HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

POLITICAL LAW

RE: INCIDENT REPORT OF SECURITY DIVISION +

This Court has held in a number of cases that a man having an illicit relationship with a woman
not his wife is within the purview of "disgraceful and immoral conduct" under Civil Service
Laws.

RE: EXPENSES OF RETIREMENT OF COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICES.

The retirement program budgets of Justices of collegiate courts are subject to the discretion and
approval of this Court, as part of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all
courts and personnel thereof. In the exercise of such discretion, the Court takes into consideration
several factors, such as, but not limited to, the established or actual costs of the items and
activities which are part of the retirement program, the number of employees of the collegiate
court, the period of time since the last increase in the retirement program budget, and the
availability of funds.

PHILIPPINE SINTER CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL

TRANSMISSION CORPORATION AND CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER AND LIGHT
COMPANY, INC., RESPONDENTS.

Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative bodies, such as the ERC in the
instant case, if based on substantial evidence, are controlling on the reviewing authority.
Administrative decisions on matters within their jurisdiction are entitled to respect and can only
be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law, none of which obtains in
this case.

RE: INVESTIGATION REPORT ON THE ALLEGED EXTORTION ACTIVITIES OF

PRESIDING JUDGE GODOFREDO B. ABUL, JR., BRANCH 4, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BUTUAN CITY, AGUSAN DEL NORTE

It is well to point out at this juncture that in criminal cases, the rule is that the death of an
accused after conviction but during the pendency of his/her appeal shall result in the dismissal of
the criminal case. This dismissal is triggered by the presumption of innocence accorded every
accused as well as by his/her right to due process under the Constitution. As the said principles
are instrumental to criminal as well as to civil cases, these should likewise be applied to
administrative proceedings such as the one at bench. "[Since death of an accused extinguishes
personal criminal liability as well as pecuniary penalties arising from the felony when the death
occurs before final judgment in criminal cases, the standard for an administrative case should be
similar 01 less punitive.]" "If this is the standard for criminal cases wherein the quantum [of
proof] is beyond reasonable doubt, then a lower standard for administrative proceedings such as
the case at bar should be followed, even if the quantum of proof therein is substantial evidence."

Based on the foregoing, Judge Abul's heirs should be given death benefits granted under Section
2 of RA No. 9946. If Judge Abul served for at least 15 years, his heirs should receive a lump sum
equivalent to ten (10) years. Alternatively, if he served for less than 15 years, the lump sum
should be equivalent to five (5) years. Subsequently, after the gratuity period of ten (10) years
has passed, his heirs are entitled to survivorship benefits, specifically, full monthly pension (if
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
Judge Abul rendered at least 15 years of service) or pro-rated monthly pension (if he served for
less than 15 years).

To recapitulate, these are the salient points for the dismissal of the case at bench: 1) because of
Judge Abul's death, the administrative complaint against him should be dismissed in accordance
with the Constitutional principles of due process and presumption of innocence; and 2) taking
into account the instant Motion for Reconsideration, Judge Abul's heirs should be granted the
death benefits and survivorship pension benefits due to his death while in actual service. This is
considering that prior to his demise, no definite ruling was rendered and no corresponding
penalty was imposed upon him. Equally important is the Court's belief in equitable and
humanitarian considerations, especially when the case involves an inevitable occurrence like
death.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PETITIONER, VS. CENTRAL BANK OF THE

PHILIPPINES (NOW BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS) AND CITIBANK, N.A.,
RESPONDENTS.

CBP (now BSP) is a corporate body performing governmental functions. Operating a

clearing house facility for regional checks is within CBP's governmental functions and
duties as the central monetary authority.

One of the generally accepted principles of international law, which we have adopted in our
Constitution under Article XVI, Section 3 is the principle that a state may not be sued without its
consent, which principle is also embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. However, state
immunity may be waived expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a general
or special law. On the other hand, consent is implied when the state enters into a contract or it
itself commences litigation.
In the case of government agencies, the question of its suability depends on whether it is
incorporated or unincorporated. An incorporated agency has a Charter of its own with a separate
juridical personality while an unincorporated agency has none. In addition, the Charter of an
incorporated agency shall explicitly provide that it has waived its immunity from suit by granting
it with the authority to sue and be sued. This applies regardless of whether its functions are
governmental or proprietary in nature.
Indubitably, the CBP, which was created under RA 265 as amended by Presidential Decree No.
72 (PD 72), is a government corporation with separate juridical personality and not a mere
agency of the government. Specifically, Sections 1 and 4 of RA 265, as amended, provided for
the creation of the CBP, a corporate body with certain corporate powers which include the
authority to sue and be sued. Its main function is to administer the monetary, banking and credit
system of the Philippines which is primarily governmental in nature. It has the following duties:
(a) to primarily maintain internal and external monetary stability in the Philippines, and to
preserve the international value of the peso and the convertibility of the peso into other freely
convertible currencies; and (b) to foster monetary, credit and exchange conditions conducive to a
balanced and sustainable growth of the economy.
Undoubtedly, the function of the CBP as the central monetary authority is a purely governmental
function.
Nonetheless, while the CBP performed a governmental function in providing clearing house
facilities, it is not immune from suit as its Charter, by express provision, waived its immunity
from suit. However, although the CBP allowed itself to be sued, it did not necessarily mean that
it conceded its liability. Petitioner BPI had been given the right to bring suit against CBP, such as
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
in this case, to obtain compensation in damages arising from torts, subject, however, to the right
of CBP to interpose any lawful defense.

PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS.

URDANETA SACRED HEART HOSPITAL, RESPONDENT.

Non-exhaustion of administrative remedies was justified. USHH's filing of the complaint with
the RTC without first exhausting available administrative remedies is justifiable in light of the
denial of its claims by the PHIC's Board itself, the body superior to the RO or the PARD where
USHH was supposed to file an MR or appeal. To put it into perspective, "[PHIC's] President and
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is directly appointed by the President of the Republic while its
Board of Directors (the Board) is composed of several cabinet secretaries (or their permanent
representatives) and representatives of different stakeholders." Thus, it is reasonable to conclude
that the PHIC Board exercises a higher authority than the ROs or the PARD, and that to file an
MR or appeal to it would be futile since the PHIC Board already directed its denial. The trial
court and the appellate court also correctly considered USHH's Complaint as an exception to the
application of the doctrine on exhaustion of administrative remedies on the basis of strong public
interest. Alternatively, the instant case may also fall under the following exceptions: (a) "when to
require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable" and (b) "when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention."

Re: LETTER OF MRS. MA. CRISTINA ROCO CORONA REQUESTING GRANT OF

RETIREMENT +

Issue:
W/N Mrs. Corona should be accorded retirement benefits, other gratuities and survivorship
pension as the spouse of the late CJ Corona despite the latter’s ouster by impeachment

Held: Petition is granted

The sole effect of impeachment is the removal from office and disqualification from holding
any public office. Citing cases from the American Jurisprudence (where the law on impeachment
in the country is heavily based on) there is mutual exclusivity of impeachment proceedings and
court trial.

Impeachment is not crafted to mete out punishment. It is made to secure the state against
gross political misdemeanors. As such, it does not touch the person or property, but only divests
him of his political capacity.

No legally actionable liability attaches to the public officer by a mere judgment of

impeachment against him or her, and thus lies the necessity for a separate conviction for charges
that must be properly filed with courts of law.

In terms of hierarchy, judges of the lower courts stand on unequal footing with the Justices of the
Supreme Court. It may certainly be contended that their circumstances do not level with those of
a Supreme Court Justice, much more the Chief Magistrate. However, whether a judge or a
justice, all are members of the Philippine Judiciary who swear foremost fealty to the same
Constitution and oath of public office, both of which demand the highest degree of awareness,
loyalty, and submission regardless of professional ascendancy. It needs emphasizing that the
peculiarities of the present case find no directly-analogous precedent, both in law or in fact, that
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
the Court may rely on. Thus being the case, the liberalities granted to a judge can be allowed to
the Chief Justice.

Whether this would be finally addressed by a compelling authority in the proper forum, the late
Chief Justice Corona has already been removed by impeachment. What was done is fait
accompli and now a final, unalterable reality. For the future's worth, it is herein stressed that
the SALN is a tool for public transparency, never a weapon for political vendetta.

Chief Justice Renato C. Corona is hereby DECLARED entitled to retirement benefits and other
allowances under Republic Act No. 9946 equivalent to a five-year lump sum of the salary and
other allowances he was receiving at the time of his removal by impeachment on May 29, 2012.
The claim of survivorship benefits of Ma. Cristina Roco Corona is hereby GRANTED reckoned
from the lapse of the five-year period on the lump sum. All benefits granted herein are ordered
immediately RELEASED to his widow and beneficiary, Ma. Cristina Roco Corona, subject to
usual clearances.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v. CITY OF MUNTINLUPA

While ordinances, just like other laws and statutes, enjoy the presumption of validity, they may
be struck down and set aside when their invalidity or unreasonableness is evident on the face or
has been established in evidence.

A void ordinance cannot legally exist, it cannot have binding force and effect.

Ordinance which is incompatible with any existing law or statute is ultra vires, hence, null and
void.

The foregoing provisions clearly set out that municipalities may only levy taxes not otherwise
levied by the provinces. Section 137 particularly provides that provinces may impose a franchise
tax on businesses granted with a franchise to operate. Since provinces have been vested with
the power to levy a franchise tax, it follows that municipalities, pursuant to Section 142 of RA
7160, could no longer levy it. Therefore, Section 25 of MO 93-35 which was enacted when
Muntinlupa was still a municipality and which imposed a franchise tax on public utility
corporations within its territorial jurisdiction, is ultra vires for being violative of Section 142 of
RA 7160.

The City cannot seek refuge under Article 236(b) of Administrative Order No. 270[36] (AO 270)
in its bid to declare Section 25 of MO 93-35 as valid. As mere rules and regulations
implementing RA 7160, they cannot go beyond the intent of the law that it seeks to implement.
The spring cannot rise above its source.

Hence, even if Article 236(b) of AO 270 appears to vest municipalities with such taxing power,
Section 142 of RA 7160 which disenfranchised municipalities from levying a franchise tax,
should prevail. The power to levy a franchise tax is bestowed only to provinces and cities.

In sum, the then Municipality of Muntinlupa acted without authority in passing Section 25 of
MO 93-35, hence it is null and void for being ultra vires.

HERMINIO T. DISINI v. REPUBLIC

Republic is entitled to temperate and exemplary damages:

HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

With the grant of temperate damages, this allows the imposition of exemplary damages by way
of example or correction for the public good. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a
matter of right and are only considered when moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages are granted."Exemplary damages are designed by our civil law to permit the courts to
reshape behavior that is socially deleterious in its consequence by creating negative incentives or
deterrents against such behavior." Its purpose is to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings
and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a
punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.
There is no doubt that Disini's receipt of the substantial commissions from Westinghouse and
B&R is illegal and despicable which is no less than abhorred by our Freedom Constitution as its
mandate includes eradication of graft and corruption, punishment of those guilty thereof and
recovery of ill-gotten wealth. Verily, Disini's conduct should be corrected and deterred as his use
of influence or power for his own personal benefit to the detriment of the Republic caused
substantial injury not only to public funds but to the morale, trust and confidence of Filipinos in
the government and its projects. Hence, this Court finds it reasonable under the circumstances to
award One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as exemplary damages.
Nevertheless, the Republic is not entitled to nominal damages as it is incompatible with the
award of temperate damages. Nominal damages are recoverable where a legal right is technically
violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of
any kind or where there has been a breach of contract but no substantial injury or actual damages
whatsoever have been or can be shown. Clearly, Disini's illegal acquisition of substantial
commissions from Westinghouse and B&R produces injury or damage to the Republic which has
been deprived the use of these public funds in the interest of the Filipinos.
In the same manner, moral damages cannot be awarded in favor of the Republic as it failed to
convince this Court that it suffered any form of physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social-humiliation, or any other
similar circumstance because of Disini's acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
In sum, in order to be considered as ill-gotten wealth, they must have: (a) originated from the
government; and (b) been taken by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
and close associates by illegal means. Evidently, the BNPP is· a government project the
construction of which was awarded to Westinghouse as the main contractor and B&R as the
architect-engineer, allegedly through undue advantage of Disini's influence and close association
with President Marcos. In exchange, Disini allegedly received substantial commissions based on
3% and 10% of the total contract price from Westinghouse and B&R, respectively. Obviously,
the payment of the alleged commissions would be coming from Westinghouse and B&R, which
are private corporations, and not directly from the government.
However, contrary to the contention of Disini, ill-gotten wealth also encompasses those that are
derived indirectly from government funds or properties through the use of power, influence, or
relationship resulting in unjust enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the
Filipino people and the Republic. The alleged subject commissions may not have been sourced
directly from the public funds but it is beyond cavil that Disini would not have amassed these
commissions had he not exerted undue influence on President Marcos.
Disini indirectly and unjustly enriched himself through his influence and close association with
President Marcos by ensuring that the BNPP project would be awarded to Westinghouse and
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

B&R. Besides, his alleged receipt of commissions from Westinghouse and B&R is clearly within
the definition of ill-gotten wealth under the PCGG Rules and Regulations, that is, the receipt,
directly or indirectly, of any commission from an entity in connection with any government
contract or project.
Disini's argument that he may not be held liable since he was not a public officer, or that there
was no finding of conspiracy between him and President Marcos, deserves scant consideration.
Suffice it to say that EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A (1986) clearly provide that ill-gotten wealth may
be recovered from President Marcos' immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates, notwithstanding their private status. Undoubtedly, the Republic may recover ill-
gotten wealth not only from President Marcos, Imelda and his immediate family but also from
his dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates whether or not President
Marcos is also found liable together with them.
In light of the above issuances authorizing the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, there is no doubt
that the Republic has a valid cause of action founded in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A (1986).
While it is true that the Republic failed to prove the amount of commissions received, this does
not mean, however, that Disini is free from any liability under this civil action for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages. Thus, under the principle of unjust enrichment,
We uphold the Republic's right to recover these commissions in favor of the Filipino people. No
one should unjustly enrich himself by receiving commissions in connection with a government
project when clearly, he has no right for it nor entitled to retain the same.
Nonetheless, since recovery thereof cannot be effected due to the absence of a definite amount,
We deem it proper to award the Republic temperate damages for the pecuniary loss and the
Filipino people suffered on account of Disini's illegal acquisitions of substantial commissions
from Westinghouse and B&R, albeit the amount thereof not being proven with certainty.

SHEILA MARIE G. UY-BELLEZA, PETITIONER, VS. THE CIVIL REGISTRAR OF

TACLOBAN CITY, RESPONDENT.

A passport is “a document Issued by the Philippine government to its citizens requesting other
governments to allow its citizens to pass safely and freely, and in case of need, to give him/her
all lawful aid and protection.” It is an official document of identity of Philippine citizenship of
the holder issued for travel purposes. A passport proves that the country which issued it
recognizes the person named therein as its national.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

LABOR LAW

LUFTHANSA TECHNIK PHILIPPINES v. ROBERTO CUIZON +

As a general rule, the Supreme Court may only entertain questions of law. As an exception,
the Court may review factual issues when the factual findings are in conflict.
The Court may review factual issues in a labor case when the factual findings are in conflict.
Article 297 (formerly 282) of the Labor Code provides that an employer may terminate its
employee for "[f]raud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer or duly authorized representative."
"The requisites for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence are: (1) the employee
concerned must be holding a position of trust and confidence; (2) there must be an act that would
justify the loss of trust and confidence; [and (3)] such loss of trust relates to the employee's
performance of duties."

JOSE DEL PILAR v. BATANGAS II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE +

Article 223 provides that decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and
executory unless appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all
cases decided by labor arbiters as provided in Article 217(b) of the Labor Code. From the finding
of illegal dismissal up to the execution of the monetary award, the jurisdiction of the NLRC is
appellate in nature. "Article 218(e) of the Labor Code does not provide blanket authority to the
NLRC or any of its divisions to issue writs of injunction, considering that Section 1 of Rule XI
of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC makes injunction only an ancillary remedy in
ordinary labor disputes."

PEDRITO R. PARAYDAY v. SHOGUN SHIPPING CO. +

There is a conflict between the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, on one hand,
and those of the CA, on the other hand, it becomes proper for this Court, in the exercise of its
equity jurisdiction, to review the facts and re-examine the records of the case. Thus, this Court
shall take cognizance of and resolve the factual issues involved in this case.
"In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that its dismissal
of an employee was for a valid cause. However [as mentioned above], before a case for illegal
dismissal can prosper, an employer employee relationship must first be established."

ENGINEERING v. SEGUNDINO PALLE +

Generally, length of service is a measure to determine whether or not an employee who was
initially hired on a temporary basis has attained the status of a regular employee who is entitled
to security of tenure. However, such measure may not necessarily be applicable in a construction
industry since construction firms cannot guarantee continuous employment of their workers after
the completion stage of a project.[32] In addition, a project employee's work may or may not be
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. Thus, the fact that a
project employee's work is usually necessary and desirable in the business operation of his/her
employer does not necessarily impair the validity of the project employment contract which
specifically stipulates a fixed duration of employment.

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. ROSARIO A. GOMEZ,

RESPONDENT.

In termination cases, the employer bears the burden of proving that the employee's dismissal was
for a valid and authorized cause. Consequently, the failure of the employer to prove that the
dismissal was valid, would mean that dismissal was unjustified, and thus illegal.

ITALKARAT 18 v. JURALDINE N. GERASMIO +

It must be noted that under Article 229 [223] of the Labor Code, as amended, a decision of the
NLRC already becomes final after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties; on
the other hand, the reglementary period with respect to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court is sixty (60) days.
There is now no dispute that the CA can make a determination whether the factual findings by
the NLRC or the Labor Arbiter were based on the evidence and in accord with pertinent laws and
jurisprudence.

The significance of this clarification is that whenever the decision of the CA in a labor case is
appealed by petition for review on certiorari, the Court can competently delve into the propriety
of the factual review not only by the CA but also by the NLRC.
It is a well-settled rule, however, that before the employer must bear the burden of proving
that the dismissal was legal, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the
fact of his dismissal from service. Bare allegations of constructive dismissal, when
uncorroborated by the evidence on record, cannot be given credence.
To summarize, if the fact of dismissal is disputed, it is the complainant who should substantiate
his claim for dismissal and the one burdened with the responsibility of proving that he was
dismissed from employment, whether actually or constructively. Unless the fact of dismissal is
proven, the validity or legality thereof cannot even be an issue. In the present case, the fact of the
matter is that it was Juraldine himself who resigned from his work, as shown by the resignation
letter he submitted and the quitclaim that he acknowledged, and thus, he was never dismissed by
the Company.
In conclusion, considering that there was no dismissal involved in this case as Juraldine
voluntarily resigned from work, his claims arising from his complaint for illegal dismissal must
be denied. This includes his claim for separation pay as he failed to prove his entitlement thereto,
either via contract or company practice.

JR HAULING SERVICES v. GAVINO L. SOLAMO +

it is a well-established rule that the party-litigant who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary to establish his/her claim has the burden of proving the same by the amount of
evidence required by law, which, in labor proceedings, is substantial evidence, or "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." To be clear, in
the hierarchy of evidentiary values, "proof beyond reasonable doubt is placed at the highest
level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence, and substantial
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
evidence, in that order." Thus, in the hierarchy of evidence, it is the least demanding.
"Corollarily, the ground for the dismissal of an employee does not require proof beyond
reasonable doubt." The quantum of proof required is merely substantial evidence - which only
entails evidence to support a conclusion, "even if other minds, equally reasonable, might
conceivably opine otherwise." Accordingly, requiring a quantum of proof that is over and above
substantial evidence is contrary to law.
In determining an employee's entitlement to his monetary claims, the burden of proof is shifted
from the employer to the employee depending on the nature of the money claim prayed for. In
claims involving payment of salary differentials, this Court has held that the burden rests on the
employer to prove payment following the basic rule that "in all illegal dismissal cases, the
burden rests on the defendant to prove payment rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-
payment." This rationale is supported by the fact that all pertinent personnel files, payrolls,
records, remittances and other similar documents which show that the salary differentials have in
fact been paid are not in the possession of the worker but are in the custody and control of the
employer
This Court has held that in labor cases, "[a]ffidavits may be sufficient to establish substantial
evidence." Respondents argued, however, that affidavits taken ex-parte should not be given due
weight for being self-serving, hearsay and inadmissible in evidence. By citing pertinent
provisions on the rules on evidence, respondents insisted that any admissions made therein
cannot be used to establish their culpability, but only of the confessants themselves.

The argument that the affidavits are hearsay for having been taken ex parte i.e., that the affiants
were not presented for cross-examination, does not persuade us. The rules of evidence prevailing
in courts of law do not control proceedings before the labor tribunals where decisions may be
reached on the basis of position papers, accompanied by supporting documents, including
affidavits of witnesses, and other allied pleadings.
Loss of trust and confidence as a ground for dismissal of employees covers employees
occupying a position of trust who are proven to have breached the trust and confidence reposed
on them. Moreover, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must
be work-related and shows that the employee concerned is unfit to continue working for the
employer. In addition, loss of confidence as a just cause for termination of employment is
premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a position of responsibility, trust and
confidence or that the employee concerned is entrusted with confidence with respect to delicate
matters, such as the handling or care and protection of the property and assets of the employer.
The betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offense for which an employee is penalized. In this
regard, it is not the job title but the nature of the work that the employee is duty-bound to
perform which is material in determining whether he holds a position where greater trust is
placed by the employer and from whom greater fidelity to duty is concomitantly expected.

PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS v. ALMARIO C. SAN JUAN +

We have held that the 120-day period should be reckoned from the time the seafarer reported to
the company-designated physician. If the company-designated physician fails to give his
assessment within the period of 120 days with sufficient justification, then the period of
diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days.
Settled is the rule that when a seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury while on board the
vessel, his fitness or unfitness for work shall be determined by the company-designated
physician, and that "in case of conflicting medical assessments [between the company-designated
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
physician and the seafarer's own physician], referral to a third doctor is mandatory; and that in
the absence of a third doctor's opinion, it is the medical assessment of the company-designated
physician that should prevail." Relevant to this rule is Section 20(B)(3) of the 2000 POEA-SEC,
which similarly states that "[i]f a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment
[of the company-designated physician], a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the
Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties."

PEOPLE v. OLIVER IMPERIO Y ANTONIO +

Under RA 8042, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority is liable for Illegal Recruitment when
the following elements concur: (1) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law
to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) the offender
undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Article
13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the
Labor Code (now Section 6 of RA 8042). In the case of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale, a
third element is added: that the offender commits any of the acts of recruitment and placement
against three or more persons, individually or as a group.

Moreover, "[t]o prove [I]llegal [R]ecruitment, it must be shown that the accused gave the
complainants the distinct impression that [he or she] had the power or ability to deploy the
complainants abroad in [such] a manner that they were convinced to part with their money for
that end."

ALLAN REGALA, PETITIONER, VS. MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,

RESPONDENT.

Consistent therewith is the doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts, and this is strictly
adhered to in labor cases. However, where, like in the instant case, there is a conflict between the
factual findings of the LA and the CA, on one hand, and those of the NLRC, on the other, it
becomes proper for this Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, to review the facts and
re-examine the records of the case.
A fixed-term employment contract which otherwise fails to specify the date of effectivity and the
date of expiration of an employee's engagement cannot, by virtue of jurisprudential
pronouncement, be regarded as such despite its nomenclature or classification given by the
parties. The employment contract may provide for or describe some other classification or type
of employment depending on the circumstances, but it is not, properly speaking, a fixed-term
employment contract.
There is constructive dismissal where "there is cessation of work because 'continued employment
is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a
diminution in pay' and other benefits. Aptly called a dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to
dismissal but made to appear as if it were not, constructive dismissal may, likewise, exist if an
act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on
the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued
employment."
Patently, the reduction of Regala's regular work days from five (5) days to two (2) days resulted
to a diminution in pay. Regala's change in his work schedule resulting to the diminution of his
take home salary is, therefore, tantamount to constructive dismissal.
The fact that Rega1a may have continued reporting for work does not rule out constructive
dismissal, nor does it operate as a waiver.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

MARIA LEA JANE I. GESOLGON v. CYBERONE PH. +

The four-fold test used in determining the existence of employer employee relationship involves
an inquiry into: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c)
the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to control the employee with respect to the
means and method by which the work is to be accomplished.

Based on record, petitioners were requested by respondent Mikrut to become stockholders and
directors of CyberOne PH with each one of them subscribing to one share of stock. However,
petitioners contend that they were hired as employees of CyberOne PH as shown by the pay slips
indicating that CyberOne PH paid them P10,000.00 monthly net of mandatory deductions. Other
than the pay slips presented by petitioners, no other evidence was submitted to prove their
employment by CyberOne PH. Petitioners failed to present any evidence that they rendered
services to CyberOne PH as employees thereof.
As it is established that petitioners are not employees of CyberOne PH, there is no need for this
Court to delve into the issues of petitioners' illegal dismissal, their monetary claims and the
probative value of the pay slips presented by petitioners. Based on the foregoing, this Court is
convinced that petitioners are not employees of CyberOne PH, but stockholders thereof.

To summarize, the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over CyberOne AU. CyberOne PH is
neither the resident agent nor the conduit of CyberOne AU upon which summons may be served.
Also, there existed no employer employee relationship between petitioners and CyberOne PH.
Hence, there is no dismissal to speak of, much more illegal dismissal.

OMANFIL INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION &

MODH AL-ZOABI TECHNICAL PROJECTS CORP., PETITIONERS, V. ROLANDO B.
MESINA, RESPONDENT.

If the repatriation was indeed voluntary on his part, he would not have pursued a case of illegal
termination against petitioners which would cost him time and money. As it is, Mesina's
immediate filing of a case of illegal dismissal negates petitioners' claim that he voluntarily
agreed to his repatriation to seek medical treatment in his home country. Likewise, petitioners
failed to establish the fact that they provided Mesina a re-entiy visa to support their argument
that they did not dismiss him. In any case, even the existence of a re-entry visa does not
necessarily defeat an illegal dismissal complaint.

EFREN SANTOS v. KING CHEF +

"In cases where there is both an absence of illegal dismissal on the part of the employer and an
absence of abandonment on the part of the employees, the remedy is reinstatement but without
backwages." However, considering that petitioners do not pray for such relief, "each party must
bear [their] own loss," placing them on equal footing.

FERNANDO C. GOSOSO v. LEYTE LUMBER YARD

HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
Abandonment requires the concurrence of the following: (1) the employee must have failed to
report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) there must
have been a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some
overt acts.

Mere absence or simple failure to report for work is not abandonment, more so if the employee
was able to lodge his complaint before the labor tribunals with haste. An immediate filing of a
complaint for illegal dismissal, more so when it includes a prayer for reinstatement, is
inconsistent with a charge of abandonment.

RONNIE L. SINGSON v. ARKTIS MARITIME CORP.

The mere lapse of the 120-day period under Article 198(c)(l) of the Labor
Code does not automatically give rise to a cause of action for a claim of permanent total
disability benefits.
To be clear, when a certain sickness or injury causes a temporary and total disability which lasts
continuously for more than 120 days, then such total disability is considered to be permanent.
However, as an exception to this rule, if the said sickness or injury that caused the temporary
total disability requires medical treatment beyond the 120-day period but not to exceed 240
days, then the employee is only entitled to temporary total disability benefits until he is declared
as either: 1) "fit to work," which stops his entitlement to disability benefits; or 2) "permanently
and totally disabled," which then entitles him to permanent total disability benefits. In any event,
if the 240 days had lapsed without any certification issued by the company designated doctor,
then the employee may pursue an action for permanent total disability benefits. Mere presence of
a disease is not a disability.

PEOPLE v. AVELINA MANALANG

Jurisprudence is settled that a person, for the same acts, may be convicted separately for Illegal
Recruitment under RA 8042 (or the Labor Code), and Estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC.

In estafa, damage is essential, but not in the crime of illegal recruitment. As to the latter, it is the
lack of the necessary license or authority, but not the fact of payment that renders the recruitment
activity as unlawful.

C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT v. JIMMY G. JAICTEN

Settled is the rule that the company-designated physician is tasked with assessing the seafarer's
disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of the latter's
employment. However, his or her assessment is not automatically final, binding or conclusive on
the claimant, the labor tribunal or the courts as its inherent merits would still be weighed and
duly considered. Moreover, the seafarer has the right to dispute such assessment by consulting
his own doctor. In addition, in case of disagreement between the findings of the company-
designated physician and the seafarer's doctor of choice, both parties may agree to jointly refer
the matter to a third doctor whose decision shall be final and binding on them.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
GERARDO U. VILLE, PETITIONER, VS. MAERSK-FILIPINAS CREWING, INC.
AND/OR A.P. MOLLER A/S, RESPONDENTS.

It is settled rule that non-compliance with the post-employment medical examination

requirement (within 3 days after disembarkation) is tantamount to a waiver or forfeiture of any
right to claim disability benefits.

SUSAN M. BANCE v. UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANTHONY

For resignation from employment to be valid, there must be an intent to relinquish the position
together with the overt act of relinquishment. Resignation must be voluntary. In illegal dismissal
cases, the employer, if defense of resignation is presented, must show that the employee indeed
voluntarily resigned.

"It is settled that there is nothing reprehensible or illegal when the employer grants the employee
a chance to resign and save face rather than smear the latter's employment record."

To constitute willful breach of trust, the employee concerned must be holding a position of trust
and confidence, and there must be an act, that is willful, that would justify the loss of trust and
confidence. Additionally, cashiers, auditors, property custodians, and those positions who, in the
normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or
property are considered positions of trust.
Fraud and dishonesty can only be used to justify termination from employment when the
employee concerned commits a dishonest act that reflects a disposition to deceive, defraud and
betray the employer.

To comply with the requirement of procedural due process, two written notices must be issued.
The first written notice should contain the specific causes or grounds for termination against the
employee. The second written notice contains the decision terminating the employment after
considering all circumstances involving the charge. Conferences and verbal announcements do
not suffice as substitute for the requisite first written notice.

DEL MONTE LAND TRANSPORT BUS v. RENANTE A. ARMENTA

The rules governing jurisdiction on labor standards claims, may be summed up as follows:
If the claim involves labor standards benefits mandated by the Labor Code or other labor
legislation regardless of the amount prayed for and provided that there is an existing
1.
employer employee relationship, jurisdiction is with the DOLE regardless of whether the
action was brought about by the filing of a complaint or not.

If the claim involves labor standards benefits mandated by the Labor Code or other labor
legislation regardless of the amount prayed for and there is no existing employer-employee
2. relationship or the claim is coupled with a prayer for reinstatement, jurisdiction is with the
LA/NLRC.

FLORENCIO B. DESTRIZA, PETITIONER, VS. FAIR SHIPPING CORPORATION,

ANGEL C. CACHAPERO, AND/OR BOSELINE S.A., RESPONDENTS.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
It is settled that in case of disagreements between the findings of the company-designated
physician and the seafarer's doctor of choice, resort to a third-doctor opinion is mandatory. The
third-doctor opinion is final and binding between the parties. The opinion of the company-
designated physician prevails over that of the seafarer's personal doctor in case there is no third-
doctor opinion.

V PEOPLE MANPOWER PHILS., INC., AND/OR CAPE PNL LTD., PETITIONERS,

VS. DOMINADOR C. BUQUID, RESPONDENT.

In order to be considered a seaman or seafarer, one would have to be, at the very least, employed
in a vessel engaged in maritime navigation. Thus, it is clear that those employed in non-mobile
vessels or fixed structures, even if the said vessels/structures are located offshore or in the
middle of the sea, cannot be considered as seafarers under the law.

These allegations bolster the fact that: 1) Dominador was not aboard any vessel engaged in
maritime navigation or mobile offshore or drilling unit, but a port, which is a fixed structure by
nature; and 2) the said port is located in the Gulf of Papua New Guinea, which only means that it
is not located in the high seas.

The applicable law defines a "seafarer" based not only on the employee's kind of work, but also
on the kind of marine vessel or offshore unit the employee was aboard during his employment.
Stated otherwise, an overseas employee, in order to be considered as a "seafarer," must not only
perform tasks concerning manning marine vessels or marine navigation, but they must also
perform such functions onboard a vessel engaged in maritime navigation or a mobile offshore rig
or drilling unit in the high seas.

ARLENE PALGAN v. HOLY NAME UNIVERSITY

The Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, and not the Labor Code, determines whether or
not a faculty member in an educational institution has attained regular or permanent status.

The governing law for the employment status of teachers/professors/instructors are the manuals
of regulations for private schools.

The following requisites before a private school teacher acquires permanent status, namely: 1)
The teacher serves full-time; 2) he/she must have rendered three consecutive years of service;
and 3) such service must have been satisfactory.

Being unqualified as a nursing faculty from the start, petitioner cannot possibly be considered a
full-time faculty and thus, could not, even after rendering satisfactory service for three years, be
entitled to permanency.

The Court thus laid down the criteria under which fixed-term employment could not be said to
be in circumvention of the law on security of tenure, thus:

1. The fixed period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties
without any force, duress, or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and
absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent; or

2. It satisfactorily appears that the employer and the employee dealt with each other on more or
less equal terms with no moral dominance exercised by the former or the latter.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

Considering petitioner's part-time status, even if no written fixed-term contract was presented,
judicial notice can be made upon the fact that teachers' employment contracts are for a specific
semester or term.

PHILAM HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION v. SYLVIA DE LUNA

In labor cases, the proper recourse from the adverse decision or final order of the NLRC is via a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to the appellate court on
the ground that the labor tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction. This judicial review presupposes that the NLRC's disposition of the case has
already attained finality, and the appellate court is to ascertain whether it should reverse or
modify the NLRC decision on the aforesaid exclusive ground.

From the CA, the labor suit is elevated to this Court via a petition for review
on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on pure questions of law; questions of
fact may be entertained and reviewed only in exceptional circumstances.

Factual findings of the NLRC are accorded great respect, but the appellate court is not precluded
from reviewing evidence alleged to be arbitrarily considered or otherwise disregarded by the
former.

When the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code, such as loss of
trust and confidence, but the termination was procedurally infirm, the sanction against the
employer for such a violation is tempered; hence, the award of nominal damages. This is because
the dismissal was initiated by an act imputable to the employee compared to when the dismissal
was initiated by the employer through the enumerated authorized causes under the Labor Code,
where the sanction is stiffer and the amount of nominal damages is higher.

When the employer extended the period of preventive suspension beyond 30 days, he is obliged
to pay the wages and other benefits due to the employee.

EMS CREW MANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES v. ERWIN C. BAUZON

The employment of seafarers, including claims for permanent and total disability benefits, is
governed by law, its rules and regulations, and the contracts that they sign upon being hired or
rehired.
Bauzon, as an Able Seaman on board the vessel, was exposed to harsh sea weather, chemical
irritants, dusts, heat, stress brought about by being away from his family, long hours of work, and
limited and unclean air/oxygen, all of which invariably contributed to his illness. There was at
least a reasonable connection between his job and his contracting the throat ailment during his
employment, which eventually developed into papillary cancer.
Moreover, the duties and responsibilities of an Able Seaman generally require the use of a
variety of chemical substances (e.g., grease, solvents, cleaning agents, de-greasers, paint, etc.
There was, by all accounts, a reasonable connection between the nature of his work on board the
vessel and the illness that he came down with. The aggravation of his illness had been duly
established by him.
Settled is the rule that a worker brings with him possible infirmities in the course of his
employment, and while the employer is not the insurer of the health of the employees, he takes
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
them as he finds them and assumes the risk of liability. In order for an illness to be compensable,
it is enough that the employment had contributed, even to a small degree, to the development of
the disease.
Neither is it necessary in order to recover compensation, that the employee must have been in
perfect condition or health at the time he contracted the disease. Every workingman brings with
him to his employment certain infirmities, and while the employer is not the insurer of the health
of the employees, he takes them as he finds them and assumes the risk of liability. If the disease
is the proximate cause of the employee's death for which compensation is sought, the previous
physical condition of the employee is unimportant and recovery may be had therefor independent
of any pre- existing disease.
This Court finds that the nature of Bauzon's employment had contributed to the aggravation of
his illness. We reiterate that the nature of his job as an Able Seaman exposed him to harsh sea
weather, chemical irritants, dusts, heat, stress brought about by being away from his family, and
long hours of work, all of which invariably contributed to his illness. Under these circumstances,
there was at least a reasonable connection between his job and his ailment.

BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, PETITIONER, VS. NELSON C.

BOOL, RESPONDENT.

Length of service cannot be considered as a mitigating circumstance when the length of

respondent's service itself helped facilitate the commission of the offense, which is found to be
grave or serious.
In this case, the Court agrees with the BSP that it was precisely because of Bool's length of
service and experience that he was chosen as BSP's representative to France. It was in
consideration of his extensive experience, special skills, and relevant expertise that he acquired
by reason of his long years of service with the BSP that Bool was chosen for the highly technical
work abroad. The CSC correctly held that the fact that Bool had been in the service for 33 years
should have made him "more meticulous and prudent in discharging his responsibility."
Moreover, the offense committed is so gross, grave, and serious in character as to endanger or
threaten the public welfare. The CSC is correct in holding that the repercussions and the impact
resulting from Bool's negligence in not detecting the error in former President Arroyo's surname
are so great.

INTERISLAND INFORMATION SYSTEM VS. CA

As can be gleaned from the records, respondent Ibay did not abandon his work in Inter-Island as
in fact he immediately filed a complaint for illegal dismissal after he was prevented from
entering the company premises. This only proves that respondent Ibay had no intention to sever
his employer-employee relationship with Inter-Island.
The contention that Ibay had applied to work abroad is not supported by evidence on record.
Even if the same is true, Ibay's intent to earn a living during the pendency of the labor case
should not be taken against him. Besides, even if he indeed applied for a new job abroad in
November 2003, petitioner's illegal dismissal of respondent Ibay and the latter's subsequent
filing of a complaint were fait accompli, having already been accomplished in October 2003 or
way before respondent Ibay's alleged application for work abroad.This cannot erase the fact that
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

the company illegally dismissed its employee without just and authorized cause and prevented
the latter from entering the company premises.
Further, petitioner's contention that it issued several return-to-work orders is without any factual
basis. Petitioner's allegation that it ordered its worker to return to work during the mandatory
conference on January 12, 2004, as reiterated in its position paper dated February 5, 2004 and in
its Rejoinder dated May 12, 2004, were substantially refuted by Ibay who claimed non-receipt of
petitioner's written notice to return to work.
As a final note, the obstinate failure of respondent lbay and his counsel of record before the LA
and the NLRC, Atty. Erro, to comply with the appellate court and this Court's numerous
directives has not escaped Our notice. While it is true that Ibay's cause was ultimately proven to
be meritorious, this fact does not excuse nor justify Ibay's or Atty. Erro's repeated failure to
comply with the orders of the Court. In fact, this case has dragged on for 11 years since the filing
of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before this Court in 2009 due to the mere fact that
Atty. Erro could not be located to be served the notices of this Court. Even respondent Ibay was
not found in his address on record during the service of the warrant of arrest for contempt.
Although we recognize Atty. Erro's appointment as undersecretary of DAR during the pendency
of this case and his inability to continue private law practice because of conflict of interest, this
does not excuse him from complying with his responsibility to update the Court and the IBP of
his current and complete address and to his clients. Clearly, petitioner cannot be faulted when it
relied on the information of Atty. Erro's address as stated in his pleadings filed before the LA
and NLRC. His failure to withdraw as counsel of record of respondent lbay in this case or even
the proper tum-over of the same to his partner Atty. Pahilga undoubtedly shows negligence on
his part.

EDUARDO G. JOVERO v. ROGELIO CERIO

The presentation of service contracts between the employer and their client (even if it shows the
duration of the project), in lieu of the employees' individual employment contracts, does not
establish that the latter are project employees. There was no other substantial evidence offered to
prove that respondents were informed at the time of their hiring, that they were project
employees. Moreover, petitioner's failure to file termination reports at the end of each project
was an indication that respondents were regular employees.
For purposes of appeal, the period shall be counted from receipt of such decisions, resolutions, or
orders by the counsel or representative of record.
c) The bailiff or officer serving the notice, order, or resolution shall submit his/her return within
two (2) days from date of service thereof, stating legibly in his/her return his/her name,
the names of the persons served and the date of receipt, which return shall be immediately
attached and shall form part of the records of the case. In case of service by registered mail or by
private courier, the name of the addressee and the date of receipt of the notice, order or
resolution shall be written in the return card or in the proof of service issued by the private
courier. If no service was effected, the reason thereof shall be so stated.

Considering that the Bailiff Proof of Service and Notice of Judgment/Final Order show that
Jovero's counsel received Labor Arbiter Rivera's Decision on August 21, 2001, and that the
reglementary period indubitably lapsed before he filed his appeal, the CA correctly held that the
NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance of and even granted Jovero's
appeal. Lest we forget, perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

law is not a mere technicality, but jurisdictional. Hence, failure to perfect an appeal as required
by the Rules renders the judgment final and executory.

JOSE R. DELA TORRE, PETITIONER, VS. TWINSTAR PROFESSIONAL

PROTECTIVE SERVICES, INC., RESPONDENT.

The LA and the NLRC are mandated to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts
in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law and procedure all in
the interest of substantial justice. In this connection, the NLRC is not precluded from receiving
evidence on appeal as technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases. As applied in
this case, the NLRC, acting within its lawful authority, decided to admit evidence for the first
time during appeal, and the circumstances would show that the said decision was not made
arbitrarily or capriciously. The records would show that Twinstar, to its prejudice, failed to
submit any evidence before the LA and thus, the latter was not able to make an informed
decision on the issues presented before it.

While the alleged negligence of Twinstar and its previous counsels generally does not excuse the
non-submission of its position paper and evidence despite notice, it is within the prudent
discretion of the NLRC to decide on whether or not to admit and consider the evidence presented
before it. Considering the relevance and veracity of the evidence presented by Twinstar, not to
mention the primacy given to substantive justice over procedural technicalities, this Court is
constrained to agree with the CA in affirming the NLRC Decision.
It must be emphasized that "not every inconvenience, disruption, difficulty, or disadvantage that
an employee must endure sustains a finding of constructive dismissal." What is vital is the
weighing of the evidence presented and a consideration of whether, given the totality of
circumstances, the employer acted fairly in exercising a prerogative. Applying the foregoing
standards to this case, petitioner utterly failed to prove that he was constructively dismissed. He
never presented any evidence, aside from his self-serving allegations, that he was forced to be on
floating status for more than six (6) months without being given new assignment by Twinstar.
While an employee may indeed accept his dismissal and agree to waive his claims or right to
initiate or continue any action against his employer, both parties do not have the jurisdiction or
authority to determine whether such termination is legal or not; such question of law is still
subject to the final determination of the competent labor tribunals and courts, as the case may be.
It follows then that the award of nominal damages, which by its nature, arises from the
determination of whether the employee's rights were violated or not in an illegal dismissal case
cannot be deemed to be covered by the Quitclaim.

To stress, nominal damages are "adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose
of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him."

Moreover, any quitclaim or agreement executed by the parties, as with all contracts, must not be
contrary to law or public policy. It is apparent that the public policy in the stiffer imposition of
nominal damages is to discourage the abhorrent practice of "dismiss now, pay later."

CHARLO P. IDUL v. ALSTER INT'L SHIPPING SERVICES

HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

The CA did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
annulling the Decision of the NLRC, and reinstating the Labor Arbiter's Decision. The CA
correctly concluded that a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when 1) the
company-designated physician declares it to be so within the 240-day period; or 2) when after
the lapse of the 240-day period, the company-designated physician fails to make such
declaration.
ARMANDO H. DE JESUS VS. INTER-ORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES, INC., ET
AL.
Rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. If the
application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it is always within
our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from their operation. Law and
jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with the procedural rules, even
the most mandatory in character, mindful of the duty to reconcile the need to put an end to
litigation speedily and the parties' right to an opportunity to be heard.
For a disability to be compensable under Section 20 (B) of the 2000 POEA SEC, it must be the
result of a work-related injury or a work-related or work-aggravated illness. The POEA SEC
defines a work-related injury as "injuries resulting in disability or death arising out of and in the
course of employment.' On the other hand, a work-related illness has been defined as "any
sickness resulting in disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section
32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied."

The 2000 POEA SEC provides for the company-designated doctor to assess the illness of the
seafarer or his fitness to return to sea duties. In the event the seafarer disagrees with the
assessment of the company-designated physician, he ought to consult his doctor of choice. Here,
instead of consulting his own physician, De Jesus executed a release and quitclaim in favor of
respondents. In executing this document, petitioner thus impliedly admitted the correctness of
the assessment of the company-designated physician, and acknowledged that he could no longer
claim for disability benefits.

In sum, in order for a deed of release, waiver or quitclaim pertaining to an existing right to be
valid, it must meet the following requirements: (1) that there was no fraud or deceit or coercion
on the part of any of the parties; (2) that the consideration for the quitclaim is sufficient and
reasonable; and (3) that the contract is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or
good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
At this point, petitioner was already aware of his medical condition when he signed the waiver as
he was examined by the company-designated doctor. Moreover, there was no proof that
respondents employed fraud, malice, force or duress to compel him to sign the quitclaim. "Lack
of sleep and exhaustion", can hardly be accepted as grounds to invalidate the waiver considering
that it was signed six days after his arrival. For sure, as a seasoned seafarer, petitioner properly
considered his decision of giving up his rights before signing the quitclaim.

SALVACION A. LAMADRID, PETITIONER, VS. CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS

LIMITED AND VIVIAN LO, RESPONDENTS.

SECTION 2. Section 3, paragraph (a) of Republic Act No. 8042, as amended, is hereby amended
to read as follows:

(a) “Overseas Filipino worker” refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a citizen or on board a
vessel navigating the foreign seas other than a government ship used for military or non-
commercial purposes or on an installation located offshore or on the high seas; to be used
interchangeably with migrant worker.

Under the foregoing definition, Lamadrid is considered an Overseas Filipino Worker (OFW).
She had been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state where she is not a citizen. Cathay’s
cabin crew are all based in Hong Kong, and in fact Lamadrid resided and leased an apartment in
Hong Kong during her stint with Cathay. As an OFW faced with a termination dispute,
Lamadrid’s case may be heard and decided by the Arbiter under Article 224 [217] of the Labor
Code in relation to RA 8042 as amended by RA 10022.

Lamadrid's position as a Senior Purser is imbued with trust and confidence.

Jurisprudence classify positions of trust and confidence into two categories. The first consists of
those managerial employees or those "vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and
execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign
or discipline employees" as defined under Article 219 [212] (m) of the Labor Code. By the
nature of their position, managerial employees are expected to exhibit utmost fidelity to the
employer as they are entrusted with confidential and sensitive matters. The second category
involves those who in the normal and routine exercise of their functions regularly handle
significant amounts of the employer's money or property, such as but not limited to cashiers,
auditors, and property custodians.

The company laid down the penalties for violation of its policies; however, the evaluation of an
employee's infraction should be dealt with fairness and reason. Simply put, all surrounding
circumstances must be considered and the penalty must be commensurate to the violation
committed by an employee. Termination of the services of an employee should be the employer's
last resort especially when other disciplinary actions may be imposed, considering the
employee's long years of service in the company, devoting time, effort and invaluable service in
line with the employer's goals and mission.

RENATO C. TACIS v. SHIELDS SECURITY SERVICES

Constructive dismissal is an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment is

rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; or when there is a demotion in rank and/or a
diminution in pay. It exists when there is a clear act of discrimination, insensibility or disdain by
an employer, which makes it unbearable for the employee to continue his/her employment. In
cases of constructive dismissal, the impossibility, unreasonableness, or unlikelihood of continued
employment leaves an employee with no other viable recourse but to terminate his or
her employment.

Resignation is the formal pronouncement or relinquishment of a position or office. It is the

voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot
be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and he has then no other choice but to
disassociate himself from employment. The intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of
relinquishment; hence, the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

considered in determining whether he in fact intended to terminate his employment. In illegal

dismissal cases, it is a fundamental rule that when an employer interposes the defense of
resignation, on him necessarily rests the burden to prove that the employee indeed voluntarily
resigned.

Guided by the foregoing legal precepts, a judicious review of the facts on record will show that
the Company was able to show petitioners' voluntary resignation. The acts of petitioners before
and after the resignation do not show that undue force was exerted upon them.

EDGARDO I. MABALOT, PETITIONER, VS. MAERSK - FILIPINAS CREWING, INC.

AND/OR A.P. MOLLER A/S, RESPONDENTS.

A final, conclusive, and definite medical assessment must clearly state the seafarer's fitness to
work or his exact disability rating, or whether such illness is work-related, and without any
further condition or treatment. It should no longer require any further action on the part of the
company- designated physician and it is issued by the company-designated physician after he or
she has exhausted all possible treatment options within the periods allowed by law.

To stress, the assessment to be conclusive must be complete and definite; otherwise, the medical
report shall be set aside and the disability grading contained therein shall be ignored. As case law
holds, a final and definite disability assessment is necessary in order to truly reflect the true
extent of the sickness or injuries of the seafarer and his or her capacity to resume work as such.

EVELINA E. BELARSO v. QUALITY HOUSE

While the State can regulate the right of an employer to select and discharge his or her
employees. An employer cannot be compelled to continue the employment of an employee in
whom there has been a legitimate loss of trust and confidence.

REPUBLIC VS. ABELLANOSA

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against

three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. In this case, private complainants Pomar,
Pastolero, Cathedral, Orias, Suobiron, Bueron, and Pelipog testified that appellant went to Pavia,
Iloilo and represented herself as a recruiter who could send them to Brunei for work; that
appellant impressed upon them that she had the authority or ability to send them overseas for
work by showing them a job order from Brunei and a calling card; and appellant collected
processing or placement fees from the private complainants in various amounts ranging from
5,000.00 to 20,000.00; and that she did not reimburse said amounts despite demands. In
addition, it was proved that appellant does not have any license or authority to recruit workers
for overseas employment as shown by the certification issued by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration. Finally, appellant recruited seven persons, or more than the
minimum of three persons required by law, for illegal recruitment to be considered in large scale.

Ratio Decidendi: Recruitment becomes illegal when undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders

of authority.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group.In this case, private complainants Pomar, Pastolero, Cathedral,
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
Orias, Suobiron, Bueron, and Pelipog testified that appellant went to Pavia, Iloilo and
represented herself as a recruiter who could send them to Brunei for work; that appellant
impressed upon them that she had the authority or ability to send them overseas for work by
showing them a job order from Brunei and a calling card; and appellant collected processing or
placement fees from the private complainants in various amounts ranging from 5,000.00 to
20,000.00; and that she did not reimburse said amounts despite demands. In addition, it was
proved that appellant does not have any license or authority to recruit workers for overseas
employment as shown by the certification issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration. Finally, appellant recruited seven persons, or more than the minimum of three
persons required by law, for illegal recruitment to be considered in large scale.

PACIFIC ROYAL FOODS VS. VIOLETA

Bare suspicion, like that harbored by PRBFI against respondents, is not a just cause to fire any
employee. The employer need not present proof beyond reasonable doubt or clear and
convincing evidence to justify the dismissal, but bare suspicion that the employee is doing
something detrimental to the interests of the employer is just a hunch, a mere gut feeling that
cannot amount to substantial evidence. A reasonable mind requires reason. Mere allegations are
not legally compelling unless proved.

ESICO VS ALPHALAND CORPORATION AND ALPHALAND DEVELOPMENT INC.

The Supreme Court (SC) clarified where jurisdiction lies for money claim (even if the same is)
connected with an employment contract. Based on the case, Esico was employed by PhilWeb
Corporation (Phil Web), a part of respondents’ group of companies. PhilWeb initially hired
Esico as Risk & Security Management Officer. Thereafter, respondent Alphaland concurrently
engaged Esico as a rotary wing pilot assigned to fly the chairperson of respondents’ group of
companies to his various engagements within and outside the country. The engagement letter
provides, among others, that the Company agrees to advance the expenses necessary to send him
on ground and flight course training. In turn, he agreed to render service to the Company for a
minimum period of five years beginning on the start date indicated above. Should he fail to
complete minimum years of service, Esico shall reimburse the Company for the expenses spent
on his training subject to proportionate reduction equivalent to 5 percent per completed quarter
of actual service.

After more than two (2) years, Esico tendered his resignation, citing various reasons therefor. As
a consequence of his resignation, respondents demanded from Esico reimbursement of the
amount corresponding to a portion of his flight training expenses. Esico refused to pay. Thus, the
respondents filed a complaint against Esico for alleged wrongful resignation and damages with
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), based on the employment contract.

We now face the issue, does the Labor Arbiter (LA) or NLRC have jurisdiction over the case
filed by Alphaland against Esico for the alleged wrong resignation and damages based on the
employment contract?

The SC answered in the negative. The bone of contention between the parties lies in the
interpretation of the employment contract, specifically the clause on the minimum service
requirement in consideration of expenses (advances) for flight trainings. Unarguably,
respondents claim payment of actual damages equivalent to the amount they advanced for
Esico’s flight training who reneged on his contractual obligation by his premature resignation.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

Respondents cause of action, the supposed violation of the right-duty correlative between the
parties, hinges on the enforceability of the contentious clause in the employment contract.
Clearly, respondents’ recourse against Esico is based on the law on contracts. The labor tribunals
do not have jurisdiction to settle various issues necessitating application of civil laws on
obligations and contracts. Moreover, in determining which tribunal has jurisdiction over a case,
the SC considers not only the status or relationship of the parties, but more so the nature of the
question that is the subject of controversy.

Respondents further asserted that Esico’s failure to serve written notice of his resignation at least
a month prior violated Article 300(285)(a)54 of the Labor Code which makes him liable to pay
for damages.

This claim for damages, however, still arose from Esico’s supposed breach of employment
contract. The SC concluded that jurisdiction is conferred by law and not by the parties. The
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC cannot exercise jurisdiction over respondents’ complaint just by the
mere expedient of citing the employer-employee relationship between the parties and designating
it as one for “wrongful resignation with claims of damages.”

UNIVERSITY OF CORDILLERAS v. BENEDICTO F. LACANARIA

Totality of Infractions Rule. The totality of infractions or the number of violations committed
during the period of employment shall be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed
upon an erring employee. The offenses committed by [employee] should not be taken singly and
separately. Fitness for continued employment cannot be compartmentalized into tight little
cubicles of aspects of character, conduct and ability separate and independent of each other.
While it may be true that [the employee] was penalized for his previous infractions, this does not
and should not mean that his employment record would be wiped clean of his infractions. After
all, the record of an employee is a relevant consideration in determining the penalty that should
be meted out since an employee's past misconduct and present behavior must be taken together
in determining the proper imposable penalty. Despite the sanctions imposed upon [the
employee], he continued to commit misconduct and exhibit undesirable behavior xxx. Indeed,
the employer cannot be compelled to retain a misbehaving employee, or one who is guilty of acts
inimical to its interests. It has the right to dismiss such an employee if only as a measure of self-
protection.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

CIVIL LAW WITH LAND TITLES

SPS. BELINDA LIU AND HSI PIN LIU v. MARCELINA ESPINOSA +

Thus, an action for unlawful detainer will stand if the following requisites are present:
a. Initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff;
b. Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter's right of possession;
c. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of
the enjoyment thereof; and
d. Within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.
The Court fully sustains both the MTCC and the RTC findings that the foregoing requisites have
been sufficiently established in the case at bar.
It is clear upon perusal of the records that petitioners are the registered owners of the subject
property, as evidenced by TCT No. 146-2010008891, and that the respondents' occupation of the
subject property was merely tolerated by the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest and the
petitioners themselves based on the understanding that the said respondents will peacefully
vacate the same once the need to use the land by the petitioners arises.
Subsequently, this occupation became illegal when respondents refused to heed petitioners'
express and clear demands to vacate the subject property, the last of which was dated February
12, 2013. It is evidently clear that the complaint for unlawful detainer, filed on August 6, 2013,
was made within one year from the time the last formal demand to vacate was made.
It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of an indefeasible title to property in favor of the
person in whose name the title appears. It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of
the land described therein. Hence, petitioners as the titleholders are entitled to all the attributes of
ownership of the property including possession.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
SPOUSES DARITO P. NOCUENCA AND LUCILLE B. NOCUENCA,
COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. ALFREDO T. BENSI, RESPONDENT.

Article 536 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is
a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive
another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should
refuse to deliver the thing.

While lawyers are mandated to act with dignity and in a manner that inspires confidence to the
legal profession, their rights must still be protected just like every ordinary individual. The legal
profession and the threat of disbarment should not be used as a means to provoke lawyers who
are acting well within their rights.

MRS. CONSOLACION V. TIÑA v. STA. CLARA ESTATE +

Time and again, this Court has consistently held that where the issue of ownership is inseparably
linked to that of possession, adjudication of the issue on ownership is not final and binding, but
merely for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of
ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title
to the property.[26] In an ejectment case, questions as to the validity of the title cannot be resolved
definitively. A separate action to directly attack the validity of the title must be filed, as was in
fact filed by petitioner, to fully thresh out as to who possesses a valid title over the subject
property. Thus, any ruling on ownership that was passed upon in the ejectment case is not and
should not be binding on Civil Case No. 00-11133.

REPUBLIC v. JORGE CASTILLO +

As to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the complaint for expropriation, we hold that,
at the time of the institution of this case in 1980, Section 1(a) of P.D. No. 478, otherwise known
as "Defining the Powers and Functions of the Office of the Solicitor General" provides that the
Solicitor General has the power to represent the government and its officers before this Court
and the CA, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which
the government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. Moreover, Section 1(k)
of P.D. No. 478 likewise provides that the Solicitor General can act and represent the RP and/or
the people before any court, tribunal, body or commission in any matter, action or proceedings
which, in his opinion, affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require.
With the foregoing in mind, we rule that the Solicitor General has the authority to initiate the
present expropriation case against the respondents.

RODOLFO CARANTO v. ANITA AGRA CARANTO +

In civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff, who is required to establish his/her
case by a preponderance of evidence.[31] Preponderance of evidence is defined as the weight,
credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible
evidence."[32] It is a phrase that, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
that is more convincing to the court as it is worthier of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto.

HEIRS OF AURIO T. CASIÑO v. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES +

As a rule, in an action for quieting of title, the plaintiff or complainant must demonstrate a legal
or equitable title to, or an interest in the subject property. He must likewise show that the deed,
claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that purportedly casts a cloud on his title is in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF

CONSUELO SANTIAGO GARCIA CATALINO TANCHANCO AND RONALDO
TANCHANCO, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIVIDAD GARCIA SANTOS, RESPONDENT.

It is settled that "the law favors testacy over intestacy” and hence, "the probate of the will cannot
be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus,
unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be rendered
nugatory." In a similar way, "testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent
take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose."
The main issue which the court must determine in a probate proceeding is the due execution or
the extrinsic validity of the will as provided by Section 1, Rule 75[124] of the Rules of Court. The
probate court cannot inquire into the intrinsic validity of the will or the disposition of the estate
by the testator. Thus, due execution is "whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely
executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law"

PRYCE PROPERTIES CORP. v. NARCISO R. NOLASCO +

Section 4 of RA 6552 requires four (4) conditions before the seller may actually cancel the
contract thereunder: first, the defaulting buyer has paid less than two (2) years of
installments; second, the seller must give such defaulting buyer a sixty (60)-day grace period,
reckoned from the date the installment became due; third, if the buyer fails to pay the
installments due at the expiration of the said grace period, the seller must give the buyer a notice
of cancellation and/or a demand for rescission by notarial act; and fourth, the seller may
actually cancel the contract only after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the buyer's receipt of
the said notice of cancellation and/or demand for rescission by notarial act.
In claiming that it had validly rescinded its contract to sell with Nolasco, Pryce relies on two
documents: a written Contract to Sell, which sets out an automatic cancellation provision in case
of default and which Pryce alleges that Nolasco impliedly agreed to, and its denial of the refund
as asserted in its Answer with Counterclaims against Nolasco's Complaint before the RTC.
A notarial rescission contemplated under RA 6552 is a unilateral cancellation by a seller of a
perfected contract thereunder acknowledged by a notary public and accompanied by competent
evidence of identity.[18] This notarial notice of rescission has peculiar technical requirements.
Rescission unmakes a contract. Necessarily, the rights and obligations emanating from a
rescinded contract are extinguished. Being a mode of nullifying contracts and their correlative
rights and obligations, rescission thus must be conveyed in an unequivocal manner and couched
in unmistakable terms. This is so as not to restrict the parties therein to mere guesswork in
determining their contractual status, in mapping out their causes of action, if any, against each
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
other, in deciding on their remedies should they be aggrieved by the rescission and find the need
for redress, and in estimating the prescriptive periods of such legal remedies. Basic fairness
empowers this rule.

APOLINARIO VALDEZ v. HEIRS OF ANTERO CATABAS +

We clarified that a possessor or occupant of property may be a possessor in the concept of an

owner prior to the determination that the property is alienable and disposable agricultural land.
Thus, the computation of the period of possession may include the period of adverse possession
prior to the declaration that the land is alienable and disposable. Though at the time of his
application, the subject property was not yet classified as alienable and disposable, the
subsequent declaration thereof should be considered in Antero's favor whose free patent
application was still pending and subsisting at that time and is not canceled up to this time.

ARTURO C. CALUBAD v. BILLY M. ACERON +

While it is true that petitioner Calubad is not a party to Civil Case No. Q-93-18011, the
foregoing provision states that the Resolution dated December 13, 2004 is conclusive and
binding upon him being the successor-in-interest of Oliver who acquired title to the subject
property after Civil Case No. Q-93-18011 has become final and executory. As a general rule, a
person not impleaded and given the opportunity to present his or her case cannot be bound by the
decision. However, having acquired alleged interest over the subject property only after the
finality of Civil Case No. Q-93-18011, he is bound by the judgment and the determination of
rights of the original parties therein.

In other words, Calubad, being a privy to the judgment debtor, Oliver, can be reached by an
order of execution.] Evidently, petitioner Calubad's claim over the subject property is not adverse
to that of Oliver as he derived his alleged ownership or interest thereof from Oliver by virtue of a
contract of loan and deed of real estate mortgage. Hence, petitioner Calubad cannot enforce his
alleged interest or claim over the subject property as against Aceron who is the adjudged owner
of the subject property in Civil Case No. Q-93-18011 against his predecessor-in-interest Oliver;
nor exempt himself from the execution of Civil Case No. Q-93-18011 on the pretext that he is a
purchaser in good faith and for value relying on the indefeasibility of a Torrens title.

Furthermore, petitioner Calubad's resort to the remedy of annulment of judgment under Rule 47
is unnecessary as the same extends only to a party in whose favor the remedies of new trial,
reconsideration, appeal, and petition for relief from judgment are no longer available through no
fault of said party. As a non-party in Civil Case No. Q-93-18011, petitioner Calubad could not
bring the action for annulment of judgment considering that the remedies of new trial,
reconsideration, appeal or setting the judgment aside through a petition for relief are not available
to him in the first instance.

Moreover, even assuming that petitioner Calubad can avail of the relief under Rule 47, such an
action would not finally determine his rights over the subject property as against the competing
rights of the original parties. Annulment of judgment is an equitable relief not because a party-
litigant thereby gains another opportunity to reopen the already-final judgment but because a
party-litigant is enabled to be discharged from the burden of being bound by a judgment that was
an absolute nullity to begin with.

Finally, an action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court does not
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
involve the merits of the final order of the trial court. The issues of whether the subsequent
mortgage of the subject property by Oliver to petitioner Calubad and the indefeasibility of a
Torrens title give petitioner a right of ownership over the subject property superior to that of
Aceron are outside the scope of the present petition for review. To resolve such issues requires a
review of evidence which this Court obviously cannot do in this petition. An action for
annulment of judgment is an independent action where the judgment or resolution sought to be
annulled is rendered and is not an appeal of the judgment or resolution therein. Thus, the issue of
petitioner Calubad's alleged interest on or ownership of the subject property cannot be addressed
in this petition for review.

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF JULIETA L. DANICO +

In fine, the NPC and the Spouses Danico entered into two deeds of sale and stipulated that of the
two Statements of Account, the Statement of Account as of December 31, 1985 pertained to the
first deed of sale while the Statement of Account as of April 30, 1985 pertained to the second
deed of sale. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the two deeds of sale are clear and unambiguous
as to the existence of the two statements of account. In fact, both the Spouses Danico and the
NPC adhered and agreed to the terms, conditions and stipulations embodied in the two deeds of
sale knowing fully well the existence of the two statements of account.

Article 1370 of the Civil Code provides that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no
doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall
control. If, indeed, the stipulations in the said two deeds of sale did not express the true intention
of the parties, both the Spouses Danico and the NPC could have filed the corresponding action
for reformation of the contract. But they did not do so. Besides, both deeds of sale had been
executed on the same day, that is, on September 9, 1985. Thus, the parties knew at the time of
their execution the existence of the two Statements of Account as stipulated in the contracts.
They cannot now impugn the existence of Statement of Account as of April 30, 1985 when the
words of both contracts are clear and readily understandable. The contract is the law between the
parties. Thus, it should be interpreted according to their literal meaning and should not be
interpreted beyond their obvious intendment.
As to respondent NPC's liability to pay interest, Article 1956 of the Civil Code states that no
interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing. As can be gleaned from
the foregoing provision, payment of monetary interest is allowed only if: (1) there was an
express stipulation for the payment of interest; and (2) the agreement for the payment of interest
was reduced in writing. The concurrence of the two conditions is required for the payment of
monetary interest. Thus, We have held that collection of interest without any stipulation therefor
in writing is prohibited by law.

In the case at bar, it is clearly apparent that the two deeds of sale do not contain any stipulation
as to the payment of monetary interest. Contrary to the contention of petitioner DBP, the
stipulation as to interest in the original agricultural loan dated April 22, 1977 and the Deed of
Conditional Sale dated October 10, 1985 are not applicable to NPC as the latter is not privy to
the said contracts.

REPUBLIC v. MANUEL M. CARAIG +

HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
The OSG is not only raising a question of law, i.e. on whether the evidence presented by Manuel
was sufficient to prove that the subject land is alienable and disposable. It is also raising a
question of fact as it seeks the Court's determination as to the veracity and truthfulness of the
testimonies of the witnesses presented by Manuel in support of his claim that he and his
predecessors-in-interest were in actual, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
ownership of the land even before June 12, 1945. Consequently, the Court is constrained to
exercise its jurisdiction in the case since the errors raised by the OSG in its Petition, being mixed
questions of fact and of law, are not proper subjects of an appeal by certiorari.
In any case, the Petition is still dismissible for utter lack of merit.
No less than the Constitution prescribes under the Regalian Doctrine that all lands which do not
appear to be within private ownership are public domain and hence presumed to belong to the
State. As such, a person applying for registration has the burden of proof that the land sought to
be registered is alienable or disposable. He must present incontrovertible evidence that the land
subject of the application has been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or
alienated to a private person by the State and no longer remains a part of the inalienable public
domain. With the presentation of the CENRO certificates as evidence, together with the
documentary evidence, Manuel substantially complied with the legal requirement that the land
must be proved to be an alienable and disposable part of the public domain.
in Republic v. TA.N Properties, Inc., and similar cases which impose a strict requirement to
prove that the public land is alienable and disposable, especially in this case when the Decisions
of the lower court and the Court of Appeals were rendered prior to these rulings. To establish
that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable public land, the general rule
remains: all applications for original registration under the Property Registration Decree must
include both (1) a CENRO or PENRO certification and (2) a certified true copy of the original
classification made by the DENR Secretary.
As an exception, however, the courts — in their sound discretion and based solely on the
evidence presented on record — may approve the application, pro hac vice, on the ground of
substantial compliance showing that there has been a positive act of government to show the
nature and character of the land and an absence of effective opposition from the
government. This exception shall only apply to applications for registration currently
pending before the trial court prior to this Decision and shall be inapplicable to all future
applications.

Manuel filed his application for original registration on September 2, 2002. The MTC granted
the same on February 28, 2007 or 15 months before the promulgation of T.A.N. Properties.
Substantial compliance on the legal requirements should therefore be applied in this case. Thus,
Manuel duly proved that Lot No. 5525-B is alienable and disposable.

BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK v. EDGARDO C. YPIL +

It highlights that the Promissory Note stipulated that in the event of default, CSTC's remaining
obligations with the Bank will immediately become due and payable even without a demand
notice. It points out that CSTC had already defaulted on its obligations under the Promissory
when the Notice of Garnishment was served to the Bank. Hence, the Bank asserts that it acted
correctly when it formally debited CSTC's deposit to reflect the legal compensation which
automatically took place even prior to the service of the Notice of Garnishment on February 4,
2004. Moreover, the Bank contends that since legal compensation occurs by operation of law,
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
the deposits could not have been the proper subject of the Notice of Garnishment and could not
be placed in custodia legis.
It is settled that "[c]ompensation is a mode of extinguishing to the concurrent amount the debts
of persons who in their own right are creditors and debtors of each other. The object of
compensation is the prevention of unnecessary suits and payments thru the mutual extinction by
operation of law of concurring debts."
jurisprudence states that "the diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a
family. Banks are required to exercise the highest degree of diligence in its banking
transactions." In view of this, BDO Unibank, Inc. should recognize that it should be diligent and
circumspect in its dealings with its clients, especially with regard to transactions that involve
loans and credits. If only it had properly monitored the accounts of its clients, BDO Unibank,
Inc. would not have been remiss in assuring that CSTC fulfills its end of the loan or even in
exercising its option to offset the company's deposits with that of its outstanding obligations in
order to protect the Bank's interests. Unfortunately, it has to face the consequences of its
inattention to detail.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PETITIONER, VS. CENTRAL BANK OF THE

PHILIPPINES (NOW BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS) AND CITIBANK, N.A.,
RESPONDENTS.

CBP's establishment of clearing house facilities for its member banks to which Valentino and
Estacio were assigned as Bookkeeper and Janitor-Messenger, respectively, is a governmental
function. As such, the State or CBP in this case, is liable only for the torts committed by its
employee when the latter acts as a special agent but not when the said employee or official
performs his or her functions that naturally pertain to his or her office. A special agent is defined
as one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the
duties of his office. Evidently, both Valentino and Estacio are not considered as special agents of
CBP during their commission of the fraudulent acts against petitioner BPI as they were regular
employees performing tasks pertaining to their offices, namely, bookkeeping and janitorial-
messenger. Thus, CBP cannot be held liable for any damage caused to petitioner BPI by reason
of Valentino and Estacio's unlawful acts.
Nonetheless, even assuming that CBP is an ordinary employer, it still cannot be held liable.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that an employer shall be liable for the damages caused
by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. An act is deemed an assigned
task if it is "done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the
account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage." Obviously,
Valentino and Estacio's fraudulent acts of tampering with and pilfering of documents are not in
furtherance of CBP's interests nor done for its account as the said acts were unauthorized and
unlawful. Also, petitioner BPI has the burden to prove that Valentino and Estacio's fraudulent
acts were performed within the scope of their assigned tasks, which it failed to do. It is only then
that the presumption that CBP, as employer, was negligent would arise which then compels CBP
to show evidence that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
Thus, where a public officer acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, any injury or damage
caused by such acts is his or her own personal liability and cannot be imputed to the State.
The fraudulent acts of CBP's employees Valentino and Estacio, were evidently not pursuant to
their functions and were in excess of or without authority; therefore, any injury or damage
caused by such acts to petitioner BPI shall be Valentino's and Estacio's own personal liabilities
which should not be imputed to CBP as their employer.
Finally, anent the issue of Citibank's liability as the collecting bank, we affirm the trial court's
dismissal of the third-party complaint against it. In this case, the subject checks were not
returned to Citibank before the lapse of the clearing period. Thus, Citibank acted within its
authority in allowing the withdrawal of said checks after the lapse of the clearing period without
any notice of dishonor from the drawee bank, petitioner BPI. The remedy, therefore, of petitioner
BPI lies against the parties responsible for the tampering with and pilfering of the subject checks
and other bank documents which resulted in the total damage of P9 million.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HEREDEROS DE CIRIACO

CHUNACO DISTELERIA INCORPORADA, RESPONDENT.

An applicant for land registration must prove that the land sought to be registered has been
declared by the President or the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. Specifically, an applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved by
the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. A
certificate of land classification status issued by the CENRO or PENRO of the DENR and
approved by the DENR Secretary must also be presented to prove that the land subject of the
application for registration is alienable and disposable, and that it falls within the approved area
per verification survey by the PENRO or CENRO. A CENRO or PENRO certification alone is
insufficient to prove the alienable and disposable nature of the land sought to be registered. It is
the original classification by the DENR Secretary or the President which is essential to prove that
the land is indeed alienable and disposable.

EULOGIO ALDE v. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA +

This Court agrees with Alde that the MLA remains valid even beyond the posting and
publication thereof because as an administrative proceeding before the CENRO, it is in the
nature of an action quasi in rem.

In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding
is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi
in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended
to operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to
ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are
binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.

Thus, the City Government of Zamboanga is not without recourse. It can legally step in and
assert its interest after the expiration of the lease awarded to Alde.

In defending its case, it bears noting that the City Government did not present any presidential
proclamation, executive order, statute, investigative report by the LMB or an administrative
action, that clearly reserved the subject lots for public use by the local government. Not even the
Local Government Code empowers local government units to reserve, on their own, particular
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
public lands for the private domain or patrimonial property of the Government. By statute, this
power to classify public lands as alienable and disposable and to relegate to the private domain
or patrimonial property, is reposed in the President and the DENR Secretary, as delegated to
them by Congress, through CA 141 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705. Therefore, they
cannot delegate the same to another office or officer, such as the City Government of
Zamboanga. What has once been delegated by Congress can no longer be further delegated or
redelegated by the original delegate to another, as expressed in the Latin maxim - Delegata
potestas non potest delegari.

NINIA P. LUMAUAN v. COA +

Petitioner can be held personally liable for the disallowed benefit to the extent of the amount
she actually and individually received pursuant to our ruling in Madera v. Commission on
Audit.

In Madera, We promulgated the following rules on return of disallowed amounts, viz.:

1. If a Notice of Disallowance is set aside by the Court, no return shall be required from any
of the persons held liable therein;

2. If a Notice of Disallowance is upheld, the rules on return are as follows:

a. Approving and certifying officers who acted in good faith, regular performance of
official functions, and with the diligence of a good father of the family are not
civilly liable to return consistent with Section 38 of the Administrative Code of
1987;

b. Approving and certifying officers who are clearly shown to have acted in bad
faith, malice, or gross negligence are, pursuant to Section 43 of the
Administrative Code of 1987, solidarily liable to return only the net disallowed
amount which, as discussed herein, excludes amounts excused under the
following sections 2c and 2d.

c. Recipients - whether approving or certifying officers or mere passive

recipients - are liable to return the disallowed amounts respectively received
by them, unless they are able to show that the amounts they received were
genuinely given in consideration of services rendered.

d. The Court may likewise excuse the return of recipients based on undue prejudicie,
social justice considerations, and other bona fide exceptions as it may determine
on a case to case basis. (Emphasis supplied).

A payee or recipient may be excused from returning the disallowed amount when he/she has
shown that he/she was "actually entitled to what he/[she] received" or "when undue prejudice
will result from requiring payees to return or where social justice or humanitarian considerations
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

are attendant."

We have reviewed the records and found none of the extenuating circumstances to be present.

To recall, the benefit subject in this case is accrued COLA. As pointed out by the COA,
petitioner is not entitled to said allowance because it was already incorporated in the
standardized salary rates of government employees. Neither was it established that ordering its
return would unduly prejudice petitioner. It was also not shown that social justice or
humanitarian considerations were extant to the instant case. Thus, there is no justifiable
circumstance present that would excuse petitioner from returning the disallowed benefit to the
extent of the amount she actually and individually received.

Finally, pursuant to our pronouncement in Madera, petitioner should only be held liable to return
the disallowed amount corresponding to the amount actually and individually received by her.

ARAKOR CONSTRUCTION v. GADDI

"[i]f any one party to a supposed contract was already dead at the time of Its execution, such
contract is undoubtedly simulated and false, and, therefore, null and void by reason of its having
been made after the death of the party who appears as one of the contracting parties therein."
Indeed, "no one can give what one does not have; nemo dat quod non habet. One can sell only
what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more right than what the
seller can transfer legally."

HOME GUARANTY CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. ELVIRA S. MANLAPAZ,

RESPONDENT.

Jurisprudence teaches that "the parties to a contract are the real parties-in-interest in an action
upon it." As such, "[t]he basic principle of relativity of contracts is that contracts can only bind
the parties who entered into it, and cannot favor or prejudice a third person, even if he is aware
of such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof'.
Indeed, "'[w]here there is no privity of contract, there is likewise no obligation or liability to
speak about."
Section 25 of P.D. No. 957 states:
SEC. 25. Issuance of Title. – The owner or developer shall deliver the title of the lot or unit to the
buyer upon full payment of the lot or unit.

To recapitulate and for future guidance, the guidelines laid down in the case of Eastern Shipping
Lines are accordingly modified to embody BSP-MB Circular No. 799, as follows:
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi contracts, delicts or
quasi-delicts is breached, the contravener can be held liable for damages. The provisions under
Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable
damages.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory
damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan
or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in
writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be
computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the
provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest
on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of
6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages,
except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly,
where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from
the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but when such
certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall
begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the
quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base
for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the
rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 6%
per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then
an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
And, in addition to the above, judgments that have become final and executory prior to July 1,
2013, shall not be disturbed and shall continue to be implemented applying the rate of interest
fixed therein.

REPUBLIC v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE

An applicant for land registration must prove that the land is an alienable and disposable land of
the public domain.

Certifications issued by the CENRO, or specialists of the DENR, as well as Survey Plans
prepared by the DENR containing annotations that the subject lots are alienable, do not
constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the property sought to be
registered belongs to the inalienable public domain. Rather, this Court stressed the importance of
proving alienability by presenting a copy of the original classification of the land approved by
the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.

In T.A.N. Properties, the Court ruled that it is not enough for the CENRO or the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) to certify that the land is alienable and
disposable. The applicant for original registration must present a copy of the original land
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records to establish that the land is alienable and disposable. In ruling in
this wise, the Court explained that the CENRO or the PENRO are not the official repository or
legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and
disposable. As such, the certifications they issue relating to the character of the land cannot be
considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

Thus, as things stand, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be
accompanied by (1) a CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. (Emphasis supplied)

However, despite this pronouncement in T.A.N. Properties during the pendency of the case in the
appellate court, the PNP did not make any attempt to submit the required twin certifications in
order to prove that the subject lots have been classified as alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. The PNP failed to refute the CENRO Report by submitting the twin certifications
as required in T.A.N. Properties. An applicant for land registration bears the burden of proving
that the land applied for registration is alienable and disposable.

(important)

The Court further elaborated on the reason behind the rule on substantial compliance in Republic
v. San Mateo. In the said case, the Court explained that the rule on substantial compliance was
allowed in Vega due to the lack of opportunity for the applicant to comply with the requirements
provided in T.A.N. Properties. The Court explained:

In Vega, the Court was mindful of the fact that the trial court rendered its decision on November
13, 2003, way before the rule on strict compliance was laid down in T.A.N. Properties on June
26, 2008. Thus, the trial court was merely applying the rule prevailing at the time, which was
substantial compliance. Thus, even if the case reached the Supreme Court after the promulgation
of T.A.N. Properties, the Court allowed the application of substantial compliance, because there
was no opportunity for the registrant to comply with the Court's ruling in T.A.N. Properties, the
trial court and the CA already having decided the case prior to the promulgation of T.A.N.
Properties.
Conversely, if there is an opportunity for the applicant to comply with the ruling in T.A.N.
Properties (i.e., the case was still pending before the trial court after the promulgation of T.A.N.
Properties), the rule on strict compliance shall be applied. From the foregoing, it is clear that
substantial compliance may be applied, at the discretion of the courts, only if the trial court
rendered its decision on the application prior to June 26, 2008, the date of the promulgation
of T.A.N. Properties. (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)

In fine, We find that the respondent's evidence does not suffice to entitle it to register the subject
lots. The PNP failed to present any evidence showing that the DENR Secretary had indeed
released the subject lots as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.

DIOSCORO POLIÑO BACALA v. HEIRS OF SPS. JUAN POLIÑO AND CORAZON

ROM

Gross inadequacy or simulation of price neither affects nor invalidates a sale, but it can be shown
that the parties may have really intended a donation or some other act or contract.

Donation has three indispensable elements: (1) the reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (2)
the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and (3) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus
donandi.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

A resolutory condition extinguishes a transaction that, for a time, existed and discharges the
obligations created thereunder. It was stipulated in the Agreement that Anecito shall enjoy
the usufruct of the subject property, and that upon Anecito's death, Juan shall support and give
financial assistance to Aquilino and Ducepino. These stipulations in the Agreement are
resolutory as Anecito and Juan also agreed that breach of the terms and conditions of the
Agreement shall render the Deed of Sale non-effective and nugatory.

Substantial breaches of contract are fundamental violations as would defeat the very object of the
parties in making the agreement. The happening of a resolutory condition is a substantial breach
that may give either party thereto the option to bring an action to rescind the contract and/or
seek damages.

As a general rule, the power to rescind an obligation must be invoked judicially and cannot be
exercised solely on a party's own judgment that the other has committed a breach of the
obligation. As an exception, an injured party need not resort to court action in order to rescind a
contract when the contract itself provides that it may be revoked or cancelled upon violation of
its terms and conditions.

CELEDENIO C. DEMEGILLO v. ARTURO S. LUMAMPAO

The issue in an accion publiciana is the "better right of possession" of real property
independently of title. It is therefore "an action for recovery of the right to possess and is a
plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a regional trial court to determine the better
right of possession of realty independently of the title."When the parties, however, raise the issue
of ownership, "the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties has the
right to possess the property."

Simply put, DARAB adjudicators have primary and exclusive original jurisdiction to determine
and adjudicate cases involving the correction, partition, cancellation, secondary and subsequent
issuances of CLOAs. Meanwhile, the DARAB is vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction to
review, reverse, modify, alter or affirm resolutions, orders, and decisions of its adjudicators.

Public land patent, when registered in the corresponding Register of Deeds, is a veritable Torrens
title, and becomes as indefeasible upon the expiration of one (1) year from the date of issuance
thereof."

The RTC was without jurisdiction or power to order the reconveyance of the land in dispute as
this can be done only through a definitive ruling thereof - something which cannot be done by
the court in an accion publiciana.

The age-old rule that a person who has a Torrens title over the land is entitled to possession
thereof.

SPS. EUGENIO DE VERA AND ROSALIA PADILLA v. FAUSTA CATUNGAL

HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

It is important to note that "in determining whether consent is vitiated by any of these
circumstances, courts are given a wide latitude in weighing the facts or circumstances in a given
case and in deciding in favor of what they believe actually occurred, considering the age,
physical infirmity, intelligence, relationship, and conduct of the parties at the time of the
execution of the contract and subsequent thereto, irrespective of whether the contract is in a
public or private writing." A voidable contract is valid and binding until annulled in a proper
court action.

Although notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity and are accorded evidentiary
weight as regards their due execution, this presumption, however, may be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence.

When one of the contracting parties is unable to read or is otherwise illiterate, and fraud is
alleged, a presumption that there is fraud or mistake in obtaining consent of that party arises.
Article 1332 offers protection to contracting parties that are unfortunate and disadvantaged to be
illiterate and unable to read. It contemplates a situation where "a contract is entered into but the
consent of one of the contracting parties is vitiated by mistake or fraud committed by the other."
This provision also modifies the principle that a party is presumed to know the contents and
import of a document to which he affixed his signature.

CRISTINA R. SEMING v. EMELITA P. ALAMAG

It is well settled that the object of every contract must be determinate. "The requisite that a thing
be determinate is satisfied if at the time the contract is entered into, the thing is capable of being
made determinate without the necessity of a new or further agreement between the parties."

Petitioner relied on the October 22, 1990 and January 23, 1991 receipts to prove that Natividad
transferred and conveyed to petitioner the former's 771-square meter portion of Lot 512-C. But
as mentioned above, said receipts are null and void, and thus, should not be given evidentiary
weight and credence. Notably, even if we consider the receipts presented by petitioner, the exact
portion of Lot 512-C allegedly sold to petitioner was not specified. The phrase "[t]his amount is
payment only for two lots" renders the object of the sale ambiguous as it does not even define the
metes and bounds of the lots which are supposedly the subject of the sale.

VILORIA VS. GAETOS

In an action for quieting of title, the plaintiff has the burden to show by preponderance of
evidence that they have a legal and equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the
action.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
EDUARDO ATIENZA, PETITIONER, VS. GOLDEN RAM ENGINEERING SUPPLIES
& EQUIPMENT CORPORATION AND BARTOLOME TORRES, RESPONDENTS.

Solidary liability cannot be lightly inferred. "There is solidary liability when the obligation
expressly so states, when the law so provides, or when the nature of the obligation so requires.
Settled is the rule that a director or officer shall only be personally liable for the obligations of
the corporation, if the following conditions concur: (1) the complainant alleged in the complaint
that the director or officer assented to patently unlawful acts of the corporation, or that the officer
was guilty of gross negligence or bad faith; and (2) the complainant clearly and convincingly
proved such unlawful acts, negligence or bad faith."

The bad faith of respondents in refusing to repair and subsequently replace a defective engine
which already underperformed during sea trial and began malfunctioning six (6) months after its
commissioning has been clearly established. Respondents' uncaring attitude towards fixing the
engine which relates to MV Ace I's seaworthiness amounts to bad faith. Thus, the RTC's grant of
moral damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit has sufficient basis.

SPOUSES EUGENIO PONCE AND EMILIANA NEROSA, PETITIONERS, VS. JESUS

ALDANESE, RESPONDENT.

Respondent Jesus inherited a property from his father in 1973. he has been paying taxes on said
property and the tax declaration was in his name. in 1996 or after 23 years he discovered that the
ponce spouses were occupying the property. the ponce spouses also produced a tax declaration
which the court found to refer to another property. the ponce spouses also argued that they
possessed the property for more than 20 years and therefore they are the owners by possession.
court ruled that the fact that Jesus was paying the taxes indicates that he possesses it in the
concept of an owner for nobody in his or her right mind would be paying taxes for a property
that is not in his or her actual or constructive possession.

Indeed, while the tax declaration is not conclusive proof of ownership of Jesus over the subject
land, it is an indication however that he possesses the property in the concept of an owner for
nobody in his or her right mind would be paying taxes for a property the1t is not in his or her
actual or constructive possession.

PATRICIO G. GEMINA v. HEIRS OF GERARDO V. ESPEJO

When the party-defendant is present, the absence of his counsel during pre-trial shall not ipso
facto result in the plaintiffs ex parte presentation of evidence.

It is hornbook doctrine that the entitlement to the possession of real property belongs to its
registered owner. However, the registered owner must seek proper judicial remedy and comply
with the requisites of the chosen action in order to recover possession of a real property from the
occupant who has actual and physical possession thereof. Furthermore, it must be emphasized
that the plaintiff must not bank on the weakness of the defendant's title, hence, must establish his
title and the identity of the property because of the possibility that neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant is entitled or even more the true owner of the property in dispute.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
ARTURO A. DACQUEL, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES ERNESTO SOTELO AND
FLORA DACQUELSOTELO, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT,
IMELDA SOTELO, RESPONDENTS.

A deed of donation over a parcel of land appears to have been executed. But one of the
signatories was dead 36 years earlier. The deed of donation was therefore void.

Here, respondents successfully refuted said presumption of regularity. Rodriguez, the notary
public, testified that all the parties personally appeared before him when the Deed of Donation
was notarized. Interestingly, Eufrosina, the wife of Valentin and one of the signatories in the
Deed, died in 1958, or 36 years before the Deed of Donation was executed. It is worthy to note
that Isidro, one of the petitioners, admitted his mother’s demise during the trial.

Thus, Eufrosina could not have personally appeared before the notary public unless by some
miracle she had risen from her grave to sign the Deed of Donation. The only plausible
conclusion is that another person stood in her place, and that the notary public did not duly
ascertain if the person who signed the Deed of Donation was actually Eufrosina.

What happened now to the void deed of donation?

It is subject to attack at any time. An action to declare the existence of a void contract does not
prescribe.

The Deed of Donation is an absolute nullity hence it is subject to attack at any time. Its defect, i.
e., the absence of consent of respondents, is permanent and incurable by ratification or
prescription. In other words, the action is imprescriptible. This is in accord with Article 1410 of
the Civil Code which states that an action to declare the inexistence of a void contract does not
prescribe.

What happened now to the land, subject of the deed of donation.

The land is held by petitioners in trust for respondents who are the real owners. Respondents can
institute a case against petitioners for reconveyance of the property anytime.

Since the Deed of Donation is void ab initio due to the illegality in its execution, the disputed
land is deemed to be simply held by petitioners in trust for respondents who are the real owners.
Respondents therefore have the right to institute a case against petitioners for the reconveyance
of the property at any time. The well-settled rule is that “[a]s long as the land wrongfully
registered under the Torrens system is still in the name of the person who caused such
registration, an action in personam will lie to compel him to reconvey the property to the real
owner.

LAURO CARDINEZ v. SPS. PRUDENCIO AND CRESENCIA CARDINEZ

Deed of Donation is void ab initio in the absence of respondents' consent. The notarized Deed of
Donation does not enjoy the presumption of regularity.

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK v. BASES CONVERSION

HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

It is settled that the requirement of just compensation is not satisfied by the mere deposit with
any accessible bank of the provisional compensation determined by the LBP or the DAR, and its
subsequent release to the landowner after compliance with the legal requirements set forth by
law. What is material is the fact that the landowner remains unpaid notwithstanding the taking of
the property.

It is settled that certificates of title issued in administrative proceedings, such as EPs and
CLOAs, are as indefeasible as those issued in judicial proceedings. In line therewith, Section 24
of the CARL, as amended by RA 9700, now explicitly provides that CLOAs enjoy the same
indefeasibility and security afforded to all titles under the Torrens System.

ATTY. ARISTOTLE T. DOMINGUEZ v. BANK OF COMMERCE

In petitions for cancellation of adverse claim, trial courts are not precluded from adjudicating
matters involving attorney's fees. While the trial court is directed to speedily hear the case on the
validity of the adverse claim, there is no prohibition or any restriction on the trial court from
hearing issues on money judgment particularly on matters concerning attorney's fees and lien. A
Compromise Agreement between the counsels client and the adverse party is
one of the factors is determining the counsel's
lawful fees for the legal services he rendered.

In charging lien to secure attorney's fees, money judgment and execution are necessary.

PNTC COLLEGES v. TIME REALTY

"it is well to remember that a contract is the law between the parties. Obligations arising from
contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in
good faith. The parties are allowed by law to enter into stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions
they may deem convenient which bind the parties as long as they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy."

Essentially, the stipulations in the Contract of Lease "are clear and show no contravention, of
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. As such, they are valid, and the parties'
rights shall be adjudicated according to them, being the primary law between them. When the
terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties,
the rule is settled that the literal meaning of its stipulations should control."

Relevantly, the lease contract provides that Time Really has the prerogative to take control or
possession of PNTC's properties in the event the latter violates a provision of the contract,
including non-payment of rent and other charges. Through its judicial admissions which the CA
already took note, there is no doubt that PNTC should settle the said obligations in accordance
with the Contract of Lease and applicable laws.

To expound, PNTC incurred the obligations mainly because of Paragraph 23 of the Contract of
Lease which states that Time Realty can retain PNTC's properties as security for unpaid rentals
and other charges.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

PULIDO VS. PEOPLE

a void ab initio marriage is a valid defense in the prosecution for bigamy even without a judicial
declaration of absolute nullity. Consequently, a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of either
the first and second marriages obtained by the accused is considered a valid defense in bigamy.

CARLOS J. VALDES v. LA COLINA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

For a valid novation to take place, the following requisites must concur: "(1) a previous valid
obligation; (2) the agreement of all the parties to the new contract; (3) the extinguishment of the
old contract; and (4) validity of the new one. There must be consent of all the parties to the
substitution, resulting in the extinction of the old obligation and the creation of a valid new
one."[73]
There is no question that the new concept of the Montemar Project, as intimated in the
September 3, 1992 Memorandum of Agreement and the August 31, 1992 Consolidated Deed of
Sale, was wholly incompatible with its original concept earlier agreed upon by the Valdeses and
LCDC. At that point, what was required for the validity of the new concept was Valdeses'
express conformity thereto, with full knowledge that its implementation will denote that their
rights to the 40% share of the proceeds derived from the sale of the Montemar Villa lots will be
novated and converted into a 7.5% equity in MRDC.
In light of the foregoing facts, this Court finds that Gabriel, as the representative of the Valdeses,
had knowledge of the new concept of the Montemar Project, and consented to the entry of
Philcomsat as a new investor, this finding is based on the following established facts: (1) the
August 27, 1992 letter-conformity which bore Gabriel's signature on the conforme portion
thereof; (2) several minutes of the board meetings of MBCI, where MBCI directors, including
Gabriel, discussed the entry of Philcomsat as a possible investor of the Montemar Project; and
(3) the notices sent to the LCRC stockholders and directors of scheduled meetings for the
purpose of discussing the proposed new concept of the said project. We agree with the findings
of the CA that the wordings in the notices sent to Gabriel sufficiently apprised him of the
changes in the Montemar Project.
Jurisprudence has shown that in order to constitute :fraud that provides basis to annul contracts,
it must fulfill two conditions: "First, the fraud must be dolo causante or it must be fraud in
obtaining the consent of the party," and "[s]econd, the fraud must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence and not merely by a preponderance thereof."

MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER, VS. STRONGHOLD

INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,
The purpose of CMVLI is to provide compensation for the death or bodily injuries suffered by
innocent third parties or passengers as a result of the negligent operation and use of motor
vehicles. The victims or their dependents are assured of immediate financial assistance,
regardless of the financial capacity of motor vehicle owners.
The Court ruled that the schedule does not restrict the kinds of damages that petitioner therein
may be made to pay as long as liability is shown to have arisen and the requisites for each kind
of damages are present. The schedule is not an enumeration of the specific kinds of damages that
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

may be awarded. Its purpose was to set limits to the amounts the insurance company would be
liable for in cases of "claims for death, bodily injuries of, professional services and hospital
charges, for services rendered to traffic accident victims"; it does not limit or exclude claims for
other kinds of damages. The Court added that petitioner therein should have used a more specific
and precise language to reflect its intentions as presented in its arguments.

CITY OF TANAUAN, PETITIONER, VS. GLORIA A. MILLONTE, RESPONDENT

"Time and again, we have ruled that 'while it is true that a notarized document carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and has in its favor the
presumption of regularity, this presumption, however, is not absolute."
Article 1410 of the Civil Code relevantly states that "[t]he action or defense for the declaration of
the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe." In other words, "an action that is predicated on
the fact that the conveyance complained of was null and void ab initio is imprescriptible."
Therefore, Millonte, as an heir, could assail the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale even years
after the execution of the document, and even if the title of the property has already been
transferred in the name of the City of Tanauan. The passage of time in this case could not defeat
the legal principle that a null and void contract can be assailed anytime due to the
imprescriptibility of the action. In like manner, given that the action is imprescriptible, the
petitioner cannot invoke laches as a defense. Undeniably, Millonte is not estopped from assailing
the Deed of Absolute Sale specifically since the signatures of the Gonzaga siblings were forged
and without any binding or legal effect.

Jurisprudence teaches that "the 'declaration of nullity of a contract which is void ab

initio operated to restore things to the state and condition in which they were found before the
execution thereof.'"

GODINES v. PLATON DEMAYMAY

Our jurisdiction has long recognized the validity of oral contracts, including oral contracts of
sale. Article 1305 of the Civil Code provides the following definition of a contract:

Article 1305. A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons where by one binds himself,
with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.
Pertinently, Article 1356 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 1356. Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they may have been entered into,
provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. However, when the law requires
that a contract be in some form in order that it may be valid or enforceable, or that a contract be
proved in a certain way, that requirement is absolute and indispensable.

HEIRS OF JESUS P. MAGSAYSAY v. SPS. ZALDY AND ANNALIZA PEREZ

Article 434 of the New Civil Code further provides what a complainant must prove in order to
recover the property:
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on
the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim.
In other words, the person who claims a better right of ownership to the property sought to be
recovered must prove two things: first, the identity of the land claimed, and second, his title
thereto.
The alleged failure of respondents to present evidence notwithstanding, it must be emphasized
that this is a case of reconveyance, with allegations of fraud and misrepresentation. A complaint
for reconveyance is an action which admits the registration of title of another party but claims
that such registration was erroneous or wrongful. It seeks the transfer of the title to the rightful
and legal owner, or to the party who has a superior right over it, without prejudice to innocent
purchasers in good faith. The relief prayed for may be granted on the basis of intrinsic fraud -
fraud committed on the true owner instead of fraud committed on the procedure amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.
The party seeking to recover the property must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that he
or she is entitled to the property, and that the adverse party has committed fraud in obtaining his
or her title.

SPOUSES CALVIN LUTHER R. GENOTIVA AND VIOLET S. GENOTIVA,

PETITIONERS, VS. EQUITABLE-PCI BANK (NOW BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK,
INC.), RESPONDENT.

Duress or intimidation is present "when one of the contracting parties is compelled by a

reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon [their] person or
property, or upon the person or property of [their] spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give
[their] consent."
For intimidation to vitiate consent, the following requisites must be present:
(1) that the intimidation must be the determining cause of the contract, or must have caused the
consent to be given; (2) that the threatened act be unjust or unlawful; (3) that the threat be real
and serious, there being an evident disproportion between the evil and the resistance which all
men can offer, leading to the choice of the contract as the lesser evil; and (4) that it produces
reasonable and well-grounded fear from the fact that the person from whom it comes has the
necessary means or ability to inflict the threatened injury. x x x
Applying the foregoing to this case, it is obvious that BDO's supposed "threat", i.e., its
withholding of Violet's retirement benefits, is not the intimidation referred to by law. The records
show that the bank was unable to release Violet's clearance for the release of her retirement
benefits for the simple reason that she had an existing liability to the bank arising from the Deed
of Suretyship that she executed with her husband and other stockholders of Goldland. Clearly,
such act is neither unjust nor unlawful.

FROILAN NAGAÑO v. LUIS TANJANGCO

HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

There is no incompatibility between PD 27 and EO 228 because EO 228 because EO 228 "deals
with payment of amortization and not on who qualify as legal transferees of lands covered by PD
27." Thus, the prevailing rule is that lands covered by PD 27 can only be validly transferred by
hereditary succession or to the government.

HEIRS OF LEONARDA LATOJA v. HEIRS OF GAVINO LATOJA

The principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title has been carved in case law edicts. This means
that a certificate of title registered under the Torrens System serves as proof of an
incontrovertible title over the property in favor of the individual whose name appears on the
title. With the emergence of the Torrens System, the integrity and conclusiveness of a certificate
of title may be guaranteed and preserved. However, this system frowns upon those who
fraudulently secure a certificate of title to the prejudice of the real owner of the land. Hence,
usurpers who intend to enrich themselves cannot hide under the mantle of the Torrens System
which may only be cancelled, altered or modified through a direct attack where the objective of
the action is to annul or set aside the judgment or enjoin its enforcement
An action for reconveyance based on fraud is a direct attack on a Torrens title. It follows that
despite the finality accorded to a Torrens title, reconveyance may prosper as an equitable remedy
given to the rightful owner of a land that was erroneously registered in the name of another. This
action recognizes the validity of the registration and its incontrovertible nature; it does not
question the indefeasibility of the Torrens title.

Private individuals, aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, may seek direct reconveyance
of a land subject of a free patent where the latter was fraudulently obtained.

PNB vs. LIMSIAMCO

The authority to encumber one's land title naturally includes the authority to perform acts to
disencumber such title.

It has been consistently held by this Court, that the relief afforded by Section 112 of the Land
Registration Act may only be allowed if "there is a unanimity among the parties, or there is no
adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest;" otherwise, the case
becomes controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case. In another case, this Court
has held that "Section 112 authorizes, in our opinion, only alterations which do not impair rights
recorded in the decree, or alterations which, if they do prejudice such rights, are consented to by
all parties concerned or alterations to correct obvious mistakes."

Clearly, the situations above would not require a separate, ordinary action in order for the RTC,
while acting as a cadastral court, to have jurisdiction to rule on the petition for the cancellation of
the annotation of mortgages on the land titles covering the mortgaged lots.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

COMMERCIAL LAW

MARIA LEA JANE I. GESOLGON v. CYBERONE PH. +

While it is true that CyberOne AU owns majority of the shares of CyberOne PH, this,
nonetheless, does not warrant the conclusion that CyberOne PH is a mere conduit of CyberOne
AU. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil applies only in three basic instances, namely: (a)
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
when the separate distinct corporate personality defeats public convenience, as when the
corporate fiction is used as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation; (b) in fraud cases,
or when the corporate entity is used to justify a wrong, protect a fraud, or defend a crime; or (c)
is used in alter ego cases, i.e., where a corporation is essentially a farce, since it is a mere alter
ego or business conduit of a person, or where the corporation is so organized and controlled and
its affairs conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of
another corporation.

We find that the application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is unwarranted in the
present case. First, no evidence was presented to prove that CyberOne PH was organized for the
purpose of defeating public convenience or evading an existing obligation. Second, petitioners
failed to allege any fraudulent acts committed by CyberOne PH in order to justify a wrong,
protect a fraud, or defend a crime. Lastly, the mere fact that CyberOne PH's major stockholders
are CyberOne AU and respondent Mikrut does not prove that CyberOne PH was organized and
controlled and its affairs conducted in a manner that made it merely an instrumentality, agency,
conduit or adjunct of CyberOne AU. In order to disregard the separate corporate personality of a
corporation, the wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established.

Moreover, petitioners failed to prove that CyberOne AU and Mikrut, acting as the Managing
Director of both corporations, had absolute control over CyberOne PH. Even granting that
CyberOne AU and Mikrut exercised a certain degree of control over the finances, policies and
practices of CyberOne PH, such control does not necessarily warrant piercing the veil of
corporate fiction since there was not a single proof that CyberOne PH was formed to defraud
petitioners or that CyberOne PH was guilty of bad faith or fraud.

Hence, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil cannot be applied in the instant case. This
means that CyberOne AU cannot be considered as doing business in the Philippines through its
local subsidiary CyberOne PH. This means as well that CyberOne AU is to be classified as a
non-resident corporation not doing business in the Philippines.
Applying the foregoing, CyberOne AU, as a non-resident foreign corporation which is not doing
business in the Philippines, may be served with summons by extraterritorial service, to wit: (1)
when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffs; (2) when the action relates to, or the
subject of which is property, within the Philippines, in which the defendant claims a lien or an
interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in
part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and (4)
when the defendant non residents property has been attached within the Philippines. In these
instances, service of summons may be effected by (a) personal service out of the country, with
leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of court; or (c) any other manner the court may
deem sufficient.

AGRO FOOD v. VITARICH CORPORATION

"When a corporation intentionally or negligently clothes its officer with apparent authority to act
in its behalf, it is estopped from denying its officer's apparent authority as to innocent third
parties who dealt with this officer in good faith."

MULTI-WARE MANUFACTURING v. CIBELES INSURANCE CORPORATION

The Court explained that the rationale behind the incorporation of "other insurance" clause in fire
policies is to prevent over-insurance and thus avert the perpetration of fraud. When a property
owner obtains insurance policies from two or more insurers in a total amount that exceeds the
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
property's value, the insured may have an inducement to destroy the property for the purpose of
collecting the insurance. The public as well as the insurer is interested in preventing a situation in
which a fire would be profitable to the insured.

Since the policy procured by petitioner from Cibeles Insurance covered the same subject and
interest as that covered by the policies issued by Western Guaranty and Prudential Guarantee, the
existence of other insurance policies referred to under Policy Condition No. 3 is undeniable. The
non-disclosure of these policies to the insurers was fatal to petitioner's right to recover on the
insurance policies.

ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION* AND GUILLERMO DIMOG, PETITIONERS,

VS. SPOUSES MARIO ANTONIO MACAM

RA 8791 enshrines the fiduciary nature of banking that requires high standards of integrity and
performance. The statute now reflects jurisprudential holdings that the banking industry is
impressed with public interest requiring banks to assume a degree of diligence higher than that of
a good father of a family. Thus, all banks are charged with extraordinary diligence in the
handling and care of its deposits as well as the highest degree of diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees.

Section 20 of the GBL allows universal or commercial banks, upon prior approval of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, to open branches or offices within or outside the Philippines. It further
provides that "a bank authorized to establish branches or other offices shall be responsible for all
business conducted in such branches and offices to the same extent and in the same manner as
though such business had all been conducted in the head office. A bank and its branches and
offices shall be treated as one unit."

We cannot overemphasize that the highest degree of diligence required of banks likewise
contemplates such diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. The very nature of
their work which involves handling millions of pesos in daily transactions requires a degree of
responsibility, care and trustworthiness that is far greater than those expected from ordinary
clerks and employees. The bank must not only exercise "high standards of integrity and
performance," it must also insure that its employees do likewise because this is the only way to
insure that the bank will comply with its fiduciary duty.

ALPHA PLUS INTERNATIONAL ENTERPRISES CORP. v. PHILIPPINE CHARTER

INSURANCE CORP.

Like any other contract, parties to a contract of insurance could stipulate on terms and conditions
that would govern them as long as these stipulations are not contrary to law. An insurance
contract is the law between the parties. Its terms and conditions constitute the measure of the
insurer's liability and compliance therewith is a condition precedent to the insured's right to
recovery from the insurer.

Case law teaches that the prescriptive period for the insured's action for indemnity should be
reckoned from the "final rejection" of the claim. The "final rejection" simply means denial by the
insurer of the claims of the insured and not the rejection or denial by the insurer of the insured's
motion or request for reconsideration. The rejection referred to should be construed as
the rejection in the first instance.

To determine the prescription of the subject insurance claim, Article 63 of the Insurance Code as
well as Condition No. 27 of the two fire insurance policies should be considered.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

Section 63 of the Insurance Code states that:

Sec. 63. A condition, stipulation or agreement in any policy of insurance, limiting the time for
commencing an action thereunder to a period of less than one year from the time when the cause
of action accrues, is void.
On the other hand, Condition No. 27 of the parties' fire insurance policies provides:

27. Action or suit clause - If a claim be made and rejected and an action or suit be not
commenced either in the Insurance Commission or any court of competent jurisdiction within
twelve (12) months from receipt of notice of such rejection, or in case of arbitration taking place
as provided herein, within twelve (12) months after due notice of the award made by the
arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, then the claim shall for all purposes be deemed to have been
abandoned and shall not thereafter be recoverable hereunder.

It is settled that respondents' rejection of petitioner's claim was embodied in a Letter dated
January 22, 2009, copy of which was received by petitioner on January 24, 2009. Hence, in
accordance with the parties' Condition No. 27 of their fire insurance policies, the prescriptive
period should be reckoned from petitioner's receipt of the notice of rejection, specifically on
January 24, 2009. One (1) year or 365 days from January 24, 2009 would show that petitioner's
prescriptive period to file its insurance claim ends on January 24, 2010.

METROPLEX BERHAD v. SINOPHIL CORPORATION

Section 38 of the Corporation Code, the pertinent portions of which provide:

Sec. 38. Power to increase or decrease capital stock; incur, create or increase bonded
indebtedness. - No corporation shall increase or decrease its capital stock or incur, create or
increase any bonded indebtedness unless approved by a majority vote of the board of directors,
and at a stockholder's meeting duly called for the purpose, two-thirds (2/3) of the outstanding
capital stock shall favor the increase or diminution of the capital stock, or the incurring, creating
or increasing of any bonded indebtedness. Written notice of the proposed increase
or diminution of the capital stock or of the incurring, creating, or increasing of any bonded
indebtedness and of the time and place of the stockholders' meeting at which the
proposed increase or diminution of the capital stock or the incurring or increasing of any bonded
indebtedness is to be considered, must be addressed to each stockholder at his place of residence
as shown on the books of the corporation and deposited to the addressee in the post office with
postage prepaid, or served personally.

SEC only has the ministerial duty to approve the decrease of a corporation's authorized
capital stock.

Disclosure of corporate actions to the stock exchange is intended to apprise the investing public
of the condition and planned corporate actions of the listed corporation, thereby providing
investors with sufficient, relevant and material information as to the nature of the investment
vehicle and the relationship of the risks and returns associated with it. The corporation's simple
act of disclosing the decrease and delisting to the PSE was more than enough notice to the
investing public. There was nothing in the corporation's act that resulted in grave or irreparable
injury or prejudice to the investing public
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
KLM ROYAL DUTCH AIRLINES, PETITIONER, VS. DR. JOSE M. TIONGCO,
RESPONDENT

Considering that a contract of carriage is vested with public interest, a common carrier is
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently in case of lost or damaged goods
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence. Hence, in an action based on a
breach of contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does not need to prove that the common
carrier was at fault or was negligent. He or she is only required to prove the existence of the
contract and its non-performance by the carrier.

There is no dispute that KLM and Dr. Tiongco entered into a contract of carriage. Dr. Tiongco
purchased tickets from the airline for his trip to Almaty, Kazakhstan. KLM, however, breached
its contract with Dr. Tiongco when it failed to deliver his checked-in suitcase at the designated
place and time. The suitcase contained his clothing for the conference where he was a guest
speaker, a copy of his speech, and his resource materials. Worse, Dr. Tiongco's suitcase was
never returned to him even after he arrived in Manila from Almaty. Thus, KLM's liability for the
lost suitcase was sufficiently established as it failed to overcome the presumption of negligence.

ELIDAD KHO AND VIOLETA KHO, PETITIONERS, VS. SUMMERVILLE GENERAL

MERCHANDISING & CO., INC., RESPONDENT.

Petitioners' product which is a medicated facial cream sold to the public is contained in the same
pink oval-shaped container which had the mark "Chin Chun Su," as that of respondent. While
petitioners indicated in their product the manufacturer's name, the same does not change the fact
that it is confusingly similar to respondent's product in the eyes of the public. As aptly found by
the appellate court, an ordinary purchaser would not normally inquire about the manufacturer of
the product. Petitioners' product and that solely distributed by respondent are similar in the
following respects "1. both are medicated facial creams; 2. both are contained in pink, oval-
shaped containers; and 3. both contain the trademark "Chin Chun Su" x x x The similarities far
outweigh the differences. The general appearance of (petitioners') product is confusingly similar
to (respondent)." Verily, the acts complained of against petitioners constituted the offense of
Unfair Competition and probable cause exists to hold them for trial.

The essential elements of an action for unfair competition are: (1) confusing similarity in the
general appearance of the goods, and (2) intent to deceive the public and defraud a competitor.
The confusing similarity may or may not result from similarity in the marks, but may result from
other external factors in the packaging or presentation of the goods. Likelihood of confusion of
goods or business is a relative concept, to be determined only according to peculiar
circumstances of each case. The element of intent to deceive and to defraud may be inferred from
the similarity of the appearance of the goods as offered for sale to the public.

Unfair competition is always a question of fact. In line with this, We find that with the existence
of probable cause on hand, it would serve the ends of justice if the parties would be able to
present their respective claims and defenses in a full-blown trial. For now, it is sufficient that
probable cause exists to hold petitioners for trial for the unfair competition case filed against
them. Thus, the appellate court did not err when it directed the trial court to reinstate the
Information and proceed with the criminal case before it. Hence, no double jeopardy.

EDUARDO ATIENZA, PETITIONER, VS. GOLDEN RAM ENGINEERING SUPPLIES

& EQUIPMENT CORPORATION AND BARTOLOME TORRES, RESPONDENTS.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
Basic is the principle that a corporation is vested by law with a personality separate and distinct
from that of each person composing or representing it. Equally fundamental is the general rule
that corporate officers cannot be held personally liable for the consequences of their acts, for as
long as these are for and in behalf of the corporation, within the scope of their authority and in
good faith. The separate corporate personality is a shield against the personal liability of
corporate officers, whose acts are properly attributed to the corporation.

TAXATION LAW
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
I-REMIT VS. CIR

I-Remit argues that it has the right to rely on the favorable pronouncement of the CTA Second
Division in its May 23, 2011 Decision. To recall, the Second Division of the Tax Court stated
that "a joint computation, using the total number of shares sold during the IPO (Initial Public
Offering), should determine the IPO tax rate to be used."
However, the pronouncement was an erroneous interpretation of Section 127(B) from which no
vested right may arise. Thus, it cannot be the source of any vested right in favor of petitioner –
more so in this case where the said pronouncement was reversed and reconsidered by the same
court in its August 18,2011 Resolution.
In fine, we rule that the tax on sale of shares of stock in closely held corporations sold or
exchanged through initial public offering under Sec. 127 (B) is separately computed as to shares
offered in primary and secondary offerings.

BASES CONVERSION v. CIR

Section 5, Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the CTA expressly requires a notice to
the parties of the hearings conducted by the CTA En Banc. Specifically for motions for
reconsideration, Section 3, Rule 15 of the same requires the notice to be set for hearing.
Suppletorily, notice of hearing is likewise required under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules
of Court. Thus, the BCDA was required to include a notice of hearing in its Motion for
Reconsideration. That the filing of the motion is optional did not excuse non-compliance since
the BCDA opted to file such motion.

ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. CIR

[T]he only issue is whether BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is a general interpretative rule applicable
to all taxpayers or a specific ruling applicable only to a particular taxpayer.

BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is a general interpretative rule because it was a response to a query
made, not by a particular taxpayer, but by a government agency tasked with processing tax
refunds and credits, that is, the One Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Drawback Center of
the Department of Finance. This government agency is also the addressee, or the entity
responded to, in BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03.
Clearly, BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is a general interpretative rule. Thus, all taxpayers can rely
on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 from the time of its issuance on 10 December 2003 up to its
reversal by this Court in Aichi on 6 October 2010, where this Court held that the 120+30 day
periods are mandatory and jurisdictional.

However, BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 cannot be given retroactive effect for four reasons: first, it
is admittedly an erroneous interpretation of the law; second, prior to its issuance, the BIR held
that the 120-day period was mandatory and jurisdictional, which is the correct interpretation of
the law; third, prior to its issuance, no taxpayer can claim that it was misled by the BIR into
filing a judicial claim prematurely; and fourth, a claim for tax refund or credit, like a claim for
tax exemption, is strictly construed against the taxpayer.

Applying the exception molded in San Roque, i.e., that "all taxpayers can rely on BIR Ruling
No. DA-489-03 from the time of its issuance on 10 December 2003 up to its reversal by this
Court in Aichi on 6 October 2010," EDC's petition for review before the CTA should be
reinstated since the filing of its administrative and judicial claims fell within the stated period.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

On this score, we remove the cobwebs in the declaration of the CTA En Banc that EDC's
premature filing of its petition for review merely failed to exhaust administrative remedies which
"is not a jurisdictional defect."As has been repeatedly emphasized herein and in the auspicious
case of San Roque, the 120+30 day prescriptive periods in the law is mandatory and
jurisdictional.

CIR VS. STANDARD INSURANCE CO.

Respondent's Petition for Declaratory Relief does not present a justiciable controversy ripe for
judicial determination. Respondent's petition failed to demonstrate that respondent's legal rights
are subject of an imminent or threatened violation that should be prevented by the declaratory
relief sought; the apprehension that its business may be rendered technically insolvent in view of
the continued enforcement of the taxes under Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC appear to be
merely conjectural and anticipatory.
Moreover, respondent's adequate remedy upon receipt of the FDDA for the DST deficiency for
taxable year 2011 was to file an appeal in due course with the CTA instead of resorting to a
petition for declaratory relief with the RTC. Similarly, the respondent's adequate remedy in the
event of the issuance of a FAN in connection with its assessments for deficiency VAT for
taxable year 2012 was to protest the same with the BIR and if denied, appeal such denial to the
CTA or request for reconsideration with the CIR. Thus, the sixth requisite is likewise absent. In
view of the absence of the aforementioned requisites, the RTC should have dismissed
respondent's Petition for Declaratory Relief.

CIR v. UNIOIL CORPORATION

May the BIR submit proof of its issuance of a Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN) and receipt
thereof by the taxpayer – for the first time on a petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court?

No. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Unioil Corporation (G.R. No. 204405, August 4,
2021), the Supreme Court emphasized that it is not a trier of facts, and such evidence should
have been submitted to the CTA. The CTA was especially created by law for the purpose of
reviewing tax cases. The CTA undertakes trial on the issues brought before it and accordingly
exercises the power to receive evidence. It is not the Supreme Court’s duty to look and sift
through the evidence of the parties. The BIR’s failure to offer proof of the taxpayer’s receipt of
the PAN as evidence before the CTA means that it failed to establish the fact of issuance of the
PAN to the taxpayer, which means that it failed to comply with the notice requirements under the
Tax Code. This effectively denied the taxpayer its right to due process and renders BIR’s
assessment void.

HEDCOR SIBULAN v. CIR

In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part
of the Commissioner to act on the application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer
affected may, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after
the expiration of the one hundred twenty-day period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim
with the Court of Tax Appeals.

Under the foregoing provision, the CIR has 120 days from the date of submission of complete
documents to rule on an administrative claim of a taxpayer. In case of denial of the claim for tax
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
refund or tax credit, either in whole or in part, or if the CIR failed to act on an application within
the prescribed period, the taxpayer shall file a judicial claim by filing an appeal before the CTA
within 30 days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration the 120-
day period. The 120-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional. It should therefore be strictly
observed in order for a claim for tax credit refund to prosper. Otherwise, non-observance of the
period would warrant the dismissal of a petition filed before the CTA as it would not acquire
jurisdiction over the claim.

LA FLOR ISABELA VS. CIR

Jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals:

Section 7 of RA 9282 provides for the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA on matters
arising under the NIRC or other law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), to
wit:
Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. — The CTA shall exercise:
a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:
xxxx
2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments,
refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other
matter arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue Code provides a specific
period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed a denial;
Considering the foregoing defects in the waivers executed by the parties, the periods for the CIR
to assess or collect the alleged Withholding Tax on Compensation (WTC) and Expanded
Withholding Tax (EWT) deficiencies were not extended. The period within which the CIR could
assess the internal revenue taxes of La Flor had already prescribed. In fine, the assessments
issued by the BIR are therefore considered void and of no legal effect. Without a valid waiver,
the statute of limitations on assessment and consequently on collection of the deficiency taxes
could not have been suspended.
La Flor validly applied for a compromise agreement even after filing its application for tax
amnesty under RA 9480.
Considering petitioner La Flor's compliance with the requirements under RA 9480 as
implemented by DOF DO No. 20-97, it is now deemed absolved of its obligations and is already
immune from the payment of the said taxes as well as additions, civil, criminal and
administrative penalties.
The doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied as an exception to the statute of limitations on
assessment of taxes considering that the BIR provides a detailed procedure for the proper
execution of waiver which must be strictly followed. The BIR cannot simply invoke the doctrine
of estoppel to conceal its failure to comply with its own issuances, namely, RMO No. 20-90 and
RDAO No. 05-01. It cannot just collect taxes based on an already prescribed assessment, even
when taxes are considered the lifeblood of government. A waiver of the statute of limitations is a
derogation of a taxpayer's right to security against prolonged and unscrupulous investigations.
Thus, it must be carefully and strictly construed. Hence, both the assessment and collection
"should be made in accordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for
government itself."

CIR v. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION

HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
The CTA En Banc correctly affirmed the CTA Second Division's ruling that Philex is entitled to
a refund of P18,610,568.32 representing its unutilized and excess input VAT attributable to its
zero-rated sales for the fourth quarter of 2009.

Notably, the CTA En Banc enumerated four grounds in support of its ruling, to wit:

(1) Philex's appeal before the CTA Second Division was seasonably filed;

(2) Philex is entitled to a refund as correctly ruled by the CTA Second Division;

The CTA Second Division did not err in considering the amount of zero-rated sales of
Philex which were likewise supported by financial invoices dated outside the period of
(3)
claim as the provisional invoices and bills of lading proved that sales were actually
generated during the period of claim; and

Presentation before the CTA Second Division of the subsidiary sales journal and subsidiary
(4)
purchase journal is not required for refund of input tax attributable to zero-rated sales.

Section 112(c) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) provides:

SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. -

xxxx

(C) Period within which refund or tax credit of input taxes shall be made. - In proper cases, the
Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input
taxes within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete
documents in support of the application filed in accordance with Subsection (A) hereof.

xxxx

In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part
of the Commissioner to act on the application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer
affected may, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after
the expiration of the one hundred twenty day-period, appeal the decision or the unacted
claim with the Court of Tax Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)
The term "complete documents" is further clarified in Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC)
No. 49-2003. Pilipinas Total Gas, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Pilipinas Total
Gas, Inc.)[21] explained the term "complete documents" in accordance with RMC No. 49-
2003, viz.:

[F]or purposes of determining when the supporting documents have been completed - it is the
taxpayer who ultimately determines when complete documents have been submitted for the
purpose of commencing and continuing the running of the 120-day period.
There is nothing in the afore quoted provision of the NIRC of 1997 which require[s] the
presentation of the subsidiary sales journal and subsidiary purchase journal in order [for] a
taxpayer [to] be entitled to refund, or issuance of a tax credit certificate, of its claimed input tax
attributable to zero-rated sales." The subsidiary journals are not required, but they may be
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
utilized by the CIR as vital sources of information for other purposes such as making
assessments.

REMEDIAL LAW

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM v. MANUEL F. SENO +

In Crespo v. Mogul, the Supreme Court held that once a complaint or information is already filed
in court, any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its continuation rests on the sound
discretion of the court. It is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. Thus,
when a motion to dismiss the case is filed by the public prosecutor, it should be addressed to the
court who has the option to grant or deny the same. The court should be mindful not to infringe
on the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.
Moreover, in Santos. v. Orda, Jr., this Court emphasized that the above rule likewise applies to a
motion to withdraw Information or to dismiss the case filed before the court, like in the case at
bar, even before or after arraignment of the accused. The grant or denial of the same is left to the
trial court's exclusive judicial discretion. Hence, it should not merely rely on the findings of the
public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice that no crime was committed or that the evidence in
the possession of the public prosecutor is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction of the
accused. Instead, the trial court has to make its own independent assessment of the merits of the
case as well as the evidence of the prosecution. Its independent assessment must be based on
the affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents, or evidence appended to the Information,
the records of the public prosecutor which the court may order the latter to produce before
the court, or any evidence already adduced before the court by the accused at the time the
motion is filed by the public prosecutor.

MILAGROS MANOTOK DORMIDO v. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN +

In dismissing the Complaint and denying the Motion for Reconsideration, the Ombudsman relied
on the Ombudsman Act of 1989, cited relevant jurisprudence, and squarely applied the foregoing
to the facts of the case at hand. This negates Dormido's allegation that grave abuse of discretion
might have attended the Ombudsman's conclusions. Whether these determinations by the
Ombudsman were correct or wrong is not remediable by certiorari. Whimsicality in the issuance
of a decision, not accuracy, is the core of certiorari proceedings. An unfavorable evaluation of
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
the evidence presented by a party will not be inquired into via certiorari unless it is shown that it
was done in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal enmity.

CLARA R. ICK v. ATTY. ALLAN S. AMAZONA +

Every person is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. Settled is the rule that in
disbarment proceedings, the complainant must satisfactorily establish the allegations of his or her
complaint through substantial evidence. Mere allegations without proof are disregarded
considering the gravity of the penalty prayed for. Charges based on mere suspicion and
speculation cannot be given credence.

LOYDA L. REYES, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN,

RESPONDENT.

There is no prejudicial question not proscription that will prevent it from proceeding. Double
jeopardy or In Pari Delicto are also not available as defenses as to bar the disciplinary
proceedings against an erring lawyer. It should be noted that it can be initiated motu proprio by
the Supreme Court or the IBP and even without a complaint and can proceed regardless of lack
of interest of the complainants, if the facts proven so warrant.

HEIRS OF AURIO T. CASIÑO v. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES +

It bears stressing that the doctrine of res judicata actually embraces two different concepts: (1)
bar by former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment.

The second concept which is conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or question which was
in issue in a former suit and was judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and
persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action
between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent
jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains
unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can
be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies,
it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second
action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a
former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the
second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit. In this case,
identity of cause of action is not required, but merely identity of issues.

Applying the foregoing to the instant case, the validity of the real estate mortgage and the
subsequent foreclosure sale can no longer be attacked in a new complaint for quieting of title,
more so because the Decision in Civil Case No. 1465 has become final and an entry of judgment
has already been entered in our books. To put it simply, we have already ruled, in effect, that
DBP is the owner of the subject property as it was acquired by it through a valid foreclosure sale.
Granting the reliefs sought by Aurio and his heirs would be inconsistent with the ruling in Civil
Case No. 1465 and will disturb the final and executory Decision in the said case.

Moreover, the writ of possession that was issued as a result of the proceedings in Civil Case No.
1465 cannot be regarded as a cloud upon the alleged title of Aurio, as the said writ and/or the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 1465 were not shown to be "in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable
or unenforceable." It is the claimant or plaintiff who has the burden of proof as a general
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
principle of due process, and in this case, Aurio has fell short in discharging his burden when he
failed to prove neither his alleged title to the subject property nor anything that could constitute a
cloud upon that title.

EDISON PRIETO v. ERLINDA CAJIMAT +

For a question to be one of law, it must not involve an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented by any of the litigants. The resolution of the issue must solely depend on
what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is obvious that the issue invites
a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.

However, the rule admits of exceptions, which includes, but not limited to: (1) where the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, and conjectures; (2) where
the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
where the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and (5) the findings of fact are
premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record.

COA v. SILVINO T. PAMPILO +

A petition for declaratory relief is an action instituted by a person interested in a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of
construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute and
for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. It must be filed before the breach or
violation of the statute, deed or contract to which it refers; otherwise, the court can no longer
assume jurisdiction over the action. Thus, "[t]he only issue that may be raised in such [an action]
is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or statute. Based on the
foregoing, the core issue involved in the Amended Petition is whether the business practice of
the Big 3 violates the RPC and RA 8479. This, however, cannot be made the subject matter of a
declaratory relief.
As regards the issue of intervention, Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court requires that: (1)
the movant must have a legal interest in the matter being litigated; (2) the intervention must not
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties; and (3) the claim of the
intervenor must not be capable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding. The right to
intervene, however, is not an absolute right as the granting of a motion to intervene is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court and may only be allowed if the movant is able to satisfy all
the requirements.

In this case, Pasang Masda's allegation that its members consume petroleum products is not
sufficient to show that they have legal interest in the matter being litigated considering that there
are other oil players in the market aside from the Big 3. Jurisprudence mandates that legal
interest must be actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or
expectant. Such is not the situation in this case. In fact, there is no showing that Pasang
Masda has something to gain or lose in the outcome of the case. Thus, it was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of public respondent RTC in allowing Pasang Masda to intervene despite
its failure to comply with the first requirement.

EDDA V. HENSON v. COA +

HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
It bears stressing that "in the absence of a proper and adequate notice to the court of a change of
address, the service of the order or resolution of a court upon the parties must be made at the last
address of their counsel of record." Hence, in case there is a change in address, it is the duty of
the lawyer to promptly inform the court and the parties of such change to ensure that all official
and judicial communications sent by mail will reach him.

Here, based on the letters attached to her Compliance, it appears that petitioner's counsel
belatedly informed respondent COA-CP of her change of address. Thus, the service made by
respondent COA-CP on January 17 and 26, 2017 at the old address of petitioner's counsel are
deemed valid and effectual.

Besides, even if the Court disregards this procedural defect or lapse in the interest of substantial
justice, the Petition would still be dismissed for lack of merit.
The essence of due process, as the Court has consistently ruled, is simply the opportunity to be
heard, or to explain one's side, or to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of;
thus, for as long as the party was afforded the opportunity to defend himself/herself, there is due
process.

ANTONIO G. NGO v. VISITACION GABELO +

A party's failure to comply with the requirement of prior barangay conciliation before filing a
case in court would render his complaint dismissible on the ground of failure to comply with a
condition precedent.

PANACAN LUMBER CO. v. SOLIDBANK CORP. +

Well-settled is the rule that personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings is not necessary. Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, requires
only the posting of the notice of sale in three public places and the publication of that notice in a
newspaper of general circulation. An exception to this rule is when the parties stipulate that
personal notice is additionally required to be given to the mortgagor. Failure to abide by the
general rule or its exception renders the foreclosure proceedings null and void.

REPUBLIC v. MANUEL M. CARAIG +

The arguments raised in the instant petition involve a mixed question of facts and of law.

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court prescribes that only questions of law should be raised in petitions
filed under the said rule since factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal
by certiorari. The Court is not a trier of facts. Thus, We will not entertain questions of fact as
factual findings of the appellate court are considered final, binding, or conclusive on the parties
and upon this Court especially when supported by substantial evidence.

MARIA LEA JANE I. GESOLGON v. CYBERONE PH. +

Extraterritorial service of summons applies only where the action is in rem or quasi in rem but
not if an action is in personam as in this case; hence, jurisdiction over CyberOne AU cannot be
acquired unless it voluntarily appears in court. Consequently, without a valid service of summons
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
and without CyberOne AU voluntarily appearing in court, jurisdiction over CyberOne AU was
not validly acquired. Consequently, no judgment can be issued against it, if any. Any such
judgment will only bind respondents CyberOne PH, Mikrut, and Juson.

In any event, the determination of whether there exists an employer-employee relationship

between petitioners and CyberOne PH is ultimately a question of fact. Generally, only errors of
law are reviewed by this Court. Factual findings of administrative and quasi-judicial agencies
specializing in their respective fields, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are
accorded high respect, if not finality. However, in this case, the findings of the NLRC are in
conflict with that of the LA and CA. Thus, as an exception to the rule, We now look into the
factual issues involved in this case.

ATTY. JOSEPH VINCENT T. GO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. VIRGILIO T.

TERUEL, RESPONDENT.

It is well-settled that "[t]he essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the
same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose
of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum,
a party seeks a favorable opinion in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable
decision. An important factor in determining its existence is the vexation caused to the courts
and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs.
Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another."

Evidently, Atty. Teruel willfully committed forum shopping when he instituted two actions
grounded on the same cause, even if strictly speaking, he was not included as a "complainant" in
Fr. Reyes' Complaint. This is because he prepared and filed both administrative actions with full
knowledge that they have the same cause of action and contained nearly exactly the same
allegations. Simply put, the outcome in one case would necessarily have an effect in the other
since both cases share the same cause of action and involve the same parties.

ARTURO O. RADAZA v. SANDIGANBAYAN

An accused who travels abroad with the provisional conformity of the Sandiganbayan is
considered to have positively invoked and already validated the same judicial power that
permitted his travel outside the Philippines during the pendency of the criminal proceedings. By
the principle of estoppel, the accused's own actuations countered and nullified any dispute on the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the person of such accused.

the accusations against Radaza, whether in the original Information or in the Amended
Information, both yield a prima facie case of violation of RA 3019, effectively placing the
subject offenses under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and rendering Radaza indictable
under Section 3(e) or 3(g).
Sections 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019 state:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative
or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions;
xxxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit
thereby.
The elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are:
(a) That the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official
functions, or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers;
(b) That he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and
(c) That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.
On the other hand, Section 3(g) of RA 3019 requires the concurrence of the following requisites:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he or she entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.
Jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information. Correlatively, the law vests upon the Sandiganbayan the power to hear and decide
violations of RA 3019, among other offenses, committed by a city mayor, among other public
officials specifically enumerated therein.
By the wordings of the assailed Informations, the Court finds all elements for both offenses
properly alleged by the prosecution against Radaza.

HARBOUR CENTRE PORT TERMINAL v. LA FILIPINA UYGONGCO CORP.

Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their nature; that
is, they are proceedings for the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing
a person to do the thing required. As otherwise expressed, a proceeding for civil contempt is one
instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of a private party to an action and to compel
obedience to a judgment or decree intended to benefit such a party litigant. So a proceeding is
one for civil contempt, regardless of its form, if the act charged is wholly the disobedience, by
one party to a suit, of a special order made in behalf of the other party and the disobeyed order
may still be obeyed, and the purpose of the punishment is to aid in an enforcement of obedience.
The rules of procedure governing criminal contempt proceedings, or criminal prosecutions,
ordinarily are inapplicable to civil contempt proceedings.

In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved party, or has

successor, or someone who has a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected. In criminal
contempt proceedings, it is generally held that the State is the real prosecutor.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
ILDEFONSO TV PATDU v. CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES

The remedy to assail the OMB's findings of probable cause in criminal or non-administrative
cases Is still by filing a petition for certiorari with the SC, and not with the CA.

EVANGELINE ENGAO ASIS v. HEIRS OF ROSELLO CALIGNAWAN

Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements as to the elements of forum-shopping.

First, there must be identity of parties. Both petitioners and respondents or their predecessors
were the contending parties in the Complaints for Declaration of Nullity and Recovery of
Ownership.

Second, there must be similarity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, where the relief is
anchored on the same facts. While the caption of both complaints are evidently distinct, the
allegations contained in their respective bodies seek a similar relief, that is, the entitlement to the
properties and reconveyance thereof in favor of Rosello and eventually to the respondents who
are the latter's heirs. It is a hornbook doctrine that the cause of action is determined by the
allegations of the complaint and not the caption or designation by the parties, considering that
the latter is not even indispensable to the complaint.

Third, the judgment rendered in any of the actions would amount to res judicata as to the other.
The finality of the Decision rendered by the RTC of Burauen, as affirmed by the appellate court
and which subsequently reached this Court in G.R. No. 188676 entitled Heirs of Felipe Engao,
Namely: Erma E. Trocino. Felicitacion E. Bausita, Cesar Engao and Evangeline E. Asis vs.
Rosello Calignawan, operated as res judicata on the matter of the Deed of Donation's validity.

ORLANDO D. GARCIA v. SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION

The findings of the DAR Secretary are accorded great weight and respect. Considering his
technical expertise on the matter, courts cannot simply brush aside his pronouncements regarding
status of a land, a subject well within his field, absent palpable and overriding error or grave
abuse of discretion that would result in manifest injustice and grave misapplication of the law.

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. HIGH DESERT STOP

OVERS

In the case before us, the Government is bound by the MOA due to estoppel. The OSG is
assumed to have known about the existence of the MOA as petitioner's principal counsel. At the
very least, even if the OSG had no prior knowledge of the MOA, it was duly notified on
November 10, 2010 when it received a copy of the assailed Judgment dated July 2, 2010 together
with other Orders issued by the trial court which approved the MOA. Notwithstanding such
knowledge, the OSG failed to file an appeal or resort to other remedies to contest the validity of
the MOA.

This Court also agrees with the appellate court's ruling that the action for annulment of judgment
is not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. An action to annul a final judgment is an
extraordinary remedy, which is not to be granted indiscriminately by the court. It shall be availed
of when the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

THE LINDEN SUITES, INC. VS. MERIDEN FAR EAST PROPERTIES, INC.

Examination of Judgment Obligor Not Limited by Place of Residence

The trial court should have proceeded to conduct a permissible examination of respondent,
through its officers, so as to disclose the properties which can be subjected to execution. The trial
court, in denying petitioner’s motion, exclusively confined itself with the one and only limitation
stated in the provision, thereby ultimately defeating the purpose of the rule, i.e. to ascertain the
properties or earnings of a judgment obligor that are to be applied to the satisfaction of the
judgment. The RTC should have employed other allowable means such as, but not limited to, the
submission of documents consisting of a list of properties and income of respondent and the
affidavits of concerned officers in relation thereto.

The well-settled doctrine is inapplicable in the case at bench. Petitioner wanted the officers to be
examined not for the purpose of passing unto them the liability of respondent as its judgment
obligor. In fact, it never averred in the motion any intention to make the officers liable for
respondent’s obligation due to the latter’s purported attempts to evade the execution of the final
judgment. What is clear therein is that the sole objective of the examination of the officers was to
ascertain the properties and income of respondent which can be subjected for execution in order
to satisfy the final judgment and nothing else.

SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC., PETITIONER, VS.

MABALACAT INSTITUTE, INC., RESPONDENT
The Court likewise reminds us that the elements of forum shopping are: (i) identity of parties, or
at least such parties representing the same interest; (ii) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the latter founded on the same facts; and (iii) any judgment rendered in one action
will amount to res judicata in the other action.

Considering that the second and third elements of forum shopping and litis pendentia are lacking,
there is no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for between a suit for collection of sum
of money and an unlawful detainer case, and that any judgment rendered in one of these actions
would not amount to res judicata in the other action.

METRO RAIL TRANSIT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS.

TRACKWORKS RAIL TRANSIT ADVERTISING, VENDING AND PROMOTIONS,
INC. RESPONDENT.

litis pendentia ripened to res judicata when the PDRCI's arbitral award, as confirmed by the
RTC of Pasig City in its March 14, 2013 Resolution, became final and executory and a writ of
execution was issued against Trackworks on June 13, 2013.
Settled is the rule that a judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null and void and
may be attacked anytime. It creates no rights and produces no effect. It remains a basic fact in
law that the choice of the proper forum is crucial, as the decision of a court or tribunal without
jurisdiction is a total nullity. A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. All
acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
DORIS MARIE S. LOPEZ, PETITIONER, VS. ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR.,
RESPONDENT.

Parameters of a judicial review under a Rule 45 petition

a. Rule 45 petition is limited to questions of law

Before proceeding to the merits of the case, this Court deems it necessary to emphasize that a
petition for review under Rule 45 is limited only to questions of law. Factual questions are not
the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. This Court will not review facts, as it is not our
function to analyze or weigh all over again evidence already considered in the proceedings
below. As held in Diokno v. Hon. Cacdac, a reexamination of factual findings is outside the
province of a petition for review on certiorari, to wit:

It is aphoristic that a re-examination of factual findings cannot be done through a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because as earlier stated, this Court is
not a trier of fa.cts[.] x x x. The Supreme Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the
evidence considered in the proceedings below. This is already outside the province of the instant
Petition for Certiorari.

There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain
set of facts; a question of fact, on the other hand, exists when the doubt or difference arises as to
the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Unless the case falls under any of the recognized
exceptions, we are limited solely to the review of legal questions.

b. Rule 45 petition is limited to errors of the appellate court

Furthermore, the "errors" which we may review in a petition for review on certiorari are those of
the C A, and not directly those of the trial court or the quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, or officer
which rendered the decision in the first instance. It is imperative that we refrain from conducting
further scrutiny of the findings of fact made by trial courts, lest we convert this Court into a trier
of facts. As held in Reman Recio v. Heirs of the Spouses Agueda and Maria Altamirano, etc., et
al., our review is limited only to the errors of law committed by the appellate court, to wit:

Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, jurisdiction is generally limited to the review of errors of
law committed by the appellate court. The Supreme Court is not obliged to review all over again
the evidence which the parties adduced in the court a quo. Of course, the general rule admits of
exceptions, such as where die factual findings of the CA and the trial court are conflicting or
contradictory.

EDILBERTO 'EDDIE' PINEDA v. ABELARDO C. MIRANDA

this is a case for unlawful detainer filed against the petitioners at mtc which ruled in favor of
respondents. appealed to rtc which affirmed mtc decision. petitioners did not appeal the rtc
decision. 7 years passed. respondents filed at rtc for complaint to revive judment. petitioners
filed several motions and appeals. supreme court said petitioners’ remedy was appeal when rtc
promulgated its decision. their subsequent motions and appeals are without legal basis.

In this case, the RTC Branch 42 Decision dated May 17, 1999 became final and executory when
no further legal action was undertaken by herein petitioners concerning the RTC Branch 42
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

Decision. Thus, on January 6, 2000 or less than a year after the RTC Branch 42 Decision became
final, respondents filed a motion for the lssuance of a Writ of Execution. The Motion was
granted on February 14, 2000. However, seven years later, the RTC Branch 42 Decision h~1d
not yet been executed. Thus, on May 9, 2006, the respondents filed a Complaint for Revival of
Judgment in accordance with the above legal provisions. On the premise that the RTC Branch 42
Decision was already final and executory, respondents filed a revival suit as a procedural means
of securing the execution of the RTC Branch 42 Decision which had become dormant after the
passage of several years. The revival suit filed by respondents did not intend to re-open any issue
affecting the merits of the case or the propriety or correctness of the first judgment. The ordinary
remedy of appeal was still readily available as a proper remedy.

As for petitioner’s legal remedy RTC Branch 42 promulgated its Decision on May 17, 1999.
However, instead of filing an ordinary appeal, petitioners filed the following motion and
petitions throughout the course of the proceedings: (1) Motion to Quash Writ of Execution; (2)
Petition for Annulment of Judgment; and (3) Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition.

First, the Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution was filed on the ground that the Writ of
Execution cannot be enforced anymore because more than five years had elapsed since its
issuance. 39 However, the Court notes that respondents’ Complaint for Revival of judgment was
filed on May 9, 2006, two months before petitioners filed their ~motion to Quash the Writ of
Execution on July 20, 2006. Neither did petitioners show that there had been a change in the
situation of the parties which makes the execution inequitable; or that the writ of execution was
improperly issued, defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party; or that the
judgment debt had been paid or otherwise satisfied; or that the writ was issued without authority:
Petitioners’ Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution was therefore groundless.

Secondly, petitioners’ Petition for Annulment of Judgment of both the MTC and RTC Decisions
was correctly dismissed by the CA not only because it did not have jurisdiction over the Petition
but also because it was not the proper legal remedy.

Rule 47, Sections 1 and 241 of the Rules of Court are clear. The remedy of annulment of
judgment can only be availed of when the ordinary remedy of appeal, among others, is no longer
available through no fault of the petitioners. Furthermore, the annulment may be based only on
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction which were clearly not present in this case.

Lastly, petitioners’ Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition filed with the CA was to compel the
RTC to give due course to petitioners’ Notice of Appeal filed after the RTC granted respondents’
Complaint for Revival of Judgment. A Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition is only available
when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. Again, the Court reiterates that the ordinary remedy of appeal was easily available to
petitioners when the RTC Branch 42 promulgated its May 1 7, 1999 Decision.

In the end, the Court finds that the CA correctly ruled that the RTC Branch 42 Decision can still
be revived as the respondents properly filed a Complaint for Revival of Judgment in accordance
with existing law and jurisprudence. The Court therefore instructs the RTC to execute Civil Case
No. 11757 with deliberate dispatch.

HEIRS OF ELISEO BAGAYGAY v. HEIRS OF ANASTACIO PACIENTE

HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

A land covered by free patent title was sold within the prohibitory period. Supreme court said
that the sale was void. Petitioners claim that the case is barred by laches. That they should be
reimbursed for the purchase and for improvements. Supreme court said laches does not apply in
case of contracts void ab initio. But respondents are entitled to reimbursement for price of the
land. But no reimbursement for improvements because such are compensated from fruits arising
from possession.

In actions for reconveyance of property predicated on the fact that the conveyance complained of
was null and void ah initio, a claim of prescription of action would be unavailing. “The action or
defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.” Neither could
laches be invoked in the case at bar. Laches is a doctrine in equity and our courts are basically
courts of law and not courts of equity. Equity, which has been aptly described as “justice outside
legality,” should be applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law. Aequetas
[nunquam] contravenit legis. The positive mandate of Art. 1410 of the New Civil Code
conferring imprescriptibility to actions for declaration of the inexistence of a contract should pre-
empt and prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity. Certainly, laches cannot set
up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right, and petitioners can validly
vindicate their inheritance despite the lapse of time.

As above-mentioned, a sale of a parcel of land is in violation of the five[1]year prohibition on

the alienation of land acquired via free patent application is void and produces no legal effect. As
successors-in-interest of Alido, petitioners’ right to challenge the sale between Alido and
respondent cannot be barred by I aches as it was in violation of the restriction on the sale of land
acquired through free patent.

IGNACIO S. DUMARAN v. TERESA LLAMEDO

Failed to prove that fraud existed, thus, the writ of preliminary attachment issued by the RTC
was a "too harsh" provisional remedy that must be denied.
Under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, there are two remedies a party can avail of to discharge
their attached property:
(1) Under Section 12, make a cash deposit equal to the claim or give a counter-bond which will
take the place of the attached property; or
(2) Under Section 13, file a motion to discharge the attachment on the following grounds:
(a) that it was improperly or irregularly issued; or
(b) that it was improperly or irregularly enforced; or
(c) that the bond of the plaintiff is insufficient.

For the second remedy to apply, a writ of attachment may be discharged without filing a cash
bond or counter-bond only if the writ of preliminary attachment itself has already been proven to
be improperly or irregularly issued or enforced, or the bond is insufficient.

EAST WEST BANKING CORPORATION v. IAN Y. CRUZ

It is important to mention as well that "'the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due
process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

accordance with the provisions of law. A party who seeks to avail of the right must, therefore,
comply with the requirements of the rules, failing which the right to appeal is invariably lost.'
Compliance with procedural rules is mandatory, 'since they are designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims
and in the administration of justice.'

A final note. It is known that "the business of banking is one imbued with public interest As
such, banking institutions are obliged to exercise the highest degree of diligence as well as high
standards of integrity and performance in all its transactions. The law expressly imposes upon
the banks a fiduciary duty towards its clients and to treat in this regard the accounts of its
depositors with meticulous care."

If the Bank deemed that it received damage in any way, it has no one to blame but itself, or
rather, its employees who allowed the transfer of funds without proper verification, including the
issuance of the alleged spurious FEFCs. Paul could not have successfully completed the
transactions without the approval of his superiors. However, a further discussion of these matters
is not proper as this already involves a consideration of factual incidents not within the ambit of
the present suit.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, PETITIONER, VS. ROMEO B. DARADAR,

RESPONDENT.

All elements of res judicata are present in the instant case. Anent the first and second elements,
the Second Order is a final judgment which has already attained finality and was rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction. It is likewise undisputed that there is an identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action between Civil Case Nos. 21375 and 25981.

Finally, the third element of res judicata is present as the Second Order dismissing Civil Case
No. 21375 operated as a judgment on the merits. Here, the Second Order did not state that the
dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice. A dismissal based on any of the grounds in
Section 3, Rule 17 operates as an adjudication on the merits.

SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.— If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to
appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute
his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the
court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own
motion without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same
or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits,
unless otherwise declared by the court. (Emphasis supplied)

Unless otherwise qualified by the court, a dismissal under said rule is considered with prejudice,
which bars the refiling of the case.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES MILU AND
ROSALINA DE JESUS, RESPONDENTS.

The trial court did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when it denied the spouses De
Jesus' motion for issuance of a status quo order and when it no longer conducted the hearing on
their application for preliminary injunction.

Grave abuse of discretion exists when "an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or
personal bias."

A status quo order is "in the nature of a cease and desist order," and is "intended to maintain the
last, actual, peaceable and uncontested state of things which preceded the controversy." If the
RTC granted the spouses De Jesus' prayer for such order, Land Bank will be prevented from
consolidating its ownership over the properties for the duration of such order.

However, We find no legal impediment to prevent Land Bank from consolidating its ownership.
The RTC is correct that upon the expiration of the period for redemption, without the mortgagor
or his or her successor-in-interest redeeming the property, consolidation becomes a matter of
right.

If the redemption period expires without the mortgagor or his successor-in-interest redeeming
the foreclosed property within one year from the registration of the sale with the Register of
Deeds, the title over the property consolidates in the purchaser. The consolidation confirms the
purchaser as the owner entitled to the possession of the property without any need for him to file
the bond required under Section 7 of Act No. 3135. The issuance of a writ of possession to the
purchaser becomes a matter of right upon the consolidation of title in his name while the
mortgagor, by failing to redeem, loses all interest in the property.

Thus, when the one-year redemption period lapsed without the spouses De Jesus redeeming the
properties, and without any TRO or writ of preliminary injunction to prevent consolidation,
nothing barred Land Bank from exercising its right.

Given that the trial court already ordered the spouses De Jesus to present their evidence in
support of their application for preliminary injunction, considerably in view of the limited
duration of Land Bank's commitment not to consolidate, then they should have complied with
the same. Instead, they moved to set the main case for pre-trial. Such an act constitutes a clear
case of abandonment of their application for preliminary injunction. It goes against the very
nature of preliminary injunction – a remedy resorted to "when there is a pressing necessity to
avoid injurious consequences that cannot be redressed under any standard of compensation."

A status quo order, if issued by the RTC, would be tantamount to an injunction order issued
without the benefit of a hearing, contrary to the express requirement of Section 5, Rule 53 of the
Rules of Court that "[n]o preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice
to the party or person sought to be enjoined." Clearly, the RTC may not grant the spouses De
Jesus' motion for status quo order without running afoul of such express proscription.

FLORANTE VILLAROMAN v. ARCIAGA

The complaint for specific performance is barred by res judicata.

Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; or a thing
or matter settled by judgment." Under this rule, final judgment or decree on the merits by a court
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
of competent jurisdiction "is conclusive as to the rights of the parties or their privies in all later
suits, and on all points and matters determined in the former suit.
All the elements of res judicata are present.
There is no question as to the presence of the first three elements in the present case. The
decision in Civil Case No. 11993 is a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court that had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties.
Anent the fourth element, a careful examination of the allegations raised by the parties in Civil
Case No. 11993 and Civil Case No. 00-113 shows that the cases involve the same parties and
relate to the same subject matter. Specifically, in Civil Case No. 11993, the plaintiffs therein are
the heirs of the late Jose, while Agrifina, the mother of herein petitioners, is one of the
defendants in the said case insofar as her claim over the 300-square meter portion of Lot 965 is
concerned. Notably, Agrifina was eventually substituted by petitioners upon her demise on
January 17, 1997.
In the instant case, the plaintiffs are herein petitioners as heirs of Agrifina, while defendants are
the heirs of Jose. While we are aware that the subject matter in Civil Case No. 11993 comprised
the whole area of Lot 965, Agrifina's property interest therein encompassed the 300-square meter
portion of Lot 965, which is the very same subject matter involved in this case.
Finally, there is identity of causes of action between Civil Case No. 11993 and Civil Case No.
00-113. "A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission committed
by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff."
Verily, when respondents filed their Complaint for Annulment of the Kasulatan ng Bilihang
Ganap dated April 2, 1980 with the RTC in Civil Case No. 11993, Agrifina and her co-
defendants responded thereto by filing an Answer with Counterclaim for Damages with prayer
that they be declared as the lawful owners of their respective portions of Lot 965. Jurisprudence
on the matter is that a counterclaim raised by a defendant partakes of a nature of a complaint or a
cause of action against a plaintiff. "It is in itself a distinct and independent cause of action, so
that when properly stated as such, the defendant becomes, in respect to the matter stated by him,
an actor, and there are two simultaneous actions pending between the same parties, where each is
at the same time both a plaintiff and defendant."
In the Answer with Counterclaim for Damages in Civil Case No. 11993, Agrifina's cause of
action rested on respondents' failure to respect her ownership over the 300-square meter portion
of Lot 965 by virtue of the Kasunduan ng Bilihan dated September 4, 1968 between Jose and
Florentino, and the Kasulatang Tapos at Lubos Na Bilihan Ng Lupa dated January 12, 1971
between herself and Florentino. In Civil Case No. 00-113, petitioners' cause of action hinges on
respondents' refusal to execute a deed of absolute sale despite the existence of the two foregoing
documents supposedly evidencing the sale of the property from Jose to Florentino, and from the
latter to Agrifina.
Clearly, in both Civil Case No. 11993 and Civil Case No. 00-113, herein petitioners impute the
same wrongful act on respondents – their failure to recognize petitioners' title over the 300-
square meter portion of Lot 965 despite the existence of perfected contracts of sale in their favor.
Although differing in form, these two cases are ultimately anchored on conflicting claims of
ownership over the property in dispute. Thus, we conclude that they have identical causes of
action.
Settled is the rule that "the application of the doctrine of res judicata to identical causes of action
does not depend on the similarity or differences in the forms of the two actions."
Under the same test evidence, if the same evidence ultimately support and establish the causes
of action in the first and second cases, then there is likely an identity of causes of action.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
Applying Section 4, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, petitioners cannot split their cause of action by
filing a case in court to recognize them as lawful owners of a property, and thereafter file another
separate complaint for specific performance that ultimately seeks to determine with finality their
title or ownership over the same property.

GUILLERMA S. SILVA, PETITIONER, VS. CONCHITA S. LO, RESPONDENT.

In our jurisdiction, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court have laid down two phases of an action for
partition: first, the trial court, after determining that a co-ownership in fact exists and that
partition is proper, issues an order for partition; and, second, the trial court promulgates a
decision confirming the sketch and subdivision of the properties submitted by the parties (if the
parties reach an agreement) or by the appointed commissioners (if the parties fail to agree), as
the case may be.
The tenants are not heirs and are thus strangers to the estate of the decedent, the subject matter of
the action for partition. However, in relation to the subject property, as tenants who are qualified
beneficiaries thereof under the CARL and to whom new titles had been issued, they are palpably
real parties-in-interest. While the validity of the partition of the subject property and consequent
distribution thereof can still be finally determined in CA-G.R. SP No. 116979, a complete relief
for those already parties or the complete determination of the claim could not be had since the
tenants were not impleaded. In short, the tenants are not indispensable parties but, at the least, are
necessary parties in the determination of the partition of the subject property.
By operation of law, the tenancy relationship between the tenants on one hand, and the co-
owners of the subject property, the heirs of the decedent, on the other hand, subsisted even after
the death of one of the landholders. Under the CARL, the tenants are deemed qualified
beneficiaries to ownership of a portion of their tilled land. Ultimately, the tenants cannot be
cursorily excluded from a court determination of the validity of the partition, and consequent
change in ownership, of the subject property.

CATHAY PACIFIC STEEL CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. CHARLIE CHUA UY,

JR., RESPONDENT.

In contrast to Cathay, which presented the foregoing testimonial and documentary evidence, all
that Uy could offer to negate his liability is the dismissal of the criminal case filed by Cathay
against him. He did not even deny the authenticity and due execution of his signature in the
delivery receipts. He likewise did not rebut Cathay's claim that the release of the retazos was
conditioned upon his authorization. He never imputed any motive or ill will on the part of Cathay
in filing the complaint. All he did was bank on the criminal case which, as already discussed, not
only covered a separate and independent action, but also pertained to a different subject matter.
For these reasons, We are constrained to rule that the greater weight of evidence is on the side of
Cathay. Uy should be held liable for the unremitted payments from the sale of the retazos.

GOLDWELL PROPERTIES TAGAYTAY v. METROPOLITAN BANK

The "debtor cannot ask for the release of any portion of the mortgaged property or of one or
some of the several lots mortgaged unless and until the loan thus secured has. been fully paid,
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

notwithstanding the fact that there has been a partial fulfillment of the obligation. Hence, it is
provided that the debtor who has paid a part of the debt cannot ask for the proportionate
extinguishment of the mortgage as long as the debt is not completely satisfied." Thus, the fact
that petitioners paid for the loan value of the Pasay properties is immaterial; the mortgage would
still be in effect since the loans have not been fully settled.

The Court has previously held that "[w]hen the law does not provide for the determination of the
property's valuation, neither should the courts so require, for our duty limits us to the
interpretation of the law, not to its augmentation."Although this pronouncement pertains to the
basis of the bid price of a mortgaged property that became the subject of foreclosure, by analogy,
We can infer that courts, cannot likewise dictate how banks should set the values of mortgaged
properties for purposes of loan acquisition. In this case, the Court cannot compel Metrobank to
accept the values pegged by the independent appraisers as insisted by the petitioners, lest We be
suspected of meddling with management prerogative. Besides, the petitioners only raised this
valuation issue after they have already obtained the loans.

In granting loans, banks always attempt to impose as many interests that they can, sometimes
worded differently to confuse debtors. Unfortunately, borrowers are, in most cases, forced to
accept unfair interest rates and > conditions due to dire need. Ergo, the Court has the duty to
ensure that banks do not unduly take advantage of their position of wealth and opportunity.
Certainly, while the business of banks is geared toward profit-earning, it should always be
subject to standards of reasonableness and fairness.

VILORIA VS. GAETOS

It should be noted that the rules on verification and certification against forum shopping are
designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice. Hence, they should not
be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert their own ultimate and legitimate
objectives. The requirement of strict compliance merely underscores their mandatory nature to
the effect that the verification and certification against forum shopping cannot altogether be
dispensed with or their requirements completely disregarded. They do not prohibit substantial
compliance with the rules under justifiable circumstances.
The petition's Verification/Certification on Non-Forum Shopping was not signed by all the
parties therein. This defect was duly admitted by the petitioners' in their Reply. However, they
argue that such was not fatal nor was it jurisdictional as to affect their present appeal.

We agree. Altres v. Empleo laid down the following guidelines with respect to noncompliance
with the requirements on or submission of a defective verification and certification against forum
shopping:

A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission

1) of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of
defective certification against forum shopping.

As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render

the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the
2)
pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to
3) swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and
when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.

As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein,

unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction
4)
thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or
presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."

The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in
a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under
reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners
5)
share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of
only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the
Rule.

Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not
by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable
6)
to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to
sign on his behalf.

Applying the above guidelines to the present case, We find that the subject
Verification/Certification of Non-forum Shopping substantially complied with the rules.

JAY V. SABADO v. TINA MARIE L. SABADO

Jurisdiction over the person of the respondent in a petition for TPO/PPO under RA 9262 can be
acquired through any of the means of serving summons under the Rules of Court. In an action in
personam such as a petition for TPO/PPO under RA 9262, the purpose of summons is two-fold:
(1) to notify the defendant that an action has been brought against him; and (2) to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to
the court's jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons, any judgment of the court
which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void.
The trial court acquired jurisdiction through his voluntary appearance when he sought the lifting
of the TPO and the denial of the issuance of PPO in his opposition, without raising the issue of
lack of jurisdiction over his person. By such conduct, he can no longer subsequently object to the
court's jurisdiction.

DAISY JOY ROJALLO CERVANTES v. H.E. BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III

"[a] case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration
on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial
relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of
the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of
mootness. This is because the judgment will not serve any useful purpose or have any practical
legal effect because, in the nature of things, it cannot be enforced."
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the action for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioners has been mooted by the termination of the BOT Agreement of private respondents.
The staleness of the claims becomes more manifest considering the reliefs sought by petitioners,
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

i.e., to annul and set aside the BOT Agreement for the modernization of the POC; and to
permanently enjoin respondents from implementing the MPOC Project, are hinged on the
existence of the BOT Agreement.
Corollarily, the eventual termination of the BOT Agreement rendered the resolution of the issues
relating to the prayers for certiorari and prohibition of no practical or legal effect. Simply stated,
petitioners in this case would no longer be entitled to any actual substantial relief regardless of
this Court's disposition on the merits of the present petition.

JORGENETICS SWINE IMPROVEMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS.

THICK & THIN AGRI-PRODUCTS, INC., RESPONDENT.

The chairperson and president of a corporation may sign the verification and certification
without need of board resolution. Moreover, lack of authority of a corporate officer to undertake
an action on behalf of the corporation may be cured by ratification through the subsequent
issuance of a board resolution.
A variance in the date of the verification with the date of the petition is not necessarily fatal to
Jorgenetics' case since the variance does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that no
verification was made, or that the verification was false. It does not necessarily contradict the
categorical declaration made by Jorgenetics in its affidavit that its representatives read and
understood the contents of the pleading.
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired by service of summons.
However, "even without valid service of summons, a court may still acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant if the latter voluntarily appears before it." "If the defendant knowingly
does an act inconsistent with the right to object to the lack of personal jurisdiction as to [them],
like voluntarily appearing in the action, [they are] deemed to have submitted [themselves] to the
jurisdiction of the court."
Thus, a defendant is deemed to have voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the
court if they seek affirmative relief from the court. This includes the filing of motions to admit
answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift
order of default with motion for reconsideration.

AROMIN VS. SOSIS

A lawyer's neglect in keeping track of the case and his failure to apprise his client of the
developments of the case do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Fraud is not extrinsic if the alleged
fraudulent act was committed by petitioner's own counsel. The fraud must emanate from the act
of the adverse party and must be of such nature as to deprive petitioner of its day in court. Thus,
in many cases, we have held that a lawyer's mistake or gross negligence does not amount to
extrinsic fraud that would grant a petition for annulment of judgment.

BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, PETITIONER, VS. BANGKO

SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND THE MONETARY BOARD, RESPONDENTS.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
Cases involving the propriety of the issuance of ancillary writs, as mere adjuncts to the main suit,
become moot and academic upon disposal of the main action. TROs and WPIs "constitute
temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action" and are "preservative remedies
for the protection of substantive rights" of the parties. They are ancillary because "they are mere
incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action." Ancillary writs are not causes
of action in themselves; they are mere adjuncts to the main suit with the sole object of preserving
the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. Being ancillary in nature, the existence of
a main action or proceeding is a condition sine qua non before a WPI or TRO may lie.

A bank under receivership can only sue or be sued through its receiver, the PDIC. Thus, a
petition filed on behalf of a bank under receivership that is neither filed through nor authorized
by the PDIC must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

A TRO and WPI issued by a court without jurisdiction over the main case are void for want of
jurisdiction.

CIR VS. STANDARD INSURANCE CO.

Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that the sworn certification against forum
shopping must be attached to the petition for review on certiorari. In contrast, there is no
requirement that motions for extension of time be accompanied by a certification against forum
shopping.

BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS v. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS

TROs and WPIs "constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action"
and are "preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights" of the parties. They
are ancillary because "they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main
action."
Ancillary writs are not causes of action in themselves; they are mere adjuncts to the main suit
with the sole object of preserving the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. Being
ancillary in nature, the existence of a main action or proceeding is a condition sine qua
non before a WPI or TRO may lie:
In our jurisdiction, writs of preliminary injunction and TROs are considered as provisional
injunctive reliefs that are only permitted to be issued in connection with — or as an ancillary to
— a main action or proceeding pending in court. It is settled that the office of a writ of
preliminary injunction is limited only to the preservation of the status quo until an action or
proceeding could be fully decided; whereas a TRO is merely the maintenance of such status until
an application for a writ of preliminary injunction can be heard. Evidently, the existence of a
main action or proceeding is a condition sine qua non before a writ of preliminary injunction or
TRO may lie.
The ancillary character of the writs of preliminary injunction and TROs also finds black letter
support in our rules of procedure. Sections 1, 2 and 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court — which
define and describe the precise circumstances under which a writ of preliminary injunction and
TRO may be granted — all assume the prior existence of a main action or proceeding before
such writ and order may be granted.

Thus, any preliminary writ cannot survive the resolution of the main case of which it is an
incident because an ancillary writ "loses its force and effect after the decision in the main
petition." When a main action is dismissed, any provisional remedy in this case is dissolved. It
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

then follows that once a decision disposing of the main case becomes final and executory, any
disposition by a court on the propriety of a TRO and WPI issued in the case serves no practical
purpose and renders such a disposition moot and academic.
A bank under receivership can only sue or be sued through its receiver, the PDIC. Thus, a
petition filed on behalf of a bank under receivership that is neither filed through nor authorized
by the PDIC must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
A TRO and WPI issued by a court without jurisdiction over the main case are void for want of
jurisdiction.
ASSET POOL A v. SPS. BUENAFRIDO AND FELISA BERRIS

The true rule which determines whether a party has only a single and entire cause of action for
all that is due him, and which must be sued for in one action, or has a severable demand for
which he may maintain separate suits, is whether the entire amount arises from one and the same
act or contract or the several parts arise from distinct and different acts or contracts.
Where there are entirely distinct and separate contracts, they give rise to separate causes of
action for which separate actions may be instituted and presented. When money is payable by
installments, a distinct cause of action assails upon the following due by each installment and
they may be recovered in successive action. On the other hand, where several claims payable at
different times arise out of the same transactions, separate actions may be brought as each
liability accounts. But where no action is brought until more than one is due, all that are due
must be included in one action; and that if an action is brought to recover upon one or more that
are due but not upon all that are due, a recovery in such action will be a bar to a several or other
actions brought to recover one or more claims of the other claims that were due at the time the
first action was brought.
In sum, petitioner may institute two alternative remedies against the spouses Berris: either a
personal action for the collection of the promissory notes issued under the Discounting Line or a
real action to foreclose the mortgage, but not both, simultaneously or successively. Although we
recognize the right of the mortgage creditor to recover the deficiency when the mortgaged
properties are not enough to satisfy the entire obligation, the action is only instituted after the
termination of the foreclosure proceedings and not during its pendency, so as not to violate the
prohibition against splitting of cause of action.
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS v. CA-CAGAYAN DE ORO STATION

Before the courts may issue a writ of preliminary injunction, it is essential that the party seeking
its issuance be able to establish the existence of a right to be protected. It must be a right that is
actual, clear, and existing; not a mere contingent, abstract, or future right. Further, the invasion
of that clear and unmistakable right must be material and substantial.

There must also be a showing of urgency to prevent irreparable injury on the part of the party
seeking injunction. Injury is irreparable where there is no standard by which its amount can be
measured with reasonable accuracy discussed the unquantifiable nature of damages or injury for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Any damage which is easily subject to mathematical computation and, if proven, is fully
compensable by damages. Thus, a preliminary injunction is not warranted.

It is well settled that the aggrieved party may challenge the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction only on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

jurisdiction on the part of the issuing court. Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of
preliminary injunction implies "a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of [a]
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation
of law."
CRISTINA R. SEMING v. EMELITA P. ALAMAG

A private document must be authenticated in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court
before its acceptance as evidence in court. The October 22, 1990 and January 23, 1991 receipts
are private documents executed by petitioner herself. Before they can be admitted in evidence,
they must be authenticated in accordance with Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
which states:

Section 20. Proof of private documrents. - Before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
Accordingly, "before a private document is admitted in evidence, it must be authenticated either
by the person who executed it, the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, any
person who was present and saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and recognized
the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the instruments had previously confessed
execution thereof."
"Settled is the rule that forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence, thus, the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. One who
alleges forgery has the burden to establish his/her case by a preponderance of evidence."
The best evidence of a forged signature in the instrument is the instrument itself reflecting the
alleged forged signature. The fact of forgery can only be established by comparison between the
alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is
theorized upon to have been forged."

Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. - The handwriting of a person may be
proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen
the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or
been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence
respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court,
with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered,
or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
Payment of real property taxes does not prove that the whole area of Lot 512-C was sold to her.
In any case, this Court cannot give probative or evidentiary value to the tax receipts and tax
certification presented by petitioner. Firstly, the tax receipts presented date back to 2002 to 2007
only. Notably, these receipts all the more cast doubt on petitioner's and Jesusa's assertion that the
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

sale of Lot 512-C took place in 1977. Secondly, the tax certification presented by petitioner
showing that she had paid real property taxes on Lot 512-C since 1977 up to 2006 is a mere
photocopy and not even a certified true copy of the original. A mere photocopy otherwise
controverted by the opposing party cannot be admitted into evidence and the same cannot stand
in the place of the original.

LETICIA A. RAMIREZ v. FELOMINO ELOMINA

The instant Petition challenges the appellate court's May 25, 2012 Resolution which ordered the
issuance of an Entry of Judgment. However, said Resolution was a necessary consequence of the
appellate court's December 21, 2011 Resolution which denied the November 3, 2011 Motion for
Reconsideration due to late filing.

Thus, the appropriate recourse would have been for Ramirez to timely file an appeal of the
December 21, 2011 Resolution, which she received on January 5, 2012. She had until January
20, 2012 to file an appeal, reckoned from the date of her receipt. However, the instant Petition
was only filed on August 10, 2012, and thus likewise filed beyond the reglementary period to file
an appeal.

In view of the foregoing, We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court.
A special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is designed to correct
errors of jurisdiction and not errors in judgment. Thus, We have repeatedly held that when "the
court has jurisdiction over the case and person of the defendant, any mistake in the application of
the law and the appreciation of evidence committed by a court may be corrected only by appeal."

In the instant case, it is undisputed that the CA had jurisdiction over the case. What Ramirez
actually seeks is the reversal of the appellate courts' ruling declaring Felomino as the lawful
owner of the subject land. Therefore, assuming there was any error in the appellate court's
interpretation of the law and appreciation of evidence, it may only be corrected through an
appeal and not through certiorari, since it is considered as an error of judgment and not of
jurisdiction.

TECHNICAL EDUCATION v. ERNESTO ABRAGAR

The joinder of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for the exercise of judicial
power. While the failure to implead an indispensable party is not per se a ground for the
dismissal of an action, considering that said party may still be added by order of the court, on
motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are
just, it remains essential — as it is jurisdictional — that any indispensable party be impleaded in
the proceedings before the court renders judgment. The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as
to the absent parties but even as to those present.

A void judgment is in effect no judgment at all, and all acts performed under it and all claims
flowing out of it are void. The judgment is vulnerable to attack even when no appeal has been
taken, and does not become final in the sense of depriving a party of his right to question its
validity.

Thus, the failure to implead petitioner and the other parties to the MOA renders the July 30, 2004
Decision of the LA, writ of execution, and break- open order null and void for want of authority,
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
which may be attacked in any way at any time, even when no appeal is taken. It is immaterial
that petitioner filed the Appeal Memorandum in Intervention after the LA judgment became
allegedly final and executory, since a judgment void ab initio is non-existent and thus cannot
acquire finality.

ZAHARA PENDATUN MAULANA v. JUDGE OSCAR P. NOEL

The complaint should not be dismissed solely on the basis of complainant's affidavit of
desistance. Thus, the fact that herein complainant manifested before the Investigating Justice that
she is no longer interested in pursuing the case does not, as a matter of course, warrant the
automatic dismissal of an administrative case against respondent, more so in the instant case
where respondent appears to have admitted certain material allegations in the complaint filed
against him.

Certifications issued by the FEO Records Section are sufficient proof of the fact of possession or
non-possession of a valid license to own or possess firearms or explosives in the offense of
Illegal Possession of Firearms. OCA Circular No. 11-2011 further states that personal
appearances of FEO records personnel is not required in order to establish the authenticity of
FEO-issued certifications.

This only means that FEO-issued certifications are sufficient evidence, and thus, should be
accepted by the courts in determining the presence or absence of a valid license or permit to own
or possess firearms.

PEOPLE v. MAE AL-SAAD Y BAGKAT

Jurisprudence holds that direct evidence is not the sole means of establishing guilt. The lack or
absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the accused-appellant's guilt cannot be
proved. Circumstantial evidence, if sufficient, can supplant the absence of direct evidence and
therefore, also prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt

ALPHA PLUS INTERNATIONAL ENTERPRISES CORP. v. PHILIPPINE CHARTER

INSURANCE CORP.

An amended complaint supersedes an original one. As a consequence, the original complaint is

deemed withdrawn and no longer considered part of the record.

When the amended complaint does not introduce new issues, cause of action, or demands, the
suit is deemed to have commenced on the date the original complaint was filed.

With petitioner's filing of the Amended Complaint which raised new demands, the original
complaint of petitioner must be deemed to have been abandoned and to have been
rendered functus officio.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. MAGDALENA QUILIT AND

MAURICIO LAOYAN, RESPONDENTS.

The power to issue writs of certiorari is an incident of judicial review. DARAB, not being a court
of law exercising judicial power, is, therefore, inherently powerless and incapable by
constitutional fiat of acquiring jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari, and issuing
writs of certiorari to annul acts of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) or
RARAD even when it exercises supervisory powers over them.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

DARAB's exercise of the innately judicial certiorari power is an executive encroachment into
the judiciary. It violates the separation of powers; it is unconstitutional.
Well-settled is the rule that "this Court is not a trier of facts, and it is not its function to examine,
review, or evaluate the evidence all over again. "Along the same lines, a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers only questions of law. Thus, in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the Court is generally limited to reviewing only
errors of law and not of facts.

Nevertheless, the Court has enumerated several exceptions to this rule, such as when: "(1) the
conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based
on misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of
specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the findings of absence of facts are
contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such
findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties."

LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. ESPEDITO* Q. ESCARO

It is well-settled that the "valuation of property or determination of just compensation in eminent

domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the courts and not with
administrative agencies." Accordingly, RA 6657 vests the RTCs, acting as SACs (Special
Agrarian Courts), original and exclusive jurisdiction in the determination of just compensation,

The correct period to file a petition for judicial determination of just compensation under RA
6657 (CARP) before the RTC-SAC is 10 years pursuant to Article 1144 (2) of the Civil Code.
As established from the records, respondent filed the complaint for determination of just
compensation with the RTC-SAC on January 5, 2009, more than 10 years after he received or
acquired knowledge of the notice of coverage from the DAR sometime between 1994 and 1996.
As such, it appears that there was sufficient ground for the dismissal of respondent's complaint
for having been filed out of time.

Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation." At this juncture, it must be emphasized that
determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is essentially a judicial function
which cannot be vested in administrative agencies.

There is no statutory basis for the DARAB to promulgate rules that would derogate the
jurisdiction of the RTC-SAC or impose procedural limitations which would effectively bar it
from taking exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction. Any attempt to do so should
be struck down for being contrary to law and the Constitution.

V PEOPLE MANPOWER PHILS., INC., AND/OR CAPE PNL LTD., PETITIONERS,

VS. DOMINADOR C. BUQUID, RESPONDENT.

If the factual findings by the LA, NLRC, and the CA are contradictory, the same may be subject
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
of review by the Supreme Court.

PNB-REPUBLIC BANK v. REMEDIOS SIAN-LIMSIACO

Jurisprudence has already held that the action to cancel the mortgage is a personal action, as
compared to an action to foreclose such mortgage, which is a real action that involves real
property.

since neither the subject mortgage contracts nor the instant case involved the mortgagors-
principals' real property rights, there was no need to join them and hence, respondent validly
instituted the action in her own name but still in her capacity as an agent of the mortgagors-
principals.

In any event, we agree with the appellate court in its ruling that the joining of the mortgagors-
principals would be unneccessary and moot as the evidence on record patently reveals that the
main loan contracts have already been rendered unenforceable by virtue of prescription. Given
that the subject mortgage contracts are mere accessory contracts to the said loan contracts, then it
follows that the action to foreclose on these mortgage contracts had also already prescribed.
Therefore, there is no necessity in including the mortgagors-principals in the petition as the
cancellation of the mortgages annotated on the titles was a result of the unenforceability of the
principal loan.

The parties' right to due process had been substantially complied with, given that both parties
were given the opportunity to present their side and adduce their own evidence to bolster their
positions. To emphasize, it has always been a basic principle in our jurisdiction that on balance,
substantial justice trumps procedural rules, especially given that there is no prejudice to the
parties' right to due process. This axiom is especially true if the strict and rigid application of
such procedural rules would result in technicalities which tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice.

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK v. LAGUNA NAVIGATION

The general rule is that this Court has no jurisdiction to resolve questions of fact in a petition for
review on certiorari, subject to exceptions laid down in case law. There is a question of fact
when the issue at hand invites a review of the evidence presented. The test, therefore, of whether
a question is one of law or of fact is "whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised
without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it
is a question of fact."
We find that the issues raised by PCIB are clearly questions of fact. The bank contends that the
CA erred in ruling that its complaint could not be fairly and justly disposed without the direct
examination of the witness contained in the destroyed TSNs notwithstanding the admitted and
established facts of the case. It also claims that the RTC could have decided the case based on
other evidence such as the Partial Stipulation of Facts, the other available TSNs containing the
cross-examination of a witness, and the documentary exhibits duly admitted. The bank claims
that the records would show that the remaining issue to be resolved as determined by the trial
court is the manner of payment of the principal obligation after the parties executed a Partial
Stipulation of Facts; yet, this document was not considered by both the CA and the RTC. It
alleges that it had already made a formal offer of evidence, which the RTC admitted; while the
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

respondents merely offered the Contract of Continuing Guaranty and waived its right to present
testimonial and documentary evidence.
Indeed, the bank seeks mainly for the examination by this Court of the evidence in the records.
This entails appreciation of evidence that the trial court has passed upon. Doing so would be
disturbing the findings of fact made by the RTC and affirmed by the CA. It is well settled that
the RTC is in a better position to determine which party was able to present evidence with
greater weight. Significantly, there is no reason to disturb the findings of fact in the instant case.
Notably, the dispositive portion of the September 25, 2001 RTC Order states that PCIB failed to
prove its case by preponderance of evidence despite several opportunities afforded to
it. Preponderance of evidence is the required quantum of evidence in civil cases; it is defined as
the evidence more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that offered as opposition
thereto.

MAGNA READY MIX CONCRETE CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. ANDERSEN

BJORNSTAD KANE JACOBS, INC., RESPONDENT.

A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may sue in Philippine Courts although
not authorized to do business here against a Philippine citizen or entity who had contracted with
and benefited by said corporation. To put it in another way, a party is estopped to challenge the
personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with
it. And the doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence applies to a foreign as well as to
domestic corporations. One who has dealt with a corporation of foreign origin as a corporate
entity is estopped to deny its corporate existence and capacity. The principle will be applied to
prevent a person contracting with a foreign corporation from later taking advantage of its
noncompliance with the statutes chiefly in cases where such person has received the benefits of
the contract.
The rule is deeply rooted in the time-honored axiom of commodum ex injuria sua non habere
debet -no person ought to derive any advantage of his own wrong. This is as it should be for as
mandated by law, "every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."
xxxx

By virtue of the doctrine of estoppel, a party cannot take undue advantage by challenging the
foreign corporation's personality or legal capacity to sue when the former already acknowledged
the same by entering into a contract with the latter and derived benefits therefrom.

RAMON JACINTO v. ATTY. BENEDICT LITONJUA

In settlement of estate proceedings, the ultimate objective is the distribution and partition of the
decedent's estate under Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.
The general rule is that an administrator has all the powers necessary for administration of the
estate and which powers he can exercise without leave of court. However, as regards the sale,
mortgage or other encumbrances on the estate, the provisions of Rule 89 apply.

MARYLOU R. ANCHETA v. MARY CAMBAY

HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

Lack of jurisdiction being a valid ground for annulment of a judgment, and one which may
negate the court's acquisition of jurisdiction, including defective service of summons, it is a well-
founded cause for an action for annulment of a judgment.

BASES CONVERSION v. CIR

At the crux of the present petition is the issue of whether or not BCDA is a government
instrumentality or a government-owned and - controlled corporation (GOCC). If it is an
instrumentality, it is exempt from the payment of docket fees. If it is a GOCC, it is not exempt
and as such non-payment thereof would mean that the tax court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the case and properly dismissed it for BCDA's failure to settle the fees on time.
BCDA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers. As such, it is exempt from
the payment of docket fees required under Section 21, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court

EMILY ESTORES Y PECARDAL, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES

RESPONDENT.

It is well established that the defense of alibi or denial, in the absence of convincing evidence, is
invariably viewed with disfavor by the courts for it can easily be concocted, especially in cases
involving the Dangerous Drugs Act.
When a prohibited drug is found in a house or other building belonging to and occupied by a
particular person, the presumption arises that such person is in possession of such drugs in
violation of law. The fact of finding the said illegal drug is sufficient to convict. In other words,
the finding of illegal drugs in a house owned by the accused, or in this case, the room occupied
and shared by petitioner and accused Miguel, raises the presumption of knowledge and, standing
alone, was sufficient to convict. Petitioner failed to present any evidence to rebut the existence
of animus possidendi over the illegal drugs found in the cabinet inside her room. Her claim that
she was unaware that illegal drugs were in her room fails to convince. Mere denial cannot prevail
over the positive testimony of a witness. It is a self-serving negative evidence which cannot be
accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.

REPUBLIC v. HEIRS OF SPS. MAURO BORJA AND DEMETRIA BAJAO

It has been settled that the 60-day period within which a petition for certiorari should be filed is
non-extendible, except in meritorious cases.
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the
petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)

A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC states that in cases where a motion for reconsideration was timely filed,
the filing of a petition for certiorari questioning the resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration must be made not later than sixty (60) days from the notice of the denial of the
motion.
It must be further stressed that this case has dragged on for 17 years to date. This case has in fact
reached the execution stage, where the trial court had directed the LRA to issue the OCT in
numerous occasions for several years. The LRA stubbornly refused to abide by the court order.
On March 5, 2010, the LRA had succeeded in persuading respondents to enter into a settlement,
where it was agreed that the LRA would issue the OCT on the condition that respondent produce
a certification that "no OCT has ever been issued" on the subject property. When respondents
produced the certification, the LRA found another reason not to issue the OCT. This very
judgment is the subject of appeal by petitioners before the appellate court. Instead of timely
filing its appeal to a then 10-year old case, petitioners filed a Motion for Extension, which is
prohibited under the rule. If, indeed, petitioner considered the importance of this case, it should
have diligently and timely pursued its appeal.
It bears stressing that "the right to appeal is not a natural right but a statutory privilege, and it
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. The party
who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so,
the right to appeal is lost."

LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. DEL MORAL +

All the elements of res judicata are present in the case at bar. First, there is a final judgment or
order, that is, the RTC Decision dated October 16, 2006 as affirmed by the CA in its Decision
dated October 30, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 98373 had already become final and executory by
virtue of this Court's Resolution dated June 4, 2008 in G.R. No. 181183 which denied the DAR's
Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court. Thereafter, on October 28, 2008, the
corresponding Entry of Judgment was issued.
Second, both the CA and the RTC have jurisdiction over (1) the subject matter, that is, the
computation of just compensation of the subject properties and the awards for temperate and
nominal damages as well as legal interest; and (2) the parties, namely, LBP, DAR and Del
Moral. Third, the RTC Decision dated October 16, 2006 and CA Decision dated October 30,
2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 98373 are judgments on the merits, the rights and obligations of the
parties with respect to the causes of action and the subject matter of the case having been
unequivocally determined and resolved.
Lastly, CA-G.R. SP No. 98033 and CA-G.R. SP No. 98373 refer to the same subject matter,
raise the same issues and involve the same parties. Although CA-G.R. SP No. 98373 was an
appeal filed only by the DAR, for purposes of res judicata, we have held that only a substantial
identity of parties is required and not absolute identity. The LBP may not be impleaded in CA-
G.R. SP No. 98373 which had already attained finality, however, the LBP has community of
interest with the DAR as both parties represented the government's interest in the expropriation
of Del Moral's 102 hectares of landholdings.
Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the present case becomes
dismissible. Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court enunciates the rule of res judicata or bar
by prior judgment, thus:
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order rendered
by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may
be as follows:
xxxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or
as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or
special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity[.]
By the principle of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes an
absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand or cause of action. Res
judicata is based on the ground that the party to be affected, or some other with whom he/she is
in privity, has litigated the same matter in the former action in a court of competent jurisdiction,
and should not be permitted to litigate it again.
The records reveal that the two appeals before the CA stemmed from the same factual
circumstances between the same parties as both the DAR and the LBP were parties in Agrarian
Case No. U-1505 before the RTC for the proper determination and payment of just
compensation. To reiterate, the DAR's appeal of the RTC's Agrarian Case No. U-1505 before the
CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 98373 was already terminated in our Resolution dated June 4,
2008.
during the pendency of this case, R.A. No. 9700 was enacted on August 7, 2009 which amended
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6657, viz.:
Section 5. Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
SEC. 7. Priorities. — The DAR, in coordination with the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
(PARC) shall plan and program the final acquisition and distribution of all remaining unacquired
and undistributed agricultural lands from the effectivity of this Act until June 30, 2014. Lands
shall be acquired and distributed as follows:
Phase One: During the five (5)-year extension period hereafter all remaining lands above fifty
(50) hectares shall be covered for purposes of agrarian reform upon the effectivity of this Act.
All private agricultural lands of landowners with aggregate landholdings in excess of fifty (50)
hectares which have already been subjected to a notice of coverage issued on or before
December 10, 2008; rice and corn lands under Presidential Decree No. 27; all idle or abandoned
lands; all private lands voluntarily offered by the owners for agrarian reform: Provided, That
with respect to voluntary land transfer, only those submitted by June 30, 2009 shall be allowed:
Provided, further, That after June 30, 2009, the modes of acquisition shall be limited to voluntary
offer to sell and compulsory acquisition: Provided, furthermore, That all previously acquired
lands wherein valuation is subject to challenge by landowners shall be completed and
finally resolved pursuant to Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended: x x x.
(Emphases supplied.)
However, despite the foregoing, we have held in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses
Chu that R.A. No. 9700 applies to landholdings that are yet to be acquired and distributed by the
DAR. This is further strengthened by Paragraph VI (Transitory Provision) of DARA.O. No. 02-
09, the implementing rules of R.A. No. 9700, which specifically provides that:
VI. Transitory Provision
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
With respect to cases where the Master List of ARBs has been finalized on or before July 1,
2009 pursuant to Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 2003, the acquisition and distribution of
landholdings shall continue to be processed under the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 prior to its
amendment by R.A. No. 9700.
However, with respect to land valuation, all Claim Folders received by LBP prior to July 1,
2009 shall be valued in accordance with Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 prior to its amendment
by R.A. No. 9700. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, based on the foregoing, the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 9700 and its
implementing rules with respect to the factors to be considered in computing just compensation
shall not be applicable in the case at bar as Del Moral's claim was approved by the LBP as early
as 1992, or 17 years before July 1, 2009. Hence, the proper determination of just compensation
of Del Moral's landholdings shall be based on Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 prior to its
amendment by R.A. No. 9700. The RTC and the CA are therefore duty bound to utilize the basic
formula prescribed and laid down in pertinent DAR regulations existing prior to the passage of
R.A. No. 9700 to determine just compensation.
The determination of just compensation is a judicial function which cannot be curtailed or
limited by legislation, much less by an administrative rule. [31] Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657 vests
the Special Agrarian Courts the "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners." While Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 requires
the due consideration of the formula prescribed by the DAR, the determination of just
compensation is still subject to the final decision of the proper court.
Regarding the award of temperate and nominal damages, we hold that temperate or moderate
damages may be recovered if pecuniary loss has been suffered but the amount cannot be proved
with certainty from the nature of the case. The trial and appellate courts found that Del Moral
was unable to use productively the 102 hectares of its landholdings after it was deprived of its
possession in 1972. With the passage of time, it is, however, impossible to determine Del Moral's
losses with any certainty. Thus, considering the particular circumstances of this case, the award
of P10 million as temperate damages is reasonable.
Although res judicata applies in this case, for the greater interest of justice, nominal damages of
P1 million should be deleted as temperate and nominal damages are incompatible and thus,
cannot be granted concurrently.

PATRICK U. GABUTINA, PETITIONER, VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,

RESPONDENT.

Delay in filing a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the CA spanned
more than six years, when, in the first place, he only had 15 days under the law to do so. The
Court has consistently held that the right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of law. Under
Administrative Order No. 07, as amended, Gabutina only had 15 days from the time he received
the February 18, 2005 Order on March 17, 2005 within which to file a Petition for Review with
the CA. In the second place, his six-year delay was not justified by any compelling reason; thus,
his Petition for Review must fail. Ironically, as respondent, Gabutina should have pursued the
procedural remedies available to him. It was his own undoing that rendered his cause a failure.

GUILLERMO VILLANUEVA REPRESENTING UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS

LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION (COCOLIFE), COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY.
BONIFACIO ALENTAJAN, RESPONDENT.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, or in anticipation
thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means other than appeal
or certiorari.

There is forum shopping when the elements of litis pendencia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. They are as follows: (a) identity of
parties, or at least such parties that represent the same interests in both actions, (b) identity of
rights or causes of action, and (c) identity of reliefs sought.

Under this test, we find that Atty. Alentajan committed forum shopping when he filed Civil Case
No. R-QZN-13-02119-CV despite the finality of the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-05-5629.

First, an identity of parties exists in Civil Case No. Q-05-5629 and Civil Case No. R-QZN-13-
02119-CV. In both cases, the initiating parties were the same, the heirs of Bienvenido O.
Marquez Jr., namely, Erlinda, Paz, Anna, and Bienvenido IV. They represented the same interest
in both cases wherein they claimed to be the legitimate heirs of Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr. and
co-owners of the real property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 79724
registered in the name of Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr. and Erlinda O. Marquez.

Meanwhile, COCOLIFE is the sole private respondent in both Civil Case No. Q-05-5629 and
Civil Case No. R-QZN-13-02119-CV. It espoused the same interest, as the transferee-owner of
the real property allegedly still owned by the heirs of Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr.

Second, the test of identity of causes of action does not depend on the form of an action taken,
but on whether the same evidence would support and establish the former and the present causes
of action. The heirs of Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr. cannot avoid the application of res
judicata by simply varying the form of their action or by adopting a different method of
presenting it.[24]

In Civil Case No. Q-05-5629, the trial court already ruled upon the issue of the validity of the
foreclosure of real estate mortgage as well as the validity of the issuance of TCT in favor of
COCOLIFE. The issue as to the ownership of the subject real property covered by TCT No.
79724 was already substantially passed upon and decided by the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-
05-5629. The evidence necessary to prove their claim in Civil Case No. R-QZN-13-02119-CV
had already been presented in the previous case, that is, Civil Case No. Q-05-5629. Therefore,
the subsequent filing of Civil Case No. R-QZN-13-02119-CV of the same party against
COCOLIFE in the form of a complaint for reconveyance of title cannot prosper. In fact, as per
Order dated November 12, 2013 issued by the RTC, Branch 90 of Quezon City, Civil Case No.
R-QZN-13-02119-CV was dismissed on the ground that the cause of action was barred by a prior
judgment issued by the RTC, Branch 92 of Quezon City which became final and executory on
September 22, 2010.

Third, in Civil Case No. Q-05-5629, the heirs of Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr. prayed for the
annulment of foreclosure proceedings, certificate of sale, and transfer certificate of title issued in
the name of COCOLIFE.

On the other hand, in Civil Case No. R-QZN-13-02119-CV, the heirs of Bienvenido O. Marquez,
Jr. asked for the reconveyance of the real property and annulment of title. They also prayed that
the TCT issued in the name of COCOLIFE be declared null and void and that TCT No. 79724 be
reconstituted.

It is obvious that the reliefs sought by the heirs of Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr. in both Civil Case
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
No. Q-05-5629 and Civil Case No. R-QZN-13-02119-CV were the same such that a ruling in
one case would have resulted in the resolution of the other, and vice versa. To illustrate, had the
validity of the foreclosure of real estate mortgage and the sale of the subject real property be
declared, there would be no need for another decision as to the ownership and title of the subject
property. Conversely, had the ownership and title of the subject property be decided upon, a
declaration of the validity of the sale and foreclosure proceedings in another case would have
been unnecessary. The reliefs prayed for, the facts upon which both are based, and the parties are
substantially similar in the two cases. Since the elements of res judicata are present, Atty.
Alentajan committed forum shopping when he filed Civil Case No. R-QZN-13-02119-CV
without indicating that Civil Case No. Q-05-5629 had already become final and executory.

Furthermore, Atty. Alentajan argued that Villanueva had no authority to represent COCOLIFE in
the disbarment case filed against him as Villanueva had no special power of attorney executed in
his favor by COCOLIFE. The Resolution dated April 26, 2011 issued by COCOLIFE in favor of
Villanueva referred to a different legal action and not to a disbarment case which was filed three
years thereafter or on September 15, 2014.

LEGAL ETHICS

RUBEN A. ANDAYA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. EMMANUEL ALADIN A.

TUMANDA,RESPONDENT.

His deliberate failure to settle his obligation despite repeated demands is in itself a gross
misconduct for which he may be sanctioned with one-year suspension from the practice of law.
As pointed out by complainant in his Complaint-Affidavit and as aptly found by the IBP,
respondent has been using several addresses to avoid being traced and to evade his obligation to
complainant. In fact, because of this, the IBP had to send copies of the Notice of Hearing to the
different addresses of respondent as he could not be located. Such aberrant behavior of
respondent lays bare his lack of integrity and moral soundness.
In addition, respondent even refused to answer the accusations against him and to appear in the
mandatory conferences despite due notice, thereby causing undue delay in the resolution of the
instant case.
All these circumstances taken together justify the imposition upon respondent of a three-year
suspension from the practice of law. It bears stressing that the determination of the appropriate
penalty to be imposed on an erring lawyer is within the sound judicial discretion of the court
taking into consideration the factual circumstances of the case.

FRANCISCO PAGDANGANAN, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ROMEO C. PLATA,

RESPONDENT.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
Gross misconduct has been defined as any inexcusable, shameful or flagrantly unlawful conduct
on the part of the person involved in the administration of justice, conduct that is prejudicial to
the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. Such conduct is generally
motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose, but does not necessarily imply
corruption or criminal intent.

AA TOTAL LEARNING CENTER FOR YOUNG ACHIEVERS, INC. REPRESENTED

BY SANTIAGO B. BURGOS, COMPLAINANT, V. ATTY. JOVENCIO JAMES G.
BEREBER, RESPONDENT.

Simply put, in determining whether a lawyer is guilty of violating the rules on conflict of interest
under the CPR, it is essential to determine whether: (1) "a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an
issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other
client;" (2) "the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of a lawyer's duty
of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-
dealing in the performance of that duty;" and (3) "a lawyer would be called upon in the new
relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their
connection or previous employment."
Considering the foregoing, the proper resolution of the issue herein involved necessarily hinges
upon the existence of an attorney-client relationship. Notably, the absence of an attorney-client
relationship between Bereber and Burgos is an essential element of Bereber's defense to the
charge of conflict of interest.

JONATHAN C. PARUNGAO, COMPLAINANT, V. ATTY. DEXTER B. LACUANAN,

RESPONDENT.

For there to be conflicting interests when a former client is involved, the following
circumstances must concur: (a) the lawyer is called upon in his present engagement to make use
against a former client confidential information which was acquired through their connection or
previous employment, and (b) the present engagement involves transactions that occurred during
the lawyer's employment with the former client and matters that the lawyer previously handled
for the said client.

GUILLERMO VILLANUEVA REPRESENTING UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS

LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION (COCOLIFE), COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY.
BONIFACIO ALENTAJAN, RESPONDENT.

"Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration
of justice. Any conduct [that] tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice
contravenes [this obligation]." In fact, willful and deliberate forum shopping has been made
punishable either as direct or indirect contempt of court in SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94
dated April 1, 1994.

In engaging in forum shopping, Atty. Alentajan violated Canon 1 of the CPR which directs
lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. He also
disregarded his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and the
prohibition against unduly delaying a case by misusing court processes.

Regardless of the fact that Atty. Alentajan did not act as counsel in Civil Case No. Q-05-5629, it
would not exempt him from culpability. He knowingly filed another civil case despite the finality
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
of the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-05-5629 which already resolved the issue of ownership and
validity of foreclosure of mortgage of the subject property. In fact, aside from filing Civil Case
No. R-QZN-13-02119-CV, Atty. Alentajan assisted his clients in filing various cases such as,
criminal complaint for violation of Sections 1 and 36 of R.A. No. 7653 in relation to Sections 4
and 6 of R.A. No. 3765, criminal complaint for violation of Article 302 of the RPC or robbery in
an uninhabited place or a private building and contempt against the officers of COCOLIFE
which were all dismissed for lack of merit.

Rule 10.3, Capon 10 of the CPR mandates lawyers to observe the rules of procedures and to not
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his/her client,
but not at the expense of the truth and the administration of justice. The filing of multiple cases
constitutes abuse of the court's processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct
and degrade the administration of justice. The filing of another action concerning the same
subject matter likewise runs contrary to Canon 1 and Rules 12.02 and 12.04 of Canon 12 of the
CPR. Canon 1 of the CPR requires a lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his/her duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Rule 12.02 prohibits a lawyer from
filing multiple cases arising from the same cause, and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 prohibits the
undue delay of a case by misusing court processes.

PASTORA GANANCIAL v. BETTY CABUGAO +

Mere formal infirmities in the notarization of the instrument will not invalidate the mortgage.
Basis for the award of damages must be clearly and distinctly set out in the judgment.

LOURDES E. ELANGA v. ATTY. RUTILLO B. PASOK +

"[T]he quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in a disbarment case is substantial
evidence or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. The complainant has the burden of proving his allegations against
respondents." In the case at bench, the Elangas proved with substantial evidence that Atty. Pasok
committed several infractions pertaining to his participation in relevant documents concerning
the opposing parties not only as a retained counsel but also as a notary public, and which
involved monetary considerations which he improperly received.

TEODORO L. CANSINO and EMILIO L. CANSINO, JR., Complainants, VS. ATTY.

VICTOR D. SEDERIOSA, Respondent.

SECTION 1. Qualifications. - A notarial commission may be issued by an Executive Judge to

any qualified person who submits a petition in accordance with these Rules.

To be eligible for commissioning as notary public, the petitioner:

(1) must be a citizen of the Philippines;

(2) must be over twenty-one (21) years of age;
(3) must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one (1) year and maintains a regular place of
work or business in the city or province where the commission is to be issued;
(4) must be a member of the Philippine Bar in good standing with clearances from the
Office of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
(5) must not have been convicted in the first instance of any crime involving moral turpitude.
(Emphasis Supplied.)
In other words, a lawyer, during the period of his/her suspension, is barred from engaging in
notarial practice as he/she is deemed not a member of the Philippine Bar in good standing, which
is one of the essential requisites to be eligible as a notary public.

There is more than enough evidence that shows that Atty. Sederiosa has continuously been
practicing his legal profession despite the suspension order against him. He remained to be a
duly commissioned notary public from January 8, 2016 to December 31, 2017 as attested by the
Certification from the RTC - Davao City, the Commission for Notary Public dated January 8,
2016, and the Affidavit of Loss dated August 8, 2016 which he duly notarized. In short, he had
never served his suspension.

It must be stressed that at the time he notarized the Affidavit of Loss on August 8, 2016, Atty.
Sederiosa was already cognizant of the Court's December 7, 2015 Resolution as early as January
29, 2016. As such, he was already aware that the Court had imposed the following penalties
upon him: (a) immediate revocation of his notarial commission; (b) disqualification from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years; and (c) suspension for one year from
the practice of law. Consequently, Atty. Sederiosa should have refrained from performing the
duties of a notary public and engaging in law practice. Yet, he continued to notarize documents
in clear defiance of the Court's orders. By doing so, he continued to practice law.

All told, Atty. Sederiosa is administratively liable for engaging in law practice during his
suspension and for performing his duties as a notary public despite revocation of his
commission. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

RISIE G. BAYGAR, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. CLARO MANUEL M. RIVERA,

RESPONDENT.

Atty. Rivera was merely performing his official duties as Municipal Administrator of the
Municipality of Binangonan, particularly the implementation of the Closure Order against the
businesses operated by the Baygar family and matters related thereto. As Municipal
Administrator, one of his duties is to "assist in the coordination of the work of all the officials of
the local government unit, under the supervision, direction, and control of the governor or
mayor, and for this purpose, he may convene the chiefs of offices and other officials of the local
government unit." The implementation of a closure order and the issuance of business permits
may be considered well within this function of a Municipal Administrator. Significantly, Risie
failed to prove by substantial evidence that in the performance of his functions, Atty. Rivera
committed acts in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the CPR.
Finally, it has not escaped our attention that the Baygars already filed an administrative
complaint against Atty. Rivera before the CSC as well as two criminal complaints before the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
MANUEL B. TABLIZO v. ATTYS. JOYRICH M. GOLANGCO +

It is settled that in disbarment and suspension proceedings against lawyers in this jurisdiction, the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant. Thus, this Court has held that "in consideration of
the gravity of the consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the bar, we have
consistently held that a lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof
rests upon the complainant to satisfactorily prove the allegations in his complaint through
substantial evidence." A complainant's failure to dispense the same standard of proof requires no
other conclusion than that which stays the hand of the Court from meting out a disbarment or
suspension order.

In the case at bar, there is an absolute dearth of evidence of the respondents' alleged Gross
Misconduct. Other than his bare allegations, complainant was unable to present proof to
substantiate his grave charges against respondents. That the Consolidated Resolution and
Consolidated Resolution - MR issued by the respondents in the OMB Cases were adverse to
complainant does not, by itself, establish malice or prejudice against him.
In contrast, respondents enjoy, absent any evidence to the contrary, the presumption that they
had regularly performed their official duties as GIPOs and Directors of the EIO, Office of the
Ombudsman, when they resolved the OMB Cases. All parties were accorded the opportunity to
be heard following the rules of procedure before the Office of the Ombudsman. In fact, Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon Mosquera effectively granted complainant's prayer for the inhibition of
respondents Atty. Bunagan and Atty. Salazar of EIO - Bureau A by re-assigning complainant's
Motion for Reconsideration of the Consolidated Resolution to respondents Atty. Golangco and
Atty. Agbada of EIO - Bureau B for resolution. It is also noteworthy that both the Consolidated
Resolution and Consolidated Resolution – MR were reviewed and ultimately approved by
Ombudsman Carpio Morales.
Furthermore, a perusal of the Consolidated Resolution and Consolidated Resolution - MR issued
by respondents readily shows that they sufficiently presented the factual and legal bases for the
dismissal of complainant's charges against Zafe and Alberto. Therefore, it cannot be argued that
the subject Resolutions were completely arbitrary, capricious, or groundless.
More importantly, if complainant really believed that respondents committed reversible errors in
judgment or grave abuse of discretion in rendering the Consolidated Resolution and
Consolidated Resolution - MR, then his remedy would have been to seek judicial review of the
same, and not through a disciplinary case against the respondents. The following declaration of
the Court in administrative matters involving judges may be applied by analogy herein: "An
administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available,
such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless the assailed
order or decision is tainted with bad faith, fraud, malice or dishonesty."

ATTY. ANTONIO B. MANZANO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. CARLOS P. RIVERA,

RESPONDENT,

Only a person who is commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years
commencing the first day of January of the year in which the commissioning is made, unless
earlier revoked or the notary public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court.
Hence, a violation thereof should therefore not be dealt with lightly to preserve the integrity of
notarization.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
In the case at bench, it was sufficiently proven that Atty. Rivera was not commissioned as a
notary public at the time he notarized the Answer that was filed by the defendants in Civil Case
No. 33-467-2014. The Certification issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of
Tuguegarao City, Cagayan duly showed that Atty. Rivera was not commissioned as a notary
public for and in the Province of Cagayan in 2014. Thus, Atty. Rivera is indubitably liable for
gross violation of the notarial rules which should not be dealt with lightly by the Court.

Atty. Rivera's act of making it appear that he was a duly commissioned notary public is in blatant
disregard of the Lawyer's Oath to obey the laws, i.e. the Notarial Law, and to do no falsehood. It
likewise constitutes a transgression of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), which states that: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct."

PRUDENCIO B. PORTUGUESE,* JR., COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JERRY R.

CENTRO, RESPONDENT.

It is settled that "[a] member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his
office as an attorney, for violation of the Lawyer's Oath and/or breach of the ethics of the legal
profession as embodied in the [CPR]. For the practice of law is 'a profession, a form of public
trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good
moral character.' The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound
judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts."

TONY PETER PARTSCH v. ATTY. REYNALDO A. VITORILLO

The prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine private lands is too basic a rule for even
non-attorneys to be unaware of. As a lawyer, Atty. Vitorilllo is presumed to know this. Despite
being equipped with such knowledge, Atty. Vitorillo still marketed the subject property for sale
to Partsch, a Swiss national. More telling of Atty. Vitorillo's ethical obliquity is his questionable
instruction to Partsch to just proceed with the fencing of the subject property without any
acceptable guarantee of Atty. Vitorillo's title thereto. Again, Atty. Vitorillo had not refuted this
serious allegation. He is deemed to have acted in contravention of Canon 1, Rule 1.02 - CPR's
proscription against counseling activities aimed at defiance of the law.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a member of the Bar may be disbarred
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Court for any deceit, gross misconduct in such
office, or violation of the Lawyer's Oath.

ATTY. ROGELIO S. CONSTANTINO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. NEMESIO A.

ARANSAZO, JR.,

It is settled that a "lawyer-client relationship begins from the moment a client seeks the lawyer's
advice upon a legal concern. The seeking may be for consultation on transactions or other legal
concerns, or for representation of the client in an actual case in the courts or other fora. From that
moment on, the lawyer is bound to respect the relationship and to maintain the trust and
confidence of his client."

Thus, if an individual consults a lawyer in respect to his business affairs or legal troubles of any
kind with a view towards obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the lawyer, by virtue
thereof, permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then a lawyer-client relationship is
established.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
The information regarding the real estate mortgage, private documents such as the Deed of
Assignment, and other pertinent facts and figures revealed in confidence to Atty. Aransazo used
as basis or support in the execution of his sworn statement and the filing of the amended
complaint of Aldaba against Atty. Constantino, were all acquired through an attorney-client
relationship. Such act is in direct violation of the CPR and constitutes a breach of trust sufficient
to warrant imposition of disciplinary sanction against Atty. Aransazo.

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an
attorney, for violating the lawyer's oath and/or for breaching the ethics of the legal profession as
embodied in the CPR, for the practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the
performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral
character. The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts.

ADELITA S. VILLAMOR, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ELY GALLAND A. JUMAO-

AS, RESPONDENT.

There can be no denying that a lawyer-client relationship existed between Villamor and
respondent despite the absence of any express or written agreement or arrangement as to
attorney's fees. Atty. Jumao-as' argument that it was Retubado who engaged his legal services
and that his participation was limited only to the incorporation of the lending company, is
misplaced. It must be stressed that in the course of the incorporation, respondent directly dealt
with Villamor as owner of the company; conversely, Villamor definitely made consultations with
respondent on legal matters pertaining to the incorporation and operation of the lending business.
In turn, respondent learned of confidential information from Villamor. In fine, a lawyer-client
relationship existed between Villamor and respondent. On the other hand, respondent expressly
admitted that Yu was also his client.

Thus, when respondent sent a demand letter to Villamor on behalf of Yu, he was clearly
representing conflicting interests. Suffice it to state that Villamor and Yu have inconsistent
interests. If respondent would argue for the rights of Yu, he would in effect directly oppose the
interests of Villamor. In short, he would be representing inconsistent and opposing interests
which is not allowed.

Canon 15 of the CPR requires lawyers to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his/her
dealings and transactions with his/her clients. Corollary to this, Rule 15.03 provides that lawyers
shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts.

JOHN PAUL KIENER, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. RICARDO R. AMORES,

RESPONDENT.

Atty. Amores should be held administratively liable for violating the Rules on Notarial Practice
when he notarized a document without the presence of the signatory and failed to indicate his
commission number in the notarial certificate.

It is settled that "notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but one invested with
substantive public interest. Notarization converts a private document into a public document,
making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a notarized
document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a
notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
notarial duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would
be undermined." Atty. Amores is, therefore, bound to strictly comply with these notarial rules.

A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, one of which is a jurat. Atty.
Amores performed a jurat when he notarized the Secretary's Certificate with Irene signing as the
Corporate Secretary. Rule II, Section 6 of the Rules on Notarial Practice defines a jurat as:

Section 6. Jurat. — "Jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document;

(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules;

(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and

(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document.

This provision requires that the signatory, or the affiant in some cases, physically appears before
the notary public and signs the document in his presence. Rule IV, Section 2 of the same rules
further provides:

xxxx

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument
or document —

(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

This provision bolsters the requirement of physical appearance as it prohibits the notary public
from performing a notarial act if the signatory is not in his/her presence at the time of the
notarization.

In Prospero v. Delos Santos, the Court emphasized that "a notary public should not notarize a
document unless the person who signed the same is the very same person who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein.
Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in question, the
notary public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging
party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act or deed."

To repeat, Atty. Amores failed to observe the requirement of physical presence when he
notarized the Secretary's Certificate. Upon examination of the document, and as admitted by
Atty. Amores himself, Irene's signature in the Secretary's Certificate attached to the complaint-
affidavit in the criminal case was merely printed. In short, it was not an actual handwritten
signature of Irene. Atty. Amores's defense that Irene physically signed one copy that was
subsequently reproduced then notarized, does not convince this Court. Atty. Amores did not
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
present any proof that Irene was indeed physically in his presence upon the signing and
notarization of the document. It goes without saying that Irene had signed the document
elsewhere, scanned it, and then sent it electronically to Atty. Amores for the latter to print,
reproduce, notarize, and use for the designated purpose. If indeed Irene had personally appeared
before him, he should have asked her right then and there to affix her signature to each and every
copy of the document, not just to one copy.

It is also worth mentioning that Atty. Amores failed to indicate the serial number of his notarial
commission in the concluding part of the notarial certificate of the Secretary's Certificate as
required by the rules.

Based on the foregoing, Atty. Amores violated the Rules on Notarial Practice. For having
committed such violations, he also failed to adhere to Canon 1 of the CPR, which requires every
lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for the law and
legal processes, and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in
any unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct.

On a final note, the Court deems it necessary to remind lawyers who are currently commissioned
as notaries public that a community tax certificate (CTC) is no longer considered as competent
evidence of identity. Atty. Amores used a CTC as competent evidence of identity of Irene in
notarizing the Secretary's Certificate. However, it was not a violation at the time of the
performance of the notarial act in 2007 as the use of CTCs was prohibited only in 2008 by virtue
of an amendment to the Rules on Notarial Practice as clarified in the case of Baylon v. Almo.

ROGER B. DAP-OG, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. LUEL C. MENDEZ, RESPONDENT.

"The Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency
in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, whether in his profession or private
life because good character is an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law
and for the continuance of such privilege."
As applied in this case, Atty. Mendez clearly did not meet the lofty standards reposed on
lawyers. There is no excuse for respondent's unlawful and dishonorable behavior. Even assuming
for the sake of argument that respondent's allegations against Roger were true, that the latter
swindled the former's clients, no person should take the law into his own hands. In this regard,
this Court must remind respondent that while he can represent his clients with zeal, he must do
so within the bounds of the law.

CRIMINAL LAW
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
PEOPLE v. HECTOR CORNISTA Y REOTUTAR +

The rule is that "a few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring
to minor details [and collateral matters,] which do not touch the essence of the crime do not
impair their credibility." In addition, Carmelita testified that at the time Arturo was kidnapped,
there was a light on the fence, a daylight in front of the restaurant, and the restaurant's signboard
illuminated the area. Thus, she was able to recognize appellants. Furthermore, as the CA aptly
held, appellants failed to give any reason why Carmelita would falsely accuse them of
kidnapping her husband. In the absence of any ill motive on the part of Carmelita to point to the
appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, her testimony must be given full faith and credit.
The elements of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended, are as
follows: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his/her liberty; (b) actual
deprivation of the victim of his/her liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which is extorting
ransom for the release of the victim. [46] In the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom
with Homicide, the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of
whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought.

PEOPLE v. FLORENTINO LABUGUEN Y FRANCISCO +

To avail of this exempting circumstance, the evidence must establish: (1) the existence of an
uncontrollable fear; (2) that the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is
greater than or at least equal to that committed. A threat of future injury is insufficient. The
compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused to escape.

LUIS T. ARRIOLA v. PEOPLE +

The courts below held Arriola criminally liable for Estafa by false deceits under Article 315,
Paragraph 2(a) of the RPC, which provides:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). -Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow x x x:
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
Ordinarily, this Court desists from trifling with the findings of facts by the courts below.
Findings by trial courts are generally accorded with great respect by the appellate courts, more so
that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts but of questions of law.
For this case, however, We defer to one of the prevailing exceptions listed by jurisprudence, that
is, when the findings of fact by the trial court were conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based. [22] The courts below correctly convicted Arriola, but not much
substantial discussion was made on the falsity of his representations and the documentary
evidence thereof, which We now address.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the
competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to
produce it. A person who introduces a hearsay statement is not obliged to enter into any
particular stipulation, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any
contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that he/she entrenches
himself/herself in the simple assertion that he/she was told so, and leaves the burden entirely
upon the dead or absent author. For this reason, the rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly
on the ground that there was no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The return by the
accused of money belonging to the private complainant will not reverse a consummated act
of Estafa. Quite the contrary, such action may even uphold a conviction. Section 27, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court states that in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or criminal
negligence or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused
may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. In this case, Arriola's initial
attempts to reimburse Del Rosario through checks, coupled with the actual return of the latter's
money after the RTC issued its judgment of conviction, may all be considered as unequivocal
gestures to compromise and which can be measured against Arriola as his implied admission of
guilt.

PEOPLE v. FLOR PUEYO +

Successful prosecutions for statutory rape charges falling under Article 266-A(2) rely on only
two requisites: (1) the victim is a child, male or female, under 12 years of age, and (2) that the
accused inserted any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of the victim. In relation
to Section 5(b) of RA 7610, the apparent circumstances fit squarely as sexual assault: AAA, 6
years young at the time of the incident, received a penetrating blow onto her vagina that almost
extended to her anus by a welding rod wielded by Pueyo. The severity of the genital injury
inflicted upon AAA cannot be more telling of Pueyo's abusive intent. AAA's consent to Pueyo's
vile act holds no relevance here - it is settled that a child's consent is immaterial because of his or
her presumed incapacity of discerning evil from good

PEOPLE v. VALENTINO CATIG Y GENTERONI +

The elements of the crime of rape under Article 266-A of the RPC are as follows: (1) the accused
had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) the said act was accomplished (a) through the use of
force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or
(c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented.
It is not required for a rape victim to undergo a comprehensive medical examination so as to
prove that he/she is a mental retardate. We have repeatedly pronounced that mental retardation
can be proven by evidence other than medical/clinical evidence, such as the testimony of
witnesses and even the observation by the trial court. However, the conviction of an accused of
rape based on the mental retardation of the victim must be anchored on proof beyond reason able
doubt of the same.

MERLINA R. DIAZ v. PEOPLE +

It has been held that the requirement of particularity as to the things to be seized does not require
technical accuracy in the description of the property to be seized, and that a search warrant may
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific
as the circumstances will ordinarily allow it to be described.

PEOPLE v. JOHNNY ARELLAGA Y SABADO +

In illegal drugs cases, the drugs seized from the accused constitute the corpus delicti of the
offense. Thus, it is of utmost importance that the integrity and identity of the seized drugs must
be clearly shown to have been duly preserved with moral certainty. "This means that on top of
the elements of possession or illegal sale, the fact that the substance illegally sold or possessed
is, in the first instance, the very substance adduced in court must likewise be established with the
same exacting degree of certitude as that required in sustaining a conviction." [15] "The chain of
custody rule performs this function as it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity
of the evidence are removed."
Without the three witnesses, there is reasonable doubt on the identity of the seized drugs itself.
Without the three witnesses, the Court is unsure whether there had been planting of evidence
and/or contamination of the seized drugs. Because of this, the integrity and evidentiary value of
the corpus delicti had been compromised. Consequently, appellant must be acquitted.

PEOPLE v. ALEX BALUYOT Y BIRANDA +

It is a well-settled rule that in criminal cases, the accused's guilt must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. This burden lies with the prosecution. In this case, the prosecution was not able
to prove Alex's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The failure of the drug enforcement officers to
observe the three-witness rule seriously compromised the integrity of the seized items and
ultimately casted reasonable doubt on Alex's guilt.

PEOPLE v. ZZZ +

Sexual intercourse with a victim who is under 12 years old, as defined under Article 266-A,
Paragraph 1(d) of the RPC, is Statutory Rape. Where the victim is below 12 years old, the only
subject of inquiry is whether carnal knowledge took place. Under the law, carnal knowledge is
the act of a man having sexual intercourse or sexual bodily connections with a woman. The
victim's consent to the vile act holds no relevance here - it is settled that a child's consent is
immaterial because of his or her presumed incapacity of discerning evil from good.

PEOPLE v. ROGELIO NATINDIM +

Since treachery qualified the crime to murder, the generic aggravating circumstances of abuse of
superior strength, in aid of armed men and nighttime are absorbed by and necessarily included in
the former. Unless the aggravating circumstance of nighttime was purposely sought and founded
on different factual bases, then nighttime can be considered as a separate generic aggravating
circumstance, which is however not present in the case at bar. The prosecution failed to prove by
sufficient evidence that nighttime was purposely and deliberately sought by the appellants. Thus,
this Court holds that since treachery was alleged in the Information and duly established by the
prosecution during trial, the appellants' conviction for the crime of Murder is proper.

However, evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance cannot be appreciated in this case

for failure of the prosecution to specifically allege in the Information the acts constituting it.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
Mere reference to evident premeditation is not sufficient because it is in the nature of a
conclusion of law, not factual averments.

PEOPLE VS. XXX

The elements of Qualified Rape are: "(1) sexual congress; (2) with a woman; (3) done by force
and without consent; (4) the victim is under [eighteen] years of age at the time of the rape; and
(5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim." In this
case, AAA was below eighteen years old when the crime was committed against her, which was
verified by her birth certificate. Accused-appellant, who admitted that he is AAA's father,
sexually took advantage of her without her consent, likely relying on the authority he holds over
her. Relevantly, "when the offender is the victim's father, as in this case, there need not be actual
force, threat or intimidation because when a father commits the odious crime of rape against his
own daughter, who was also a minor at the time of the commission of the offenses, his moral
ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes for violence and intimidation." Undoubtedly,
accused-appellant's relationship with the victim should be considered in assessing his criminal
liability.

PEOPLE v. ARMANDO BUEZA Y RANAY

The absence of hymenal laceration is inconsequential since it is not an element of the crime of
Rape. The Court has consistently held that mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis
capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. Thus, when
a penis comes in contact with the lips of the victim's vagina, the crime of Rape is considered
consummated.

As regards the charge of Grave Threats, the Court agrees with the appellate court that the crime
was consummated as soon as the victim heard Bueza utter his threatening remarks. Article 282
of the RPC holds liable for Grave Threats, "any person who shall threaten another with the
infliction upon the person, honor, or property of the latter or of his family of any wrong
amounting to a crime[.]" The crime is consummated as soon as the threats come to the
knowledge of the person threatened.

In this case, it is clear that the accused-appellant's threat to kill the private complainant is wrong
on the person amounting to, at the very least, homicide under the RPC. The felony of Grave
Threats was consummated the moment she heard Bueza utter his threatening remarks. The
appellate court correctly ruled that it was inconsequential that the threat was made in the
presence of a number of people since the offense does not require that it be committed in private.

However, we note that Bueza was charged with and prosecuted for Robbery with Rape and
Grave Threats "in relation to Republic Act No. 7610." Pursuant to our ruling in People v.
Tulagan (Tulagan), we find the need to fix the proper nomenclature of the crimes committed.
Tulagan teaches that:

'[F]orce, threat or intimidation' is the element of rape under the RPC, while 'due to coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group' is the operative phrase for a child to be deemed
'exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse,' which is the element of sexual abuse under
Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610.

xxxx
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
Therefore, there could be no instance that an Information may charge the same accused with the
crime of rape where 'force, threat or intimidation' is the element of the crime under the RPC, and
at the same time violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.

xxxx

Assuming that the elements of both violations of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 and of Article
266-A, paragraph l(a) of the RPC are mistakenly alleged in the same Information x x x the
accused should still be prosecuted pursuant to the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, which is
the more recent and special penal legislation that is not only consistent, but also strengthens the
policies of R.A. No. 7610.

Thus, the Court fixes the error in the nomenclature of appellant's crimes. As it should now stand,
accused-appellant is to be held criminally liable for Robbery with Rape defined under Article
294, Paragraph 1 of the RPC and of Grave Threats under Article 282 of the RPC. The correlation
to RA 7610 is deleted.

PEOPLE v. EDDIE MANANSALA Y ALFARO +

Settled is the rule that an appeal in a criminal case throws the entire case wide open for review.
Thus, it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct any error that may be found in the
appealed judgment, whether assigned as an error or not. In the crime of murder, the elements of
murder and the aggravating circumstances qualifying the killing must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt by the prosecution.
The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded
by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent, during the
space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. When it is not shown as to how and when
the plan to kill was hatched or what time had elapsed before it was carried out, evident
premeditation cannot be considered. "Evident premeditation must be based on external acts and
must be evident, not merely suspected, indicating deliberate planning."

Nevertheless, despite the absence of evident premeditation, the killing remains to be murder in
view of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
PANTE VS. PEOPLE

A "finder" under Article 308, par. 2(1) of the RPC is not only limited to the actual finder of the
lost property since the gist of the offense is the furtive taking and misappropriation of the
property found. Though not the actual finder, there is no dispute that Pante knew for a fact that
his two co-accused minor did not own the subject money. He knew for a fact that his co-accused
minor merely found the money along the road while the latter was delivering bread. Instead of
returning the money, Pante convinced his co-accused minors not to return the money and to
divide it among themselves. At that moment, Pante placed himself precisely in the situation as if
he was the actual finder. Otherwise stated, petitioner was a "finder in law," if not in fact; and his
act in appropriating the money was of precisely of the same character as if it had been originally
found by him. His criminal intent to commandeer the money found was altogether clear at that
point.

PEOPLE VS. MONTALVO

HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
Self-defense is an affirmative allegation and offers exculpation from liability for crimes only if
satisfactorily proved. It requires (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable
necessity of the means employed by the accused to repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation
on his part. By invoking self-defense, the burden is placed on the accused to prove its elements
clearly and convincingly. While all three elements must concur, self-defense relies first and
foremost on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression is
proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded.

In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of
the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously
and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him.

In the same tenor, we affirm the lower courts' finding that Perreira is not entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The requisites for voluntary surrender that: (1)
the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender was voluntary, were not met. The facts
established herein parlay that the barangay authorities had to search for Perreira and go to the
place where he fled to. Only then was he arrested.

PEOPLE VS. MARIO PANIS

Anent the imposable penalty, Article 248 of the RPC, as amended, specifically provides that the
crime of Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The qualifying circumstance of
treachery having qualified the killing to the crime of Murder, and there being no other
aggravating circumstance, the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed upon Santiago was proper.
With respect to the award of damages, We further modify the awards of civil indemnity, moral
damages, and exemplary damages to P75,000.00 each; and temperate damages to P50,000.00
pursuant to People v. Jugueta.[55] Finally, all the monetary awards shall earn interest of six
percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of the judgment until fully paid.
To be convicted of the crime of Murder, the following elements must be established, to wit: (1) a
person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) as
amended; and (4) the killing constitutes neither parricide nor infanticide.
In the case at bar, the abovementioned elements were duly established by the prosecution.
Artemio, Sr. was killed. Santiago was positively identified as one of the assailants in the killing
of Artemio, Sr. Moreover, the killing was not parricide or infanticide.

PEOPLE VS. ZZZ

The date of commission of the crime is not an essential element thereof. In fact, the specific Rule
cited by accused-appellant states that "it is not necessary to state in the Information the precise
date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense." The
date of commission is not even an element of the crime of rape which elements are: (1) sexual
congress; (2) with a woman; (3) done by force and without consent; (4) the victim is under [18]
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
years of age at the time of the rape; (5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate
or adopted) of the victim.
[A]n Information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the acts or
omission constitutive thereof. The exact date of the commission of a crime is not an essential
element of the crime charged. In a prosecution for rape, the material fact or circumstance to be
considered is the occurrence of the rape, not the time of its commission. The precise time of the
crime has no substantial bearing on its commission. Therefore, it is not essential that it be alleged
in the information with ultimate precision.
Further, it cannot be considered that appellant was deprived of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
DEBUQUE VS. NILSON

PD 1689 imposes the penalty of life imprisonment to death if the estafa is committed by a
syndicate, defined as a group of "five or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out
the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme..." Section 1 of PD 1689 reads:

Section 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling as defined
in Article 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life
imprisonment to death if the swindling (estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or
more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction,
enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of money contributed
by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative, "samahang nayon(s)", or farmers'
association, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.

xxxx
Thus, the elements of Syndicated Estafa are as follows: (a) Estafa or Other Forms of Swindling,
as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed; (b) the Estafa or Swindling is
committed by a syndicate of five or more persons; and, (c) defraudation results in the
misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks,
cooperative, "samahang nayon[s]," or farmers' association, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.

Applying the foregoing, the Court finds no existing syndicate in which Ramon and the other
accused had any participation. As found by the DOJ Secretary, Atty. Debuque acted on his own,
without the participation or involvement of Ramon or the other accused. Atty. Debuque was
never authorized by the ILC shareholders, i.e., Ramon and the other accused, to transact with
Nilson. The third standard provided in Remo, therefore, is not satisfied. There is simply no proof
that all of the accused, including Ramon, acted through ILC in defrauding Nilson.

There was also no showing that Ramon acted on his own and defrauded Nilson. On the contrary,
the evidence shows that Nilson parted with his money solely because of Atty. Debuque's
misrepresentations and false pretenses.

PEOPLE v. BELINA BAWALAN Y MOLINA

While the prosecution failed to prove the victim's minority due to the absence of her birth
certificate, it however established that the crime was committed by a group of three persons, and
by an ascendant and a person exercising authority over the victim. Consequently, the crime still
falls under Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Sections 6(c) and (d) of RA 9208.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
The issue on whether the entrapment operation was recorded in the police blotter prior to the
conduct of the actual operation, and whether the marked money was already prepared during the
pre-operation meeting, are likewise immaterial in the prosecution of the crime charged. Thus,
this Court deems it unnecessary to delve into this matter.

As to the inconsistencies in AAA's testimony, We find them unsubstantiated. AAA's allegedly

conflicting answers as to what happened after she boarded the tricycle pertained to two different
instances, Her first narration referred to a previous incident where she was taken to the cemetery
by a male customer while the second narration pertained to the entrapment operation.

ROSELA BARLIN VS. PEOPLE

The Information clearly and categorically charged her with Estafa under Article 315 paragraph
(1)(b) for violating the trust receipt agreements she had entered into with Gacayan. It must be
stressed that a violation of trust receipt agreements would make the accused criminally liable
for estafa under paragraph (1)(b) of Article 315 of the RPC as expressly provided in Section 13
of the Trust Receipts Law.

The prosecution had proved petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of estafa.
The element of damage was sufficiently established when Gacayan parted with her goods and
failed to recover the proceeds of the sale thereof or the unsold items despite repeated demands.
Petitioner herself admitted that she tried to turn over the proceeds of the sale under the TRAs
through the issuance of post-dated checks which were however dishonored.

Petitioner even admitted before the trial court that the post-dated checks were issued with respect
to the same transactions in this case. She also presented a Compromise Agreement with respect
to the dishonored post-dated checks executed by the parties before the MeTC of San Juan.

As regards the proper penalty, Article 315 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 10951
(RA 10951) provides that the imposable penalty is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
periods, which ranges from two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) months when the amount
of fraud does not exceed P40,000.00. Considering that there is no mitigating and aggravating
circumstance present in this case, the proper penalty should be within the range of three (3)
months and eleven (11) days to four (4) months and twenty (20) days. The Indeterminate
Sentence Law is not applicable in this case since the maximum term of imprisonment does not
exceed one year.

Thus, in view of RA 10951 and considering the amount involved, it is proper to impose upon the
petitioner the penalty of three (3) months and eleven (11) days of arresto mayor in its medium
and maximum periods.

XXX v. PEOPLE

Crimes mala in se are those "so serious in their effects to society as to call for almost unanimous
condemnation of its members." On the other hand, crimes mala prohibita are "violations of mere
rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of
society."Generally, the term mala in se pertains to felonies defined and penalized by the RPC
while mala prohibita refers generally to acts made criminal by special laws. In acts which are
declared to be mala prohibita, malice or intent is immaterial. Since RA 9262 or the Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 is a special law, the act of deprivation
of financial support is considered malum prohibitum. Petitioner's argument of absence of malice
or intent is immaterial and the only inquiry to be made is whether or not XXX committed the act.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
SPOUSES ISIDRO DULAY III* AND ELENA DULAY, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Private complainants' failure to conduct due diligence does not negate petitioners' fraud in
pretending to own the subject property and gain by selling it to gullible buyers. In short,
the estafa by deceit was consummated when petitioners received payments for the subject
property knowing that they were not the registered owners who could validly transfer title
thereto. Time and again we have ruled that the one induced, who must be ignorant of the falsity
of the representations, must have relied on the truth thereof and, as a consequence, sustained
injury

PEOPLE VS. EVANGELISTA

The rule on chain of custody establishes the identity of the object of the sale or the item
possessed by the accused without authority. The purpose of this rule is to preserve the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized dangerous drugs in order to fully remove doubts as to its
identity. It must be shown that the items presented and identified in court during trial are the very
same items that were sold and seized from the accused during the buy-bust operation. Section 21,
as amended, provides that the marking, taking of photographs, and inventory of the seized items
must be done immediately after seizure and confiscation of the items in the presence of two
witnesses (as compared with the previous requirement of three witnesses): an elected public
official, and a representative from the National Prosecution Service or the media. The provision
allows for the marking, taking of photographs, and inventory be conducted in the nearest police
station or office if practicable in case of warrantless seizures. It further provides that the seized
items must be immediately brought to the forensic laboratory for examination.

HORCA VS. PEOPLE

The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil
aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the
civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c)
the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the
accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if
there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or
omission imputed to him.

MARZAN VS. PEOPLE

the crime of violation of Section 3(a) of RA 3019 may be committed in either of the following
modes: (1) when the offender persuades, induces or influences another public officer to perform
an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority
or an offense in connection with the official duties of the public officer; or (2) when the public
officer allowed himself to be persuaded, induced or influenced to perform said act which
constitutes a violation of rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority or an offense
in connection with the official duties of the public officer.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES (2023 BAR)
GIL MIGUEL, PETITIONER, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS,
RESPONDENT

In sum, Murder is considered a heinous crime in so far as the GCTA Law is concerned, and
persons charged with and/or convicted of such are disqualified from availing of the benefits of
the law.

it is clear that the trial court, the appellate court, and this Court exercise concurrent jurisdiction
over petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. However, this does not mean that
parties are absolutely free to choose before which court to file their petitions, thus:

[M]ere concurrency of jurisdiction does not afford parties absolute freedom to choose the court
with which the petition shall be filed. Petitioners should be directed by the hierarchy of courts.
After all, the hierarchy of courts 'serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitioners for the extraordinary writs.'