Vladan Perišić

Theoretical Presupposition of Christian Fundamentalism

Regardless of the original definition of the term fundamentalism as something that holds to “a
foundation or basis”1, the meaning that is in use today is more precisely defined e.g. by a definition
such as: “Fundamentalism connotes fanaticism, anti-democratic and anti-pluralistic goals, rejecting
the world ‘as it is’ and readiness to act recklessly.”2 These are, more or less, characteristics of every
fundamentalism, including, accordingly, the Christian one. Furthermore, every religious
fundamentalism rarely corroborates its militant piety with “Socratic dialogues”, given that
“Fundamentalists have no time for democracy, pluralism, religious toleration, peacekeeping, free
speech, or the separation of church and state. Christian fundamentalists reject the discoveries of
biology and physics about the origins of life and insist that the Book of Genesis is scientifically
sound in every detail.”3 All this is among religious fundamentalists accompanied by exclusivism,
since another of their characteristics is the drawing of a strict boundary between believers and non-
believers, insiders and outsiders.4

Certainly, there are many other definitions of (religious) fundamentalism, the comparison and
analysis of which should be the goal of a separate paper.

I do not intend to deal with this here. For the purpose of this paper, it is enough to say that every
fundamentalism, in addition to these common characteristics, also has its own specifics. For
Christian fundamentalists this differentia specifica seems to be primarily a firm conviction in the
“infallibility” of the Bible, cemented by its literal understanding5, which can be illustrated by the
following typical statement: “All the words in the Old and in the New Testaments are the words of
God. Anyone who believes that even one word of Scripture is not from God, does not believe in

1
Webster’s New World Dictionary, 4th ed., ed. Michael Agnes (New York: Simon & Schus- ter, 2003),
264.

2
Ralf Schnell (Herausgeber), Metzler Lexikon Kultur der Gegenwart: Themen und Theorien, Formen und
Institutionen seit 1945.

3
Karen Armstrong, “The Battle for God” (The Random House Publishing Group, New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 2001), 17.

4
See more about this in: Martin Marty and Scott Appleby, The Fundamental Project, chap. 15
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press: 1991–95).

5
In one dictionary, fundamentalism is defined as “religious beliefs based on a literal interpretation
of the Bible” (Webster's New World Dictionary). However, although a literal interpretation of the
Bible is very important for fundamentalism, it is only one (perhaps the most common) of its
characteristics, since fundamentalism is not satisfied with the interpretation of the Scriptures alone.
On the other hand, as we shall see, although this literal interpretation is most often present, it is
not impossible that it is sometimes omitted.
God. Anyone who disobeyes any word from Scripture has disobeyed God.”6 It is, of course,
immediately clear that this understanding does not stem from the perspective of the modern
historical-critical biblical science, which, truth be said, is sometimes used even by fundamentalists
themselves, but only when it does not collide with their theology (more precisely – with their
ideology). In biblical studies it has been convincingly shown that, with such an understanding of
the Scripture, they represent an example of the persistence of an unsustainable conviction. The
obviousness of this unsustainability of biblical fundamentalism stems both from the depths of
Christion tradition (in the form of the over many generations acquired knowledge that a literal
interpretation of the Scripture does not always lead to its real meaning), and from the modern
times (in the form of the modern biblical science, cultural pluralism and even the implications that
the concept of evolution has on the fundamentalists’ theological and religious-anthropological
world views).

However, what I would like to speak about here is neither Christian (especially not only Orthodox)
fundamentalism as such, nor its (no matter how amusing, although sometimes sad) manifestations
in the thought and behaviour of unenlightened masses or unenlightened bishops. For, both the
laity and the clergy, if they are spiritually unenlightened, can easily slip into fundamentalism, into a
kind of rigidity, as much in thinking as in behavior. Because, for the fundamentalist mentality,
uniqueness, rigidity and exclusivity are inevitable.

As interesting and extremely important as these topics in themselves might be, in this paper I will
try to skip them and make a step further by answering a completely different (but not unrelated)
question – Which are the theoretical presuppositions that make such a fundamentalistic attitude and
the similar ones possible in the first place?7 I am convinced that there are more of these
presuppositions, but there is one that I find particularly important, at least when we talk about the
Church: giving absolute priority to rhetorics over philosophy. I hope that it will become clear by the end of
this paper that fundamentalism need not rest only on the literal understanding of the Scripture8
(this type of fundamentalism gets easily disclosed) but it can rest on something much more hidden
– namely on the non-literal interpretation. In this case, however, it does not rely on philosophical
truthfulness, but on rhetorical eficcacy in achieving usefulness (whether for the addressee or the
addresser). So, one of the deepest roots from which fundamentalism can grow (although it is
important to emphasize that this does not have to happen always) is the use of rhetoric as an
effective method to achieve goals that we are convinced are useful for those people we are
convincing of something (accompanied by the complete absence of philosophical eros). As
unusual as it might appear at the first glance, this is not a characteristic (merely) of modern times.
On the contrary, it infiltrated into the Church from her very beginning and, accordingly, left its
trails even in the scriptures.

For a proper understanding of the intention of this paper it is necessary to always keep in mind
that in sacral texts there is distinction between divine inspiration and its human (sometimes all too

6
Grudem A. Waine, Bible Doctrine: The Essential Teachings of the Christian Faith (Grand Rapids, MI:
Zondervan Publishing, 1999) 33.
7
Whereby “making something possible” does not mean “necessarily leading to it”.

8
Fundamentalism based on a literal understanding of the Holy Scriptures is much more
widespread, much more researched and much easier to discover, so I will not deal with it.
human) explication. All sort of things can infiltrate the latter (given that it is imperfect by nature),
including the sophistic-rhetorical style of exposure. This is precisely what interests us here.
Certainly, the divine revelation cannot be separated from its human communication, but it can still
be distinguished from it. Leaving aside the revelation, in this paper I am dealing only with one (by no
means the only possible) type of its communication – the rhetorical one. At the same time, it is
important to emphasize that I am not claiming that the one who spreads his beliefs by using
rhetorical tools is thus deprived of revelation. It just seems to me that the message of revelation
would in many cases be more acceptable without rhetorical dualistic rigidity and exclusivity (which
often turns into demagoguery). It would especially be more acceptable if it were accompanied by
philosophical restraint regarding the frequent self-praise and self-promotion of the zealous
“possessors of truth”.

First of all, it should be emphasised that this is not about a comparison between rhetorics as a
theoretical discipline and philosophy as a “strict science” in e.g. Husserlian sense. It is more about
the spirit and atmosphere, habits and convictions, that are, unconsciously more than consciously, being
used when one approach the text of the scripture and the real life. In both cases the
fundamentalists’ attitude, as its own deep unconscious, has giving primacy to
1) the conviction that one has definite (and exclusive) knowledge regarding what
Christianity is and what precisely Jesus’ message is, as opposed to a more philosophical conviction
that these are questions which, no matter how much we investigate them, always elude our final
judgement to some extent. It is therefore much easier, but also much more dangerous to
2) try to convince others of our own beliefs by means of trained rhetorics than to search
with others, not in quarrel and confrontation but in a calm dialogue, based on a cautious
philosophical approach, which is always grounded primarily in the (Socratic) confession of
ignorance, for the real truth about the Scripture and its message for us. Philosophical approach,
namely, as opposed to the rhetorical one, is characterised precisely by an uncompromising quest
for the truth, as opposed to the quest for the most convincible way (which is not the same as the
strongest argument) of placing convictions (about how things are going), which is an attribute of
rhetorics.9

Ad 1) Christian fundamentalism (which easily ends up in fanaticism) is characterised by a

9
The example of the philosophical approach among Christian authors could be find e.g. in Origen
(as he does not insist on his answers and solutions as final and he is even less trying to impose them
to anyone as infallible dogmas) or Basil of Caesarea (who, unlike e.g. Athanasius who understood
ὁμοούσιον as a test of orthodoxy almost till the end of his life, did not insist on terminology but on
the meaning, which – as Athanasius himself eventually also understood – can be expressed in various
linguistic ways). Certainly, we could find many other examples (but, to say the truth, by far not as
many as of the rhetorical approach).
interpretations, though an unconscious one and therefore in a much bigger danger to slip into
extremism (whose main characteristic is precisely the lack of self-criticism). A fundamentalist does
not understand that hermeneutics cannot be avoided. There is no choice between hermeneutics and non-
hermeneutics, but only between good and bad, conscious and unconscious, flexible and rigid,
subtle and rudimentary hermeneutics. Every reading is automatically interpretation, whether we are aware of
this or not. Fundamentalists are generally unaware of this, and precisely this constitutes the
condition of possibility of the existence of fundamentalist attitude. On the other hand, Christian
fundamentalism, which is not based on a literal interpretation of the Bible (we have already
mentioned that there is one), although it manages to avoid a literal reading of the Scriptures, still
fails to escape the belief that it has full control over the truth, of which it can convince everyone,
using the skills provided by rhetorics. This, of course, “for their own good”.
Ad 2) It is very well noticed that “the fundamental divide in Greek culture [is] between
philosophy and rhetorics”.10 If we illustrate this through the opposition, even the conflict, between
Plato and Isocrates, we can then conclude that, unfortunately, Isocrates has won. Standard
education in Antiquity was, little by little, formed not around Plato’s but Isocrates’ conception.
Plato (especially in Protagoras and Gorgias) called in question both the goals and methods of rhetors
and their predecessors sophists, whereas Isocrates (in Helen, Against the Sophists, Antidosis), although
he, under the influence of Socrates and Plato, distanced himself from sophists, criticised
philosophers for he believed that their research of the fundamental principles of things is nothing
but the waste of time. He denied philosophy, logic, physics and mathematics any practical value,
i.e., every usefulness (ὠφέλιμον). For him rhetorics11 was the best way for reaching the highest
purpose of human life. Certainly, Plato did appreciate rhetorics12 to some extent, just as Isocrates
appreciated philosophy, but each of them clearly gave priority to the other discipline.

One could oppose this thesis of mine by noticing that Jesus did not recommend to his disciples
and followers to study philosophy (in order to have caution against a hasty interpretation of his
words) so that they could be his faithful successors and offer his teaching to the others. This is, of
course, true, but he also did not recommend them to improve in rhetorics (so that they could, as
skilfully as possible, convince of their (possibly not always successful) understanding of Christ’s
messages everyone who might have a different interpretation of these messages or even has not yet
heard them at all). However, many of the disciples were passionately doing precisely this (through
their education process, but later as well). Why did they opt for rhetorics and not philosophy? One
of the reasons was definitely the fact that the educational system was at that time mostly

10
John Lamont, “A Conception of Faith in the Greek Fathers” in Analytic Theology: New essays in the
Philosophy and Theology, ed. by Oliver D. Crisp and Michael C. Rea (Oxford University Press, 2009)
92.

11
Which, in his opinion, rests on an innate ability that only man has: “there has been implanted in
us the power to persuade each other”, Nicocles or the Cuprians 7, in Loeb Classical Library, Isocrates I,
tr. George Norlin (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966) 79–91.

12
“Plato’s aim was to get it [i.e. rhetorics] out of the hands of superficial persuaders and special
pleaders, and show that, [only] properly applied and based on knowledge of the truth, it was
coextensive with philosophy.” W. K. C. Guthrie, The Sophists (Cambridge University Press, 1971)
177.
concentrated around rhetorics. But, no less important was the fact that the fruits of the rhetorical
persuasion were immediately at hand, much closer and much easier than the fruits of the much
more demanding (and much more uncertain) philosophical efforts. Having acquired rhetorical
skills through their education and successfully using them in the defence of faith, Christian
intellectuals, carried away with this success, often forgot that rhetorics brings a very dangerous
possibility of advocating any thesis, if only it is well exposed, i.e., skillfully “wrapped”. Thereafter
(when social circumstances became favourable for them – from Constantine onwards) also came
the possibility of forceful (and not only rhetorical) imposition of these theses on other people.

Certainly, it is not impossible to view rhetorics completely neutrally (by analogy to e.g. grammar or
logic). In that case, its convincing skills could be used even for the purpose of convincing and
reassurance of the fundamentalists themselves. But here I do not refer to this (in itself quite
possible and legitimate) usage. What I have in mind, I repeat, are habits, mentality and inclination that
produce the feeling that, by means of these skills, you can convince anyone of anything. I aim at
the unbreakable marriage between rhetorics and sophistics, which led Plato to reject both of them in the
name of dialectics (which for him means: philosophy). He did this precisely because rhetors and
sophists did not care about the truth, but exclusively about winning the argument with the
opposer. This passion for victory, together with the easygoing belief that the truth is simply given
to us (so there is nothing more we need to diligently search for), entered as poison by the back
door the mentality of many Christians from the earliest times. Precisely here do I recognise
theoretical presuppositions of Christian fundamentalism.

The fact that the early Christian authors were, so to speak, forced to use all their rhetorical skills in
order to give their faith legitimacy in an unchristian environment can definitely be used as an
explanation why they embraced rhetorics as the most powerful means of their defence, even
counter-attack. However, explanation is not the same thing as justification. Moreover, they did not use
rhetorics only to oppose those ἔξω, but also those within the community, whenever it seemed that
they do not understand things in the right way (i.e., in the way in which things are understood by
those who are applying their rhetorical skills). The problem arises precisely here. As an illustration
of this I will mention maybe the earliest example of such procedure – Apostle Paul’s address to
Corinthians in his second epistle to their ecclesial community. A brief analysis of this event will
perhaps best illustrate what this paper is about.

In his Second epistle to Corinthians Paul first of all insists that interpretation needs to serve the
“benefit” (πρὸς τὸ ὠφέλιμον). In order to achieve this, as a hellenistic Jew whose mother tongue
was Greek, he used in his explanations the well-known Greek-Roman rhetoric techniques. By
using them skillfully he seems to manage to, for example, convince (at least some) Corinthians that
they did not properly understand his first address to them (in which he, contrary to all rules, names
himself as a witness of his own words), so he now gives explanation in his second address (where,
allegedly, the witness of his words is not him, but God himself).13 He thereby uses both “literal”

13
The Old Testamental legal provision (Deut. 19, 15) that “only on the evidence of two or three
witnesses shall a charge be sustained”, i.e, that no one can be convicted on the grounds of a single
testimony, that is, no one can testify for himself, seemed clear to all who knew the Scripture. However,
Apostle Paul, forced by the fact that, to the Corinthian Church, he actually has to testify for himself
and “allegorical” interpretation as it suits him, in order to “in a prudently adaptable [interpretative]
alchemy”14 achieve what he intended. For, he is convinced that only this is to the benefit of
Corinthian Christians (and by no means their insistence that he should somehow prove to them
that he is a real apostle).

This ability to interpret the same text in different ways was practiced already at the earliest stages of
the education in rhetoric, offered in Antiquity by grammars and rhetors,15 but not philosophers
(who were, of course, aware of this method, but did not understand it as a right way of achieving
the truth). Furthermore, the training was directed neither in the direction of the literal
interpretation, nor of the allegorical one, but it aimed at mastering both of them in order to be able
to adapt the arguments to the current case.16 Accordingly, referring to the texts and their different
interpretations depended on the current situation, i.e., on whether or not a particular interpretation
can serve the current thesis or puropose. The same text, differently interpreted, can very soon
serve a completely different thesis or purpose regarding current burning question, all this in order
to make the interpretation πρὸς ὠφέλιμον (or under this pretext). Thus, the early Christian exegesis
was rooted in the rhetorical exercises of the antique schools, which, unfortunately, educated its
students in an atmosphere which demanded little (or non at all) of that unbiased search for the

(as he had no ἐπιστολή συστατική, i.e., he cannot name any witness that he really is διάκονος Χριστοῦ,
but has to recommend himself) interprets this provision very inventively (in order to avoid the
disgrace of self-witnessing). Thus, for him a biblical text no longer means what it always meant, as
Paul now reinterpreted its meaning (naming in 2Cor 11, 1–12, 13, in the absence of the real witnesses,
a fool and the one about whom a fool boasts as the “witnesses” of his apostleship). This was an
extremely skilful rhetorical maneuver. Many early Christian writers took over from him the same
way of using this Old Testament provision. An example could be found in Origen who transforms
this legal provision into an “interpretative axiom”, claiming, even more inventively, that the
“witnesses” mentioned in Deuteronomy are not persons but textual excerpts (διηγῆσεις) from the
Scripture. [Hendrik van Vilet, No Single Testimony: A Study on the Adoption of the Law of Deut. 19, 15 Par.
into the New Testament, Studia Theologica Rheno-Traiectina 4, Utrecht, Kemink and Zoon, 1958, 5].
Similar examples can also be found in John Chrysostom (Vita Antonii 39, 1; 23, 3) and many others.

14
Margaret M. Mitchel, Paul, the Corinthians and the Birth of Christian Hermeneutics (Cambridge University
Press, New York, 2010) 13.

15
“…at one time they [rhetoricans] advice one to attend to the text (ρητόν) and the statements
(φωναί) of the lawgiver – as clear (σαφῆς) and in need of no interpretation (μηδεμία ἐξήγησις) – and
at another time they turn around (ἀναστρέψαντες) and advice one not to follow either the text or the
statements, but the intention (διάνοια) of the lawgiver…” Rhetors do all this only to “...confirm the
meaning (τὸ σημαινόμενον) that is useful for themselves” (emphasis VP). Sextus Empiricus, Adversus
mathematicos 2, 36–38, in Sexti Empirici opera ed. J. Mau and H. Mutschmann, 2nd edn. (4 vols.; Leipzig:
Teubner, 1958–62), III, p. 91.

16
This was the case everywhere, i.e., in Alexandria, Antioch, Carthage, Cappadocia, Rome etc. See:
Margaret M. Mitchel, Paul, the Corinthians and the Birth of Christian Hermeneutics (Cambridge University
Press, New York, 2010) 107.
truth, cultivated by the philosophical schools (whether the truth turns out to be ὠφέλιμον or not17).
Typical rhetorical education (that Paul and other Church fathers also most probably went through)
put special emphasis on training future leaders in using textual proofs on the court proceedings
(whether that text was a state law or a written testimony) – so called interpretatio scripti. It is clear
that the purpose of engaging in the court proceedings is not the quest for the truth, but a quest for
victory at any price. As is well known, not many fathers of the Church studied philosophy18
seriously and thoroughly, but almost all of the educated ones studied rhetorics. Thus, little by little,
interpretatio scripturae was formed on the grounds of interpretatio scripti.19

In other words, Christian exegesis was formed on what Mitchell calls “agonistic paradigm of
interpretation”, which implies that all texts are potentially ambiguous, but, by means of verified
and skilfully used rhetorical means, one can convince the interlocutor (who is usually perceived as
an opponent) that the text has precisely the meaning that a well trained rhetor ascribes to it. In the
“agonistic paradigm” texts are used either to support what the one who polemicize argues, or to
deny that. Tertium non datur. This is because this paradigm is an agonistic one. It includes in itself, as
a part of strategy, even the humiliation of the opponent, as he, allegedly, interprets the text in
direct opposition to what it actually says. A further problem is that this duality of the text (this
exclusive either-or) is being shown as an a priori rhetorical construction, not as a result of an
impartial exegesis. Precisely this a priori agonistics, this artificial tension between the positions that
cannot be reconciled because all the transitional moments between them are in advance disabled
through this rhetoric-sophistic mentality, is something completely foreign to the philosophical
approach. It would not be entirely wrong to say that this sharpened dualism has something gnostic
in it.20

17
The impossibility of the practical use of true knowledge did not discourage philosophers (as was
the case with sophists and rhetoricians) from diligently searching for it: “All other sciences are
more useful than philosophy, but none is better [= closer to the truth] than it.” Aristotle,
Metaphysics A 2, 982b-983a.

18
It seems that an integral part of schooling at that time was getting acquainted with the main ideas
of the most famous philosophers, collected in a kind of textbooks. To that extent the educated
fathers of the Church had a certain knowledge of philosophical thought. But rarely have any of
them thoroughly studied the original writings (and not just certain selected passages) of great
philosophers.

19
See: Kathy Eden, Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition: Chapters in the Ancient Legacy and its Humanist
Reception (Yale Studies in Hermeneutics, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997) ch 3.

20
“Gnosticism came in many forms. … In Gnosticism of whatever variety, however, one thing
seems to be constant and that is its dualism, its sharp contrasts between good and evil, light and
darkness, the spirit and the material world, the enlightened and the ignorant, the saved and the
unsaved. This dualism is written into the nature of reality, because the creator of the world is not
God but a demiurge, a half god or fallen angel responsible for evil and the ambiguity of the
human situation. … While Fundamentalism does not posit a duality in God or in the created
world, it is dualistic in most other respects, beginning with a clear line between the saved and the
unsaved. … The unsaved are those who refuse to believe that a rigid dualism is the answer to the
Thus, at least through Apostle Paul “The agonistics of interpretation ... was built into scripture in its
legal passages ... and its interpreters...”21 primarily by the possibility of applying the unexpected
compound of the literal and metaphorical hermeneutics (e.g. in 1 Cor 4, 6) even “within the same
text segment” if only it served the interpreter’s goals.22 In such cases, the goal (which is ὠφέλιμον
or utilitas) really justified the means.23 The agonistic paradigm, being essentially antithetic, for it
tolerates only two opposed sides in the form of two different interpretations or approaches, does
not allow for any nuances or subtleties. Wherever these appear (e.g. in the same Paul: spirit, soul
and body, which will later on be repeated by Origen and others), one of the elements must drop
off soon as excessive (in their case – soul), so that the other two might be viewed in the sharpest
possible opposition, which does not allow any reconciliation. This shows that rhetorics
phenomenologically might seem as if it respects many different possibilities, but it is always only in
order to reject them one after another, as it is always essentially antithetic, which in the one who
practices it slowly but surely develops a mentality formed in the unreconcilable oppositions like we–
you, ours–yours, etc, etc. This unreserved “rhetorical adaptability”24 to the reaching of the goal
disabled the necessary caution of the self-critical approach to what is being advocated (an approach
which, however, does not by itself imply the uncertainty of the position reached through an
impartial research).

If dispite everything we assume (for good reason – see fn 22) that Apostle Paul is nevertheless
worthy of our trust and if we believe that he really had a direct encounter with the risen Lord, who
entrusted him with a certain mission even if he had no συστατική ἐπιστολή (letter of
recomendation), we still have no reason to assume something like that every time when a Christian
(regardless of his level in hierarchy) proclaims his own vision of God, Church, or the way of
Christian life. Even if Paul’s πρὸς τὸ ὠφέλιμον really was for the benefit of those addressed by Paul
(although his method in that particular case was not ireproachable), we have no a priori reason to

world’s problems, that all truth lies on one side, and that the other side is bereft of any legitimacy.
(Joe E. Morris, Revival of the Gnostic Heresy: Fundamentalism, Palgrave, Macmillan, 2008, IX–
X)

21
Margaret M. Mitchel, Paul, the Corinthians and the Birth of Christian Hermeneutics (Cambridge University
Press, New York, 2010) 28 (Emphasis: VP).

22
By this I do not claim that Paul, because he acts in this way, is not a real apostle. Nor do I claim
that I do not believe that he is a real apostle either. What I claim is that the fact that I believe that he
is a real apostle is not based on what he has to say about himself (by his rhetorical, highly sophisticated
argument in 2 Cor) but on what he has to say about Christ.

23
The same thing might be expressed nicer, as follows: “Paul continually and strategically adjusted the focus
between clarity and obscurity (σαφῆνεια, ἀσάφια) depending upon the hermeneutical, rhetorical and
theological needs of the case at hand.“ Margaret M. Mitchel, Paul, the Corinthians and the Birth of
Christian Hermeneutics (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2010) 77.

24
Margaret M. Mitchel, Paul, the Corinthians and the Birth of Christian Hermeneutics (Cambridge University
Press, New York, 2010) 65.
 believe that such is the case every time when those “outside”, and especially those “within” are
addressed by the one whose convincing power is hard to resist. In such cases it is impossible to
exclude the possibility that the necessary πρὸς τὸ ὠφέλιμον might be for the rhetor’s own benefit
(although, of course, the whole rhetorical persuasive power was used to show that everything was
actually for the benefit of the audience). Having all this in mind, I conclude that what is welcome,
even necessary, in situations like this is a healthy dose of scepticism,25 precisely big enough to
provide us with a golden middle26 between credulity and unbelief, which we call faith.

25
Of course, by skepticism here I do not mean any elaborate philosophical conception, but simply a
sober restraint from gullibility which can be as far removed from true faith as mere disbelief.
26
The “middle” here should be understood in the Aristotelian sense as the middle ground between two
extremes (courage as the middle ground between cowardice and crazy boldness; generosity as the
middle ground between stinginess and extravagance; kindness as the middle ground between
discouragement and arrogance, etc.). The middle, therefore, is not mediocrity but precisely its opposite.
It is the pinnacle of virtue as the middle ground between lack and exaggeration.