REPORTABLE

2023 INSC 705

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1030/2023

MANOJ KUMAR SONI …APPELLANT

VS.

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH …RESPONDENTS

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1458/2023

KALLU @ HABIB …APPELLANT

VS.

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH. …RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

1. These criminal appeals, by special leave, assail the common

judgment and order dated 12th October, 2022 of the High Court of Madhya

Pradesh, Bench at Jabalpur (“High Court”, hereafter) whereby Criminal

Appeal No. 10474 of 2019 and Criminal Appeal No. 10549 of 2019 [appeals
Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by
satish kumar yadav

under Section 374(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code (“Cr. PC”, hereafter)]
Date: 2023.08.16
16:50:45 IST
Reason:

carried by Manoj Kumar Soni (“Manoj”, hereafter) and Kallu @ Habib

1
(“Kallu”, hereafter), respectively, were dismissed. While Manoj assailed his

conviction for the offence punishable under Section 411 of the Indian Penal

Code, 1860 (“IPC”, hereafter) and sentence of rigorous imprisonment of

three years with a fine of Rs. 5,000.00 and a default sentence of three

months, Kallu assailed his conviction for the offence punishable under

Section 120-B, IPC and sentence of rigorous imprisonment of ten years with

a fine of Rs. 5,000.00 and a default sentence of three months.

2. In all, five accused persons were convicted and sentenced for

different offences punishable under the IPC vide the common judgment of

the Additional Sessions Judge (“Trial Court”, hereafter) dated 28th

November, 2019. The aforesaid judgment having been confirmed by the

High Court, all the accused persons preferred Special Leave Petitions

(“SLPs”, hereafter) before this Court challenging the common judgment

dated 12th October, 2022. The SLPs of the three accused, namely, Suleman,

Arif and Jaihind, were dismissed and the judgment and order of the High

Court affirming their conviction and sentence left undisturbed. However,

notice was issued on the SLPs preferred by the remaining two accused,

Manoj and Kallu, on 06th April, 2023 and 11th April, 2023, respectively.

3. These two appeals were heard on different dates. However, a

common judgment being under assail, this Court proposes to dispose of

both these appeals vide this common judgment.

4. The case of the prosecution, in a nutshell, is that a complaint was

registered by PW-18 (“complainant”, hereafter) to the effect that on 14th

2
April, 2010, at around 1:30 pm, while the complainant was in her house,

four persons rang the doorbell. When her servant, PW-8, answered the door,

all four persons armed with a pistol forcefully entered the house. They tied

up the hands and legs of the complainant and her servant, threatened to

kill them, and proceeded to rob the complainant of silver and gold jewellery,

cash, and other valuables by taking the keys to the locker. The accused

persons remained at the complainant's residence till 2:30 pm before fleeing.

Based on the complaint, an F.I.R. was registered at around 4:30 pm against

four unknown persons under Section 394, IPC and all of them were

subsequently arrested.

5. Investigation of the F.I.R. was carried out by the Investigating Officer

(“I.O.”, hereafter). The specific allegations against Manoj are that the stolen

jewellery (“articles”, hereafter) had allegedly been sold to him and, despite

being aware that the co-accused had sold him stolen goods, he still chose

to receive and possess the same dishonestly. Consequently, he was arrested

on 9th May, 2010. Thereafter, these articles were recovered by the I.O. on

two different days — 9th May, 2010 and 21st May, 2010. While the Seizure

Memo dated 9th May, 2010 bears the signature of seizure witnesses PW-16

and PW-5, the Seizure Memo dated 21st May, 2010 bears the signature of

seizure witnesses PW-11 and PW-6. The process of identification was

conducted by PW-19, the Tehsildar, on 15th July, 2010. The specific

allegations against Kallu, former driver of the complainant, pertain to his

involvement in a conspiracy with other co-accused persons. The allegation

against him is that he shared information with them, disclosing that the

3
complainant had a substantial amount of money and valuable jewellery in

her residence, coupled with the knowledge that she lived alone; this,

allegedly led to the subsequent planning and execution of the robbery at

the complainant's house.

6. Upon completion of investigation, a chargesheet was filed before the

concerned court against the accused persons including Manoj and Kallu. The

offences with which all the accused were charged are shown as under:

Jaihind Sections 450, 394, 397, IPC and Section 25(1-B),

Arms Act, 1959 (“Arms Act”, hereafter)
Arif Sections 450, 394, 397, IPC and Section 25(1-B),
Arms Act
Suleman Sections 450, 394, 397, IPC
Kallu Section 120-B, IPC
Manoj Section 411, IPC

Upon committal, charges were framed and the accused including Manoj and

Kallu pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

7. Based on the complainant's testimony, it is established that among

the four accused present at the scene during the incident, Suleman, Arif,

and Jaihind were duly identified by the complainant, but the fourth accused

remained unidentified. During the investigation, it was revealed that the

fourth accused was a minor and the case was subsequently referred to the

juvenile court for further proceedings. Insofar as Kallu and Manoj are

concerned, they were not present at the complainant's house during the

incident and were apprehended at a later stage of the investigation when it

4
was discovered that Manoj had purchased the stolen articles, and Kallu was

involved in hatching the conspiracy.

8. After appreciating the oral and documentary evidence on record, the

Trial Court convicted and sentenced all the five accused persons as follows:

Jaihind Sections 450, R.I. for 5 years with a fine of Rs 1,000

and Arif 397, IPC and R.I. for 10 years with a fine of Rs 5,000
Section 25(1- R.I. for 1 year with a fine of Rs 1,000
B), Arms Act Default: 1 month, 3 months, and 1 month
respectively
Suleman Sections 450, R.I. for 5 years with a fine of Rs 1,000
397, IPC. R.I. for 10 years with a fine of Rs 5,000
Default: 1 month and 3 months, respectively
Kallu Section 120- R.I. for 10 years with a fine of Rs 5,000
B, IPC Default: 3 months
Manoj Section 411, R.I. for 3 years with a fine of Rs 5,000
IPC Default: 3 months

9. In convicting Manoj, the Trial Court primarily relied on two pieces of

evidence: the Seizure Memos, which were prepared upon recovery of the

stolen articles from Manoj's possession, and the Identification Memo, in

which the complainant identified the articles stolen. The Trial Court drew

presumption under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (“Evidence

Act”, hereafter), to the extent it provides that “a man who is in possession

of stolen goods soon after the theft is either the thief or has received the

goods knowing them to be stolen unless he can account for his possession”.

According to the Trial Court, the crucial corroborative evidence in Manoj's

5
case was the fact that the articles found in his possession belonged to the

complainant and were accurately identified by her. Additionally, Manoj failed

to provide any explanation regarding how the stolen articles came into his

possession. These collective factors resulted in his conviction under Section

411, IPC.

10. Insofar as Kallu is concerned, the Trial Court primarily based his

conviction for criminal conspiracy on two key factors: first, the information

provided by co-accused Jaihind during interrogation in his memorandum

statement dated 12th May, 2010, stating that he had given Rs.3,000.00 to

Kallu from the stolen money and had kept one country-made pistol along

with three cartridges at his (Kallu) house/tapra; and secondly, during

interrogation, Kallu himself in his memorandum statement admitted to

keeping Rs.3,000.00 in his room's cupboard, which was subsequently seized

upon his disclosure. Having held that Kallu had conspired with the other co-

accused, the Trial Court convicted him of criminal conspiracy punishable

under Section 120-B, IPC.

11. The aforesaid judgment having been challenged by Manoj and Kallu,

a learned Single Judge of the High Court was of the view that the findings

of the Trial Court did not warrant any interference and that the appeals were

devoid of any merit; hence, the same were dismissed. In confirming Manoj’s

conviction and sentence, the High Court relied on the finding that most of

the stolen articles were recovered from his possession and some of them

were melted by him. Considering that the articles were duly identified by

the complainant, the High Court was of the view that Manoj, knowing that

6
the articles were stolen property, dishonestly retained them. While affirming

the conviction and sentence of Kallu, the learned Judge referred to the fact

that the complainant was known to Kallu and he was working as her driver

and that Rs.3,000.00 was recovered from his house based on the disclosure

statement.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

12. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of Manoj submitted that the

courts below erred in recording the conviction under Section 411, IPC. The

main submissions advanced by him to have the conviction reversed are as

follows:

a) All four independent witnesses (PW-5, PW-6, PW-11, and PW-16) who

were shown to be present during the seizure/recovery of the articles

from Manoj’s house turned hostile and failed to support the

prosecution's case of seizure. Surprisingly, the courts below completely

ignored this aspect of the matter.

b) There were serious procedural lapses in conducting the identification

process in respect of the articles. The prescribed procedure in respect

of seizure of a property was not followed, and a procedural flaw is

established from the testimonies of the complainant and PW 19. The

recovery of the ornaments from the possession of Manoj does not

establish them to be that of the complainant. Therefore, the

presumption under Section 114, Evidence Act was erroneously drawn

as the very identification process suffers from serious lapses.

7
c) The Trial Court recorded the statement of Manoj under Section 313, Cr.

PC in a very casual manner, as if it were completing a formality in law.

It miserably failed to put any adverse circumstance appearing in the

evidence against Manoj for eliciting his explanation. This is one other

procedural lapse, and a grave one, which has rendered the trial vitiated

qua Manoj.

d) Manoj has been framed in the case due to the animosity between him

and the police as the police used to “often harass [Manoj] for going here

and there and getting the jewellery weighed, identification etc.”. This

statement of Manoj, given at the end of his examination under Section

313, Cr. PC was brushed aside by the courts below without assigning

any reason, far less cogent reason.

e) Significant contradictions exist between the testimonies of police

witnesses and seizure witnesses. The Trial Court predominantly relied

on the statements of the police witnesses, overlooking the presence of

additional testimonies of independent seizure witnesses available in the

records, who subsequently turned hostile.

13. Finally, it was submitted that there was absolutely no material to

convict Manoj under Section 411, IPC. Hence, the conviction and sentence

of Manoj ought to be set aside and consequently, the appeal be allowed.

14. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/State submitted that

both the courts below delved deep into the materials on record and, upon

meticulous consideration of evidence, did not find any material

8
contradiction in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The

procedural flaws pointed out by his adversary did not result in any failure

of justice and, therefore, there is no reason to interfere with the judgment

and order passed by the Trial Court, which has since been affirmed by the

High Court. Supporting the conviction and sentence of Manoj, the learned

counsel urged this Court to dismiss the appeal.

15. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of Kallu challenged the

correctness of the impugned judgment and advanced the following

submissions:

a) No evidence was presented to substantiate the alleged conspiracy on

the part of Kallu to commit any crime as alleged by the complainant. In

other words, the necessary elements of the offence under Section 120-

A, IPC, punishable under Section 120-B, IPC were not established.

b) The Trial Court convicted the other accused persons primarily relying

on the statements and information provided by the complainant.

However, the complainant did not make any statement or allegation

against Kallu. His conviction was based solely on two factual aspects:

first, that Rs.3,000.00 was recovered from him during the investigation

based on information provided by the accused Jaihind and, secondly,

that Kallu used to be the complainant's driver one year ago. Apart from

these circumstances, the prosecution failed to present any additional

evidence to substantiate the charge under Section 120-B, IPC; the

9
 conviction and sentence, therefore, cannot sustain merely on these

grounds.

c) Suresh Chandra Bahri vs. State of Bihar1 was placed to support the

contention that the essential elements of an agreement between Kallu

and the other co-accused persons to commit the offence are lacking,

which is a necessary component to bring home the charge of criminal

conspiracy. Additionally, Ram Sharan Chaturvedi vs. State of

Madhya Pradesh2 was relied upon to emphasize the requirement for

some kind of physical manifestation of agreement in order to establish

the offence of criminal conspiracy. Topandas vs. State of Bombay3

was placed for supporting the contention that one person alone can

never be held guilty of criminal conspiracy for the simple reason that

one cannot conspire with oneself. It was pointed out that in the present

case, Kallu is the only person convicted under Section 120-B, IPC, while

no other accused has been convicted under the same provision, inviting

thereby serious doubts about the validity of Kallu's conviction.

d) The courts below have overlooked significant material contradictions,

improvements, and omissions in the statements of prosecution

witnesses.

1
(1995) Supp (1) SCC 80
2
(2022) SCC OnLine SC 1080
3
(1955) 2 SCR 881

10
 16. It was, accordingly, prayed by the learned counsel that the appeal

be allowed, and the conviction recorded and sentence imposed on Kallu be

set aside.

17. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent/State

supported the impugned judgment and order of the High Court. It was

submitted by him that the Trial Court has carefully considered all the

materials placed on record and arrived at a just conclusion. No case for

interference having been set up by appellant Kallu, learned counsel prayed

for dismissal of the appeal.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

18. We have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel

for the parties and have also perused the materials on record.

19. There can be no two opinions that the quality of evidence led by the

prosecution in the present case to nail Manoj and Kallu was wholly

untrustworthy for convicting them and the Trial Court as well as the High

Court erred in not acquitting them.

Disclosure Statements

20. The facts of the case reveal that all the accused persons made

disclosure statements to the I.O. whereupon recovery of money, jewellery,

etc. was effected. Although it is quite unusual that all five accused, after

being arrested, would lead the I.O. to the places for effecting recovery of

11
 the stolen articles, we do not propose to disbelieve the prosecution plea

only on this score. Manoj’s involvement was primarily based on the

disclosure statements made by co-accused Suleman and Jaihind where they

admitted to selling the stolen articles to him and a similar statement made

by Manoj himself which led to recovery under Section 27, Evidence Act.

Similarly, both the courts below, in convicting Kallu, largely relied upon the

disclosure statement made by Kallu himself as well as co-accused Jaihind,

who confessed to giving Rs.3,000.00 to Kallu from the stolen money and

storing a country-made pistol along with three cartridges at his

house/tapra.

21. A doubt looms: can disclosure statements per se, unaccompanied by

any supporting evidence, be deemed adequate to secure a conviction? We

find it implausible. Although disclosure statements hold significance as a

contributing factor in unriddling a case, in our opinion, they are not so

strong a piece of evidence sufficient on its own and without anything more

to bring home the charges beyond reasonable doubt.

22. The law on the evidentiary value of disclosure statements under

Section 27, Evidence Act made by the accused himself seems to be well-

established. The decision of the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya and

others vs. King-Emperor4 holds the field even today wherein it was held

that the provided information must be directly relevant to the discovered

4
1946 SCC OnLine PC 47; AIR 1947 PC 67

12
 fact, including details about the physical object, its place of origin, and the

accused person's awareness of these aspects. The Privy Council observed:

The difficulty, however great, of proving that a fact discovered on

information supplied by the accused is a relevant fact can afford no
justification for reading into s. 27 something which is not there, and
admitting in evidence a confession barred by s. 26. Except in cases
in which the possession, or concealment, of an object constitutes the
gist of the offence charged, it can seldom happen that information
relating to the discovery of a fact forms the foundation of the
prosecution case. It is only one link in the chain of proof, and the
other links must be forged in manner allowed by law.

23. The law on the evidentiary value of disclosure statements of co-

accused too is settled; the courts have hesitated to place reliance solely on

disclosure statements of co-accused and used them merely to support the

conviction or, as Sir Lawrence Jenkins observed in Emperor vs. Lalit

Mohan Chuckerburty5, to “lend assurance to other evidence against a co-

accused”. In Haricharan Kurmi vs. State of Bihar6, this Court, speaking

through the Constitution Bench, elaborated upon the approach to be

adopted by courts when dealing with disclosure statements:

13. …In dealing with a criminal case where the prosecution relies
upon the confession of one accused person against another accused
person, the proper approach to adopt is to consider the other
evidence against such an accused person, and if the said evidence
appears to be satisfactory and the court is inclined to hold that the
said evidence may sustain the charge framed against the said
accused person, the court turns to the confession with a view to
assure itself that the conclusion which it is inclined to draw from the
other evidence is right.

5
(1911) ILR 38 Cal 559, page 588
6
AIR 1964 SC 1184

13
 24. In yet another case of discrediting a flawed conviction under Section

411, IPC, this Court, in Shiv Kumar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh7

overturned the conviction under Section 411, declined to place undue

reliance solely on the disclosure statements of the co-accused, and held:

24. …, the disclosure statement of one accused cannot be accepted

as a proof of the appellant having knowledge of utensils being stolen
goods. The prosecution has also failed to establish any basis for the
appellant to believe that the utensils seized from him were stolen
articles. The factum of selling utensils at a lower price cannot, by
itself, lead to the conclusion that the appellant was aware of the theft
of those articles. The essential ingredient of mens rea is clearly not
established for the charge under Section 411 IPC. The prosecution's
evidence on this aspect, as they would speak of the character
Gratiano in Merchant of Venice, can be appropriately described as,
“you speak an infinite deal of nothing.” [William Shakespeare,
Merchant of Venice, Act 1 Scene 1.]

25. Coming to the case at hand, there is not a single iota of evidence

except the disclosure statements of Manoj and the co-accused, which

supposedly led the I.O. to the recovery of the stolen articles from Manoj

and Rs.3,000.00 from Kallu. At this stage, we must hold that admissibility

and credibility are two distinct aspects and the latter is really a matter of

evaluation of other available evidence. The statements of police witnesses

would have been acceptable, had they supported the prosecution case, and

if any other credible evidence were brought on record. While the recoveries

made by the I.O. under Section 27, Evidence Act upon the disclosure

statements by Manoj, Kallu and the other co-accused could be held to have

led to discovery of facts and may be admissible, the same cannot be held

to be credible in view of the other evidence available on record.

7
(2022) 9 SCC 676

14
 26. While property seizure memos could have been a reliable piece of

evidence in support of Manoj’s conviction, what has transpired is that the

seizure witnesses turned hostile right from the word ‘go’. The common

version of all the seizure witnesses, i.e., PWs 5, 6, 11 and 16, was that they

were made to sign the seizure memos on the insistence of the ‘daroga’ and

that too, two of them had signed at the police station. There is, thus, no

scope to rely on a part of the depositions of the said PWs 5, 6, 11 and 16.

Viewed thus, the seizure loses credibility.

27. This Court in Sanjeet Kumar Singh vs. State of Chhattisgarh8

held:

18. But if the Court has — (i) to completely disregard the lack of
corroboration of the testimony of police witnesses by independent
witnesses; and (ii) to turn a Nelson's eye to the independent
witnesses turning hostile, then the story of the prosecution should
be very convincing and the testimony of the official witnesses
notably trustworthy. If independent witnesses come up with a story
which creates a gaping hole in the prosecution theory, about the very
search and seizure, then the case of the prosecution should collapse
like a pack of cards. It is no doubt true that corroboration by
independent witnesses is not always necessary. But once the
prosecution comes up with a story that the search and seizure was
conducted in the presence of independent witnesses and they also
choose to examine them before Court, then the Court has to see
whether the version of the independent witnesses who turned hostile
is unbelievable and whether there is a possibility that they have
become turncoats.

28. The testimony of the seizure witnesses, we are inclined to the view,

is the only thread in the present case that could tie together the loose

garland, and without it, the very seizure of stolen property stands falsified.

We cannot overlook the significance of the circumstance that all four

8
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1117

15
independent seizure witnesses (PWs 5, 6, 11, and 16), who were allegedly

present during the seizure/recovery of the stolen articles from Manoj’s

house, having turned hostile and not support the prosecution case, the

standalone evidence of the I.O. on seizure cannot be deemed either

conclusive or convincing; the recoveries made by him under Section 27,

Evidence Act must, therefore, be rejected.

29. The material inconsistency in Kallu's case is the contradiction in the

depositions of the I.O. and the complainant. The I.O. deposed that he, upon

the disclosure by co-accused Jaihind, successfully recovered a sum of Rs.

3,000.00 (comprised of three one-thousand-rupee notes), seized the same

in the presence of witnesses, and prepared a seizure panchnama; however,

when one looks at the complainant’s version, it is wholly inconsistent. She

stated in her deposition that the accused persons did not take away any

one-thousand-rupee note from her house. It does not escape our attention

that the conviction of Kallu entirely hinges on the alleged recovery of Rs.

3,000.00 and both the courts below heavily relied on this aspect to convict

him of criminal conspiracy. However, it does not appear from a perusal of

the Trial Court’s judgment as to who exactly the seizure witnesses were in

whose presence Rs. 3,000.00 was recovered although it does seem that

none of the several prosecution witnesses, who were witnesses of arrest

and seizure, had supported the prosecution case. Although there could be

evidence aliunde to establish the guilt of the co-accused Jaihind, Arif and

Suleman, there was absolutely no evidence worthy of consideration which

could have been relied on to convict Manoj and Kallu.

16
 30. It is clear as crystal that the sole connecting evidence against Manoj

and Kallu was the recovery based on their disclosure statements, along with

those of the other co-accused but this evidence, in our opinion, is not

sufficient to qualify as "fact … discovered" within the meaning of Section 27.

Having regard to such nature of evidence, we view the same as wholly

untrustworthy.

Statements under Section 313, Cr.PC

31. Another glaring flaw in Manoj’s case revolves around his examination

under Section 313, Cr.PC. The manner in which the Trial Court framed

questions for answer by Manoj left a lot to be desired. We need not reiterate

the exposition of law by this Court in multiple decisions on Section 313,

Cr.PC, wherein trial courts have been cautioned against recording

statements in a casual and cursory manner. What holds importance is not

the mere quantity of questions posed to the accused but rather the content

and manner in which they are framed.

32. Upon reading the questions put to Manoj under Section 313, Cr.PC,

it becomes evident that the Trial Court treated this process as an empty

formality. None of the material circumstances forming the basis of his

conviction were put to him. Astonishingly, not even a single question

regarding the stolen articles was posed to him. Instead, irrelevant and

abstract questions about the main incident of robbery that took place on

14th April, 2010 were asked, even though his alleged involvement occurred

much later when the robbed items were allegedly sold to him by the co-

17
 accused. The prosecution's entire case is premised on the disclosure

statements made by the co-accused, but Manoj was never given the

opportunity to explain the circumstances.

Conviction of Manoj under Section 411, IPC

33. Manoj has been convicted under Section 411, IPC which is

reproduced below:

Dishonestly receiving stolen property. —Whoever dishonestly

receives or retains any stolen property, knowing or having reason to
believe the same to be stolen property, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
three years, or with fine, or with both.

34. The Trial Court convicted Manoj based on a presumption under

Section 114(a), Evidence Act, asserting that his possession of stolen articles

shortly after the theft, with knowledge of its stolen nature, was adequate

enough to hold him guilty under Section 411, IPC. As a result, he was held

liable for the offence under the said provision. Illustration (a) of Section

114, Evidence Act has been noted above but the entire provision reads as

follows:

“114. Court may presume existence of certain facts. —The Court

may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have
happened, regard being had to the common course of natural
events, human conduct and public and private business, in their
relation to the facts of the particular case. The Court may presume—
(a) That a man who is in possession of stolen goods soon after the
theft is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to
be stolen, unless he can account for his possession.

***”

18
 35. The Trial Court erred in drawing such a presumption of fact without

considering other factors. What could be those factors has been explained

by this Court in A Devendran vs. State of Tamil Nadu9 in the following

words:

20. … Whether a presumption under Section 114, Illustration (a) of

the Evidence Act should be drawn in a given situation is a matter
which depends on the evidence and the circumstances of the cases.
The nature of the stolen articles, the nature of its identification by
the owner, the place and the circumstances of its recovery, the
intervening period between the date of occurrence and the date of
recovery, the explanation of the persons concerned from whom the
recovery is made are all factors which are to be taken into
consideration in arriving at a decision.

36. A presumption of fact under Section 114(a), Evidence Act must be

drawn considering other evidence on record and without corroboration from

other cogent evidence, it must not be drawn in isolation. The present case

serves as a perfect example of why such a presumption should have been

avoided by the Trial Court. Manoj's conviction, solely relying on the

disclosure statements made by himself and the other co-accused, does not

suffice to warrant a presumption under Section 411, IPC. It would not be

unreasonable to presume that a goldsmith, who has to deal in ornaments

and jewelleries on a day-to-day basis, would obviously be in possession of

a significant quantity of ornaments at his shop. Given the circumstances,

such a presumption drawn under Section 114(a) stands vitiated.

37. At this juncture, even if we assume the veracity of the claim that the

items sold to Manoj were indeed stolen articles, it would not be sufficient to

9
(1997) 11 SCC 720

19
 attract Section 411, IPC; what was further necessary to be proved is

continued retention of such articles with a dishonest intent and knowledge

or belief that the items were stolen. No evidence worthy of consideration

was adduced by the prosecution to prove that Manoj had retained the

articles either with dishonest intent and with knowledge or belief of the

same being stolen property.

Conviction of Kallu under Section 120-B, IPC

38. It is intriguing that among all five accused persons, only Kallu has

been convicted for criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B, IPC. At this

stage, we cannot help but wonder: can a single individual conspire with

oneself? We cannot but disagree. It logically follows that one person alone

can never be held guilty of criminal conspiracy because one cannot

conspire with oneself. As per Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Edn), ‘conspiracy’

is an “agreement by two or more persons to commit an unlawful act,

coupled with an intent to achieve the agreement's objective, and action or

conduct that furthers the agreement”. The wordings of Section 120-A, IPC

make it abundantly clear—the offence of criminal conspiracy is committed

only when two or more persons agree to do or cause to be done an illegal

act or legal act by illegal means. The position in English law too is well-

settled. In The King vs. Plummer10, the King’s Bench, speaking through

Lord Justice Bruce, held:

It logically follows from the nature of the offence of conspiracy that,

where two or more persons are charged in the same indictment with

10
(1902) 2 KB 339

20
 conspiracy with one another, and the indictment contains no charge
of their conspiring with other persons not named in the indictment,
then, if all but one of the persons named in the indictment are
acquitted, no valid judgment can be passed upon the one remaining
person. (page 343)

39. In I.G. Singleton v. King-Emperor11, the Calcutta High Court

further clarified the law related to criminal conspiracy:

The rule of English law that is now well settled is that where two
persons are indicted for conspiring together and they are tried
together, both must be acquitted, or both convicted. (page 265)

40. The decision of this Court in Topandas (supra) affirmed the

aforesaid position and held:

14. … on the charge as it was framed against the Accused 1, 2, 3

and 4 in this case, the Accused 1 could not be convicted of the
offence under Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code when his
alleged co-conspirators Accused 2, 3 and 4 were acquitted of that
offence.

41. Having regard to the position of law as aforesaid, the conviction of

Kallu under Section 120-B, IPC stands completely vitiated because of the

simple reason that one cannot alone conspire. There is no evidence to even

remotely suggest that there existed any agreement between Kallu and the

co-accused while none of the others, except Kallu, has been convicted for

criminal conspiracy.

CONCLUSION

42. What could have more aptly summarise the entire prosecution case,

especially the flawed investigation in the matter at hand, than the words

11
(1924-25) 29 CWN 260: AIR 1925 Cal 501

21
 of Daniel J. Boorstin, the American historian: “The greatest obstacle to

true discovery is not ignorance, but rather the illusion of knowledge”.

43. Against this background, to say that the convictions of Manoj and

Kallu can still sustain, appears far-fetched; their convictions cannot be

justified solely on the basis of illusory knowledge regarding their

involvement in the crime.

44. For all the foregoing reasons, Manoj and Kallu are acquitted and set

free. Consequently, conviction of Manoj and Kallu as recorded by the Trial

Court and the sentence imposed upon them, since affirmed by the High

Court, stand set aside. Manoj and Kallu are still behind bars. They shall be

immediately released from custody, if not wanted in any other case.

45. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed. No costs.

……………………………………J
(S. RAVINDRA BHAT)

……………………………………J
(DIPANKAR DATTA)

New Delhi;
11th August, 2023.

22
 Revised

ITEM NO.1502 COURT NO.5 SECTION II-A

(For Judgment)

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Criminal Appeal No(s).1030/2023

MANOJ KUMAR SONI Appellant(s)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF M.P. Respondent(s)

([HEARD BY: HON. S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND HON. DIPANKAR DATTA, JJ.]
IA No.2525/2023 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.)
WITH
Crl.A. No. 1458/2023 (II-A)
IA No. 199955/2022 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.)

Date : 11-08-2023 These matters were called on for judgment today.

For Appellant(s) Mr. Harmeet Singh Ruprah, AOR

Mr. Nikhil Tyagi, Adv.

Ms. Ritika Sethi, AOR
Mr. Vishal Prasad, Adv.

For Respondent(s) Mr. Sunny Choudhary, AOR

Mr. Manoj Kumar, Adv.
Mr. Karan Bishnoi, Adv.

Hon’ble Mr.Justice Dipankar Datta pronounced the

judgment of the Bench comprising Hon’ble Mr. Justice S. Ravindra
Bhat and His Lordship.
For the reasons stated in the signed reportable
judgment, which is placed on the file, the appeals are allowed and
the appellants shall be immediately released from custody, if not
wanted in any other case.

(SATISH KUMAR YADAV) (PREETHI T.C.)

DEPUTY REGISTRAR COURT MASTER (NSH)
ITEM NO.1502 COURT NO.5 SECTION II-A
(For Judgment)

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Criminal Appeal No(s).1030/2023

MANOJ KUMAR SONI Appellant(s)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF M.P. Respondent(s)

([HEARD BY: HON. S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND HON. DIPANKAR DATTA, JJ.]
IA No.2525/2023 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.)
WITH
Crl.A. No. 1458/2023 (II-A)
IA No. 199955/2022 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.)

Date : 11-08-2023 These matters were called on for judgment today.

For Appellant(s) Mr. Harmeet Singh Ruprah, AOR

Mr. Nikhil Tyagi, Adv.

Ms. Ritika Sethi, AOR
Mr. Vishal Prasad, Adv.

For Respondent(s) Mr. Sunny Choudhary, AOR

Mr. Manoj Kumar, Adv.
Mr. Karan Bishnoi, Adv.

Hon’ble Mr.Justice Dipankar Datta pronounced the

judgment of the Bench comprising Hon’ble Mr.Justice S.Ravindra Bhat
and His Lordship.
For the reasons stated in the signed reportable
judgment, which is placed on the file, the appeals are allowed. No
costs.

(SATISH KUMAR YADAV) (PREETHI T.C.)

DEPUTY REGISTRAR COURT MASTER (NSH)