failures during the changed step) than they would have been in the
old process.

Finally, the category-specific checklists include some notes concerning special emphasis which
should be applied when analysing non-continuous operations.

It is important to realise that the significant differences between continuous and non-
continuous typically may have their origins in such issues as:

• Increased errorsthe result of additional operator interface.

• Increased incident magnitude or rate of developmenta result of errors or malfunctions
which accumulate reactive materials or otherwise delay the release of energy in such a
manner that it greatly exceeds the design capacity of the system.
• Much greater potential for personnel exposurea result of increased direct/equipment
interface.

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Module 13: SWIFT for Hazard Identification Page 20

13.8 SWIFT Analysis of Procedures

Review of procedures using the SWIFT technique is similar to the non-continuous system
review. It is preferable to review procedures after the process has been reviewed and the
hardware changes have been identified. The consequences of wrong or incomplete
information, wrong or incomplete actions, and actions at the wrong time or out of sequence
should be the primary concern. It is helpful to divide the procedure into steps or major groups
of steps for review purposes.

It is also helpful to be aware that good procedures need to clearly explain:

• What is to be done.
• Why the action is necessary.
• Where the action is to be performed.
• How the action is to be achieved.
• When the action is to be executed.
• Who is responsible for completing the action.

When analysing procedures, all question categories should be addressed; however, Material
Problems (MP), Operating Errors and other Human Factors (OE&HF) and Emergency
Operations (EO), are most likely to produce the most significant discussions

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