ET2050

Territorial Scenarios and

Visions for Europe
Project 2013/1/19

Interim Report | 31/05/2012

Revision | 12/10/2012

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ESPON 2013
 This report presents a more detailed overview of
the analytical approach to be applied by the
ET2050 ESPON project. This Applied Research
Project is conducted within the framework of the
ESPON 2013 Programme, partly financed by
the European Regional Development Fund.

The partnership behind the ESPON Programme

consists of the EU Commission and the Member
States of the EU27, plus Iceland, Liechtenstein,
Norway and Switzerland. Each partner is
represented in the ESPON Monitoring
Committee.

The approach presented in the report was

presented and discussed with the ESPON
Monitoring Committee, and the indications made
by the ESPON Monitoring Committee were
integrated, but still it may not necessarily reflect
the opinion of the members of the Monitoring
Committee.

Information on the ESPON Programme and

projects can be found on www.espon.eu

The web site provides the possibility to

download and examine the most recent
documents produced by finalised and ongoing
ESPON projects

This basic report exists only in an electronic

version.

© ESPON & MCRIT LTD, 2012.

Printing, reproduction or quotation is authorised

provided the source is acknowledged and a
copy is forwarded to the ESPON Coordination
Unit in Luxembourg.

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List of authors
Andreu Ulied (Mcrit)
Oriol Biosca (Mcrit)
Marta Calvet (Mcrit)
Rafael Rodrigo (Mcrit)

Valérie Biot (IGEAT)

Vincent Calay (IGEAT)
Philippe Doucet (IGEAT)

Ivan Illes (HAS RCERS)

Zoltán Gál (HAS RCERS)
Gábor Lux (HAS RCERS)

Roberto Camagni (Politecnico di Milano)

Roberta Capello (Politecnico di Milano)
Ugo Fratesi (Politecnico di Milano)
Camilla Lenzi (Politecnico di Milano)
Andrea Caragliu (Politecnico di Milano)

Marek Kupiszewski (CEFMR / IOM)

Dorota Kupiszewska (CEFMR / IOM)

Klaus Spiekermann (S&W)

Michael Wegener (S&W)

Hedwig van Delden (RIKS)

Jacek Szlachta (SGH)

Alexandre Dubois (Nordregio)

Johanna Roto (Nordregio)

Harry Coccosis (University of Thessaly)

Dora Papatheochari (University of Thessaly)

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Table of contents
1. Presentation ...........................................................................................................................10

1.1 Objective of ET2050.........................................................................................................10

1.2 ET2050 Transnational Project Group (TPG) ....................................................................10
1.3 Work activities ..................................................................................................................11

2. Participatory Activities ............................................................................................................17

2.1 Type and time frame of activities......................................................................................17

2.2 Stakeholders involved in the Participatory Plan ...............................................................17
2.3 Methodology.....................................................................................................................18
2.4 Synthesis of comments and contributions received..........................................................19
2.5 Participatory Plan Update.................................................................................................34
2.6 Additional material............................................................................................................39

3. Present State of Europe .........................................................................................................40

3.1 World Context...................................................................................................................40

3.2 Analysis by sectors...........................................................................................................43
3.3 Analysis by territories .......................................................................................................64
3.4 Synthesis of macro-regional Visions ................................................................................89

4. Baseline Scenario ..................................................................................................................92

4.1 Approach ..........................................................................................................................92

4.2 Critical Bifurcations from Present State............................................................................93
4.3 Baseline Key Directions .................................................................................................101
4.4 Baseline Quantitative Description...................................................................................107

5. Exploratory Scenarios ..........................................................................................................112

5.1 Approach ........................................................................................................................112

5.2 Analysis of most relevant Scenarios for ET2050 ............................................................119
5.3 ET2050 Scenarios – Ongoing discussion.......................................................................150

6. Policy Assessment of Scenarios ..........................................................................................153

6.1 Midterm Targets and Pathways to 2030.........................................................................153

6.2 Territorial Impact Assessment (TIA) ...............................................................................156

7. ANNEX 1 - References.........................................................................................................161

8. ANNEX 2: Project planning ..................................................................................................164

8.1 Schedule of activities......................................................................................................164

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 8.2 Detailed work plan and partner involvement ..................................................................166
8.3 Work towards Interim Report 2 (april 2013)....................................................................171

9. ANNEX 3: Full Baseline Quantitative Description.................................................................172

10. ANNEX 4: ET2050 Meta-model SPQR (TV+ // PASH+).......................................................189

11. FIRST ANNEX TO INTERIM REPORT (OCTOBER 2012): Structuring of Exploratory

Scenarios, Territorialisation and Use of Wild Cards ...................................................................193

11.1 Approach....................................................................................................................193
11.2 Scenarios 2010 to 2030 .............................................................................................197
11.3 Scenarios 2030 to 2050 .............................................................................................203
11.4 Overall phased and territorially differentiated evolutions 2010-2050 ..........................207
11.5 Expectations on the Territorial Impact Assessment of Exploratory Scenarios............208

12. SECOND ANNEX TO INTERIM REPORT (OCTOBER 2012):: Quantitative Forecast Models
209

12.1 MULTIPOLES model..................................................................................................209

12.2 MASST model ............................................................................................................209
12.3 Metronamica model....................................................................................................211
12.4 SASI Model ................................................................................................................211

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Figures
Figure 1-1 Approach to construction of scenarios and the Vision (Project Specification) ...........11
Figure 1-2 Tasks in the Work Programme ..................................................................................13
Figure 1-3 Activities carried out ..................................................................................................16
Figure 2-1 Results to Question 4A (ParP) ..................................................................................27
Figure 2-2 Participatory Plan Update (schedule) ........................................................................39
Figure 3-1 World Context. Evolutions for key variables 1950-2010 ............................................42
Figure 3-2 Europe in the World Context. Evolutions for selected variables 1950-2010 ..............43
Figure 3-3 Sectors considered by ET2050 .................................................................................43
Figure 3-4 Macro-regions considered by ET2050.......................................................................64
Figure 4-1 EU2020 Scenarios (JM Barroso, Informal European Council, Feb’10)......................93
Figure 4-2 Main Characteristics of Baseline Scenario ..............................................................108
Figure 4-3 Level of fulfilment of official targets by ET2050 Baseline ........................................110
Figure 4-4 Logic framework for the Baseline Scenario .............................................................111
Figure 5-1 Classification of scenarios according to geographic scale of reference and the
consideration of main drivers......................................................................................................116
Figure 5-2 Classification of scenarios according to Smart and Sustainable policy aims...........117
Figure 5-3 Classification of scenarios according to Smart and Inclusive policy aims ...............118
Figure 5-4 ESPON 3.2 Scenarios in a cohesion // competitiveness 2D space .........................119
Figure 5-5 ESPON 3.2 - Hypotheses of the Baseline scenario.................................................120
Figure 5-6 ESPON 3.2 - Spatial structure of Baseline in 2030 .................................................121
Figure 5-7 ESPON 3.2 - Hypotheses of the Competitiveness-Oriented scenario .....................122
Figure 5-8 ESPON 3.2 - Spatial structure of Competitiveness-Oriented in 2030......................123
Figure 5-9 ESPON 3.2 - Hypotheses of the Cohesion-Oriented scenario ................................124
Figure 5-10 ESPON 3.2 - Spatial structure of Cohesion-Oriented in 2030 ...............................125
Figure 5-11 NL2040 - Framework scenarios ............................................................................126
Figure 5-12 NL2040 - Scenario’s Characteristics .....................................................................129
Figure 5-13 FRANCE2020 – Four Scenarios ...........................................................................134
Figure 5-14 Territoires2040 –"L’urbain-metropolisé français dans la mondialisation", scenario
description ..................................................................................................................................137
Figure 5-15 Territoires2040 –"L’urbain-metropolisé français dans la mondialisation", scenario
sketches .....................................................................................................................................138
Figure 5-16 Europe2030 – Straight line development scenario sketch.....................................140
Figure 5-17 Europe2030 – Long-term voluntarist scenario sketch ...........................................142
Figure 5-18 PLUREL Urban Development Scenarios – Framework.........................................143

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Figure 5-19 PLUREL Urban Development Scenarios – Ethnography’s parameters by scenarios
...................................................................................................................................................145
Figure 5-20 PASHMINA – Scenarios in a speed (economy) VS concentration (social) 2D space,
and possible transitions between them.......................................................................................146
Figure 5-21 PASHMINA – Spatial implications of different scenarios.......................................147
Figure 6-1 Synthesis of actual EU policy targets 2020, 2030, 2050 .........................................156
Figure 6-2 Assessment of regional sensitivity to branched EU Directives in ESPON ARTS ....158
Figure 6-3 Preliminary list of indicators considered in ET2050 TIA ..........................................159
Figure 7-1 ET2050 homepage (www.et2050.eu)......................................................................162
Figure 7-2 Gallery of infographic resources (www.et2050.eu)...................................................162
Figure 7-3 Virtual library at http://www.et2050.eu/Et2050_Library/...........................................163
Figure 8-1 Schedule of activities and deliveries........................................................................166
Figure 8-2 Updated Tentative schedule of internal milestones and partner involvement..........171
Figure 9-1 World Framework – Reference sources for exogenous variables ...........................172
Figure 9-2 World Framework – Table of exogenous variables quantified .................................173
Figure 9-3 World Framework – 1990-2050 growth trends ........................................................174
Figure 9-4 World Framework – Table of growth rates of exogenous variables.........................175
Figure 9-5 World Framework – Table of European weight in the World ...................................175
Figure 9-6 World Framework – 1990-2050 evolution of European weight in the World............176
Figure 9-7 World Framework – 1950-2050 evolution growth rates of exogenous variables .....177
Figure 9-8 European Drivers – Table of input variables quantified ...........................................179
Figure 9-9 European Drivers –1950-2050 evolution for selected input variables......................182
Figure 9-10 European Main Trends – Table of output variables quantified ..............................184
Figure 9-11 European Main Trends – 1950-2050 evolution for selected output variables ........187
Figure 11-1 1st approach for Exploratory Scenarios: full matrix of framework conditions and
policies .......................................................................................................................................194
Figure 11-2 1st approach for Exploratory Scenarios: integrated vs fragmented EU framework
conditions ...................................................................................................................................195
Figure 11-3 2nd approach for Exploratory Scenarios: set of scenarios with consistent framework
conditions and policies ...............................................................................................................195
Figure 11-4 Forecast and back-cast strategies for ET2050 Explorative Scenarios ..................196
Figure 11-5 Spatial distribution of activities among ET2050 Scenarios ....................................197
Figure 11-6 The large cities and MEGAs in Europe, according to population (ESPON 1.4.3,
2007) ..........................................................................................................................................198
Figure 11-7 List of MEGAs and FUAs in Europe (ESPON 1.4.3, 2007) ...................................200
Figure 11-8 Draft temptative extrapolation at NUTS3 level of the European territory according to
its urban functions (ET2050 2012)................................. Error! No s'ha definit l'adreça d'interès.
Figure 11-9 European policy framework in ET2050 Scenarios.................................................201

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Figure 11-10 ET2050 Scenarios facing Critical Bifurcations.....................................................202
Figure 11-11 Quantitative expectations for ET2050 scenarios in 2050 (preliminary)................205
Figure 11-12 Quantitative expectations for framework conditions in 2050 scenarios (preliminary)
...................................................................................................................................................206
Figure 11-13 Phased and territorially differentiated evolutions for FLOWS scenario................207
Figure 11-14 Phased and territorially differentiated evolutions for CITIES scenario.................207
Figure 11-15 Phased and territorially differentiated evolutions for REGIONS scenario............207
Figure 11-16 Expectations on TIA scoring for ET2050 scenarios.............................................208
Figure 11-17 Expectations on TA2020 priorities’ scoring for ET2050 scenarios.......................208

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ESPON 2013
1. Presentation
This Interim Report is submitted nine months after the beginning of works, and presents initial
and/or preliminary results, open to be refined and adjusted.
There are 21 annexes to this report, corresponding to Participatory Activities, Sectorial Reports
(8), Territorial Reports (9), European Policy Trends report, Review of Baseline and the
Scenarios Report, Review of Exploratory Scenario Report, all of them available at the project
website (www.et2050.eu)..
The information provided by this Interim Report is a summary of the results of the project planned
for this period (see Table 1-3).

1.1 Objective of ET2050

ET2050 (Territorial Scenarios and Visions for Europe) aims at supporting policy makers in
formulating a long-term integrated and coherent vision for the (smart, sustainable and inclusive)
development of the EU territory.
This aim is twofold:
 content-wise: a product, namely a Vision for the European Territory, has to be developed
 process-wise, those who will elaborate this product, namely policy makers, have to be
supported by sound scientific knowledge.

1.2 ET2050 Transnational Project Group (TPG)

The Transnational Project Group (TPG) includes, after being reorganised, 12 European applied
research institutions from 9 countries: 6 universities and research institutes, 5 companies
specialised in spatial planning and 1 non-profit foundation..
The TPG for the ESPON project ET2050 consists of the following thirteen Project Partners:
- MCRIT LTD, Barcelona, Spain (Lead Partner, LP)
- Free university of Brussels, IGEAT, Brussels, Belgium (PP3)
- Centre for Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Pécs, Hungary
(PP4)
- Politecnico di Milano, Milano, Italy (PP5)
- Central European Forum for Migration and Population Research, Warsaw, Poland (PP6)
- Spiekermann & Wegener (S&W), Dortmund, Germany (PP7)
- Research Institute for Knowledge Systems (RIKS), Maastricht, Netherlands (PP8)
- Warsaw School of Economics, Warsaw, Poland (PP9)
- Nordregio - Nordic Centre for Spatial Development, Stockholm, Sweden (PP10)
- University of Thessaly, Volos, Greece (PP11)
- Institute of Studies for Integration of Systems (ISIS), Rome, Italy (PP12)
- Ersilia Fundation, Barcelona, Spain (PP13)

The company TERSYN (PP2) is not longer active in the project.

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1.3 Work activities

Methodology
The work is organised according to the steps indicated in the Project Specifications, as follows:
- Present State of Europe: What is the current state of the European territorial structure?
- Baseline Scenarios for 2030 and 2050: What will be the future state of the European
territorial structure based on the hypothesis that development trends and policies remain
stable?
- Extreme/exploratory Scenarios 2050: What could be feasible future state of the
European territorial structure in three territorially extreme/exploratory scenarios?
- European Territorial Vision 2050: What is the room for manoeuvre to politically steer
(the development of) the future state of the European territorial structure and what is the
range in which a realistic territorial vision can be formulated?
- Midterm targets and pathways: Is the Vision feasible?, which political pathway will be
sufficient and/or more convenient to achieve end and midterm targets?

Scientifically-driven (what may happen in the future?)

Politically-driven (what we would like to happen?)

Figure 1-1 Approach to construction of scenarios and the Vision (Project Specification)

The methodology combines a quantitative and qualitative approach as follows. The qualitative
work is based on partner’s expertise, internal discussion structured by “Discussion Notes” (32
notes published in ET2050 website), and inputs generated in the participatory processes through
specific expert surveys (2 surveys during internal and open ESPON seminars).
Mostly qualitatively approach:
- Synthesis of trends by sectors and territories, and elaboration of SWOT tables.

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 - Definition of critical bifurcations
- Review of existing studies on scenarios for Europe and the rest of the World (literature)
- Definition of key directions for each scenario from the bifurcation points
- Design of logic relationships between the different key directions and trends
- Elaboration of qualitative narratives for scenarios

Quantitative approach:
- Quantitative hypothesis and expectations at global level for key indicators based on
foresight meta-models (PASH+)
- Quantitative hypothesis and expectations at European level for key indicators based on
foresight meta-models (TV+)
- Adjustment and execution of advanced forecast models (Multipoles, MASST, MOSAIC,
Metronamica, SASI)
- Meta analysis of results
- Application of TIA

Integrated qualitative and quantitative approach:

- Review of scenario assumptions
- Definition of political pathways
- Integrated qualitative and quantitative narratives

Participatory approach:
- Discussion of trends and scenarios
- Definition of TIA parameters (weights and criteria)
- Definition of the Vision throughout participatory process

Work structure
ET2050 has 3 Work Packages (WP) divided in Tasks. As illustrated below, the three main WPs
are: Coordination, Management and Quality Control (WP1), Research Activities (WP2), and
Communication and Dissemination of Results (WP3).
WP2 includes eight main research tasks:
- 5 content-based tasks (Tasks 2.3 to 2.7) matching the five steps detailed in the project
specifications (Present State, Baseline Scenarios 2030 & 2050, European Territorial
Scenarios for 2050, Territorial Vision 2050, Midterm Targets and Pathways towards
2030).
- 3 support-oriented tasks (Tasks 2.1, 2.2 and 2.8): Resources for interactive
participation (Task 2.1), Database management, forecast and foresight modelling
resources (Task 2.2), and Innovative visualisation (Task 2.8).

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The content-based tasks will be performed sequentially. The whole project will be carried out in
close consultation with the ESPON MC and CU. Participatory events and workshops will be
linked to ESPON CU activities.

Figure 1-2 Tasks in the Work Programme

The content of the 1st Interim Report according to Project Specifications

The content of the First Interim Report will reflect the orientations given in the Inception Report as
well as the results of the discussions having taken place with the Sounding Board in March 2011.
The report is envisaged to include the following elements:
a) Preliminary results on the basis of available information, including:
- An overview on concepts and methodology on analysing the present state, building the
baseline scenarios and the three territorial scenarios.
- A detailed presentation of a hypothesis on the scenarios and visions.
- Description of the technique/methodology/indicators/models to be used to approach the
European territorial scenarios and territorial vision.
- Preliminary results of Step 1, and hypothesis for Step 2 and Step 3 in preparation for
stakeholders discussions, on the basis of available information.
- Overview of involvement of stakeholders up to now and planned for the next phase up to
the second Interim Report.
- First indications on the conclusions and policy relevant options that could be the outcome
of the three steps.
b) Additional material to contribute to the ESPON 2013 capitalisation and communication
strategy, including:

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 - Slideshows explaining the assumptions, the methodology and the results of the project so
far.
- A selection of 3-5 maps suitable for the communication of project progress and results at
the different stages on the ESPON website, but as well suitable to be used for creation of
posters, postcards, exhibition materials, etc.
- Input (text, maps, images) for the creation of a specific section of the ESPON 2013
Website dedicated to the project.
c) Concrete plan for the applied research and stakeholder involvement to finalise Step 1, Step 2
and Step 3 towards the Second Interim Report.

Conclusions and Expectations for Interim Report according to Sounding Board and ESPON CU
feed-back to Inception Report
The following remarks were provided by the Sounding Board and ESPON CU after the
presentation of the ET2050 Inception Report in December 2011, for the further implementation of
the project. These remarks have been considered by the TPG:
- Describe the plan to analyse the robustness of the results of steps 2, 3, 4 and 5 for major
changes in the assumptions.
- Coverage of all 31 countries included in ESPON.
- Consideration of the results and/or methodologies of additional ESPON projects (EU-
LUPA, INTERCO, ESPON 2006 project 3.2 and TANGO).
- Enhance and elaborate in more detail the qualitative analysis methods.
- Describe and clarify how TIA and wild cards will be applied in practice.
- Explain better how the results of the forecasting models will be communicated to the
stakeholders. Describe of the foresight models (TV+ and PASH+) in described in
templates.
- Be more ambitious, explore a broader range of scenarios, reflect in more detail on the
global trends, drivers and values and use more elementary building blocks in developing
the extreme scenarios further.
- Construct a coherent overview of the themes and possible indicators that will be used
within the analysing and building processes of the project.
- Elaborate and present clear ideas on structuring the scenarios and visions.
- Discuss also the ‘Present State of the EU’ with stakeholders in one or more of the events.

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Update of activities being carried out
Until May 2012, the project has already undertaken the following tasks::

Task Activity
WP1 Celebration of TPG workshop and meeting with Sounding Board in Brussels
(March 2011).
Management
Development / maintenance of the ET2050 website (www.et2050.eu) as
knowledge-sharing and communication environment
Update of the schedule of activities and deliverables
Reorganisation of consortium tasks, forced by event of force majeure
Task 2.1 Update of Participatory Plan in coordination with ESPON CU.

Interactive participation Elaboration of a database of contacts

Between April and May 2012, small group consultation meetings (Brussels,
Lille), individual interviews, and consultations by email and videoconference
were held. A questionnaire was designed to address with various stakeholders
the question of key values and paradigms on which the Territorial Vision
should be based, as it is indeed important to bear these values/paradigms in
mind during the elaboration of the scenarios, already starting from the
baseline.
Task 2.2 Adaptation of models to ET2050 requirements.

Data gathering and Documentation of ET2050 foresight models (www.et2050.eu)

modelling resources Refinement of data to cover ESPON space outside EU27 as far as possible.
Refinement of criteria and indicators to be used within the analysing and
building processes of the project (mostly through TIA)
Task 2.3 Elaboration of 8 sectoral reports analysing most relevant trends in Europe:
demography, economy, technology, transport, energy, land-use, environment,
Present territorial state governance (reports available at www.et2050.eu)
of Europe
Elaboration of 9 macro-regional reports analysing sector specificities in
different areas of Europe, threats and opportunities: South-west
Mediterranean, Central Mediterranean, North-west region, Central and Alpine
region, Baltic and Northern Peripheries, Danube, South-eastern region,
Eastern region, and Outermost regions (reports available at www.et2050.eu).
Synthesis of key trends in 125 key points
Task 2.4 Analysis of existing official Baseline Scenarios in Europe as a basis for
formulating baseline scenarios for ET2050 (annex report available at
Baseline Scenario 2030 www.et2050.eu)
and 2040
Definition of Critical Bifurcations or challenges for Europe
Definition of Key Directions assumed by Baseline in response to Critical
Bifurcations.
First quantitative set of indicators for Baseline 2010-2050 using foresight tools,
to build a common base for modellers to implement the Baseline Scenario.
Modelling activities are to validate / refine / amend these initial hypothesis,
seeking to ensure consistency among models.
Task 2.5 Discussion about alternative approaches to design Explorative Scenarios.

Exploratory Scenarios Analysis of approximately 100 scenario reports (300 scenarios) as a basis for
formulating ET2050 scenarios (annex report available at www.et2050.eu)

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Task Activity
Task 2.6 Participatory activities targeted at establishing hypothesis for the Vision.

Vision Identification of free-thinkers’ visions of the long-term futures for Europe and
the rest of the World.
Task 2.7 Identification of policy targets derived from key EU policy documents and
directives
Midterm targets
Analysis of European Policies
Task 2.8 Extension of ET2050 website. Incorporation of infography, videos on future
trends, videos on key trends in macro-regions, and existing territorial symbolic
Innovative visualisation cartography on European Visions.

Figure 1-3 Activities carried out

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2. Participatory Activities
While reporting on the various consultations recently organised to initiate the implementation of
the ET2050 Participatory Plan (ParP), this chapter provides a detailed presentation of the results
gathered in this framework. The type and time frame of the various activities, the participants
involved, and the methodology adopted will be successively addressed in the first three sections
(2.1, 2.2, 2.3). A synthesis of all the comments and contributions received will be presented in
section 2.4, and section 2.5 presents the ParP update. Additional material - annexes to ParP- is
listed at the end of this report and has been made available on the ET2050 website,
http://www.et2050.eu/europe_2050/index.php/first-interim-report-may12

2.1 Type and time frame of activities

As planned in the approved Inception Report of the ET 2050 project, the first round of
consultations took place between January and May 2012. This involved:
- the elaboration of a database of contacts (January/February 2012 + updates in March,
April and May);
- the elaboration of an ET 2050 presentation leaflet (see Annex ParP1 at www.et2050.eu);
- the sending on 12th March 2012 of a “courtesy mail” to various stakeholders of Group 2
(policy makers) and Group 4 (Experts), inviting them to take part in the first round of
consultations;
- in April 2012, various arrangements made with individuals and organizations who
expressed their interest in participating;
- in April and May 2012, various participatory activities, including small group consultation
meetings, individual interviews, and consultations by exchange of mail (several
participants preferred to return a completed questionnaire without communicating
verbally).

2.2 Stakeholders involved in the Participatory Plan

All those who reacted positively to the “courtesy mail” have been listed in Annex ParP2 at
www.et2050.eu (54 records1). It is intended to enrich this list on an on-going basis during the
whole duration of the ET2050 project, while keeping these participants posted and involving them
in future activities. Most of those already registered participated one way or another in the first
round of consultations.
In line with the project specifications and the approved Inception Report, special care was taken
to involve members of Group 4 (Experts), who took an active part in the consultations. Many
Group 2 policy makers also reacted positively to the “courtesy mail”, including planning
practitioners (i.e. “Group 2b” referred to in the CU’s comments on the Inception report - especially
members of the international planning associations ISOCARP and ECTP-CEU) and various
European interest groups and associations (i.e. “Group 2c – European lobby organisations”),
including EUROMONTANA, the Union for the Mediterranean, TECNALIA, EUROCITIES,
METREX and EURADA, to name but a few.

1
In a few records of the list, the name of the organisation registered in field “société” refers to the company or employer of the
participant, which may differ from the body he/she represented during the consultations. For example,“Urban Concept” is the
name of Mr L-E. Bouche-Florin’s consultancy, but Mr Bouche-Florin himself took part in the consultations in his quality of mem-
ber of the ECTP-CEU (European Council of Spatial Planners) and CEMAT delegate. Ms M. Jouen is member of the “Notre
Europe” association, but also of the advisory board of Ms Mercedes-Bresso, President of the Committee of the Regions.

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2.3 Methodology

Elaboration of the contact database

The contact database was progressively developed and updated during the activities listed
above.
In a first step, a list of addressees of the “courtesy mail” was established. Various sources were
consulted to this end. To comply with any legal constraints possibly applying in the area of
private life protection, publicly accessible data were exclusively consulted2.
In its current state, the contact database includes 671 records (Group 1: 48; Group 2: 345; Group
3: 67; Group 4: 211). Apart from ‘planning practitioners’, Group 2 also encompasses the following
sub-categories: European Commission (including Sec Gen, DG CLIM, DG ECFIN and DG EMPL,
as requested by the ESPON CU),Council of the EU (DG G1 Regional Policy Team), European
Parliament (REGI Commission), Committee of the Regions, ECOSOC, various other EU
bodies/agencies (EEA, etc.), public interest groups (e.g. AEBR, AER, CPMR, Eurocities, Metrex),
territorial groupings (Council of the Baltic Sea States, Danube Strategy, Grande Région, Plan
Bleu, INTERREG programmes, etc.), non EU international organisations (Council of Europe,
International Maritime Organisation, UNECE, UNEP, etc.) various national planning
administrations (in particular past, current and coming presidencies of the NTCCP).
Group 4 includes a broad category of “scientific experts”, as well as two specific categories:
ESPON project Lead Partners, and ESPON Contact Points.

Activities carried out

Stakeholders who expressed their interest in taking part in the consultations were first contacted
by email. The ET 2050 presentation leaflet of the project (Annex ParP1 at www.et2050.eu) was
attached to the invitation message, as well as a short questionnaire used for all the consultations.
The five questions of this questionnaire are those addressed in section 2.4 below.
Depending on the availability of participants, their contribution consisted in one or more of the
following three activities: answering the questionnaire verbally, answering it in writing or
participating in a small group meetings (5). Comments received during the interviews/meetings
by those who did not react in writing were collected and transcribed in a questionnaire by IGEAT.
According to the ET2050 Inception Report, this first round of consultations was meant to provide
an input to, and clarify the hypotheses underlying, the baseline and exploratory scenarios. No
reference was made to the Territorial Vision. The approach taken for the first round of
consultations slightly departed from this initial one. Drawing on the principles of the systemic
planning theory (elaborated in reaction to the old master planning approach3) the choice was

2
The following sources were exploited:

- list of experts selected by each ET 2050 TPG partner responsible for Task 2.3 sectoral and transnational reports, as
well as proposals from the MC (cf. Krakow meeting December 1 , 2011, inception report);

- list of participants in the public consultation procedure relating to the Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion;

- officials of various EU institutions;

- officials involved in the elaboration and implementation of the Baltic Sea and Danube Strategies;

- members of NTCCP delegations (PL-DK-CY trio);

- ESPON project lead partners and ESPON ECP.

3
For further detail, consult for example HALL Peter (2002) Urban and Regional Planning – Routledge, especially Chapter 9
dedicated to the planning process as theorized by B. McLoughlin, G. Chadwick and A. Wilson, in which much emphasis has
been placed on the necessity to clarify key policy goals from the very outset of the planning process.

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made to address with various stakeholders the question of key values and paradigms on which
the Territorial Vision should be based. It is indeed important to bear these values/paradigms in
mind during the elaboration of the scenarios, instead of elaborating them on a relatively arbitrary
basis. The issue is addressed in question 4 of the questionnaire. Special care has also been
taken in the other questions to consider various aspects of EU policy making, including EU
governance.
To encourage free speech, it was decided to keep anonymous the various comments expressed
by respondents, and therefore not to publish the various completed questionnaires. However,
several participants have spontaneously transmitted reference documents or individual written
contributions to nurture the ET 2050 Territorial Vision elaboration process. These reference
documents and contributions have been included in this report as Annexes ParP 4 to 11
(www.et2050.eu)
As anticipated by the CU when commenting on the Inception Report, these small group meetings
proved very fruitful, particularly conducive to creative exchange of views. As recommended by
the CU, an innovative way of web-based communication was successfully experimented in this
framework, namely a highly efficient professional video-conferencing system (allowing a
multilateral conversation to take place with up to fifteen participants, with a possibility to record
the proceedings on digital support and share various documents/presentations on line.)
2.4 Synthesis of comments and contributions received
A total of twenty completed questionnaires have been analysed. Some were directly received
from respondents, others were elaborated by IGEAT on the basis of comments expressed
verbally during individual interviews or small group meetings.
The purpose of this section is to summarise, for each of the five questions included in the
questionnaire, the overall substance of key-messages delivered by the participants. The exercise
is challenging, because a wealth of insightful and very diverse views were expressed in this
framework. As is the case with any synthesis, a selective approach was adopted and relatively
minor points made by respondents had to be sacrificed. Since a certain degree of arbitrariness
generally remains unavoidable in such circumstances, those interested in having a closer insight
into the contributions received are strongly advised to consult the attached compilation of replies
to the questionnaire (Annex ParP 3) and the various extra contributions received (Annexes ParP
4 to ParP 11).
Whereas various comments collected were strikingly convergent, a few very original views were
also expressed by some ‘lateral thinkers’. Both types of inputs were of course worth mentioning,
especially in the framework of a foresight exercise such as ET 2050: if consensus building does
matter, some ideas currently put forward by a minority may also prefigure future ‘leitbilds’
commonly accepted in 2050. The very notion of ‘sustainable development’ was unknown to the
layman 25 years ago... The following sub-sections have therefore been elaborated to reflect the
two types of inputs, starting with those most often referred to and ending with more original
viewpoints.
The areas and levels of expertise of the various respondents were very diverse. In various
contributions received, the rigorousness and reliability of some elements may appear open to
criticism. As the aim of the exercise was to encourage creative thinking and free expression of
personal views, special care has been taken in this report to echo as faithfully as possible the
content of the written and verbal contributions received, including those lending themselves to
controversy. The ET 2050 project partnership will use these contributions as stimulating food for
thought during the scenario and vision elaboration exercises, which will anyway involve testing
the overall reliability and consistency of the various data and information collected.

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Question 1 - What key EU policy issues should deserve particular attention in the ET2050
scenario building exercise?
The notion of “EU policy issues” was very widely interpreted during the consultations. Actually,
various contributions were more dedicated to “policy issues in Europe”. Beside formal EU
policies themselves, much attention was also paid to their necessary mutual coordination and
integration (or the lack of such integration), to their impact and consequences in the domestic
context and the general need for vertical integration of policies.
According to various respondents, no specific thematic issue can be singled out. Instead, some
overarching policy issues or principles should be addressed, including sustainable development,
territorial cohesion, etc. In an interviewee’s opinion, “considering all the challenges that Europe is
currently facing in economic, environmental and social terms, comprehensive responses to such
multi-dimensional challenges should be given priority. In particular, all the policy issues linked to
the transition to a green economy should be intensively discussed”. It was also stated that “key
EU policy should be more oriented towards more comprehensive/holistic policy design” and that
“social, economic, environmental, cultural development as well as cohesion-related results are
needed”. Sustainability was even deemed to be needed in fields such as finances and
employment.
The emphasis was often placed on the need for policy integration, in particular at the EU level to
overcome the fragmentation of the policy approach (e.g. “effective integration of EU policies such
as CAP, energy, environment, etc. in a consistent EU spatial strategy”), but also through
cooperation within cross-border and macroregions.
The same case for policy integration was made through references to relevant strategic
documents such as the ESDP4, the Territorial Agenda, EU 2020, and to territorial approaches in
the urban 5, rural, urban-rural6, cross-border and transnational contexts.
A respondent stressed that “cohesion must mean a reduction in disparities between the relatively
prosperous European urban core (London/Paris/Rhine/Ruhr) and the periphery”, and “at the very
least, it must seek greater equality of competitive opportunity”. For this purpose, “the key lies with
the relative futures of Europe’s major urban centres”, but also “the development of collective
strength around the periphery”, for which “connectivity is key”.
It was repeatedly stressed that the EU needs to be considered in its wider context. This concerns
not only the territorial analysis (the integration of the ‘Euromed’ space, including Russia and
Southern Mediterranean countries – especially since the Arab Spring, as well as the global
dimension) but also the future of the EU foreign policy, neighbourhood policy in particular, with a
particular focus on its territorial dimension. The relative decline of the EU relative position in the
world was also referred to. A respondent involved in a previous foresight study exercise
(conducted in the nineties) stressed that the approach was too “Eurocentric” at the time, even to
address the question of the relationships between the EU and the external world. “External
relations” were treated more as a “diplomatic issue” instead of concentrating on new challenges
of international / global relevance.

4
The view was also expressed that « the ESDP was a bold attempt which at its final stages faltered and fell short of the hopes
many had for it. »
5
One comment insists on the need not to lose sight of medium-sized towns, whose role is “very important to better balance the
territorial structure and the urban system. Unfortunately, medium-sized towns have more limited financial means to get EU
funding  big cities get the lion’s share”.
6
Including urban-rural relationship, periurban areas, “transition zones”, “urban agriculture” cf. FP6 PLUREL (Periurban Land
Use Relationships) project www.plurel.net

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One of the contributions pointed to major differences between Eastern and Western Europe in
terms of territorial planning practices, governance and policy integration mechanisms as well as
management of EU funds.
The strong bias towards policy integration did not prevent various respondents from emphasizing
the critical importance of some policy areas. These are listed below, starting with those most
often referred to:
 Demography: ageing, in- and out-migrations, depopulation in jobless areas and “shrinking
regions”7, residential mobility, risk of brain drain. Solutions should be provided for a “Europe
in movement”, i.e. im-em-in-migration questions in relation to urban changes (sprawl, shrink-
ing cities, brownfield sites). Do not only consider the issue of making people closer to jobs,
but also that of making jobs closer to people8. Ageing is not taking place at the same pace in
various regions. The question was asked: “Is the EU going to act politically to reverse or slow
down the ageing trend in general?”
 Energy: production of renewable energy (Intelligent Energy Europe, etc.) in urban and rural
areas9; energy efficiency; energy self-sufficiency of cities/towns should be the goal; security
of energy supply; regional vulnerability to an increase in the energy prices; the EU energy pol-
icy should be radically revamped;
 Climate change: the issue must be considered from both the adaptation and mitigation per-
spectives; eco-innovation and territorial planning, smart cities, mitigation strategies; critical is-
sues must be faced, for example the implications of the Arctic permafrost thaw
(http://www.clubofrome.org/?p=3425 ), or specificities of Mediterranean climates and ecosys-
tems;
 Mobility, accessibility and connectivity, especially as a critical pre-requisite to economic de-
velopment in less accessible areas (hence the need for integration of the transport and de-
velopment policies), affordable public transports; define clear priorities in the TENs;
 Social/economic development & cohesion: job creation, social inclusion, exploitation of the
endogenous territorial development potential; “R&D and innovation is the only card to play: if
we fail to play it, this will be a terrible crisis, and territorial planning is key in this respect”; pub-
lic space quality as a driver of economic development of cities
 Environmental sustainability
 Access to education and training
 Scarcity of natural resources (overexploitation, necessity to promote a more efficient use),
loss of biodiversity
 Coastal planning, distribution of port infrastructure, Maritime Strategic Framework Directive
(MSFD); European sea- and airports compete with one another, whereas they should unite to
face global competition
 Land use, land management: reuse / optimise the use of urban land, urban regeneration
 Security, including environmental security (e.g. floating buildings in flood mitigation strate-
gies).
 Well-being, happiness (suicide figures are not good)

7
Cf. study “Shrinking Regions: a Paradigm Shift in Demography and Territorial Development”:
http://www.ums-riate.fr/documents/Shrinking_Study_EN.pdf) and http://shrinking.ums-riate.fr/
8
Reference was made to “Europe 2000+, Cooperation for European territorial development” published by the European Com-
mission in 1994: chapter “Trends in the spatial distribution of population and employment”, pp. 31-37
9
A respondent wrote : « Rethink the ways (even in governance terms) of producing renewable energy at the urban and rural
scales… current development/implementation mechanisms are not in favour of citizens, but of usual and well-known suppliers /
distributors: Europe is missing the opportunity of linking opportunities connected to new technologies with the creation of a real
new way of living based on real independency from non-renewable sources and energy multinationals”

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 Cultural trends / society model: “what do people want? What makes them happy? What is a
modern and mature society?”

Question 2 - Should the scenarios focus on the possible evolution of the European territorial
structure and EU policy-content, or also on possible change in the area of EU governance?
Various views were expressed in the two main categories of issues raised by the question:
governance aspects on the one hand, and territorial structure / EU policy content on the other.
Many more comments were made on the former than the latter.
Governance aspects
The question as to whether possible change in the area of EU governance should be taken into
consideration in the scenario elaboration process did not appear controversial. Many
respondents warmly supported this choice, some presenting it as a major requirement. Others
insisted that it would be artificial to address governance systems and policy elaboration
separately, as they are two sides of the same coin. It was also said that “scenarios should take
into account the conjoined evolution of territorial structure, policies and governance”.
A strong case was often made for more policy coordination and vertical/cross-sector integration.
For the time being, advocating this coordination is still akin to wishful thinking. For example, the
following question was raised: “Why do we need an “Aalborg declaration” and a “Leipzig Charter”
as reference documents concerning sustainable urban development in Europe? Is it so difficult to
adopt one single EU reference document on this topic instead of having the “DG Environment
friends” and “DG Regio friends” adopting each their own, because they work in isolation?”
While acknowledging the strategic importance of EU governance, a participant expressed doubts
about the possibility to reform it significantly. He also pointed to inconsistencies in the set of
formal EU competences: for example, the EU has very limited power in the area of education,
while ambitioning to promote the knowledge economy.
A functional definition (who does what?) of Territorial Cohesion was deemed more important than
a “conceptual/theoretical” one.
The proposal was made to examine the feasibility of an “ESDP 2050”, some sort of new overall
master plan for EU territorial policy making. This proposal may appear daring, but it shares some
common ground with this opinion expressed by another respondent: “After a relatively long period
of deregulation and neo-liberal thought, there is a trend towards more regulation. Economic
regulation could make a dramatic come-back, but also spatial planning at the same time. At the
EU level however, strategic planning is more on the agenda than regulatory planning.” In the
same vein, it was stressed that “strategic planning is needed to break the stranglehold of
parochialism and Nymbyism. Collaborative planning is important to counter departmental silos of
government and the constraints of administrative boundaries. To avoid being just dominated by
‘fire fighting’ and driven short-termism, a strong and long term Vision is needed.”
The question was raised as to whether the scenarios should examine the possible effects of an
evolution towards contrasted EU governance models (federal EU governance and government vs
intergovernmental EU where every member states would recover its full sovereignty). While
considering that this should not be the priority, a respondent suggested addressing another issue:
the significant territorial impact of a possible harmonisation of taxation policy. However,
reference was also made to A. Faludi & J. Peyrony’s article published in 2011 in the European
Journal of Spatial Development10. Revisiting the scenarios of ESPON 2006 Project 3.2, the
authors imagine four other types of possible scenarios (‘Anglo-Saxon, ‘Saint-Simonian’,

10
Annex ParP 7 - http://www.nordregio.se/Global/EJSD/Refereed%20articles/refereed43.pdf

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‘Rhineland’ and ‘European’) based on various combinations of governance types and cohesion
policies. This article could be a very helpful inspiration for the elaboration of the ET2050
scenarios.
It was stressed that “integration of EU will only progress with a mix of EU polices and EU
governance, as the present discussion about the crisis shows”, and that “policies and governance
have to be assessed against their impact on efficiency/equity/sustainability, with territory as cross
cutting dimension.” The need to propose both short term and longer term concrete policy steps
was also emphasized.
In a participant’s opinion, an overall (possible) radical change in the area of EU governance could
consist in a significant widening of the EU policy remit and politics. This would affect territorial
policy as well as other policy domains.
It was also considered necessary to make a distinction between ‘EU governance’ and
‘governance of Europe’. Both should be addressed in the scenario building, including the
possible evolution of multilevel governance, for example toward more autonomous regions with
clearer responsibilities and a more effective and consistent application of the subsidiarity
principle, especially in the area of territorial development. In this respect, it was also said that
“several brilliant planners involved in ESPON activities promote a more European perspective in
planning activities, but in reality, most of planning is very much done at the local level. And vice
versa: those involved in planning practice at the local level sometime try to convey some key-
messages to higher levels, but it takes a long while until this really happens.”
Another point was made about multilevel governance : the problem of “institutional thickness”
faced in most member states, i.e. too many authorities and other decision makers of various tiers
of government responsible for dealing with the same issues. In Spain, for example, every
authority claims to be entitled to deal with “territorial cohesion”, including the national authorities
when carrying out various sector policies. In general, reforms are needed to clarify the allocation
of responsibilities and promote appropriate partnerships.
A last key governance-related issue raised was the discrepancy between the geographical remit
of local or regional authorities and the size of functional areas (in the domestic, cross-border and
transnational contexts). In an ideal world, this remit should be redefined, but this generally
proves difficult or even virtually impossible. In many cases, decision-makers have no other
choice than putting up with administrative boundaries dating back to the middle age, while
exploring new governance and territorial cooperation mechanisms to guide territorial development
in functional areas. This can take place in the domestic context (e.g. to run a wide metropolitan
area) and at the cross-border or transnational level, for which the EGTC tool offers new
opportunities. Similar tools could be used to run FUAs. It was generally acknowledged that cities
need to cooperate beyond their administrative boundaries, but also that this is easier said than
done.
Territorial structure / EU policy content
The following comments were made:
 A thorough analysis of various sectoral policies is a prerequisite: examine first to what extent
these policies contradict or complement each other.
 Cities should be promoted as economic engines of Europe. They have a pivotal role to play,
even for their surrounding rural areas (e.g. access to health care in large hospitals in the
nearest big city).
 In strictly geographical terms, the EU territorial structure will keep evolving in the coming
years (e.g. western-Balkans states as new EU members + still open question of Turkey…).
Considering the history of Europe, this is nothing really new: the European territorial structure
has often been reshaped, and this is very likely to continue in the future. As EU governance

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 is closely linked to the evolution of its [territorial] structure…and vice-versa, the scenarios
should avoid considering these two aspects separately, and instead focus on the evolution of
their mutual linkages…
 ET 2050 should elaborate scenarios for several ecological areas(Mediterranean, Continental,
Southern Atlantic, Northern Atlantic, Alpine, etc.)

A more technical but important point was made about the scenario elaboration method:
“scenarios, as tools for policy action, are more useful whenever a simplified narrative is used in
their construction. This implies the use of as few variables as possible and thus in principle we
would suggest using a one-dimensional approach to scenario development.” Put otherwise, the
complex discussion about policy integration and its multiple implications should not ‘contaminate’
the scenario building process.

Question 3 - What major trends / policy developments should be taken into account when
elaborating the ET 2050 scenarios? Do you see some possible course of events that could
emerge in the long run and whose importance is currently underestimated or simply ignored?
Not surprisingly, several priority policy areas already mentioned in reply to Question 1 (relating to
key EU policy issues) were once more referred to here. In various field, reference was made to
both positive and negative possible trends (or optimistic / pessimistic scenarios).
 Demography: ageing, population decline, segregation. In- and out-migrations between
Europe and other parts of the world; this concerns not only people but also companies and
job locations, depending on the relative competitiveness of European companies and those
based outside Europe. A “shrinking nations / regions” scenario could be triggered by out-
migration fluxes. Conversely, a sudden influx of massive immigration into Europe could also
result from emancipation of oppressed populations. Risk of moral failure in relation to the
questions of migrants and borders, farewell to the enlightenment principles, with huge political
and economic consequences, as the Europe “brand” would be devaluated. Because of its
weak demography, the EU risks to be marginalised at the global level. Climate refugees.
 Energy: evolution of the energy supply and price, growth of (non-renewable) energy con-
sumption; energy management, new patterns of production and consumption. Energy trans-
port networks are a key strategic issue (NABUCCO gas pipeline, etc.) Further reshaping of
energy policies (e.g. role of nuclear power and scale of new renewable energy technologies.)
Electric and hydrogen power will be the future. New hydrogen highways can be popular in a
few years. New types of batteries such as nickel-metal hydride and lithium are non-toxic and
recyclable. New private and public transport systems will appear. Further increase in decen-
tralised energy generation (30% in Europe in 2010). Cities shall drive investments towards
clean, renewable, self-sufficient energy systems. New urban forms generated by a new ap-
proach to urban design will contribute to overcome problems currently faced in the area of
energy supply and consumption.
 Climate change: sea level rise, coastal erosion, water scarcity, climate refugees, greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions, major possible contribution of large urban areas to the development of
an energy self-sufficiency model; this + electro-mobility make it possible to envisage the sub-
stantial decarbonisation of urban Europe well before 2030 (cf. EUCO2 80/50 project carried
out by METREX: http://www.euco2.org/ ).
 Mobility, accessibility and connectivity: death of distances, social gap resulting from different
patterns of mobility (internationally minded and wealthy people vs inhabitants of a suburb who
never go downtown).
 Social/economic development & cohesion : development of the “alternative economy” (coop-
erative sector, local markets, etc.). Possible decline of the current austerity models. Slums in
Europe. Financial crisis (+ related collapse of the housing market). At first sight, housing pol-

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 icy seems to be an issue of local or regional relevance, but various recent practices on the
real estate and mortgage markets (sub-primes, oversupply in Spain and other countries, etc.)
turned out to have major consequences at a macroeconomic scale; this evolution may also
deeply impact territorial development.
 Environmental sustainability: risk of degradation of the environment due to pressures of hu-
man and economic activities such as coastal urbanisation, manufacturing industry, tourism
and recreational activities
 Scarcity of natural resources: water, cultivable surfaces, food. However, there is also a good
prospect of significant improvements in the area of natural resource protection.
 Coastal areas and maritime issues: growing importance of maritime spatial planning, to be
coordinated with land spatial planning
 Land use, land management: growing demand for space, issue of compatibility between dif-
ferent land uses and possible resulting conflicts; regeneration and partial redesign of densely
populated residential areas and connected public spaces
 Cultural trends / society model: preferences of people will evolve in various respects, in par-
ticular the choice of their place of residence (large agglomerations / less densely built envi-
ronment / rural areas, depending on various factors such as land values, energy cost, job op-
portunities, access to education and health care services)

Other trends/policy areas / challenges were also mentioned:

 Political capacity: a possible drastic exhaustion of public funding would make Europe depend
solely on economic factors and no more on policies (“no public policy” scenario).
 Wild cards such as collapse of the euro, nuclear catastrophe, wars in the EU neighbouring
countries, and negative scenarios also need to be seriously considered. Cf. Jean-Pierre Du-
puy (2002) Pour un catastrophisme éclairé.
 “Back to protectionism scenario”: the EU could end up getting completely isolated from the
rest of the world. Even reinforced controls at the internal borders may be feared.
 There is some hope that traditional power structures of member states will progressively be-
come obsolete and lose ground to a new more bottom up “democratic” social alliance of a
large majority of the regions.
 The traditional national-regional-local governance structure (19th century approach) is being
transformed because it no longer reflects the needs of the 21st century, e.g. in the missing
links between local actions and global issues. Cf. URBACT LUMASEC project:
http://urbact.eu/fileadmin/Projects/LUMASEC/outputs_media/LUMASEC_Hottopic_01.pdf ,
diagram under heading “2. Radical change in territorial governance and finance” . Cross-
border & macroregional groupings, NUTS 3 entities and neighbourhood groups are becoming
new key-players.
 Evolution of the EU geography: accession of Turkey, evolution of the neighbourhood policy in
reaction to new trends (e.g. the Middle East becoming an emerging market)
 Evolution of the world economic geography: shift of the world’s economic centre of gravity,
importance of getting closer to Asia and the Middle East
 Some revolutionary technologies may dramatic ally change the style of life while potentially
reducing energy consumption and GHG emissions: example of the “3D house printing” sys-
tem experimented in the Netherlands (use of a rapid-prototype or 3D printing process to fabri-
cate large components). Cf. The Economist 21 April 2012, also http://inhabitat.com/print-a-
house-in-24-hours-with-robots/ and http://phys.org/news139161727.html
 Evolution of the agricultural production in Europe (better quality food production, combined
with preservation of the natural environment and cultural landscapes

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 New technologies will carry on impacting important components of planning: life expectancy,
transportation, energy, climate change, just to name a few. Recent advances in pharmacol-
ogy and nanotechnology can for instance reduce the prevalence of Alzheimer’s and other
dementias, and may improve regenerative medicine. Genetic manipulation will increase the
duration of human organs. Life expectancy is expected to increase, accompanied by a fun-
damental improvement in the quality of life in old age. Nanotechnology can also introduce
new construction materials that will reduce energy consumption. The development and the
application of low-carbon technologies are also very important.

Question 4 - What kind of possible EU paradigms should guide the elaboration of the scenarios
and the Territorial Vision? What ideal European territory would you dream of for the 2050 time
horizon?

Question 4A. - Please rank the ten paradigms proposed below by priority order (each a distinct
rank):
Paradigm Rank
Competitive Europe
Culture first: development of the cultural heritage as the main goal
Ecumenopolis (**): Europe integrated in a world-wide city
European spatial justice (equal opportunities between territories)
Inclusive growth (*)
Minimal ecological footprint: green Europe
Smart growth (*)
Sustainable growth (*)
Territorial diversity: Europe as a mosaic of identities
Territorial integration: borderless Europe
(*) as understood in the EU2020 strategy
(**) coined in 1961 by Constantinos Doxiadis http://www.doxiadis.org/page/default.asp?id=238

The purpose of question 4A was twofold: first, to examine whether a certain degree of
convergence was perceptible among the various persons consulted with regard to key values and
policy goals; second, to stimulate creative thinking by giving respondents a flavour of the type of
paradigms they were invited to propose in reply to question 4B. A mix of well known paradigms
(e.g. the EU 2020 smart, sustainable and inclusive growths) and more unusual ones (especially
“culture first” and “Ecumenopolis”) was deliberately proposed to take on board the current policy
debate on the future of EU policy while leaving the door open to exogenous inputs.
Some participants expressed reservations about the exercise, motivated by its relative
arbitrariness or the difficulty to propose a consistent ranking of the various paradigms listed. This
explains why a few respondents did not abide by the rule “each a distinct rank”. One of them
specified that his ranking of “culture first” actually applied to the reworded paradigm: “culture and
education first”, and that “European spatial justice” should not only concern “equal opportunities
between territories but also between people”. The various rankings proposed are displayed in the
table below .Considering the small size and the heterogeneous composition of the group of
respondents, the outcome can of course not be regarded as representative of the opinions of any
group of stakeholders. Nevertheless some results are worth noting:

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 some consensus between participants to rank “sustainable growth” and “inclusive growth”
relatively high
 “territorial diversity”, “culture first” and “Ecumenopolis” proved clearly less popular (or less
familiar??), especially “Ecumenopolis” (standard deviation = 1.5)
 fairly similar position of the other five paradigms.

Standard
Paradigm Mean deviation
Sustainable growth (*) 3.2 2.2
Inclusive growth (*) 3.4 2.1
Territorial integration: borderless Europe 4.2 2.4
Smart growth (*) 4.3 2.4
Minimal ecological footprint: green Europe 4.6 2.6
European spatial justice (equal opportunities between territories) 4.8 3.0
Competitive Europe 4.9 2.8
Territorial diversity: Europe as a mosaic of identities 6.1 3.0
Culture first: development of the cultural heritage as the main goal 7.9 2.4
Ecumenopolis (**): Europe integrated in a world-wide city 8.8 1.5
Figure 2-1 Results to Question 4A (ParP)

Question 4B. Please brainstorm. Propose your own paradigms:

A wide variety of paradigms was put forward. Some of them actually paraphrase one or more
paradigms already listed in question 4A (or comments already made in reply to questions 1 to 3).
Others proposed different models, sometimes presented as alternative scenarios (an even some
pessimistic ones, which may appear odd in a section about “paradigms”).
In the following presentation, the material received from respondents has been grouped on a
thematic basis. As is often the case with this type of clustering exercise, a certain degree of
arbitrariness was unavoidable; indeed, the multidimensional nature of various responses received
could have justified to include them in more than one thematic category.
Most paradigms proposed were worded in a synthetic style. It was therefore deemed preferable
to reproduce them literally below. When necessary, and provided that the substance of the views
expressed was unequivocal, the text of some contributions reproduced in Annex ParP 3 was
slightly reworded; in case of doubt, it was left unchanged.
The themes most frequently mentioned have been placed on top of the list. By and large, the
level of attention paid to various issues does not significantly differ from that observed in the
replies to Questions 1 and 3. However, the section relating to “economy and technology” is
rather long. This is also the case of section “political approach”, but rather understandably for a
question about paradigms. Among the various other themes, “energy” and “demography”, which
generally appeared as key-issues in the previous sections, are no longer on top of the list,
especially “demography”, which has been hardly touched upon in the proposed paradigms. This
would suggest that demographic change is perceived as some sort of “heavy trend”, on which
policy decisions cannot have much influence. Such a view may arguably be regarded as
questionable, but it seems to have been implicitly adopted by the respondents. Conversely,

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themes such as happiness / well-being or culture / way of life are more often referred to than in
the previous sections.
-----------------------------------
Economy / technology
 Economic recovery
 Secure Recovery for the Future of Europe (“Recovery” is the immediate priority, and “Secu-
rity” is the longer term need).
 International competitiveness
 Go back to human scale production / local economy
 Access to essential goods and services
 In the business sector: socially responsible companies (e.g. Toshiba)
 A non-dependant Europe: Europe capable as much as possible to produce the food and en-
ergy resources it needs, raw materials in general, using fully the potential of its territory
 Europe industry of design (N.B. investment in quality is the only European specific asset)
 Education, research and innovation, qualification of human resources, “reindustrialization” of
European countries
 “New Intellectual Property in Europe” : inventing things in a complete open method with the
aim to improve things (in this case more sustainable lighting) instead of just making profit by
protecting your Intellectual Property. Cf. Mr Frans Otten from Lemnis lighting.
 “3rd industrial revolution Europe”: transition of producing from centralised mass production to
local, individualised 3D printing from local resources of new materials (composites, nanotech-
nology etc) as the new way of production (E.g. printing a house). Tremendous impact on the
use of space: reduction of travel and transport, no more big plants. The economy goes local
and individual again11.
 “Europe’s financial landscape is unrecognisable”: the role of money is back to where it be-
longs: a tool to exchange. Tax and social contribution schemes are the same all over Europe
(perhaps the UK dropped out of the EU for defensive reasons) ending the tax-based competi-
tion: location of companies is based on the availability of labour and raw materials. All costs
of production of goods and services are included (environment, water, public services like
roads etc) in prices of products (as an example this would mean the inclusive price of an
iPhone would be $ 10,000 instead of $ 1,000 you pay now).
 Socioeconomic convergence within [“between” is probably meant] European member States

Happiness, wellbeing
 Quality of life of EU citizens
 Quality of life and particularly public services: where is Europe going in this respect?
 Consider that each of us is a world, and then learn to listen and understand
 Stop running
 Ask ourselves questions such as: “Can I be happy if others are not?”, “What are my fears
about the future?”
 Consider activity and not only jobs
 Slow society: reject the “immediacy worship”, get back to a human pace.
 Happy Europe: Europe where people can find a place to live and work that fits their aspira-
tions, which might differ from one person to another.

11
Cf. The Economist 21 April 2012, also http://inhabitat.com/print-a-house-in-24-hours-with-robots/ and
http://phys.org/news139161727.html

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 “Happiness”, place the human being at the centre of everything
 “Europe with a different concept of growth”: new indicators, looking at the growth of happi-
ness instead of income, indicators better reflecting the wishes of the Europeans: we rather
work a bit less and have more balance between work and private. Higher income is not the
main driver for people’s choice of a new job. Territorial assets / quality might be an important
one, certainly when raising kids.

Political approach
 A new paradigm could be Resilient Europe, capable to react positively to world changes.
 Resilient growth (against economic/political crisis and disasters)
 Shared vision, common fate/destiny
 The “European common good” (which remains to be defined)
 Strengthened rule of law and respect for fundamental rights & individual freedoms
 “The four visions of Europe as (1) a world economic power, (2) a continent with borders, (3) a
normative soft power and (4) an attractive cluster of nodes in global networks seem to be
complementary. But they are, in fact, contradictory, because they require different definitions
of the geographical area called "Europe" and different strategic choices concerning political
priorities. We assume that the contradiction can only be solved if we decide to give up the
references to a mythical notion of Europe and replace it by a secular concept of the European
Union. In this case, the problem is no longer a question of identity or of so-called “civilization”,
but a question of strategy and political choice to be debated by citizens and their political rep-
resentatives.” Cf. Annex ParP6 EuroBroadMap
 “Governance on the right level” : integrated policies will come on the second level: priorities
will be dealt with by separate authorities on different territorial levels: i.e. a global authority on
climate change, a catchment area authority for flooding management of rivers ...
 Under pressures of financial and related political crises: decline of power of nation states and
growth of regionalism/localism.
 Actually, we can imagine many interesting paradigms. This is not the core issue, because
trade-offs between various paradigms will always remain necessary. The search for a rea-
sonable balance between various societal values will always remain necessary. Therefore
we can start with many different paradigms, all of which could be considered as a given start-
ing point, but the challenge is to go beyond this to provide the necessary synthesis and key
policy options. Cupboards are full of good recommendations... But the real challenge of
foresight exercises is to identify credible trade-offs between such recommendations.

Sustainability, environment
 Sustainable growth
 Everything sustainable (sustainable transport, sustainable city, sustainable energy produc-
tion, etc.)
 “Europe restores its’ Environment”: creation of a complete new industry to restore the dam-
age past and current generations have done to our own environment. (E.g. fishing all plastics
from the seas and oceans and reusing it, capturing and storing CO2 through use in green
houses, reclaiming the offices that are vacant, restoring nature in Pan European Ecological
Network (PEEN))
 Reduce the demand and resource consumption while sustaining the current levels of quality.
 Transition from the Industrial Age to the Ecological Age (post-overconsumption era)
 Green/cultural growth
 Growth through regeneration

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 A forest policy, including ecology, sylviculture, employment, territory assessment, may occupy
a good place in both a sustainable development policy and in a Mediterranean [missing word
: “strategy”? “policy”?] (open to no member Mediterranean countries), if it is designed as a
part of a territorial approach
 Inclusive, incremental and coherent development

Energy
 Energy-rich or energy-poor paradigms? Both are possible.
 Free energy for everybody (e.g. ITER nuclear fusion, concentrated solar-thermal power of the
DESERTEC project)
 Energy self-sufficient Europe
 A city with net nil energy balance (where the production of energy can be equal to its con-
sumption)
 A decentralised renewable energy future based on the generating potential of the major urban
areas.
 “European renews its Energy” : transition to an ‘internet-grid-like’ energy system, with house-
holds, buildings and other production-sites being both local producers and consumers of re-
newable energy and almost no central energy production anymore. Almost independent of
foreign energy sources. A new way of storing energy (e.g. the Norwegian lake). Cf. Jeremy
Rifkin.

Territorial development
 ‘Anglo-Saxon, ‘Saint-Simonian’, ‘Rhineland’ and ‘European’ models (A. Faludi & J. Peyrony’s
article already referred to above12.
 Territorial cohesion policy at European scale
 A better balanced and territorially cohesive Europe with greater collective economic strength
around the periphery based on inter and intra polycentric cooperation and complementarity.
 A better connected Europe around the periphery and to the core.
 Territorial integration: balanced inside, strong dialogue with border macro-areas
 Europolis: Europe integrated with its cities

Land use / city planning

 Europe of social cities (German “soziale Stadt” www.quartiersmanagement.de )
 A Europe of (social) Cities
 “Europe’s cities have changed”: like the Portland 20 minutes land use concept: every citizen
can satisfy his needs within a radius of 20 minutes, which allows dense building with less en-
ergy consumption (heating and transport) and can facilitate the migration towards urban ar-
eas. http://www.portlandonline.com/portlandplan/index.cfm?a=288098&c=52256
 Harmonisation of territorial and urban policies
 Inclusive cities

Culture, way of life

 A beautiful Europe: a territory with a varied landscape, with a lot of open spaces, of cultivated
land, producing diversified local products.

12
Annex ParP7) and http://www.nordregio.se/Global/EJSD/Refereed%20articles/refereed43.pdf

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 Culture as the fourth pillar of sustainable development
 “Europe eats differently”: consumption of local food, different food (like insects), slow food,
less meat more vegetables, no more big flows of nutrients from South America and Africa to
Europe to feed cattle.
 “Europe without religion”: religion has always been a source for conflicts and mono-theistic
religions are the cornerstone of man’s belief he is beyond his environment and not part of the
environment. This artificial hierarchy (god man  animals  plants  elements) is man
created to support the concept of mono-theism. It justifies mankind’s power over na-
ture/environment: we can do what-ever we want with what is under our command and God is
far away, so he will not punish us now.... Concept for man’s feeling of superiority.

Demography
 A younger Europe

“Miscellaneous”
The following text has been provided by a respondent. Many aforementioned issues are also
raised here. As it would have been a pity to dismantle this contribution, it has been reproduced
exhaustively below.
“My dream in 2050
European territory is a mosaic of different regions and landscapes. The whole territory is covered
with access to a high level of broadband. Technology has been improved to minimize impact of
magnetic fields. Rural areas are lively, apart from a few highly protected natural parks. Big urban
centres are less congested as many people have left. People there are happier. European land is
farmed in a sustainable manner and produces enough food for European people, according to
European standards, without harming the environment. Food is varied in form, taste, names.
Names are consonant with places. People know where their food comes from. They even know
how it is produced. Settlements of reasonable sizes are present everywhere. All people have
access to a minimum number of square meters/person to live (not too big but not to small) at
reasonable prices compared to average income. Shared community habitat has developed. Low-
carbon habitat has been developed in most areas. Wind and solar energy are produced
everywhere on the territory. Artists have decorated the windmill fields so that we find them
beautiful (or invisible). Technology has improved, windmill fields are less noisy and so better
accepted. Electric lines are in the ground. The economic structure differs from one region to
another but services are well provided and developed, thanks to wide development of e-services
as well. Industrial production is dynamic and clean. More products are made in Europe than in
2010. Long distance efficient transport systems are available within maximum 1h for everyone
and clean local transport systems are available for the shorter distances. Car sharing is a
common practice for most citizens, thanks to wide development of car sharing websites and
shared cars systems. There are shared bicycles in all cities. Everyone can access an efficient
hospital within 20 minutes. It is possible to easily access a theatre and a cinema. Thanks to ICT,
you can follow on screens shows performed elsewhere if you live far from a big cultural centre.
Well, just a dream…”

Question 5 - What recommendations would you like to express concerning the ET2050
scenario and Territorial Vision elaboration process?
Quite a great deal of helpful pieces of advice were provided in reply to Question 5. Issues
addressed can be grouped into four broad categories: policy-related aspects, technical aspects,
participatory process, and communication
Policy-related aspects

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ET 2050 should take on board various policy initiatives and projects already initiated by the EU
and other actors, for example:
 EU 2020 and its flagship initiatives e.g. Innovation Union13, Resource Efficient Europe14,
and Smart Specialisation Platform15.
 various activities spearheaded by METREX such as PolyMETREXplus, which produced a
“European Territorial Vision and Framework (ETVF)” (outcomes summarised in the METREX
booklet "This is not a Plan" – Annex ParP 9). Also the EUCO2 80/50 project, whose final re-
port was published in 201116
 the ECTP Young Planners’ Workshop on "planning and territorial cohesion"17.

As already specified in reply to Question 1, the approach cannot be limited to the EU space: it is
essential to consider, in the scenario and Territorial Vision development process, the wider
geographical context; this includes
 territorial development issues in foreign countries (Russia, etc.)
 possible changes in European geography: possible accession of Turkey and relations with
the Middle East, Asia and North Africa.

Recommendations were made about other key-components that should appear in the ET2050
scenarios and Territorial Vision:
 European territorial cooperation (ETC), in particular ETC governance (e.g. widening the
EGTC scope to the transnational context)
 EU funding-related issues: problems faced by some cities/regions as a consequence of their
insufficient financial management capacities, in particular the resulting inefficiency of the EU-
funded operations;
 Possible redirection of public investments to sectors and bodies which really need them (e.g.
urban and community development)
 Actions to be taken to harness the territorial capital and promote a less fragmented EU space
 European and national hubs and networks (transport & energy networks but also the ecosys-
tem framework and the green infrastructure, including forests and other woodland areas)
 European and national flagship projects

Other recommendations include:

 Avoid a “TA2007/TA2020” remake: these documents are less good (less “territorial”) than the
ESDP.
 Be creative, think out-of-the-box. The lack of creativity for the preparation of the new EU
regulatory timeframe has been a disaster. Even structures are meticulously kept unchanged.
 Systematically underestimate the influence of politics.
 Do not avoid philosophical issues

Technical aspects

13
Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union
14
Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/resource-efficient-europe
15
Cf. http://s3platform.jrc.ec.europa.eu
16
downloadable from the METREX web site at www.eurometrex.org)
17
Cf. http://ypwectp.wordpress.com/

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The following recommendations were made:
 Take into account, update as appropriate and propose a critical assessment/synthesis of
other prospective studies, e.g. the recent “Euro-Med 2030” (2011)
 Provide as many graphic representations (graphs, curves, maps) as possible to show the
main trends and the outputs of the scenario making.
 Scale: the territorial structure must be assessed at the local level, infraregional disparities
must be taken into account.
 Provide decision makers with appropriate tools, e.g. TIA, SEA, and STeMA (Sustainable Ter-
ritorial environmental/economic Management Approach)
 Try to propose evaluations criteria of scenario “free of GDP”.
 Especially for long-term forecasting exercises, propose smoothed/fuzzy maps of results (not
in current regional limits).
 To forecast X years in the future, make sure that you also have data relating to the X past
years at hand.
 Propose a reference methodology to measure the capability of local and regional authorities
to be competitive in sustainability.

Participatory process:
Among the countless stakeholders and other (categories of) actors to be involved, the following
ones were mentioned:
 networks of cities
 CEMAT experts
 (non EU) external observers sufficiently “distant” in various respects (geographically, politi-
cally, linguistically)
 key-players which are not yet familiar with ESPON
 ordinary non-expert people, at all the social levels
 young people
 non-planners, as much as possible.

Other recommendations and suggestions relating to the participatory process itself were made.
These include:
 Consider both the EU vision (top-down) and the people views, fears and wishes (bottom-up)
 Formation of a "user group" for any Territorial Vision for Europe; this group would include the
key urban, transport and energy interests from various EU institutions and networks with rec-
ognised urban interests, such as the Committee of the Regions, EESC, METREX, CEMR,
Eurocities etc. The contribution of such a group could be to give a response to Scenarios and
Visions on the basis of subsidiarity.
 Adopt a multi level process; ESPON often gives the impression that the truth comes from a
European vision, whereas national, regional, local stakeholders are wrong, with too narrow a
vision. We certainly need to build a European vision, but it should be built on the diversity of
national/…/local visions, and not on “pensée unique” see what Krugman says:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/07/opinion/krugman-those-revolting-europeans.html. This is
also why cross border cooperation is so important; it can be the place where national visions
have to adapt to / combine with each other.

Communication
Last but not least, various helpful comments also addressed communication-related issues.

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 Avoid sticking too much to EU jargon (e.g. “smart, sustainable, inclusive”).
 Get rid of spatial planning jargon. Planners must be able to communicate in plain language,
understandable to the layman, which is not always the case for the time being.
 To help bridge the gap between scientists and decision makers , develop/adopt a common
language for a common understanding of common issues.
 Keep key regions/cities informed of progress on ET 2050
 Do not forget to keep those involved in different stages of the project regularly informed about
progress made by ET 2050.
 The ESPON community should be much closer to policy-makers. For the time being, they do
not understand the ESPON production, because it is not very user-friendly. Scientific results
should be made much more readable.

2.5 Participatory Plan Update

It was announced in the Inception Report that the ParP would be updated on a six-monthly basis.
Two relevant comments expressed by the CU in their response to the Inception Report have
already been addressed above, namely:
- a better definition of the various groups of stakeholders (cf. Heading “3. Methodology”,
sub-section “elaboration of the contact database”): significant refinements were
introduced (especially in the composition of Group 2); the database content was further
expanded (671 records, including all the relevant services of the European Commission);
- small group consultations, including an innovative way of web-based communication (cf.
same heading, sub-section “contacts with participants”)
Other points made in the CU response include considerations about the interaction between
stakeholder groups: exploration of the “scope for positive sum games” and elaboration of a
mutual understanding of the scenarios (including the “integration of diverse opinions”, as
recommended by P. Salez, member of the sounding board). These points seem to be connected
with the more general comment made on page 5 (third bulleted point) of the CU response about
“communication and integration of stakeholders” 18, in particular to clarify “how the participatory
process will ensure that the policy driven assumptions and logic behind the forecasting models
will consider and reflect the discussion with the stakeholders on the scenarios and vision”. This
question is highly complex and difficult. Somehow, first clues were provided during this first
round of consultations by participants themselves, especially those raising governance-related
issues in their responses to Question 2 of the questionnaire. Furthermore, some of them, despite
their belonging to a specific interest group, showed clear awareness of the need for policy
integration transcending specific interests. However, this leaves unanswered the question of how
the various viewpoints should be integrated, in practical terms, in the ET2050 scenario and vision
building. It seems clear that a very important step of this process will consist in giving full
consideration to the outcome of this first round of consultations in the coming scenario
elaboration phase. As far as possible, the scenarios should therefore integrate assumptions and
key parameters of EU- and European policy relevance, on both policy-content and governance-
related issues. In-depth discussions about this topic should take place during the coming
workshops in Aalborg and Brussels. Later on, a similar approach should be adopted for all the
subsequent steps of the ET 2050 project. At this stage however, it seems premature to include
detailed amendments in the ParP to provide a comprehensive picture of all the steps to be taken
to secure the right level of policy integration in the scenarios and the vision. Instead, it is
proposed to do so after the Aalborg and Brussels workshops, to exploit their conclusions.

18
“stakeholders’ contributions” was probably meant.

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Commenting on the calendar of project activities, the CU response to the Inception Report
pointed out that “the ‘Present State of the EU’ was missing in the objectives and also a discussion
on the robustness of the results.” In reply to this observation, it is worth stressing that the Present
State robustness was tested by the various partners responsible for the macro-regional and
sectoral reports. These reports integrate the contributions of several experts consulted on the
various specific issues addressed. Furthermore, this robustness, as a key-element to be
considered in the scenario-building, will also be discussed during the coming Aalborg and
Brussels workshops.
As far as the calendar of participatory activities itself is concerned, a revised version has been
elaborated, amending the version included as Figure 3.5 in the ET 2050 Inception Report.
The main amendments essentially concern activities planned in 2012:
- Adaptation and clarification of various activities carried out between January and May
2012
- Clarification of the nature of activities planned later in 2012 (Aalborg MC meeting and
Open Seminar, further ParP contacts, Brussels Policy Workshop with the ESPON MC on
28 September and Cyprus Policy and Scientific Workshops in December).

Objectives / Contribu-
Date Place Actors involved Activity
tion to the project

2012 Month 5 - month 16

01/01 Input to thematic and Relevant ET 2050 PPs Personal interviews

macroregional reports
/ Scientific, policy analyst
and policy makers
30/04

19/03 Brussels TPG meeting

20/03 Brussels TPG meeting – Cu + sounding board

03 Web Awareness raising Group 2 (policy makers) “Courtesy mail”, information on ET

mail and Group 4 (experts) 2050

05 Brussels Input to / hypotheses for PP3 Small group & individual

baseline scenarios, consultations
exploratory scenarios Group 2 (policy makers)
and Territorial Vision Interactive participation: questionnaire,
and Group 4 (experts) interviews, small group meetings, video
conference

12/06 Aalborg Baseline scenario 2030 ET 2050 LP, Policy workshop 2

and 2050:
PP3 (dedicated session of MC meeting)
discussion of
hypotheses and + presentation and discussion
storyline in relation to
their consistency, MC, DG Regio, CU
likelihood and, more
importantly, their
preferability.

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 Objectives / Contribu-
Date Place Actors involved Activity
tion to the project

Input to prepare the

MC WORKSHOP 28
SEPTEMBER,
dedicated to the policy-
aims and criteria to
elaborate the Territorial
Vision

13/06 Aalborg Steering committee ET 2050

14/06 Aalborg Key findings of the 1st ET 2050: LP and Scientific workshop 2
Interim Report relevant PPs
ESPON Open seminar (dedicated
Critical questions to Participants in ESPON session)
identify 2013-2020 open seminar
trends, building blocks Interactive sessions (quantitative
for the exploratory survey and qualitative questionnaire
scenarios

18/09 Brussels Involvement Et 2050 LP+ PP ? Policy face-to-face interview /

individual consultation
CU director

Eu Parliament
representative (REGI
commission)

19/09 Brussels Steering committee

+ Cu + Sounding board

28/09 Brussels Input on the policy- ET 2050 LP Policy workshop 3

aims and criteria to
elaborate the Territorial PP3 interactive session (90 minutes) based
Vision, and influence on answers to questionnaire delivered
elaboration of MC, DG regio, CU in July to MC members (synthesis
exploratory scenarios provided by PP3)

10 Web Awareness raising PP3 Courtesy mail

mail
Gr 3

10 Brussels Input to the fine tuning PP3 Small group and individual
of the baseline scenario consultations
2050 storyline key EU actors:
Interactive participation: questionnaire,
Input to exploratory DG (MOVE, AGRI, interviews, small group meetings, video
scenarios and territorial REGIO, ENVI, …) conference
vision
CoR, ECOSOC EU
PArliament

11 Brussels Input to exploratory PP3 Small group and individual

scenarios and territorial consultations
vision key EU and non EU
actors, from Interactive participation: questionnaire,
interviews, small group meetings, video

36/212
 Objectives / Contribu-
Date Place Actors involved Activity
tion to the project
conference
GR 3 (non public)

04/12 Cyprus Validation of the ET 2050 LP (MCRIT), Policy workshop 4

(Paphos) baseline scenarios 2030
-2050 PP3 (IGEAT) + dedicated session of the MC meeting

Input to the exploratory PP POLIM + half day session is needed

scenarios in terms of
consistency, likelihood PP S&W interactive presentation
and desirability, criteria
for TIA.
(communication and media tools: PP
13 )
Discussion on +
methods and input to
elaborate the Vision, MC, DG Regio, CU
and first proposal on
hypothesis

5- Cyprus Input to extreme ET 2050 LP and Scientific workshop 3

6/12 scenarios, relevant PPs
(Paphos) ESPON internal seminar, dedicated
Input to Territorial Participants in the session interactive presentation (media
Vision ESPON seminar tools: PP 13 )

+ interactive/informal sessions during

the seminar (poster, survey…PP 13)

2013 Month 17 - Month 28

01 ? Barcelona Towards second interim All ET 2050 PPS TPG meeting

report

02 ? Input to basic ET 2050 All the relevant Expert group consultations

assumptions and PPs
development of the Thematic and/or geographic panel
extreme scenarios Participants (scientific
experts, group 4, ESPON scientific Conference?
assessing the baseline potential group 2 and 3)
and exploratory
scenarios

03 Brussels Input to hypotheses ET 2050 relevant PPs CU Joint Thematic workshop 1

for/development of the and experts
extreme scenarios
Actors from all groups
Input to the Full day dedicated to ET 2050 ?
development of the
Territorial Vision

04 All PPs Second interim report

05 Brussels Input to the Territorial ET 2050: LP, PP3 Policy group consultations
Vision
+ relevant PPs interactive events

Key actors from groups brainstorming

2 and 3 (Eu Parliament
REGI committee
hearings)

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 Objectives / Contribu-
Date Place Actors involved Activity
tion to the project

06 Ireland Testing the consistency ET 2050 relevant PPs Scientific workshop 4

and likelihood of
exploratory scenarios Participants in ESPON ESPON seminar: a dedicated
(draft final) Open seminar workshop is needed

Input to Territorial
Vision, based on first
outline

06 Ireland Presentation and ET 2050 steering Policy workshop 5:

discussion of the draft committee
final exploratory MC meeting
scenarios. + ESPON CU
A half day session is needed
Testing a first outline of +MC and DG Regio
territorial Vision,

Developing by
consensus building on
policy-goals

09 Brussels Discussion on mid term All relevant PPS Policy workshop 6

target and pathways
LP and PP 3 MC session (90 minutes ?)

MC, CU , DG REGIO

10 website Consultation on GR 2,3 and 4 Mail consultation, use of database

from PP3
(Exploratory scenarios
?) territorial Vision and
midterm target and path
ways

11 Brussels (exploratory scenarios?) GR 2 and 3 Small group consultations

territorial vision, mid
term target and path
ways

12 Lithuania ET 2050 relevant PPs ESPON Internal seminar

Discussion on Participants to ESPON Scientific workshop 5

exploratory scenarios, seminar
Territorial vision,
midterm target and
pathways

12 Lithuania Validation of ET 2050 steering MC meeting

exploratory scenarios committee
? Policy workshop 7
+MC , DG Regio, CU
Validation of the draft
Territorial Vision

Validation of draft
midterm target an
pathways

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 Objectives / Contribu-
Date Place Actors involved Activity
tion to the project

2014 Month 29 -Month 34: final report

02: DFR

03 Brussels Communication and All groups Joint/ Thematic workshop 2 ???

Consensus building on
the Territorial Vision

Fine tuning mid-term

targets and pathways

06 Greece Discussion and ET 2050 relevant PPs ESPON Open seminar

Consensus building on and expert
the Territorial Vision Scientific workshop 6
mid-term target and Participants in ESPON
pathways Open seminar

06 Greece Validation of the ET 2050 steering MC meeting

Territorial Vision committee
Policy workshop 8
Validation of midterm MC, DG Regio, CU
targets and pathways

Figure 2-2 Participatory Plan Update (schedule)

2.6 Additional material

Further relevant material19 relating to the participatory process can be downloaded from the
project website: Cf. http://www.et2050.eu/europe_2050/index.php/first-interim-report-may12

19
- Annex ParP1. ET2050 presentation leaflet
- Annex ParP2. Participants in the ET 2050 first round of consultations
- Annex Parp3. ET2050 First Round of Consultations_Compilation of replies to the questionnaire
- Annex ParP4. GOODSTADT Vincent (ECTP-CEU)_Europe 2050 - Some Reflections on Way Forward
- Annex ParP5. VAN DER KAMP Hendrik (ECTP-CEU)_The City State as an Urban Model
- Annex ParP6a. EuroBroadMap Presentation
- Annex ParP6b. EuroBroadMap VISION1 “Europe” as a world economic power
- Annex ParP6c. EuroBroadMap VISION2 “Europe” as a continent with borders
- Annex ParP6d. EuroBroadMap VISION3 “Europe” as a normative soft power
- Annex ParP6e. EuroBroadMap VISION4 “Europe” as an attractive cluster of nodes in global networks
- Annex ParP6f. EuroBroadMap VISION5 “Europe” as an obstacle to the European Union
- Annex ParP7. FALUDI, Andreas and PEYRONY, Jean, 2011, Cohesion Policy Contributing to Territorial Cohesion – Future
Scenarios, Refereed article No. 43, September, 2011, European Journal of Spatial Development
- Annex ParP8. TEIXEIRA João Pereira (ECTP-CEU)_New paradigms or the same problems with other contexts?
- Annex ParP9. METREX_European Territorial Vision & Framework (ETVF)
- Annex ParP10. VOGELIJ Jan (ECTP-CEU)_Contribution to the building of a Vision ET2050

- Annex ParP11. VOGELIJ Jan (ECTP-CEU)_Some ideas for a new vision

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3. Present State of Europe
3.1 World Context
Evolutions for selected key variables from 1950 until 2010 (sources indicated in each case) are
presented just as a reference for the most detailed analysis at European level.
The below figures show a constantly growth of the World population, with an increasing urban
population share, improving social conditions (decreased illiteracy rate, increased world equity
since the 1990s), with exponential growth patterns in sectors like economy, trade, tourism,
transport, and linear energy consumption increases. As a result of all previous trends, global
GHG emissions, CO2 included, have also increased steadily. The weight of Europe in the World
for most of these trends tends to decrease all over the period considered, mostly due to an
increasing number of world relevant actors (emerging and emerged economies).

World Population (m illions of people)

10.000
9.000
8.000
7.000
6.000
5.000
4.000
3.000
2.000
1.000 Source: United
0 Nations – UNDESA
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 (2010)

World Urban Population (% over total population)

80%

70%
60%

50%

40%

30%
20%

10% Source: United

0% Nations – UNDESA
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 (2011)

World illiteracy rate (% of population 15+)

50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5% Source: United
0% Nations – UNICEF
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 (2010)

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 World GDP (1000 m ilions of 2010 €)
50.000
45.000
40.000
35.000
30.000
25.000
20.000
15.000
10.000
5.000 Source: World Bank –
0 (A.Maddison 2007) //
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 WB 2012)

World total trade (goods % services in 1000 m illion €)

25.000

20.000

15.000

10.000

5.000
Source: United
0 Nations – UNCTAD
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 (2011)

World Tourism (m illion overnight visitors per year)

1.000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100 Source: United
0 Nations, UNWTO
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 (2012)

World Gini Coeficient (Incom e Disparities)

0,66

0,66

0,65

0,65

0,64

0,64

0,63
Source:
0,63 Bourguignon/Morrison
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 (2002)

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 World energy consum ption (MTOE)
12.000

10.000

8.000

6.000

4.000

2.000
Source: British
0 Petroleum – BP
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 (2011)

Global seaborne traffic (billion tonne·km )

40.000

35.000
30.000

25.000
20.000

15.000

10.000

5.000 Source: British

0 Petroleum – BP
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 (2011)

Global air traffic (billion RPKs)

5.000
4.500
4.000
3.500
3.000
2.500
2.000
1.500
1.000
500 Source: British
0 Petroleum – BP
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 (2011)

World CO2 em issions (m illion tones)

35.000

30.000

25.000

20.000

15.000

10.000

5.000
Source: British
0 Petroleum – BP
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 (2011)

Figure 3-1 World Context. Evolutions for key variables 1950-2010

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Overall European role in the World 1950-2010 (Europe share in the World)
100%
Population GDP Trade
Tourism Energy consumption CO2
90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Figure 3-2 Europe in the World Context. Evolutions for selected variables 1950-2010

3.2 Analysis by sectors

The sectors considered are listed in the following table:

Sector
Demographic trends and potential territorial impacts in Europe
Economic trends and potential territorial impacts in Europe
Societal trends and potential territorial impacts in Europe
Technologic trends and potential territorial impacts in Europe
Energy trends and potential territorial impacts in Europe
Transport trends and potential territorial impacts in Europe
Land-use trends and potential territorial impacts in Europe
Environmental trends and potential territorial impacts in Europe
Governance trends and potential territorial impacts in Europe

Figure 3-3 Sectors considered by ET2050

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The sectorial analysis (included as Annexes of this Interim Report) have been summarised in the
next 125 key points. All points refer to 2012 unless stated otherwise.

Demography20
1. Global growth. Since the 1970’s, the World population has been growing at a rate of one
billion approximately every 12 years. A vast majority of population increase is confined to
developing countries; the developed countries as a whole noted very small increases. The
share of European countries’ population in relation to the World’s has decreased from 15% in
1950 to 7,5% in 2010.
2. Low fertility. In 2010 the total fertility rate (TFR) stood at 2,5 for the world but continental
values varied substantially from 4,7 in Africa to 1,6 in Europe, and within Europe from 2,2 in
Iceland, 2,1 in Ireland (the only two countries with above replacement fertility) to 1,3 in
several states in Western Balkans and Eastern Europe.
3. Longer life expectancy. Life expectancy at birth of males in the ESPON countries is
currently 76,2 years and females’ is 82,2 years, with a trend towards a narrowing of the gap in
life expectancy between both genders. In the countries in which the reduction in mortality was
the most successful, life expectancy has been growing since it started to be measured in
1840s at the pace of around 2,5 year per decade. In Europe the regional distribution of life
expectancy shows a clear East-West divide, with countries belonging in the past to the Soviet
block lagging behind. South European and Scandinavian regions have higher life expectancy
than other countries of the “old” EU.
4. Aging population. The old-age dependency ratio (ODR) calculated as the ratio of people
aged 65 or above relative to the working-age population aged 15-64, is 22,4% on average in
2005. The implications of an ageing EU population will be substantial in the coming decades.
5. Neighbouring countries and demographic pressures. Eastern EU neighbours experience
population decline (Russia, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine) due to dramatic levels of mortality,
especially in males, comparable to those observed in developing countries. Neighbouring
countries in the south of the EU (the South and East coast of the Mediterranean Sea)
experience population increases driven by fertility, young age structures and moderate
mortality. The differences in population dynamics between the EU and neighbouring regions
generate and will generate in future a pressure to emigrate from North Africa and the demand
for migrants in Europe. However, for this category of migrants, a mismatch between supply
and demand of skills is very likely and should be consider as a migration limiting factor.

20
Demography building blocks have been put together based on ET2050 Demography Sectoral Report (CEFRM-IOM, 2012),
and the following forecasts and reports:
 Rees P., P. Boden, A. Dennett, J. Stillwell, M. Jasińska, A. de Jong, M. ter Veer, M. Kupiszewski, D. Kupiszewska
(2010) Regional population dynamics: a report assessing the effects of demographic developments on regional
competitiveness and cohesion. Report on Deliverable 7. DEMIFER. Demographic and Migratory Flows affecting
European Regions and Cities. Applied Research Project 2013/1/3. ESPON.
 Rees P., P. Boden, A. Dennett, J. Stillwell, M. Jasinska, A. de Jong, M. ter Veer (2010) Report on scenarios and a
database of scenario drivers Deliverable 6. DEMIFER. Demographic and Migratory Flows affecting European Regions
and Cities. Applied Research Project 2013/1/3. ESPON.
 EUROPOP2010 by Eurostat
 NIDI et al. (2010), ESPON Demifer, Espon Programme
 UMS RIATE et al. (2007), ESPON Project 3.4.1, Espon Programme
 Lanzieri,G (2011) The greying of the baby boomers: a century-long view of ageing in European populations, Eurostat
Statistics in Focus 23/2011
 EC (2009) 2009 Ageing Report: Economic and budgetary projections for the EU27 Member States (2008-2060), Joint
report prepared by the European Commission (DG ECFIN) and the Economic Policy Committee (AWG);
 EC (2012) 2012 Ageing Report: Underlying assumptions and projection methodologies, DG ECFIN and the Economic
Policy Committee (AWG).
 UN (2010) World Population Prospects: 2010 update, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
(UNDESA)
 UN (2011) World Urbanisation Prospects: 2011 update, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
(UNDESA)

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6. International extra-European migration. Two factors are dominant in the process of
recruitment of extra-European migration: geographical distance and historical colonial links.
The current economic crisis has reduced the inflow and in some cases even reversed the
direction of flows, as for example in Spain which switched from a net gainer to a net loser.
7. International intra-European Migration. In the last decade the intra-European migration
was dominated by East to West flows. Retirement related migration to sun-sea-sand areas
played important role in the Mediterranean, but these flows are strongly affected by economic
conditions and are currently subsiding. A substantial share of migrants moved to the largest
cities, but it was quite characteristic that rural and peripheral areas also attracted some, a
phenomenon not widespread previously.
8. Internal Migration Internal migration in ESPON member states is dominated by inflows to
urban agglomerations, which have greater than proportional to its population gross internal
migration.

Economy21
9. European growth. The European Union was growing around 2,5% right before the crisis,
below the 3,2% of the US but above the 1,2% of Japan. Within Europe, the new 12 member
countries have significantly outperformed the old 15 members, by almost 2%, a very
significant difference but still insufficient to fill the gap between the two groups in terms of
income per capita. The economic crisis has hit Europe even harder than the United States,
and has also hit all countries of Europe but in much differentiated ways. The old 15 member
countries of the EU have been hit significantly more than the new 12 member countries.
10. Regional disparities. Wide differences still exist among European countries in GDP using
purchasing power parity, with the highest level in the Luxembourg at more than 270% and the
lowest level in Bulgaria at less than 50%. There is still a dualism between the old 15 member
states of the European Union and the New 12 member countries which have joined the EU in
2004 or 2007. None of the New 12 countries reaches the EU average.
11. Employment rates. They are around 65% of the relevant population on average in the
European Union, a level very similar to the one of the United States. Differences between
countries, however, are significant. Female employment rates are lower in Europe, about 5%
less than the male counterpart, with a difference more marked than in the United States. The
long term pattern of employment rates was stably increasing until the start of the economic
crisis while with the economic crisis it bounced back. The employment rate of females is still
6% lower than the total one but there has been partial convergence.
12. Unemployment. The problem of unemployment has been made much more important by the
economic crisis but the different European countries have labour markets with different
capacity to produce jobs. At the EU 27 level the unemployment rate is now close to 10%,
significantly higher with respect to a structural/frictional level. The total unemployment rate
had been declining in the late 90s, then increasing slightly in the early 2000s and then
significantly declining to about to around 7%, before growing steeply with the current

21
Economy building blocks have been put together based on ET2050 Economy Sectoral Report (Politecnico di Milano, 2012),
and the following forecasts and reports:
 EC (2009) 2009 Ageing Report: Economic and budgetary projections for the EU27 Member States (2008-2060), Joint
report prepared by the European Commission (DG ECFIN) and the Economic Policy Committee (AWG);
 EC (2012) 2012 Ageing Report: Underlying assumptions and projection methodologies, DG ECFIN and the Economic
Policy Committee (AWG).
 A. Maddison (2003) The World Economy: Historical Statistics, OECD.

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 economic crisis to values close to 10%. The economic crisis has hence been able to cancel
the progresses of the previous 15 years. Female unemployment has slowly converged to the
one of males, while the economic crisis affected young people significantly more than the
others so that the difference with respect to the total rate is now the largest recorded in the
time series. There is chronic employment in Southern Europe, e.g. around 10% in Spain (out
from the total 23% unemployment) and 7,5% in France. The situation is critical in many other
countries. Unemployment reaches almost up to 40% of youths in Southern Europe, even
among well educated people, inducing new outwards migration.
13. Productivity. In average, between 1998 and 2011 productivity per capita grew 0,5% in the
euro zone, against 2,5% in USA and 3,0% in Sweden. The total amount of worked hours by
the European labour market is not significantly smaller than in the USA or Japan. Despite the
fact that the number of hours worked per week and employee has dropped in Europe some
15% since 1980, the total labour input has remained stable. However, the level of investment
on research and development and the training and professional qualification of the population
is low, and the economic structure of many European countries is dominated by sectors
providing low productivity, such as agriculture, construction, distribution or tourism. In
countries like Spain, a large part of the GDP growth in the last 2 decades was mostly due to
the increase on the number of workers, mostly emigrants, working on sectors with low
productivity. In Poland, but also in some other countries in Europe, productivity in agriculture
remains 20% below average.
14. Research and Development. Expenses on Research and Development are about 1,9% in
the euro zone, against 2,6% in USA and 3,7% in Sweden. The relevance of sectors related
new technologies is smaller in Europe than in USA (7% of GDP against 10%). The
fragmented investments in Defense and Military-related fields by European countries,
compared to the Chinese and USA integrated military programs, explain to a large extend the
difference in publically financed research.
15. North-South Structural Gap. Still the Northern and Southern European regions have large
differences on terms of their economic structures. After decades of transfers from northern to
southern countries linked to Structural and Cohesion Funds, the North remains industrialised
and technologically-oriented, while the South is even in a faster process of deindustrialisation.
Employment in the industrial sector in Germany was reduced 10% in the latest ten years
(mostly transferred to industrial-related business activities) while it was reduced by 25% in
Spain (mostly due to the industrial delocalisation process; industries coming in the late
eighties and nineties leaving to Eastern European countries such as Poland and Hungary, or
to China, and to a some extend also to Morocco). Salaries in the industry use to be higher
than in the low service sectors (e.g. tourism) and therefore also the consumption level in
Southern countries tends to be reduced, or compensated by a higher level of private debt that
recently achieved unsustainable levels. Economic gaps among more developed and less
developed regions may remain, because of the likely reduction of financial transfers and
solidarity between regions and countries at EU level, as well as Cohesion Policies, due to the
financial shortage of National administrations.
16. Public Debt. The level of public debts in European economies has rapidly grown after the
2008 crisis, largely due to the need to guarantee the stability of the financial systems and
cover unemployment expenses. Optimising the size of Public Administrations and improving
their efficiency delivering added-value services remains as a key challenge for many
countries.
17. Private Debt. Because salaries loose purchase power, consumption tend to be reduced for
the majority of the population, except for the highest income group. The private debt
accumulated during the latest years will tend to be reduced very slowly. After the introduction
of the euro, largely because the monetary situation of Germany and the lack of proper

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 common fiscal regulation in Europe, private debt grew from 120% of GDP to 225% in Spain,
from 170% to 250% in Portugal, from 150% to 330% in Ireland, and from 55% to 120% in
Greece.
18. Real Estate Speculative Bubble has increased private debt two/three times faster that GDP.
The ratio of loans that fail increased by 12 in Ireland from 2007 to 2010, creating an in-depth
crisis in the financial system. The number of Real Estate properties in hands of banks has
increased exponentially in the previous three years, and in many cases still their market
values have not been reduced according to the crisis. The speculative Real Estate Bubble
(e.g. Japan in 1993; USA and Europe in 2008) result from periods of fast growth, and very
low interest rates, in contexts with relaxed land regulations. In Spain, 2012, there are
approximately 1,3 million new houses and apartments, many in the hands of banks, along the
coast, to be sold.
19. Stable Inflation. In the last decade, inflation has not been a problem for the European
Economy, after the creation of the euro and the European Central Bank. In the near future a
small inflation may be even beneficial to finance debts and stimulate exports sensitive to the
rate change. A strong value for the euro together with austerity measures reinforces the
recession.
20. Trade. Global trade has increased by 2.000% since 1950. EU trade in 2010 is six times
greater than in 1980. EU trade in 1980 was already six times greater than in 1970. Exports
and imports account for around 40% of EU GDP in average. Most important trade partners
are USA (18% of exports), China (8,4%) and Switzerland (7,8%). There has been a
replacement of the USA with China as the main exporter towards Europe, while European
exports are still mainly towards the USA. The comparison of Chinese figures against USA
and, specially, Switzerland clearly indicates the growth potential for trade growth.
21. Trade by sector. With the increasing demand from emerging economies, the demand and
price of raw materials and fuels have been high and growing. Because raw materials and
mineral fuels have considerably increased their share on European imports and represent 5%
of GDP approximately, if the pattern of increasing prices continues, this may result in a lost of
growth in EU GDP. On the other hand, energy efficiency could limit the impact of these
increases.
22. Global Finances. Global finances have grown much faster than trade, in an unregulated
process, often creating unstable dynamics (e.g. crisis in Asia in early nineties, crisis related to
subprime in 2008). Paradoxically, developing countries such as China, that have strict
regulations for the use of international private funds to finance their growth, used to transfer
public savings to finance Western public debts; at the same time, private savings and private
direct investments in Western countries have been increasingly transferred to developing
countries where more business opportunities exist in the coming years.

Society22
23. Hours worked. Total number of hours worked per employee and year has declined over
time. In 2010, Europeans worked on average 1.746 hours per year, while in 1980 they

22
Society building blocks have been put together based on ET2050 Economy Sectoral Report (Politecnico di Milano, 2012),
and the following forecasts and reports:
 EC (2009) 2009 Ageing Report: Economic and budgetary projections for the EU27 Member States (2008-2060), Joint
report prepared by the European Commission (DG ECFIN) and the Economic Policy Committee (AWG);
 EC (2012) 2012 Ageing Report: Underlying assumptions and projection methodologies, DG ECFIN and the Economic
Policy Committee (AWG).
 EC (2012) Active ageing and solidarity between generations: a statistical portrait of the European Union 2012, Statistical
Books, Eurostat

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 worked 2.000 hours. In most advanced economies, like Germany or France, people work
today around 1.500 hours per year.
24. Women Labour. The participation rate in the European countries (of people aged 15 to 64) is
at 70.6% (2007), and for the euro area at 70.8%. Man and woman participation rates
converge, but still there is a 6% difference on average with important geographical
differences (e.g. Northern Europe and Southern). Since the 70s, the social ideal of women
working at home has been replaced by a more flexible balance between work and family.
Today, half of western women go to work. This development calls for new employment
models and will have a significant influence on values in the years to come.
25. Retirement Age. The legal retirement age is currently established at 65 in most European
countries, but the average retirement age of European population is 61,2. More flexible work
places and schedules in a more service-oriented and knowledge-based economy allow for
longer careers in some cases, while pre-retirements on the other hand are applicable already
in the mid 50s.
26. Service-oriented jobs. European countries’ economy is more and more dependent on
services and advanced tourism. Advanced personal services in health and education
represent an increasingly important economic activity. In 2010, the weight of services in the
European economy is 79,5%, while in 2000 it was of 75,3%. The weight of services may still
increase in the future.
27. Entrepreneurship remains lower that in emerging economies, but the number of people
working free-lance grows. Most new companies are started by individuals 25-44 years of age,
and the shrinking share of this cohort will also mean less entrepreneurship and reduced
innovation.
28. Youngster Employment. Too many young people today leave school early, increasing their
risk of becoming unemployed or inactive, living in poverty and causing high economic and
social costs. Unemployment is currently high among young graduates from different levels of
education and training. Indicators for youth labour market performance do not fully capture
that an astonishing 15% of European 20-24 year olds are disengaged from both work and
education (NEET youth: neither in employment, education or training) and risk being
permanently excluded from the labour market and dependent on benefits.
29. Consumption Patterns. 55% of GDP is produced by household expenditures (gross fixed
capital formation is 22%). Consumption is recently tending to be reduced and focused on low-
cost products, for most people, but also to more luxurious products and services for the
wealthier elite. Also, more environmentally sensitive consumption is being perceived.
Changes in consumption patterns often happen linked to new generations.
30. Income Disparities. In the latest 20 years disparities have increased in most European
countries, as well as in other developed and emerging countries, even if disparities at country
level have been reduced globally. Slums and conflicting neighbourhoods still exist in large
advanced European metropolis, such as Paris or London.
31. Global Middle Class is emerging worldwide, approximately 100 million per year (according
to Goldman Sachs), and their consumption level is also rising. The gap in GDP and welfare
between European countries and emerging developing countries worldwide is getting
reduced.
32. Single Households. Due to population ageing, the number of single and two-person
households has already increased considerably, and was potential to continue to do so
towards 2030 and 2050. About one third of people are currently living in single-parent
families. In 2010, average household size in the EU is of 2,3 persons, while in 1990 was of
2,7.

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33. Internet Users. There are more than 250 million daily Internet users in Europe and virtually
all Europeans own mobile phones. This has changed lifestyle. It will be challenging for
business and other organizations to find new ways of work-life integration. The increasingly
free production and access to information content will challenge the traditional business
model in many sectors, particularly in the creation of added value.
34. eLearning. The education system remains to be adapted in many European countries to the
requirements of the emerging economy, favouring more pro-active and collaborative, creative
and entrepreneurial competences in students. Links between universities and corporations
remain weak. Knowledge-based economies require lifelong education that hardly formal
system can deliver. Education systems are currently adapting only slowly to the learning
society. European systems have been slow to respond to the requirements of the knowledge
society, failing to adapt curricula and programs to the changing needs of the labour market.
35. Multiple Identities. Identities attached to the territory gain importance, leading to selected
closure from foreign activities and cultural influence, excepts in cosmopolitan centres, that
attract educated globally-minded youth. Informal relations still dominant in peripheral and less
developed zones and conflictive neighbourhoods. Face-to-face relations remain important,
even though Virtual Communities are further expanded. New Communities emerge related to
projects and interests, not just religious or family.
36. Cultural Diversity. Migration in the EU largely comes from North Africa, the Near East and
South America. An increased protectionism and self-sufficiency in wealthier communities can
be already perceived. The number of languages spoken in Europe tends to get reduced. Only
2% of Europeans live and work in other European countries. Cross-border short-distance
traffic remains marginal. International relations between European countries grow less than
could be expected, given the geographic proximity and the common market, in relation to the
growth of traffic between European countries and countries outside the EU27.
37. Rigid Social Institutions. Rigidity in social institutions, resistant to change. Political parties,
Trade Unions, and other social institutions are challenged by emerging more active
minorities.
38. Security Society. Protection against crime is a fundamental governmental task, as well as
reducing social anxieties and hysteria in relation to external risks. New ICT will provide more
safety at the extent of invading personal privacy, moving towards a radical transparency.
39. Productive Agriculture. Within the food sector, the most influential trend is that the global
food prices are growing in real terms, as a result of growing world population, rising affluence,
and the shift to Western dietary preference. This can place more pressure on water for
agriculture. The strongest effect of high food prices is that the poorest countries may not be
able to afford decent food or the minimum to maintain its basic needs for survival. One
important trend is the increase of local markets for agricultural products sensitive to ecological
higher quality. This brings higher level of self-sufficiency at local and regional level. This trend
is closely related to trend 46 (food and water security).

Technology23
40. R&D expenditure. The EU2020 strategy has set up the target of attaining a 3% GDP yearly
investment in R&D by 2020. Today, the EU is spending 1,9% of its GDP for research and

23
Technology building blocks have been put together based on ET2050 Technology Sectoral Report (MCRIT, 2012), and the
following forecasts and reports:
 Wintjes,R., Hollanders,H. (2010) Regional impact of technological change in 2020, European Commission (DG
Research & Innovation)

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 development compared with America’s 2,6%, and the US has twice as many scientists and
engineers per million people as the EU, and scientific brain drain from Europe to the US
continues. China’s will become the 2nd largest R&D power in the World in the mid 2010s well
ahead of major EU Member States, and with efforts focussed in most promising cutting-edge
areas. Overcoming the missing link between research and development-deployment in
Europe is key to future development.
41. Regional Innovation. Progressive convergence for public R&D expenditures in EU Member
States (catching up in patent inscription by lagging regions), but industry based R&D
increasingly concentrated in few selected locations (densely populated metropolitan areas in
Western Europe). Some regions perform well at accessing, absorbing and diffusing
knowledge even when they have limited knowledge creation capacities, while traditional
regions are set to improve education to increase their absorption capacity.
42. Healthcare Technologies. Progress in biotechnology, genetics, stem cell research, tissue
engineering and nanotechnology, as well as personalised medicine, advanced prosthetics
and anti-ageing medicine is believed will have a huge impact in human life span.
Nanomachines allowing precision interactions with nanoscale objects will be used to identify
and destroy cancer cells not long after 2020. Stem cell therapies will go beyond already
existing therapies to treat a wider variety of cancers, Parkinson's disease, spinal cord injuries,
sclerosis and muscle damage. Developments in prosthetics and implants are to increase the
quality of life of disabled and elderly.
43. Social Networking. The vision of “ubiquitous computing” defined by Weiser in 1993 is
already in force through smart phones. Social networking and virtual communities based on
hobbies, work and cultural affinity will create bonds as important as those attached to the
territory, and geographic proximity. People in networked societies live and work in multiple
sets of overlapping relationships, cycling among different networks. Social capital will thrust
due to complementarities of relational networks, despite the fact that people may be
physically dispersed and do not know one another.
44. Virtual Reality. Augmented reality results from the combination of virtual and real objects in
real environment fully integrating virtual content with the real world. Telepresence combines
software, video, audio, screen and networking technologies to create a collaborative
experience that is as close to a face-to-face physical meeting as it gets, allowing to reduce
travel needs.
45. Smart Cities and Housing. The new intelligence of cities resides in the increasingly effective
combination of digital telecommunication networks, ubiquitously embedded intelligence,
sensors and tags, and software. Residential users may control their environment through the
service interface of the gateway that is able to get connected with any type of home terminal,
like e.g. wireless PDA, embedded devices. Electric intelligent transport vehicles, of individual
use and collective property of management will change the way we move in the city. The
most dramatic general effect of digital telecommunications is to create new kinds of
interdependencies among scattered regions and settlements. The proliferation of nested
smart cities and smart places connected to global networks will eventually produce new types
of urban tissue which in the long term will radically reshape our cities. This trend is related to
trend 79 (intelligent vehicles)
46. Food and Water Security. Urban agriculture in the future can be developed in vertical
structures thanks to techniques such as hydroponics or aeroponics, methods of growing
plants using mineral nutrient solutions, in water or aerosols, without soil, allowing for lower
water costs, lower nutrition costs, no nutrition pollution, lower risk of pests and stable and
higher yields easier to harvest. Desalination is one of the most obvious technological
advances in relation to access to ‘new’ water resources, used mainly in arid and semi-arid
areas (today 50% in the Gulf, 16% North America, 13% Europe, 11% Asia, 5% Africa and 3%

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 the Caribbean). This trend is closely related to trends 39 (productive agriculture), 104 (water
stress), and 106.(organic farming).
47. New Materials. Demand is increasing fast for a series of critical raw materials driven by the
growth of developing economies and new emerging technologies. Materials can enable
industrial and commercial success for both existing and not-yet existing products and
processes: they may introduce new functionalities and improved properties adding value to
existing products and process representing an invisible revolution. The engineered production
of materials by design might allow the development of products and processes under a really
sustainable systemic approach. This trend is closely related to trend 108 (resources scarcity).
48. Environmentally Friendly Vehicles. Before people drive advanced electric cars, hybrid
vehicles using a combination of fossil fuels and other sources are helping to bridge the gap
between conventional gasoline engines and the cleaner hydrogen vehicles of the future.
Hybrids may account in 2015 for 2% of total cars in Europe, 6% in the US and 8% in Japan.
Hydrogen vehicles built on fuel cells are potentially highly energy efficient, but technical
obstacles still exist regarding their development mainly due to fuel cell costs and hydrogen
production costs (and emissions), freezing conditions, service life. In urban environments,
smaller and cleaner vehicles are to spread guaranteeing very high levels of personal mobility
at low costs and impacts.
49. Renewable Energy Sources. The use of RES has been growing fast in the last decade:
wind energy and solar photovoltaic are the most developed. Biochar, created when biomass
is heated to high temperatures under low oxygen concentrations offers a CO2 emissions zero
balanced combustion source based on recycling urban waste. This trend is closely related to
trend 61 (decarbonisation).
50. Biofuels. The EU has a significant potential for the production of biofuels but it is estimated
that between 4% and 18% of the total agricultural land in the EU would be needed to produce
the amount of biofuels to reach the level of liquid fossil fuel replacement required for the
transport sector in the Directive 2003/30/EC. This trend is related to trend 79 (intelligent
vehicles)
51. Nuclear Energy. Nuclear fusion is an attractive long-term energy solution, although it is
unlikely that the technology will be ready for commercial power generation in the near future.
Nevertheless, fusion energy has made significant progress over the last few decades and is
now considered as a credible option for clean, large-scale electricity generation. This trend is
closely related to trend 64 (phase-out nuclear energy).
52. Grid Energy Storage refers to the methods used to store electricity on a large scale within
an electrical power grid. Electrical energy is stored during times when production exceeds
consumption and the stores are used at times when consumption exceeds production. In
particular, the use of grid-connected intermittent energy sources such as photovoltaics and
wind turbines can benefit from grid energy storage.
53. Carbon Capture. Carbon Capture Storage (CCS) is a group of technologies for capturing the
CO2 emitted from power plants and industrial sites, compressing CO2 and transporting it to
suitable permanent storage sites such as deep underground. First commercial plants are
beginning to operate. CCS can provide the main means of curbing emissions from heavy
industrial sectors such as steel, cement and refineries, which together account for around
10% or 15% of Europe’s CO2 emissions. Plankton blooms in the seas achieved by seeding
oceanic waters with iron have been proposed as a Carbon Capture solution considering that
when the planktons blossom they consume carbon dioxide but at the end of the growing
phase, dead plankton sinks to the bottom of the Ocean requisitioning consumed CO2 for
several centuries.

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54. eGovernance. The rush by government agencies worldwide to embrace the associated
technologies collectively known as Web 2.0 has opened up a number of dazzling new ways
citizens can participate in the public sector. Prodded by this private-sector groundswell and by
the successful use of these technologies in election campaigns, local, regional and national
governments are now focusing on Web 2.0 as they develop more accessible services and an
array of participatory public platforms.

Energy24
55. Energy Intensity (energy consumption in relation to GDP), tends to decrease overtime in
Europe due to changes in the economic structure (relative de-industrialisation, more service-
oriented activities) and efficiency improvements. It varies between European countries, being
higher in Eastern European countries. Since GDP will tend to grow in a long-run, it is
expected that European energy consumption will rise at a relatively lower level. In 2008,
Ireland and Denmark are the Member States with the lowest energy intensity (respectively
107 and 103 kgoe/€1000 GDP), followed by United Kingdom, Austria and Italy. Bulgaria, with
more than 5 times the EU average, has the highest energy intensity, followed by Romania.
Ireland and United Kingdom have decreased energy intensity by more than 20% between
2000 and 2008, which is the most important decrease in EU-15 countries.
56. Energy Demand. Over the last twenty years, global energy demand has increased by around
40% around the world, so an average of 1,5% a year, but only a 5% in Europe. The vast
majority of the energy consumption growth is coming from non-OECD countries such as
China, India, etc. From 4.900Mtoe in 1971 energy demand grow to 10.200 Mtoe in 2010 in
the World, from 1.300 Mtoe in 1971 to 1.764 Mtoe in 2010 in Europe.
57. Energy External Dependency. EU energy dependency tends to increase: from 47% in 1980
to 57% in 2010. 83.5% of oil and 64.2% of gas was imported in 2009. Oil and gas from the
Atlantic North will be increasingly used to reduce dependency from Russia and Arab
countries major providers.
58. Energy Prices (oil, gas) may experiment erratic patterns year to year, even if they tend to
rise overall, because markets segments will become more speculative and unreliable, more
diversified demand and supply. Peaks on energy prices will be an incentive to adapt
consumer behaviours to reduce energy demand and induce more effective uses, as well as to
progressively implement new technologies, such as the Electric Grids (trends 52 and 63),
allowing a more decentralised production and more efficient management of resources. This
trend is closely related to trend 80 (transport prices).
59. Oil Production Peaking due to the progressive depletion of numerous large oil fields.
Forecast vary from more optimistic 101,5 Mb/day in 2030 (by the International Energy
Association) to 75,8 Mb/day as maximum level. Oil prices, in speculative markets, will
continue to be unstable. This trend is closely related to trend 108 (resources scarcity).
60. Coal Reserves. European coal reserves are just 5% of the total estimated World level, in
Poland, Germany, Czech Republic, Greece and Hungary. Deposits are expensive to exploit
due to their depth. This trend is closely related to trend 108 (resources scarcity).

24
Energy building blocks have been put together based on ET2050 Energy Sectoral Report (TERSYN, 2011), and the following
forecasts and reports:
 EC (2009) EU Energy Trends to 2030. Update 2009, European Commission DG Energy in collaboration with DG for
Climate Action and DG for Mobility and Transport; EC (2010) Priorities for 2020 and beyond – a blueprint for an
integrated energy network European Commission DG Energy
 BP (2011) Statistical Review of World Energy 1965-2010, British Petroleum BP.

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61. Decarbonisation. According to 2008 data, 10,3% of EU energy consumption comes from
renewable energy sources. There are big differences among Member States: Sweden and
Finland have a share of more than 30%, while 7 member States (Belgium, Cyprus, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands and United Kingdom) have a share of less than 5%.
Onshore and offshore wind energy potential is high in the Baltic, and North Atlantic. Solar-
thermal energy has potential especially in the South of Europe, as well as solar-photovoltaic
energy. In 2008 four Member States had a share of wind power on total electricity of 8% or
more: Denmark (18.3%), Portugal (10.4%), Spain (9.9%) and Ireland (8%). This trend is
closely related to trend 49 (renewable energy sources).
62. Hydrogen Energy Carrier. Hydrogen will be developed as new energy carrier allowing for
better energy management.
63. Electric Grid. The interconnection of all electricity networks is a strategy of the EU. The
interconnection of networks is to allow redistribution of renewable energy production all
around. Intelligent and decentralised electricity networks will be developed on the long-run.
Houses, facilities, vehicles, will be able both to consume and produce energy to be
distributed. This will induce more self-sufficiency at different levels, resulting in a better
management of demand peaks and probably moderating or reducing the tendency of energy
prices to rise. Transport represents 33% of energy consumption in Europe. Increasing energy
prices will result in higher transport costs that will mostly affect peripheral regions depending
on long-distance transport. This trend is closely related to trend 52 (energy grid storage).
64. Phase-out nuclear energy. Germany, Belgium and Switzerland recently decided to phase-
out nuclear energy, with France still having a different policy. Nuclear energy accounts for
about one third of EU electricity production and 12% of EU total energy consumption. Nuclear
power is a low-carbon energy source with no direct CO2 emissions, but it has obvious
environmental and health risks. This trend is closely related to trend 51 (nuclear energy).
65. Carbon taxes. May affect the profitability of energy-intensitive industries.

Transport25
66. Flows at World Level. Transport and communication technologies have facilitated the
development of efficient and relatively inexpensive logistic chains at World level over the last
decades, inducing the delocalisation of European industries towards developing economies,
especially in Asia. The flows of passengers and containers have continued to grow in the
World exponentially in the last 20 years. The civil aviation traffic (in RPM) grew in the world by
six times between 1970 and 1990, and air trips between Europe and the rest of the World
grew by 3,5% yearly during the decade of 2000. The world merchandise maritime trade
multiplied by 2 between 1995 and 2005, well above global GDP growth which was around
30%. The strongest growth has been with the Asia region and between the large emerging
economies (BRIC) and Europe and North America. The transatlantic maritime freight has
already become less important, and larger European ports situated in the North may face
increasing competition from Mediterranean ports in the routes Asia-Europe-North and South

25
Transport building blocks have been put together based on ET2050 Transport Sectoral Report (S&W, 2012), and the follow-
ing forecasts and reports:
 EC (2011) Impact assessment of the 2011 transport White Paper (SEC(2011) 358 Final)
 EC (2009) EU Energy Trends to 2030. Update 2009, European Commission DG Energy in collaboration with DG for
Climate Action and DG for Mobility and Transport; EC (2010) Priorities for 2020 and beyond – a blueprint for an
integrated energy network European Commission DG Energy
 Mcrit et Al. (2009) Mobility scenarios towards a postcarbon society, Task 2 Quantitative Scenarios deliverable of
TRANSvisions study co-ordinated by Tetraplan for EC DGTREN.

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 America. This evolution is likely to continue at a more moderate speed in relation to Asia, and
more accelerated with Africa and South America.
67. EU passenger transport growth. While daily commuting trips have a trend towards
progressive stabilisation in Europe (decoupling from economic growth) long-distance
passenger transport (business, personal visits and leisure trips abroad) grow very faster.
Passenger·kilometres (pax-km) of trips with neighbouring countries grow at 6% annually,
increasing their share in total EU27 pax-km from 3% to 9%. Even for long-distance transport,
the elasticity to GDP will be smaller for intra-EU27 trips (less than 1.3% per year for EU
residents, and 1.45% for non EU residents) than for international travel (2.1% per year).
Passenger traffic grows following the travel time and budget constraints (approx. 15% of
personal available income allocated in transport, in average, no more than 1 hour/day per
person, in average, all trips together). Depending on GDP per capita, and the evolution of
transport costs and average transport speed, passengers will travel more or less in the future
(in pax-km), reflecting the fact that personal mobility is not purely driven by economic aspects.
Shrinking EU population in several countries (e.g. BG, DE, EE, LV, LT, HU, RO) and rapid
ageing in most countries can also have an effect on moderating passenger transport growth
in certain regions.
68. Short and Long-Distance Trips. Urban, and Domestic transport growth is lower than long
distance. While urban transport is already decoupled from economic growth, the number of
long-distance trips inside Europe, and outside, keep growing and the average passenger trip
becomes longer. Pax·km are therefore expected to grow faster than trips (+60% elasticity)
with increasing average trip lengths.
69. Trip purposes. The shorter, regional, distances are divided in equal parts between
commuter, private and holiday. Private and business gain importance at national level while
long-distance transport is dominated by holiday trips. More diversity of trip purposes as well
as dispersed origin and destinations are expected for long-distance transport.
70. EU freight transport growth. Freight transport has grown above economy during the last
decades. In 2005, the traffic between the EU27 and the rest of the World represented 86% of
the total freight traffic generated or attracted by the EU27 (tonnes-km, including freight to
overseas), and only 14% was traffic intra EU27. In 2005, 35% of inland EU27 freight traffic
was imports or exports from overseas, with an increasing trend. European ports and freight
corridors near large ports and urban centres are increasingly busy. While many European
ports are widening their infrastructure, the connections to their hinterlands need be upgraded
by dedicated freight services to improve their efficiency, mostly by rail in the short term.
71. Road traffic is the dominant transport mode. In 2005, road traffic represented 87% of
passenger traffic, pax-km not including trips to overseas. It is expected that the road freight
market, being extremely competitive, will be able to take advantage of technological
innovation faster than other modes, if properly regulated.
72. Rail traffic. High-speed rail has introduced a new formerly not existing level of surface
transport. Since 1990, the volume of high-speed pax·km has increased by a factor of more
than six and represents in 2010 more than 25% of total rail travel (although air travel is still six
times larger). Rail passenger has a share of 10% for long-distance inter-NUTS3 trips in 2005,
and rail freight growth between NUTS3 a share of 24%.
73. Short sea shipping. It is expected that SSS will continue to grow in Europe as much as
overseas traffic. Transhipment hubs and secondary ports in Europe may become more
important in their regional hinterlands.
74. Intercontinental Air Travel. With an increasing number of mega-cities in the world,
intercontinental travel has a global trend towards increase of RPKs, especially for hub to hub
relations and for feeder services. The number volume of RPKs inbout or outbound from

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 Europe increased from 450 billion in 2000 to 662 billion in 2010. The number of available seat
kilometres (ASK) hub to hub, and for feeder flights in the world has multiplied by 9 between
1972 and 2006, from approximately 20 billion ASK to 180, while the number of ASK between
secondary airports over the same period has only doubled, from 5 to 10 billion ASK.
However, the growth of LCC in regional markets has been very important in the last 15 years.
75. Integrated Networks. More productive long-distance transport and communications services
connecting some selected nodes in Europe to premium Global nodes. Given the relatively
high urbanisation of Europe, transport infrastructures in Europe can not be expanded easily in
the next decade, especially in the central regions, or around major cities and metropolitan
areas, at a reasonable economic and environmental cost, even if they are very congested.
Because of this, achieving productivity gains in the transport sector and avoiding the increase
of congestion costs above the present 1% of GDP, or reducing it, will be increasingly
important. New materials and more efficient construction processes may allow for specialised
transport infrastructures adapted to new type of vehicles, even in city centres, such as car
parks and special urban tunnels for electric vehicles that are driven automatically when
travelled across.
76. Specialised Modes. Air and roads will still be the dominant transport modes, Rail is mostly
focused on inter-city fast services for passengers, commuting and dedicated lines for freight
transport connecting larger European ports. As recognised by the European Commission,
there needs to be a focus on strategic, multi-modal “core networks” that can be funded and
will be able to handle the major share of the future growth and transport tasks.
77. Infrastructure Construction. The rapid economic growth in developing economies create a
huge demand for all kind of infrastructure, that also generates more development. At global
level, investment needs across key sectors telecommunications, airports, ports, road, rail,
electricity, oil and gas (transmission and distribution) and water infrastructure – are likely to
total around 2.5% of world GDP over 2010-2030. National frameworks need to highlight the
importance of strategic infrastructure.
78. Transport Planning. Achieving integrated and sustainable urban transport is an increasingly
complex task which touches many stakeholders and interests. A greater coordination of all
authorities having an influence on the transport system is highly desirable but is not likely to
be accomplished. National infrastructure planning remains to a large extent disconnected
from planning at EU level. National and European infrastructure projects have largely focused
on developing individual priority projects rather than on creating a network.
79. Intelligent Vehicles. Electric intelligent transport vehicles, of individual use and collective
property of management will change the way we move in the city. The difference between
private and public transport modes will tend to disappear. Online pricing and traffic
management will make the current divide between scheduled, collective transport and
individual vehicles much smaller. It therefore makes sense that the categories we use today
as “transport modes” may not even be relevant in forty years. Fossil fuel-based vehicles may
likely improve their efficiency 12%, and non-fossil fuel-based vehicles share will rise to 4.5%
in 2020. Thirty years later, these figures may be 39% and 22%, respectively. This trend is
closely related to trends 45 (smart cities), 50 (biofuels) and 102 (urban pollution).
80. Transport Prices With energy prices including sensitive year to year fluctuations due to
speculative and unreliable markets, peaks on energy prices will be an incentive to adapt
consumer behaviours. However, overall transport prices will tend to increase only marginally,
internalising environmental costs, and following deterritorialised patterns. Flows increasingly
permeate political borders. Transport policies do not achieve the goals of liberalisation of
markets, and transport infrastructure follow a mix of nation-building strategies and social and
economic profitability. This trend is closely related to trend 58 (energy prices).

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81. Taxes on oil in 2005 represent roughly 2% of the GDP. In the long term, as oil become less
used in transport, other alternative fiscal revenue generation systems will be needed. A
couple examples of these are online pricing based on the actual use of infrastructure and
transport services, which is more likely to induce demand self-organisation than oil taxes. In a
number of scenarios studied the reduction in public revenue from oil taxation happens very
rapidly. This is as an area of opportunity in political terms, since more effective taxation
systems can be implemented. Regional traffic inside NUTS3 generates 41% of road
emissions in 2005, so a reduction of 50% of urban emissions would yield a 19% reduction in
total direct transport emissions.
82. CO2 emissions. In 2010, transport uses 32% of all final energy consumption in the EU27,
and energy consumption in transport has grown by 33% between 1990 and 2008. The share
of unconventional vehicles (hybrids, electrics…) in the road sector was in 2000 only of 0,5%,
and in 2010 of 4,2%. Transport today accounts for about one fourth of total CO2 emissions
(1050 million tonnes emitted in 2010, 29% above 1990 levels). The higher cost of abating
emissions in the transport sector makes that potential for decarbonisation of transport in the
short term is relatively low. However, the average level of emissions per new vehicle in the
road sector has dropped from 172gr/km in 2000 to 140gr/km in 2010 (19% decrease). This
trend is related to trend 100 (green house gas emissions).
83. Externalities. The number of road fatalities has had a decreasing trend in the last 40 years.
In 1970, the number of deaths in European roads is estimated on around 110.000 deaths per
year. Between 1970 and 2000, the number of fatalities decreased around a 20% per decade
(down to 56.500 deaths in 2000) but between 2000 and 2010 there has been almost a 40%
drop, attaining 35.000 deaths per year level. It is an objective of the EU that the number of
fatalities in the road sector gets reduced by 50% by 2020, and to almost eliminate road
fatalities by 2050.

Land-Uses26
84. Types of Land-uses. The three largest land types in Europe are forests (35%), arable land
and permanent crops (25 %), and pastures and mixed mosaics (17%). About 4% of Europe is
covered by artificial surfaces.
85. Population density. Europe has the highest overall population density (60 inhabitants/km2)
of any continent, but huge disparities in population density exist. Of the total European
population, 73% lives in urban areas, with 67% in southern Europe and 83% in northern
Europe. In 2010, urban population represents 73% of total EU27 population against 69% in
1990 and 55% in 1950.
86. Land occupation. Structure and distribution of transport and urban infrastructure lead to the
fact that 30% percent of EU27 land is highly or very highly fragmented. As a result of
increased fragmentation, 70% of species are threatened by loss of their habitat, an
extraordinarily high proportion. The consumption of ecosystem services, which is
unsustainable in many cases, will continue to grow as a consequence of a likely three- to six-

26
Land uses building blocks have been put together based on ET2050 Land uses Sectoral Report (RIKKS, 2012), and the fol-
lowing forecasts and reports:
 IGEAT et al. (2006) Spatial Scenarios and Orientations in Relation to the ESDP and Cohesion Policy final report of the
ESPON 3.2 Project.
th th
 J.Robert (2010) Synthesis of the 15 CEMAT National Reports, document prepared for the 15 Council of Europe
Conference of Ministers Responsible for Spatial/Regional Planning, CEMAT/CoE
 EEA (2011), The European Environment – State and Outlook 2010 (SOER 2010)

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 fold increase in global GDP by 2050 even while global population growth is expected to slow
down. This trend is closely related to trend 105 (land consumption).
87. Urban Sprawl. After the industrial revolution, the perceptions of cities as “spaces of risk”
prevailed in British and some other European cultures, and the escape to the countryside was
sought by those who could afford it. By contrast, Southern European -Mediterranean-
societies have portrayed cities as spaces of virtue, attraction, culture and creativity, and the
affluent social classes chose to live closer to the historic core. Therefore (according to URBS
PANDENS27). Cultures of urbanism in Southern Europe have created compact cities in
combination with infrastructure-related urban sprawl after long periods of informal
suburbanisation as a means to survival. Cultures of anti-urbanism in North-West Europe
created lifestyle-related urban sprawl. More affluent residents are recently moving to their
second homes in rural areas due to increase of tourist and entertainment industry, traffic
congestion in inner-city areas. State controlled /induced sprawl in Central and Eastern Europe
has deconstructed the compact city/pastoral landscape dualism through the development of
new suburban landscapes, which are usually not only residential after 1990s. The role of
central and new local governments (municipalities, regions) with regards to the sprawling
process varies between and within Central-East and South-East European societies (e.g.
illegal sprawl). This trend is closely related to trend 105 (land consumption).
88. Forest Expansion. An expansion of forest is expected due to a declining agricultural area
and policy incentives at various levels. Decrease of agricultural area is assumed in relation to
to global competition and tighter environmental constraints, and partially also due to
improvements in agriculture productivity. European cropland is expected to decrease by 2080
between 28% to 47% and grasslands between of 6% to 58%.
89. Agricultural Uses. 36% of European land is dedicated to agriculture. Europe is one of the
World’s largest and most productive suppliers of food and fibre (in 2004: 21% of global meat
production and 20% of global cereal production). About 80% of this production occurred in the
EU25. The productivity of European agriculture is generally high, in particular in Western
Europe: average cereal yields in the EU are more than 60% higher than the global average.
Current land-use practices, dominated by concentration and specialisation, and abandonment
of land, both result in landscape polarisation that often leads to a reduction in landscape
diversity and its multi-functionality — its capacity to support multiple uses (Selman, 2009).
Over-specialised lands that optimise one function, such as crop production, at the expense of
others are stable only in a narrow span of conditions and can become more vulnerable to
diseases, climatic extremes, invasive species and other factors (Foley et al., 2005)
90. Environmentally Protected Areas. At the end of 2009, 17,6% of the terrestrial area in EU27
was part of Natura 2000, i.e. around 755.000 km2; further increasing compared to 17% in
2008. Slovenia and Bulgaria are the countries which rank first, with a share of more than 30%
which is around twice the EU average. Spain and Slovakia follow with a share of around 29%.
Spain accounts for more than 19% of the EU’s Natura 2000 terrestrial area, with a surface of
almost 145 000 km2. Compared to 2008, in 2009 Spain, Poland and Germany have the most
significant increase of the Natura 2000 terrestrial area (by adding 10 000 km2, 9 000 km2 and
6 000 km2 respectively), while Romania and Sweden have decreased their own surface of
Natura 2000 protected areas.
91. Hybrid Geographies. Europe has a diverse mix of land-use patterns, from compact cities
and specialised zones around transport nodes, to more disperse urbanisation, for instance
along the Mediterranean coasts, fragmented and specialised developments in a general

27
URBS PANDENS, Urban sprawl: european patterns, environmental degradation and sustainable development, was an EU
funded project developed between 2002 and 2005 by a consortium of 8 institutions leaded by the Potsdam Institute for Climate
Research (PIK). The project was concerned with cross-European patterns of urban sprawl.

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 tendency towards more relaxed land regulations and increasing land occupation, excepts in
countries with strict anti-sprawl regulation. Large parts of Europe become periurban, a
“Middle Landscape” largely composed by fuzzy urban-rural zones, with urban developments
extensions customised to specific residential and/or corporative needs and limited
reurbanisation projects. The trend towards protection of natural habitats will be reinforced
through EU specific regulations, but legal framework regarding land-use mostly remains at
municipal and regional level.
92. Spatial Polarisation. Transport and Communication networks reinforce centrality of global
metropolis. We observe rising number of megalopolis at global level. The number of cities
larger than 1 million inhabitants in Europe has grown from 21 in 1950 to 37 in 2010 (+76%),
but the overall number in the World has increased from 75 in 1950 to 449 in 2010 (+500%).
Patterns of polarisation are extremely diverse at different geographic scales: polycentric
macro-regional systems (Rhine, Randstad…), monocentric national (Paris, London, Vienna,
Madrid), fragmented inner rural zones. By the 2030s, five of the world’s eight billion people
will live in cities.
93. Subverted Proximities, Neighbourhoods become more distant while some remote places
become much closer. Differences on accessibility remains between inner rural areas and
remote regions, especially in the East of Europe, as well as in relation to large cities well
connected to networks. Paradoxically, this tendency increases the value of the territory as
place, not just relative position, and cultural landscape and, in some cases, cross-border
historical zones. The electronic unravelling of traditional imperatives of contiguity may
produce urban rearrangements and may result in random scattering and galloping
decentralisation, of residence, tourism, low added-value industrial or logistic functions, as well
as concentrate highest added value functions in large cities.
94. Settlement Structures. Various settlement systems in Europe are at differing stage of
urbanization – suburbanization – counterurbanization - reurbanisation cycle. Gentrification of
city cores contributed substantially to the reurbanisation phase. Centrifugal migration does
not usually imply an increase in the agricultural activities. Emigrants from cities and towns
often utilise rural space as a place of living, but not work, sometimes they engage in
entrepreneurial activities which are associated with rural areas, such as tourism or localised
traditional production and services. The concentrating and deconcentrating effect of migration
is highly dependent on migrants’ age and therefore life cycle.
95. Metropolitanisation seems to have slowed down in Western, but not in Eastern. Europe in
the 2000s. Bigger cities have performed better than average since 1995. This highlights in
general a process of concentration of wealth in the biggest cities, mainly the first national
cities and especially in Eastern Europe. However this metropolitanisation is mainly to be
observed during the nineties and is slowing down in the years 2000, at least in Western
Europe. The economic growth of cities is embedded in contexts of national regulation and
growth and although some room of manoeuvre exists for cities, national / regional policies
play an important role in determining their economic paths (according to ESPON FOCI).
Increased urbanisation is the growing of agglomerations and metropoles but also the
recomposition of rural settlements resulting from the spread of cities.
96. Gateway Nodes. Large (capitals) cities play an important role as gateways between the
economies of Europe and the rest of the world. Specialised developments emerge clustered
to global transport nodes such as airports (e.g. Aeropolis) and ports (e.g. Logistic Villages…).
97. Rural Depopulation. The development of international migration, globalization of migration
processes and decrease in the costs of travel has resulted in migration flows going from rural
and peripheral areas towards world cities. Emigration from rural and remote areas leads to
adverse effects: depopulation, ageing and deformation of sex structures of affected
populations. Emigration is selective: emigrants are young, better educated and more

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 entrepreneurial than stayers. Demographic deterioration of rural and peripheral areas is one
of the important issues which should shape research agenda on the future organization of
growth, mostly in the areas of high tourist and recreational value. Movements of
“rurbanisation” and “counter-urbanisation” can be important in certain areas (some EU
regions are already showing a constant repopulation of their rural areas).
98. Social Polarisation in cities seems to be a general phenomenon across Europe. Main
factors explaining this evolution are, amongst others, the professionalisation process of the
demand for labour, the reorganisation from a fordist to a flexible regime of regulation inducing
higher fragilisation of at least parts of the work force, socio-demographic trends such as
decomposition of households, the concentration of immigration in cities, general state-level
reforms of welfare regimes and labour markets and increasing real estate prices.
99. Intraregional Disparities. A general trend to increase of disparities between cities and their
hinterland, but individual situations are varied and complex and dependent on regional and
national context.

Environment28
100. Green House Gas emissions. The EU25 had, in 2002, the average greenhouse gas
emissions of 11 tons CO2 per capita. In EU27 greenhouse gases emissions decreased by
14.3% between base year and 2008 (and by 11.3% during 1990-2008). Energy-related GHG
emissions represent 80% of total GHG emissions in the EU27. In the EU27, most GHG
emissions come from the production of electricity and heat, road transportation, fossil fuel
combustion in households and in manufacturing industries, agriculture and the iron and steel
industry. In 2008 the EU-15 countries showing the most significant decrease compared to the
base years are Germany (-22.3%) and United Kingdom (-19.1%), followed by Sweden (-
11.3%) and Belgium (-8.6%). This decline in emissions in 2008 was due largely to lower CO2
emissions from fossil fuel combustion in the energy, industry and transport sectors. This trend
is closely related to trend 82 (transport CO2 emissions).
101. Global Warming. Global warming is well established at a European scale
(+0.41°C/decade for the period 1979 to 2005). However, there is a difference between
Northern Europe and the Mediterranean countries: the trends in temperature and
precipitations are higher in the Northern Europe than in the Mediterranean area. Despite
general reductions in the extent of air pollution in Europe over the last decades, significant
problems still remain with acidification, terrestrial nitrogen deposition, ozone, particulate
matter and heavy metals. Restrictive measures to mitigate these impacts by reducing
greenhouse gas emissions are implemented, like higher fuel, taxes, emission trading
schemes. Targets concerning CO2 emissions will be achieved only in 2050, because of the
combination of low economic growth and more energy efficiency.
102. Urban pollution. The evolution of transport technologies will lead to a less noisy and
pollutant vehicles, with more intelligent traffic management in cities. This will increase the
quality of life in large cities, making them more attractive places to work and live. In 2007
more than 47 million people (i.e. 52% of the population living in agglomerations with more

28
Environment uses building blocks have been put together based on ET2050 Environment Sectoral Report (IGEAT, 2012),
and the following forecasts and reports:
 EC (2009) EU Energy Trends to 2030. Update 2009, European Commission DG Energy in collaboration with DG for
Climate Action and DG for Mobility and Transport; EC (2010) Priorities for 2020 and beyond – a blueprint for an
integrated energy network European Commission DG Energy
 BP (2011) Statistical Review of World Energy 1965-2010, British Petroleum BP

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 than 250,000 inhabitants) were exposed to daily road noise levels exceeding 55 dB Lden (the
lower benchmark for the combined noise indicator). People exposed to daily railway and
airport noise were fewer, but still significant, with respectively nearly 6.5 and 3.7 million
exposed to each. The number of people exposed to levels exceeding 50 dB Lnight (the lower
benchmark for night time noise) to road noise was 33.7 million. This trend is related to trend
79 (intelligent vehicles).
103. Vulnerability. The impact of climate change is projected to include a significant rise in the
level of the world’s oceans together with the melting of glaciers and changes in ocean
currents. Low lying coastal areas could become completely submerged increasing human
vulnerability in other areas. Floods and droughts could affect millions of people leading to
significant movements of migrants, refugees and internally displaced people. With the highest
population density of any continent, the pressure on Environment in Europe is quite high.
73% of the European population lives in urban areas, this affect directly agriculture, which is
one of the world’s largest and most productive in food and fibre. However, Europe should not
expect any significant immigration generated by climate change.
104. Water Stress. There are many pressures on water quality and availability including those
arising from agriculture, industry, urban areas, households and tourism. As GDP per capita
rises, so does water demand and by 2025 two-thirds of the world’s population are expected to
be living in water-stressed regions. A significant part of the problem is the huge and often
deeply inefficient use of water. In addition, throughout many parts of the world, rainfall and
river flows are strongly seasonal, with too much water arriving during monsoon periods
followed by maybe seven or eight months of water scarcity. Of the total withdrawals in
European countries, 32% are for agriculture, 31% for cooling water in power stations, 24% for
the domestic sector and 13% for manufacturing. Freshwater is stable or declining in northern
Europe and growing slowly in southern Europe. Recent floods and droughts have placed
additional stresses on water supplies and infrastructure. This trend is related to trend 46 (food
and water security).
105. Land Consumption. According to recent data, about 3.7% of Europe’s land is covered
by artificial surfaces such as housing and industrial sites; which equals 0.12% of land outside
urban and industrial areas is taken up by transport infrastructures. It has to be outlined that
artificial surfaces such as urban areas and transport infrastructure have expanded by nearly
8% between 1990 and 2006. This trend is closely related to trends 86 (land occupation) and
87 (urban sprawl).
106. Organic Farming. The total organic farming area in EU27 continues to show an upward
trend, and has increased by 7.4% in 2008. In 2008 EU27 had around 7.6 million ha under
organic farming, i.e. around 22% of the total area cultivated organically in the world. EU27
share of organic farming in utilized agricultural area in 2008 was 4.5%, further increasing
compared to 2007 (4.1%). With 15.8% of organic farming, Austria had the highest share in
2008, followed by Sweden (10.8%), Latvia and Czech Republic (around 9%). In 2008 Spain
passed Italy out and has the largest organic area (almost 1.3 million ha, i.e. more than 17% of
total organic farming area in EU27), followed by Italy (almost 1.0 million ha, i.e. 13%) and
Germany (0.9 million, i.e. 12%). Many countries have a minor share of organic farming, of
less than 4% of their utilized agricultural area (Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Hungary,
Poland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Romania and Malta). This trend is related to
trend 46 (food and water security).
107. Ecologically sensitive zones. Grasslands, wetlands and coastal habitats face the
greatest threats, mainly due to the decline of traditional patterns of agriculture, tourism
development and climate change. The abandonment of traditional management practices has
resulted in a loss of biodiversity in some locations whereas in others the shift towards more
intensive agricultural practices is the root of the problem. Bogs, mires and fens require

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 specific hydrological regimes. Dune habitats are under severe pressure throughout the EU
with almost no favourable assessments.
108. Resources Scarcity. Alongside energy, the growth in consumption of many of the
world’s main metals is also on the rise. Between now and 2030 we will consume more
copper, more aluminium and more steel than we have in history. A number of rare metals
increasingly matter in the global economy, not only because they are vital to the production of
advanced electronics equipment – cell phones, batteries, plasma screens – but also because
they are part of the “green technology revolution”, being essentials in the construction of
hybrid cars and wind turbines. Growing territorial conflicts linked to resource and risk
management, for energy, resources and also water, together with emerging cooperative
initiatives (e.g. Baltic, Danube). This trend is closely related to trends 47 (new materials), 59
(peak oil) and 60 (coal reserves).
109. Fish Resources. Despite policies to protect fish, over-fishing has put many fish stocks in
European waters outside sustainable limits (62- 92% of commercial fish stocks in north-
eastern Atlantic, 100% in the western Irish Sea, 75% in the Baltic Sea, and 65-70% in the
Mediterranean). Aquaculture is increasing its share of the European fish market leading to
possible adverse environmental impacts in coastal waters.
110. Biodiversity. Today there are 100.000 nature reserves around the World, covering
approximately 15% of earth’s surface. But the number of known species is shrinking. Forty
percent of all organisms known are threatened with extinction.
111. Natural Disasters. About 90% of all natural disasters in Europe that have occurred since
1980 are directly or indirectly attributable to weather and climate, and about 95% of economic
losses caused by catastrophic events have resulted from these weather and climate-related
disasters. The average number of annual disastrous weather and climate-related events in
Europe and the damage caused by them has increased substantially in recent decades. In
the period 2000-2009 369 natural disasters linked to weather and climate-related events have
been reported. These events have caused more than 1.5 million victims (more than 77.000
deaths and 1.472.601 affected) and economic damage of around US$ 93,8 billion. The most
frequent event are floods (167, i.e. around 50% of total), followed by wind storms (111),
extreme temperatures (84) and droughts (7).
112. Environmental Taxes. The share of environmental taxes in total tax revenue decreased
for the EU27 as a whole during the period considered reaching 6.1% in 2008 (from 6.8% in
2000) while at the same time, the share of taxes on labour also decreased slightly (from
50.1% in 2000 to 50.0% in 2008). However, one can observe that this does not hold in all
Member States and some of them (Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Poland) have increased the
share of environmental taxes while decreasing taxes on labour. The share of environmental
taxes in total taxation varies among the Member States: e.g. in 2008 the share was more than
10% in Denmark, Bulgaria and Malta, while it was less than 6% in Belgium, Germany, Spain,
France, Austria, Italy, Lithuania and Sweden. During the period 2000- 2008 trends were also
different among countries: Romania had the greatest decrease in the share of environmental
taxes (from 11.4% to 6.3%), followed by Malta and Lithuania, while Bulgaria registered the
highest increase (from 7.5% to 10.6%), followed by Estonia and Denmark.

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Governance29
113. European Enlargement. After successive enlargements, the EU territory has nearly
reached continental size, but there is a growing adverse perception of new Enlargements.
None of the 12 countries joining the EU in 2004 and 2007 reaches the average EU GDP.
114. European Crisis Management. Weak and slow decision-making processes at EU level
has been especially notorious in the several crisis events over the last decades (e.g. Balkans
war in the 90s, Subprime crisis in 2008). The heterogeneity in relation to the size of countries
in Europe (6 countries account for 70% of the total GDP on EU27) is not considered into the
structure of the decision-making processes.
115. Multi-speed Governance Europe evolutes towards a “Multi-speed” governance, based
on the Open Coordination Method, with countries retaining much of their power. The more
adaptative countries and regions are able to move on quickly than others which stay as
laggards. Rising populism at National level.
116. Fragmented Government. The 2008 crisis has demonstrated the lack of reliability of
official European statistics. The public debt in Greece raised from 3,7% to 12,7% (once
official figures were corrected), then 15,4% in October 2010. European institutions failed to
act together in a short enough period of time, making the debt crisis in the euro zone affecting
also Portugal. Even though the public debt in Japan and USA is higher than in Europe, the
interest rates paid by European countries are much higher due to the fragmentation of the
debt nationally, and the lack of credibility of some countries. The austerity policies imposed to
Southern European countries, largely due to the poor management of their governments,
reducing public investments, cutting social programmes, while keeping strong the euro and
low levels of inflation, reinforced their dramatic situation. Investors just leave the euro zone, at
the end.
117. Corporative Government. Increasing importance of large corporations and Public
Private Partnership in public policies. Public sector still represents 40% of the economies.
The public debt of most countries remains above 50% of GDP. Limited capacity to streamline
public institutions. Social expenditure represents 50% of public budgets (3,5% GDP).
Investments on infrastructure represents 1% GDP and R&D 2% GDP. Increasing financial
problems in European countries on public services related to social expenditures.
118. Territorial Governance. International cooperation between institutions of different scales
and sectors remain difficult. Little integration and coherence leading to inefficiencies. Multi-
level Cooperation remains relatively low at BSR and Danube. Regional tensions (e.g.
Scotland, Flanders, Basque Country, Catalonia, Corse, North of Italy…) remain unsolved.
Countries remain the dominant players at European levels, with cities and regions playing
more important roles at global level. Internally, the European Union promotes not only
economic and social cohesion but also territorial cohesion.
119. European Political reforms. European institution budget remains at 1% GDP coming
from National transfers. The EU aims to ensure a more balanced development of economic
activity across all of its regions including urban and rural areas, islands and peripheral
regions. In particular, the Commission intends to pay more attention to urban areas, and to
increase the involvement of local and regional authorities in operational programmes. A major

29
Governance building blocks have been put together based on ET2050 Governance Sectoral Report (Nordregio, 2012), and
the following reports
 EC (2011) EU Budget 2010. Financial Report, Publications Office of the European Union
 EC (2009) Community Expenditure 1958-2008 by heading, annex II of EU Budget 2008. Financial Report, Publications
Office of the European Union, pp77-83
 P. Butzen, E. De Prest and H. Geeroms (2006); Notable trends in the EU budget, Economic Review, 2006 issue II, pp
49-67

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 challenge ahead will therefore be the capacity of European governments at all levels to carry
out the necessary structural changes, such as the opening of transport markets, pricing,
education and training, in order to achieve potential productivity gains from technological
innovation. No ambitious reforms carried out at European level yet, just some quick fixes to
prevent the whole building to collapse. Some policies in the agenda, fiscal harmonisation and
investment criteria to be adopted at European level.
120. Neighbouring Countries. European economy will remain open. FDI will remain at the
present level. Direct investments of European companies in Neighbouring countries will tend
to increase in the future, both in Arab countries (specially in Morocco), as well as in former
USSR republics, from industrial plants, logistic centres or energy-related facilities to tourism.
The level of economic integration with Neighbouring countries will tend to be reinforced to
assure these increasing investments.
121. World Governance. In 1900, Europe (excluding Russia) accounted for roughly 40% of
global economic product; 100 years later it produced less than 25% of global output. Although
in all probability the European Union will remain intact as an organization and will continue to
play a role in the global governance, its position is increasingly weak, challenged as it will be
by the need to find a compromise between the different member states on foreign and global
policy issues.
122. EU Budget Size. The European Union budget has a number of specific characteristics
which make it different from the budgets of the Member States: in principle, it must never be
in deficit, and there is a special decision-making procedure to determine it. The structure and
maximum expenditure of the budget are specified for 7-year periods in the Financial
Perspective. Current period is 2007-2013 has an overall budget of €864,3 billion. With a
yearly budget of around €120 billion (1% of the aggregated Member States GDP), if the EU
were a country it would be placed between Finland and Greece in terms of the size of its
expenditure. As a reference, Germany’s budget (expenditures) for 2010 was of €1.186 billion
and France’s €1.068 billion, and the US budget for 2011 was to €2.692,0 billion ($3.599,0
billion).
123. Main EU Expenditures. The main items of the budget are the CAP and the regional
policy. In the 2007-2013 period the agricultural, rural development and fisheries expenditure
account for 42% of EU budget (Preservation and management of natural resources fund30),
while the competitiveness and cohesion funds account for 45% of the budget (Sustainable
growth fund31). The foreign policy represents some 6% of the budget, while the administrative
body costs an additional 6%. The importance of the Common Agricultural Policy, historically
the largest EU expenditure item, is steadily diminishing in favour of expenditure on cohesion
policy. However, opinions differ on the contribution made by the cohesion policy towards
income convergence between regions in the EU.
124. Budget Trends 1957-2020. Under the Treaty of Rome the budget was to be made up of
contributions from Member States. In the 1970s, as new competences were acquired by the
EU, a new budget model was created with the EU having its own resources based on
Member States' sales, agricultural and customs taxes. This change made budget much more
important. In the 1980s, the EU budget continued to grow rapidly, with the CAP and payments
to poorer member countries like Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece being particularly
expensive. The late 1980s brought period budget agreements for increased budgetary
stability. After Delors reform it was 1989-1993 (five years), 1994-1999 (six years), 2000-2006

30
Includes among others the Agricultural markets fund (43.500M€ yearly), the rural development fund (11.500M€ yearly).
31
Includes among others the structural funds (21.700M€ yearly) and Cohesion Fund (7.960M€ yearly), Regional Competitive-
ness fund (6.750M€ yearly), 7FP (6.500M€ yearly), Lifelong learning program (1.100M€ yearly), TEN program (850M€ yearly),
Energy projects to aid economic recovery program (700M€ yearly), Galileo program (450M€ yearly)

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 (seven), 2007-2013 (seven) and 2014-2020(seven) Negotiations for the 2014-2020 are
underway, with the Commission proposing an overall increase of 5% on the previous budget,
despite the requests of some member states including the UK, Germany and France, for the
budget to be frozen.
125. The Balance of Payments has been a traditional source of controversy (e.g. since 1984
the UK has a rebate on payments on the basis of scale of contribution to the EU budget and
level of returns). Currently, the largest net donator to the EU budget is Germany with €8,9
billion yearly, while Poland is the largest receiver with €8,5 billion. Overall, 9 countries would
be net donators (Germany, UK, France, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, Austria, Denmark and
Finland) in 2010. The largest net donator per capita is Sweden, with almost 125 euros per
inhabitant and year, while the largest net receiver per capita is Luxembourg, with more than
2.500 euros per inhabitant and year.

3.3 Analysis by territories

Next table presents the list of macro-regions considered just for the purpose of covering the
whole area of study:

Trans-national macro-region
North West Region (Ireland, UK, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg)

Baltic and Northern Peripheries Region (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Lithuania,
Latvia, Estonia) with extensions to the Arctic and Barents area (Baltic Russia)

Central and Alpine Region (Germany. Austria, Switzerland)

Danube Region (Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania) with extensions to
Moldova, southern Ukraine

Eastern Europe (Poland) with extensions to Belarus and northern Ukraine

West Mediterranean Region (Spain, Portugal) with extensions to Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria,
Tunisia)
Central Mediterranean Region (Italy, Slovenia, Malta) with extensions to some Mashrek countries
(Libya, Egypt)
East Mediterranean Region (Greece, Cyprus, Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia
and Herzegovina) with extensions to (Turkey, Armenia, Georgia, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel,
Palestinian territories);

Outermost regions (Canarias, Madeira, Açores…)

Figure 3-4 Macro-regions considered by ET2050

North West Region32

 Demography. The changes in population in Europe can be summarised under the notion
of the ‘Ageing of Europe’. The process of ageing is the result of three parallel trends: a fall
in fertility rates, a fall in mortality rate and an increase in longevity. Freedom of movement
within the EU has meant large-scale intra-European migration, largely for economic

32
This chapter is based on ET2050 North-West Region Report (IGEAT, 2012). The North-west region is integrated by the fol-
lowing countries: Ireland, UK, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg

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 reasons. The main migratory flows are from periphery to core, and from East to West. It is
clear that population is increasing in most areas of NWE. In Ireland, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, most of Belgium, Central England, West and South Germany, and parts of
Southern England, West and Central France, population is increasing because of both
positive natural population growth and a positive migratory balance. Although population
decline is mainly concentrated in Southern and Eastern Europe and the Nordic countries,
there are pockets of population decline in NWE, too, such as most of Scotland, Wales
and North East England, together with parts of Central and Eastern France. The areas
least affected by the demographic challenges in NWE are large metropolitan areas such
as Paris and London, a region stretching from South East England via the Netherlands to
northern Germany, all of the island of Ireland, some parts of Southern Germany, Northern
Switzerland and Alsace.
 Economy. Looking at the Lisbon criteria of a tertiary, knowledge-based economy relying
on urban economic centres, it appears that the highest competitiveness levels are located
in the main metropolitan and industrial centres. In NWE, a group of core regions (South
West Germany, South East England, Paris, Luxemburg, Brussels, Southern Netherlands)
achieved the highest Lisbon performance levels. There are also relatively high levels in
much of the rest of the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands and Belgium
 Territorial patterns. High population densities concentrated in highly urbanized areas.
NWE hosts a large number of “functional urban areas”, especially two Global Cities (Paris
and London), several “Metropolitan European Growth Areas” (MEGAs – i.e. Dublin,
Geneva, Manchester or Lyon) both of a strategic importance in the wider European and
global context. It is also the host of the “European Engines” (Brussels, Amsterdam) and of
potential MEGAs (Glasgow, Edinburgh, Birmingham, Lille, Antwerpen, Rotterdam,
Luxembourg). Such an urban concentration draws a core-periphery pattern of relationship
between low population densities in rural areas at the fringe and high densities in the
urban core. Such high urban densities involve also a pressure on rural land with the
intensification of agriculture in the surrounding zones of the urban cores, with substantial
impact on the environment, but also an extension of housing pressure due to the
metropolitan growth.
 Transport. Due to the existence of a dense motorway network, a well developed network
of inland waterways, the concentration of major European seaports, a highly developed
high speed train network and the largest airport hubs in Europe, the overall level of
accessibility of NWE is high, but not universal across zone. Many of the most accessible
regions of NWE constitute a relatively compact zone crossing Belgium, Luxembourg, the
regions of Western Germany, of the Mid-South of the Netherlands, of North-Western
France, including Paris and of the South-East of England, including London. The more
peripheral parts of the NWE area (i.e. Ireland, Scotland and especially the Highlands &
Islands, West of England & Wales) are characterized by a comparatively lower
endowment with transport infrastructures by road & by rail. However, this slightly
improves once accessibility by air is considered, especially with the low cost airlines
companies privileging cheapest peripheral airports.
 Land-Uses. One of the key transnational issues with regard to settlement patterns in
NWE is the tension between the opposing trends of polycentrism and monocentrism of
population and economic activities. At the macro level, NWE is home to a significant part
of the ‘pentagon’ (an area delineated by metropolises of London, Paris, Frankfurt, Milan
and Hamburg). At the meso level, the strong economic growth of NWE has not been
experienced universally, and great disparities exist both within the core and between the
core and periphery. At the micro-scale, urban-rural interdependencies are increasing,
partly as a result of the spatial deconcentration of economic activities and the expansion

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 of city hinterlands. Achieving balanced regional development requires a strong regional
integration of functional urban areas and their surroundings.
 Environment. There is a clear north-south split in terms of the impact of climate change,
with NWE faring better than southern Europe. Nevertheless, there is a small increase in
drought potential in the western and eastern borders of France, Belgium, Luxembourg,
South of the Netherlands and parts of the southern Rhine Valley in Germany. There is
also an increased potential for flood hazards in much of West and South Germany and in
some parts of central England. In terms of natural hazards, NWE shows vulnerability to
winter storms. Western and Southern Germany and Northern Switzerland have the
highest indicator values for flood events. In relation to the risk of radioactive
contamination, cities and regions in the vicinity of nuclear power plants, such as North
West of France show a higher degree of exposure. The greatest number of flood events
has occurred in South West Germany, while there have also been frequent flooding in
other parts of West and South Germany, South Belgium, East France, and Central and
South England and Wales. River flooding occurrence is generally very low in the
periphery of NWE. The major pollution causes in NWE are power generation, industry,
waste disposal, transport, agriculture, and households. Hence, levels of pollution are
highest in the core areas where the greatest concentrations of industrial and urban
development exist. Most of the areas with the highest rates of fragmented semi-natural
areas in Europe are to be found in NWE. The most extreme fragmentation in NWE is in
coastal or river zones, particularly in the coastal regions bordering English Channel and
south of North Sea (i.e. South and Central England, North France, North and Central
Belgium and the Netherlands), as well as in Ireland. The least fragmentation is generally
found in mountainous areas, which in NWE is mostly limited to North and West Scotland
 Governance. National policies (National Strategic Plans for the coming decades) share
common values and planning principles: it is broadly assumed that a socio-economic
balanced territorial development should be implemented on sustainable economic, social
and environmental basis. Transport efficiency as well as access to housing, an accurate
management of environmental issues such as resource depletion and CO2 emissions
appear as crucial targets for all NWE countries.

Strengths Weaknesses (Structural unbalances)

Population increase in most areas Ageing population
Highest competitiveness levels regarding the Lisbon criteria Economic concentration and specialization
Excellent overall transport accessibility Core-periphery territorial structure
Shared Governance Values Low regional accessibility in inner peripheries
Most fragmented semi-natural area in Europe
Opportunities Threats
Achieving a balanced regional development with a strong Increasing pressure on rural hinterland: risks for
regional integration of functional urban areas environment and agriculture productivity
Development of low carbon and sustainable urban Environmental and industrial hazards (flood, drought, winter
economies storm, radioactive contamination)
Diminishing the pressure on rural hinterland Lack of cross-country integration and territorial policies
Reinforcing the coordination of national development Lack of urban-rural integration
strategies with stronger and better integrated territorial Lack of balanced regional development
policies

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Baltic and Northern Peripheries Region33
 Demography. Many areas in the Region, especially in rural surroundings are suffering on
population decline and demographic thinning out. Decline in population is not affecting
only to total number of people but also to age structure; i.e. in the rural areas primarily
young and well educated inhabitants are out-migrating. Thus many regions will
increasingly suffer from a shrinking potential labour force (i.e. less people in working age)
as well as from a greying population (i.e. more people of pension age) whereas in the
largest cities the migration processes contribute to a comparatively good labour market
situation. Although aging has become an issue of common concern in the Region, it is
also possible to identify a relatively high birth rate trend in the north-western part of the
Region. In terms of migration, three main types of flows can be identified: from rural to
local/regional urban centres, from smaller towns to metropolitan cities and across national
boundaries. The intraregional transnational migration flows are mainly from the East to
the West. I.e. 25% of all international migration on average in Norden occurs within the
Nordic countries and in addition 10% of the Nordic migratory flow is to/from Balticum and
Poland.
 Economy. There are large disparities in the status of socio-economic development
between western and eastern countries, as well as lagging behind development of rural
areas in some parts of the region. Disparities in GDP per capita, for instance, are
amongst the highest in the EU. The Western part has a GDP/capita equal to 122% of the
EU27 average, whereas the GDP/capita in the Eastern part is only 52.6% of the EU
average (European Commission 2010b). Anyhow, prior to the onset of the economic and
financial crisis, real GDP growth was above the EU. Thus the east-west division has been
partly eroded.
 Territorial patterns. Three main territorial divides can be found. The north-south divide
results from diversified climate conditions and settlement pattern of densely populated
southern parts and sparse north in the Region. In the Southern part of the Region there
are plenty of densely populated small municipalities. Many of these small municipalities
have good commuting possibilities as a part of dense urban network like in Denmark and
Southern Sweden or otherwise good connections to regular but looser system of cities. In
the sparsely populated north the population is nonetheless extensively centralized to a
number of isolated towns where majority of the population live heavily concentrated. And
because of the long distances it can be challenging to reach a sufficient number of people
within daily commuting range to run public and private services cost-efficiently and to
establish a well-functioning labour market. The east-west divide reflects differences in
several socio-economic development aspects. In economic term this regional divide is
one of the sharpest in continental Europe. The urban-rural divide is on the one hand
related to partly striking differences between the metropolitan areas and hinterlands
where the rural areas are struggling with population ageing and outward migration.
Additionally, some remote territories with low accessibility suffer from a deficit of
affordable and modern ICT connections.
 Knowledge-base. Many of the countries are relatively small in economic terms and are
thus often simply unable to compete on a par with the major European economies
although well-educated population and considerable R&D capacity is a high potential for
knowledge-based development. Some Nordic regions are among the regions in the EU
with the highest share of GDP spent on R&D (European Commission 2010b). That fact in

33
This chapter is based on ET2050 Baltic and Northern Peripheries Report (Nordregio, 2012). The Baltic and Northern Periph-
eries region is integrated by the following countries: Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia with
extensions to the Arctic and Barents area (Baltic Russia)

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 combination to high qualified labour force sites that the competitiveness of the Region is
today strong and the Region has good preconditions for coping with the challenges of
globalization.
 Energy: Large oil and gas reserves (Norway, Russia) as well as significant use of
renewable energy sources, mostly hydropower, are of importance for regions energy
balance and for ensure energy security. The region is anyhow increasing reliance on
nuclear energy. Half of the region is dependent on energy imports and thus the
importance of developing integrated energy networks and markets are crucial.
 Transport. The location at the periphery of Europe and thus remote from the main
markets set challenges related to accessibility and logistics costs due to distances,
topographic and climatic reasons. For the region the good transport connections of both
persons and goods is particularly important as the regional economies are dependent on
exports. The region has high potential to absorb future transport growth through maritime
services and thus increase the overall accessibility. The main challenge with regard to the
future transport development in the Region is to reduce its remoteness by improving links
within the region and to the rest of the EU i.e. by extending the TEN-T network. A number
of initiatives have been proposed to develop transport connection both to/from and within
the region in order to support the industries better. This includes north-south connections
as well as east-west and transversal transportation networks, both within the Region and
from the region. Opportunity is related to gateway function of the Region in serving
especially flows to and from Russia and the Far East market. The Baltic Sea is one of the
maritime areas with the densest traffic in the world. Seaports act as key transit point for
the export and import of natural resources, manufactured goods and high added-value
goods.
 Land Uses. The Region is rich in natural resources that work as a basis for the prosperity
in the Region. Southern part of the region has good agricultural possibilities whereas
forestry is an important industry in the northern part. Minerals and metals found mostly in
the Fennoscandian Shield are unique regional resources in a European context.
 Environment. In the Arctic and Atlantic parts of the region global climate change and
possible increase both in transport flows and offshore energy production can be potential
risks. Increasing temperatures will potentially have fundamental impacts to fragile and
vulnerable marine and terrestrial ecosystems as to traditional livelihoods in the regions
with limited adaptation capacity. Increasing use of resources is mostly an environmental
challenge or hazard as management of possible oil spills or other accidents would be very
challenging due to distances and harsh weather conditions, both ice and storms.
 Governance. Regarding the border regions, the countries in the region share both
internal and external EU boundaries with and without EFTA agreement. Even there are
multiple cross-border cooperation programmes and initiatives; the existence of the
boundaries sets some limitations both for territorial cooperation, competitiveness and
cohesion of the region but also to i.e. provision of services. Also the lack of some
boundaries in the maritime areas set some extra challenges.

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 Strengths Weaknesses (Structural unbalances)
Well-educated population and considerable R&D capacity Large disparities in the status of socio-economic
High IC T usage in some parts of the Region (top leading development between W-Region and E-Region
countries) Insufficient use of innovation potential
Relatively high quality of environment (including vast Peripheral geographical location to important economic
forest areas) centres
High potential and know-how for production of renewable Poor accessibility (of some parts of the region)
energy Environmental state of the Baltic Sea
Well-established forum for regional co-operation Monocentric settlement pattern

Opportunities Threats
Making use of the vast innovation potential Increasing regional disparities inside the countries in the
Future transport growth through maritime services Region
More and more widely used e-government practices High potential for cross-border customs fraud and
smuggling of excisable products
Environmental problems associated with the growth in
both road and sea transport
Natural hazards such as rising sea level, flooding, etc.
High vulnerability to technological hazards (e.g. oil spills)
due to fragile ecosystem
Disadvantageous demographic processes

Central and Alpine Region

 Demography. Looking at natural population development, most regions in Austria, except
the regions of the Vienna agglomeration, have had rather positive figures. However, most
regions in Germany have a negative natural population development. Since the
unification, the new German Länder are characterised by continuously negative net
migration rates, the only exception are the regions around Berlin benefitting from
suburbanisation processes. Net outmigration at lower rates is also the dominant trend in
several rural areas in other parts of the macro region. Accordingly, total regional
population change is very different in different parts of the region. On the one hand, there
are clusters of regions in most of Switzerland, Austria and Southern Germany plus a few
metropolitan hot spots (Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen, Cologne) that had clear population
increase during the last decade. On the contrary, there is a massive population loss in
most parts of the new German Länder that is also expected to be the dominant trend in
future. Population loss is also the dominant trend in several, but not all, rural areas of the
macro and in some old industrialised areas in Germany. The aging of population is a
concern in all three countries, however, due to the different natural and population
developments regions are affected differently.
 Economy. The economic performance within the macro region is highly disparate.
Whereas on the one hand, some regions in Germany and Switzerland have the highest
GDP per capita in Western Europe, the regions of the new German Länder perform
clearly below EU average: However, this low performance is still much higher than those
of most regions in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, growth rates during the last
decade were higher in the new German Länder than in most other parts of the macro
region. Surprisingly, the educational level of the macro region is not as high as expected.
Germany and Austria are only about European average in terms of population with
tertiary education, however, disparities within the countries are comparable low. Many
indicators for advanced economies such as R&D expenditure, patent application, high-
tech employment, labour productivity show great disparities in the macro region with
some parts belonging to the leading regions in Europe and other clearly behind. Similar
pattern apply to unemployment rates. Switzerland, Austria and the southern parts of
Germany have lowest rates in Europe, whereas the new German Länder are belonging to
the worst performing regions in Europe. Notable, German's regions are almost the only

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 regions in Europe that have a decrease in the unemployment rates during the past years
of the economic crises.
 Territorial patterns. The territorial pattern in the macro region is very heterogeneous in
any respect. The macro region accommodates many types of European landscapes
ranging from coastal zones, flat lands via low mountain ranges to the Alpine mountains.
There are several high-density large metropolitan areas functioning as the economic
cores of the macro region. The other end is marked by low density rural areas in the Alps
or particularly in the north-east of Germany, the latter being affected by a low economic
base, high unemployment rates and outmigration. The overall spatial pattern is the
increase of importance of the metropolitan areas in terms of population development,
which is only partly accompanied by increase of jobs. In Germany, population increase in
the core cities of the agglomerations was often higher than in the suburban areas.
 Energy. Traditional energy resources are limited in the macro region. The extraction of
the sole relevant energy resource in Germany, coal, is almost abandoned due to non-
competitive extraction costs. In consequence, coal fired power plants are importing coal
from worldwide sources. Energy production is based on a mix of coal and gas (about 60
percent in Germany), nuclear power (about 20 percent in Germany) and renewable
energies. Wind energy potential is high in the middle and northern parts of Germany, but
low in the southern parts of the macro region. However, this is compensated by a reverse
spatial pattern of solar energy potential. However, the share of renewable energy in
energy consumption is partly high in the macro region with Austria leading with almost 30
percent of energy consumption from renewable energies with an importance of hydro
power; whereas Germany's share is about fifteen percent.
 Transport. There have been huge investments in the road network of the macro region
during the past decades that led to the densest network in Europe and contributed to the
high share of road transport in modal split of passenger travel. In particular in Germany,
many parts of the road network are highly congested due to an overlap of daily commuter
traffic and long distance freight transport. The rail network has been particularly improved
by investments in high-speed rail, new Alpine crossings and logistic centres. Accessibility
by road and rail belongs in some regions, particularly in the western parts of the macro
region to the highest in Europe. Due to the distribution of international airports across
Germany and the two capital airports in Switzerland and Austria, the share of regions with
good accessibility by air is much higher than in other parts of Europe.
 Environment. Greenhouse gas emissions have been clearly reduced during the last
decades so that the modest Europe 2020 targets will be or are already reached but
currently no targets that are more demanding. Share of protected Natura 2000 areas is
high in several Alpine regions as well as in some parts of the low mountain range and
coastal and low density flatland areas in the new German Länder.
 Governance. The countries of the macro region have developed a highly complex
political decision system following the principles of subsidiarity. Decision and
implementation power for spatial development is to a large degree in the hand of the
middle political level (Länder or Kantone) or even below. On the other hand, decisions at
European policy level have become more and more important for the development of the
regions. For regional development, ERDF and Cohesion Fund spending are of particular
importance in the new German Länder resulting in up to twenty percent of public
investment there..

Strengths Weaknesses (Structural unbalances)

Dominant role of metropolitan areas High unemployment in parts of the macro region
Polycentric urban system Huge spatial disparities

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 Strong economic performance Dominance of road transport
Many features of advanced economies Rather unbalanced accessibility pattern
Diversity of regions and landscapes
High quality and density of transport infrastructure
Balanced governance systems
Opportunities Threats
Attractivity for foreign labour force Depopulation of some rural areas
Transformation to green economic structures Aging of population
Potentials for sustainable transport Maintenance of services of general interest
Potential for renewable energy production Continuation of land consumption for settlements
Import dependency for traditional energy resources

Danube Region34
 Demography. The Danubian macro-region has 59 million inhabitants. The Danube region
is the only macro-region in the EU where the population is not increasing but decreasing.
Between 2001 and 2011 the population of the macro-region decreased by 2 million
people from 61 million to 59 million. The decrease has both natural and migratory
reasons. Natural reasons because the number of children born is low and the death rate
of adult men is high (alcoholism and smoking is also high.) Intensive international
migration is a relatively new phenomenon in the Danubian region. In the “socialist” priod
the countries of the region were – with the exception of the former Yugoslavia - strictly
isolated from each other and from western countries. Migration to other EU countries
started immediately after EU accession when the official obstacles were removed. The
target countries of migration were determined by linguistic and historic affinities:
Romanians went to Italy, Spain and France. Slavic migrants went to England, to Germany
and to Northern Europe, Hungarians went to Austria and – in absence of language
knowledge - remained at home. Apart from the most densely populated urban areas
(Bucharest is an extremely densely populated city with 8,000 inhabitants per square
kilometre) the region’s average population density is 100 per square kilometre. The most
sparsely populated areas are the Western region of Romania and the central parts of
Romania and the majority of Serbian regions. Burgenland is also a sparsely populated
region. In ageing population, regional level data are showing great differences. Several
economically advanced regions have ageing population (Austria, Central-Hungary, West-
Transdanubia and some of the neighbourhood of Bucharest). In the majority of regions in
Danube macro-region the ratio of young generation overweighs the old-aged one. This is
extremely true in all the Polish regions, and in the central and northern regions of
Romania.
 Economy. All the countries of the Danubian Macro-region are less developed than the
EU average. But a catching-up process can be observed in all countries. • Especially
the catch-up of Slovakia is remarkable. The Danubian macro-region is remarkable also
for the disparities within the region. The poorest region of the EU where the GDP per
capita is less than 30 percent of the EU average are here (Sevarozapaden and Severen
tsentralen in Bulgaria, Nord-Est in Romania). On the other hand, all capital city regions
(Praha, Közép-Magyarország, Zahodna Slovenija, Bratislavsky kraj, Bucuresti-Ilfov) have
higher per capita GDP than the EU average, in the case of Prague and Bratislava the
double of the average).

Per capita GDP as percentage of the EU average

34
This chapter is based on ET2050 Danube Region Report (HAS RCERS, 2012). The Danube region is integrated by the fol-
lowing countries: Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania with extensions to Moldova, southern Ukraine

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 1995 2000 2005 2011
EU 100 100 100 100
Bulgaria 32 27 37 45
Czech Rep. 77 71 79 80
Croatia 46 50 57 61
Hungary 51 54 63 66
Romania 33 26 35 49
Slovakia 47 50 60 73

Rising unemployment is a serious problem especially for young people: in some countries
youth unemployment rate may go as high as 40%. It is low-educated or professionally
unskilled people who are the most badly hit by unemployment. East Central Europe has a
growing tendency of youth unemployment but there are significant differences in this
aspect among the member regions of the macro-region. However, the Czech Republic
and Austria have low rate of youth unemployment. In these post-socialist countries the
shutdown of big industrial plants and the collapse of agricultural cooperatives have
resulted in a massive dismissal of employment surplus. On the demand side the following
factors were increasing the ratio of unemployment: tensions in industrial structure, the
shrinking size of internal markets, the transformation of firms, the new proprietary
structure and privatization of firms. A specific challenge for the Danube region is the fate
of the Roma population. 5 million Roma live in the Danubian Region, more than half of the
World’s Roma population. They were always poorer than the other groups of the
population but their problems became acute after the change of the economic and
political system in the Danubian Region in 1990. Before this change Roma people have
found employment in the agricultural co-operatives, in the nationalized industry and in the
building sector. After the change, there was no agricultural co-operatives, nationalized
industry and even building industry employed less people than earlier. Roma people are
in very critical situation. The EU and the member states prepared in 2009 a Roma
strategy for the EU and for the member states but the time was not enough to achieve
decisive results.
 Territorial patterns. Convergence processes have been favourable for the whole
Danube region, but they have been most beneficial for capital cities. It means that the
overwhelming part of GDP is produced in the capital-city-regions (in Bulgaria 48%, in
Hungary 48%, in Slovakia 60%, in Croatia 47%). The sharp dividing line between German
and Austrian, as well as post-socialist space persists, while a rearrangement of
development rankings is taking place within the study area itself. Even accounting for
differences in the level of data aggregation, the unambiguous winners of the process are
capital regions, exploiting their role as metropolitan growth areas (in ESPON terminology,
MEGAs). All of these regions have improved their relative positions, while a decline in
relative development level has taken place in a number of non-central regions with a
strong industrial character. No region outside capital regions has experienced a
significant improvement in development ranking. This process highlights the heavily
metropolitan character of high-technology manufacturing and knowledge-intensive high-
technology services, as well as the functions of economic, financial and political control,
where the higher tiers of the globally organised urban network predominate, and the
competitive positions of functional urban areas (FUAs) lacking a critical mass are much
less advantageous. The location of industry shows the strengthening position of a
manufacturing integration zone stretching from the Vienna–Budapest corridor to south-
western Poland, with strengthening linkages to Western European industrial networks,
predominantly automotive industry. The development of supply networks and
clusterisation processes follow the spatial structures of individual economic branches.
The clusters of high-technology manufacturing and knowledge-intensive high-technology
services follow the hierarchy of the urban network, with strong metropolitan concentration
and the relevance of technology- and natural sciences-oriented universities. The favoured

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 spaces of clusterisation lie in western border regions, with gradual expansion along main
transport corridors. The Danube has become the axis of urbanisation; commercial-
industrial activities related to the river have contributed to a strong concentration of
population on the upper and middle sections of the Danube. From the standpoint of the
urban network, the middle section of the Danube has become a true axis of urbanisation
(Linz–Vienna–Bratislava–Budapest), which has now extended to the South-East –
towards Novi Sad and Belgrade. The lower section of the river is more sparsely populated
and rural in nature. Urban system of Central Europe will be characterised by a number of
specific features during the coming decades: a polycentric macroregional urban system
constituted by monocentric national urban systems and a fragmented rural network, a
high level of industrial employment in cities compared with European core regions, a high
concentration of companies of international and national importance in capital cities, the
weakness of the urban bourgeoisie and civil society outside Germany and Austria, an
increase in poverty and in degenerating social strata, the poor condition of the built
heritage and the slow disappearance of infrastructural weaknesses.
 Energy. The European Union is determined to increase energy security, diversification of
the purchase, to avoid one-sided dependency. Important energy transport infrastructures
cross the macro region: South Stream, large capacity gas pipeline that bypasses Ukraine
and the EU so that the region is freed of the threat of Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes;
The Nabucco gas pipeline system diversifies the sources of supply (Azerbaijan, Iraq,
Turkmenistan and possibly Egypt), thereby it reduces the dependence of the EU on
Russian gas. However, the number of participants of the project and the direction of the
pipeline became uncertain by May 2012. From 2020, the region’s nuclear power plants
will deliver electricity supply to Germany as well having closed down its similar facilities.
 Transport. Mono centrism, centred in capital cities, became natural in structuring the
long-distance highway/ motorway network and rail network in the 20th century –
degrading decentralization and regional development efforts drafted in the documents of
the various political systems following each other. Nevertheless, in the last 15 years a
considerable network of motorways had been constructed in the region, especially in
Croatia, Hungary, and Slovakia and in the Czech Republic. Unfortunately, transport on
the Danube is significantly less than 20 years ago. During the war in the former
Yugoslavia important bridges on the Danube were destroyed and traffic was stopped.
After the war the bridges were rebuilt but traffic remained very small.
 Land-use is expected to move towards stronger urbanisation in selected urban areas
(capital cities and cities with good growth prospects), especially in the Western Balkans,
where urban sprawl has already been observable, and metropolitanisation is proceeding
at a brisk pace. Suburban growth is comparatively limited at the moment. The continuing
relevance of home ownership in these states (partially in the absence of a strong rental
market) will be an important factor in the process. Urban planning is currently unprepared
to manage these processes, and fundamental changes are unlikely, or expected to be
slow.
Rural areas undergo the loss of population and sometimes a reduction in land-use
intensity, especially in distant (mountainous) areas, with potentially accelerating instances
of the complete abandonment of settlements due to depopulation, but gain relevance as
second homes in attractive locales and suburban growth areas in the proximity of
developing agglomerations. Unlike Western Europe, selected rural areas undergo a form
of ghettoisation due to the increasing concentration of disadvantaged groups.
Roadway networks will be one of the influential forces in land-use development. While
transport networks are essentially “finished” in Western Europe, and well-developed in
specific countries on the southern periphery, even the main transport axes can be missing

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 in CEE. Balkans countries, especially, are affected by a low motorway density, and will
encourage the development of these networks even if they fall out of favour in Western
European policy.
Another factor shaping rural land-use patterns is EU policies encouraging specific forms
of usage (energy, forestation, recreational and reserve areas). National policies also play
a part, e.g. Hungary, where forest management and reserve areas have traditionally
enjoyed strong attention. Forestation and reforestation are both trends which can be
expected to continue, coupled with the reclamation of agricultural land. Market conditions
and public policies will both shape the emerging configuration of land-use.
A specific issue of the Danube region concerns river management and flood control, as
along the length of the Danube, Drava (the Hungarian–Croatian border river), and
especially the Tisza in Hungary, flooding is commonplace and the area of land where
flood prevention is required is larger than the equivalent in the Netherlands. An added
issue is the cross-border nature of flood control, as some relevant rivers are border rivers,
or cross several countries – the Danube first and foremost. This area has been, and is
expected to remain a key area of cooperation, including non-EU countries, i.e. Ukraine–
Romania–Hungary. It is possible that with changing land-use patterns and the increasing
importance of conservation, initiatives towards the partial re-flooding of selected areas
and the expansion of wetland reserves will take shape in the following decades, in
Hungary, Western Transylvanian regions in Romania, Vojvodina in Serbia, as well as
around the Danube Delta.
 Environment. Those dependent on the Danube will need to prepare for direct climate
change impacts including more frequent flooding and longer periods of drought. Indirect
effects can include worsening water quality, loss in diversity of flora and fauna, including
fish species as well as other environmental benefits and services that we have come to
take for granted.
 Governance. In the whole Danube region the EU has become the dominant factor, the
operator and financing agent of external and partially of the internal integration. The Euro-
regional initiatives and the different EU funding programmes directly convey the
expectations and reactions for the outsiders. There is no region in the area which is not
linked somehow to the EU programmes, not receiving some kind of institutional, technical
and financial support.

Strengths Weaknesses (Structural unbalances)

Skilled workforce, valuable economic traditions Low economic activity rate, high relevance of informal
Lower production costs economies
Improving infrastructural connectedness, Underdeveloped urban centres (FUAs) without a critical
FDI inflows into manufacturing, mass, the dominance of capital cities,
Favourable environmental conditions, low pollution in Undercapitalised economies, over-reliance on FDI,
comparison with the EU-15, Dual economies: competitive exogenous MNCs and
Abundant natural resources in Balkans countries, underdeveloped indigenous enterprises,
especially Bosnia–Herzegovina and Albania, Predominant foreign ownership in strategic sectors
Danube as a connecting source of identity and Low internal demand and fragmented internal markets,
communication & innovation axis Large but inefficient public sector,
Weak civil society,
Opportunities Threats
Integration into European and global value chains, Capital-centred development without broader catching-up,
continuous industrial upgrading, increasing core–periphery dichotomy
Growing service economies, Ageing population,
Favourable capital attraction conditions, Continuing marginalisation of specific social groups,
Knowledge-based development on the basis of university especially Roma,
poles, Dependent power relations and increasing profit
State reform initiatives, repatriation,
Market expansion towards the EU core and third countries, Losses in human capital due to immigration,
as well as the exploitation of internal markets with rising Energy security challenges coupled with growing demand,

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 living standards, “Frozen conflicts” in the Balkans, postponed EU-integration,
Unexploited, diverse tourist and natural reserves potential Delocalisation of production towards the Far East
Political marginalisation in a “core vs. periphery” EU
development scenario; preserved “second-tier”
membership,
Inadequate preparedness for climate change scenarios,

Eastern Europe35
 Demograhpy. The countries concerned vary considerably in terms the trajectory of
demographic processes. In 2009 and 2010 Poland had a population growth rate of 0.9/0.9
per mille whereas the respective figures for Ukraine were -4.2/-4.4 with Belarus recording
2.7/ 3.1. The age structure of population in those countries has been systematically
deteriorating given the very fast growth of population past the productive age and the
shrinking number of newly born children. The balance of foreign migration in 2008 and
2009 per one thousand inhabitants was -0.7 and 0.0 in Poland, +0.8 and +0.5 in Belarus,
with no data available for Ukraine. The average life expectancy for women and men in
2009 was respectively: 80.1/71.5 years in Poland, 73.9/62.3 years in Ukraine and
75.9/64.3 years in Belarus. Over the last two decades the average life expectancy in
Poland has increased by approx. 5 years whereas the indicators for Ukraine and Belarus
have stabilised at their current low levels. Population density per square kilometre
amounts to 122 people in Poland, 76 people in Ukraine and 46 in Belarus.
 Economy. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity
(PPP) in Poland exceeded 61% of the UE-27 average in 2009. In 2010 the GDP per
capita at PPP was USD 19,752 in Poland, USD 6,874 in Ukraine and USD 13,951 in
Belarus. Such strong variation results from Poland’s successful transformation and EU
accession in 2004 while Ukraine and Belarus remained at the margin of modernisation
processes, with no openness in their national economies. The economic crisis which
began in 2008 largely bypassed Poland, significantly hitting other European economies,
including Ukraine: its GDP in 2009 fell by approx. 15% whereas Belarus recorded no
changes in that year. This led to significant problems in external debt servicing for
Ukraine and Belarus.
In 2010, the volume of exports per capita totalled USD 4,184 in Poland whereas the
respective figures were USD 1,123 for Ukraine and USD 2,667 for Belarus. The isolation
of Belarus is clearly evidenced in two indicators: the number of foreign tourists per 1,000
residents and tourism revenues in 2008. For Poland, those indicators reached,
respectively, USD 12,960 and 11,771 million. Ukraine recorded USD 25,449 and 5,768
million (with Russians accounting for most tourist traffic) whereas Belarus achieved
merely USD 91 and 363 million. This stems from the perception of Belarus in the
European Union as a country which remains outside Europe and its essential changes in
economy and civilisation have slowed down. Thanks to a sound business environment,
Poland is among top ten destinations of foreign direct investments (FDI). Ukraine
leverages FDI opportunities only partially whereas Belarus is bypassed by foreign
investors.
 Territorial patterns. The systemic transformations towards market economy in the three
countries led to the aggravation of inter- and intraregional disparities. The main

35
This chapter is based on ET2050 Eastern Region Report (SGH, 2012). The Eastern Region region is integrated by the follow-
ing countries: Poland with extensions to Belarus and northern Ukraine

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 beneficiaries of those transformations were the capital cities of the three countries, i.e.
Warsaw, Kiev and Minsk, with benefits derived also by other large cities which were
centres of various services. Those opportunities were leveraged to the lowest extent by
rural areas with an important role of agriculture, many of them with a peripheral location.
As regards Poland, Western regions are in a much more favourable situation in
comparison with the Eastern parts of the country, located along the external EU frontier.
The structure of production capacities in Ukraine and Belarus is essentially different and
resembles a jigsaw puzzle, with a good position of Eastern regions. Of crucial importance
are the disproportionate levels of development between the three countries, whereas
differentiations within each country are much less marked. It is observed that the spatial
structure of Poland is polycentric, with a few almost equally important business hubs: a
situation which generally facilitates socio-economic growth. This pattern is found in
Ukraine to a lesser extent with Belarus decidedly falling behind.
Poland can boast high-quality strategic documents concerning territorial issues, both at
the national level (National Spatial Development Strategy 2030; National Regional
Development Strategy 2020), as well as the regional level (spatial development strategies
and plans). Ukraine has launched wide-ranging studies, primarily of diagnostic nature,
some of them supported by Europe Aid. They should lead to the territorial dimension
being incorporated into public policies. The new generation strategic thinking about
territorial development is absent in Belarus.
 Knowledge base. The R&D expenditures as a proportion of GDP in 2009 accounted for
merely 0.68% in Poland, which is a disastrously low percentage. There is no information
about the scale of such expenditures in Ukraine and Belarus but they are presumably
even lower. Poland has declared that the ratio will increase to 1.9% by 2020. The problem
lies in the very low R&D expenditures in the private sector (industry) and very strong
territorial differentiation in the scale of such expenditures: two Polish regions are among
the bottom ten NUTS 2 areas. Poland’s contribution within framework programmes is
higher than the funds transferred to this sector as a result of competitions. There is a very
strong territorial concentration of the R&D potential in a handful of major centres
(Warsaw, Cracow, Poznań, Wrocław). Opportunities arising from R&D networking in a
variety of frameworks are not utilised. All the countries have high ratios of students per
10,000 residents in the 2008/2009 academic year: 564 in Poland, 619 in Ukraine and 615
in Belarus. The number of Internet users per 1,000 residents in 2010 reached to 623 in
Poland, 317 in Ukraine and 230 in Belarus.
 Transport. In Poland we are dealing with generally low yet geographically diverse
territorial accessibility, both for goods and for people. This results mostly from the
country’s peripheral location within the European Union. As a consequence of spatial
isolation, many cities and subregions are excluded as potential destinations of foreign
direct investments. Accessibility deficits are recorded both in terms of the insufficient
quality and density of TEN-T networks, as well as inter- and intraregional frameworks.
Generally, the external accessibility of Western Poland is much better than that of Eastern
Poland. An important problem is that the connections between metropolitan centres have
been improving too slowly. The systemic transformation and EU membership brought
serious lateral shifts in streams of transit traffic (from South West to North East, and from
South East to the West). The largest deficits are recorded in the case of quality and
speed of rail transport. Poland has virtually abandoned the idea to develop high-speed rail
by 2030. Recent years have seen a considerable quantitative and qualitative expansion in
the scale and network of air transport, which often compensates for the weaknesses of
land transport. Since 2004, many essential transport connections, mostly roads, have
been financed under the European cohesion policy. Despite investments in ring roads,
traffic segregation, photo radars etc. Poland still has one of the highest road traffic

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 mortality rates in the EU. Public transport investments in major cities play an important
role, including city rail transport and integration of transport systems within metropolitan
areas, which has become one of the priorities of the European cohesion policy in Poland.
The external frontier of the European Union represents a barrier to the development of
connectivity and to socio-economic growth of Ukraine and Belarus due to the customs
frontier for goods, constraints in the movement of persons resulting from the Schengen
Agreement and rigorous phytosanitary and veterinary requirements. Despite the priorities
identified under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, the number of
border crossing points is insufficient, with their equipment and capacities being too low to
handle the existing traffic streams. Additionally, numerous pathologies on the frontier
constrain cross-border relations. Of importance for Poland and Ukraine is maritime
transport (respectively: Baltic Sea and Black Sea) with ports acting as gateways. The
quality of transport infrastructure in Ukraine and Belarus is in even more critical condition
than in Poland.
 Land use. The countries concerned are generally characterised by a very low degree of
spatial order, which results from: investors’ pressure to gain access to the most valuable
areas, privatisation and appropriation of many unique resources, degradation and
insufficient quality of public space. The systemic transformation largely accelerated the
process of uncontrolled suburbanisation, which is evidenced in the chaotic outflows of
built-up areas around large and medium-sized cities. This is caused, among others, by
weaknesses in legal regulations concerning land use planning. On the other hand,
weaknesses of spatial planning generally do not affect the protection of forests and
natural resources whereas the improving environmental awareness among the public
facilitates preservation and protection of crucial resources such as fertile soil, ores etc. In
Poland, the new generation of local physical plans only partially cover the most important
areas which play a crucial role for the county’s development. This kind of analysis is also
sometimes found in Ukraine.
 Environment. After 1990 the three countries saw an improvement in the quality and
condition of their natural environment. This stemmed indirectly from the restructuring and
changes in the sectoral structure of their respective economies and the national product
(deindustrialisation), entailing a radical reduction of dust and gas emissions, improved
quality of water management, reduced contamination of surface waters, lower quantities
of solid waste and improved management of such waste. Societies of those countries
demonstrated increasing sensitivity to the condition of the natural environment, with
environmental organisations gaining the status of an important partner for public
administration. Traditionally, the three countries had relatively effective solutions in place
to protect their most valuable natural resources and landscapes, such as national parks,
nature reserves etc. In Poland, additionally, the European integration process played an
important part: introduction of environmental impact assessments, ‘polluter pays’ principle
etc., considerable support for environmental investments under the European cohesion
policy, efforts to achieve compliance with the acquis in terms of EU environmental
standards, introduction of integrated environmental monitoring, as well as work related to
the integrated system of nature protection areas NATURE 2000.
In Ukraine and Belarus, liquidation of the aftermath of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster was
an important factor in the past decades. Poland has no nuclear power plants, and the
debate about building such plants is in progress. Given the structure of energy supplies
from domestic resources, where coal plays a significant role, Poland and Ukraine find it
very hard to fulfil the expectations concerning a significant reduction of carbon emissions.
In Poland, the share of energy from renewable resources has significantly increased in
the past few years, partly as a result of investments conducted within the European

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 cohesion policy. According to estimates, climate change has a generally neutral impact
on the situation in Eastern Europe. Of particular importance, however, are extreme
weather phenomena, notably floods, which have become more frequent than in the past.
 Governance. The situation of the three countries is quite different in this respect, due to
their respective integration trajectories. For Poland, the European Union has become a
catalyst of many important socio-economic changes. Starting from early 1990s, Poland
was a beneficiary of the PHARE programme. The association agreement guaranteeing
access to the EU market came into force in February 1994, and preparations for EU
membership meant that Poland’s legislation had to be brought in line with that of the EU
(acquis communautaire). The accession, which took place on 1 May 2004, enabled
Poland to leverage the European cohesion policy facilities. After 1990, Poland profoundly
reformed its territorial public administration structure, establishing local governments at
the level of cities and municipalities. At the second stage of the reform, which started in
1999, self-governing regions (voivodships) were established. Territorial government units
are based on elected representative bodies, their own budgets and competencies in local
and regional matters. The new voivodships, 16 in total, became NUTS 2 areas. After
Poland’s accession those voivodships managed approx. one third of structural funds and
the Cohesion Fund facilities. Radical modernisation of public administration is one of the
effectively implemented cohesion policy priorities. Multi-level public governance is a new
phenomenon, enabled by the ever improving culture of collaboration between various
stakeholders. Much as in Ukraine and Belarus, Poland has traditionally been weak in
terms of civil society, which is evidenced in its deficits with regard to various institutions
enabling citizens’ activity. The low social trust makes it harder to establish public-private
partnerships and other forms of collaboration between various stakeholders.
Despite economic transformations across Europe, various benefits of European
integration were, regretfully, unavailable to Ukraine and Belarus after 1990s. Those
countries have centralised decision-making systems, which is manifested, among others,
in the absence of independent local governments that would be equipped with core
competencies. In the case of Ukraine, the existing forms of political discourse led to the
freezing of ratification of the already-negotiated association agreement in 2012.
Moreover, Belarus has been subjected to various restrictions by the European Union as a
consequence of human rights violations and various insufficiencies of democracy. This
essentially slows down the process of building economic and social connections with the
European Union and the achievement of the required standards in law and civilisation. It
is also believed that corruption is a widespread phenomenon in those countries.

Strengths Weaknesses (Structural unbalances)

Poland is among the poorest EU member states but with a High unemployment rate as a key problem
strong developmental potential Weaknesses of R&D
Poland stands out in terms of its entrepreneurial spirit Improvements in infrastructure as a precondition for
Labour costs are lower in Poland than in Western Europe development
Natural environment resources represent a developmental Increasingly diverse degrees of development across
opportunity Poland’s regions
Polycentric spatial development in Poland The need for improvements in administration
Numerous factors accelerating economic growth
Rich cultural heritage resources
High adaptive capacities of Polish businesses
Opportunities Threats
Intensifying integration and globalisation processes Intensifying emigration processes
Prospects of further EU integration Issues in supply of energy and basic materials
Poland’s EU membership Growing threats to natural environment
Favourable international environment International conflicts which affect the economy
Ensuring the inflow of foreign direct investments

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West Mediterranean Region 36
 Demography. Significant slowdown in what is still a high annual rate of population growth
in the south of the region (e.g., Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia), mostly due to a faster than
predicted fertility decline. Despite migrations in the 2000 decade, the ageing of population
is a concern in the northern countries of the region (e.g., Spain may have population
losses after 2030). Labour shortages in the north of the region in the mid term will need to
be met from new immigration (considering economic recovery), and a persistent heavily
labour supply surplus in the southern-rim countries, but with net entries into the labour
force starting to decrease sharply from 2015. In the northern rim, urbanization rate will
moderate, adding only around 250.000 urban dwellers a year, compared to very high
average annual growth in the south, around 4 million per year. Migratory flows were very
high between 1997 and 2007 in Spain and Portugal during the period of economic growth,
and stopped thereafter, even slightly inversed. In 2006, Mediterranean Europe (ES, FR,
IT, GR) welcomed as a whole over 11 million foreign residents, and in Spain 20% of
foreign residents hail from other Mediterranean countries (especially Morocco).
 Economy. Most important trade partner for Tunisia and Morocco is the EU (70% and
57% of their trade). However, while EU countries remain essential export markets (80%
and 70% of exports respectively) suppliers have diversified to the advantage of the rest of
the world. In any case, the strong Euro-Mediterranean interdependencies are likely to
continue to increase. Tourism is an important circulatory flow of people for the region.
International tourist arrivals more than quadrupled between 1970 and 2005: in Spain
there were 57 million visitors in 2011 (against 42 million in 1998), in Portugal 13 million in
2006, in Morocco 9,2 million in 2011 (against 1 million in 1990 and 5 million in 2004), in
Tunisia 7 million in 2008, but in Algeria only 0,2 million in 2006. In 2003, more than 87%
of tourists in the Mediterranean countries came from Europe. Increasing of residential
economy in coastal areas of Southern Europe: demographic ageing and the increased
spending power of some older age groups has prompted a growing trend to utilise their
role as popular retirement destinations to boost economic growth. Development of a
region’s residential economy usually focuses on consumer services, health, leisure,
culture and education, tourism, financial services and home related services. The jobs
created are often relatively poorly paid, and low skilled. There is a perceived risk that the
dominance of these activities could discourage development of higher value-added
activities for which more skills are required. This could increase the fragility of local
economies. Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows have been noticeably increasing since
the turn of the century, although they are still far from reaching the levels which would be
needed for any notable effect to be felt in terms of capital accumulation and increased
productivity. Mediterranean Partner Countries continue to comprise the region in the
world with the lowest levels of trade integration between its countries, with little more than
5.7% of their total trade.
 Territorial patterns. Urbanisation has been particularly growing along the coastal strip of
West Mediterranean countries to accommodate both permanent and temporal population.
This phenomenon is much more acute in Europe than in Africa, and especially important
in Spain. The result of a substantial urbanisation of the coast has adverse effects on the
quality of the environment. The predominant pattern of residential urbanisation is diffuse
settlements adjacent to or disconnected from concentrated urban centres. Residential
sprawl is on average responsible for more than 45% of coastal zone land transformation
into artificial surfaces. There is an increasing demand for investment in coastal

36
This chapter is based on ET2050 South-West Med Report (MCRIT, 2012). The Western Mediterranean region is integrated
by the following countries: Spain, Portugal with extensions to Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia)

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 residences due to tourism and leisure from northern Europe. In addition, there is also
domestic demand from the inland population, e.g. the retired.
 Knowledge-base. The Western Mediterranean Region ranks low on knowledge base.
The region experiences a gap between its southern and northern shores, not only with
regard to development, but also in relation to research, technological development and
the production of knowledge in general. However, even if the situation is much better in
Spain and Portugal than in the Maghreb, there is a substantial gap between the situation
in these countries (e.g. R&D investment as a share of GDP) and other central and
northern regions in Europe. The Western Mediterranean region remains relatively poor in
terms of attraction of innovative companies, both with regard to volume and sectors. The
Human Potential is the keystone of a policy for knowledge production and competitive
R&D. Even in the southern rim the human potential becoming involved in research is on
the rise despite reservations with regard to quality.
 Energy. The Mediterranean basin holds a significant potential for renewable energy
sources (RES), particularly in terms of solar and wind energy. RES represented 12% in
2010 of Portugal’s primary energy consumption (and 52% of electricity consumption), and
9,5% of Spain’s primary energy demand in 2010 (and 35% of electricity demand). The
situation in the southern rim is more modest. As of now, their contribution to meeting the
demand is still relatively low. Increased hydraulic stress coupled with the increased
frequency of extreme climatic events can be a drop in hydro-electric potential and the
cooling potential of thermal plants (reduced yield). The Maghreb–Europe Natural Gas
Pipeline Project (Gazoduc Maghreb Europe; GME) involved the construction and
operation of a 1,620km pipeline system to bring gas from the Hassi R’Mel field in Algeria,
across Morocco and the Strait of Gibraltar, to interconnect with the gas grids of Spain and
Portugal and into the rest of the western European gas transport system.
 Transport. The Mediterranean offers a route for exchanges of manufactured products
between Europe and Asia, as well as for the supply of Europe with energy products from
the Gulf countries. Around 24% of the goods tonnage consists of energy products, with
non-bulk goods accounting for 36% of the total. Container traffic originating in Asia and
bound for European countries is preferentially unloaded in the ports of the northern range.
The performance of Mediterranean ports remains insufficient to actively compete with
northern European ports. However, some Mediterranean ports accommodate relatively
large container traffics, e..g. Port Saïd (Algeria), Tanger Med (Morocco), Algesiras,
Valencia and Barcelona (Spain), Marseille (France), Marsarxlokk (Malta) and Gioia Tauro,
Genoa, la Spezia, Taranto (Italy), in most cases dedicated to transhipment activities. Most
of the main container ports in the Mediterranean have development or expansion plans in
place to keep pace with containership growth and operator requirements. Relatively good
transport road infrastructure in the northern Mediterranean rim, important deficits in the
southern rim though being addressed, especially Morocco.
 Environment. The impacts of climate change with major direct physical consequences
for human activity are: the water issue, already central to sustainable development
concerns in the West Mediterranean (particularly to the Southern countries) because it is
so scarce, will be a key factor through which the effects of climate change on human
activity are expected to spread; tourism: the climate is an essential component in the
choice of tourist destination. If heat-waves and summer temperatures increase, creating
problems with water resources, the Mediterranean regions could end up becoming less
attractive than more northern climes. Some estimates suggest that 1°C of warming by
2050 could drive tourist numbers on the southern shores down by 10%; The coastal
zones: Greater exposure of infrastructure to wave action and coastal storms could be

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 cited as one of the most serious effects. The same problems will be faced by port
installations, lagoon areas, and delta.
 Land-Uses. Within the 10 km coastal zone, urban surfaces are dominant on the first
kilometre from the shoreline. In several coastal regions of Spain (like in Italy and France)
the coverage of built-up areas in the first kilometre coastal strip exceeds 45 %. Land use
changes in the West Mediterranean are mostly conversion from other land covers to
agriculture (especially in the southern rim) and urban uses (especially in Spain and
Portugal).
 Governance. International cooperation policies and economic reforms in the northern rim
(and also in the southern rim, to a lower extent) of the region have been focused
essentially on reducing state involvement, trade liberalization, withdrawing subsidies and
privatization. There are a number of political and institutional initiatives if cooperation in
the region: Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), Euro Mediterranean Free Trade Area
(EMFTA), Mediterranean Sea Basin Programme as a part of the new European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), EU-Morocco Action Plan, EU-Tunisia Action Plan, Trans-
Mediterranean transport network and Regional Transport Action Plan, Coastal Zone
Policy: ICZM Protocol to the Barcelona Convention, Inter-Mediterranean Commission
(IMC).

Strengths (Mediterranean way of life) Weaknesses (Structural unbalances)

Large cities with advanced activities Unbalanced economy
Cultural heritage Lack of research and development
Weather conditions in the coast Limited number of corporations in more advanced sectors
Relatively good infrastructure, even in Northern Africa Social Inequity
(ports and roads) Regional unbalance
Space availability in the interior rural zones Public institutions capacity
Tourist infrastructure Democratic deficits (especially in Northern Africa)
Agricultural potential competitiveness Excess of density in the coast
Younger populations Lack natural resources in the North
Cultural diversity because of very diversified migration Low-scale agricultural production
Opportunities (Emerging economies) Threats (A turbulent neighbourhood)
Increase of foreign investments on logistics (in relation to An uncontrolled rise in illegal migration
the Asian markets) Water scarcity
Increase of foreign investments on industry in the South Continued paralysis of Euromed cooperation as a
Increase on tourism at global level consequence of the Arab-Israeli conflict
Energy resources in the South A lack of convergence to EU levels of income
Fisheries Cultural and political conflicts
Young active population in the South Social conflicts linked to unemployment, specially in the
South
Environmental deterioration in the Mediterranean
Climate Change

Central Mediterranean Region37

 Demography. Italy and Egypt stand out with a total number of inhabitants of,
respectively, sixty and eighty million people. Slovenia and Libya are instead relatively
smaller inhabited respectively by two and six million people. Italy currently faces two
major demographic trends: ageing population (Italy is the second oldest of the world) and
growing immigration. Slovenia faces demographic challenges similar to Italy. Libya has a
yearly growth rates reaching 6 per cent per year, partly, because the process of
increasing immigration from bordering countries; at the same time, Libyan citizens are

37
This chapter is based on ET2050 Central Mediterranean Report (Politecnico di Milano, 2012). The Central Mediterranean
region is integrated by the following countries: Italy, Slovenia, Malta with extensions to some Mashrek countries (Libya, Egypt)

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 keener to flee from their Country the higher their education level. Egypt experienced a
steady positive rate of population growth in the last century. Over 40% of Egypt’s
population is aged 20 and under, the median age is only 24, with a meagre 5% of the
population being 65 and over. This massive labour force represents a major strength for
Egypt’s economy, although a relative lack of jobs pushes Egyptians to emigrate. This
trend is likely to remain quite stable in the next years and should be taken into account
when drawing inference on the possible migration flows from this Country to Countries
belonging to the EU
 Economy. Italy and Slovenia belong to the OECD, have GDP levels similar to the
advanced part of the EU27, and reached a relevant stage of development. As such, they
currently face two major problems: maintaining a good balance between increasingly
conservative approaches to public spending and regaining momentum in growth
performance; fine-tuning of the national pension system, stressed by reduced spending
capability and ageing population. These two countries, therefore, may be more sensible
to scenarios where the current public spending patterns are subject to an even stronger
pressure, for instance because of lower future growth of countries belonging to the EU.
Libya and Egypt, instead, belong to the middle income group as defined by the World
Bank. They experienced relevant growth rates in the last decades, pushed mainly by the
large availability of natural resources (in the case of Libya) and the vast number of young
people in their working age (as for Egypt). They are, however, currently experiencing a
period of political turmoil, with the recent fall of long-lasting regime and uncertainly about
the identity and nature of future ruling parties.
 Territorial patterns. In terms of urbanisation rates, Italy and Libya host two thirds to
three quarters of their population in urban areas; however, this datum for Libya clearly
reflects the barren nature of this Country (in 2010, less than one per cent of the Country’s
surface was arable, according to World Bank data ) and 84% of total population lives in
costal areas. At the same time, Egypt (also with a vast share of national soil made up of
desert land: arable land covers just 3 per cent of the Country’s total soil) and Slovenia
host less than half of their population in cities. In Italy, the distribution of the Country’s
population shows a massive concentration of the center of gravity in the largest urban
areas. Therefore, a sprawl process involved large urban agglomerations in Italy in the last
decades, with growth taking place mainly outside large municipalities, but connected to
the creation of jobs in the core areas. Italy’s Southern and Northern regions have been
traditionally characterized by a major GDP gap. While far from reducing, internal regional
divisions have at least remained unchanged in recent decades. Slovenia presents some
relevant internal spatial imbalances, mainly due to the rural/urban dichotomy. The
benefits of the fast convergence against the EU are not equally distributed across space,
with a strong core-periphery pattern. Central Slovenia’s GDP is currently above the EU27
average, whilst the Pomurska region, bordering Hungary, is below half of the mean EU
value and predominantly characterized by agricultural activities. In Egypt, 98 per cent of
total Egypt population lives in just 3 per cent of the total Country territory, concentrated
over the land made arable by the river Nile.
 Knowledge-base. The South Mediterranean Region is highly diversified within its
boundaries. On the one hand, Italy and Slovenia belong to the OECD, have a well-trained
and sectorally diversified labour force, with good levels of education. On the other hand,
Egypt and Libya are relatively behind, with relevant portions of the population without
formal education. Relevant, in particular for Egypt, is the gender divide, with the female
portion of the population receiving less education than the male one. While therefore
Libya and Egypt may still walk a long way in traditional human capital investment (viz.
formal education, available for as many citizens as possible), Italy and Slovenia will be
likely to pay attention to their ageing knowledge base. In these countries, a major risk is

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 the depreciation of their human capital stock, which can be arrested (or inverted) only with
major improvements in their education systems.
 Energy. Libya stands out in this field with respect to other countries in this region. In fact,
Libya’s economy heavily draws on its natural reserves. In particular, the Country hosts
about 3 per cent of total world oil reserves (the 8th largest figure in the world) and the 22nd
largest natural gas reserve. On the contrary, Italy, Egypt and Slovenia are mostly
dependent on energy imports. All these countries access gas reserves located in
Northern Africa (Algeria and Tunisia) and trade oil with oil-producing countries; all these
countries need therefore also to think strategically about their location within international
oil trade networks. Among all four countries, only Slovenia produces energy from nuclear
sources.
 Transport. Italy stands out in this respect. A rich and dense transport infrastructure
network has been recently updated with fast trains connecting the major cities in the
North and in the Center of the Country. Its key geographic position between the core
economic regions of the EU, North Africa, and the Balkans grants accessibility to crucial
trade routes. Slovenia enjoys a favourable position as the key of trade routes between
Central Europe and the Balkans. Currently, it represents the South-East border of the
EU27 (a position which will be overrun if Croatia will access the Union). Its transport
infrastructure may still benefit from further investment. Libya and Egypt face the
Mediterranean sea from its southern shore. These Countries are the final gate to
Southern Europe, because of their strategic position for the trade routes between Sub-
Saharan countries and the EU. Besides, Egypt enjoys the crucial role of the Suez canal
for the East-West trade routes – in fact, In fact, as much as 8 per cent of total seaborne
trade is deemed to pass through this canal.
 Land-Uses. Libya and Egypt are clearly disadvantaged by their soil structure. In both
countries, almost available surface is barren, which limits the availability and scope for
transport infrastructure but also – and especially – for agricultural use. On the other hand,
this creates the rationale for a compact urban system, with the coastal areas being most
attractive for urban location. Slovenia is mostly mountainous, with around 90 per cent of
the surface of the country at least 200 meters above sea level. The Country is affected by
a relevant rural/urban dichotomy, which is correlated with non-negligible spatial
imbalances. Its surface is mostly covered in forests, which causes risky trends of
deforestation and diminishing availability of agricultural land. This fosters the risk of non-
sustainability of the development process in terms of the environment and future
urbanisation processes. Italy, finally, suffered from relevant soil consumption in the era
around its first economic boom (following WWII). Large portions of the Country, previously
used for agricultural purposes, have been urbanised. This process is a relevant deviation
from the Country’s long-term urban planning tradition, and needs major amendment if
Italy wants to maintain equilibrium on its territory.
 Environment. For all examined countries, a major theme of analysis, with relevant
scenario implications, may be their long-run capability to invest in territorial quality.
Environmental sustainability is in fact not only an issue of collective wealth, but also for
territorial competitiveness. In fact, relatively fertile countries like Slovenia and Italy risk the
rapid depletion of their natural capital, because of its over-exploitation. At the same time,
countries like Egypt and Libya, where the surface available to economic exploitation is
much smaller, must invest in maximizing the sustainability of their environment use, in
order to prevent from stealing from future generation’s wealth.
 Governance. These four countries belong to a relatively geographically homogeneous
Area. Clearly, their potential for economic and cultural cooperation is relevant. All four
countries share the fact of being a potential gate of access to other regions (Libya and

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 Egypt as a gate to Sub-Saharan countries, Italy to the core European area, Slovenia
bordering the Balkans and Central-Eastern Europe). However, major political differences,
coupled – in the last few months by political unrest in North Africa and the economic crisis
in Europe – caused major concerns in this respect.

Strengths Weaknesses (Structural unbalances)

Excellent regional positioning on major trade routes) Population ageing (Slovenia, Italy)
Diversified economy (Italy, Slovenia) Excess labour force (Egypt)
Natural resources (Libya) Dependency on natural resources, viz. non-diversified
Cultural heritage economy (Libya)
Natural capital Relevant public debt (Italy)
Competitiveness on some high-tech, high-value added Low education of the labour force (Egypt, Libya)
sectors (Italy) Water scarcity (Egypt, Libya)

Opportunities Threats
Attractiveness for tourism Political instability (Libya, Egypt, and to a lesser extent
Young labour force (Egypt) Italy)
Likelihood of fast technological catch-up Dependency on imported energy sources
Diplomatic challenges (EU countries in the world arena,
north-African countries bordering politically-unstable
countries)
Reducing pool of available Mediterranean fish
Climate change, with risks of further desertification (Egypt,
Libya)

East Mediterranean Region38

 Demography. Demographic trends are heterogeneous between and within the countries
depending on economic, social, cultural and spatial factors. Challenges that need to be
met are: the spatial concentration of positive or negative demographic development, the
depopulation, the ageing population and migration. Regarding population growth at
national level the EU members have experienced a modest increase in population
through the last years mostly caused by immigration. On the contrary, the non-EU
countries have lost a significant part of their population due to emigration. The
demographic development in the EU member states follows the European trend of an
ageing population. The main problem in those countries is the ageing of the population
with all the connected strong impacts on the social and health services and the labour
market. On the other hand, the candidate countries follow two different routes. Countries
like Serbia, Montenegro and Albania seem to have a strong positive balance between
birth and death rates offsetting emigration and keeping population on a growth path. The
weak economic performance and lacking perspectives are the main motivating factors
stimulating external migration. Notable are the emigrant outflows coming from Greece,
Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia. Within EU, there is generally a shift of population from east to west with the
exception of some parts in the examined macro-region such as Cyprus. Cyprus clearly
succeeded in gaining population during the second half of the 90s with being in the group
of regions which heavily improved their positions. Regarding the islands, the main
handicaps are found in islands where a minimum population threshold, 3,000/4,000
habitants is not reached. These islands, experiencing a declining population, see their
access to physical and social infrastructures and other general services becoming worse.
On the other hand the Middle East has experienced an increased rate of population

38
This chapter is based on ET2050 South East Mediterranean Region (University of Thessaly, 2012). The South-eastern Medi-
terranean region is integrated by the following countries: Greece, Cyprus, Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro,
Bosnia and Herzegovina with extensions to (Turkey, Armenia, Georgia, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Palestinian territories);

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 growth over the past century. Improvements in human survival, particularly during the
second half of the 20th century, led to rapid population growth in the Middle East and
other less developed regions. The introduction of modern medical services and public
health interventions, such as antibiotics, immunization, and sanitation, caused death rates
to drop rapidly in the developing world after 1950, while the decline in birth rates lagged
behind, resulting in high rates of natural increase (the surplus of births over deaths).
 Economy. The analysis of the GDP per capita performance revealed that the area is far
from being cohesive since it includes the Balkans and Greece facing severe problems of
economic instability due to the economic crisis and Cyprus being an exception. With
reference to the economic activity level and growth performance two patterns are visible
in the area since economic strength is obviously influenced by the status of EU
integration: old EU member countries are usually performing better economically than
new EU member states, which in turn perform better than EU candidate, potential
candidate and other countries.
 Territorial patterns. The eastern countries of the Mediterranean report accelerated
urbanization (3.6% over the period 1970-2000). By 2025, urban population would reach
220 million in the Eastern and Southern countries (151 million in 2005) and 156 million in
the countries of the European rim (140 million in 2005). A third of this growth would take
place in the Mediterranean coastal regions. The political or economic capital cities and
the several-million metropolises are thirty in the Mediterranean, though they
accommodate only a third of total urban population. The medium and small-sized cities –
numbering 1450 – are experiencing a steady growth, whereas they lack resources and
technical capacities. The extent of decentralization in these countries is still quite weak,
particularly on the financial level. The expansion of cities is mainly induced by the
dynamism of unregulated housing. According to countries and cities, between 30 and
70% of city-dwellers cannot have access to housing unless they resort to informal
channels for the purchase of building land plots. This results in the development of
derelict areas on the outskirts, with difficult access to water, sanitation and other basic
facilities.
 Knowledge-base. The research and development (R&D) system includes universities,
other public and private R&D facilities, science and technology parks, innovation and
transfer centres while universities and science centres are concentrated in urban areas or
in regional economic centres. According to national strategies for innovation and
technology the countries in the area are more or less provided with technology parks,
innovation and transfer centres. In the EU member states such facilities are essential
partners of implementing the national and regional innovation strategy. In the new
member states such institutions were established during the transformation process while
in the candidate, potential candidate and third countries such facilities and institutions as
well as adequate strategic concepts are missing.
 Energy. There is a certain typology that can be found in the Eastern macro-region and
especially in Greece and its islands. This includes semi-rural, often tourist-oriented
coastal and island regions in the South of Europe. The high photovoltaic (PV) potential of
many of the regions in this group is an important asset for the future and could help to
ease the strain of high demand for cooling in the summer time. The most pressing
problems are related to possible climate change impacts on the regional energy
infrastructure, both in terms of energy production and demand, due to diminishing water
reserves, higher average temperatures and heat waves, and consequently, forest fires.
The supply problems will coincide in time with higher peaks of electricity demand, derived
from a more extended use of air-conditioning. By 2025, primary energy demand in the
Mediterranean, will have increased by 50% compared to 2006 Energy demand growth

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 rates in the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries will exceed, in percentage
terms, four times those of the northern ones and will by then account for 42% of the
Mediterranean basin’s total demand for energy, compared with 29% in 2006. Turkey
could well become the basin‘s second biggest consumer. Fossil fuels (oil, gas and coal)
account for 80% of the countries’ energy supply (94% for the Souteastern Mediterrnaean
countries and 75% for the Northern Mediterranean countries according to the Blue Plan).
Four countries- Algeria, Libya, Egypt and Syria- are oil exporters, providing 22% of the
Mediterranean basin’s oil imports and 35% of its gas imports. All the other countries are
net energy importers.
 Transport. The railway network of the countries is not sufficiently developed mostly
because of the mountainous morphology of the area. Discontinuities across the borders
are very often the season of the limited efficiency of railway at the transnational level. The
area also comprises major strategic transit routes and important seaports within three
European Transport Areas. The most important ports within the Mediterranean Transport
Area belong to Greece, Cyprus and Turkey. Flows of air transport are oriented southeast
serving the holiday destinations and the Eastern Mediterranean and linking the Middle-
East and Africa to en route traffic arriving departing the European Region. There is a
major transnational axis in the macro-region, the South Eastern axis that link the EU with
the Balkans and Turkey and further with the Southern Caucasus and the Caspian Sea as
well as with the Middle East up to Egypt and the Red Sea.
 Land-Uses. East Mediterranean region has undergone major land use changes through
the last decades mainly due to the rapid urbanization of the coast, the abandonment of
farms and grazing land, forest fires and the expansion and intensification of tourism-
related activities and agriculture. Especially the eastern part of the Mediterranean is
subject to sudden and drastic environmental and socio-economic changes. These
changes lead to the partial and/or complete abandonment of large areas of agricultural
land resulting in noticeable but non-quantified land degradation. Studies have revealed a
significant land use change from agricultural and natural vegetation to urbanized areas
due to the high population increase during the last 80 years (51-times the magnitude of
the total built-up area). Overgrazing was practised by 70 per cent of the farmers and was
found to be one of the most important environmental consequences of land use change
(1600 ha have been transformed from natural grazing to built-up (urban) in the study
area).In addition, this part of the Mediterranean has witnessed problematic political and
military conditions that have drastic influences on the environmental and socioeconomic
situation, contributing further to the deterioration of the environment and land use
changes as well as the peasants’ socio-economic conditions.
 Environment. The densely populated unregulated-housing areas are particularly
vulnerable to natural hazards. Between 1975 and 2001, out of 480 extreme events
recorded in the Mediterranean, the most affected countries of the examined macro-region
as for the number of fatalities have been Turkey and Greece. Earthquakes, floods and
other fatal disasters regularly unveil a poor implementation of town planning and building
rules. With the expected impacts of climate change, the vulnerability of urban areas to
extreme hydrometeorological events, to warming and to sea level rise for the very low
coastal cities, will be accentuated. With accelerated urbanization on the East,
management of household waste has also become a major concern for local authorities.
 Governance. There are a number of political and institutional initiatives of cross border
cooperation such as the Mediterranean Action Plan, the Union of the Mediterranean,
Strategic action plan for the environmental protection and rehabilitation of the Black Sea,
the Black Sea Synergy, the Mediterranean sea basin programme 2007-2013, cross-

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 border cooperation within the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
(ENPI) etc.

Strengths Weaknesses (Structural unbalances)

Strong polycentric system and a leading role of the small Existence of imbalances in the study area reflecting
and medium-sized cities broader regional economic relationships
High educated labour force potential Depopulation and migration
Important high-capacity ports Weak accessibility and poor quality of basic services
Broad biodiversity and abundance of natural resources of Low level of exploitation of renewable energy and of energy
high environmental value efficiency
A great variety of valuable world cultural heritage

Opportunities Threats
Mobility of labour force through EU Membership and Brain drain-migration of skilled labour force
approximation Social segregation due to economic problems, migration
Dynamic FDI activities in Balkan countries Delayed integration in common market
Qualified human resources as basis for promoting the Lack of co-operation in decision making
entrepreneurial skills
Sustainable development of tourism
Construction and upgrading of Pan-European Corridors and
TEN projects

Outermost Regions39
 Demography. The ORs’ demographic features are characterized by a mildly positive
population dynamics, lower than EU27 average growth (+0.4% per year in the period
2000-2007), except in the case of Guiana (+4%) and, to a lesser extent, the Canary
Islands (+2.3% in 1998-2008). The dependency ratio is below the EU average (38.1%)
especially where the combination of natural growth and mortality is “favourable” (e.g. the
Canary Islands, Réunion, Madeira and the Azores).
 Economy. A high proportion of the workforce of most ORs is employed in agriculture, this
fact means that they also design their unique environmental and cultural landscape and to
a varying degree assure an export good and a supply for the local food market. Tourism
has a relevant potential in most ORs and in some of them is a key sector for employment
and external trade; in the ORs tourism is based on an exceptional natural and cultural
environment. All outermost regions are characterized by a small local market size, both in
terms of population and purchasing power. This small size, when combined with high
trade costs, implies that many products are not sold in that market. A large flow of
transfers from the mainland and the EU have sustained private consumption and
disposable income (These transfers vary and in some ORs may well be around 30 to 40%
of the GDP). ORs are very distant from the European continent in geographical terms.
They are isolated, either because they are oceanic islands, or because they are bordered
by poorly populated, basically forested areas with relatively low levels of development, in
addition to the lack of direct communication with their geographical surroundings and the
difficulty of trading relationships due to the fact that they belong to different economic
areas. They are areas with a small surface area, with scarce natural resources.
 Territorial patterns. Most ORs are of volcanic origin and are characterised by very
diverse relief from steep to flat, sometimes within the same region. Most of the social and
economic life is concentrated in the coastal areas which are particularly exposed to

39
This chapter is based on ET2050 Outermost Regions (MCRIT, 2012). Outermost regions include the following: Canary Is-
lands, Madeira, Açores, French Guiana, Martinique, Réunion

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 extreme climatic events. The archipelagos are highly fragmented, a factor which provokes
a double insularity in the smaller islands. The natural surface area comprises values of
between 40% and 50%, those with a larger natural surface area (Martinique, Reunion,
Guadalupe, and Guiana) have values of above 80% and even 90% (the Canary Islands).
The Useful Agricultural Surface Area (UAS) is below 30%.
 Knowledge-base. Potential growth in the ORs can come from restructuring the traditional
sectors of tourism, agriculture and fishery and new specializations which stem from the
application of RTDI to old and new sectors. New and high profile skills, well focused and
market oriented applied research as well as improved marketing need to sustain the
process.
 Energy. The Outermost Regions have had severe problems to assure the regular supply
of fossil fuels and are penalized by higher cost of provision, due to accessibility and
distribution handicaps. During the past years, the development of renewable energies has
been pursued and favourable natural and environmental conditions exist in different
regions to develop different renewable sources from biofuels to wind, solar and
photovoltaic. In addition, in some ORs there is a growing experience in RTDI on
renewable energies which to draw upon for their development. The insularity and small
size encourage a wider development of small plants of renewable energies, which could
aim to satisfy a much more significant share of total energy demand, given the higher cost
of traditional sources and their unreliability.
 Transport. Remoteness has a negative impact on most sectors because of the transport
costs, which affect mobility of factors (labour and capital), trade and in general all forms of
integration with the EU. To deal with remoteness however in the past transport
infrastructures have been built and a mildly positive trend in the maritime transport of
freight can be observed in the last decade in all ORs except the Portuguese Islands. At
the same time air transport of people increased substantially almost everywhere thanks
also to the opening of low cost routes. Accessibility issues affect ORs not only in their
trade and exchanges with the EU but also within their geographic areas and within the
same archipelago.
 Land-uses. The natural surface area comprises values of between 40% and 50%, those
with a larger natural surface area (Martinique, Reunion, Guadalupe, and Guiana) have
values of above 80% and even 90% (the Canary Islands). The Useful Agricultural Surface
Area (UAS) is below 30%.
 Environment. The Outermost Regions share specific characteristics which make them
particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, namely: Concentration of population,
socio-economic activities and infrastructure along the coastal zone; High sensitivity to
extreme weather conditions (e.g. hurricanes, cyclones, drought, floods, volcanic
eruptions); Dependence on water resources (coastal aquifers) highly sensitive to sea
level changes. Although flooding, erosion and freshwater shortage pose a certain threat
to the coastal zones of the outermost regions, recent climate change discussions for the
OR primarily focus on the loss of biodiversity, a main factor influencing the important
tourism industry of the islands.
 Governance. In the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the outermost
regions are covered in Article 349, which requires that EU policies must be adjusted to
their special circumstances. Since 2004, the EU has had an integrated strategy, based on
active partnership between EU institutions, national governments and the outermost
regions. The three priorities are to make the regions more accessible, more competitive
and more integrated with the countries around them. Several programmes has been
started to accomplish the goals of accessibility, competitiveness and integration: POSEI

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 Programme, Transnational Cooperation Programme Madeira-Açores-Canarias,
Operational Programme Indian Ocean

Strengths Weaknesses
High-quality agricultural produce Small size of the market affects the competitiveness
Tourism, key sector Remoteness (from EU) and insularity
Quality of life / Way of life/ Style of life Higher cost of transport
Tropical climate High prices of import goods
Good inter-island links Fragmented territory and difficult access due the
Positive demographic balance topography
Dependency on tourism
Opportunities Threats
Ideal location for experimentation to combat the effects of Transportation costs: internal interisland and with third
climate change countries
Remarkable biodiversity and wealth of marine ecosystems Economic dependence on a few products (bananas)
Scientific portals for their geographical areas Water scarcity
Renewable energies (wind, tidal and wave). Climate Change effects (flooding, coastal erosion)
Research and hi-tech industries Lost of biodiversity
Project of port infrastructures for developing services Change in EU and national regulations concerning the
(logistics, naval repair) Outermost Regions
Creating more technology-based and/or innovation-based
jobs (aquaculture, renewable energies, biotech)

3.4 Synthesis of macro-regional Visions40

Cooperation between European regions as well as between cities but also between cities and
their hinterland appear as a crosscutting issue for the development of a Vision for Europe. This
has to do both with the improvement of relations between territorial entities and with the
improvement of the decision-making process, which should be improved by the means of
transparency and collaborative processes.
These are old values of territorial development in Europe. These values are key drivers in the
development of visions for Europe as the situations of the macro-regions are rather contrasted.
Moreover, radical disparities between sub-entities of those macroregions appear especially in
Southern and Eastern Europe.
Related to polycentricity and equilibrium are connection and accessibility. The improvement of
transport networks and of connections between various regions in Europe still appears to many of
crucial importance, but the overinvestment on infrastructure with limited economic sustainability
also emerges as important. Related to this issue is also the scarcity of energy resources as well
as the environmental impact of nuclear energy and of GHG emissions. Improving accessibility,
reinforcing equilibrium and developing cooperation are key policy-aims, heavily dependent upon
energy and environmental perspectives. The integration of this set of issues (environment,
energy, and political and economical development) should be at the core of the development of a
vision for Europe.
Economic growth remains a central value of economic development, the production of wealth
being largely seen as a central issue in the development of political communities and of their
wellbeing. Despite this, a Vision for Europe should also take into account the fact that growth
should be related to sustainable development. On this, the whole issue of Green Growth appears
of central importance, notably in the Europe 2020 Strategy. Green Growth is envisioned as a turn
of economic activities to sustainable development in accordance to OECD’s standards.
In this perspective, the majority of the macro-regions envision a sustainable development based
on renewable energies, ecosystem conservation, biodiversity enhancement and water and

40
This section has been elaborated as a first step towards the European Vision, by Vincent Callay (IGEAT 2012).

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energy friendly production at the core of future development. However, regarding geographical as
well as economic disparities in Europe, the situation of the macro-regions and their sub-entities is
contrasting. The development of visions for the future of Europe should tackle this latter point.
The reinforcement of democracy appears also as a shared target for the visions examined.
Developing collaborative decision-making processes as well as transparency remains of crucial
importance. This couples to the ambition of enhancing participatory processes and the
involvement of population in policy development.
To address the potential limiting factor derived from sub-regional heterogeneities when building
the Territorial Vision, this preliminary synthesis of macro-regional trends and visions has initially
attempted to focus on key territorial typologies beyond the defined macro-regional frameworks:
Coastal Europe, Urbanised Europe and Rural Peripheries. The further development of European
spatial patterns and the Vision will require more contrasted typologies in order to picture the huge
internal diversity of Spaces in Europe.

Coastal Europe
Out of the territorial Visions examined comes an emerging issue: the new trans-regional
dynamics developed within coastal and maritime regions in Europe, namely the North Sea, the
Atlantic Coast, the Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. Each coastal region appears to share
common social, economic and environmental problems and opportunities. This dimension is of
crucial importance in the development of a common European Vision as these coastal areas
could be seen as specific territorial entities where new definitions of transnational regions
emerge. Those regions share common environmental issues, but also economic issues, such as
the transformation of industrial economies, their nodal position in the transport of goods and a
peripheral position in the national economies; and social issues such as new waves of in-
migrations and tourism potential.

Urbanised Europe
The importance of connections between cities could be summed up in the “Urban Clusters” idea
of the Plan Bleu concerning the Mediterranean area. This is shared by many visions, especially
those concerned with the development of coastal regions. This points out both issues of
connections between cities and of joined strategies and collaborative visions about economic,
social and environmental development. The concept of Urban Cluster introduces sharing
perspectives and projects between close cities in order to foster their competitiveness.
Envisioning the future of rural hinterland is a crucial issue. The rapid development of urban areas
in Europe is a matter of high pressure on their rural hinterland at economic, social and
environmental level. Having visions about how those hinterlands will transform and change as
well as about how their relationships with their main urban core will be managed is a key for the
future equilibrium of Europe.
It is largely admitted that the future of Europe’s economic development will be based on cities.
The rising of the knowledge-based economy as well as of the service economy and their
domination in Europe’s economic development is broadly envisioned as the future of Europe.
However as it is emphasised in the Plan Bleu and the Norvision, it remains crucial to manage
how cities as motors of economic development will affect their hinterland and how the wealth
generated by urban activities will be redistributed. Another issue is the economic transition of
rural and peripheral areas: the recent transformations in their population structures influenced by
the new technologies of information and communication, the development of private means of
transport as well as the rise in commuting and of its scale should be tackled as a crucial issue in
the relationship between cities and their hinterland but also in the definition of the urban character
itself of the economy.

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The sustainable character of cities is broadly envisaged as a crucial point at many levels:
housing, commuting, public and private transports, economy, etc. This emphasises the
importance of conceiving visions that entail sustainability and green economy at the core of both
urban development and the transformation of urban-rural relations.
“Being attractive” has been the motto of many cities in Europe and the world since the 1990’s.
This has engendered an overall turn to urban marketing, missing the point of social equilibrium as
well as the whole issue of sustainable development. The development of visions for Europe
should critically address the effects of being attractive, positive as well as negative and situate
that very issue within a broader framework where this mingles with social and environmental
issues.
Territorial equilibrium is often seen as a crucial support to social integration. The social
fragmentation of Europe’s territory is a threat that overlaps with the current disequilibrium
between the urban core of Europe concentrating mainly in the North Western area and the rest of
the territory either urban but economically peripheral or rural. The social integration of the broad
territory but also at a smaller scale, especially at the scale of cities, is a key issue that should be a
part of visions about the future development of Europe, especially its more pessimistic ones.

Rural European Peripheries

The importance for rural periphery to be better connected to urban economic cores appear of
crucial importance to satisfy both targets of a better territorial equilibrium in Europe as well as of a
social integration of the whole territory.
To assume a highest connection of the rural periphery into the core dynamics of Europe means
both to support its better integration but also to take into account its specificities and the
contrasting situations. This means also to support the diversification of activities in the rural
hinterland and periphery to reinforce both the autonomy of those territories and their capacity to
collaborate with urban regions.
The diversification of those territories has not only to do with economy. It is also a matter of
environment and biodiversity. The constant pressure of extending urban areas and conurbations
affects the rural periphery by pushing to a homogenization of its environment. Envisioning how
rural areas could maintain diversity at the environmental level comes out as a key issue.
Such an environmental diversification has to do with the keeping or the re-development of a small
and medium scale agriculture respecting natural cycles and respecting environmental equilibrium
and ecosystems. Gains in productivity by the intensification of agriculture should also been
critically addressed. Moreover the whole issue of urban small-sized agriculture should be
envisioned as a possible turn in food supplying.
The transformation of agricultural practices should also be seen as a trend to an improvement in
food production in a context where the health of an ageing Europe will be highly valuated.
The transformation of the rural economy, its diversification and change in size as well as
transformations in the productivity of agricultural production could help to find rooms for the
development of activities related to the production of renewable energies in various countries:
solar and wind energies productions in Mediterranean countries are already a rising activity and
this could be seen as an important turn in the whole rural European area.

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4. Baseline Scenario
4.1 Approach
A Baseline Scenario is a projection of current trends in absence of neither new policies nor
unexpected events. It should strive to generate consensus, with other baseline scenarios
previously developed to be a useful reference. A Baseline Scenario will not likely comply with
most official political targets, and therefore it can be understood as a realistic future ahead,
especially in the short and mid term. A baseline scenario is neither the “worst-case” scenario, nor
the “most likely future”.
The Baseline Scenario could be understood as a future evolution with no dominant drivers:
no “technologic panacea”: Neither technology nor free markets are the solution
no “Invisible hand”: spontaneous behaviour does not result in social self-organisation
no “political reforms”, but small adjustments
Exploratory Scenarios, on the other hand, can be understood as ways to explore more or less
extreme possibilities for each of the three drivers behaviour, technology and government. The
ET2050 Vision could be, in this context, the “middle path” – an ideal balance of the alternative
exploratory scenarios.
The ET2050 Baseline Scenario sticks to the principles of smart, sustainable and Inclusive growth
as the leitmotifs of European policies, and is built on the baseline scenarios developed in EU
policy documents and recent studies. The European territory must be explicitly included in the
scenario narratives in two complementary senses: as territorial impacts (passive factor that
generates externalities) as well as territorial conditions (active factor that induces development).
The ET2050 Baseline Scenario is a structural description of the European territory in the 2030
and 2050 time horizons. It concentrates in particular on changes in the following thematic areas:
demography, economy, technology, energy, transport, land-use, environment and governance,
and their independency with territorial dynamics. From a territorial point of view, the baseline
describes implications of identified mega-trends in the different European macro-regions.
The methodology of development of the Baseline Scenario for 2030 and 2050 included the
following research activities:
- internal expert consultations and debates by ET2050 partners carried out in the Second
TPG meeting in Brussels, to discuss a first draft Baseline Scenario (19/20-03-2012)
- analysis by sectors and macro-regions, carried out in the ET2050 project (see all reports
at www.et2050.eu, 20-04-2012 version
- elaboration of the Present State and Trends analysis
- analysis of ongoing debates on policy reforms in Europe
- identification of Critical points of Bifurcation or alternative evolutions in response to major
challenges anticipated for key sectors based on the present state of Europe and historical
evolutions (see Section 4.2 of this report).
- comparative analysis of existing baseline scenarios developed in European studies as
well as at World scale (ET2050_Baseline_References, document, 24-04-2012 version)
- definition of baseline assumptions or Key Directions of the Baseline Scenario based on
possible responses to critical bifurcations. Validation through participatory process
- quantitative analysis made with TV+ and PASH+ refined meta-models, that provide for a
number of relevant indicators aggregated at EU level (27-04-2012)

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The next steps will be:
quantitative modelling (at NUTS3 or NUTS 2 level) using forecast models
analysis of territorial differences
providing explanation to territorial dynamics: drivers, seeds, trends, limits and patterns.
definition of relevant wild cards
TIA policy-evaluation of the Baseline Scenario
definition of scenario variants, based on the TIA policy evaluation
full revision of the Baseline Scenario in comparison with Exploratory Scenarios
assessment of the consistency of the scenarios with territorial policy aims applying TIA. This
assessment will help in the discussion process with the ESPON MC.
For 2012-2020, the Baseline Scenario and also the explorative scenarios up to 2020 are inspired
by EU policy documents, mostly by the Regions 2020 Report (2008, 2011)41.
The ET2050 Baseline Scenario assumes as starting hypothesis a Sluggish recovery pathway for
the 2010-2020 period.

Figure 4-1 EU2020 Scenarios (JM Barroso, Informal European Council, Feb’10)

The resulting assumptions for the ET2050 Baseline Scenario will be explained in Section 4.4 of
this report.

4.2 Critical Bifurcations from Present State

The following 25 questions are aimed at assisting the process of definition of scenarios.
Depending on the answers given to the following questions, alternative future scenarios can be
defined, such as the Baseline. There is a difficulty of the exercise that needs to be considered:
there is a huge uncertainty as regards the world economic development and the impact of

41
ÖIR et al (2011), Regional Challenges in the Perspective of 2020 – Phase 2: Deepening and Broadening the Analysis, EC
DG Regio.

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growing resource scarcity (water, energy, etc..) on the production and consumption patterns. This
makes the process of answering to most of the following questions particularly challenging.

Particularly relevant bifurcations are:

1) Will European national economies42 be able to adjust to structural transformations?

Dealing with the economic crisis and increasing economic growth rates. The economic crisis has
significantly decreased the income of most European countries and increased unemployment (up
to 10% in many countries, and more than 20% in Spain). To recover, it will be necessary at least
some years of sustained growth, which will require structural transformations.
The Baseline assumes that structural transformations, requiring policy reforms beyond business-
as-usual are not carried out as required. Therefore, economic growth is low and unemployment
remains high, especially in Southern countries.

2) Will migrations continue to be necessary in Europe to shirking labour market?

Dealing with a shrinking labour market. Population changes are the main driver of employment
rates in most regions. Average participation rates tend to be reduced in Europe, among others
due to the increasing number of retired people in the higher age cohorts. The ageing of European
population will reduce both the active population as well as the average rate of participation.
External migration will be necessary to maintain economic growth. But other regions such as
North America, Australia, and most developed Asian countries will also compete for the global
migration as their populations get older.
The Baseline assumes that net international extra-European migration will be growing slowly,
especially coming from Ukraine or Belarus, Arab Countries, former colonies, as well as from
southern and south eastern Asia. Migration will be attracted mainly by cosmopolitan centres and
urban agglomerations.

3) Will European countries be able to sustain their welfare system?

Dealing with World-wide competition without abjuring the European labour market model and
welfare state. The European society is characterized by higher levels of public welfare with
respect to almost all the rest of the world, which means higher services but also higher
expenditure for health care and pensions. These costs translate into higher taxes on labour and
capital. At the same time, the European labour market model is in many cases little flexible, with
workers which either do the same job until the retirement age or fall into unemployment. Young
people, in particular, find it difficult to find a regular job to enter this protected labour market. In
order to be able to sustain its welfare system and labour protection, European countries will need
to foster labour productivity, otherwise production and services will be off-shored.
The Baseline assumes that the public welfare system will be reduced, and its management more
privatised, forced by public financial constrains. There will be a process of harmonisation across
European countries along these lines.

4) Will Europe (and its single countries) be able to find ways to finance its public debt?
Dealing with stretched public finances. The expensive welfare state, as well as the poor efficiency
of many public administrations together with an emerging political populism, already made
Europe a relatively indebted continent, but this situation has worsened with the economic crisis,
so that now almost all countries have a significantly larger burden of public debt on GDP. Some

42
European countries refers to ESPON space.

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countries are already experiencing difficulties in re-financing maturing debt. For this reason tight
public finances, better public management, and coordination between countries will be needed in
order to maintain the debt sustainable.
The Baseline scenario assumes that financial debts will remain as a permanent burden for most
European countries; even if future public expenses are reduced and debts are better managed,
debts will not be significantly reduced. Each country will still stand alone for its own debt,
increasing the costs for all.

5) Will Europe be able to compete with emerging countries in high-value sectors?

Dealing with a different competition from rising powers. The European economy used to compete
with their products against the firms of other OECD countries such as the US or Japan. The
earlier competition from China and the Asian tigers but also from Brazil and India, was on the
contrary based on cost competitiveness on lower value added products. This pattern has already
changed. Emerging economies are increasingly active in high-tech sectors and products, and this
will increase in the future so that European economies will need to compete against younger
countries also in these sectors, by trying to maintain and renew the technological advantage they
still have.
The Baseline scenario assumes that European technological advantages will be progressively
reduced overtime, since emerging markets will be able to adapt and integrate new technologies
easier than European countries; therefore, hardly European companies will not be able to
compete in new sectors.

6) Will Europe be decarbonised and decentralized energetically, reducing GHG emissions?

Dealing with energetic transition. Primary biomass in European Countries may grow from 180
Mtoe in 2010 to 300 Mtoe in 2030 (EU25), especially in Poland, Spain, Italy or UK. The transition
towards a society free from fuel energies will last for some decades, or two generations. In this
transition, a large number of alternative sources of energy will emerge. The share of renewable
energy sources is already increasing but still remains far from EU targets. As Northern European
countries are more involved that Southern ones in the development of renewable energy sources,
they contribute better to the GHG emissions decrease. Even if a large increase in renewable
energy is expected in Europe, especially in wind, solar and biomass (RES could account in 2030
18,4% and 26% in 2050), the rising of these sources will only compensate the decrease in
hydropower. Grid energy storage will be commercially introduced to store electricity on a large
scale within an electrical power grid. Transport emissions, accounting today for more than 20% of
GHG emissions, will mostly remain stable due to the fact that increasing transport demand largely
counter balances the impact of improvements in fuel efficiency and fuel shift.
The Baseline scenario assumes that fossil fuels will still be the most important energy sources,
despite the important increase in RES, and a decrease in GHG emissions even though targets
will not be met, and a gap will develop between Northern and Southern Europe contribution to
improvement.

7) Will Europe will be able to tap the untapped potential of its regional diversity richness?
Dealing with internal income disparities. Income disparities between countries and even more
between regions will grow. The resources devoted to the compensation of these differentials will
be scarce in the foreseeable future, and not effective enough. For this reason Europe will need to
find a way to enhance the endogenous potential of its regions if it has to achieve overall growth.
Cooperation between European cities is weak and competition is strong.
The Baseline scenario assumes that disparities will grow in Europe, as they are growing in the
rest of the World. Inequalities at local or regional level will become more dramatic than at national

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level. Public support to less developed regions will become more scarce and will produce limited,
sometimes even contradictory, effects.

8) Will spatial development and settlement structures be more polarised?

Dealing with Territorial Cohesion. Europe has the highest population density (60 persons/km2) of
any continent. Of the total European population 73% lives in urban areas against 69% in 1990
and 55% in 1950, but southern Europe is far less urban (67%) than northern Europe (83%). The
urbanisation process is expected to continue, up to 80% urban population in European countries
in 2030 and even 89% in 2050, resulting in even denser urban environments than today. In the
meanwhile, many rural and sparsely populated areas lose out along this process, in human
capital and activities. In Eastern Europe this process will result in much larger urban centres than
today, than in Western Europe where the distribution is to remain largely constant since area is
already much urbanised. The current debate on territorial cohesion is concerned with integrating
relevant policies and actions, requiring well-established democratic institutions and adequate
responses to the demands of technical systems and markets. In the context of Europe 2020, the
question is weather this EU strategy will remain mainly a matter for Directorate Generals and their
various clients pursuing their policies, or will Cohesion policy, with its more integrated and
decentralised approach involving many levels of government and stakeholders, form platforms for
integrating them.
The baseline assumes no relevant policy reforms taken over the next decades, with a
continuation of the urbanization process and the development towards larger urban centres, and
increased territorial unbalances.

9) Will be Europe politically more integrated?

Dealing with different national interests. Since its foundation, 27 States have become part of the
European Union, integrating today a population of more the twice its original. The European
model has changed forever with the expansion towards the East in the years 2000s, doubling the
number of countries and embracing nations that are substantially poorer in comparison to former
partners. Governance will become more complex and so will be the culture mix. Europe evolutes
towards a “Multi-speed” governance, based on the Open Coordination Method, with countries
retaining much of their power. The more adaptative countries and regions are able to move on
quickly than others which stay as laggards.
The baseline assumes no significant advancement of European political integration, in a more
complicated and variable institutional geometry.

10) Will decision and management processes of EU key policies be more decentralised?
Dealing with improved governance. The EC White Paper on Governance urged the Union to
renew the Community method by following a less top-down approach and complementing its
policy tools with non-legislative instruments. The White Paper aims at increasing the involvement
of citizens in the European policy, empowering local actors to a higher extent and considering
spatial, environmental and socioeconomic issues altogether in an integrated approach. At the
same time, an increasing mismatch between social and economic flows and administrative and
current political boundaries is taking place, territorial jurisdictions introducing rigidities in service
provision, fund allocation and policy building. New planning and territorial cooperation initiatives
are needed, open to networks of public and private institutions, and attached to add-hoc
geographies (e.g. cross-border regions, mountain zones, coastal zones or islands, river basins,
remote or sparsely populated regions …). Policies should increasingly emerge in the future by the
initiative of local communities putting accent on good governance and strategic thinking.

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The baseline assumes that EU governance will still be mostly top-down, and that the territorial
decentralisation of decision and management processes and the empowerment of local
communities will remain limited.

The next points (11 to 25) complement the 9 basic bifurcations and are aimed to provide greater
precision in the definition of ET2050 Scenarios, also of the Baseline.

11) Will be European countries able to re-qualify its aging labour force?
Dealing with an aging population and workforce The European population is aging very fast,
second only to Japan. This implies that the workforce is increasingly old, and that workers in their
50s or even 60s will need to be re-trained and qualified for new economic jobs. Moreover, due to
the demographic trends (life expectancy growing from current 79 to 85 in 2050, and fertility rates
well below 2,1), the old-edge dependency ratio will more than double in the European countries
(from current 22,4% to 58,1% in 2050), so that it will become important to maintain workers into
the labour market until older ages.
The Baseline scenario assumes that the level of qualification of the labour force will increase at a
very modest level, and labour productivity will be lower than in USA and emerging economies.

12) Will be Europe able to put in place a “smart growth” as suggested by the Agenda 2020?
Building a more innovative economy. The only way to foster productivity for advanced economies
passes through innovation, but despite the efforts by the individual countries and the EU, the
innovation effort is still not high enough. Moreover, the competition for the most qualified human
capital has become global too, which makes it important for Europe to be able to retain and
attract the highest skilled workers and researchers, by offering them not only good quality of life
but also job satisfaction opportunities.
The Baseline scenario assumes that “smart growth” as such will mostly happen in Northern and
Central European countries, while Eastern European countries will tend to be more focused on
manufacture and Southern countries have a mixed economy, with an increasing importance on
low-added value services, such as mass-residential tourism, and some more added-value
services such as tourism linked to health, education and business.

13) Will be Europe able to create and take advantage of a demand from emerging countries?
Dealing with lower demand. The US, which is still the largest buyer of European goods and
services, will probably remain in a situation of weak demand for the years to come, so that the
European economy, which cannot rely on the public sector to create demand, will need to find
other demand sources. This should be found in the same emerging economies which have
increased their exports towards Europe in the last two decades. These emerging economies, in
fact, have already started increasing the disposable income of their citizens, and European firms
have to try and find a way into these rapidly expanding markets.
The Baseline scenario assumes that European firms will struggle to be able to maintain the actual
level of exports to emerging markets, excepts in sectors where competitive advantages exist and
can be maintained; emerging markets will tend to keep foreign imports low, or increase the
relative trade among themselves.

14) Will trade continue to grow World wide at a higher ratio than GDP?
Maintaining a relevant position in global trade. World trade has grown between 1991 and 2011 at
twice the rate of economy, almost 6% yearly on average (WTO, 2012). The volume of exports in
the World between 1950 and 2008 multiplied by 32 times according to UNCTAD (in volume,
tonnes), for a growth of global GDP of just 8 times. Container traffic emerged since the 90s, and

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represents today one sixth of total trade (went from TEU25 million in 1990 to TEU160 million in
2008, and is forecasted to rise to TEU375 million by 2020). However, since the trade collapse of
2008-09, the world economy and trade remain fragile and a further slowing of trade is expected in
2012 showing that the downside risks remain high. Developed economies exceeded expectations
with export growth of 4,7% in 2011 while developing economies (including CIS) did worse than
expected, recording an increase of just 5,4%.
The Baseline scenario assumes that European trade will continue to grow in the coming decades
driven by intra-European trade, and because of the growth of emerging economies, even if
Europe is likely to lose some shares in this global framework.

15) Will tourism continue to grow World wide at a higher ratio than GDP?
Managing international tourist flows. Since the 1950s, tourism has experienced continued
expansion and diversification becoming one of the largest and fastest growing economic sectors
in the World. Tourism is responsible for 5% of the world’s GDP, 6% of total exports and employs
1 out of every 12 people in advanced and emerging economies alike. In spite of occasional
shocks, international tourist arrivals have shown uninterrupted growth: from 25 million in 1950, to
277 million in 1980, to 435 million in 1990, to 675 million in 2000, and the current 940 million.
Even in 2011, international tourist arrivals grew by over 4%, according to UNWTO, in a year
characterised by a stalled global economic recovery, major political changes in the Middle East
and North Africa and natural disasters in Japan. Tourist arrivals to Europe reached 420 million in
2011 (more than 500 million including Russia) accounting for almost half of World tourism, but the
fastest growth is in the emerging regions where the share in international tourist arrivals has
steadily risen from 31% in 1990 to 47% in 2010.
The Baseline scenario assumes that European tourism will continue to grow in the coming
decades even if Europe is likely to lose share in the global framework.

16) Will intra-European migrations grow?

Experiencing fewer migratory tensions. In the last decade the intra-European international
migration (i.e. between EU Member States) was dominated by East to West flows, related to
work. Retirement related migration to sun-sea-sand areas played important role in the
Mediterranean, but these flows are strongly affected by current economic conditions and could
also move to Northern African countries and more remote areas. Internal migration (i.e. within EU
Member States) was dominated by inflows to urban agglomerations.
The Baseline assumes that intra-European international migration will slightly decrease and
internal migration will remain on the current level. The differences in the attractiveness of various
regions and in regional migration gains and losses will be much lower than those in the past.

17) Will long-distance freight transport be decoupled from transport growth?

Growing global freight traffic. If global GDP doubles between 2005 and 2030 (from $47 billion to
$92 billion), world maritime container traffic could increase by more than 6,0% per annum, air
freight could increase by around 5,9% per annum and rail freight traffic worldwide could increase
at around 2,5% per annum. On this basis air freight could triple in 20 years, and port handling of
maritime containers worldwide could quadruple by 2030. Transport prices will continue to go
down relative to the value of goods because of more efficient technologies (larger vehicles, more
efficient management…), even if higher environmental taxes are somehow introduced. Increasing
concentration of transport operators at global scale.
The Baseline scenario assumes that freight transport in Europe will only increase at the projected
economic growth rate, resulting only in an 80% increase between 2010 and 2050, that is a 1,5%
annum.

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18) Will long-distance passenger growth be decoupled from economic growth?
Growing long-distance passenger traffic. Worldwide passenger traffic would grow on average
5,1% yearly. To meet this increased demand for air transportation, the number of airplanes in the
worldwide fleet will grow at an annual rate of 3,6%. The traffic would grow at an average rate of
4,8% yearly between 2010 and 2030. Globally, the single biggest traffic flow will be the US
domestic market with 11.1% of all RPKs flown, while intra-Western European traffic, with its well
established global and low cost carriers, will be the third largest flow with nearly 8% of World
RPKs. The Chinese domestic market is forecast to grow at more than 7% per annum, moving it
from the fourth largest flow in 2010 to the second by 2030.
The Baseline scenario assumes that long-distance will not be decoupled from economic growth,
and both will grow in parallel.

19) Will urban transport be decoupled from economic growth?

Dealing with congested urban environments. Commuting transport is growing the least in Europe,
and long distance the most. The number of trips by person made in European cities will tend to
become more stable, even if GDP continues to grow, and their purposes more divers. Individual
transport modes (e.g. walking, riding a bike, or a motorbike, an small private car) will not be
significantly reduced, replaced by collective transport modes.
The Baseline scenario assumes that in congested urban environments, urban transport will tend
to be stable, independent of economic growth.

20) Will be Europe able to put in place energy efficiency?

Establishing an energy efficient economy. While energy efficiency improvements are widespread
over the coming decades in the World, total energy use is still projected to grow strongly at global
level. Over the next twenty years, global energy demand will increase by around 40%, and
double by 2050, with the vast majority of the growth coming from non-OECD countries such as
China and India. Most of the growth in energy production is located in developing regions, which
are projected to substantially increase their share in global production for the coming decades.
Energy dependency in European countries is to increase, 59% in 2030 and 65% in 2050,
compared to 54% in 2005. The price of energy will not decrease due to the rising of demand from
emerging economies which will compete for the same resources and commodities; hence energy
efficiency will be needed also for pure economic reasons.
The Baseline scenario assumes a tendency towards more energy efficiency and a moderate
transition to renewable energy sources, below the levels assumed by European targets in force.

21) Will be Europe able to take the lead in the green economy sector?
Dealing with the challenges of global warming. Reducing emissions will probably entail higher
costs for European firms, which will make them less competitive in the short-term, ceteris paribus,
with respect to countries where regulations are less ecologic. At the same time, this challenge
could bring long-term opportunities if Europe could establish itself as a forerunner in green
technology.
The Baseline scenario assumes that long-term potential competitive advantages will not
compensate certain short-term costs. Environmental regulations, applied to current markets and
existing technologies, will not be cost-effective, all considered.

22) Will be European agriculture more competitive?

Dealing with local and global agriculture. Europe is one of the World’s largest and most
productive suppliers of food and fibre (21% of global meat production and 20% of global cereal
production in 2004). 36% of European land is dedicated to agriculture. The productivity of

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European agriculture is generally high, in particular in Western Europe: average cereal yields in
the EU are 60% higher than the global average. In 2008 European countries had around 22% of
the total area cultivated organically in the world. Global food prices are growing in real terms, as a
result of growing world population, rising affluence, and the shift to Western dietary preference.
Competition for agricultural land with biofuel production may raise food prices as well (between
4% and 18% of EU’s agricultural land will be needed to produce the amount of biofuels to reach
the level of liquid fossil fuel replacement required for the transport sector in the Directive
2003/30/EC).
The Baseline scenario assumes an increase of local markets sensitive to ecological higher
quality. The “buy local” movement takes hold both based on environmentalist but also
protectionist motivation.

23) Will land-use patterns become more hybrid due to ineffective planning?
Dealing with increasingly mixed land-uses. Urban planning is stagnated and unable in many
areas of the World to give adequate response to growing population. In some areas, new
construction in urban areas has not kept up to demand, so crowding and sprawl to the
surrounding suburbs is apparent. Many regions have developed residential tourism economies
supported by extensive real estate operations in a general tendency towards more relaxed land
regulations and increasing land occupation, except in Northern countries with strict spatial
development regulation. New residential developments will mostly be located on agricultural
areas.
The baseline scenario assumes continuity in the trend towards increasing “Middle Landscapes”
largely composed by fuzzy urban-rural zones. Inland water bodies will remain attractive for new
residential development in South-eastern Europe and Western Europe, and so will be marine
water bodies in Mediterranean and Western Europe. Agricultural areas close to cities are likely to
be taken over by suburbanization. The area of forests is likely to expand while the area for
grassland is likely to decrease.

24) Will governments become more corporative?

Dealing with higher governance tensions. Future governance in European Countries will be
driven first by the type of societal value system we will be living in (more inclusive or more
exclusive), and second the kind of response by political and societal institutions (partial or
complete, proactive or reactive). Public sector still represents today 40% of the European
economies. There is a limited capacity to streamline public institutions. The public debt of most
countries remains above 50% of GDP. More public private partnership initiatives are expected.
Increasing financial problems in European countries on public services related to social
expenditures.
The baseline assumes a weaker institutional framework will result in higher influence of corporate
interests in public governance.

25) Will Europe become more spatially integrated?

Dealing with the integration of different European territories beyond political borders. Since the
adoption of the ESDP, there has been a necessity to develop a more functional approach to
European integration, based on enhanced policy integration and coordination between different
types of territories (e.g. metropolitan areas, cross-border areas, transnational regions, urban-rural
relationships). This emphasis on spatial integration is based on two main arguments. First, it has
become evident that regions and territories are increasingly interdependent in terms of socio-
economic growth and welfare development: in order to sustain these interdependencies, EU
policymakers have developed policy initiatives and mechanisms supporting further spatial
integration. Second, a better policy coordination and integration both between sectors and

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between territories may lead to substantial savings in public funding (i.e. avoiding unnecessary
redundancies in public investments) and create stronger socio-economic leverages due to larger
and more targeted investments. However, the difficulties encountered to find the right balance in
territorial governance adjustments may seem daunting in an era requiring swift and transparent
decision-making structures. Social integration is still weak in Europe. Only 2% of Europeans live
and work in other European countries. Cross-border short-distance flows of people remain
marginal, despite cooperation initiatives. International relations between European countries grow
less than could be expected, given the geographic proximity and the common market.
The baseline assumes no significant advancement will be made when it comes to spatial and
cross-sectoral integration, with the mere continuation of existing structures and initiatives.

4.3 Baseline Key Directions

Based on the answers provided to previous questions, key directions of the Baseline Scenario
are presented at aggregated European level for most relevant sectors. These Key Directions will
be further developed at a territorial more desegregated scale (NUTS2 or NUTS3), based on
typologies developed by past ESPON projects, and evolutions overtime refined, based on the
results of the modelling exercise to be developed.

1) Ageing Population
Increasing ageing and labour scarcity in Europe due to persistent low fertility rates and increasing
life expectancy. Population growth in developing Asian and African countries and the demand for
labour in Europe lead to the increasing immigration targeted to areas where lower skill jobs are
available, as well as to cosmopolitan centres where talented people are attracted. The
consequences of ageing may be different for different regions and may affect migration flows
across regions in different ways. A major consequence of the ageing of the population is that the
working age population will decline with downward effects on economic growth and
competitiveness of many European regions.

2) Relative Economic Decline

Continuation of present trends of globalisation, free trade, extension of resources through
technological innovation, but less intensive than years before. The gap in GDP and welfare
between the EU and developing countries worldwide is reduced. A growing middle class emerge
worldwide. European economy is more dependent on services and advanced tourism.
Reindustrialisation limited to traditionally industrial zones. Increase of local markets for
agricultural products. Transport industry, food processing and design niches may remain
competitive, but in other sectors European industries will not be World leaders (microelectronics
and computers, software, genetics, nanotechnology…).

3) Growing inequities:
Increasing polarisation among more developed and less developed regions, as well as between
cities in regions and neighbourhoods within cities, beyond traditional core-peripheral paradigms.
The electronic unravelling of traditional imperatives of adjacency may produce urban
rearrangements but it is unlikely to result in random scattering and galloping decentralisation.
Reduction of financial transfers and solidarity between regions and countries at EU level, as well
as Cohesion Policies, due to the financial shortage of National administrations.

4) Risk Adverse Society:

Salaries continue to loose purchase power and reduces consumerism. Private debts remain high,
but do not increase from actual levels. More environmentally sensitive and reactive society.

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Identities attached to the territory gain importance, leading to selected closure from foreign
activities and cultural influence, excepts in cosmopolitan centres, increased protectionism and
self-sustainability. Overprotected place-based strategies in wealthier communities. Informal
relations still dominant in peripheral and less developed zones and conflictive neighbourhoods.

5) Insufficient Technologic Innovation

The new technologic wave of innovations linked to nanotechnologies and biomedicine, energy
and artificial intelligence will take longer than expected. Technology is not the panacea to solve
actual problems. Slow implementation of actual technologies (e.g. Smart Cities, Electric Grid…) in
Europe. Insufficient research efforts, with significant but limited exceptions. Ineffective planning.

6) More diversified energy sources

Even though a large increase in renewable energy is expected, and energy supply is more
diversified, fossil fuels will still be the most important energy sources in the short-term and prices
will keep rising at a moderate rate. EU energy dependency will also increase to some extend.
Growing territorial conflicts linked to resource and risk management, for energy and other
resources (e.g. water).

7) Subverted proximities
More productive long-distance transport and communications services connecting some selected
nodes in Europe to premium Global nodes Political borders are surpassed by flows but cross-
border relations remain weak in Europe. Neighboring places become more distant while some
remote places become much closer. Geographic proximities are subverted by networks
connecting from the body to the globe, as well as by Virtual Communities.

8) Differentiated territorial patterns

Extraordinary diverse evolution of territorial patterns, from compact cities and nodes around
transport nodes, to more disperse urbanisation, fragmented and specialised developments in a
general tendency towards more relaxed land regulations and increasing land occupation.
Paradoxically, this tendency reduces the value of the territory as position and increases its value
as place, and landscape.

9) Increasing Urbanisation
The urbanization process and the development towards larger urban centres is expected to
continue all over Europe, although the rate with which this process takes place is expected to be
slower in Western Europe than in the rest of Europe. Urban sprawl remains an important issue
and new urban development can mainly be found in areas formerly occupied by agriculture,
causing agricultural areas close to cities to be taken over by suburbanization. Europe becomes a
landscape largely composed by fuzzy urban-rural zones, with urban developments customised to
specific people’s and corporative needs. More focus on reurbanisation projects in the center of
large cities and neighbourhoods.

10) Land Scarcity

Competition of land is expected to increase, due to a further urbanization, an increasing demand
for meat and dairy products and the need to maintain a sufficient agricultural production, together
with an increasing demand for bio-energy crops, all while meeting ambitious environmental goals,
such as the GAEC standards for permanent pastures, the nitrate and water framework directive
and the biodiversity action plan BAP). This increasing demand for land is likely to further slow-
down the expansion of the forests that Europe experienced over the past decades.

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11) Climate Changes
Stronger impacts of Climate Change than projected by climate researchers, and more strong
restrictive measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (fuel, taxes, emission trading schemes)
are applied; since these measures are not fully cost-effective they contribute to further reduce
economic growth.

12) Corporative Government

Increasing financial problems on public services related to social expenditures. Limited
investments on infrastructure, and R&D focused on selected fields. Either populists and
technocrats in charge of Public Administrations. Rising of corporative government. Political power
partially transferred to international larger corporations

13) Multiple-speed and multi-level European governance.

Increasing coordination on fiscal and labour policies among central EU countries while others
have specific cooperation agreements with them, as well as with other neighboring countries, and
other countries worldwide, in a more complicated and variable institutional geometry. Reduction
of solidarity with Third Countries and increasing international conflicts. Territorial authorities
become less efficient, at all administrative scales.

14) EU facing its permanent dilemmas

The European Union will carry on oscillating between further policy- and territorial integration and
disintegration. Capitalising on historical landmark breakthroughs such as the Single Act, the
Maastricht and Lisbon Treaties, and the single currency policy, federalists and functionalists will
continue making their strong case for a more extensive use of the “Community Method”, the only
efficient way to secure further policy integration, which the EU desperately needs to avoid being
turned into a club of dwarf states in the global context. In contrast, intergovernmentalists will
persist in resisting any move towards further EU integration. Supported by emerging populist
parties, they will argue that any further infringement on national sovereignties cannot be
tolerated, all the more so as alternatives such as the Open Method of Coordination do exist. A
similar scenario will take place in the framework the EU cohesion policy. Activists of the
Territorial Cohesion ideal will keep on promoting vertical and horizontal integration of various
sector policies with a territorial impact as well as territorial integration, while advocating the
adoption of a formal EU territorial strategy. Territorial planning sceptics will take the opposite line:
arguing that integrated planning is an old fashioned concept doomed to failure (as demonstrated
in Eastern Europe during the cold war), they will support a flexible approach based on a case-by-
case evaluation of the territorial impact of various policies and projects.

15) Towards a Multiple-Speed Europe

Member States will remain the key political actors in the European Union, since they were in the
Rome Treaty. The political integration process, after the failure of the European Constitution and
the current economic crisis, will follow during the next decades a multiple-speed evolution, with
continuous small adjustments overtime, slowly moving Southern and Eastern Member States, as
well as Neighbouring Countries, to have particular ad-hoc cooperation agreements with more
integrated Central and Northern countries. More fiscal integration will be necessary to reduce
monetary instability, if the euro-zone has to be maintained. Populist tensions will emerge and
become stronger in the next decade. The enlargement process will be delayed, limited to few
countries in the Balkans. Territorial Cooperation between cities and regions in different countries
will be limited to specific cross-border areas, or restrained in time, on the basis of specific issue-
based cooperation initiatives. European policies will remain the result of increasingly complicated
multi-party negotiations among Member States, and nationalistic short term positions will still
prevail in front of long-term common interests. European visions, such as the current Europe

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2020 Strategy, will have limited political influence, in an intergovernmental frame where European
institutions may complement Member States in some areas, but can’t substitute them in the
critical ones. Territorial governance becomes less prioritized in subsequent European strategies,
and essentially returns to a classic spatial dichotomy between urban and innovative regions as
growth engines of Europe and lagging regions that needs to converge. The mode of EU
governance returns essentially towards an inter-governalist approach.

16) A Frozen EU Budget

The 7-year period Financial Perspective 2014-2020 will probably be frozen, despite EU request
for a 5% increase. EU Budget will remain not much higher than 1% of European GDP, with a
progressive reduction of the budget allocated to agriculture (40% in 2012), and cohesion
(Structural and Cohesion Funds (approximately 35% in 2012), and relative increases in all other
sectors, particularly research and competitiveness-related policies. More balanced transfers
between Member States and European institutions. The European Union will not be able to raise
its own taxes or generate debts to finance its programmes. Common policies will be effective in
regulatory aspects, such as market competition and environmental protection, complementary to
Member States own regulations, but will hardly be able to apply common European strategies in
the redistribution of funds among countries and regions, each country pursuing its own interest.

17) Low ambition in making value of the territorial framework of the Cohesion policy
The Cohesion policy is expected to represent 48% of EU budget up to 2020. Structural Funds in
2012 represent 58%, of Cohesion Policies budget, the European Social Fund 22% and the
Cohesion Fund 20%. Even when the EU offers a more territorialized framework for the post-2013
programming period than in the past, with the Common Strategic Framework integrating territorial
policies and funds, with the reinforcement of the multilevel governance scheme, with “integrated
territorial investments” and the generalisation of local development to all territorial funds, the
potential of this territorial framework will remain substantially unexploited, with new strategic
territorial planning documents in line with ESDP (1999) or the Territorial Agenda 2020 (2011)
remaining of very low political influence. The Cohesion budget will progressively be reduced in
the mid term, and will increasingly tend to be more focused on promoting a competitive
environment adapted to the cycles of the economy (e.g. avoiding excess of investment on fast
growth situation). Structural Funds will be progressively reduced and allocated to promote more
economic activities than basic infrastructure. Since policies will be more sensitive to disparities at
local and intraregional level, social funds will tend to be better linked to urban redevelopment
plans and targeted to deprived areas and neighbourhoods with social tensions. More integration
between Cohesion policy and other sectoral policies, particularly Pillar II of the CAP,
environmental and transport policies, is expected in order to create more leverages for regional
development in spite of reduced financial resources available.

18) Agricultural Policies more focused on rural development and natural preservation
The CAP is in the process of being reformed in 2013. It will continue being ruled by the more
demanding regulation geared towards a viable food production, sustainable management of
natural resources and climate action, and also rural development. While Pillar I covers direct
payments and market measures providing a basic annual income support to EU farmers and
support (75% funds 2012), Pillar II covers rural development (25% funds 2012). Pillars will be
maintained, funds will be progressively increased in Pillar II, and mechanisms to transfer funds
from the second to the first pillar will tend to become more limited. Subsidies to production will
tend to be reduced in favour of objectives such as landscape management, ecologic production,
more self-sufficiency and access to local markets. Integrated rural development plans outside the
agricultural sector will become much more relevant than today, particularly focussed on

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promoting tourism, improving commercial chains between producers and consumers, and
promoting bottom-up public-private initiatives, at National and European level.

19) Transport policies aim to better regulate markets and promote new technologies
The European Transport White Paper 2010-2020, and the Transeuropean Networks Guidelines
for Transport continues the previous evolution of the Common Transport Policy. It remains
focused on liberalising and further integrating the European transport system, particularly the rail
sector, introducing right market incentives (e.g. the user-pays principle) and promoting the
implementation of more effective technologies from economic and environmental point of view.
Reducing mobility demand will not be an option, nor forcing economically non sustainable modal
shifts, since transport demand is expected to grow for long-distance relations above GDP growth,
both for freight and for passengers, and all trip purposes, especially between European main
nodes and the rest of the World. the TEN-T Core Networks represent a major investment on long-
distance infrastructure from 2012 to 2030 (€ 1,5 trillion), with a relatively dense rail networks for
freight and passenger connecting all major airports and ports in the long-term. It is unlikely that
this ambitious investment programme will be realised. Transport investments on infrastructures
with low socioeconomic profitability will hardly be supported by European funds, even if they may
have social or territorial cohesion interest. At urban level, decoupling mobility and economic
growth is expected and urban policies will be focused on applying intelligent systems to manage
mobility, increasingly carried out by public modes and more environmentally friendly individual
modes; since noise, pollution and stress, may tend to be reduced, the centre of European cities
will become more liveable, attractive and productive environments. Safety will be an increasingly
important goal.

20) More integrated Environmental Policies

Environmental directives have been effective in imposing higher environmental standards across
European countries and promoting the European environmental sector. The Road Map towards
the 7th Environmental Action Programme fixes an ambitious programme having as a paramount
target the reduction of 20% GHG emissions by 2020 (in relation to 1990 levels), and 80% by
2050, to mitigate the impacts of Climate Change. In addition to the more traditional elements of
environmental policy (biodiversity, water, waste, etc) the 7th EAP will build on the actions set out
in the Resource Efficiency Roadmap and will also have to deal among others with changing the
behaviour of consumers, especially the new roles of urban communities, while it will renew the
emphasis on the international aspect of environmental policy, setting the basis for a global green
growth while continuing to strive for better global environmental governance. Financing
environmental policy objectives will require a mix of public and private means given the pressures
on public budgets. In April 2009 the European Commission presented a policy paper known as a
White Paper on Adaptation to Climate Change which presents the framework for adaptation
measures and policies to reduce the European Union's vulnerability to the impacts of climate
change. In the long-run, it is expected that European environmental regulations will not be much
relaxed and will tend to be more important for all economic sectors, particularly Real Estate,
Energy or Transport. Environmental taxation may tend to be slowly integrated into other
taxations, and the polluter-pays principle generally applied at National level, based on common
European criteria, generating additional revenues to be applied to environmental management.
Plans for Natural Protection and Management will be one of few cases of permanent cross-border
cooperation in Europe.

21) Energy policies begin

The Lisbon Treaty (2007) laid out for the first time the EU's competencies in the Energy area and
the key objectives of energy policy (Energy Plan for Europe), and declared it to be an area of
'shared competence'. Given the high dependency of most European countries from oil and gas

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produced by neighbouring countries the need to straightening this policy is clear, however the
National strategies are different (e.g. while France maintains a high Nuclear capacity, other
countries have a lower capacity and even reduce it). Also the need to develop an integrated but
decentralised Electric Grid at continental level, largely powered by renewal sources, will push in
favour of more cooperation in this political field. The Energy Roadmap 2050 focus on EU's
decarbonisation (reduce by 95% in carbon emissions from primary energy sources by 2050,
compared to 1990 levels.) According to the EU 2020 Strategy, the EU is committed to reducing its
own emissions by at least 20%, reducing its energy consumption by 20% and increasing the
proportion of renewable energies in its energy mix by 20% by 2020, and different countries have
their own targets. A 10% biofuel component in vehicle fuel is also envisaged by 2020, but it is
estimated that between 4% and 18% of the total agricultural land in the EU would be needed to
allow this threshold, making it both likely and desirable that these needs will in fact be met
through a combination of domestic EU production and imports from third countries. The EC has
outlined a master plan for an integrated energy network taking into account key interconnections
with third countries, in its Communication on ‘Energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and
beyond’. Since it is not likely that a strong Common Energy Policy emerge in the coming
decades, it is expected that the energy corporations existing in different countries, often public
companies, may follow more or less compatible but different, often competitive, strategies.

22) European Research programs will grow

One of the flagship initiatives of the Europe 2020 strategy is innovation. This new approach aims
to support innovation in fields that represent challenges for European society, such as climate
change, energy efficiency, food safety, health and the ageing population. In this regard, one of
the objectives to be reached in 2020 – namely 3% of the gross EU domestic product to be
invested in research and development – is difficult to achieve giving the current economic
situation. The fragmentation of research into National programmes diminishes its effectiveness, in
relation to American or Chinese programmes. Horizon 2020 will be a key tool in implementing
the Innovation Union flagship initiative and it will focus on excellent science (35% of total budget),
industrial leadership with dedicated support for ICT, nanotechnologies, advanced materials,
biotechnology, advanced manufacturing and processing, and space; facilitate access to venture
capital; and provide support for innovation in SMEs. (25% of total budget); and society changes
such as food security, health and wellbeing, efficient energy, smart green transport, climate action
and resource efficiency, and inclusive innovative societies (40% of total budget). The budget of
Horizon 2020 is of EUR 80 billion. It is expected that in following programmes the budget and the
ambition of European integrated research programmes may grow.

23) Migration policies maintained

EU members were historically allowed to set their own policy on migration. However, the Treaty
of Amsterdam (1997) and the Tampere European Council (1999) gave the EU responsibility for
setting a Common Immigration and Asylum Policy, with the principal aim of making migration safe
and legally controlled. Since 1997, EU member states have not made a sufficient progress in
developing a common position on these issues, and it is not expected that the progress will be
intensified in the future, however the Lisbon Treaty (2007) strengthened the ability of EU
authorities to determine member states' immigration and asylum policies. Advances towards
developing a common migration policy are being made, in particular by developing various
directives (eg single permit directive, directive on the right to family reunification, directives
concerning students and researchers …), but countries will keep the right to decide about their
admission policies.

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4.4 Baseline Quantitative Description

Baseline at a glance
In this section first reference values for key indicators are provided as starting point for the
modelling exercise. Values are obtained from a large number of sources at global and European
level and made consistent, at aggregated European level, by using TV+ and PASH+ Meta-
models.
Based on the results to be obtained from forecast models in the next months, integrated through
the meta-analysis process, the values presented next will be refined and adjusted whenever
needed. Main sources used for reference are always indicated (MM means ET2050 Meta-model,
in the cases no other source has been used as reference).
Next table presents working hypothesis to be validated or modified by the actual results produced
by forecast models. An extended version of this table, including the quantitative World framework
and the European main drivers and trends is available as an Annex in the end of this report.

Trend
Headline Baseline snapshot Rate of change
2010-2050
Around 525 millions between
Population in EU27 peaks by 2025 and 2030, and Population growth rates from
2040 with 526 millions, and declining thereafter. +0,3% yearly in 2010 to
Population starts declining. +0,2% yearly in 2030 and to
17% of population older than
65 in 2010, 24% in 2030 and -0,15% yearly in 2050
29% in 2050.

Share of people older than

25% increase in age-related 80 from 4,2% in 2010 to Dependency ratio increasing
and social welfare 10,6% in 2050. Dependency at 1,2% yearly between 2010
Society expenditure between 2010 ratio from 46% in 2010 to and 2030, and 1,0%
and 2050. 72% in 2050 (3 dependants thereafter towards 2050
for every 4 workers, approx)

GDP per capita in 2050

GDP growth rate from 6% in
43.000 euros (1.8 times
1970 to 2,0% in 2000, 1,6%
2010’s).
Sluggish recovery in 2030 and 1,4% in 2050.
Economy
Labour productivity in 2050
Labour productivity growth
100.000 euros per worker
stabilised around 1,8%
(2.1 times 2010’s)
Convergence for government
R&D expenditure in the EU,
but intense polarisation of
Inability to increase R&D private.
investment to 3% (EU2020 R&D investment stabilised in
Technology
goal). Old technologies and 1,9% of EU27 GDP.
evading technologies
(emotion controllers,
immersive virtual-reality)

Energy imports from 54% in

2005 to 59% in 2030 and
Decreasing energy
65% in 2050.
consumption only after 2030, Between 2010 and 2050,
Energy 43
but increasing energy RES in gross final energy 45% energy intensity drop.
dependence. demand, from 11% in 2010
to 25% in 2050.

43
Energy required to produce a GDP unit (TOE per euro)

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 Trend
Headline Baseline snapshot Rate of change
2010-2050
Rail modal share below 5% Total passenger transport
Sustained growth of traffics, in 2050 (6,6% in 1995, 6,2% activity (including
Transport and increasing share of road in 2009) for passengers, and international aviation) to
transport below 7% for freight (12,6% increase 51% between 2005
in 1995, 10% in 2009). and 2050.
Accelerating growth of
metropolitan areas driven by
globalisation and knowledge
society, especially capital From 55% urban population
Land-Uses Increasing urbanisation cities; but population in 1950 to 73% in 2010, 80%
increase in a number of in 2030 and 89% in 2050.
medium sized highly rural
towns linked to attractive
landscape and quality of life.

GHG emissions in 2010

represent 87% of 1990’s, in
2030 76% and 2050 65%.
Decreasing CO2 emissions Still, 2050 EU27 target is to Between 2010 and 2050,
Environment but established targets are reduce to 80%, by 2020 44
25% carbon intensity drop.
not met (EU2020), and 20% by 2050
(July’09 agreement in G8
summit)

Nation-States remain the key

Multiple-speed and Multi- players in Europe, and follow No further enlargement in
Governance level more complex different integration and the Union after Romania’s
governance cooperation patterns. EU and Bulgaria’s in 2007
budget ramins at 1% GDP

Figure 4-2 Main Characteristics of Baseline Scenario

Baseline level of fulfilment of EU targets

Sector Horizon Official European Target Baseline assumption

Public expenditure permanently Annual government deficit under 3% below 1% Complies
Government debt under 60% of GDP 63% in 2030 // 50% in Complies
permanently
2050
75% of the 20-64 year-olds to be 71% in 2030 // 72% in Does not comply
Employment 2050
employed 2050
From 1.8% to 3% of the EU's GDP 1,9% Does not comply
R&D / innovation 2020 (public and private combined) to be
invested in R&D
Total greenhouse gas emissions 14% reduction 2020 Does not comply
GHG emissions 2020
20% in 2020 lower than 1990
Total greenhouse gas emissions 35% reduction 2050 Does not comply
2050
80% in 2050 lower than 1990
20% of total energy from renewables 14,8% in 2020 Does not comply
Energy sources 2020
in 2020
20% increase in energy efficiency by 15% in 2020 Does not comply
2020
Energy 2020
consumption 50% increase in energy efficiency by 22% in 2030 Does not comply
2030
2030

44
Emissions relieved per energy unit (CO2 tonnes per TOE)

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Sector Horizon Official European Target Baseline assumption
Transport emissions (including CO2 2% lower Does not comply
Transport 2030 aviation, excl. maritime), 20% lower
in 2030 in relation 2008
Transport emissions (including CO2 2% lower Does not comply
2050 aviation, excl. maritime), 60% lower
in 2050 in relation 1990’s
Multi-modal TEN-T core network by Only partially Does not comply
TEN-T 2030
2030 achieved
All core network airports connected Only partially Does not comply
2050 to rail network by 2050, preferably by achieved
high-speed rail
All core seaports sufficiently Only partially Does not comply
connected to the rail freight and, achieved
2050
where possible, inland waterway
system.
Lower to 50% the use of 70% Does not comply
Urban transport 2030 “conventionally-fueled” cars in urban
transport
0% use of “conventionally-fueled” 30% Does not comply
2050
cars in urban transport
CO2 free logistics in cities by 2030 Only partially Does not comply
2030
achieved
By 2020, 50% fatalities in road Accomplished Complies
Road transport 2030// 2050 transport. Close to zero fatalities in
road transport by 2050.
Car emissions: 95 g CO2/km target 110 g CO2/km Does not comply
2020
for 2020
30% of road freight over 300km Share of road freight Does not comply
should shift to other modes such as transport over 300km
rail or waterborne transport by 2030, is maintained
2030 // 2050
and more than 50% by 2050
(facilitated by efficient and green
freight corridors)..
To triple the length of high-speed rail Increases by 50% Does not comply
Rail transport 2030
network by 2030.
To complete a European high-speed Doubles its current Does not comply
2050
rail network by 2050. length
By 2050, the majority of medium- Share of rail mid Does not comply
distance passenger transport should distance passenger
2050 go by rail. . transport increased
but air transport still
dominant
Low-carbon sustainable fuels in 20% Does not comply
Aviation 2050
aviation to reach 40% by 2050
Stabilisation of air emissions by Only partially Does not comply
2020 (carbon neutral growth) and achieved
2020 // 2050
50% reduction in 2050 compared to
2005
CO2 emissions from maritime Only partially Does not comply
transport should be cut by 40% (if achieved
Maritime 2050
feasible 50%) by 2050, compared to
2005 levels
Transport SESAR, Modernised air traffic Only partially Does not comply
2020
management management infrastructure. achieved
To establish the framework for a Only partially Does not comply
European multimodal transport achieved
2020
information, management and
payment system

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Sector Horizon Official European Target Baseline assumption
Move towards full application of Only partially Does not comply
2050 “user pays” and “polluter pays” achieved
principles
Reducing school drop-out rates 13% in 2020 Does not comply
Education 2020
below 10% by 2020
at least 20 million fewer people in or 1,6 million only Does not comply
Social exclusion 2020 at risk of poverty and social
exclusion by 2020

Figure 4-3 Level of fulfilment of official targets by ET2050 Baseline

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Logic relationships between trends and key directions for the Baseline

Figure 4-4 Logic framework for the Baseline Scenario

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5. Exploratory Scenarios
5.1 Approach
A review of almost 100 prospective studies defining scenarios for 2030 and 2050 (approximately
300 different scenarios) at European and World level has been carried out to support a next step
on the discussion process related to Exploratory Scenarios.
Next table shows a synthesis of most relevant scenarios studied, according to the geographic
scale of reference and the consideration of main drivers.
After, the next two graphics display the same scenarios according to key policy-aims.
The analysis is based on an expert qualitative judgment when the scenario does not provide a
quantitative description.
Next sections introduces the more relevant scenarios identified in the ET2050 context.

TERRITORIAL MAIN DRIVERS

IDENTIFICATION

Governance
Technology

Behaviour
European

National
Global

Local
REPORT / STUDY SCENARIOS

Perpetual Motion
1

Urban Colonies
UK OFFICE SCIENCE & 3
TECHNOLOGY 2055
Tribal Trading
4

Good Intentions
2

Triumphant Markets
2

The Hundred Flowers

3
FORWARD STUDIES
UNIT
Shared Responsibilities
"Five different futures for 2
Europe" 2010
Creative Societies
4

Turbulent Neighbourhoods
2

Strong Europe
2

Transatlantic Market
CPB, "4 FUTURES 4 1
EUROPE" 2040
Regional Communities
4

Global Economy
1

Take the A-Train

1
EMCC. "Trends and
drivers of Change in the I'm in love with my car
1
EU transport and logistics
sector:scenarios 2017" Riding the rainbow
2008 1

Moonlight ride in a Diesel

1

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 TERRITORIAL MAIN DRIVERS
IDENTIFICATION

Governance
Technology

Behaviour
European

National
Global

Local
REPORT / STUDY SCENARIOS

Pro-active Europe
2

ESPON 3.2. Europe 2030 Cohesion-oriented

2

Competitiveness-oriented
2

The Markets First

1

Policy First
1
UN GEO-3
Security First
1

Sustainability First
1

Knowledge is King
2

MEDACTION 2030 Big is beautiful

2

Convulsive Change
2

Market Forces
1

Policy Reform
GLOBAL SCENARIO 1
GROUP
Great Transitions
4

Fortess World
3

S&T develops a Mind of its Own

1

The World Wakes Up

MILLENIUM PROJECT 1
SCENARIOS 2025
Please, turn off the Spigot
1

Backlash
3

Geen economy
FOCI - Future Orientation 2
for Cities 2030
Enhancing the European potential
2

Green High-Tech
2

Energy-efficient Europe
2
ReRisk 2030
Nuclear Energy for Big Regions
2

Business as usual?
2

The Reference scenario

4

The Pro-active scenario ("Green

SS-LR 2030
Economy") 4

The Defensive scenario

4

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 TERRITORIAL MAIN DRIVERS
IDENTIFICATION

Governance
Technology

Behaviour
European

National
Global

Local
REPORT / STUDY SCENARIOS

BAU
2

Gradual response to climate

change + high levels of State 2
ESPON EDORA 2030
Rapid response to climate change
+ low levels of State 2

Rapid response to climate change

+ high levels of State 2

Cybertopia
1

MILLENIUM PROJECT The Rich Get Richer

1
SCENARIOS 2050 (Global
Exporatory Scenarios) A Passive mean World
1

Trading places
1

Netherlands Trend Scenario by NEAA

1
Environmental
Assessment Agency 2050 Challenge Scenario by NEAA
1

Planned-opolis
4

Sprawl-ville
Megacities on the Move 4
2040
Renew-abad
4

Communi-city
4

Pear World
1

Apple World
PASHMINA: The World in 3
2050
Orange World
2

Potato World
4

Nobody cares: standstill in

European integration 2

EU under threats: a fragmented

Global Europe 2050
Europe 3

EU renaissance: further European

integration 2

Talent Towns
4

Cosmopolitan Centres
3
Netherlands 2040
Egalitarian Ecologies
4

Metropolitan Markets
1

France 2040 Hyperpolisation

2

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 TERRITORIAL MAIN DRIVERS
IDENTIFICATION

Governance
Technology

Behaviour
European

National
Global

Local
REPORT / STUDY SCENARIOS

Regiopolisation
4

Postpolisation
4

Dépolisation
4

L’Archipel éclaté (un scénario

néolibéral) 3

Le local différencié (un scénario

néo-communautaire)
Aménager la France 2020
Le centralisme rénové (un
scénario néo-jacobin) 2

Le polycentrisme maillé (un

scénario de l'équité) 2

Clever and Caring

2

Fast Forward
2
One Planet Economy 2050
Breaking Point
2

Slow Motion
2

Open Governance
2

Leviathan Governance
2
Digital Europe 2030
Privatised Governance
2

Self-Governance Governance
4

Europe’s Innovative Societies

2

European Innovation Fatigue

2
Innovating Futures 2025
Cities Go Ahead
4

Innovations for Innovation’s Sake

2

Blueprints
Shell Energy Scenarios 1
2050
Scramble
1

Moving alone
2

Moving together
TRANSVISIONS 2
European Transport 2050
Stop moving
2

Moving less
2

Logistics 2050 Mega-efficiency in Megacities

4

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 TERRITORIAL MAIN DRIVERS
IDENTIFICATION

Governance
Technology

Behaviour
European

National
Global

Local
REPORT / STUDY SCENARIOS

Customized lifestyles
4

Paralysing protectionism
3

Global resilience – local adaptation

1

Great Escape
2

Evolved Society
2

PRELUDE of Europe’s
Clustered Networks
future 4

Lettuce surprice U
2

Europe of Cohesion
2

Sustainability
2

PLUREL Hyper-Tech
4
"Urban development
Scenarios 2025" Fragmentation
2

Extreme water
4

Figure 5-1 Classification of scenarios according to geographic scale of reference and the
consideration of main drivers

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 Smart
Sustainable

Triumphant Markets The Hundred Flow ers

Shared Responsibilities Creative Societies
Turbulent Neighbourhoods Perpetual Motion
Urban Colonies Tribal Trading
Good Intentions Market Forces
Policy First Security First
Sustainability First S&T develops a Mind of its Ow n
The World Wakes Up Please, turn off the Spigot
Backlash Take the A-Train
I'm in love w ith my car Riding the rainbow
Moonlight ride in a Diesel Pro-active Europe
Cohesion-oriented (Danubean Europe) Competitiveness-oriented (Rhine-Rhone Europe)
Know ledge is King Big is beautiful
Convulsive Change Strong Europe
Transatlantic Market Regional Communities
Global Economy Geen economy
Enhancing the European potential Green High-Tech
Energy-efficient Europe Nuclear Energy for Big Regions
Business as usual? The Reference scenario
The Pro-active scenario ("Green Economy") The Defensive scenario
Gradual response to climate change + high levels of State BAU
Rapid response to climate change + low levels of State Rapid response to climate change + high levels of State
Cybertopia The Rich Get Richer
A Passive mean World Trading places
Trend Scenario by NEAA Challenge Scenario by NEAA
Planned-opolis Spraw l-ville
Renew -abad Communi-city
Pear World Apple World
Orange World Potato World
Nobody cares: standstill in European integration EU under threats: a fragmented Europe
EU renaissance: further European integration Talent Tow ns
Cosmopolitan Centres Egalitarian Ecologies
Metropolitan Markets Clever and Caring
Fast Forw ard Breaking Point
Slow Motion Open Governance
Leviathan Governance Privatised Governance
Self-Governance Governance Europe’s Innovative Societies
European Innovation Fatigue Cities Go Ahead
Innovations for Innovation’s Sake Blueprints
Scramble Moving alone
Moving together Stop moving
Moving less Mega-efficiency in Megacities
Customized lifestyles Paralysing protectionism
Global resilience – local adaptation Great Escape
Evolved Society Clustered Netw orks
Lettuce surprice U Europe of Cohesion
Sustainability Hyper-Tech
Fragmentation Extreme w ater
Hyperpolisation Regiopolisation
Postpolisation Dépolisation
L’Archipel éclaté (un scénario néolibéral) Le local différencié (un scénario néo-communautaire)
Le centralisme rénové (un scénario néo-jacobin) Le polycentrisme maillé (un scénario de l'équité)

Figure 5-2 Classification of scenarios according to Smart and Sustainable policy aims

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 Smart
Inclusive

Triumphant Markets The Hundred Flow ers

Shared Responsibilities Creative Societies
Turbulent Neighbourhoods Perpetual Motion
Urban Colonies Tribal Trading
Good Intentions Market Forces
Policy First Security First
Sustainability First S&T develops a Mind of its Ow n
The World Wakes Up Please, turn off the Spigot
Backlash Take the A-Train
I'm in love w ith my car Riding the rainbow
Moonlight ride in a Diesel Pro-active Europe
Cohesion-oriented (Danubean Europe) Competitiveness-oriented (Rhine-Rhone Europe)
Know ledge is King Big is beautiful
Convulsive Change Strong Europe
Transatlantic Market Regional Communities
Global Economy Geen economy
Enhancing the European potential Green High-Tech
Energy-efficient Europe Nuclear Energy for Big Regions
Business as usual? The Reference scenario
The Pro-active scenario ("Green Economy") The Defensive scenario
Gradual response to climate change + high levels of State BAU
Rapid response to climate change + low levels of State Rapid response to climate change + high levels of State
Cybertopia The Rich Get Richer
A Passive mean World Trading places
Trend Scenario by NEAA Challenge Scenario by NEAA
Planned-opolis Spraw l-ville
Renew -abad Communi-city
Pear World Apple World
Orange World Potato World
Nobody cares: standstill in European integration EU under threats: a fragmented Europe
EU renaissance: further European integration Talent Tow ns
Cosmopolitan Centres Egalitarian Ecologies
Metropolitan Markets Clever and Caring
Fast Forw ard Breaking Point
Slow Motion Open Governance
Leviathan Governance Privatised Governance
Self-Governance Governance Europe’s Innovative Societies
European Innovation Fatigue Cities Go Ahead
Innovations for Innovation’s Sake Blueprints
Scramble Moving alone
Moving together Stop moving
Moving less Mega-efficiency in Megacities
Customized lifestyles Paralysing protectionism
Global resilience – local adaptation Great Escape
Evolved Society Clustered Netw orks
Lettuce surprice U Europe of Cohesion
Sustainability Hyper-Tech
Fragmentation Extreme w ater
Hyperpolisation Regiopolisation
Postpolisation Dépolisation
L’Archipel éclaté (un scénario néolibéral) Le local différencié (un scénario néo-communautaire)
Le centralisme rénové (un scénario néo-jacobin) Le polycentrisme maillé (un scénario de l'équité)

Figure 5-3 Classification of scenarios according to Smart and Inclusive policy aims

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5.2 Analysis of most relevant Scenarios for ET2050

Spatial scenarios in relation to the ESDP and EU Cohesion Policy by ESPON (2007)45
The main objective of the ESPON 3.2 project was to develop spatial scenarios. The time horizon
for the spatial scenarios was set to 2015 (mid term) and 2030 (long term).
An integrated baseline scenario showed the probable evolution of the European territory in a
situation of no major changes (political or external). Two prospective policy scenarios explored
the effects of EU policy in a cohesion-oriented scenario (policies formulated with the goal of
social, economic and territorial cohesion as top priority) and in a competitiveness-oriented
scenario (overall global competitiveness of EU economy being the major objective).
The project discussed issues in the social, economic, territorial and environmental dimensions,
including considerations on transport and mobility. Find below the most relevant characteristics of
ESPON 3.2 scenarios in the mobility domain.
Next figure characterises considered scenarios:

Figure 5-4 ESPON 3.2 Scenarios in a cohesion // competitiveness 2D space

Source: Spatial scenarios in relation to the ESDP and EU Cohesion Policy by ESPON, 2007

45
ESPON 3.2 was carried out by a consortium constituted by IGEAT, AETS, BBR, CRS-HAS, CUDEM, DIG, MCRIT, NISR,
Nordregio, UMS 2414 Riate

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Baseline (trend) scenario

The territorial trend scenario for 2030 refers mainly to the impact of policy continuity in a context
where new challenges emerge, adding to those already existing. Areas with good pan-European
accessibility will spread from the central Pentagon area in almost all directions. However,
disparities in accessibility between central and more peripheral areas will remain significant,
especially regarding freight transport, and even more in terms of regional or local accessibility.

Sector Main Characteristics

Demography Reduced population ageing as a result of lower fertility and mortality rates
Stable total European population (+ enlargement)
Increasing, but globally controlled external migration
Unchanged constraints on internal migration
Economy Slowly increasing total activity rate
Slowly growing R&D expenditure, but constant technological gap vis-a-vis the USA
Decreasing public expenditure
Energy Steady increase of energy prices
Stable or decreasing European consumption
Increasing use of renewables
Transport Continued growth of traffic, but moderately curbed by energy price with possible modal shift
Constant increase of infrastructure endowment, but below demand needs
Partial application of the Kyoto Agreement
Rural Further liberalisation of international trade
development Increasing industrialisation of agricultural production, including the production of bio-fuels
Further diversification of functions of rural areas; stronger dependence upon the residential
economy and new forms of tourism
Progressive reduction of CAP budget
Socio-cultural Heterogeneous and insufficient policies related to integration
sector Growing ethnic, religious and social tensions
Governance Increasing co-operation between cross-border regions
Increase in multi-level and cross-sectoral approaches, but limited to specific programmes (rural
development);
Maintenance of competition and incoherence between - policies devoted to innovation and
competitiveness and
Others devoted to cohesion
Climate Moderate overall climate change (+1°)
Change Increase in extreme local events
Moderate emission levels due to new technologies
Few (too few) structural adaptation measures
Enlargement Bulgaria & Romania by 2007
Western Balkans (with Croatia acceding first) By 2020
Turkey By 2030
Continued combination of deepening and widening
Modest impact of neighbourhood policy
Figure 5-5 ESPON 3.2 - Hypotheses of the Baseline scenario
Source: Spatial scenarios in relation to the ESDP and EU Cohesion Policy by ESPON, 2007

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 Figure 5-6 ESPON 3.2 - Spatial structure of Baseline in 2030
Source: Source: Spatial scenarios in relation to the ESDP and EU Cohesion Policy by ESPON, 2007

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Competitiveness-Oriented scenario (Rhine-Rhone)

This scenario is a prospective, policy-oriented scenario. It is based on the assumption of a

significant reshaping of EU policies originating in the disappointing results of the implementation
of the Lisbon Strategy during the period 2000-2005. The EU budget is being reduced and EU
expenditures are being targeted towards R&D, education, ICT and strategic external accessibility,
including in structural policies. The CAP is subject to rapid and radical liberalisation, with a
significant reduction of support, of external tariffs and of export subsidies. The budget of structural
policies is also being reduced, with a part of former EU interventions being re-nationalised and
EU support being concentrated on the most competitive areas of less developed regions. As a
counterpart, public services are further liberalised and privatised, labour markets are regulated in
a more flexible way and the third pillar of EU policies (foreign policy, justice, security etc.) is being
strengthened.

Sector Main Characteristics

Demography Increase in selective external in-migration: economic sectors & destination

Abolition of constraints to internal migration
Increase in retirement age. Encouragement of fertility rate through fiscal incentives
Economy Stronger reduction of total public expenditure compared with the baseline scenario
Further privatisation and liberalization of public services
Prioritisation of public expenditures in R&D, education, ICT and strategic external accessibility
(ICT and transport)
More and easily accessible venture capital
‘Flexibilisation’ of labour markets
Energy Steady increase of energy prices
European consumption increasing
Realisation of TEN – E: investment in infrastructure according to market demand
Priority to large-scale energy production for metropolitan areas as an alternative for oil and gas
Transport Realisation of TEN-T: investment in infrastructure according to market demand
Prioritisation of links between metropolitan areas
Application of the Kyoto Agreement
Rural Rapid and radical liberalisation of CAP (reduction of tariffs, of budget and of export subsidies)
development Reduction of support to rural development policy
Rapid industrialisation of agricultural production
Strong dualisation of rural areas, resulting from market forces
Socio-cultural Reactive management of social problems in large cities
sector Increase of surveillance and security systems
Governance Abolishment of barriers to cross-border co-operation
Less public intervention
Wider application of the Open Method of Coordination
Increased role of private sector in decision making
Strengthening of the third pillar of the EU policies: foreign policy, justice, security
Climate Moderate overall climate change (+1°)
change Increase of extreme local events
Constant to increasing emission levels
Mitigation measures based on flexible schemes & stimulation of alternative technologies.
Adaptation measures only where cost efficient
Enlargement Continuing enlargement to widen the market:
Romania, Bulgaria in 2007 Western Balkan, EFTA/EEA countries in 2015 Turkey in 2020,
Strengthening of the neighbourhood policy (Maghreb, Ukraine, Russia etc.)
Figure 5-7 ESPON 3.2 - Hypotheses of the Competitiveness-Oriented scenario
Source: Spatial scenarios in relation to the ESDP and EU Cohesion Policy by ESPON, 2007

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 Figure 5-8 ESPON 3.2 - Spatial structure of Competitiveness-Oriented in 2030
Source: Source: Spatial scenarios in relation to the ESDP and EU Cohesion Policy by ESPON, 2007

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Cohesion-Oriented scenario (Danube)

In this scenario, the main priorities of public policies at EU level, in a context of growing
globalisation, are focused on economic, social and territorial cohesion and not on global
competitiveness.

Sector Main Characteristics

Demography Restrictive external migration policies

More flexible retirement ages
Better balance of population structure through encouragement of higher fertility rates
More flexible arrangements for child care
Unchanged constraints on internal migration
Economy Maintaining the volume of the EU budget
Reinforcement of structural funds and concentration on weakest regions
Further harmonization of taxation and social security systems, as far as non detrimental to the
competitiveness of less developed countries
Energy Steady increase of energy prices
Realisation of TEN-E
Promotion of decentralised energy production , particularly renewables
Transport Development of TEN-T with priority given to peripheral regions at different scales
Support to transport services in rural and less developed areas
Application of the Kyoto Agreement
Rural Minor CAP reforms, but shift from pillar 1 to pillar 2. Priority given to less developed rural regions
development in the field of direct payments to farmers (pillar 1)
Priority given to environmental and animal health criteria
Promotion of quality products
Active policy for economic diversification in rural areas, including SMEs, tourism, residential
functions etc.
Socio-cultural Promotion of regional and European identities
sector Integration of marginal groups like romany in peripheral areas
Proactive socio-cultural integration policies, particularly in cities
Increased fiscal and/or social investment in quality of life issues, like health, personal care, local
environment, etc...)
Governance Active multi-level territorial governance, particularly in areas supported by structural funds
Strong role of public actors in territorial governance
Stronger role for the European Commission
Climate Moderate overall climate change (+1°)
change Increase of extreme local events
Constant emission levels strict mitigation measures (taxes, road pricing as far as non detrimental
to peripheral regions)
Wide range of adaptation measures like EU hazard funds and large investments
Enlargement Deepening preferred to widening
Brake on further enlargements (except Bulgaria and Romania)
Only lip service to neighbourhood policy
Figure 5-9 ESPON 3.2 - Hypotheses of the Cohesion-Oriented scenario
Source: Spatial scenarios in relation to the ESDP and EU Cohesion Policy by ESPON, 2007

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 Figure 5-10 ESPON 3.2 - Spatial structure of Cohesion-Oriented in 2030
Source: Source: Spatial scenarios in relation to the ESDP and EU Cohesion Policy by ESPON, 2007

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The Netherlands of 2040 by Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (2010)
This study develops four scenarios that can be used to think about the future of the Dutch
economy in 2040.. The scenarios in this study are four consistent stories for such contingencies.
They deal with two basic uncertainties: (i) the future division of tasks among workers—will it occur
anywhere in the world or will production occur more locally and (ii) whether the size of cities will
become larger or smaller. Together, these two uncertainties lead to the four scenarios presented
in the figure below. The horizontal axis presents the options for the division of tasks; the vertical
axis shows the possibilities for city size. The scenarios are labelled such that the first term reflects
the characterisation of people and the second informs about the type of location.

-
Figure 5-11 NL2040 - Framework scenarios
Source: CPB (2010), The Netherlands of 2040, Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis

Talent Towns (TT)

Imagine a world with relatively small cities (100,000 - 200,000 inhabitants) and specialised
workers and firms. TT is a very dynamic world with excellent opportunities, but also major
challenges. Communication technology (CT) enables specialist workers to co-operate in virtual
teams. Consequently, firms employ specialists from all over the world. Specialist workers gain
from personal interaction with their fellow specialists. Together with an attractive living
environment, this determines their choice to live in small specialised tows. The strongly
competitive environment enables high-skilled specialists to earn high incomes. However, the
rising top performer of tomorrow can overtake the top performer of today. The wages of low-
skilled workers suffer downward pressure due to global competition. The TT world faces the
paradox of high demand for protection and redistribution, but limited supply. The comparative
advantage of the Netherlands and other European countries lies within business services.
Manufacturing activities move for the most part to Asia.
Cosmopolitan Centres (CC)

Envision a world of large cities (each of 2 to 8 million inhabitants) with global connections hosting
specialised workers and firms. In a CC city, many specialists from all over the world combine their
efforts in innovation, design and production. This global division of tasks relies on efficient and
relatively cheap communication technologies, which facilitate intensive coordination between all
steps in the production process. Cities develop into clusters of specialised activities. The largely
science-driven expansion of bio- and nanotechnology demands close cooperation between
researchers in universities and firms. The prosperity of these cities might be threatened if other
cities contest or take over their comparative advantage. Therefore, income levels may differ
substantially between centres and between a particular centre and its hinterland. Substantial
income inequality also exists within cities, because the large CCs attract a broad range of
supporting tasks. The Netherlands may host a few of these clusters in which it has a comparative
advantage. Dutch CC cities may specialise in, for instance, company headquarters, water
management and engineering, biomass technology, medical engineering, creative activities or
logistics services.

Egalitarian Ecologies (EE)

Variety and dispersion characterise egalitarian ecologies. Economic activity spreads out over
medium-sized cities (100,000 - 500,000 inhabitants) that host medium-sized firms. Successful
cities are hotbeds of high-quality production, and offer opportunities for creative cooperation on a
small scale. Knowledge resides largely in the minds of the country's generalist employees in
combination with the databases and other IT-applications of firms. The IT systems enable firms to
produce differentiated products that cater to differences in local demand. Living and working
activities spread out over space. Because firms benefit little from being located near each other,
they turn away from large cities and settle in medium-sized cities. These cities offer high-quality
private and public services and provide agreeable living conditions for their employees. EE
represents a world with little income growth and modest income differentials. Because
technological progress levels off and considerable wealth flows to suppliers of raw materials,
disposable income grows only moderately. Medium-sized cities the Netherlands flourish, building
on their strengths in fields such as creative industries, agricultural services, healthcare products,
fashion and design. Economic activity in the Randstad keeps pace, because the Netherlands
retains its position in the transport of final goods all over Europe.

Metropolitan Markets (MM)

Think of a few very large metropolises with more than 10 million inhabitants dominating the world.
Large factories, huge office buildings and sky-high apartment blocks characterise these cities.
Economic activity is concentrated in dense areas, where economies of scale and scope are
optimally exploited. Metropolitan Markets is a world in which the winning cities take all. In MM,
bio- and nanotechnology break through. Their sheer complexity requires extensive research
facilities and a high degree of tacit knowledge exchange within large firms to create sufficient
potential for developing marketable applications. Metropolises attract firms and people. In
metropolises, firms find trusted business partners, knowledge centres, a large supply of generalist
workers and many consumers. People move to a MM city to select the best job, to build
interesting relationships and to benefit from an appealing supply of cultural and recreational
services. Where the metropolis thrives, the hinterland lags behind. The metropolis attracts all of
the highly productive firms and higher-qualified people. Income inequality is large-both within the
metropolis and between the metropolis and the hinterland. The Netherlands faces the challenge
whether it is large enough to host a local metropolis. Given the scale and scope of MM cities
there is a chance that this is impossible. In that case, the Netherlands as a whole becomes a
hinterland. Neighbouring European metropolises would attract all company headquarters,
research centres and talented people.
-
 -
Figure 5-12 NL2040 - Scenario’s Characteristics
Source: CPB (2010), The Netherlands of 2040, Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
France 2020 by DATAR (2002)46
DATAR offers in this book the result of forward thinking on France in 20 years. After an analysis
of issues critical to the future, the tensions at work and they can induce reversals, four exploratory
scenarios are presented. They are built around one key variable: the dominant mode of public
action and territorial frameworks privileged. They set out the implications of the options on the
spatial dynamics and the main features of the organization of the territory.

Archipelago exploded (a neoliberal scenario)

This scenario is characterized by a fragmented territory in which opposing dynamic cities,

economically efficient and internationally competitive and marginalized areas. The action of the
state is primarily to provide efficient framework for market development. The state should help,
without real success, and difficulties in territories away from the predominant dynamic that, in this
model are not supported by regional solidarity.

Local differentiated (a scenario New Community)

Local differential scenario shows an area where the creative initiatives of economic values and
socio-cultural multiplied decentralized levels of giving shape to many heterogeneous entities
forging links between them cooperation on thematic projects. Not having anticipated and set
rules, the state is in a position to mediate disputes between territories. He tries to temper
imbalances and to ensure access of all citizens to public services. He is forced to reinvent its role
in the direction of greater flexibility, to reintroduce an overall coherence.

Centralism renovated (neo-Jacobin a scenario)

Centralism renovated features a state legitimized in its desire to retain a role on behalf pre-
eminent issues of national solidarity, cohesion, and even environmental protection in the context
of European integration measured. Spatial embodies this voluntarism; local initiatives are firmly
framed without going back on the principles of decentralization. The aim of the government
interventions is to integrate the areas lagging behind in a pattern that still has much to center-
periphery model.

Networked Polycentrism (a scenario of equity)

This scenario puts on the restructuring of territories and redefining the mission of public power.
The territorial dynamics based on the one hand, on participatory approaches in project areas:
cities, countries, regional parks, and, secondly, on creative cooperation between cities and
regions, around issues of interregional scope to the scale of large river settlement. The
structuring of simultaneous network micro-territorial level and the macro-poles makes a territorial
integration of the territory that reinforces in a Europe which was also the choice of polycentrism.
The state envisages a policy of adaptation to the territories and lived spaces issues, but mainly
engages in strategies measured on territorial differentiation supported a renewed concept of
"regional balance".

46
DATAR (2002) Aménager la France de 2020
 Scenario 1: Archipelago exploded
Globalisation stimulates certain urban nodes and prompts competition between localised
networks. Spaces polarised by the most performing regional metropolis are not able to organise
the whole of the territory
 Scenario 2: Local differentiated
The organisation of the territory is largely a function of local initiatives which favour different forms
and degrees of polarisation, based on national and European networks of interchange. In
absence of national initiative, certain territories have trouble in getting structure, i.e. in developing.
 Scenario 3: Centralism renovated
Hierarchies are reinforced: the State promotes a centralised regulation of all territories by limiting
the autonomy of local communities. On the other hand, public solidarity is devoted to benefit
territories with difficulties
 Scenario 4: Networked Polycentrism
Development is structured over an urban network where polycentricism is reinforced at two
territorial scales: first at interregional level with frameworks of cooperation-competition between
cities, and second at agglomeration / national level with new networks of local project
management

Figure 5-13 FRANCE2020 – Four Scenarios

Source: DATAR (2002), Aménager la France de 2020
Territoires2040 by DATAR (2011)47
DATAR officially launched on October 2009 a programme of prospective on a national scale
entitled Territories 2040, developing the change. By promoting this cycle of reflection-oriented
strategy and action, DATAR reshapes the way it has practiced foresight over the last 50 years. In
the third number of the Territories2040 magazine, M.Lussault presented in the framework of the
workshop “The network of French metropolises in the World-Economy”48 the main variants in
which French metropolises built different “connecting” territorial systems aimed at enhancing the
links between France and the Globalisation.

Hyperpolisation

In 2040, the dynamics of global urbanization have led to the formation of a single network
hyperpolarised in France, characterized by the metropolitan coopetition between its nodes.
Coopetition can be defined as a mixture of competition and cooperation between the different
poles. Each metropolitan node is to base its economic development on the concentration of
creative functions (research, higher education, culture) and their application, being now central to
national and international attractiveness and value added production. This concentration will be
accompanied by a branding strategy through major events and the exploitation of the image of
central metropolitan nodes. Across the territories, the hyperpolisation strengthens logical
concentration in multifunctional centres, constituting overall systems centralities strongly
polarised. Large networks will be strongly structuring urban territorial dynamics and allow the
functional efficiency and accessibility to spaces. University campuses and creative spaces
become metropolitan attractors, around which many will develop public policy.49

Regiopolisation

In 2040, it will be found in France a strong very differentiation of the different territories in the
framework of formation of mega-polarised regions, being called regiopoles. This powerful process
will lead to a restructuring of the current national regional divisions. The scale nation-state will
become a lower reference in terms of territorial control. A deep tax reform will give cities and
regions real capacity to gather the necessary resources to develop their public policies. Planning
policies attempt to contain the suburban sprawl phenomena and we witness actions of
densification as well as targeted operations of requalification of iconic areas in some new
agricultural and forestry areas. Mobility systems are organised in such a way to provide better
access to various regional centres. The mobility paradigm based on private automobile will only
remain relevant in most periurban spaces, while in the densest suburbs effective public mobility
systems will be implemented. 50

47
L’urbain-metropolisé français dans la mondialisation – processus et scénarios, Michel Lussault, for Territoires 2040, DATAR
2011
48
“Le réseau des métropoles françaises dans l’économie-monde”
49
In original French, “Hyperpolisation. En 2040, la dynamique de l’urbanisation mondiale aura abouti à la constitution d’un seul réseau hyper-
polisé en France, caractérisé par la coopétition entre ses nœuds métropolitains. On définit ici la coopétition comme un mélange de compétition et
de coopération entre les différents pôles. Chaque nœud métropolitain fondera son développement économique sur la concentration des fonctions
créatives (recherche, enseignement supérieur, culture) et leurs applications, devenues essentielles à l’attractivité nationale et internationale et à la
production de valeurs ajoutées. Cette concentration s’accompagnera d’une stratégie de branding, via les grands événements et l’exploitation de la
capitale image d’un nœud métropolitain. À l’échelle des territoires de vie, l’hyperpolisation renforcera les logiques de concentration dans des pôles
multifonctionnels, constituant globalement des systèmes de centralités fortement polarisants. Les grands réseaux et les commutateurs urbains
seront puissamment structurants des dynamiques territoriales et permettront l’efficacité fonctionnelle et l’accessibilité maximale aux espaces. Les
campus universitaires et les espaces créatifs deviendront aussi et vraiment de nouveaux attracteurs métropolitains, autour desquels s’élaboreront
bon nombre de politiques publiques."
50
In original French, “ Régiopolisation. En 2040, on constatera en France une différentialisation territoriale forte (donc un maintien voire une
accentuation des polarités) dans le cadre de la constitution de méga-régions polarisées par l’urbanisation métropolisante, appelées régiopoles. Ce
mouvement puissant conduira à une recomposition du découpage régional national actuel. L’échelle stato-nationale deviendra une référence plus
faible en matière de contrôle territorial. Une réforme fiscale profonde donnera aux métropoles et aux régions de véritables capacités de collecte
des ressources nécessaires aux politiques publiques. Les politiques d’aménagement tentent de contenir les phénomènes d’étalement périurbain
et on assiste même à des actions de densification ciblées ainsi qu’à des opérations de requalification emblématique d’espaces pavillonnaires très
peu denses en territoires néo-agricoles et forestiers. Le système mobilitaire est organisé pour assurer à la fois la meilleure accessibilité aux diffé-
Postpolisation

In 2040, urbanisation and globalisation have infused the entire national territory and signs of this
will be felt everywhere mostly through widespread suburbanization. So this is the scenario with
most evident signs of victory of low density peripheries over centralisation and generalisation of
the principle of diffusion, conceived both as a principle of development and an urban form, valid
at all scales in the same time. Postpolisation will be a largely self-organizing and self-promoted
process by actors but with a real support by the public sector, mostly through the intervention of
networked territorial governances (the scale of governance is chosen depending on the type of
issue addressed) relying on the local scale, whose powers will be enhanced (the State falls back
on the role of regulator). In particular, public operators make possible the enhancement of
urbanisation, that is to say the process of suburban development permitted by financial transfers
by state, local or private actors.51

Dépolisation

In 2040, the urban evolution will tend to weaken significantly the effects of polarisation of the
territories in favour of a hierarchical spatial organization distributing the little realities as a
generalized principle of low density. Centralities will no longer be functionally important or
referential of social practices. There has been a triumph of digitising companies and in particular
the success of social networks that become reference of communicative modes. The
diseconomies of scale of large technical systems and urban infrastructure are growing, as funding
opportunities are increasing and individuals fleeing dense areas. The emergence of new technical
solutions for self-sufficiency can take a stall and ensure domestic autonomy of individuals and / or
neighbourhood groups. Faced with the loss of link business-territory that had been constitutive of
metropolitan urbanization, there is the formation of micro-markets both local and networked52

rents pôles régionaux. Le modèle de l’automobile individuelle ne reste notable que dans les espaces les plus périurbains, alors que même les
périphéries plus denses se dotent de moyens mobilitaires efficaces"
51
In original French, "Postpolisation. En 2040, l’urbanisation et la mondialisation auront infusé l’intégralité du territoire national et les manifes-
tations s’en feront sentir partout, sous la forme d’une périurbanisation généralisée. Il s’agit donc du scénario qui signe la victoire de la périphérisa-
tion la moins dense sur la centration et la généralisation du principe de la diffusion, conçue à la fois comme un principe d’évolution et une forme
urbaine, valable à toutes les échelles en même temps. La postpolisation sera donc un processus largement auto-organisé et auto-promu par les
acteurs mais avec un réel accompagnement par la puissance publique, notamment via l’intervention de gouvernances territoriales en réseau
(l’échelle de gouvernance est choisie en fonction du type de question abordée), appuyée sur les territoires locaux aux compétences renforcées
(l’État se replie sur une fonction de régulateur). En particulier, les opérateurs publics rendront possible l’accentuation de la résidentialisation, c’est-
à-dire du processus de développement du pavillonnaire permis par les transferts financiers redistributifs de l’État, des collectivités, voire des ac-
teurs privés"
52
In original Frenc, “En 2040, l’évolution urbaine tendra à affaiblir significativement les effets de la polarisation des territoires au profit d’une
organisation spatiale très peu hiérarchisée distribuant les réalités selon un principe généralisé de faible densité. Les centralités ne seront plus
fonctionnellement importantes, ni référentielles des pratiques sociales, des imaginaires territoriaux et des actions politiques. On assiste à un
triomphe de la numérisation des sociétés et en particulier au succès des réseaux sociaux communicationnels qui deviennent référentiels des
modes de définition des proximités acceptables et légitimes pour tout un chacun; La déséconomie d’échelle des grands systèmes techniques et
des infrastructures urbaines s’accentue, à mesure que les possibilités de financement s’accroissent et que les individus fuient les secteurs den-
ses. L’apparition de nouvelles solutions techniques d’autosuffisance permet d’assumer le décrochage et d’assurer l’autonomie domestique des
individus ou/et des groupes de voisinage restreints. Face à la disparition du lien entreprises-territoires qui avait été constitutif de l’urbanisation
métropolitaine, on assiste à la constitution de micromarchés à la fois locaux et en réseaux”
Figure 5-14 Territoires2040 –"L’urbain-metropolisé français dans la mondialisation", scenario
description
Source: Michel Lussault (2011) for Territoires 2040
Figure 5-15 Territoires2040 –"L’urbain-metropolisé français dans la mondialisation", scenario
sketches
Source: Michel Lussault (2011) for Territoires 2040
Europe 2030 by CRPM (2002)53
The ESDP, adopted in Potsdam in 1999 by the Ministers in charge of spatial planning, set as a
priority the principle of a “Polycentric and balanced spatial development within the EU”. The
present study was designed with a view to examining this concept in greater detail and imagining
what kind of configuration this particular option might take in Europe’s peripheries, both in terms
of content (policy options) and form (mapping scenario). The work was organised at European
level under the coordination of the CPMR and its Maritime Peripheries Forward Studies Unit and
was contracted out to a team of experts in charge of the national and thematic approaches,
further enriched by a number of “test” interviews with public- and private-sector players.
Two scenarios were established: i) a “straight-line” scenario, taking into consideration a continued
progression of the various developments identified, without any specific public intervention in
favour of a polycentric project at European level; and ii) a “voluntarist” scenario which, while
remaining realistic, would result in the implementation within the next 20 or 30 years of a
voluntarist policy in favour of this model, involving all spheres of government

Straight line Scenario

The “straight-line” hypothesis would lead quite quickly to a gradual expansion of the Pentagon, as
it spreads its influence towards the centre of the UK, northern Italy, south-eastern France and the
southern Baltic area. It would also see the emergence of a number of peripheral gateways such
as Madrid and the North European capitals. Very few peripheral urban systems will emerge
strongly outside of the extended Pentagon area. Only Lisbon, Barcelona, Toulouse and Göteborg
seem to show a reassuring level of drive. A few promising urban systems located along the major
transport corridors could emerge here and there, while a large number of dilemma or highly
peripheral areas will continue to face a very uncertain future. Such a scenario would soon result
in a reinforcement of polarisation and specialisation phenomena to the advantage of a limited
number of peripheral urban systems, thus contributing towards increased territorial asymmetries.

53
CRPM (2002) Construction of a polycentric and balanced development model for the European territory 2030.
 Figure 5-16 Europe2030 – Straight line development scenario sketch
Source: CPRM 2002. Introductory Briefing Note on the relevant context material available to partners
and contributors to the PolyMETREXplus Interreg IIIC project on the development of polycentric
studies, visions and strategies for the spatial planning and development of the wider Europe.
METREX, 2002
Long term voluntarist scenario

A voluntarist hypothesis in favour of redressing the balance of the European territory and
developing polycentrism is based on a situation where all political levels – from European level, to
national, regional and urban level – contribute towards structuring cooperation areas that are able
to better polarise certain development factors. In order to achieve this, it would be necessary to
work on three different scales. In order of priority, they are as follows:
 Strengthening of the “Metropolitan European Growth Areas” (MEGA). These are areas
comprising the identified urban systems and their wider sphere of influence, and polarising
factors of competitiveness. Priority would be given to encouraging cooperation at this level,
which would require the strong intervention of a certain number of sectoral policies, a
significant adaptation of the current regional policy, accompanying measures for national
policies to break up the concentration of economic activity, and finally a strong involvement
and cooperation on the part of the regional and urban areas;
 Accompanying measures to aid the emergence of new development corridors resulting from
the networking and cooperation efforts between several MEGAs, mainly through transport
policies;
 Progressive accompanying measures over a more long-term period for what the ESDP refers
to as global economic integration zones (GIZ).
 Figure 5-17 Europe2030 – Long-term voluntarist scenario sketch
Source: CPRM 2002. Introductory Briefing Note on the relevant context material available to partners
and contributors to the PolyMETREXplus Interreg IIIC project on the development of polycentric
studies, visions and strategies for the spatial planning and development of the wider Europe.
METREX, 2002
Urban development scenarios by PLUREL 2025 (2008)54
Changing land use relationships within emerging rural-urban regions and their manifestation in
phenomena such as urban sprawl and development of large transport corridors have long-lasting
consequences for the regions’ sustainability. The scenario framework should fulfil a number of
key criteria for use within the PLUREL project, such as being manageable by limiting the number
of scenarios, appropriate to the urban-rural issues addressed in PLUREL, and related to the
concerns of end users.

Figure 5-18 PLUREL Urban Development Scenarios – Framework

Source: PLUREL 2008

High growth scenario (hyper-tech)

This describes a future world of rapid economic growth, global population that peaks in mid-
century, and the rapid spread of more efficient technologies. Investment in research and
development is high and nations share knowledge and pool resources in a global research
market place. Energy prices decline because supply is driven by new developments in renewable
energy production and nuclear fission. The shock concerns the rapid acceleration of ICT which
transforms home and work as never before.
For peri-urban areas in Europe, this scenario is likely to see small »polycentric« towns and cities
become even more popular. New transport technologies lead to more rapid journeys and the
expansion of the commuting distances around towns and cities. This leads to peri-urbanisation
and metropolitanisation of rural areas on a massive scale.
Drivers: rapid development in ICT leading to reduced commuting and transport needs, with no
constraints on the location of new build.

54
By Kjell Nilsson , Thomas Sick Nielsen1, Stephan Pauleit1, Joe Ravetz and Mark Rounsevell, 2008
Self-reliance scenario (extreme water)

This describes a more heterogeneous world of self reliance and preservation of local identities.
While the population increases, economic development is primarily regionally-oriented, and per
capita economic growth and technological change are more fragmented and slower than in the
other storylines. The shock here is subtitled extreme water, and this sees rapid increase in
flooding, drought and sea level rise. A year does not go by without a major event, and in some
cities and regions development is seriously constrained.
Peri-urban areas are strongly affected; affluent yet vulnerable city-regions such as London or the
Dutch Randstad spend huge sums of money on defence and adaptation strategies. Population
growth due to climate-induced migration puts more pressure on urban infrastructure and services.
Drivers: climate change reaches a tipping point leading to impacts including rapid sea level rise,
flooding and water resource constraints.

Sustainability? scenario (peak oil)

This describes a future of environmental and social consciousness – a global approach to

sustainable development, involving governments, businesses, media and households. Economic
development is more balanced with rapid investment in resource efficiency, social equity and
environmental protection. The »shock« in this scenario is driven by the real possibility of »peak
oil«, that is, a decline in global oil production after reaching maximum production, leading to rapid
rises in energy prices, with many social and economic effects.
For peri-urban areas, high energy prices have an enormous effect on location choices as
transport costs limit commuting distances. Although tele working is encouraged, most people
attempt to return to larger cities and towns, and more remote rural areas decline.
Drivers: an energy price shock leading to rapidly increasing energy and transport costs and
consequent changes in mobility and trade flows.

Fragmentation scenario (walls and enclaves)

Europe sees a fragmentation of society, in terms of age, ethnicity and international distrust. The
voter-strong elderly population becomes increasingly dependent on the younger generation, but
the working-age population is disinclined to transfer their resources, with growing
intergenerational conflicts.
The »shock« in this scenario will be an accelerated development towards fragmentation and
social exclusion in Europe. The ethnic division of cities is driven by the increased in-migration of
the working-age population from outside and within the European Union. Cities become more
dispersed as younger migrants dominate city centres and older natives populate the outskirts and
enclaves outside the cities – so that peri-urban areas become peri-society areas.
Drivers: low growth and accelerated fragmentation leading to behavioural shifts within society.
Figure 5-19 PLUREL Urban Development Scenarios – Ethnography’s parameters by scenarios
Source: PLUREL 2008
PASHMINA Scenarios 2030 - 2050 (2010)55
PASHMINA project’s objective is to model global scenarios based on changes of paradigm in
long term time perspective (2030—2050) derived from new behavioural trends in Earth societies,
especially considering the challenges of energy provision, climate change and land-use
equilibrium. The project involves a large number of parties and several different models and sub-
models studying different dimensions of the problem, like the evolution of cities, of rural and
natural environments, or the evolution of transport.
PASHMINA defined 4 scenarios associated with 4 different fruits/vegetables (pear, apple, orange
and potato). Scenarios had strong consequences for spatial development and urbanisation, as
portrayed in the following figures. Transitions were considered as means of evolving over time
from one scenario onto another.

Figure 5-20 PASHMINA – Scenarios in a speed (economy) VS concentration (social) 2D space,

and possible transitions between them
Source: PASHMINA 7FP 2010

55
ISIS, Mcrit et al. for PASHMINA 7FP project (2009-2013). www.pashmina-project.eu
 Suburb Core-city
Do it fast

Do it alone Do it together
Do it slow

Sparse and rural Small city

Figure 5-21 PASHMINA – Spatial implications of different scenarios

Source: PASHMINA 7FP 2010
Growing beyond limits Scenario: the Pear World paradigm.

Growing beyond limits scenario features the strengthening of corporate capitalism and market
mechanisms, pursued globalization of goods and financial markets, a new technological wave in
the form of ICT, nano-technologies and biotechnologies.

Growing within limits: the Apple World paradigm.

The Growing within limits scenario assumes that a low-carbon economy and adequate
biodiversity protection can be achieved with currently identifiable technologies and at moderate
economic costs without damaging opportunities for human development, provided that a number
of barriers to achieving the right policy conditions and institutional settings are overcome.
New welfare: the Orange World paradigm

The present measurement of growth is abandoned in the New welfare scenario. A new frame is
set up to account features of wellbeing "beyond GDP", including self-production and services
rendered by nature, taking into account the realities that do not pass through the market or get
irrelevant evaluation by a market. A new techno-economic and social paradigm emerges

Turbulent decline: the Potato World paradigm

The key question with respect to turbulent decline is whether the growth in material flows could
remain within the limits for climate change, natural resources' availability, global ecosystems'
health and biodiversity loss, as well as help to alleviate global poverty. The answer would be
negative, and the world is set to collapse.
5.3 ET2050 Scenarios – Ongoing discussion
Note. The state of discussion of scenarios as it stands in September 2012, three months after
initial submission of Interim Report 1, is presented as an Annex A “Updated proposal for
Exploratory Scenarios” at the end of this document. At this point, hypothesis on the methodology
to territorialise scenarios and to introduce the analysis of wild-cards are introduced.
First sketches of three original scenarios presented in the ET2050 Project Specification were
studied and debated in the first TPG meeting in Barcelona. Consistency, likelihood and
desirability were tested with specific questionnaires. Following this process, scenarios were
adjusted and a fourth scenario was introduced to cover a deeper locally based concept of
Europe. All four scenarios were presented and discussed in the ESPON Krakow Seminar in
November 2011. Again questionnaires were distributed among participants, and analysis of
results revealed a positive increase in consistency, likelihood and desirability of scenarios. In the
TPG meeting in Brussels (March 2012) a new discussion on Exploratory Scenario assumptions
helped to further refine them.
After the review of spatial-oriented scenarios presented in the previous section, the point of
departure of the discussion were the three Exploratory Scenarios suggested in the Project
Specification:
‐ Europe of the Flows. This scenario provides an image of the European territory in which
economic and population growth as well as public investments are mainly stimulated to take
place within main corridors that structure the European territory. Europe of the Flows is
characterised by strong connections between cities and transport nodes. Political focus lies on
issues such as enhancing connections and long distance networks and global integration.
‐ Europe of the Cities. This scenario provides an image of the European territory in which
economic and population growth as well as public investments are mainly stimulated to take
place within existing cities that structure the European territory; cities that have a role as driving
forces in the global, national and/or regional level. Europe of the Cities is characterised by
economically strong and compact cities. Political focus lies on issues such as intensified use of
urban space, strong preservation of open space, reduction of long-distance traffic.
‐ Europe of the Regions. This scenario provides an image of the European territory in which
economic and population growth as well as public investments are mainly stimulated to take
place on the basis of specific regional identities and strengths. Europe of the Regions is
characterised by strong urban and rural territories that form a mosaic of different regions and
types of territories with strong identities. Political focus lies on issues such as regional self-
reliance, small-scale development and landscape protection.
After the first TPG in meeting in Brussels the discussion about the Baseline and Exploratory
Scenarios continued. At the Steering Committee meeting Brussels in September 2012 the
following agreement about the Exploratory Scenarios was achieved.
The three Exploratory Scenarios proposed in the Project Specification were accepted. The fourth
scenario tentatively envisaged was dropped because of its extreme unlikelihood of being
implemented. However, the underlying assumptions of the three remaining scenarios were
extended beyond those given in the Project Specification, and alternative titles to communicate
them were discussed.
In addition, the relation of the three scenarios to current strategic documents on European spatial
development, such as Europe 2020 and the Territorial Agenda (2007; 2011) as well as the ongo-
ing policy debates on the dichotomy "space-blind" v. "place-based" policies as documented in
OECD (2011), Barca (2009), Barca et al. (2011) and on "smart specialisation" and "smart innova-
tion" as discussed in Foray et al. (2012) and ESPON KIT (2011) was explored to make sure that
the Exploratory Scenarios will respond to the issues raised there.

Europe of Flows / Promotion of MEGAs / Metapolis 56

This scenario provides an image of Europe in which the territory is more dynamic, flexible and
adaptable to technological, social and economic change. From the global down to the local, even
personal scale, networks of information and communication connect people and activities. Virtual
communities become as important as territory-based communities. More integrated trans-national
zones emerge by the networking of cities in cross-border areas, and transport and energy
corridors link major European centres of production and consumption with neighbouring countries
and the rest of the World. This scenario follows the Europe 2020 strategy of promoting global
competitiveness of Europe by promoting the economic development of the largest metropolitan
areas of global importance in Europe, i.e. of the 76 Metropolitan European Growth Areas
(MEGAs) defined in ESPON 1.1.1 (2005, 118). The policies applied are mainly investments in
European transport infrastructure, such as high-speed rail, and support of high-level R&D
enhancing connections and long distance networks, linking neighbouring countries, favouring
more efficient technologies and management strategies.
Europe of Cities / Promotion of large European cities (FUAs) / Metropolis57
This scenario provides an image of the European territory in which economic and population
growth, as well as most private and public investments, take place within existing cities that give
structure to the European territory: national capitals and major regional capitals as driving forces.
Europe of Cities is characterised by economically strong and compact cities as centres of
excellence, creativity and entrepreneurship. The increasing concentration of added-value
activities in cities does not imply a process of rural decline, but its increasing functional
dependency on large cities. This scenario is place-based in that it follows the priority of the
European Spatial Development Perspective (1999) and the two Territorial Agendas (2007; 2011)
for balanced polycentric urban systems at the macro-regional or national scale for the 261 cities
of European or national significance defined in ESPON 1.1.1 (2005, 114). Policies applied are
mainly in the fields of cohesion, transport and R&D policy.

56
This scenario is inspired by the work of the following authors. Relevant references provided in each case:
- Ascher, François, Metapolis. Les Nouveaux principes de l’Urbanisme (2004)
- Castells, Manuel, The Space of Flows
- Bauman, Zygmunt, 44 letters from the Liquid Modern World (2011)
- Dupuy, Gabriel, Systèmes, réseaux et territorires. Réseautique territorial (1985)
- García Vázquez, Carlos, Antípolis, (2011)
- Garreau, Joel, Edge Cities (1993)
- Mitchel, William, Me+ & e-topia(2003)
- Kasarda, John, Aerotropolis. The Way We’ll Life Next (2011)
- Kunstler, James Howard, The geography of nowhere (1993)
- Rowe, Peter, Making a Middle Landscape (1991)
- Hanley, Richard, Moving people, goods and information in the 21th century. The cutting-edge of infrastructures of
networked cities (2004)
57
This scenario is inspired by the work of the following authors. Relevant references provided in each case:
- Benevolo, Leonardo, The European City. The Making of Europe (1993)
- Cerdà, Ildefons, Theory of Urbanisation (1856)
- Florida, Richard, The Creative Cities (2009)
- Jacobs, Jane, Dead and Life in the American Cities
- Glaser, Edward, Triumph of the City, (2011)
- Hall, P., Megacities, World Cities and Global Cities, in Megacities (2010)
- Nijkamp, Peter, Megacities: Lands of Hope and Glory, in Megacities (2010)
- Rifkin, Jeremy, The Empathic Civilisation, (2010)
- Savitch, H. V., Post-Industrial Cities, (1991)
- Sassen, Saskia, Urban Economics and Fading Distances, in Megacities (2010)
- Senett, Richard, Megacities and the Welfare State, in Megacities (2010)
- Solà-Morales, Ignasi, Metrópolis, (2005)
- White, William H., City. Rediscovering the Center (1988)
Europe of Regions / Promotion of small and medium-sized cities / Ecopolis 58.
This scenario provides an image of the European territory in which urban and rural territories form
a mosaic of different regions and types of territories with identities nourished by local and regional
governments able to cooperate in areas of common interest. Strengthening the social and
economic balance of Europe at the regional level, promoting endogenous development and
empowering regional institutions may lead to more efficient provision of public services. Many of
the changes in this scenario are much lead by changes of values and behaviour of new
generations, policy becoming a support for these. This scenario responds to the challenges of
energy scarcity and climate change expressed in the Territorial Agenda 2020 (2011) by
promoting small and medium-sized cities as centres of self-contained ecological regions and
sustainable mobility patterns yet taking account of the necessary economies of scale of services
of general interest and the prospects of an ageing society. Local production and local markets
gain much importance, migration of skilled people from large cities to rural areas accelerates
localism, large cities become further decentralized into more productive, slow neighbourhoods.
Policies applied are mainly from the fields of cohesion, transport and agricultural policy, the focus
lies on promoting medium-sized cities and reducing the existing imbalances at the medium and
lower level of the urban hierarchy and their functions for the surrounding regions, in particular
rural regions. Policies aim at organising the settlement systems in a more polycentric approach at
regional scale.

58
This scenario is inspired by the work of the following authors. Relevant references provided in each case
- Ohmae, Kenichi, The End of the Nation State and the Rise of Regional Economies, (1996)
- Judt, Tony, Ill Fares de Land, (2009)
- Maalouf, Amin, Le déréglement du monde, (2009)
- Einsele, Martin, The Upper Rhine, an Alternative Metropolis, (1988)
- Geddes, Patrick, Regional Planning,
- Forman, Richard T.T., Land Mosaics. The Ecology of landscapes and regions, (1995)
- Klein, Naomi, The Shock Doctrine. The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (2007)
- Munford, Lewis, The Regional Framework of Civilisation. Regions to live in, (1968) Davis, Mike, Dead Cities, (2002)
- Rubin, Jeff, Why Your World is About to Get a Whole Lot Smaller, (2009)
- Sachs, Jeffrey, Common Wealth. Economics for a Crowded Planet (2008)
- Smith, Neil, ¿Cities after Neo-Liberalism? (2009)
- Stiglitz, Joseph, Making Globalisation Work, (2007)
- Zizek, Slavoj, First as Tragedy, then as Farce, (2009)
- Alexander, Christopher, The Nature of Order, (2002)
- Calthorpe, Peter, The Next American Metropolis. Ecology, Community and the American Dream, (1993)
- Illych, Ivan, The Art of Habitat (1984)
- Lorentz, Konrad, The eight mortal sins of the urbanised society, (2011)
- Latouche, Serge, Petit traité de la décroissance sereine (2009)
- Naess, Arne, The Deep Ecological Movement, (1995)
- Salingaros, Nikos A., Principles of Urban Structure, (2005)
- Sansot, Pierre, Du bon usage de la lenteur, (2000)
- Sachs, Wolfgang, Global Ecology and the Shadow of Development (1995)
- Sessions, George, Ecocentrism, Wilderness, and Global Ecosystem Protection (1995)
- Shumacher, E.F., Small I Beautiful, (1974)
- Platt. R. H., The Ecological City, (1994)
6. Policy Assessment of Scenarios
6.1 Midterm Targets and Pathways to 2030
Sensible midterm targets (2030) that need to be met in order to guarantee that the European
territory sufficiently develops into the direction of the Territorial Vision for 2050. On the
background of the baseline scenarios and the territorial vision for 2050, the mid-term targets will
point out the added value, which has to be achieved through appropriate policies. The midterm
targets will be tangible and quantified. The targets preferably follow a territorial logic meaning that
they are expected to address different types of territories. Furthermore territorially differentiated
trajectories (from now towards 2030) to be followed by different types of regions will be
investigated in order to reach the midterm targets.
The mid-term targets to be considered have to be in line with the general objectives contained in
official EU documents (balanced economic growth, sustainable development, economic, social
and territorial cohesion etc.)59. Indicatively, the mid-term targets for territorial development could
be related to a number of thresholds concerning the population (density changes, shares of
immigrants etc.); the economy (employment rate, regional disparities, unemployment); the
accessibility and connectivity (Europe-wide and intra-regional); the energy sector (ratio of
renewable energy production in regional energy consumption); the urban expansion (land-use
change); the environment (greenhouse gas emissions, share of protected areas etc.), among
others to be studied.
Next table summarises the key EU policy targets for different time horizons and sectors, with
indication of the policy document that introduced them.

Horizon
Sector year Target Reference document
Public expenditure permanently Annual government deficit under 3% Maastrich treaty
permanently Government debt under 60% of GDP Maastrich treaty
Employment 75% of the 20-64 year-olds to be EU2020
2050
employed
R&D / innovation From 1.8% to 3% of the EU's GDP (public EU2020
2020 and private combined) to be invested in
R&D
GHG emissions Total greenhouse gas emissions 20% in EU2020
2020 (or even 30%, if a satisfactory
2020
international agreement can be achieved
to follow Kyoto) lower than 1990
Total greenhouse gas emissions 25% in non-binding resolution
2020
2020 lower than 1990 2007

59
Art. 3 of the consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union: sustainable development of Europe (balanced economic
growth, highly competitive social market economy; high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment;
scientific and technological advance); combating social exclusion and discrimination; promotion of economic, social and
territorial cohesion and solidarity among member states; respect of the rich cultural diversity; safeguard and enhancement of
Europe’s cultural heritage. These Treaty’s provisions are the background of the Europe 2020 Strategy (developing an economy
based on knowledge and innovation; promoting a more resource-efficient, greener and more competitive economy; fostering a
high employment economy delivering social and territorial cohesion). The orientations of the Green Paper on Territorial
Cohesion (section: turning territorial diversity into strength) will also be considered: concentration (overcoming differences in
density); connecting territories (overcoming distance; facilitating access to services of general interest) and cooperation
(overcoming division). The provisions of the new Territorial Agenda will equally be taken into consideration.
 Horizon
Sector year Target Reference document
Total greenhouse gas emissions 50% in Energy Policy, 2007
2050
2050 lower than 1990
Total greenhouse gas emissions 80% in G8 and EU agreement,
2050
2050 lower than 1990 july2009
Transport emissions (including CO2 Roadmap for moving to
aviation, excl. maritime), +20% to -9% by a competitive low-carbon
2030 // 2050
2030, and -54% to -67% by 2050, in economy in 2050 (EC
relation 1990’s COM(2011)|112)
Energy sources 20% of total energy from renewables in EUROPE 2020
2020
2020
10% of transport energy from renewables Renewable Energy
in 2020 Roadmap
2020
Communication by the
EC, 2007
10% of transport energy from biofuels in (European Council,
2020
2020 2007)
Energy 20% increase in energy efficiency by EUROPE 2020
2020
consumption 2020
50% increase in energy efficiency by EUROPE2030 report by
2030 2030 the Reflection. Group on
the Future (F.González)
20% decrease in primary energy 20-20-20 targets
2020
consumption by 2020
General Transport 10% of transport energy from renewables Renewable Energy
in 2020 Roadmap
2020
Communication by the
EC, 2007
fuel suppliers reduce greenhouse gas Energy Policy, 2007
2020 emissions from fuel across its life-cycle
by 10% by 2020
10% of transport energy from biofuels in Energy Policy, 2007
2020
2020
Transport emissions (including CO2 Roadmap for moving to
aviation, excl. maritime), +20% to -9% by a competitive low-carbon
2030 // 2050
2030, and -54% to -67% by 2050, in economy in 2050 (EC
relation 1990’s COM(2011)|112)
Transport emissions (including CO2 Transport White Paper
2030 aviation, excl. maritime), 20% lower in 2011
2030 in relation 2008
Transport emissions (including CO2 Transport White Paper
2050 aviation, excl. maritime), 60% lower in 2011
2050 in relation 1990’s
TEN-T Multi-modal TEN-T core network by 2030 Transport White Paper
2030
2011
 Horizon
Sector year Target Reference document
All core network airports connected to rail Transport White Paper
2050 network by 2050, preferably by high- 2011
speed rail
All core seaports sufficiently connected to Transport White Paper
2050 the rail freight and, where possible, inland 2011
waterway system.
Urban transport Lower 50% the use of “conventionally- Transport White Paper
2030
fueled” cars in urban transport 2011
0% use of “conventionally-fueled” cars in Transport White Paper
2050
urban transport 2011
CO2 free logistics in cities by 2030 Transport White Paper
2030
2011
Road transport Reduction 50% the number of road
2010 fatalities by 2010 compared with 2001
levels
By 2020, 50% fatalities in road transport. Transport White Paper
2030// 2050 Close to zero fatalities in road transport 2011
by 2050.
Car emissions: 95 g CO2/km target for Regulation 443/2009 h
2020
2020
30% of road freight over 300km should Transport White Paper
shift to other modes such as rail or 2011
2030 // 2050 waterborne transport by 2030, and more
than 50% by 2050 (facilitated by efficient
and green freight corridors)..
Rail transport To triple the length of high-speed rail Transport White Paper
2030
network by 2030. 2011
To complete a European high-speed rail Transport White Paper
2050
network by 2050. 2011
By 2050, the majority of medium-distance Transport White Paper
2050
passenger transport should go by rail. . 2011
Aviation Low-carbon sustainable fuels in aviation Transport White Paper
2050
to reach 40% by 2050 2011
Stabilisation of air emissions by 2020 IATA
2020 // 2050 (carbon neutral growth) and 50%
reduction in 2050 compared to 2005
Maritime CO2 emissions from maritime transport Transport White Paper
2050 should be cut by 40% (if feasible 50%) by 2011
2050, compared to 2005 levels
Transport SESAR, Modernised air traffic Transport White Paper
2020
management management infrastructure. 2011
To establish the framework for a Transport White Paper
European multimodal transport 2011
2020
information, management and payment
system
 Horizon
Sector year Target Reference document
Move towards full application of “user Transport White Paper
2050
pays” and “polluter pays” principles 2011
Land-use Targets in relation to land-use may be
included in the EC publication of
“Ressource Efficient Europe” targets,
expected by 2013
Education Reducing school drop-out rates below EU2020
2020
10% by 2020
Social exclusion at least 20 million fewer people in or at EU2020
2020 risk of poverty and social exclusion by
2020

Figure 6-1 Synthesis of actual EU policy targets 2020, 2030, 2050

To accomplish set up targets by 2030, it will be elaborated pathways according to the following
steps:
- Analysis of discrepancies between the present situation (2010) and mid-term targets to
highlight the necessary trajectories of regions (or groups of regions) to reach the targets;
- Test of the degree of realism of the targets, using forecast and foresight models and, if
necessary, adjustment of targets. Particular attention will be paid to the trajectories of
less-favoured regions (lagging behind, peripheral, outermost, subject to depopulation,
etc.). This step will require mostly the application of foresight meta-models, specially
adapted to backcast exercises.
- Definition of a realistic pathway of territorial development for the mid-term horizon (2030).
Pathways will be discussed together with midterm targets in the thematic, scientific and
policy workshops.
The definition of policy inputs corresponding to the pathway for 2030 will refer to the definition
and combination of public policies (policy mix), insisting on synergy effects; the adjustment of the
policy mix to specific categories of regions and/or to macro-spaces; the impacts of possible
changes in EU policies (intensity and content of cohesion policy; transport and energy policy,
CAP etc.) analysed by the application of the modelling tools.
The requirements of the mid-term strategy (targets, pathway, policy input) for changes and
improvements in the territorial governance system will refer in particular to the institutional
arrangements of relevance for addressing territorial development issues at the EU level
(codification, procedures); the coordination of EU policies; the vertical interactions in the definition
and implementation of territorial development policies.
6.2 Territorial Impact Assessment (TIA)
The application of TIA to assess territorial impact of 2030 and 2050 scenarios is considered an
essential part to give structure and provide knowledge support to the participatory process with
ESPON MC and DG Regio intended at defining the 2050 Vision.
It will involve defining the criteria (or “impact fields”) and the weights (attached to each
criterion/impact field) to be considered in the evaluation of scenarios, and identifying the relevant
indicators needed. There is no need to further improve the existing TIA software support, but,
instead, to adapt it to import results from the forecast and foresight models. Criteria and
respective weights will be determined through a participatory procedure involving all the TPG
experts and the ESPON CU and MC. In terms of impact indicators, most of the necessary inputs
to the TIA model will be provided by the estimation and simulation procedures of the quantitative
models and tools utilised in the project. Where this will prove unfeasible, sets of complex
indicators will be provided built with statistical elaborations on the basis of group work and
discussion inside the TPG.
The work will focus on:
- Defining the relevant criteria and a first proposal concerning their relative weights (to be
subsequently validated by the ESPON MC). This task will be carried out on the basis of
the EU Impact Assessment Guidelines (2009) and will involve an aggregation process
leading to a smaller number of impact criteria, as defined in the ESPON ARTS project
(about 40 fields to be restricted into 12-16 impact criteria). This is an important part of the
consensus building process with ESPON MC and its difficulty will not be underestimated.
- In the first workshop to be organised a discussion towards the definition of criteria will be
carried out, and results maybe refined and discussed again during the second policy
workshop. This process will allow involving a wider arena of experts and policy makers
through some light questionnaires to be distributed and collected during thematic and
experts’ workshops. Main questions will concern: sensitive areas to be covered through
appropriate impact indicators, political acceptability of possible potential regional
disparities in future trends concerning favourable and unfavourable impacts of trends and
scenarios, policy options - local and/or generalized - to be devised as policy response to
expected impacts.
- Identifying the most likely indicators needed for each criterion of the impact assessment:
modellers will analyse the actual capacity (including possible improvements) of their
models to produce these indicators, given the scope of the project. This preliminary
definition of criteria and indicators will be based on the ESPON experience already
available in the area of TIA applied to a relatively large number of European policies and
directives, and will be validated through the participatory process.

Policy-relevant indicators for TIA

Policy-relevant indicators should be available for TIA at NUTS3 level (or a mix of NUTS3 and
NUTS2 level for Germany and Belgium), the most appropriate for a really “territorial” inspection.
This option has been actually pursued in some previous ESPON projects, namely in TIPTAP for
the analysis of European transport policies and CAP.
However, in absence of detailed data for the whole European territory at such a disaggregated
level of analysis, TIA has also been successfully applied at NUTS2 level, for example in the frame
of the ESPON ARTS project.
 Figure 6-2 Assessment of regional sensitivity to branched EU Directives in ESPON ARTS
(Source: ÖIR, POLIMI et al; 2011: ESPON ARTS Draft Final Report)

Methodology

For the ET2050 project, TIA will be developed at NUTS2 level, possibly extending it to NUTS3
level for a sub-set of impact indicators, according to data availability.
In this light, it is relevant to remark that the methodology utilised in the ET2050 project mainly
come from previous ESPON experience (namely, the TIPTAP and ARTS projects) and the data
mainly come from the ESPON data Base and the indicators recently developed in the ESPON
INTERCO project. Statistical elaborations imply alternatively:
- quantitative impacts on specific fields developed through the models implemented in the
project,
- quali-quantitative impacts on other fields for which models are not available, elaborated
through the construction of complex indicators and judgements collected from the all
researchers involved in the project.
Replicating the methodology developed in the ARTS project (Figure 6-2) but adapting it to the
new task of foreseeing territorial impact of scenarios, in case quantitative modelling of impacts
will prove impossible, the logical process of building territorial impacts will imply the construction
of the following 4 matrices:
a) an Impact Fields Matrix (one for each Scenario), defining for each field (criterion) the
likely impact of the scenario on each typology of regions (mountain, coastal, northern,
eastern, urbanised, rural, rich, poor, ....);
b) a Regional Typology Matrix (for all Scenarios), characterising each region on the
previous typology (yes/no);
c) a Regional Sensitivity Matrix (for all Scenarios) defining the level of vulnerability and the
level of (un-)desirability of the single impacts for each region. By-and-large, the Sensitivity
Matrix built inside the ARTS project will be utilised;
d) a Territorial Impact Matrix (one for each Scenario), resulting from the linear
multiplication of the previous three matrices, showing the impact of a scenario on each
 region and each impact field. For each region, impacts on different fields could be
aggregated in a compound indicator for each impact class (economy, society,
environment, identity) and in a further “summative” impact. This last operation will imply
the definition of “weights” for each impact field/criterion (the relative importance and
priority attached to it, from a global, European perspective) in order to compare the
different impacts. Indicators of interregional disparity could subsequently be calculated.
Therefore, each impact field will be treated through:
- Indicators on existing present conditions;
- Forecasted impact coming from the TPG modelling and/or elaborations, as described
through the first two Matrices;
- Indicators of regional sensitivity to impact fields (mainly coming from the ARTS project
and possibly updated).

Impact fields considered under TIA

The main impact fields to be utilised in the TIA will be selected among the following (Figure 6-3).

Aggregate impact fields Tentative impact fields

Economy GDP (per capita)
Employment (manufacturing vs services)
Innovation
Tourism
Entrepreneurship
Accessibility
Society Unemployment
Road accidents
Risk of poverty
Income disparities
Out-migration
In-migration
Environment Natura 2000 area
Land consumption
Emissions
Congestion
Flood hazard and land erosion
Pollutants in air/soil
Identity Landscape fragmentation
Creativity
Cultural heritage
Natural heritage
Traditions and local culture
Figure 6-3 Preliminary list of indicators considered in ET2050 TIA

The definition of weights to compute aggregate impacts on macro-criteria will be a major

milestone of the project, and will be done based on inputs received during the participatory
activities. Other potential enlargements could come from the Polish Presidency document
(20111), after careful reflection inside the TPG.

TIA of ET2050 Baseline and Explorative Scenarios

The Baseline Scenario will be assessed using TIA techniques, as follows:

- First, the preliminary criteria to evaluate potential territorial impacts and the achievement
of key policy-goals and indicators to measure them, already studied in Subtask 2.2.3, will
 be discussed with the ESPON MC, in the first policy-workshop (month 9), in order to
achieve consensus on one set of weights. Proposals on weights could be tested through
a light questionnaire circulated at the winter ESPON meeting, in the same way as it was
done, successfully, during a previous ESPON meeting in Prague.
- Second, based on the results produced by the forecast models, TIA will be applied to the
2030 horizon and reviewed critically on each single impact criterion. The situation of
different regions and transnational zones will be assessed.
- Third, the results achieved will be summarized and grouped into major impact areas (to
be thought of as macro-criteria: e.g. economy, society, environment, and to be discussed
with the MC), and into a single “summative” impact, providing a synthetic, at-a-glance,
picture of the regions more advantaged and disadvantaged by the expected trends
included in the baseline scenario.
- Fourth, the results obtained will be discussed, and the relevant weights will be adjusted
as appropriate. Similarly, based on these TIA results, the 2030 scenario will be redefined
if necessary.
- Fifth, TIA will be applied to the 2050 Baseline in the same way as for the 2030 scenario.
Initial results will be presented and discussed in the thematic workshop (month 12)
- Sixth, presentation of the baseline scenarios (together with their assessment) to the MC
in the second workshop devoted to the discussion of Baseline 2050, as well as 2030 if
needed. Elaboration of a synthesis of their reactions and observations.

The assessment of the three Explorative Scenarios will comprise similar steps:
- TIA, on the basis of results produced by forecast models and foresight meta-models. The
TIA results will be synthesized in a small number of major impact areas (economy,
society, environment, etc.) and in a single “summative” impact providing a snapshot-
differentiated picture of the positively and negatively affected regions for each scenario;
- Elaboration of short, comparative discussion documents related to the four scenarios (TIA
results, main emerging territorial issues) in view of future consultations;
- Elaboration of a synthesis document gathering all elements of relevance for the
preparation of the Territorial Vision.
7. ANNEX 1 - References
Resources for participation are being developed aiming to disseminate project ongoing works and
activities in a communicative, user-friendly manner, exploiting different media and facilitating
interaction with potential participants in the process.
The paramount aim is to generate interest for the project during the process of participation (for
the stakeholders) and to increase the awareness of wider audiences once the project is over.
The work mostly consists in:
- design, development and maintenance of the website of the project as an open platform for
both communication and dissemination;
- online surveys, to be implemented after or before the workshops; conclusions will be open
to further electronic debate on the website.
- mobilisation of interested persons and institutions to make them participate in the
participatory process;
- management of the directory of participants
- cartography and infography, animations and short videos, and various other media formats
helping to make scenarios and visions better understood among stakeholders;

The central communication platform of ET2050 is the www.et2050.eu website.

Management area

Project information
and materials

Box of
announcements

Search tool

Access to
internal area

ET2050 partial
results
 Infografic
materials (maps
and visions)

Access to Virtual
Library

Links to relevant
studies and
sources

Project
activity news

Didactic
materials

Figure 7-1 ET2050 homepage (www.et2050.eu)

The work has started by developing a virtual library of images (pictures, drawings, schemes,
graphics, slide shows, animations, movies…) created to illustrate scenarios and Visions, and
publish it in the website. and the work will continue by developing original infographic and
multimedia products for each scenario and for the Vision.

Figure 7-2 Gallery of infographic resources (www.et2050.eu)

ET2050 virtual library contains selected documents concerning future trends, technologies,
scenarios, policies and databases on a set of topics from societal and demographic issues up to
governance, including economy, transport, energy, environment, habitat, land-uses. Use the right
menus to browse presently available documents. The library is to be kept updated with new
documentation.

Figure 7-3 Virtual library at http://www.et2050.eu/Et2050_Library/

8. ANNEX 2: Project planning
8.1 Schedule of activities
Next figure presents the schedule of activities of ET2050, including official deliveries, participatory
events, administrative significant dates.

Partially
Achieved task Pending Task
achieved task

Month
Day Month Year Event
number
23 June 2011 - 1st reporting period begins
Sep. 2011 1 Kick-off meeting in Luxembourg
Sep. 2011 1 1 Steering Committee in Luxembourg
Oct. 2011 2 1 TPG meeting in Barcelona
29- ESPON Internal Seminar Krakow (Poland), Expert’s workshop:
Nov. 2011 3
30 Discussion/survey on the adjusted territorial scenarios
ESPON Internal Seminar Krakow (Poland), MC Policy-oriented
1 Dec. 2011 4 workshop: Discussion of Participatory plan (and existing policy
references or alternatives for the “kind” of Vision to be developed?)
31 Dec. 2011 4 INCEPCION REPORT

- Dec. 2011 4 Small groups and interviews

1 Jan 2012 5 2nd reporting period begins
- Feb. 2012 6 Small groups and interviews
Feb. 2012 6 ESPON MC Internal Meeting
- March 2012 7 ESPON CU Thematic workshop
March 2011 7 2nd Steering Committee in Brussels
- March 2012 7 2nd TPG meeting in Brussels with Sounding Board
- April 2012 8 Small groups and interviews
30 April 2012 8 1st Activity Report submission to CU
- May 2012 9 Small groups and interviews
31 May 2012 9 INTERIM REPORT 1

ESPON Open Seminar (Denmark), Expert’s workshop: Trends

hypothesis for baseline and extreme territorial scenarios.
- June 2012 10
Transnational specificities. World futures and Common Reference
Framework.
ESPON Open Seminar (Denmark), MC Policy-oriented workshop:
Discussion on the nature of the Vision to be developed. Presentation
- June 2012 10
of the Participatory activities being carried out, as well as trends
hypothesis for baseline and extreme territorial scenarios.
1 July 2012 11 3rd reporting period begins
 Month
Day Month Year Event
number
- July 2012 11 Small groups and interviews
- Aug. 2012 12 Small groups and interviews
- Sept. 2012 13 ESPON MC Internal Meeting
- Oct. 2012 14 ESPON CU Thematic workshop
- Oct. 2012 14 3 Steering Committee Meeting
- Oct. 2012 14 3 TPG Meeting
- Oct. 2012 14 Sounding Board Meeting
- Oct. 2012 14 Small groups and interviews
31 Oct 2012 14 2nd Activity Report submission to CU
- Dec. 2012 16 ESPON Internal Seminar, Expert’s workshop
- Dec. 2012 16 ESPON Internal Seminar, MC Policy-oriented workshop
- Dec. 2012 16 Small groups and interviews
1 Jan 2013 17 4th reporting period begins
- Feb. 2013 18 Small groups and interviews
Feb. 2013 18 ESPON MC Internal Meeting
- March 2013 19 ESPON CU Thematic workshop
- March 2013 19 4 Steering Committee Meeting
30 April 2013 20 INTERIM REPORT 2

30 April 2013 20 3rd Activity Report submission to CU

- May 2013 21 Small groups and interviews
- June 2013 22 ESPON Open Seminar, Expert’s workshop
- June 2013 22 ESPON Open Seminar, MC Policy-oriented workshop
1 July 2013 23 5th reporting period begins
- July 2013 23 Small groups and interviews
- Aug. 2013 24 Small groups and interviews
Sep. 2013 25 ESPON MC Internal Meeting
- Oct. 2013 26 ESPON CU Thematic workshop
- Oct. 2013 26 5 Steering Committee Meeting
- Oct. 2013 26 4 TPG Meeting
- Oct. 2013 26 Sounding Board Meeting
- Oct. 2013 26 Small groups and interviews
31 Oct 2013 26 4th Activity Report submission to CU
- Nov. 2013 27 Small groups and interviews
- Dec. 2013 28 ESPON Internal Seminar, Expert’s workshop
- Dec. 2013 28 ESPON Internal Seminar, MC Policy-oriented workshop
 Month
Day Month Year Event
number
1 Jan 2014 29 6th reporting period begins
- Jan. 2014 29 Small groups and interviews
- Feb. 2014 30 Small groups and interviews
Feb. 2014 30 ESPON MC Internal Meeting
28 Feb. 2014 30 DRAFT FINAL REPORT
- March 2014 31 ESPON CU Thematic workshop
- March 2014 31 6 Steering Committee Meeting
- April 2014 32 Small groups and interviews
30 April 2014 32 5th Activity Report submission to CU
- May 2014 33 Small groups and interviews
- June 2014 34 ESPON Open Seminar, Expert’s workshop
- June 2014 34 ESPON Open Seminar, MC Policy-oriented workshop
- June 2014 34 Small groups and interviews
30 June 2014 34 FINAL REPORT

1 July 2014 35 7th reporting period begins

Sep. 2014 37 ESPON MC Internal Meeting
30 Oct 2014 38 6th Activity Report submission to CU
31 July 2015 47 7th Activity Report submission to CU

Figure 8-1 Schedule of activities and deliveries

8.2 Detailed work plan and partner involvement

Next table provides an updated full list of ET2050 internal milestones (including delivery dates) for
a successful accomplishment of the project (deadlines and responsible partners are subject to
change to adapt to participatory events).

Partially
Achieved task Pending Task
achieved task

Deliverable Character Deadline Responsible

Management notes Internally Monthly MCRIT
Updates Internally Periodically MCRIT
Every 6th
Administrative and financial reports To ESPON CU MCRIT
months
After
Minutes of meetings Internal MCRIT
events
Deliverable Character Deadline Responsible
Internal surveys and peer reviews related to reports to be Website brief 10 on-line
MCRIT
submitted to ESPON CU notes surveys

Participatory plan Inception report Month 4 IGEAT

Directory of stakeholders by target groups Inception report Month 4 MCRIT
Website hosting, design, development and maintenance Inception report Month 4 ERSILIA
Methods for interaction Inception report Month 4 MCRIT
Preparation of the participatory events (15 events in 3 Documented on
All over IGEAT
years) the website
Documented on
Reports of the events to be published in the website All over IGEAT
the website
Documented on
Small group discussions, interviews and on-line activities Month 4 IGEAT
the website

SPQR systematic model description Inception report Month 1 MCRIT

Data needs: demography (based on MULTIPOLES) Inception report Month 4 IOM
Data needs: economy (based on MASST) Inception report Month 4 POLIMI
Data needs: transport (based on T/IC+) Inception report Month 4 MCRIT
Data needs: land-use (based on METRONAMICA) Inception report Month 4 RIKS

Data needs: territory (based on SASI) Inception report Month 4 S&W

TV+ & PASH+ development plan Inception report Month 4 MCRIT

MCRIT,
Forecast models development plans (MULTIPOLES,
Inception report Month 4 POLIMI, IOM,
MASST, T/IC+, SASI, PASH+, TV+)
S&W, RIKS
Draft criteria for TIA to be applied in all scenarios and
Inception report Month 4 POLIMI
visions
Indicators for TIA to be applied in all scenarios and visions Inception report Month 5 POLIMI

Inception report December 2011 Month 4

Documented on
Adaptation of MULTIPOLES Month 7 IOM
the website
Documented on
Adaptation of MASST Month 7 POLIMI
the website
Documented on
Adaptation of T/IC+ Month 7 MCRIT
the website
Documented on
Adaptation of METRONAMICA Month 7 RIKS
the website
Deliverable Character Deadline Responsible
Documented on
Adaptation of SASI Month 7 S&W
the website
Documented on
Adaptation PASH+ & TV+ Month 11 MCRIT
the website

Published in the
South West Med Region Month 8 MCRIT
website
Published in the
Central Med Region Month 8 POLIMI
website
Published in the
North-West Region Month 8 IGEAT
website
Published in the
Central and Alpine Region Month 8 S&W
website
Published in the
Baltic and Nordic Region Month 8 Nordregio
website
Published in the
Danubian Region Month 8 RKK
website
Published in the
South-Eastern Region Month 8 Thessaly
website
Warsow
Published in the
Eastern Region Month 8 School of
website
Economics
Published in the
Outermost regions Month 8 MCRIT
website

Published in the CEFMR /

Demographic trends and potential territorial impacts Month 8
website IOM
Published in the
Economic trends and potential territorial impacts Month 8 POLIMI
website
Technologic trends and potential territorial impacts in Published in the
Month 8 MCRIT
Europe website
Published in the
Transport trends and potential territorial impacts Month 8 MCRIT
website
Published in the
Energy trends and potential territorial impacts Month 8 TERSYN
website
Published in the
Land-use trends and potential territorial impacts Month 8 RIKS
website
Published in the
Environmental trends and potential territorial impacts Month 8 IGEAT
website
Published in the
Governance trends and potential territorial impacts Month 8 IGEAT
website

Trends and territorial impacts by sectors. Integrated report Interim Report 1 Month 8 MCRIT
Deliverable Character Deadline Responsible
Trends by transnational zones. Integrated report. Interim Report 1 Month 8 MCRIT
Report on reference Scenarios and Visions for Europe and
Interim Report 1 Month 6 ISIS / MCRIT
the World
Thematic workshop for discussing the Present State of the
Website Month 7 IGEAT
European Territory
Report on the State of the European Territory (based on
Interim Report 1 Month 9 MCRIT
trends by sectors and zones)
Reference data to be provided by modellers Interim Report 1 Month 9 MCRIT

Interim report 1 May 2012 Month 9

MCRIT,
Forecast Baseline for 2030 Baseline (by enhanced
Website Month 10 POLIMI, IOM,
MULTIPOLES, MASST, T/IC+, SASI)
S&W, RIKS
MCRIT,
Baseline scenario 2030 (narrative, story-line by 5-10 years,
Interim Report 2 Month 10 POLIMI,
forecasts)
S&W
Policy-oriented workshop for Baseline 2030 Website Month 10 IGEAT
Scientific-oriented workshop for Baseline 2030 Website Month 10 IGEAT
Foresight for 2050 Baseline (mostly by enhanced PASH+,
Website Month 11 MCRIT
TV+)
MCRIT,
Baseline scenario 2050 (narrative, story-line by 5-10 years,
Interim Report 2 Month 12 POLIMI,
foresights)
S&W
Territorial assessment of the baseline scenarios Interim Report 2 Month 14 POLIMI
Thematic workshop with stakeholders for Baseline 2030- IGEAT /
Website Month 14
2050 POLIMI
MCRIT,
Assumptions for the three exploratory scenarios Website Month 16 POLIMI,
S&W
Scientific-oriented workshop for Baseline 2030-2050 and
Website Month 16 IGEAT
first insides on Scenarios
Policy-oriented workshop for Baseline 2030-2050 and first
Website Month 16 IGEAT
insides on Scenarios
Data produced by forecast and foresight activities Website Month 18 MCRIT
Thematic workshop on Exploratory scenarios Website Month 19 IGEAT
MCRIT,
Three exploratory scenarios Interim Report 2 Month 19 POLIMI,
S&W
MCRIT,
Forecast for 2030 Exploratory Scenarios (by enhanced
Website Month 19 POLIMI, IOM,
MULTIPOLES, MASST, T/IC+, SASI)
S&W, RIKS
Deliverable Character Deadline Responsible
Foresight for 2050 Exploratory Scenarios (mostly by
Website Month 19 MCRIT
enhanced PASH+, TV+)
Territorial assessment of the exploratory scenarios Interim Report 2 Month 20 POLIMI

Interim report 2 April 2013 Month 20

Scientific-workshop to consolidate Exploratory Scenarios Website Month 22 IGEAT

Policy-workshop to consolidate Exploratory Scenarios Website Month 22 IGEAT

Synthesis document with orientations for the Territorial
Draft final report Month 22 MCRIT
Vision
Foresight for 2050 Exploratory Scenarios Website Month 26 MCRIT
Thematic workshop with stakeholders to discuss the
Website report Month 26 IGEAT
European Territorial Vision 2050
Scientific workshop to discuss the European Territorial
Website report Month 28 IGEAT
Vision 2050
Policy workshop to discuss the European Territorial Vision
Website report Month 28 IGEAT
2050
MCRIT,
European Territorial Vision for 2050, reviewed by the
Draft final report Month 28 POLIMI, IOM,
discussions
S&W, RIKS

Draft final report December 2013 Month 28

Thematic workshop with stakeholders to consolidate the

Website report Month 31 IGEAT
European Territorial Vision (13)
Scientific workshop to consolidate the European Territorial
Website report Month 33 IGEAT
Vision
Policy workshop to consolidate the European Territorial
Website report Month 33 IGEAT
Vision
Mid-term targets with territorial differentiation Final report Month 33 MCRIT
MCRIT,
Pathways for types or regions Final report Month 33 POLIMI, IOM,
S&W, RIKS
MCRIT,
Policy recommendations Final report Month 29 POLIMI, IOM,
S&W, RIKS
MCRIT,
Territorial governance arrangements Final report Month 33 POLIMI, IOM,
S&W, RIKS

Final report June 2014 Month 34

Deliverable Character Deadline Responsible

Electronic
Posters, brochures and leaflets designed and disseminated Month 34 ERSILIA
dissemination
Multimedia products representing the scenarios and the Electronic
Month 34 ERSILIA
Vision (6 in total) dissemination

Electronic
Final website as a repository of produced material Month 37 MCRIT
dissemination
Electronic
On-line survey to a wider audience Month 35 MCRIT
dissemination
Electronic
Material for ESPON Capitalisation Strategy Month 37 MCRIT
dissemination
Redesign of communication material for wider Electronic
Month 37 ERSILIA
dissemination purposes dissemination

Figure 8-2 Updated Tentative schedule of internal milestones and partner involvement

8.3 Work towards Interim Report 2 (april 2013)

The content of the Second Interim Report shall reflect the orientations given in the Inception
Report as well as the results of the discussions having taken place with the Sounding Board. The
report is envisaged to include elements such as:
i) Main results on the basis of available data, developed indicators, scenarios, policies and
European maps, including
 An overview on concepts and methodology on creating a territorial vision, midterm targets
and policy recommendations.
 Final results of Step 1, Step 2 and Step 3.
 Overview of involvement of stakeholders up to now and planned for the next phase up to
the Draft Final Report.
ii) Additional material to contribute to the ESPON 2013 capitalisation and communication
strategy, including:
 Slideshows explaining the assumptions, the methodology and the results of the project so
far.
 A selection of 3-5 maps suitable for the communication of project progress and results at
the different stages on the ESPON website, but as well suitable to be used for creation of
posters, postcards, exhibition materials, etc.
 Input (text, maps, images) for the updating of a specific section of the ESPON 2013 Web-
site dedicated to the project.
 Written contribution for the elaboration of at least 4 leaflets/brochures to inform policy
makers on the assumptions, the methodology and the results of the project so far (focus-
ing on the baseline scenario and the three prospective scenario);
iii) Concrete plan for the applied research and stakeholder involvement to finalise Step 4 and
Step 5 towards the draft Final Report as well as the Table of Content envisaged for the Final
report.
 9. ANNEX 3: Full Baseline Quantitative Description
In this section first reference values for key indicators are provided as starting point for the
modelling exercise. Values are obtained from a large number of sources at global and European
level and made consistent, at aggregated European level, by using TV+ and PASH+ Meta-
models.
Based on the actual results to be obtained from forecast models, integrated through the meta-
analysis process, the values presented next will be refined and adjusted whenever needed. Main
sources used for reference are always indicated (MM means ET2050 Meta-model, in the cases
no other source has been used as reference).
A description of the ET2050 Meta-model, which integrated TV+ and PASH+ meta-models, is to
be found in ANNEX 3 of this Interim Report, using SPQR format.

a) World Framework (exogenous variables)

WORLD Time series source Forecast source

World Population (millions of people) UN DESA UN DESA

World Urban Population (% over total population) UN DESA UN DESA

World illiteracy rate (% of population 15+) UNICEF UNICEF

World Gini Coeficient (Income Disparities) Bourguignon/ Morrison (2002) E.Hillebrand

World GDP (1000 milions of 2010 €) World Bank PASHMINA 7FP

World total trade (goods % services in 1000 million €) UNCTAD CItYBANK

Global seaborne traffic (billion tonne·km) UNCTAD IMO

Global air traffic (billion RPKs) airbus/boeing airbus/boeing

World Tourism (million overnight visitors per year) UNWTO UNWTO

World energy consumption (MTOE) BP IEA

World CO2 emissions (million tones) BP / DG Energy IEA

DG ENERGY //
Oil price (€2010 per barrel) BP
60
US EIA

Figure 9-1 World Framework – Reference sources for exogenous variables

WORLD 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

World Population
2.531 3.039 3.708 4.473 5.308 6.125 6.910 7.670 8.323 8.889 9.214
(millions of people)

World Urban Popula-

tion
29% 33% 36% 39% 43% 46% 50% 55% 59% 64% 69%
(% over total popula-
tion)

World illiteracy rate

44% 41% 37% 30% 24% 18% 17% 14% 11% 9% 7%
(% of population 15+)

World Gini Coeficient

0,63 0,64 0,65 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,64 0,64 0,64 0,64 0,64
(Income Disparities)

60
EIA (2012), INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012 Early Release,
WORLD 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

World GDP

(1000 milions of 2010 4.501 7.422 13.535 19.367 26.411 34.214 43.338 60.565 84.638 106.888 134.986
€)

World total trade (go-

ods % services in 125 178 479 2.250 5.625 13.027 19.947 36.060 65.189 100.272 154.236
1000 million €)

Global seaborne traf-

fic 4.862 7.197 10.654 16.777 16.440 22.927 32.746 48.472 69.707 100.246 144.163
(billion tonne·km)

Global air traffic

226 368 600 1.100 2.100 3.381 4.621 7.491 12.145 19.688 31.918
(billion RPKs)

World Tourism (milli-

on overnight visitors 25 64 109 170 319 560 940 1.281 1.746 2.379 3.241
per year)

World energy con-

2.900 3.754 4.884 6.469 7.192 8.441 10.182 13.442 17.747 20.758 24.280
sumption (MTOE)

World CO2 emissions

10.000 11.802 14.908 18.990 21.977 24.224 29.905 38.875 50.537 56.757 63.741
(million tones)

Real crude oil price

13 12 9 82 33 30 67 108 121 130 138
(€2010 per barrel)

Figure 9-2 World Framework – Table of exogenous variables quantified

 World trends 1990-2050 (1990=100) World trends 1990-2050 Zoom -in (1990=100)
3.000 600
Total population Illiteracy rate Total population Illiteracy rate
Urban population Income disparities
GDP Trade Urban population Income disparities
Seaborne traffic Air traffic
GDP Energy consumption
Tourism Energy consumption
CO2 Oil Price CO2 Oil Price
2.500 500

2.000 400

1.500 300

1.000 200

500 100

Figure 9-3 World Framework – 1990-2050 growth trends

0 0
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
WORLD

annual growth rates 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
World Population
(millions of people) 1,8% 2,0% 1,9% 1,7% 1,4% 1,2% 1,0% 0,8% 0,7% 0,4%

World Urban Popula-

tion (% over total 1,4% 0,9% 0,8% 0,9% 0,9% 0,8% 0,8% 0,8% 0,8% 0,7%
population)
World illiteracy rate
(% of population 15+) -0,8% -0,9% -2,0% -2,1% -2,8% -0,9% -1,8% -2,2% -2,0% -2,5%

World Gini Coeficient

(Income Disparities) 0,2% 0,2% 0,1% 0,0% 0,0% -0,2% -0,1% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%

World GDP (1000

milions of 2010 €) 5,1% 6,2% 3,6% 3,2% 2,6% 2,4% 3,4% 3,4% 2,4% 2,4%

World total trade

(goods % services in 3,6% 10,4% 16,7% 9,6% 8,8% 4,4% 6,1% 6,1% 4,4% 4,4%
1000 million €)
Global seaborne
traffic (billion ton- 4,0% 4,0% 4,6% -0,2% 3,4% 3,6% 4,0% 3,7% 3,7% 3,7%
ne·km)
Global air traffic (billi-
on RPKs) 5,0% 5,0% 6,2% 6,7% 4,9% 3,2% 5,0% 5,0% 5,0% 5,0%

World Tourism (milli-

on overnight visitors 9,8% 5,5% 4,5% 6,5% 5,8% 5,3% 3,1% 3,1% 3,1% 3,1%
per year)
World energy con-
sumption (MTOE) 2,6% 2,7% 2,8% 1,1% 1,6% 1,9% 2,8% 2,8% 1,6% 1,6%

World CO2 emissions

(million tones) 1,7% 2,4% 2,4% 1,5% 1,0% 2,1% 2,7% 2,7% 1,2% 1,2%

Oil price (€2010 per

barrel) -1,0% -3,1% 25,4% -8,6% -0,9% 8,2% 1,7% 1,5% 0,9% 0,9%

Figure 9-4 World Framework – Table of growth rates of exogenous variables

EUROPE
Time Forecast
in the World series source 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
EU27 Population as a
share of World's (%) UN DESA UN DESA 15% 13% 12% 10% 9% 8% 7% 7% 6% 6% 6%

Europe Gini Coefici-

ent in relation to Calculated Calculated 40% 41% 41% 40% 41% 44% 47% 47% 43% 41% 39%
Worlds

EU27 GDP as share World PASHMINA

of World's (%) 37% 37% 37% 36% 33% 31% 28% 24% 20% 18% 17%
Bank 7FP
Share of EU goods
trade in the World (%) UNCTAD CItYBANK 17% 24% 22% 20% 19% 19% 15% 13% 11% 10% 9%

EU Tourism as a
share of World's (%) UNWTO UNWTO 90% 84% 79% 74% 69% 56% 45% 42% 37% 32% 27%

EU energy consump-
tion as a share of BP IEA 28% 27% 26% 24% 23% 20% 17% 13% 10% 9% 7%
World's (%)
EU CO2 emissions
as a share of World's BP / DG IEA 18% 22% 27% 25% 20% 18% 15% 10% 7% 6% 5%
(%) Energy

Figure 9-5 World Framework – Table of European weight in the World

 100%
Population GDP Trade
Tourism Energy consumption CO2
90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Figure 9-6 World Framework – 1990-2050 evolution of European weight in the World
 World yearly grow th rate (%)

0,30

Total population Illiteracy rate Urban population Income disparities

GDP Trade Seaborne traffic Air traffic
Tourism Energy consumption CO2 Oil Price

0,25

0,20

0,15

0,10

0,05

0,00

-0,05

-0,10

Figure 9-7 World Framework – 1950-2050 evolution growth rates of exogenous variables
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
b) European Main Drivers (inputs)

Time Forecast
SOCIETY series source 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Women fertility UN DE-

ECFIN 2,6 2,6 2,3 2,0 1,8 1,4 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,7
(births / woman) SA

Life expectancy at birth UN DE-

ECFIN 65,6 68,0 70,3 71,2 72,9 73,1 79,2 80,8 82,4 83,7 85,1
(years) SA

Average household size Various DG

3,8 3,5 3,3 3,1 2,7 2,5 2,3 2,2 2,2 2,1 2,0
(number of people) sources ENERGY

Active Population
EC FIN EC FIN 70% 70% 70% 71% 69% 70% 71% 71% 72% 72% 73%
(% active over 15-64)

% of personal income
Eurostat MM 14,6% 14,6% 14,6% 14,6% 16,4% 18,3% 17,4% 16,1% 16,1% 16,1% 16,1%
devoted to leisure

% of personal income
Eurostat MM 11,3% 11,3% 11,3% 12,1% 13,0% 13,8% 13,0% 13,4% 13,4% 13,4% 13,4%
devoted to transport

Historic Forecast
TECHNOLOGY series source 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Energy Intensity DG
BP / DG
(MTOE/Million,2010 ENERGY 0,48 0,37 0,25 0,22 0,19 0,16 0,14 0,12 0,11 0,09 0,08
Energy
euros) / EC FIN

Carbon Intensity BP / DG
IEA 2,25 2,47 3,19 2,99 2,67 2,53 2,49 2,14 1,88 1,76 1,62
(Mton/MTOE) Energy

Digital processing capabi-

lity of computers Future of Future of
Techno- Techno- 1,0 2,5 4,0 5,5 7,3 9,0 10,5 12,0 13,5 15,0 16,5
(logarit- logy logy
hm(operations/sec))

Historic Forecast
GOVERNMENT series source 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Market Regulation

EU enlargements
Eurostat MM 0 189 16 72 55 33 134 0 0 0 0
(million new inh.)

Total Net Migration UN ECFIN /

0 -0,25 -0,71 0,59 0,66 0,72 1,04 1,33 1,29 1,23 0,92
(million imm/year) DESA MM

ECFIN /
Retirement age MM 64,0 64,0 64,0 62,6 61,2 59,9 61,2 61,8 62,3 62,5 62,5
OECD

Anual worked hours per US BLS

Based on
employeed (hours / GOV / 2.256 2.171 2.086 2.001 1.916 1.831 1.746 1.759 1.761 1.776 1.774
EC FIN
year·worker) ECFIN

Eurpean
Euro to Dollar exchange
Central MM 0,48 0,50 0,56 1,11 1,33 1,03 1,44 1,25 1,25 1,25 1,25
rate ($ / €)
Bank
 Historic Forecast
GOVERNMENT series source 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Public Investment

Public revenue (as % of

Eurostat MM 19,8% 29,9% 39,0% 44,3% 45,4% 43,0% 44,0% 45,0% 42,0% 39,0% 39,0%
GDP)

Government expenditure
EC FIN MM 20,0% 30,1% 39,2% 48,2% 48,8% 45,2% 50,8% 46,0% 43,0% 40,0% 40,0%
(as % of GDP)

Social public expenditure

ENEPRI ECFIN 8,0% 11,0% 16,0% 24,9% 25,0% 27,0% 23,0% 23,5% 24,9% 26,4% 27,4%
(as % of GDP)

Gross capital formation

Eurostat MM 18,0% 18,4% 18,8% 19,3% 19,7% 20,1% 21,3% 21,8% 21,9% 22,2% 22,2%
(% of GDP)

Expenditure in public &

Eurostat MM 1,6% 1,7% 1,7% 1,8% 1,9% 1,9% 2,0% 1,9% 1,9% 1,9% 1,9%
private R&D (% of GDP)

Figure 9-8 European Drivers – Table of input variables quantified

Wom en fertility (births / w om an)

3,0

2,5

2,0

1,5

1,0

0,5

0,0
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Life expectancy at birth (years)

90,0

80,0

70,0

60,0

50,0

40,0

30,0

20,0

10,0

0,0
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
EU enlargements (million new inh.)
200,0

150,0

100,0

50,0

0,0
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

-50,0

Total Net Migration (com ing from outside EU27 im m /year)

1500000

1000000

500000

0
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

-500000

-1000000

Retirem ent age

64,5
64,0
63,5
63,0
62,5
62,0
61,5
61,0
60,5
60,0
59,5
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Social public expenditure (as % of GDP)

30,0%

25,0%

20,0%

15,0%

10,0%

5,0%

0,0%
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Public revenue (as % of GDP)
50,0%

45,0%
40,0%

35,0%
30,0%

25,0%
20,0%

15,0%
10,0%

5,0%
0,0%
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Expenditure in public & private R&D (% of GDP)

2,5%

2,0%

1,5%

1,0%

0,5%

0,0%
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Carbon Intensity (Mton/MTOE)

3,5

3,0

2,5

2,0

1,5

1,0

0,5

0,0
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Energy Intensity (MTOE/Meuros) in constant €2010

0,6

0,5

0,4

0,3

0,2

0,1

0,0
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
 Digital processing capability of com puters (logarithm (operations/sec))
1800,0%

1600,0%

1400,0%

1200,0%

1000,0%

800,0%

600,0%

400,0%

200,0%

0,0%
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Euro to Dollar exchange rate ($ / €)

160,0%

140,0%

120,0%

100,0%

80,0%

60,0%

40,0%

20,0%

0,0%
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Figure 9-9 European Drivers –1950-2050 evolution for selected input variables

61
c) European Main Trends (outputs)

POPULATION & Time Forecast

SOCIETY series source 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

European Population UN ECFIN /

385 416 451 474 488 509 518 538 543 545 540
(millions of people) DESA UNDESA

Population Ageing (Peo-

Pop. Pop.
ple Older than 65 years 7% 8% 9% 11% 13% 15% 16% 19% 23% 25% 27%
Ageing Ageing
(%))

Dependency ratio (chil-

MM MM 52% 55% 56% 53% 50% 48% 46% 54% 58% 66% 72%
dren+elder/15-64)

Share of early school MM

leavers (% of 18-24 with (2000-
MM 19,8% 19,4% 19,2% 18,9% 18,5% 17,6% 14,1% 13,1% 12,8% 12,5% 12,6%
at most lower secondary 2010
education) Eurostat)

MM
Tertiary educational at-
(2000-
tainment (% of 30-34 with MM 12,0% 13,0% 16,0% 18,0% 20,0% 22,4% 33,6% 36,4% 37,6% 37,6% 38,5%
2010
university degree)
Eurostat)

Time Forecast
ECONOMY series source 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

61
These results are benchmarks against which to compare the results of ET2050 models. These preliminary figures have been
determined using foresight tools, based on official forecasts and baselines by the EC.
 Time Forecast
ECONOMY series source 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

% employed over 20-64 Eurostat MM 68% 68% 68% 68% 66% 67% 69% 70% 71% 72% 72%

Unemployment rate
EC FIN EC FIN 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 9% 8% 6% 5% 5% 6%
(% unemployed / active)

Labour input in the EU

(1000xmillion worked MM EC FIN 359 367 380 396 384 382 394 402 400 388 373
hours / year)

European GDP (1000

IMF MM 1.763 2.908 5.303 7.330 9.191 11.145 13.001 15.584 18.212 20.918 23.983
milions of 2010 €)

Total EU trade goods

Eurostat, City
volume (imports&exports 20 39 90 380 877 1.975 2.498 3.769 5.688 7.870 10.888
WTO Bank
EU, in 1000 million €)

Tourism (million overnight

UNWTO UNWTO 30 75 120 190 247 312 339 491 643 766 888
visitors per year)

European Public Debt (%

IMF MM 41,7% 29,7% 32,5% 32,8% 44,5% 61,9% 72,6% 65,0% 63,0% 55,0% 50,0%
of GDP)

Time Forecast
TRANSPORT series source 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

2011 WP
Total passenger·km /
MM 815 1.344 2.451 3.384 4.242 5.200 5.961 6.778 7.708 8.125 8.564
(1000Mpax·km) Energy20
30

2011 WP
Total freight tonne·km /
MM 501 827 1.508 2.082 2.610 3.658 3.571 4.376 5.361 6.135 7.021
(1000Mt·km) Energy20
30

Passeng
er 2011
Passenger Rail modal
WP / MM 6,6% 6,4% 6,4% 5,1% 3,8% 5,1% 6,4%
share (% passenger·km)
Energy20
30

Freight
2011 WP
Freight Rail modal share
/ MM 15,5% 12,6% 13,4% 14,0% 14,5% 15,1% 15,6%
(% t·km)
Energy20
30

2011 WP
Motorisation rate (cars / /
MM 71 99 150 220 320 410 480 540 600 620 615
1000inh) Energy20
30

Road Fatalities
ERF MM 120 115 109 90 76 57 35 17 9 5 2
(1000xdeaths/year)

Time Forecast
LAND USE series source 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

EU27 Urban Population UN UN

55% 59% 64% 67% 69% 70% 73% 76% 80% 85% 89%
(% over total population) DESA DESA

EU27 Number of cities > UN UN

21 25 28 30 31 34 37 41 43 45 49
1 million inhabitants DESA DESA
 Time Forecast
ENERGY series source 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Primary energy BP / DG DG
800 1.030 1.285 1.564 1.679 1.724 1.764 1.805 1.807 1.804 1.800
consumption (MTOE) Energy ENERGY

DG
% of renewables in
Energy in 1,1% 2,2% 3,4% 5,0% 6,9% 7,6% 10,3% 14,8% 18,4% 22,2% 26,0%
energy
energy MM

Time Forecast
ENVIRONMENT series source 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Total BP
Total CO2 emissions
/ DG MM 0 57 91 105 100 97 98 86 76 71 65
(1990=100)
Energy

CO2 emissions reduction

DG
from transport MM 0 0 0 0 100 112 129 134 127 128 129
Energy
(1990=100)

Time Forecast
GOVERNANCE series source 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

European Public Debt (%

IMF MM 42% 30% 33% 33% 45% 62% 73% 65% 63% 55% 50%
of GDP)

Figure 9-10 European Main Trends – Table of output variables quantified

European Population (m illions of people)

600,0

500,0

400,0

300,0

200,0

100,0

0,0
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Population Ageing (People Older than 65 years (%))

30,0%

25,0%

20,0%

15,0%

10,0%

5,0%

0,0%
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Dependency ratio (children+elder/15-64)
80,0%

70,0%

60,0%

50,0%

40,0%

30,0%

20,0%

10,0%

0,0%
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

EU27 Urban Population (% over total population)

100,0%

90,0%

80,0%

70,0%
60,0%

50,0%

40,0%

30,0%
20,0%

10,0%

0,0%
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Labour input in the EU (m illion w orked hours / year)

405.000,0

400.000,0

395.000,0

390.000,0
385.000,0

380.000,0

375.000,0

370.000,0
365.000,0

360.000,0

355.000,0
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

EU27 GDP (1000 m ilions of 2010 €)

25.000,00

20.000,00

15.000,00

10.000,00

5.000,00

0,00
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Total EU trade goods volum e (im ports&exports EU, in 1000 m illion €)
12.000,0

10.000,0

8.000,0

6.000,0

4.000,0

2.000,0

0,0
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Tourism (m illion overnight visitors per year)

1.000,0

900,0

800,0

700,0
600,0

500,0

400,0

300,0
200,0

100,0

0,0
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

European Public Debt (% of GDP)

80,0%

70,0%

60,0%

50,0%

40,0%

30,0%

20,0%

10,0%

0,0%
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Total passenger·km (1000Mpax·km )

9.000,0

8.000,0

7.000,0

6.000,0

5.000,0

4.000,0

3.000,0

2.000,0

1.000,0

0,0
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
 Total freight tonne·km (1000Mt·km )
8.000,0

7.000,0

6.000,0

5.000,0

4.000,0

3.000,0

2.000,0

1.000,0

0,0
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Motorisation rate (cars / 1000inh)

700,0

600,0

500,0

400,0

300,0

200,0

100,0

0,0
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Prim ary energy consum ption (MTOE)

2.000,0

1.800,0

1.600,0

1.400,0
1.200,0

1.000,0

800,0

600,0
400,0

200,0

0,0
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

% of renew ables in energy

30,0%

25,0%

20,0%

15,0%

10,0%

5,0%

0,0%
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Figure 9-11 European Main Trends – 1950-2050 evolution for selected output variables
10. ANNEX 4: ET2050 Meta-model SPQR (TV+ // PASH+)

NAME ET2050 MM (TV+ // PASH+)

BACKGROUND

Last update 2012

Developer MCRIT
Developed in the project ET2050 based on TV+ (TRANSVISIONS, DG TREN 2009) and PASH+
(PASHMINA, DG RTD 2011)
Ownership MCRIT co-financed by EC. No commercialised.
Main applications Merging TV+ and PASH+ meta-models to allow for an integrated scenario
designing tool interrelating key sectoral variables in all domains to provide
consistent holistic image of future scenarios for Europe. .
 TV+ meta-model was initially intended to design transport scenarios
up to 2050, with demography / economy / energy / environment con-
siderations. TV+ was used in Transvisions study (DGTREN, 2009) to
create four alternative scenarios fulfilling transport CO2 and GHG
emission targets towards 2050 using different strategies.
 PASH+ meta-model was intended to design future scenarios at
World level up to 2050, with demography / economy / energy / trans-
port / environment / land-uses and governance considerations.
PASH+ considered 7 world macro-regions (Europe, Russia, Asia,
North America, Latin America, Africa, Oceania), and insured trend
consistency for all regions
Documents of reference TRANSVISIONS “Transport Scenarios with 20 and 40 years Horizon” Final
Report (http://ec.europa.eu/transport/strategies/studies/strategies_en.htm)
PASHMINA “Paradigm Shift Medelling and Innovative Approaches” D1.1 and
D1.2 (http://www.pashmina-
project.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46&Itemid=37)
Running time < 1 minute
Size of total results 1MB
Data exchange format Results provided in Excel
Software platform MS EXCEL

SAMPLES

Reference data from 1950-2010

Data for calibration Various Sources, mostly official forecasts by EU (Europop2010, Ageing
Report 2012, Energy and Transport outlook to 2030…)
Data inputs - Socioeconomic framework 1950-2010 for approximately 100 variables
- Demographic dynamics to 2050 (birth rates / mortality rates / migrations / EU
enlargements)
- Social dynamics to 2050 (households / personal budget on basic needs,
leisure, transport / retirement age / activity rates / annual worked hours per
person)
- Economic dynamics to 2050 (public and private investment / R&D policies /
 public expenditure)
- Technology (energy intensity, carbon intensity, vehicle technology)
- Energy dynamics to 2050 (energy mix / energy prices)
- Transport generation dynamics to 2050 (infrastructure policies, pricing and
behavioural policies to 2050)
- Land-uses dynamics
- Governance dynamics

POSTULATES

Forecast reliable up to 2050

Geographic coverage ESPON space
Adm. desegregation European aggregated level
Thematic scope Demography, Economy, Technology, Energy, Transport, Environment, Land-
use, Governance
Theory Based on simple variable interrelations, between demography, economy,
energy, transport and environment.
Inherited from PASH+, the meta-model is able to reproduce a proxy of
population cohorts based on basic demographic assumptions (birth and
mortality rates, immigration, age structure). Labour market is estimated with
additional labour input, activity and employment rate hypothesis. Economy
growth is based on labour input and investment.
For transport, the inherited TV+ module generates transport demand based
on future population and available personal income (passenger transport
based on individual travel budget hypothesis), and economic dynamics
(freight transport). Hypothesis on travel behaviour (vehicle occupation, freight
transport optimisation), public policies (pricing, taxation…) and technological
developments, allow establishing transport demand and resulting GHG
emissions from this transport needs.
GHG emissions and land-uses dynamics are estimated from economic
behaviour and transport behaviour.

QUERIES

Scenario building The ET2050 MM is an integrated tool to design coherent holistic

socioeconomic, transport, energy, environment scenarios. The model is able
to produce around 100 interelated variables aimed at illustrating quantitatively
the narratives of pre-established qualitative scenarios.

R E S U L T S (Main families of indicators)

Population and Society European Population (millions of people)

Population Ageing (People Older than 65 years (%))
Dependency ratio (children+elder/15-64)
Share of early school leavers (% of 18-24 with at most lower secondary
 education)
Tertiary educational attainment (% of 30-34 with university degree)
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (% of total population)
Economy % employed over 20-64
Unemployment rate (% unemployed / active)
Labour input in the EU (million worked hours / year)
European GDP (1000 milions of 2010 €)
Total EU trade goods volume (imports&exports EU, in 1000 million €)
Tourism (million overnight visitors per year)
European Public Debt (% of GDP)
Economic gap between regions
Transport Total passenger·km (1000Mpax·km)
Total freight tonne·km (1000Mt·km)
Passenger Rail modal share (% passenger·km)
Freight Rail modal share (% t·km)
Motorisation rate (cars / 1000inh)
Road Fatalities (deaths per year)
Road Congestion
Land-use European Urban Population (% over total population)
European Number of cities > 1 million inhabitants
Energy Primary energy consumption (MTOE)
% of renewables in energy
Energy consumption from transport (Mtoe)
% vehicles powered with RES
% transport energy from biofuels
Environment Total CO2 emissions (1990=100)
CO2 emissions reduction from transport (1990=100)
Governance European Public Debt (% of GDP)

INTERACTION WITH OTHER ET2050 MODELS

Required inputs Results of ET2050 MM provide a rought image of scenarios in all sectoral
dimensions, with consistency between key variables. However, due to the
simplified nature of the tool, results require validation with more sound and
proper models, in the case of ET2050, by MASST, METRONAMICA, SASI,
MULTIPOLES and MOSAIC
Potential outputs Results of ET2050 MM provide a common base of variables for other models
to implement scenarios in a consistent way, preventing significant disparities
in the different models’ inputs.
11. FIRST ANNEX TO INTERIM REPORT (OCTOBER 2012): Structuring of
Exploratory Scenarios, Territorialisation and Use of Wild Cards
11.1 Approach
A debate arose in the project team about the specification of the Exploratory Scenarios. There
was agreement that a scenario is a combination of two kinds of assumptions: assumptions about
the framework conditions that cannot be influenced by European or national policies and
assumptions about European and national policies that can be influenced by political decisions.
Framework conditions may include:
- Demography: total European population development
- Economy: total European economic development
- Energy: energy prices, energy intensity, renewable energy
- Environment: carbon intensity
Relevant European and national policies include:
- Migration: maximum volume and conditions of international migration
- Cohesion: expenditures of EFRE, ESF and the Cohesion Fund
- Agriculture: expenditures of CAP
- Transport: implementation of the TEN-T
- Research: expenditures for R&D promotion
- EU enlargement: accession of new member states

The question was how the two components, the assumptions about framework conditions and the
assumptions about policies, are to be combined.
- One possibility is to keep the assumptions about the framework conditions fixed while
varying those about policies and, conversely, keeping the assumptions about policies
fixed while varying those about the framework conditions in order to isolate the impacts of
framework conditions and policies, respectively.
- The other possibility is to change both types of assumptions together in order to achieve
internally consistent scenarios. That means that for each of the three Exploratory
Scenarios those assumptions about framework conditions and policies are made that best
promote the objectives of each scenario.
It was decided to apply both approaches. Next tables visualise the differences between the two
approaches. The rows represent the assumptions about policies in the three Exploratory
Scenarios and the columns the assumptions about framework conditions.
In the first approach the three scenarios are combined with alternative framework conditions, not
necessarily the most favourable ones, in order to study the performance of the three scenarios
under a range of alternative framework conditions. This will allow assessing the impacts of the
policies assumed to be implemented in the three scenarios, everything else being fixed.
 Framework conditions

3
Scale Policies 0 1 2 Energy
Business as Economic Technology scarcity //
usual decline advance climate
change

Baseline policies 00 --- --- ---

Promotion of global
A European metropolitan areas A0 A1 A2 A3
(MEGAs)
Promotion of large
B National European cities B0 B1 B2 B3
(FUAs)

Promotion of
C Regional medium-sized cities
C0 C1 C2 C3
(SMCities)

Figure 11-1 1st approach for Exploratory Scenarios: full matrix of framework conditions and
policies

The alternative framework conditions under discussion for the first approach are:
0 Business as usual: The policy assumptions of the three Exploratory Scenarios are combined
with no other framework conditions and policies than the Baseline Scenario.
1 Economic decline: Incapacity to complete in the globalisation and with emerging economies
lead to real decline of the European economy.
2 Technology advance: New advances in productivity and transport technology result in
significant reductions in production and transport costs.
3 Energy/climate: Rising energy costs and greenhouse gas emission taxes lead to strong
increases of production and transport costs.

The first two framework conditions can also be associated with different pathways of development
of the European Union:
- The business-as-usual framework conditions can also be seen as a scenario of continued
though moderate further integration of EU member states and institutions.
- The economic decline framework conditions can also be seen as a scenario of failure of the
European Union with growing fragmentation of EU institutions and policies.
 Framework conditions

0
Scale Policies 1
Business as
Economic decline
usual -Piecemeal
- Fragmented EU
EU Integration

Baseline policies 00

Promotion of global
A European metropolitan areas A0 A1
(MEGAs)
Promotion of large
B National European cities B0 B1
(FUAs)

Promotion of medium-
C Regional sized cities
C0 C1
(SMCities)

Figure 11-2 1st approach for Exploratory Scenarios: integrated vs fragmented EU framework
conditions

In the second approach both assumptions about policies and about framework conditions are
changed simultaneously to investigate the three Exploratory Scenarios under the most favourable
framework conditions. This is why only the cells on the diagonal of the matrix are filled.
Correspondences, of course, can be found between scenarios in this second approach and some
of the scenarios defined in the full matrix of the 1st approach.

Framework conditions
Territorial Reinvented
Scale development Increased EU Social
Business as behavioural
orientations global governance
usual change
competition and improved
regulation

Baseline 00 --- --- ---

A European Europe of flows --- A2 --- ---

B National Europe of cities --- --- B0 ---

C Regional Europe of regions --- --- --- C3

Figure 11-3 2nd approach for Exploratory Scenarios: set of scenarios with consistent
framework conditions and policies
The implementation scenarios with forecast and foresight models will follow a combination of the
2 approaches above described.

On a first stage, models will apply different consistent policies to forecast 2010-2030 evolutions
following the 1st approach, aiming at predicting for each scenario the unknown impacts of these
predefined sets of policies. These policies will be defined based on the qualitative features of the
different scenarios. This stage will apply a standard forecast methodology based on the definition
of consistent policies from 2010 on to obtain an image of all scenarios by 2030. Scenarios under
business-as-usual framework conditions (Piecemeal EU Integration) will be explored in-depth to
begin with (one baseline and three explorative scenarios).

On a second stage, scenarios will be developed between 2030 and 2050 following the 2nd
approach. A back-cast strategy will be applied in this second stage: having an image of the
characteristics of different scenarios in 2050 based on the descriptions of scenarios in the Project
Specifications (PS), it will be determined the path (and the required policies) to go from 2030 to
2050. The image of scenarios in 2030 will be already available from the application of the 1st
approach. Since forecast models are pushed to their limits of knowledge when exploring
scenarios very distant or very different from the present situation for which they were calibrated,
foresight scenario-building tools will be applied for 2050 scenarios.
Evolution of territorial scenarios

2010 – 2030 2030 – 2050

Forecast models, forecast from 2010 to Foresight models, back-cast from
2030, will determine the impact of 2050 to 2030. Definition of scenarios
coherent policies with scenario qualitative in 2050 according to PS descriptions,
narratives. and determination of required path
and policies to go from 2030 to 2050.

Scenarios defined based on

PS narratives in 2050

Analysis of Wild-cards
and scenario variants Wild-cards
and scenario
variants

Piecemeal EU
Integration
Scenarios
Forecast 2010 to 2030 Back-cast 2050 to 2030

2010 2030 2050

Figure 11-4 Forecast and back-cast strategies for ET2050 Explorative Scenarios

Additionally, these exercises may be complemented with full or partial analysis of scenario
variants. It will be explored how much spatial scenarios in ET2050 can be affected by sudden
unexpected or very extreme changes (e.g. Wild cards), as spatial patterns change in a
slower pace in comparison to socioeconomic and technologic changes, and not always
simultaneously. The impact of wild cards which are in the boundary of knowledge of models
can be treated as a sensitivity studies, and predicted. Each modeller will define the most
relevant wild cards that can be assessed based on the model available.

Scenario variants may also include scenarios resulting from the application of alternative
framework conditions as proposed in the 1st approach (scenarios A1 to C3). SASI is especially
well prepared to analyse variants of main scenarios since it is a dynamic integrated model
covering all sectors and able to predict the impact of comprehensive spatial development policies;
other sectoral models may also carry on predictions in relation to most relevant possible changes
in sectoral policies a given scenario, to be identified by each modeller as expert on its sector. The
impact of wild cards and variants beyond the capacity of models will be assessed qualitatively.

11.2 Scenarios 2010 to 2030

Qualitative Orientations of Scenarios

Next tables provide the qualitative pictures of the scenarios which will be at the base for 2010-
2030 modelling exercise. Modelling teams will derive policies to be implemented in their models
based on the below proposed hypothesis for each of the ET2050 scenarios.

Spatial distribution of activities:

Baseline
Flows/MEGAs Cities/FUAS/ Regions/SMCities/
Piecemeal EU
/Metapolis Metropolis Ecopolis
Integration
Relative accessibility
and connectivity to Medium-size cities and
international transport towns attract people
Larger cities ,
networks and based on their cultural
(international FUAS)
agglomeration and environmental Continuation of existing
attract both more
Spatial economies attract quality. People then trends in all sectors,
people and activities
distribution of growth, following generate new limited policy reforms
because effective
population and spontaneous market activities. Change in implemented, with no
public policies
economic growth, tendencies. World consumer behaviour relevant modification
promoting them at
(and territorial cities, mostly MEGAS favouring proximity and on actual spatial
National scale. Internal
governance) grow bigger, and any self-sufficiency. Intense patterns. Relative
migrations from
place well connected to decentralisation at economic decline.
sparsely populated
TENs. High external local and regional
areas to urban centres.
and internal migrations level. Limited external
and long-distance migrations.
mobility.

Figure 11-5 Spatial distribution of activities among ET2050 Scenarios

Figure 11-6 The large cities and MEGAs in Europe, according to population (ESPON 1.4.3,
2007)
 Global
Country MEGA Cat 1 MEGA Cat 2 MEGA Cat 3 MEGA Cat 4 Transnational/ national FUA
nodes
Ajaccio - Amiens - Anger - Annecy
- Avignon - Beauvais - Besancon -
Brest - Caen - Chambery -
Clermont-Ferrand - Dijon - Douai -
Dunkerque - Grenoble - La Roche-
Lille - Lyon - sur-Yon - La Rochelle - Le Mans -
Marseille - Bordeaux - Limoges - Lorient - Metz -
FRANCE Paris
Nice - le Havre Montpellier - Mulhouse - Nancy -
Toulouse Nantes - Nimes - Orléans - Pau -
Perpignan - Poitiers - Reims -
Rennes - Rouen - Saint Etienne -
Strasbourg - Tarbes - Toulon -
Tours - Valence - Valenciennes
Abderdeen - Belfast -
Bournemouth - Brighton - Bristol -
Edinburgh -
Cardiff - Coventry - Derby - Exeter
Glasgow - - Guildford - Leicester - Liverpool -
UNITED Birmingham Luton - Norwich - Nottingham -
London Manchester
KINGDOM - Oxford - Portsmouth - Reading -
Southampto Sheffield - Newcastle - Warwick -
n York - Bradfor - Huddersfield - Hull
- Leeds - Stoke - Wolverhampton
Graz - Innsbruck - Klagenfurt -
AUSTRIA Vienna Linz - Salzburg
Brugge - Chhaleroi - Gent -
BELGIUM Brussels Antwerp Hasselt - Kortrijk - Leuven - Liège
- Namur

SWITZER- Bern Basel - Lausanne

Zurich Geneva
LAND
Aachen - Augsburg - Bamberg -
Bielefeld - Bochum - Bonn -
Chemnitz - Dortmund - Dresden -
Berlin - Duisburg - Erlangen - Essen -
Düsseldorf - Giessen - Göttingen - Hagen -
Frankfurt - Halle - Hannover Heidelberg -
GERMANY Hamburg - Bremen Kassel - Kiel - Koblenz - Leipzig -
Mainz - Mannheim - Marburg a.d.
Cologne -
Lahn - Münster - Nürnberg -
Munich - Osnabrück - Potsdam -
Stuttgart Regenburg - Rostock -
Saabrücken - Trier - Tübingen -
Würzburg

DENMARK Copenhague Aarhus Aalborg - Odense

Algeciras - Alicante - Almeria -

Burgos - Cadiz - Castellon -
Cordoba - San Sebastian -
Palma de Granada - Huelva - Ibiza - La
Barcelona, Mallorca - Coruna - Las Palmas - Logrono -
SPAIN Sevilla
Madrid Bilbao - Malaga - Murcia - Oviedo -
Valencia Pamplona - Pontevedra - Santa
Cruz - Santander - Santiago -
Valldolid - Vigo - Zaragoza
Bari - Bergamo - Brescia - Cagliari
- Catania - Firenze - La Spezia -
Bologna - Livorno - Padova - Palermo -
ITALY Milan, Rome Turin Genoa Parma - Perugia - Pisa - Salerno -
Naples
Trento - Trieste - Udine - Venezia
- Verona
Den Haag - Den Bosch - Arnhem -
NETHER- Breda - Eindhoven - Enschede -
Amsterdam Rotterdam
LANDS Groningen - Leeuwarden - Leiden
 - Maastricht - Nijmegen - Tilburg -
Utrecht - Zwolle
Falun - Halmstad - Helsingborg -
Jönköping - Kalmar - Karlstad -
SWEDEN Stockholm Gothenburg Malmö Linköping - Luleaa - Umeaa -
Uppsala - Hernösand - Västeraas
Yväskylä - Kotka - Koupio -
FINLAND Helsinki Turku Lappenranta - Oulu - Pori -
Tampere - Vaasa
Iraklion - Chalkis - Chania - Larisa
GREECE Athens - Patras - Rhodos - Thessaloniki

IRELAND Dublin Cork Galway - Limerick

Alesund - Kristiansand -
NORWAY Oslo Bergen Stavanger - Trondheim

CZECH Brno - Hradec Kralove - Ostrava -

Prague Plzen
REPUBLIC
Debrecen - Giör - Miskolc -
HUNGARY Budapest Szeged
Bialistok - Bielsko-Biala -
LUXEMBOUR Bidgoszcz - Czestochowa - Kielce
Luxembourg - Lublin - Olsztyn - Opole -
G
Rzeszow - Torun - Zielona Gora

Gdansk-
Gdynia -
Katowice -
Krakow - Aveiro - Braga - Coimbra - Faro -
POLAND Warsaw Funchal
Lodz -
Poznan -
Szczecin -
Wroclaw
Banska Bystrica - Kosice - Nitra -
PORTUGAL Lisbon Porto Povazska Bytrica - Trnava - Zilina

SLOVAKIA Bratislava Kaunas - Klaipeda

LITHUANIA Vilnius Burgas - Plovdiv - Varna

BULGARIA Sofia Tartu

ESTONIA Tallin

LATVIA Riga

MALTA Valetta

Brasov - Cluj-Napoca - Constanta

ROMANIA Bucharest - Craiova - Galati - Iasi - Oradea –
Ploiesti - Timisoara

SLOVENIA Ljubljana Koper

Nicosia - Larnaca - Limassol -

CYPRUS Paphos

Figure 11-7 List of MEGAs and FUAs in Europe (ESPON 1.4.3, 2007)
European Policy framework:

Baseline
Flows/MEGAs Cities/FUAS/ Regions/SMCities/
Piecemeal EU
/Metapolis Metropolis Ecopolis
Integration
Markets. Global
Social behaviour and Relative failure of
Corporations and Public Policies mostly
Main Driver values linked to new public policies and
Technologic at National level
generations. adjustment
innovation.

Strong local and

Private-Public Renationalisation of regional
Territorial
Partnership at all policies. Member decentralisation, Combination of models
Governance
scales States reinforced. simultaneous to EU
integration.

EU of multiple speeds,
European increasing disparities EU limited reform. EU limited reform.
Limited Federalism.
policy at all scales. Integrated fiscal Integrated fiscal
Increasing EU budget.
framework system. system.

Overall budget
Budget significantly
reduced. Budget maintained
increased.
Budged maintained.
Limited and gradual
Cohesion Territorial Cross-border Thematic objectives
Integrated territorial reforms favouring
policy Cooperation redefined favouring
investments and efficiency with no major
reinforced, as well as urban-oriented policies
community-led local political change
with Neighbouring and innovative urban
development
Countries and rest of actions..
reinforced.
the world.

Limited reform of the

Budget reduced and Full integration of
Agricultural policy.
focused on subsidies agricultural and Limited reform of the
Agriculture Higher emphasis on
to increase the sector environmental in their Agricultural policy.
landscape
productivity territorial dimension
management.

Energy savings Important energy

No energy savings. Continuation of existing
because agglomeration savings. High share of
Renewal and nuclear trends
Energy and industrial renewals. Full
sources, as well as oil.
transformation. Limited decarbonisation of the
Intelligent Grid.
renewal energies. economy.

TENs Core Network

developed if profitable
TENs Core and
positive, major ports
Comprehensive
and freight dedicated
Network partially Local and regional
infrastructure, and Continuation of existing
Transport developed. Public transport networks.
airports. Transport trends.
transport investments Reduced mobility.
networks worldwide
reduced, not always
connected. Induced
profitable.
long-distance and
international mobility.

Protection and Limits in both use

Environmental
management of rural intensity and quality
protection focused on
areas as open spaces standards and land
Environmental keeping standards of Continuation of existing
for recreation and occupation. Full
management environmental quality trends.
environmental safety. adaptation to Global
for air and water.
Strong mitigation. Strict Warming. Significant
Technologic optimism.
public regulations. behavioural changes.

Figure 11-8 European policy framework in ET2050 Scenarios

Scenarios facing Critical Bifurcations:

Baseline
Flows/MEGAs Cities/FUAS/ Regions/SMCities/
Piecemeal EU
/Metapolis Metropolis Ecopolis
Integration
Reduction of Public
Administrations. Policy reforms based Policy reforms
Will European national Further opening and on reinforcing social towards post growth
economies be able to deregulation of welfare. Public societies limiting both
No, partially
adjust to structural markets. Private- investments that large corporations
transformations? Public Partnerships. allow for economic and central public
Public support to recovery administrations.
R&D

Moderate migrations Limited external

Will migrations Strong migrations Migrations growing
mostly bound to large migration. Residential
continue to be bound to most slowly mostly bound
urban centres from mobility from large
necessary in Europe to performing economic to largest
inner regions and cities to medium and
shirking labour market? corridors and MEGAs metropolitan regions
other EU countries small towns

Reinforced to allow its Reformed to facilitate

Will European countries Welfare system
Welfare system fully maintenance and Third Sector (ONG’s,
be able to sustain their reduced and further
privatised sustained through social communities…)
welfare system? privatised.
increased taxation interventions.

Financial debt
Will Europe (and its
Financial debt fully Financial debt remains high and
single countries) be Financial debt repaid
repaid by 2030. reduced, but not fully public administrations
able to find ways to in 2050
Surplus repaid by 2030 are substantially
finance its public debt?
reduced

Will Europe be able to Increased overall Competitive limited to Limited European

compete with emerging competitiveness sectors like transport, competitiveness to technological
countries in high-value (manufacturing, design, nutrition, sectors like tourism advantages reduced
sectors? biotech, medicine) green energies and welfare services overtime

Will Europe be Increased efficiency

High development of Decentralised RES. Fossil fuels remain
decarbonised and of fossil fuels, some
centralised RES and Lower energy important. Emissions
decentralized RES, emergence of
nuclear. Targets consumption. Targets reduced but targets
energetically, reducing CCS. Targets
partially met. met. are not met.
GHG emissions? partially met.

Will Europe will be able Yes at National level, Local differences

Continuous de-
to tap the untapped while regions in each emphasised as a
territorialisation of the Partially.
potential of its regional country will play a major European
economy.
diversity richness? secondary role. asset.

Development
Will spatial Development mostly Development
focussed on global
development and focussed on large focussed on medium
cities (MEGAs), and Increased polarisation
settlement structures and medium cities and small cities with
on corridors linking
be more polarised? (FUAs) high quality of life
them

Europe of multiple
speeds. Increased No significant
cross border progress in EU
Will be Europe
integration motivated Continuation of Limited Federalism. political integration.
politically more
by economic interests. existing trends.. No new EU Members. Limited cross-border
integrated?
Increased relations relationships. Croatia
with neighbouring enters EU.
space.

Strengthened
Will decision and Increased role of Top-down
Corporate and principle of
management processes Nations (mixed top- governance with
business dominated subsidiarity. Bottom-
of EU key policies be down and bottom-up limited
top-down governance up governance
more decentralised? approaches) decentralisation
enforced.

Figure 11-9 ET2050 Scenarios facing Critical Bifurcations

11.3 Scenarios 2030 to 2050
Scenarios will be constructed according to a back-cast approach. The image of scenarios in 2050
will be built from the PS description of scenarios, and back-cast methodology will be used to link
the 2050 image to 2030 results obtained with Forecast models. This will be the opportunity to
explore further societal changes in the long-term.
At aggregated European level, using foresight scenario-building tools (TV and PASH) reference
preliminary values for 2030 and 2050 at aggregated European scale have been computed for the
purpose to better frame and guide the modelling process.
For 2030, these values may be used by modellers as reference to better apprehend the nature of
different scenarios, and assiste them in the definition of modelling parameters for policies and
exogenous variables, so that outputs are, if feasible, in line with these aggregated expectations.
For 2050, new runs of foresight models will be used to refine these preliminary figures, in order to
trace coherent trajectories between 2030 and 2050, considering that 2050 results will be
determined a priori to match the descriptions of scenarios in the Project Specifications as much
as possible, and that 2030 results will have been obtained from the forecast exercise above
mentioned.
CITIES // FUAs //
Piecemeal EU

SMCITIES //
REGIONS //
integration
BASELINE

Metropolis
Metapolis
FLOWS //

MEGAs //

Ecopolis

1990 488 488 488 488 700

Demography

2010 518 518 518 518 600

European
population
2030 543 580 560 520 500
(Million inh)
400
2050 540 620 570 500 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

1990 13,1% 13,1% 13,1% 13,1% 35%

30%
2010 16,2% 16,2% 16,2% 16,2% 25%
% > 65%

20%
15%
2030 22,0% 23,0% 24,5% 22,0%
10%
5%
0%
2050 25,0% 27,4% 30,0% 23,0% 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Age
structure
Society

1990 20,1% 20,1% 20,1% 20,1% 22%

20%
2010 15,4% 15,4% 15,4% 15,4% 18%
% < 15%

16%
2030 13,0% 13,9% 13,5% 14,5% 14%
12%
10%
2050 12,5% 14,4% 13,5% 16,0% 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
 CITIES // FUAs //
Piecemeal EU

SMCITIES //
REGIONS //
integration
BASELINE

Metropolis
Metapolis
FLOWS //

MEGAs //

Ecopolis
1990 2,7 2,7 2,7 2,7 3

2,5
2010 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,3
Household size
2
(people per 2030 2,2 1,9 2,2 2,3
household) 1,5

1
2050 2,0 1,7 2,2 2,6 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

1970-
2,7% 2,7% 2,7% 2,7% 3%
1990
3%
1990- 2%
GDP 1,7% 1,7% 1,7% 1,7%
2010 2%
(annual growth 1%
2010-
rate) 1,7% 2,2% 1,9% 1,3% 1%
2030
0%
Economy

2030- 1970-1990 1990-2010 2010-2030 2030-2050

1,4% 2,1% 1,7% 0,7%
2050

1990 19,0 19,0 19,0 19,0 3

2,5
2010 25,1 25,1 25,1 25,1
GDP per capita 2
2030 33,5 34,6 33,8 32,4
(euros / inh) 1,5

1
2050 44,5 49,1 46,6 38,7 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

1970-
11,60% 11,6% 11,6% 11,6% 14%
1990
12%
Globalisation

1990- 10%
6,4% 6,4% 6,4% 6,4% 8%
EU Trade (yearly 2010
6%
growth rate) 2010- 4%
4,2% 7,0% 5,5% 3,0% 2%
2030
0%
2030- 1970-1990 1990-2010 2010-2030 2030-2050
3,3% 8,0% 5,0% 1,0%
2050

1990 69,2% 69,2% 69,2% 69,2% 100%

90%
2010 72,7%
Land-uses

72,7% 72,7% 72,7%

Urban
population 80%
2030 80,2% 85,0% 82,0% 78,0%
(% urban) 70%

60%
2050 89,0% 95,0% 91,0% 85,0% 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

1970-
0,90 0,90 0,90 0,90 1,00
1990
0,80
1990-
Transport

GDP / pax 0,85 0,85 0,85 0,85 0,60

2010
elasticity 0,40
2010-
(€/pax·km) 0,70 0,80 0,85 0,60 0,20
2030
0,00
2030- 1970-1990 1990-2010 2010-2030 2030-2050
0,40 0,55 0,75 0,30
2050
 CITIES // FUAs //
Piecemeal EU

SMCITIES //
REGIONS //
integration
BASELINE

Metropolis
Metapolis
FLOWS //

MEGAs //

Ecopolis
1970-
1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,60
1990
1,40
1,20
GDP / freight 1990- 1,00
1,35 1,35 1,35 1,35
elasticity 2010 0,80
0,60

(€/ton·km) 2010- 0,40

1,35 1,40 1,50 1,25 0,20
2030 0,00
1970-1990 1990-2010 2010-2030 2030-2050
2030-2050 1,40 1,30 1,50 1,05

1990 33 33 33 33 200

150
2010 67 67 67 67
Oil price 100
2030 121 100 125 140
(€2010 / barrel) 50

0
2050 138 85 155 190 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Energy

1990 2,67 2,67 2,67 2,67 3,0

2,5
2010 2,49 2,49 2,49 2,49 2,0
Carbon intensity 1,5
2030 1,88 1,95 1,80 1,55 1,0
(TCO2 / MTOE)
0,5
0,0
2050 1,62 1,75 1,25 0,50 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Figure 11-10 Quantitative expectations for ET2050 scenarios in 2050 (preliminary)

According to the 2nd approach to explorative scenarios, each scenario will be in line with a set of
coherent framework conditions (or an ideal World) in which the European scenario previously
described seems more likely and coherent.
//
Piecemeal EU

//

CITIES // FUAs
// Metropolis

SM CITIES
REGIONS //
integration
BASELINE

Metapolis
FLOWS //

Ecopolis
MEGAs

1990 5308 5308 5308 5308 10000

9000
Demography

2010 6910 6910 6910 6910 8000

World
population 7000
2030 8320 8390 8070 7950 6000
(Million inh) 5000
4000
2050 9215 9580 8770 8360 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
 //
Piecemeal EU

//

CITIES // FUAs
// Metropolis

SM CITIES
REGIONS //
integration
BASELINE

Metapolis
FLOWS //

Ecopolis
MEGAs
1970-
3,4% 3,4% 3,4% 3,4% 5,0%
1990
4,0%
1990-
Economy

GDP 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 3,0%

2010
(annual growth 2,0%
rate) 2010-
3,4% 4,2% 3,5% 2,8% 1,0%
2030
0,0%
2030- 1970-1990 1990-2010 2010-2030 2030-2050
2,4% 3,7% 3,2% 2,7%
2050

1970-
12,7% 12,7% 12,7% 12,7% 14,0%
1990
12,0%
Globalisation

1990- 10,0%
6,2% 6,2% 6,2% 6,2% 8,0%
EU Trade (yearly 2010
6,0%
growth rate) 2010- 4,0%
6,1% 6,1% 6,1% 4,5% 2,0%
2030
0,0%
2030- 1970-1990 1990-2010 2010-2030 2030-2050
4,4% 6,6% 4,9% 1,2%
2050

1990 43,6% 43,6% 43,6% 43,6%

70,0%
Land-uses

2010 50,5% 50,5% 50,5% 50,5% 60,0%

Urban
population 50,0%
2030 59,0% 59,7% 58,5% 57,5%
(% urban) 40,0%

30,0%
2050 68,7% 70,2% 65,6% 61,9% 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

1990 5,7% 5,7% 5,7% 5,7% 7,0%

6,0%
2010 3,7% 5,0%
Transport

Global air 3,7% 3,7% 3,7%

4,0%
transport
3,0%
(annual growth 2030 5,0% 6,5% 5,6% 2,8%
2,0%
rate) 1,0%
0,0%
2050 5,0% 6,2% 4,9% 2,3% 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

1990 33 33 33 33 200

150
2010 67 67 67 67
Energy

Oil price 100

(€2010 / barrel) 2030 121 100 125 140

50

0
2050 138 85 155 190 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Figure 11-11 Quantitative expectations for framework conditions in 2050 scenarios

(preliminary)
11.4 Overall phased and territorially differentiated evolutions 2010-2050
The evolution of exploratory scenarios can be further specified by giving them a time dimension
related to different macro-zones .

Europe of Flows / Promotion of MEGAs / Metapolis

Area of Europe 2010-2020 2020-2030 2030-2040 2040-2050

North

Centre
Promotion of global cities (MEGAs)
South

East

Figure 11-12 Phased and territorially differentiated evolutions for FLOWS scenario

Europe of Cities / Promotion of large European cities / Metropolis

Area of Europe 2010-2020 2020-2030 2030-2040 2040-2050

North
Promotion of large
cities (FUAs)
Centre

Promotion of large cities (FUAs)

South
Promotion of global
cities (MEGAs)
East

Figure 11-13 Phased and territorially differentiated evolutions for CITIES scenario

Europe of Regions / Promotion of medium-sized cities / Regiopolis

Area of Europe 2010-2020 2020-2030 2030-2040 2040-2050

Promotion of small
North
and medium cities
Promotion of small
and medium cities
Promotion of small
Centre
and medium cities
Promotion of small
Promotion of large and medium cities
cities (FUAs)
South
Promotion of large
cities (FUAs)
Promotion of large
East
cities (FUAs)

Figure 11-14 Phased and territorially differentiated evolutions for REGIONS scenario
11.5 Expectations on the Territorial Impact Assessment of Exploratory Scenarios
The most likely ranking of the pure spatial scenarios with respect to the major European
goals competitiveness, cohesion and sustainability could be:

Expected Ranking with respect to major goals

Spatial Development Policy
Scenario
orientation Cohesion Sustainability
Competitiveness
(Inclusive (Sustainable
(Smart Growth)
Growth) Growth)
Promotion of efficient transport
Flows and communication networks
MEGAs and competitive nodes and
cross border corridors at 2on 4th 3th
Metapolis European scale, as well as links
to NC.
Cities
Promotion of socially inclusive
FUAs 3th 2on 4th
large capital cities
Metropolis
Regions Promotion of endogenous
potentials in small and medium
SM Cities 4th 3rd 2nd
size towns in self-sufficient
Ecopolis regions
Virtuous Balance among three
policy orientations. Open
VISION Endogenous Development. 1st 1st 1st
Networks of medium size and
large cities.

Figure 11-15 Expectations on TIA scoring for ET2050 scenarios

In relation to TA2020 priorities:

Flows // MEGAs // Cities // FUAs // Regions // SM Cities //

VISION Metapolis Metropolis Ecopolis
Polycentric and balanced
territorial development Low Very High High

Integrated development in
cities, rural and urban regions Very Low Low Very High

Territorial integration in cross-

border transnational functional High Low Low
regions

Global competitiveness of the

regions based on strong Very High High Low
economies

Improving territorial
connectivity for individuals, Very High Very High Low
communities and enterprises

Managing and connecting

ecological landscape and Very Low Very Low Very High
cultural values of regions

Figure 11-16 Expectations on TA2020 priorities’ scoring for ET2050 scenarios

12. SECOND ANNEX TO INTERIM REPORT (OCTOBER 2012):: Quantitative
Forecast Models
12.1 MULTIPOLES model
Request

“The project partner responsible for the Multipoles model is asked to address the availability of
estimates of international migration since 2008 for the EFTA countries in an early stage with the
concerned countries directly.”

Response

The MULTIPOLES model requires the data or estimates on international migration (by sex and 5-
year age group) between pairs of countries. For a given pair of countries such data can be
potentially reported both by the origin country and the destination country (within the statistics on
emigration by country of destination and statistics on immigration by country of origin,
respectively). There is a known problem of the lack of comparability of data on international
migration, which means that the numbers reported by the origin and destination countries differ,
sometimes very significantly. The differences are due to many factors: different definitions,
sources, coverage and/or reliability.
To give reliable results, the MULTIPOLES model must be based on a set of consistent numbers.
In a recent ESPON project, DEMIFER (Demographic and migratory flows affecting European
regions and cities), in which the MULTIPOLES model was also used, a consistent set of data on
international migration was taken from MIMOSA, a 3-years project funded by Eurostat, devoted
solely to the estimation of international migration. The data covered the 2002-2007 period.
We have checked the availability of data since 2008, in particular as far as the EFTA countries
are concerned. Data on total immigration are available for 2008-2010 for all four EFTA countries.
Data on total emigration are available for Iceland, Norway and Switzerland for 2008-2010 and for
2010 for Liechtenstein. However, comparability of statistics is still a problem, despite the 2007 EU
Regulation on Community statistics on migration and international protection. To give an
example, Norway, a country with generally very good statistics (probably the best among the four
EFTA countries) reported that 2985 persons emigrated to Sweden in 2009, while Sweden
reported 5097 persons that immigrated from Norway, so 71% more. As a consequence, although
Norway does publish data on international migration by country of previous and next residence
and the most recent data are for 2010, we cannot use these data directly. A similar problem
refers to Iceland. The situation is even worse for Switzerland, which has data on immigration and
emigration by citizenship but not by country of previous/next residence.

12.2 MASST model

Request

“The SPQR description indicates that the national and regional model will be updated up to the
economic crisis. The team is asked to include as much data as possible covering the economic
crisis.”

Response

Data in the new version of the MASST model

In order to deal with the crisis, POLIMI has re-configured and re-estimated the MASST model,
which will be used in a new version (MASST3) developed for this project, after the two preceding
ones: MASST (Capello, 2007; Capello et al., 2008; Capello and Fratesi, 2009 and 2010) and
MASST2 (Capello et al., 2011; Capello and Fratesi, 2012).
The data used are the last available in the statistics and cover as much as possible of the crisis,
which begun in 2007 but in many cases deployed its statistical effects from 2008 onwards.
In particular, the national database covers the years until 2011, i.e. with at least 4 years of
economic crisis.
The regional database, due to the long delay by Eurostat in providing regional data, covers
NUTS2 data up to 2009, still the last available year for regional GDP data. Those data are
however enough to cover the beginning of the crisis.

Modelling the crisis in the new MASST model.

The previous versions of MASST model did not explicitly take into account the possibility for
different economic regimes in periods of crisis in the estimations, since there had not been a
comparable big crisis since the 1930s.
The new version of the MASST model, which will be used for ET2050, explicitly takes into
account the crisis already in the estimations, both at national and at regional level.
At national level, the estimation in panel allows to detect the different coefficients for estimations
in the years of economic crisis. Moreover, the presence of long-run relationships is explicitly
assumed and estimated through equations including error correction mechanisms. Finally, the
budget constraints of the public sectors are modelled.
At regional level, the new version of the MASST model is also estimated in panel, which allows to
also have at this level different coefficients for the relationships in ordinary periods and in periods
of crisis. This is especially relevant for the employment and unemployment equations. The latter,
was not present in the previous versions of MASST and will allow to produce also unemployment
rates as output.
In simulation, the crisis will be considered in a very detailed form, since the simulation algorithm
uses, for each year, the coefficients for periods of crisis or for ordinary periods. This will allow the
modellers to decide, in the time-span of simulation, which years are affected by the crisis and
which years are not, making it possible to formulate assumptions on the exit from the present
crisis and also on if and when a new crisis will hit the European economy.

4. References
Capello R. (2007), “A Forecasting Territorial Model of Regional Growth: the MASST Model”, The
Annals of Regional Science, Vol. 41, n. 4, pp. 753-787
Capello R., Camagni R., Chizzolini B. and Fratesi U. (2008), Modelling Regional Scenarios for an
Enlarged Europe, Springer Verlag, Berlin
Capello, R. and Fratesi, U. (2009) “Modelling European regional scenarios: aggressive versus
defensive competitive strategies”, Environment and Planning A, vol. 41(2) pages 481 – 504.
Capello, R. and Fratesi, U. (2010) “Globalization and a Dual Europe: Future Alternative Growth
Trajectories”. The Annals of Regional Science, 45 (3) pp. 633-665.
Capello R., Fratesi U. and Resmini L. (2011), Globalisation and Regional Growth in Europe: Past
Trends and Scenarios, Springer Verlag, Berlin
Capello, R. and Fratesi, U. (2012) “Modelling Regional Growth: an Advanced MASST Model”,
Spatial Economic Analysis, 7:3, pp. 293-318.
12.3 Metronamica model
Requests

i) “At the moment this model only covers the EU27 countries. The relevant Project Partner is
informed that the Corine Land Cover, which has been used as data source, covers, since at least
August 2011, also the EFTA countries and the Western Balkans and Turkey.”
ii) “The TPG is asked to also consider the use of the MOLAND model as this model is capable to
model ‘land-take’. And limiting land-take and soil sealing is mentioned in the Roadmap to a
Resource Efficient Europe (COM(2011) 571) as one of EU's actions to achieve a resource-
efficient Europe“
iii) “The TPG is asked to look into the EU-LUPA project and to consider using the methodologies
developed and/or results produced”.

Responses

i) To be able to include additional countries in the model, we would need to have land use maps
for at least two years for these countries. In some cases we have made exceptions to this, if we
felt that we could use parameters from countries with a similar behaviour, but we currently haven't
modelled any countries that resemble the Western Balkans or Turkey. Due to its complexity and
resource consuming intensity, the recalibration of the model is beyond the scope of ET2050.
ii) The Metronamica framework is the basis of the MOLAND model. All functionality of the
MOLAND model is included in the Metronamica model. Normally the MOLAND model is updated
every year or so to encompass the latest developments of Metronamica.
iii) The draft final report of the EU-LUPA project has been considered and it's analysis and
findings will be taken into account whenever relevant for the present situation, the baseline and
the scenarios that will be developed and run with Metronamica.

12.4 SASI Model

Request

In Figure 4-5 it is indicated that the SASI model will deliver data for indicators on cohesion and
polycentricity. However, the indicators themselves are not further detailed. The team is asked to
specify these indicators and also consider the results of the INTERCO project on indicators for
territorial cohesion.

Response

For each year of the simulation the SASI model calculates cohesion and polycentricity indictors
on the basis of NUTS-3 regions.

Cohesion indicators
Cohesion indicators are macro indicators combining the indicators of individual regions into one
measure of territorial cohesion. Changes in the cohesion indicators predicted by the model for
future transport policies reveal whether these policies are likely to reduce or increase existing
disparities between the regions.
The following cohesion indicators are calculated;
- Coefficient of variation
- Gini coefficient
 - Geometric/arithmetic means
- Relative convergence
- Absolute convergence
Currently cohesion indicators are calculated for accessibility and GDP per capita. With little
additional programming effort, cohesion indicators for other output variables of the model can be
calculated. The model documentation (Wegener, 2008, Page 28) contains a list of the about 35
population, economic and attractiveness indicators produced by the model. These include part of
the indicators of the ESPON INTERCO project (ESPON INTERCO, 2011) as far as they are
suitable for assessing territorial cohesion between (and not within) regions, such as demographic
indicators, employment indicators, accessibility indicators and migration indicators.

Polycentricity indicators
Polycentricity indicators are macro indicators measuring the degree of polycentricity of the urban
system in a territory. In SASI the polycentricity index developed in ESPON 1.1.1 (ESPON 1.1.1,
pp. 60-84) is calculated. The polycentricity index of ESPON 1.1.1 is a weighted combination of
three sub-indices:
- The Size index measures the slope and primacy of the rank-size distributions of
The ESPONpopulation
2013 Programme
and GDPisofpart-financed
cities.
by the European Regional Development Fund,
the EU -MemberThe Location index
States and themeasures the Gini coefficient of the size of the service areas of cities.
Partner States
Iceland,-Liechtenstein, Norway index
The Connectivity and Switzerland.
measures the correlation of population and accessibility by the
It shall support
slope of the regressioninline
policy development relation to Gini coefficient of accessibility of cities.
and the
the aim of territorial cohesion and a harmonious
Currently ofthe
development thepolycentricity index is calculated based on 1,588 Functional Urban Areas (FUAs)
European territory.
identified in ESPON 1.1.1 for the EU member states. With little additional effort the polycentricity
index can also be calculated based on the 76 Metropolitan European Growth Areas (MEGAs)
identified in ESPON 1.1.1 for the European Union as a whole.

References
ESPON 1.1.1 (2005): Potentials for Polycentric Development in Europe. Final Report of ESPON
1.1.1. Stockholm: Nordregio. http://www.espon.eu/main/Menu_Projects/Menu_ESPON2006Pro
jects/Menu_ThematicProjects/polycentricity.html
ESPON INTERCO (2011): Indicators of Territorial Cohesion. Draft Final Report of ESPON
INTERCO. http://www.espon.eu/main/Menu_Projects/Menu_ScientificPlatform/interco.html
Wegener, M. (2008): SASI Model Description. Working Paper 08/01. Dortmund: Spiekermann &
Wegener Urban and Regional Research. http://www.spiekermann-wegener.de/mod/pdf/AP_0801.
pdf