No. L­18438. March 30, 1963.

CONRADO PAEZ, petitioner, vs. THE WORKMEN’S

COMPENSATION COMMISSION and ISABELA
JAPONES, in behalf of her minor children RODOLFO,
ROLANDO and JAIME, all surnamed BARAWID,
respondents.

Workmen’s Compensation Commission; Jurisdiction over haz​ ­

ardous industries, like business for transportation of goods.—
While the mere act of buying and selling palay is in itself not
hazardous, yet when carrying out such business the use of motor
vehicles essential and indispensable to transport the goods
especially where the place of purchase was very far from the place
of sale so that to a driver, like the deceased, risk on the road was
great, it becomes a hazardous enterprise and the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission was correct in assuming jurisdiction of
the case.
Same; Death arising out of and in the course of employ​
ment.—
Where the deceased driver, paid on commission basis, left the
truck assigned to him and went to the other side of the river for
the purpose of advising the other truck driver to have all the
palay bought loaded early because he was in a hurry to go back,
and he (deceased), outside of his regular duties, even helped the
other driver in the work of loading and un​
loading the palay at the
bank of the river to be ferried to the other side where his truck
was parked, but said driver against the advice of the other truck
driver rode on the third banca which capsized and sunk and said
deceased was drowned, it is held that said deceased driver’s death
arose out of and in the course of employment.
Same; Prescription; Action not barred where there is
knowledge of the accident by the employer and voluntary com​ ­
pensation payments were made to the widow.—Where even if
notice of injury was filed beyond the 3 months period fixed by law,
but there is knowledge of the accident by the employer, his agent
or representative, and voluntary compensation pay​ ments were
made lo the widow, the proceeding is held valid and the action is
not barred by the statute of limitations.
Same; Compensability of claim; Notorious negligence, mean​ ­
ing of; Not present in case at bar.—Notorious negligence signi​
fies
a deliberate act of the employee to disregard his own safety. The
disregard of a warning, where the deceased did not act with full
knowledge of the existence of a danger that ordinary prudence
would counsel him to avoid, constituted merely a miscalculation,
and cannot be a valid reason to deny his widow the right to be
compensated.

REVIEW of a decision of the Workmen’s Compensation

Commission.
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Paez vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Bienvenido P. Faustino for petitioner.
The Legal Counsel, Department of Labor for respondent
Workmen’s Compensation Commission.
Lea T. Castillo for Isabela Japones and her minor
children.

PAREDES, J.:
On October 30, 1957, the heirs of Marciano Barawid,
presented with the Department of Labor, Regional Office
No. 3, a complaint for compensation. A Motion to Dismiss
the complaint was presented on January 28, 1958, on three
grounds, to wit —

1. The allegations do not constitute a cause of action;

2. Lack of jurisdiction; it appearing that the capital of Paez is very
much less than P10,000.00 and that his business of buying and
selling palay is not hazardous nor deleterious to employees; and
3. The claim is barred by the statute of limitations.

On March 10, 1958, Hearing Officer Juan M. Gerardo,

issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which states —

“Without prejudice to the right of the claimant to file suit

against the respondent under Employer’s Liability Act (Act No.
1874) before the Courts as directed by sec. 42, of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, the instant claim is hereby declared
DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction of the Regional Office to take
cognizance of the same.”

Complainant Isabela Japones, presented a Petition for

Review of the above Order. Associate Commissioner Jose
Sanchez, on January 9, 1959, remanded the case for such
action as is consistent with the Order, making the following
observations —

“x x x The Hearing Officer is correct in his finding that the

respondent regularly used a truck owned by him in his business of
buying palay. But this is precisely the reason for the logical
conclusion that, although the business of buying palay is not in
the enumeration contained in Section 42 of the Act, which is not
exclusive, said business should nevertheless be considered
‘hazardous or deleterious’ as this phrase is meant to be
understood in the Act.
Moreover, the Hearing Officer found that the respondent used
his truck for transporting not only the palay he purchased but
also that of other persons engaged in the same or similar

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590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Paez vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission

business as his; and that in all these instances he charged freight

for such transportation. Respondent must therefore, be deemed
engaged in the business of transporting goods which causes him
to fall under sub­paragraph 1, of Section 42 of the Act.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the respondent comes
within the coverage of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as
amended, either in his business of buying palay, or in his
enterprise of transporting goods; hence, the Regional Office No. 3,
Manila, has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim for
compensation filed against him by the claimant.”

and remanding the case for further investigation and/or

hearing on the merits. The Hearing Officer received
evidence, and rendered the same decision, dismissing the
case, which was again reversed by the Associate
Commissioner who ordered Paez —

“1. To pay the claimants, thru this Commission, the sum of

THREE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY­FIVE and 71/100
(P3,455.71) PESOS as Death benefits;
2. To reimburse the claimant, thru this Commission, the sum
of P150.00 for burial expenses;
3. To pay the amount of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY­NINE and
18/100 (P259.18) PESOS as attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 6,
Rule 26, of the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission and Article 2208 (8) of the new Civil Code; and
4. To pay the Commission the sum of P35.00 as fees pursuant
to Section 35 of the Act.”
 After the denial of a motion for reconsideration, the case
was brought to this court, for review.
Paez and his wife were on and sometime before 1953,
engaged in the business of buying palay for the King Tong
Seng Ricemill of Victoria, Tarlac, with the latter supplying
the capital of P1,000.00 to P2,000.00. In August, 1953, Paez
had been buying palay in Isabela. For such purpose, he
employed agents, two truck drivers and two truck helpers,
all of whom were paid on commission basis. In bringing the
palay purchased by his agents to Nueva Ecija or Tarlac, the
same had to be ferried in bancas across the Magat River in
Aurora, Isabela, towards the other bank, which is
Cabatuan; from Cabatuan side to Guimba, the
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Paez vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission

palay were hauled by truck which was regularly driven by

Valentin Lagman. Respondent’s truck driver on the Aurora
side was Primitivo Apolonio, who also collected all the
palay on said side — hauled them to the river bank (Aurora
side), where he engaged boatmen to ferry the palay to the
Cabatuan side and where Lagman would take them and
bring them to Guimba or Victoria, as the case may be. On
August 1, 1953, because his child became seriously ill,
Lagman engaged the services of Marciano Barawid to
substitute him in undertaking the trip to Isabela, with the
understanding that he (Barawid), was to receive his
(Lagman’s) pay during the latter’s absence. On August 2,
1953, Barawid drove respondent’s truck up to the
Cabatuan side of the Magat River to await for the palay
that were to be ferried from the Aurora side. On the same
date, instead of awaiting the palay on the Cabatuan side,
Barawid crossed the Magat River and joined Apolonio on
the Aurora side in hauling the palay. After having collected
all the palay on the Aurora side, Apolonio and Barawid
reached the river’s bank at about 9:00 o’clock in the
evening, and both helped in loading three (3) bancas.
Apolonio advised Barawid not to ride the third banca
because same was already fully loaded, but to take another
to Guimba, as he had to drive a new truck of his brother­in­
law. While in the midst of the Magat River, the banca
capsized and sunk, and Barawid was drowned.
The petitioner submits the following issues for
determination, to wit —
 a) the jurisdiction of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission over the case;
b) whether the death arose out of and in the course of
employment;
c) prescription of action; and
d) whether the deceased was guilty of notorious negligence.

The Workmen’s Compensation Act No. 3428. as

amended provides —

“SEC. 42. Law applicable to small industries.— All claims for

compensation by reason of an accident in an enterprise, in­

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592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Paez vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission

dustry, or business carried on or in a trade, occupation or

profession exercised by an employer for the purpose of gain,
whose capital amounts to less than ten thousand pesos and is not
hazardous or deleterious to employees, shall be governed by the
provisions of Act Numbered Eighteen hundred and seventy­four
and its amendments: Provided, however, That the following
enterprises or establishments shall be among those considered
hazardous or deleterious to employees:
(1) Any business for the transportation of persons or goods, or
both; x x x.”

The regular use of motor vehicles, was indispensable

and essential in carrying on petitioner’s business, and
necessarily placed his business under the category of
hazardous enterprises. Without the use of motor vehicles, it
would be extremely difficult for petitioner to conduct such
business. The provision of law above cited is not exclusive,
for it clearly provides that the enterprises or
establishments enumerated therein are among those that
are considered hazardous or deleterious to the employees.
True it is, that the mere act of buying and selling palay is
in itself not hazardous, but when the one engaged in the
business used motor vehicles to transport the goods,
especially when, as in the instant case, the place of
purchase was very far from the place of sale (Isabela to
Tarlac), that business became inherently hazardous and
dangerous. To a driver, like the deceased Barawid, risk on
the road was great, resulting from hold­ups and outlaws,
falling into ravines, vehicular accidents of all sorts,
collisions, tire blowouts, etc. There seem to be no serious
discussion that the regular use of motor vehicles by the
claimant’s own employees makes the business hazardous
(Haddad v. Commercial Motor Truck Co., 146 La. 897, 84
So. 197, [1920]).
The respondent Court found that petitioner was in a
sense engaged in the transportation of goods (palay), by
charging freight from other persons who loaded their palay
in his trucks, thereby definitely classifying the business of
the petitioner as hazardous. It was shown that for buying
palay for the ricemill, the petitioner was paid a commission
of P.20 for every cavan of palay purchased, aside from the
freight he charged for transporting palay from
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Paez vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission

Isabela to Nueva Ecija or Tarlac at P1.50 per cavan. This

being the case, We need not stretch our imagination far, to
visualize that petitioner was engaged more in the
transportation of palay than the buy­and­sell thereof. The
trial court was, therefore, correct in assuming jurisdiction
of the case.
Petitioner contends that the respondent WCC erred in
finding that the death of Barawid arose out of and in the
course of employment. In justifying its findings in this
respect, respondent court said —

“x x x And so, each case must be analyzed and decided

according to its own peculiar facts and careful consideration given
to the nature and incidents entailed by the employment.
Here, as elsewhere stated, the deceased Marciano Barawid left
the International truck assigned to him and went to the other side
of the Magat River (Aurora side) for the purpose of advising the
other truck driver, Primitivo Apolonio, to have all the palay
bought by the respondent’s agent loaded early because he was in a
hurry to go back to Guimba. In fact, Barawid joined Apolonio in
the work of loading and unloading the palay at the bank of the
river to be ferried towards the Cabatuan side where the
International truck was parked. The activities performed by
Barawid, we believe, were incidental to his duties not only as
driver but as purchaser of the respondent who was engaged in the
business of buying and selling palay. It is reasonable to expect an
employee, as in the case of Barawid to help a co­employee in the
performance of his duties. And even granting, only for the sake of
argument, that the acts performed by the deceased were not
strictly within the bounds of his duties, still he was, in the fullest
sense of the term, in the course of the employment. For the
performance of those acts — helping the other employee of the
respondent load and unload palay — would inure to the benefit of
the respondent in the pursuit of his business. As Arthur Larsen,
an eminent authority on the subject of Workmen’s Compensation
Laws, has put it:
‘An act outside an employee’s regular duties which is
undertaken in good faith to advance the employer’s
interests, whether or not the employee’s own assigned work
is hereby furthered, is within the course of employment.
(Larsen’s Workmen’s Compensation Text, Vol. 7, p. P338).”

“Simply stated, ‘if the act is one for the benefit of the
employer or for the mutual benefit of both, an injury
arising out of it will usually be compensable.” ‘(Schneider’s
Workmen’s Compensation Text, Vol. 7, p. 338.)

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Paez vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission

There is little to be added to the above observations, except

to state that they are based upon the evidence and law on
the subject.
The third proposition dwells on the non­dismissal of the
claim for having been filed out of time. The record shows
that the petitioner had knowledge of the death of Barawid,
and he himself made immediate arrangements for the
removal of the body from the place of the accident
(Cabatuan) to his home town, Guimba; and that the
petitioner also gave respondent Isabela Japones, the
amount of P150.00 for burial and other expenses and
another P150.00 for family subsistence. Knowledge of the
accident by the employer, his agent or representative, is
sufficient notice (section 27, of Act. No. 3428, as amended);
so that, even if the notice of injury was filed beyond the 3
months period fixed by law, the proceeding is still valid.
The fact that the petitioner also made voluntary
compensation payments to the widow, rendered it no longer
necessary to file the claim for compensation within the
time prescribed by law, as provided for in section 24 of the
same Act. The present action is not, therefore, barred by
the statute of limitations.
It is finally contended that the respondent WCC erred in
not finding that the accident was caused through the
notorious negligence of the deceased (Sec. 4, of Act No.
3428). Petitioner’s answer to the complaint for
compensation, does not allege notorious negligence in his
defense. That defense should be proven by the party
invoking it. Notorious negligence is something more than
mere or simple negligence, or contributory negligence; it
signifies a deliberate act of the employee to disregard his
own personal safety. In the case at bar, there is no showing
at all that deceased Barawid had deliberately disregarded
his safety; no intention was attributed to him to end his life
or that he wantonly courted death. The deceased wanted to
return home as it was getting late, and even helped in the
loading and unloading of the palay to the banca and truck,
to finish the work that day. It is claimed that the deceased
wanted to return home, because he was to drive the new
truck of his brother­in­law, and he was in such
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VOL. 7, MARCH 30, 1963 595

Paez vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission

a hurry that he unheeded the suggestion of his companion

not to embark any more, as it was dark and the banca was
fully loaded. Conceding this to be true, for the purpose of
argument, (Barawid can no longer contradict it, his lips
having been sealed by death), still the disregard of the
warning, can not be considered as a notorious negligence.
Disobedience to rules, orders and/or prohibition, does not in
itself constitute notorious negligence, if no intention can be
attributed to the injured to end his life. And if in the case
at bar, there was any negligence at all, the same can not be
considered notorious or evident. The deceased did not act
with the full knowledge of the existence of a danger that
ordinary prudence would counsel him to avoid such a case.
That a banca loaded with palay and 3 persons, at night
time, would sink if one person more was added to its
weight, constituted merely a miscalculation on the part of
such person, if he thought it would be safe for him to
embark, the alleged overloading notwithstanding
Barawid’s promptness in accomplishing his duties, to
enable him to attend his personal interest thereafter,
cannot be a valid reason to deny him the right to be
compensated.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the petition is dismissed, and the
decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the
petitioner.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,

 Concepcion, Barrera, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., took no part.

Petition dismissed and decision affirmed.

Notes.—The law (Sec. 42, Act No. 3428, as amended)

involved in the above case was further amended by
Republic Act Nos. 4119, approved June 20, 1964, and 4596,
which took effect on June 19m 1965.
The words “arising out of,” as used in the Compensation
Act, refer to the origin or cause of the accident and are
descriptive of its character, while the words “in the course
of” refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which
the accident takes place (Amado v. Rio y Olaberrieta, Inc.,
95 Phil. 33). Thus, injuries sustained by a workman when
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Paez vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission

he is involved with transportation while going to or coming

from his work have been considered as arising out of and in
the course of employment, when such transportation is the
result of an express agreement between the employer and
his workman, or when it has ripened into a custom and it is
incidental to, and part of, the contract of employment, or
when it is the result of a continued practice in the course of
the employer’s business and which practice is beneficial to
both employer and employee (Talisay­Silay Milling Co.,
Inc. v. WCC, et al., L­22906, Sept. 29, 1967; 21 SCRA 366;
Phil. Engineer’s Syndicate, Inc. v. Martin, L­17533, Dec. 2,
1962).
“Negligence” to be a successful defense in a
compensation case, must be more than simple or
contributory (Banaag v. Tanghurong, et al., L­17209, Dec.
2, 1963).
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