MANU/SC/0275/2019

Equivalent Citation: (2020)12SC C 542

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 10629-10631 of 2014, 9829-9830 and 9900 of 2016
Decided On: 26.02.2019
Appellants: The Competent Authority Calcutta and Ors.
Vs.
Respondent: David Mantosh and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Abhay Manohar Sapre and Indu Malhotra, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appearing Parties: Kalyan Bandopadhyay, Chander Uday Singh, Dhruv Mehta, Sr.
A dvs., Madhumita Bhattacharjee, Pratap Venugopal, Surekha Raman, Anuj Sarma,
Remya Raj, Advs. for K.J. John and Co., Anubhav Ray, Krishna Parkhari, Ankolekar
Gurudatta, Chandan Shreekant Malapur, Debarshi Bhuyan, Advs. and Party-in-Person
Case Category:
LAND LAWS AND AGRICULTURAL TENANCIES - MATTERS RELATING TO URBAN LAND
CEILING
Case Note:
Civil - Jurisdiction - Lack of - Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 filed Civil Suit for
declaration and possession of suit property against Appellants - Plaintiffs
claimed declaration that entire proceedings which culminated in issuance of
notification in relation to suit property be declared null and void and Plaintiffs
be declared owners of suit property - Trial Court dismissed suit which gave
rise to filing of First Appeal before High Court - Division Bench allowed
Plaintiffs' appeal, and set aside judgment and decree of Trial Court, and
decreed suit filed by Plaintiffs - Hence, present appeal - Whether Civil Court
had jurisdiction to try civil suit in relation to land which was subject to ceiling
proceedings under Act in question.
Facts:
The Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 filed Civil Suit for declaration and possession of
the suit property against the Appellants. Plaintiffs claimed a declaration that
the entire proceedings which culminated in the issuance of the notification
under Section 10 (1) under the Act in relation to the suit property be declared
null and void and the Plaintiffs be declared owners of the suit property. The
Trial Court dismissed the Suit which gave rise to filing of First Appeal before
the High Court by the Plaintiffs-Respondent Nos. 1 to 7. The Division Bench
vide the impugned judgment allowed the Plaintiffs' appeal, and set aside the
judgment and Decree of the Trial Court, and decreed the suit filed by the
Plaintiffs'. The High Court held that the suit was maintainable, that it was not
barred, that the Civil Court had the jurisdiction to try the civil suit on merits,
that the Plaintiffs were the owners of the suit property, that the competent
authorities did not follow the mandatory procedure laid down under the Act,

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that the proceedings under the Act are not binding on the Plaintiffs, that the
Appellant was in unauthorized possession of the suit property and were
directed to deliver vacant possession of the suit property to the Plaintiffs, or
in the alternative, to pay its value within three months to the Plaintiffs.
Held, while allowing the appeal:
(i) The jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to try the civil Suits with respect to the
lands, which were subjected to ceiling proceedings under the Act, were held
to be impliedly barred, since the Act excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil
Court. [56]
(ii) If there were any remedy available to the Respondents in relation to the
suit property, then any such remedy was under the Act but not by filing a civil
suit in a Civil Court and start a fresh round of litigation with respect to the
suit property. Such a suit was, impliedly barred in the light of exclusion of
jurisdiction of the Civil Court under the Act. [63]
(iii) Some Sections of the Act in question which had bearing on the question
of exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court were in pari materia with the
Sections in the Land Acquisition Act whereas some Sections of the Act which
also have bearing on this question were not to be found in the Land
Acquisition Act. Yet, this Court on examining the scheme of the Land
Acquisition Act and the remedies provided therein had held that the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court was impliedly excluded and barred to try the
civil suit. The scheme of this Act, therefore, clearly indicates that exclusion of
Civil Court jurisdiction was provided therein impliedly. [71]
(iv) Therefore, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the civil suit in
relation to the land which was subject to ceiling proceedings under the Act in
question; nor did the Civil Court have the jurisdiction to declare the
proceedings held under the Act, as void or illegal or non est, since it was
impliedly excluded and barred under the Act. [72]

JUDGMENT
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1 . C.A. Nos. 10629-10631 of 2014 are filed by the Competent Authority against the
judgment and Order dated 27.09.2013 in F.A. No. 202/2008, Judgment and Order dated
24.07.2014 in the Review Petition being RVW No. 36/2014 with CAN No. 1450/2014 in
F.A. No. 202/2008 passed by the High Court at Calcutta.
2 . C.A. Nos. 9829-9830 of 2016 are filed by M/s. Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals Ltd.
against the judgment and order dated 27.09.2013 in F.A. No. 202/2008 with CAN No.
1054/2014 and C.A. No. 9900/2016 against the judgment and order dated 24.07.2014
in RVW No. 117/2014 in F.A. No. 202/2008 passed by the High Court at Calcutta.
3 . In order to appreciate the controversy involved in these appeals, it is necessary to
set out the facts in detail, which led to filing of these appeals. The facts set out
hereinbelow are taken from the list of dates filed by the parties.

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4 . Appellant No. 1 herein is the Competent Authority, Calcutta-Defendant No. 3,
Appellant No. 2 is the State of West Bengal-Defendant No. 2, whereas Respondent Nos.
1 to 7 herein are Plaintiff Nos. 1 to 7, Respondent No. 8 is Defendant No. 1 and
Respondent No. 9 is Defendant No. 2 in the Civil Suit out of which these appeals arise.
5 . The dispute pertains to land bearing No. 73, holding No. 42, Canal Circular Road,
Calcutta - 700 054 measuring around 2 bighas, 2 katas, 4 chataks and 25 sq. ft. (which
is a part of and adjacent to a bigger chunk of land measuring around 29 bighas)
(hereinafter referred to as "suit property").
6. One Abdul Jabbar claimed to have purchased the suit property on 29.07.1919 in an
auction sale. He, in turn, claimed to have sold it to one Maula Ataul Haq on 29.09.1927
who, in turn, is alleged to have sold it to one Poonam Chand Sethia on 15.08.1933.
7 . Mr. Poonam Chand Sethia, in turn, on 17.08.1933 claimed to have transferred the
suit property to one Moti Chand Nakhat, Amrito Lal Shah, Thakur Lal Mehta and Champa
Lal Daphtary, being the trustees of a Trust who, in turn, claimed to have transferred it
to one Mr. P.S. Mantosh-the predecessor-in-interest of the original Plaintiff, who is now
represented by his legal representatives (Respondent Nos. 1 to 7).
8 . It may be mentioned here that after 1933 till 30.11.1962, the suit property went
through several transfers between various parties. It was also the subject matter of civil
and criminal proceedings between the parties, who claimed to have possessed the suit
property. We, however, do not consider it necessary to set out these details here.
9. Suffice it to say, that eventually the suit property along with its adjacent land bearing
Nos. 73, 60, 72, etc. came into the hands of Mr. Monilal Goyee and Mr. Bijay Kumar
Goyee who, in turn, claimed to have sold it to M/s. Hindustan Housing on 15.06.1957.
M/s. Hindustan Housing, in turn, transferred the suit property along with adjacent land
to M/s. Orient Beverage Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "M/s. OBL") vide registered sale
deed dated 30.11.1962.
1 0 . On 17.02.1976, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter
referred to as "the Act") came into force. It was extended to the State of West Bengal
on the same day. The suit property along-with the adjacent land was an "urban land"
Under Section 2(o) of this Act, and was falling under urban agglomeration as defined by
Section 2(n) of the Act.
11. M/s. OBL claiming to be a "person" Under Section 2(i) of the Act, and claiming "to
hold" the suit property Under Section 2(1) of the Act in excess of the ceiling limits
specified Under Section 4 of the Act filed a statement on 15.09.1976 Under Section 6(1)
of the Act before the Competent Authority.
12. It may be mentioned here that in the statement M/s. OBL showed the suit property
as a vacant land, and prayed that they be allowed to hold the excess vacant land for
constructing the dwelling houses thereon Under Section 21 of the Act.
13. The Competent Authority by order dated 27.09.1988, however, rejected the prayer
made by M/s. OBL. The rejection resulted in M/s. OBL agreeing to surrender the
possession of the entire excess land held by them beyond the prescribed ceiling limit.
On 04.01.1990, M/s. OBL accordingly surrendered their possession on the land bearing
Nos. 58, 60, 72, 73, 79, & 81 situated at Canal Circular Road, Calcutta in favour of the
State. The said surrender included the suit property also. The Deputy Secretary, Land &
Land Reforms Department then directed M/s. OBL to file the statement as required

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Under Sections 8 to 10 of the Act.
14. On 22.01.1990, M/s. OBL informed the Competent Authority that they are prepared
to surrender the possession of the suit property subject to awarding them compensation
as provided under the Act. On 08.02.1990, the Competent Authority served final
statement Under Section 9 of the Act on M/s. OBL. This led to the issuance of a
notification by the State Under Section 10(1) of the Act which was duly published in the
Calcutta Gazette Extraordinary on 15.02.1990 inviting objections from the general
public. The Competent Authority, however, did not receive any objection from any
person pursuant to the notice published. This was followed by issuance of the final
notification Under Section 10(3) on 11.05.1990 which resulted in vesting of the suit
property in the State of West Bengal free from all encumbrances.
15. The Competent Authority, on 23.05.1990, served notice to M/s. OBL calling upon
them to physically surrender the possession of the suit property to the State, which was
done on 28.05.1990.
16. The State of West Bengal (Appellant No. 2 herein) on 04.04.1991 allotted the suit
property (No. 73) along with adjacent land measuring around 34,147 sq. meters
bearing premises Nos. 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 72, 73, 79, & 81 at Canal Circular Road to
Respondent No. 8 (Defendant No. 1-M/s. Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals) on a long term
lease of 30 years. The Respondent No. 8 (Defendant No. 1) then was given possession
of the land from the State. The State executed a lease deed dated 02.12.1994 in favour
of M/s. Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals. Thereafter, M/s. Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals set up
a hospital at a huge cost, and is running their hospital since the last two decades.
17. In the year 1992, Respondent No. 1 (Plaintiff No. 1) woke up from her slumber, and
claimed to be the owner and holder of the suit property and part of the adjacent land.
The Plaintiff felt aggrieved by the notification issued Under Section 10(3) on 11.05.1990
and filed a Writ Petition (WP No. 1382/1992) to challenge the same before the Calcutta
High Court.
1 8 . The Single Judge vide Order dated 26.08.1992 allowed the Writ Petition and
quashed the notification dated 11.05.1990.
1 9 . The Respondent No. 8 (Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals Ltd.) felt aggrieved by the
order of the Single Judge dated 26.08.1992 and filed Writ Appeal No. 324/1993 before
the Division Bench of the High Court.
20. The Division Bench vide order 03.04.1997 allowed the appeal and set aside the
order of the Single Judge, and dismissed the Writ Petition. As a consequence, thereof,
the notification dated 11.05.1990 issued by the State was held to be legal and valid and
was accordingly restored.
21. The Respondent No. 1 felt aggrieved by the judgment of the Division Bench and
filed S.L.P.(C) No. 12726 of 1997 in this Court. By Order dated 28.07.1997, this Court
dismissed the said petition. This Court, however, observed that if the Petitioner
(Respondent No. 1 herein) has any appropriate remedy under the Act or any other law,
it would be open to her to avail the same in accordance with law.
2 2 . It is in this background, that Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 filed Civil Suit (TS No.
101/1998) out of which the present appeals arise. The suit was filed against the present
Appellants, i.e., the Competent Authority under the Act, the State of West Bengal, and
Respondent Nos. 8 and 9 in the Court of Additional District Judge, Sealdah.

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23. The Civil Suit was filed for declaration and possession of the suit property. The
Plaintiffs claimed a declaration that the entire proceedings which culminated in the
issuance of the notification dated 12.02.1990 Under Section 10 (1) under the Act in
relation to the suit property be declared null and void and the Plaintiffs be declared
owners of the suit property. The reliefs claimed in the suit read as under:
(a) A declaration that the Notification No. 53-X-U.L. (Cal) dated
February 12, 1990 is null and void.
a) A declaration the statement filed by the Defendant No. 2 Under
Sub-section 1 of Section 6 of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act,
1976 is null and void so far as it relates to premises No. 73, Canal
Circular Road, Calcutta being the suit premises;
b) A declaration that the draft statement prepared by the Defendant
No. 3 Under Section 8 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act,
1976, on the basis of the statement filed by the Defendant No. 2 is
null and void and not binding upon the Plaintiffs so far as it relates to
the suit property;
c) A declaration that letter No. 1500-UL/AV-11/19 dated April 4, 1991
and/or the purported allotment of the suit premises to the Defendant
No. 1 by the Defendant No. 3 is inoperative, collusive, fraudulent and
void;
d) A declaration that the Plaintiffs are the owners of the premises No.
73, Canal Circular Road, Calcutta and the Plaintiffs is entitled to
possession of the suit property as owner;
e) A decree for recovery of possession evicting the Defendant No. 1
from suit property;
f) A decree for a sum of Rs. 1 crore from the Defendant No. 1 as mesne
profit and/or damages for illegal use and occupation of the suit
premises;
g) Costs of the suit;
h) Such other or further relief or reliefs that the Plaintiffs may be
entitled to in law or equity.
2 4 . The Appellants-State of West Bengal, the Competent Authority, and Respondent
Nos. 8 and 9 herein filed their respective Written Statements.
25. The Trial Court on the basis of pleadings framed the following 11 issues:
1. Is there any cause of action for the suit?
2. Is the suit maintainable?
3. Is the suit barred by limitation?
4. Is the suit bad for non-joinder of necessary parties?
5. Has the Plaintiff any right title and interest over the land in suit?

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 6. Has the suit property vested to the State?
7. Is the Plaintiff entitled to get a decree for declaration that
Notification No. 53-X-UL (Cal) dated 12.02.1990 is null and void, or a
declaration that the statement filed by the Defendant No. 2 under
provisions of Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act is null and void or
declaration that the statement prepared by Defendant No. 3 is null and
void or a declaration that letter No. 1500-UL/AV/II/19 dated
04.04.1981 and the purported allotment of the suit premises to the
Defendant No. 1 is inoperative, collusive, fraudulent and void?
8. Is the Plaintiff entitled to a decree for declaration that the Plaintiff
is entitled to a possession of the suit property as a co-owner?
9. Is the Plaintiff entitled to get a decree for recovery of possession of
the suit property by evicting the Defendant No. 1 therefrom?
10. Is the Plaintiff entitled to a decree of Rs. 1 crore against the
Defendant and mesne profit?
11. To what other relief, if any, is the Plaintiff entitled to?
26. The parties then adduced their evidence. The Trial Court vide judgment and decree
dated 24.04.2008 answered all the 11 issues against the Plaintiffs (Respondent Nos. 1
to 7 herein) and dismissed the Suit which gave rise to filing of First Appeal (No.
202/2008) before the Calcutta High Court by the Plaintiffs-Respondent Nos. 1 to 7.
27. The Division Bench vide the impugned judgment allowed the Plaintiffs' appeal, and
set aside the judgment and Decree of the Trial Court, and decreed the suit filed by the
Plaintiffs'. The High Court held that the suit is maintainable; that it is not barred; that
the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to try the civil suit on merits; that the Plaintiffs are
the owners of the suit property; that the competent authorities did not follow the
mandatory procedure laid down under the Act; that the proceedings under the Act are
not binding on the Plaintiffs; that the Appellant-Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals was in
unauthorized possession of the suit property and were directed to deliver vacant
possession of the suit property to the Plaintiffs, or in the alternative, to pay its value
within 3 months to the Plaintiffs.
28. The Competent Authority-Defendant No. 3, the State of West Bengal-Defendant No.
4 and Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals-Defendant No. 1 being aggrieved by the judgment of
the High Court filed the present Special Leave Petitions in this Court, which have been
renumbered as Civil Appeal Nos. 10629-10631/2014.
2 9 . The question, which arises for consideration in these appeals, is whether the
Division Bench of the High Court was justified in allowing the appeal filed by the
Plaintiffs' (Respondent Nos. 1 to 7) and decreeing the suit.
30. We have heard Mr. Kalyan Bandopadhya, learned senior Counsel appearing for the
Appellant-State of West Bengal and Competent Authority, Mr. C.U. Singh learned Senior
Counsel appearing for Appellant-M/s. Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals and Mr. Dhruv Mehta,
learned senior Counsel for the Respondent - Plaintiffs.
31. The counsel for the Competent Authority inter alia submitted that:
(i) the reliefs prayed for by the Plaintiffs could not be granted by the Civil

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 Court, as the Civil Suit was barred under the Act. Having regard to the scheme
of the Act, the Act is a self-contained Act which provided adequate remedies to
the land holders to challenge any action taken, and orders passed by the
competent authorities in revision/appeals, as the case may be, in ceiling
proceedings under the Act itself.
(ii) It was further contended that Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 having lost their legal
battle, which had attained finality up to this Court in the first round of
litigation, all issues pertaining to the suit property had already come to an end.
According to the learned Counsel, no issue in relation to the suit property
survived for adjudication by any Court, much less the Civil Court.
(iii) It was further contended that the legal effect of issuance of the notification
Under Section 10 (1) of the Act on 12.02.1990, followed by issuance of the
consequential final notification Under Section 10(3) on 11.05.1990, was that
the suit property stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances.
Therefore, no person has any right to claim a right, title and interest over the
suit property on and after the suit property stood vested in the State on
11.05.1990.
(iv) Learned Counsel for the Appellants then contended that the Civil Suit filed
by the Plaintiffs (Respondent Nos. 1 to 7) was barred by limitation, because the
Plaintiffs had slept over their alleged right of ownership over the suit property
by not availing of remedies under the Act.
(v) According to learned Counsel for the Appellants, when M/s. OBL claimed to
have purchased the suit property in 1962, the Plaintiffs ought to have filed a
Suit for Declaration of their title, which they failed to do so. In any case, the
Plaintiffs had a remedy to file their statement Under Section 6 of the Act on
15.09.1976, or raised an objection on the issue of ownership qua M/s. OBL at
that time Under Section 10(4) of the Act.
(vi) It was contended that the Respondent-Plaintiffs, at no stage of the
pendency of the ceiling proceedings, raised any objection Under Section 10 (1).
Hence, their right, if any, to claim any right, title and interest in the suit
property got extinguished consequent upon vesting of the suit property in the
State Under Section 10(3) of the Act on and after 11.05.1990.
3 2 . The learned Senior Counsel for Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals inter alia while
elaborating the submission of learned senior Counsel Mr. Kalyan Bandopadhya
submitted that:
(i) The suit property is governed by the Act, which continues to be in operation
in the State of West Bengal. As a consequence, according to the learned
Counsel, a Civil Suit would impliedly be barred and hence the Respondents had
a remedy which is available under the Act. It was urged that the Act being a
complete Code creates rights, remedies and fora for adjudication of disputes
and hence the Civil Suit filed by Respondents No. 1 to 7 would not be
maintainable.
(ii) That in any event Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 had failed to establish their claim
of ownership and possession over the suit property. The suit instituted by
Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 was also barred by limitation because the
Plaintiffs/Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 were not in possession of the suit property

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 since 1962. The notification under the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act,
1976 was published on 17.02.1976 and as per scheme of the Act, the owner of
the suit property was obligated to file a return, since the suit property was
beyond the ceiling limit.
(iii) Plaintiffs/Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 claimed that their predecessor-in-interest
viz. namely Ms. Daisy Mantosh was the owner of premises No. 71/1, 60,72 and
73 Canal Circular Road and since the extent of land held was in excess of the
ceiling limit, yet she did not file any return in respect of the suit properties. (iv)
On the other hand, M/s. Orient Properties Pvt. Ltd. (renamed as M/s. Orient
Beverages Ltd. "OBL") submitted a return Under Section 6 of the Act, and also
made an application Under Section 21 for retaining the excess land, which was
refused on 27.09.1986.
(v) The Land and Reforms Department on 04.04.1991 decided to allot the suit
property to M/s. Janapriya Hospital Corporation Ltd., later renamed as Apollo
Gleneagles Hospitals for setting up a hospital. This was done by executing a
lease for 30 years, for which a premium of Rs. 98,41,300 was paid to the State.
A large hospital with all amenities has since been set up.
33. Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior Counsel, appeared on behalf of Respondent Nos. 1
to 7/Plaintiffs and supported the reasoning and conclusion of the Division Bench of the
High Court in the impugned Order. It was inter alia contended that no case for
interference was made out with the impugned Order.
34. The Counsel submitted that there was a non-compliance with the provisions of the
Act and the Rules framed thereunder while dealing with the suit property. A mere
notification in the Official Gazette was not sufficient for vesting to take place under the
Act. The notification, according to learned Counsel was issued without ensuring proper
compliance of the Act read with Rules and therefore the entire process of vesting of the
suit property in the Appellants was vitiated and bad in law.
35. It was then contended that the Civil Suit was maintainable and the civil court's
jurisdiction was not impliedly excluded as the Civil Suit was filed pursuant to the
directions of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court and this Court in SLP (C) No.
12726 of 2007. This Court had dismissed the said SLP vide Order dated 28.07.1998
with the liberty to pursue the remedy available under the Act or any other law. It was
submitted that since the Respondent Nos. 1 to 7/Plaintiffs were illegally dispossessed
from the suit property (as they were not given a proper and valid notice in terms of the
provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder), there was a violation of the
principles of natural justice.
3 6 . Thus, according to learned Counsel, even where a statute gives finality to a
decision, such a provision does not exclude cases where the provisions of the particular
statute have not been complied with, or the tribunal has not acted in conformity with
the statute or fundamental principles of judicial procedure. Hence, the Civil Suit filed by
Respondent Nos. 1 to 7/Plaintiffs was maintainable and not barred by law.
37. It was sought to be contended that the rights, title and interest of the Respondent
Nos. 1 to 7/Plaintiffs in the suit property are common law rights and do not emanate
from the Act and therefore, must be adjudicated only by a civil court.
3 8 . The learned Counsel further contended that there was no occasion for the
Respondent Nos. 1 to 7/Plaintiffs to file a Return or declaration in respect of the suit

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property since the suit property was not a "vacant land" in terms of the Act. The Act
only contemplates filing of Returns with respect to "vacant lands". Hence, the provisions
of the Act were not applicable to the present case.
39. The learned Counsel further argued that the civil court was therefore the proper
forum for adjudication of the disputes between the parties as the Appellants/Defendants
had colluded amongst themselves with respect to the suit property and had committed a
fraud on the Respondent Nos. 1 to 7/Plaintiffs. Hence, the dispute could not have been
decided by a tribunal by ousting the jurisdiction of the civil court.
40. Lastly, the Senior Counsel contended that the Civil Suit filed on 29.06.1998 was
well within limitation since the cause of action of the Respondent Nos. 1 to 7/Plaintiffs
to file the suit ripened only after this Court vide Order dated 28.07.1997 had disposed
of the SLP (C) No. 12726/1997 granting liberty to the Respondent Nos. 1 to 7/Plaintiffs
to pursue any appropriate remedy under the Act or any other law.
41. We have heard the learned Senior Counsels appearing for the parties and perused
the record of the case including the written submissions. We find force in the
submissions advanced on behalf of the Appellants-Defendants.
42. The three principal issues, which arise for consideration in these appeals, are:
First, whether the High Court was justified in holding that the Civil Court has
the jurisdiction to try the civil suit in relation to the suit property which was
subjected to ceiling proceedings under the Act.
Second, whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to declare the ceiling
proceedings under the Act as void and not binding on the Plaintiffs even though
the same had attained finality in the first round of litigation upto this Court.
Third, whether the High Court was justified in holding that the Plaintiffs are the
owners of the suit property and entitled to claim possession of the suit property
or its value from the Appellant-M/s. Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals.
4 3 . Before we examine the afore-mentioned three issues, it is necessary to first
examine the scheme of the Act in question and the law governing the issues raised in
the present appeals.
44. The Act in question was enacted to provide for the imposition of a ceiling on vacant
land in urban agglomerations, for the acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling
limit, to regulate the construction of building on such land, and for matters connected
therewith. It was enacted with the object of preventing the concentration of urban land
in the hands of a few persons, and speculation and profiteering with a view to bringing
about the equitable distribution of land in urban areas to subserve the common good.
45. The Act has 47 Sections. Section 2(a) to (q) defines the various expressions used
in the Act. Section 3 prohibits the person from holding the land in excess of the ceiling
limits after coming into the force of the Act. Section 4 specifies the ceiling limit for
holding the land by any person. Section 5 deals with the transfer of vacant land by its
holder. Section 6 provides for filing of Statement by the persons holding vacant land in
excess of ceiling limits. Section 7 also deals with filing of Statement in case if the land
is situated within the jurisdiction of two or more competent authorities. Section 8 deals
with preparation of draft statement as regards the vacant land in excess of ceiling
limits. Section 9 deals with the preparation of final statement. Section 10 deals with

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acquisition of vacant land in excess of ceiling limits.
46. Section 11 provides for payment of amount for vacant land acquired. Section 12
provides for constitution of Tribunal and appeal to the Tribunal. Section 13 provides for
filing second appeal to the High Court against the order of Tribunal. Section 14 provides
for mode of payment. Section 15 provides for ceiling limits on future acquisition by
inheritance, bequest or by sale in execution of decree etc. Section 16 deals with filing of
Statement when the Act is adopted by the State subsequently. Section 17 deals with
power to enter upon any vacant land. Section 18 provides for imposition of penalties for
concealment of particulars of vacant land. Section 19 provides exclusion Clause from
applicability of certain provisions of the Act to some specified landowners. Section 20
deals with power to exempt any land.
47. Section 21 provides that excess land not to be treated excess land in certain cases.
Section 22 deals with retention of vacant land under certain circumstances. Sections 23
and 24 deal with disposal of vacant land acquired under the Act. Section 25 defines
certain expressions. Section 26 enjoins notice to be given before transfer of vacant
land. Section 27 provides for prohibition on transfer of urban property. Section 28 deals
with Regulation of registration of documents in certain cases. Section 29 deals with
Regulation of construction of building with dwelling units. Section 30 gives power of
demolition and stoppage of building. It also provides a right of appeal and bar of filing
suits in civil court in relation to matters falling Under Section 30.
4 8 . Section 31 deals with powers of competent authority. Section 32 deals with
jurisdiction of competent authorities and the Tribunal in special cases. Section 33
provides a right of appeal to the appellate authority whose order shall be final whereas
Section 34 provides for filing revision to State. Section 35 empowers the State to issue
orders and directions to competent authority. Section 36 gives power to central
government to give directions to the State Government. Section 37 deals with filing of
returns and report by the competent authority. Section 38 deals with offences and
punishment. Section 39 deals with offences by companies.
49. Section 40 again provides for a bar from filing of the suit or other legal proceedings
against the Government and officers in respect of anything, which is done in good faith
or intended to be done by or under the Act. Section 41 deals with cognizance of
offences. Section 42 gives overriding effect of the Act on other laws. Section 43
specifies the court fees payable on the applications, appeals or other proceedings under
the Act. Section 44 specifies certain officers to be public servant. Section 45 empowers
the authorities to correct the clerical errors. Section 46 is a Rule making power and
lastly Section 47 gives power to remove difficulties.
50. The entire scheme of the Act set out above would make two things clear. First, the
Act is a self-contained code in itself, which provides complete machinery while dealing
with the rights of the landowners in relation to their lands, which are in excess of the
ceiling limits prescribed under the Act. It also provides adequate remedies to correct all
kinds of errors committed by the competent authority under the Act; and Second, the
Act gives finality to the orders passed by the appellate authority Under Section 33, and
also provides a bar to file the civil suits in relation to cases falling Under Section 30 (5)
and Section 40 of the Act.
51. The Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Dhula Bai v. State of MP
(MANU/SC/0157/1968 : AIR 1969 SC 78) examined the question as to when the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court can be held to have been expressly or impliedly excluded

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in trying a civil suit in the context of Section 9 of Code of Civil procedure, 1908.
52. Justice Hidayatullah, the then learned Chief Justice, speaking for the Bench in his
inimitable style, laid down 7 tests for examining the aforementioned question. These
tests read as under:
(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special
tribunals the civil courts' jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if
there is adequate remedy to do what the civil court would normally do
in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where
the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the
statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental
principles of judicial procedure.
(2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an
examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy
or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not
decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. Where there is no
express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of
the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and
the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is
necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and
provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays
down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be
determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies
normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the
said statute or not.
(3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires
cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even
the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference
from the decision of the Tribunals.
(4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the
constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A
writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is
clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a
compulsory remedy to replace a suit.
(5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax
collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected, a suit
lies.
(6) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its
constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit
does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or
there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case, the
scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant
enquiry.
(7) An exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be
inferred unless the conditions above set down apply.
53. In the light of the tests laid down in Dhula Bai (supra) and further keeping in view

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the scheme of the Act, we have to examine the issue as to whether the jurisdiction of
the Civil Court is expressly or impliedly excluded in trying the civil suit in relation to
matters arising out of the Act in question and second, whether the Civil Court has the
jurisdiction to declare the proceedings held under the Act, as being void.
54. Having examined the issue, we are clearly of the opinion that the present case falls
under clause(1) of Dhula Bai (supra) and satisfies the test laid down therein. Hence, the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court is held to be excluded by implication to try the civil suit in
question. This we say for the following reasons: -
First, the Act in question gives finality to the orders passed by the appellate
authority [refer to Section 33(3)].
Second, the Act provides adequate remedies in the nature of appeals, such as
first appeal to the Tribunal and second appeal to the High Court. [refer to
Sections 12 (4), 13 and 33 (1)].
Third, the Act is a complete code in itself and gives overriding powers on other
laws (refer to Section 42).
Fourth, the Act expressly excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation
to the cases falling Under Sections 30 and 40 (refer to Section 30(5) and
Section 40).
Fifth, as a result of dismissal of writ petition and SLP, it is held therein that the
proceedings under the Act in question were done in conformity with the Act in
question.
55. In light of the aforesaid five reasons-a fortiori, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in
relation to all the issues arising under the Act is held impliedly excluded thereby
satisfying all the conditions set out in Clause (1) of Dhula Bai (supra).
56. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to
try the civil Suits with respect to the lands, which were subjected to ceiling proceedings
under the Act, are held to be impliedly barred, since the Act excludes the jurisdiction of
the Civil Court.
57. Now coming to the facts of the case, we find from the relief prayed for in the plaint
(see prayers (a) to (d) quoted supra) that the Plaintiffs have sought a declaration, that
the notification dated 12.02.1990 issued Under Section 10 of the Act be declared null
and void; Second, a statement filed by M/s. OBL-Defendant No. 2 Under Section 6 of
the Act before the Competent Authority be declared null and void; Third, the statement
filed by Defendant No. 3 Under Section 8 of the Act be declared null and void.
58. In our opinion, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to grant the afore-mentioned
reliefs inasmuch as its jurisdiction to grant such reliefs is impliedly barred under the
Act.
59. In our view, if Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 -Plaintiffs claimed themselves to be the
lawful owners and holders of the suit property to the exclusion of others, there were
three remedies available in law which they could have availed of:
(i) First, a remedy accrued in favour of Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 if not earlier
when M/s. OBL claimed to have purchased the suit property from the alleged
vendors on 30.11.1962. It was at that point of time, a cloud was cast on their

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 alleged title in relation to the suit property. Since registration of the sale deed
amounts to a public notice, the Respondents should have filed a Civil Suit
against the vendors of M/s. OBL, and M/s. OBL, for a declaration of their
ownership and cancellation of their sale deed in relation to the suit property. It
was not availed of.
(ii) The second remedy arose Under Section 6 of the Act, for filing a statement
as owners and holders of the suit property before the Competent Authority,
after the Act came into force in 1976. This was also not availed of by the
Plaintiffs.
(iii) The third remedy was in filing objections Under Section 10 (1) of the Act
before the Competent Authority when the Competent Authority invited
objections on 12.02.1990 from public and pursuant to it, the notice was issued
in that behalf. The Respondents again did not avail of this remedy, and failed to
file any objections.
6 0 . The Respondents-Plaintiffs having failed to avail any of the three remedies at
appropriate time, resorted to fourth remedy of filing a Writ Petition to challenge the
notifications dated 11.05.1990 in the High Court of Calcutta. This Writ Petition was,
however, dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court vide dated 03.04.1997. The
order of dismissal was affirmed vide order dated 28.07.1997 passed by this Court in
SLP (C) No. 12726 of 1997.
6 1 . In our considered opinion, the dismissal of the SLP by this Court vide Order
28.07.1997 had a three-fold effect on the rights of the parties to the Lis in relation to
the suit property:
First, the entire action taken by the competent authority initiated from Section 6
of the Act till issuance of notifications Under Section 10(1) and (3) of the Act
issued on 12.02.1990 and 11.05.1990 in relation to the suit property were held
to be in conformity with the provisions of the Act. This satisfied the last
condition of Clause (1) of Dhula Bai (supra) also.
Second, the suit property stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances
Under Section 10 (3) of the Act.
Third, the State Government was held to be in legal possession of the suit
property as the owner on and after 11.05.1990, to the exclusion of all, by
following the due procedure of law.
62. In such a situation, the Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 could not take recourse to filing of
the Civil Suit on the basis of the observation made by this Court.
6 3 . As observed supra, if there were any remedy available to the Respondents in
relation to the suit property, then any such remedy was under the Act but not by filing a
civil suit in a Civil Court and start a fresh round of litigation with respect to the suit
property. Such a suit was, in our view, impliedly barred in the light of exclusion of
jurisdiction of the Civil Court under the Act.
64. Indeed, we find support for our reasoning by the decisions of this Court rendered in
several decided cases as mentioned below.
65. In State of Bihar v. Dhirendra Kumar MANU/SC/0384/1995 : (1995) 4 SCC 229,

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a question arose as to whether a civil suit is maintainable, and if so, whether ad-interim
injunction could be issued by the Civil Court in such suit against the State where the
proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act were taken pursuant to the notice issued
Under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act, and delivered to its beneficiary.
66. This Court examined the issue in the context of the scheme of the Land Acquisition
Act in juxtaposition with Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure and held that having
regard to the object and scheme of the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to deal
with the matters falling under the Act stands impliedly excluded, and is barred. Para 3
of the decision is apposite and reads as under:
3. The question is whether a civil suit is maintainable and whether ad
interim injunction could be issued where proceedings under the Land
Acquisition Act was taken pursuant to the notice issued Under Section
9 of the Act and delivered to the beneficiary. The provisions of the Act
are designed to acquire the land by the State exercising the power of
eminent domain to serve the public purpose. The State is enjoined to
comply with statutory requirements contained in Section 4 and
Section 6 of the Act by proper publication of notification and
declaration within limitation and procedural steps of publication in
papers and the local publications envisaged under the Act as amended
by Act 68 of 1984. In publication of the notifications and declaration
Under Section 6, the public purpose gets crystallised and becomes
conclusive. Thereafter, the State is entitled to authorise the Land
Acquisition Officer to proceed with the acquisition of the land and to
make the award. Section 11-A now prescribes limitation to make the
award within 2 years from the last date of publication envisaged Under
Section 6 of the Act. In an appropriate case, where the Government
needs possession of the land urgently, it would exercise the power
Under Section 17(4) of the Act and dispense with the enquiry Under
Section 5-A. Thereon, the State is entitled to issue notice to the
parties Under Section 9 and on expiry of 15 days, the State is entitled
to take immediate possession even before the award could be made.
Otherwise, it would take possession after the award Under Section 12.
Thus, it could be seen that the Act is a complete code in itself and is
meant to serve public purpose. We are, therefore, inclined to think, as
presently advised, that by necessary implication the power of the civil
court to take cognizance of the case Under Section 9 of Code of Civil
Procedure stands excluded, and a civil court has no jurisdiction to go
into the question of the validity or legality of the notification Under
Section 4 and declaration Under Section 6, except by the High Court in
a proceeding Under Article 226 of the Constitution. So, the civil suit
itself was not maintainable.
67. This very issue then came up for consideration in another decision of this Court in
Laxmi Chand v. Gram Panchayat Kararia MANU/SC/0128/1996 : (1996) 7 SCC 218.
In that case, the question arose as to whether the civil suit filed to challenge the award
passed under the Land Acquisition Act is maintainable and, if so, whether the Civil Court
has jurisdiction to entertain such suit for deciding the issue raised therein on its merits.
68. This Court held that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try such civil
suit on its merits. Its jurisdiction is impliedly barred having regard to the object and the
scheme of the Act. Paras 2 and 3 of the decision are apposite and read as under:

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 2....It is seen that Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 gives
jurisdiction to the civil court to try all civil suits, unless barred. The
cognizance of a suit of civil nature may either expressly or impliedly be
barred. The procedure contemplated under the Act is a special
procedure envisaged to effectuate public purpose, compulsorily
acquiring the land for use of public purpose. The notification Under
Section 4 and declaration Under Section 6 of the Act are required to be
published in the manner contemplated thereunder. The inference gives
conclusiveness to the public purpose and the extent of the land
mentioned therein. The award should be made Under Section 11 as
envisaged thereunder. The dissatisfied claimant is provided with the
remedy of reference Under Section 18 and a further appeal Under
Section 54 of the Act. If the Government intends to withdraw from the
acquisition before taking possession of the land, procedure
contemplated Under Section 48 requires to be adhered to. If
possession is taken, it stands vested Under Section 16 in the State
with absolute title free from all encumbrances and the Government
has no power to withdraw from acquisition.
3 . It would thus be clear that the scheme of the Act is complete in
itself and thereby the jurisdiction of the civil court to take cognizance
of the cases arising under the Act, by necessary implication, stood
barred. The civil court thereby is devoid of jurisdiction to give
declaration on the invalidity of the procedure contemplated under the
Act. The only right an aggrieved person has is to approach the
constitutional courts, viz., the High Court and the Supreme Court
under their plenary power Under Articles 226 and 136 respectively
with self-imposed restrictions on their exercise of extraordinary
power. Barring thereof, there is no power to the civil court.
6 9 . This view was reiterated by this Court in two later decisions (refer-Bangalore
Development Authority v. K.S. Narayan MANU/SC/4361/2006 : (2006) 8 SCC 336
and State of Punjab v. Amarjit Singh MANU/SC/0783/2011 : (2011) 14 SCC 713).
7 0 . On comparing the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act with the scheme of the
present Act in question, we find that the intention of the Legislature is more explicit in
excluding the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under the Act in question.
71. Indeed, it is clear from a reading of Sections 12(4), 13, 30, 33(1), 33(3), 33(5)
and 40 of the Act in question. We also find that some Sections of the Act in question
which has bearing on the question of exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court are
in pari materia with the Sections in the Land Acquisition Act whereas some Sections of
the Act which also have bearing on this question are not to be found in the Land
Acquisition Act. Yet, this Court on examining the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act
and the remedies provided therein has held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is
impliedly excluded and barred to try the civil suit. The scheme of this Act, therefore,
clearly indicates that exclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction is provided therein impliedly.
72. It is for all these reasons, we have no hesitation in holding that the Civil Court had
no jurisdiction to try the civil suit in relation to the land which is subject to ceiling
proceedings under the Act in question; nor did the Civil Court have the jurisdiction to
declare the proceedings held under the Act, as void or illegal or non est, since it was
impliedly excluded and barred under the Act.

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73. Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned senior Counsel for the Respondents-Plaintiffs vehemently
argued on the facts of the case, which are set out in detail above, that a perusal of the
facts would go to show as to how the Plaintiffs derived their title over the suit property
from their predecessor-in-title, and the prejudice which was caused to them by the
ceiling proceedings which proceeded against them behind their back.
74. We reject the contentions and submissions made on behalf of Respondent Nos. 1 to
7/Plaintiffs since we have inter alia held that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to
entertain a Civil Suit with respect to proceedings under the Urban Land Ceiling Act,
being a special and self-contained enactment.
75. Furthermore, the Respondent Nos. 1 to 7/Plaintiffs having failed to raise objections
to the ceiling proceedings at any stage, the suit property stood vested in the State, free
from all encumbrances. The belated challenge to the same is meritless. Having failed to
avail of the remedies under the Urban Land Ceiling Act and the one resorted to resulted
in rejection of the claim made therein upto this Court, Respondent Nos. 1 to 7/Plaintiffs
sought to start a fresh round of litigation by filing a Civil Suit, which was barred under
the Act. Furthermore, the State after acquiring ownership over the suit land has allotted
the suit land to the M/s. Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals on a 30 years lease. Hence, the
situation, in our view, has now become irreversible.
76. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the view that the Division Bench was
not justified in allowing the Respondents' appeal, and decreeing the Civil Suit whereas
the Trial Court was right in dismissing the Civil Suit.
77. As a consequence, the appeals succeed and are allowed. The impugned judgments
are set aside and the judgment of the Trial Court is restored. As a result thereof, the
suit filed by Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 out of which these appeals arise is dismissed with
no order as to costs.
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