stručni prilozi

dr Bojan S. Đorđević* Dejan Cvetković**

PRANJE NOVCA U
MEĐUNARODNOJ
TRGOVINI

Rezime
Razvoj tehnologije i globalizacija kontinuirano unapređuju postojeće načine i stvaraju
nove mogućnosti za konvertovanje “prljavog novca” u različite legalne oblike finansijske
aktive. Procenjuje se da pranje novca danas iznosi oko 2% do 5% ukupne svetske
proizvodnje. S obzirom na tajnost i prirodu pranja novca, teško je proceniti njegov stvarni
obim, ali mnogobrojne analize daju indikatore veličine problema na globalnom nivou.
Međunarodni trgovinski i finansijski sistem su centralne tačke borbe protiv pranja novca
gde finansijske institucije, posebno banke, predstavljaju kanal preko koga ovaj novac ulazi
u legalne ekonomske tokove. U ovom radu dali smo pregled i analizu najčešćih metoda
koje međunarodni “perači novca” koriste da bi legalizovali svoje nelegalno stečene
fondove iz svojih međunarodnih trgovinskih operacija.

Ključne reči: pranje novca, banke, međunarodna trgovina, narkotici, indikatori

bankarstvo �� - �� ����

* Docent na Fakultetu za menadžment u Zaječaru

[email protected]
** Saradnik u nastavi na Fakultetu za menadžment u Zaječaru
[email protected]

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 expert contributions

Bojan S. Đorđević, PhD*

Dejan Cvetković**

MONEY
LAUNDERING IN
INTERNATIONAL
TRADE
Summary
The development of technology and globalization permanently enhances the existing
methods and creates new possibilities for conversion of “dirty money” into various
legal forms of financial assets. It is estimated that money laundering today accounts for
about 2% to 5% of the world’s total production. Given the secrecy and nature of money
laundering, it is hard to estimate its actual volume, but numerous analyses provide the
indicators of the size of the problem on the global level. International trading and financial
systems are the central points of the ba�le against money laundering, where the financial
institutions, especially banks, are the channels through which this money enters the legal
economic flows. This paper gives the review and analysis of the most familiar methods
that are used by “money launderers” to legalize their illegally earned funds from their
international trade operations.
bankarstvo �� - �� ����

Key words: money laundering, banks, international trade, drugs, indicators

* Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Management in Zajecar

[email protected]
** Assistant Tutor at the Faculty of Management in Zajecar
[email protected]

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Pranje novca - pojam, modeli, faze npr. ubačaj istog na bankarski račun;
• Presvlačenje - kreiranje broja kompleksnih
Pranje novca (money laundering) je proces presvlaka finansijskih transakcija radi
kroz koji kriminalne grupe pokušavaju da odvajanja istih od njihovog izvora zbog
prikriju stvarno poreklo i vlasništvo sredstava prikrivanja audit tragova obezbeđujući
iz svojih kriminalnih aktivnosti uz krajnji cilj anonimnost - npr. transferi sa jednog na
obezbeđenja legitimnog i legalnog pokrića za drugi račun, menjanje valute, menjanje
svoje izvore prihoda i finansije. To je sredstvo jurisdikcije i
kroz koje velike kriminalne organizacije “žive” • Integracija - provizija očitog legitimnog
bez očiglednih veza sa kriminalnim svetom. objašnjenja za ilegalno dobijenu imovinu
Definicija pranja novca poziva za naglašavanjem koja se treba vratiti u ekonomski sektor
kriminalnih aktivnosti koje proizilaze iz novca - npr. likvidacija investiranja koja koristi
koji treba oprati. Različite zemlje su prihvatile procese za očite legitimne poslove.
različite metode adresiranja kriminalnih Uspešan proces presvlačenja uprošćava
aktivnosti. Neke su zemlje generalizovale i šemu integracionog procesa postavljanja
uključile sve kriminalne aktivnosti, dok su opranih sredstava nazad u ekonomiju na takav
druge napravile listu ozbiljnih kriminalnih način na koji oni ponovo ulaze u finansijski
poslova koji imaju tendenciju da prikupe velike sistem kao normalni biznis fondovi. Kada
sume novca. govorimo o bankama i ostalim finasijskim
Međunarodno prepoznavanje borbe institucijama, određene ranjive tačke su
protiv pranja novca na globalnom nivou identifikovane u prosecu pranja koje počinioci
je identifikovalo potrebu za kolektivnim sa teškoćama izbegavaju i gde se njihove
sprečavanjem kriminala, preko svih mogućih aktivnosti mogu lakše prepoznati:
načina, od legitimizovanja procesa njihovih • Ulazak novca u finansijski sistem;
kriminalnih aktivnosti do prelaska fondova od • Prekogranični protok fondova i
prljavih ka čistim. Iako ima različitih metoda • Transferi unutar i iz finansijskog sistema.
pranja novca koje mogu biti od kupovine Zbog ovog razloga je većina zemalja, u
luksuznih proizvoda do kompleksnih velikoj meri, koncentrisala svoje pokušaje u
međunarodnih mreža prividno legitimnih fazi postavljanja. Sprečavanje da finansijski
poslova, zahtev za pranjem procesa kriminalnih sistem bude korišćen za pranje novca pokazao
aktivnosti je veoma često vitalan za uspeh se uspešnim čineći proces pranja novca težim.
takvih kriminalnih organizacija. Povećana Ali to, ipak, ne sprečava činioce da istražuju
integracija međunarodnih finansijskih sistema, i koriste druge metode pranja svojih ilegalno
zajedno sa slobodnim kretanjem kapitala preko stečenih sredstava. Iako se većina regulativa
oslobođenja od barijera, je povećala lakoću o sprečavanju pranja novca fokusira na fazu
pranja gde kriminalni novac može biti opran postavljanja, naglašeno je da su banke i
prenosom istog iz jedne jurisdikcije u drugu, finansijske institucije, kao provajderi širokog
komplikujući proces traganja. spektra usluga, i dalje ranjive kada se koriste
Bilo koji metod da se koristi za pranje novca, za pranje i fazu integracije. Produžavanje
proces se najčešće vrši u tri faze. One se mogu kredita i rapidni prelaz fondova između
javiti kao posebne i odvojene faze iako se mogu računa sa različitim imenima i jurisdikcijama
javiti simultano, poneki put se čak i preklapaju, može biti korišćen kao deo procesa kreiranja
u zavisnosti od kriminalne organizacije koja je kompleksnih presvlaka transakcija. Banke i
uključena. Ove tri faze se obično sastoje od finansijske institucije koje postanu uključene
brojnih transakcija od strane perača u cilju u šemu pranja novca rizikuju najverovatnije
bankarstvo �� - �� ����

prikrivanja procesa traganja. Takve transakcije sudski progon, gubitak dobre trgovinske
mogu, ipak, upozoriti banku ili finansijsku reputacije i mogući gubitak licence za rad.
instituciju na kriminalnu aktivnost preko bilo
koje od ove tri faze (Bošković, 2005, str. 24.) :
• Postavljanje, plasiranje - fizička predaja keš
sredstava dobijenog od ilegalnih aktivnosti,

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 Money Laundering - Concept, three stages (Bošković, 2005, pp. 24):
Models, Stages • Positioning, placement - physical transfer of
cash funds received in illegal activities, e.g.
Money laundering is a process through depositing the funds on a bank account;
which criminal groups try to disguise the • Layering - creating a number of complex
true origin and ownership of funds from their layers for financial transactions in order
criminal activities, with the ultimate aim of to separate them from their source and
providing a legitimate and legal cover for their hide the tracks, thus providing anonymity
sources of income and finance. It is a means - e.g. transfers from one into another
the large criminal organizations use to “live” account, currency conversions, changing
without any evident relation to the criminal jurisdictions;
world. The definition of money laundering • Integration - provision of an obvious
calls for the emphasis on the criminal activities legitimate explanation for illegally
that are incurred by the money that needs obtained assets that need to be returned
to be laundered. Different countries have to the economic sector - e.g. liquidation of
accepted different methods of addressing investment which uses the processes for
criminal activities. Some countries made a obvious legitimate operations.
generalization including all criminal activities, A successful process of layering simplifies
whereas some other countries composed a the scheme of integration processes for returning
list of serious criminal operations that have a the laundered funds back into economy, so that
tendency of collecting large sums of money. they re-enter the financial system as normal
International recognition of anti-money business funds. Speaking of banks and other
laundering on a global level identified the financial institutions, certain vulnerable points
need for collective prevention of criminal have been identified in the laundering process
activities, by implementation of all possible that are difficult for launderers to avoid, and
methods, ranging from legitimization of these where their activities are easier to recognize:
criminal activities to transition of funds from • Money entering the financial system;
dirty to clean. Although there are various money • Cross-border flow of funds; and
laundering methods, ranging from luxurious • Transfers within and from the financial
products purchases to complex international system.
networks of seemingly legitimate operations, Due to this reason, most countries have,
the request for laundering in the process of to a great extent, focused their efforts on the
criminal activities is o�en of crucial importance placement stage. Preventing the financial
for the success of such criminal organizations. system from being used for money laundering
Improved integration of international financial has proved to be successful, making the money
systems, together with the free flow of capital laundering process more difficult. However,
over the removed barriers, made money this still does not prevent the perpetrators
laundering easier, since criminal money may be from exploring and using other methods to
laundered by transfer from one jurisdiction to launder their illegally obtained funds. Though
another, which further complicates the search. most regulations on anti-money laundering
Whichever method is used to launder are focused on the placement stage, it has
money, the process is usually completed in three been underlined that banks and financial
stages. They can occur as special and separate institutions, as providers of a wide range of
stages though they can be simultaneous, too, services, are still vulnerable when used for
and sometimes even overlap, depending on laundering and the integration stage. Credit
bankarstvo �� - �� ����

the criminal organization involved. These extension and rapid transfer of funds between
three stages consist of numerous transactions accounts opened to different names and under
conducted by launderers with a view to different jurisdictions may be used as a part of
hindering the search. Such transactions can, the process of creation of complex transaction
however, warn a bank or financial institution layers. The banks and financial institutions
against a criminal activity through any of these that get involved in a money laundering

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 da će biti opaženi.
Atraktivnost
međunarodnog
trgovinskog sistema
povezana je sa:
• ogromnim
brojem trgovačkih
operacija, koje
omogućuju obimnu
priliku za kriminalne
organizacije da
prebacuju sredstva
preko granica,
• složenošću
vezanom za
međunarodne
transakcije i
pribegavanju
r a z n o l i k i m
finansijskim
aranžmanima,
• dodatnom
Slika 1. Put ilegalno stečenog novca složenošću koja može
nastati iz prakse
mešanja nezakonitih
sredstava sa
tokovima gotovine
iz legalnih poslova,
• ograničenim
pribegavanjem
verifikacionim
procedurama ili
programima radi
razmene carinskih
podataka između
zemalja i
• ograničenim
izvorima koje većina
carinskih službi ima
na raspolaganju kako
Slika 2. Model etapa pranja novca bi otkrila nelegalne trgovinske transakcije.
(Izvor: G. Bošković, 2005.) U vezi sa poslednjim stavom, istraživanja
pokazuju da većina carinskih službi ispituje
Međunarodni trgovinski sistem manje od 5 procenata svih teretnih isporuka
koje ulaze ili napuštaju njihovu nadležnost. Uz
bankarstvo �� - �� ����

Međunarodni trgovinski sistem je pod to, većina carinskih službi je u mogućnosti da

uticajem širokog spektra rizika i ranjivosti usmeri relativno ograničene analitičke izvore
(izloženosti), koji pruža kriminalnim kako bi poboljšala određivanje i identifikovanje
organizacijama mogućnost da “operu” svoje sumnjivih trgovinskih transakcija.
kriminalne aktivnosti, kao i finansiranje Poslednjih decenija, međunarodna
terorističkih organizacija, uz minimalan rizik trgovina je značajno porasla: globalna trgovina

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 scheme probably risk to be prosecuted, lose vulnerabilities (exposures), and provides an
their reputation, and possibly even have their opportunity for criminal organizations to
license taken away. ‘launder’ their criminal activities, and terrorist
organizations
financing, with the
ORDERING PARTY (“THE BOSS”)
order minimum risk of
order order order being caught. The
suitability of the
international trade
system is related to
Transport Money
Organized Giving the
to final laundering
the following:
criminal money to
- drugs, transfer destination - - offshore • Huge number
weapons, etc. specialists usually offshore banks, fictitious
centres companies, etc. of trade operations,

order
which provide
Transfer of the
laundered money vast opportunities
to the bank for criminal
account
organizations to

order
Investments transfer their funds
in goods, real abroad;
estate, companies’
shares, etc. • Complexity
of international
transactions and
RESULT
Documentation on money application of
origin can no longer be
provided various financial
arrangements;
• Additional
Figure 1. The flow of illegally obtained money complexity arising
from the practice
of mixing illegal
3. Integration Stage
funds with the cash
flows from legal
2. Layering Stage operations;
• L i m i t e d
1. Placement Stage
application of
Introduction of the
verification
Disguising the illegal
origin of money by laundered money into procedures or
means of complex the legal economic
flows through: programmes in
Turning cash into paper financial transactions
documents through: through: order to exchange
- Companies
- Offshore banks - Hotel chains customs-related data
- Banks
- Parallel banks - Restaurants between countries;
- Exchange offices
- Fictitious - Real estate, etc.
- Casinos, etc. and
companies,
etc. • L i m i t e d
resources that most
customs offices have
Figure 2. Model of money laundering stages at their disposal for uncovering illegal trade
bankarstvo �� - �� ����

(Source: G. Bošković, 2005) transactions.

Speaking of the last item, research shows
International Trade System that most customs offices check less than 5%
of all freight shipments entering or leaving
International trade system is under their jurisdiction. In addition, most customs
the influence of a wide range of risks and offices are in a position to direct relatively

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robom sada prevazilazi 9 triliona US dolara Osnovne tehnike pranja novca zasnovanog
na godišnjem nivou, a globalna trgovina u na trgovini
uslužnom sektoru još dodatnih 2 triliona Za namenu ovog rada, pranje novca
US dolara. Većina ovih poslova povezana je zasnovano na trgovini definišemo kao proces
sa finansijskim sistemima, pošto je veći deo prikrivanja kriminalnih aktivnosti i transfera
dobara i usluga finansiran od strane banaka i vrednosti upotrebom trgovinskih transakcija
drugih finansijskih institucija. U industrijskim u pokušaju da se legalizuje njihovo nezakonito
zemljama porast trgovine je doveo do značajnog poreklo. U praksi, ovo se može postići kroz
povećanja bruto domaćeg proizvoda, dok lažan prikaz cene, kvaliteta ili kvantiteta uvoza
se u razvijenim zemljama taj porast još brže ili izvoza.
povećavao. Uz to, praktično sve ekonomije su U mnogim slučajevima, ovo takođe može
postale otvorenije za trgovinu. Ovo je dovelo da uključi zloupotrebu finansijskog sistema
do dodatnog pritiska na ograničene resurse kroz nepoštene (obmanjujuće) transakcije koje
koje većina zemalja, naročito onih u razvoju, uključuju širok spektar instrumenata transmisije
ima na raspolaganju kako bi pomno ispitali novca, kao što su transferi elektronskim putem.
ove aktivnosti. Osnovne tehnike pranja novca zasnovanog na
trgovini uključuju:
Pranje novca zasnovano na trgovini • više ili niže fakturisane račune proizvoda ili
usluga,
Za razliku od izbegavanja poreza i kretanja • izdavanje većeg broja faktura od realnog
kapitala, koji obično uključuju transfer legalno broja,
zarađenih sredstava preko granica, kretanja • više ili niže fakturisane račune pošiljki robe
kapitala povezana sa pranjem novca - ili ili usluga brodom i
pranje novca zasnovano na trgovini - uključuje • lažne opise proizvoda i usluga.
kriminalne radnje, koje su mnogo teže za Neke od ovih tehnika pranja novca ne
praćenje. koriste se obavezno u svakoj zemlji i zavise od
Pranju novca zasnovanom na trgovini izbora kriminalne organizacije ili kompanije
posvećeno je mnogo manje pažnje u akademskim tzv. “perača”.
krugovima u odnosu na druge načine transfera
sredstava. Literatura je prvenstveno usmerena Lažno fakturisanje (uvećani ili umanjeni računi
na alternativne sisteme novčanih pošiljki i proizvoda i usluga)
“pezos” menjačke poslove na crnim tržištima Pranje novca kroz izdavanje faktura sa višim
u regionu Severne i Južne Amerike. Međutim, ili nižim vrednostima od realnih, koja je jedna
određeni autori i institucije, u koje spadaju od najstarijih metoda nepoštenog transfera
Baker (2005), de Boyrie, Pak i Zdanovich (2005), novca preko granica, ostala je i danas najčešće
Odeljenja državne bezbednosti, migraciono primenjivana tehnika. Ključni element ove
odeljenje SAD i Carinski organi su u skorije tehnike je lažno prikazivanje cene proizvoda
vreme ispitivali opus drugačijih metoda koje ili usluge kako bi se transferisala dodatna
se koriste za pranje novca kroz međunarodni vrednost između uvoznika i izvoznika.
trgovinski sistem, baš kao i oblasti koje ove Izdavanjem ovakvih faktura, sa cenama
institucije treba da identifikuju i ograniče ove nižim od onih na fer tržištu, izvoznik je u
vrste aktivnosti. mogućnosti da prebaci novac uvozniku, jer
Mnoge od ovih studija su takođe analizirale će isplata za dobra ili usluge biti niža od cene
ustanovljene tehnike koje ocenjuju da li koju će uvoznik dobiti kada ih bude ponudio
prijavljene uvozne i izvozne cene utiču na na otvorenom tržištu.
bankarstvo �� - �� ����

vrednosti fer tržišta. Jedna od metoda koja Kao alternativa, izdavanje fakture sa cenama
se trenutno analizira uključuje upotrebu višim od cena na fer tržištu, omogućava
statističkih tehnika kako bi se detektovale izvozniku da dobije određenu korist od
nedoslednosti u informacijama koje su date na uvoznika, pošto će isplata za dobra ili usluge
brodskim dokumentima, a u želji da se efikasnije biti viša od vrednosti koju će uvoznik dobiti
identifikuju sumnjive trgovačke aktivnosti. njenom prodajom na otvorenom tržištu.

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 limited analytical sources in order to improve of statistic techniques in order to detect
detection and identification of suspicious trade discrepancies in the information provided
transactions. in transport documents, all with a view to
In the last decades, international trade identifying suspicious trade activities more
boomed significantly: global trade in efficiently.
commodities now exceeds 9 trillion USD
annually, whereas global trade in services Basic Techniques of Trade-Based Money
accounts for additional 2 trillion USD. Majority Laundering
of these operations is related to financial For the purpose of this paper, trade-based
systems, since most commodities and services money laundering is defined as a process of
are financed by banks and other financial disguising criminal activities and transferring
institutions. In the industrial countries the value through trade transactions in an a�empt
increase in trade led to the significant increase to legalize their illegal origin. In practice, this
in GDP, whereas in the developed countries can be achieved by means of falsely represented
this increase was even quicker. Moreover, all import/export price, quality or quantity.
economies basically became more open for In many cases, this also includes an abuse of
trade. This, in turn, led to additional pressure the financial system through unfair (deceiving)
on limited sources, which most countries, transactions including a wide range of money
especially the emerging ones, have at their transfer instruments, such as electronic
disposal, so that these activities could be closely transfers. The basic trade-based money
examined. laundering techniques are the following:
• Over or under invoicing of products or
Trade-based money laundering services;
• Issuing more invoices than really needed;
As opposed to tax evasion and capital flows, • Over or under invoicing of shipped products
which usually include the cross-border transfer or services; and
of legally obtained funds, capital flows related • False descriptions of products and
to money laundering - or trade-based money services.
laundering - include criminal operations, which Some of these money laundering techniques
are much more difficult to track. are not necessarily used in all countries,
Trade-based money laundering a�racts and depend on the choice of the criminal
much less a�ention in the academic circles than organization or company, the so-called
the other ways of fund transfer. The existing “launderer”.
literature primarily deals with alternative
systems of cash shipments and “pesos” foreign False Invoicing (Over or Under Invoicing of
exchange operations in the black markets of the Products and Services)
North and South Americas. However, certain Money laundering through over or under
authors and institutions, including Baker (2005), invoicing, as one of the oldest methods of unfair
de Boyrie, Pak and Zdanovich (2005), State cross-border money transfer, has remained the
Security Departments, the USA Immigration most frequently used technique even today.
Department and Customs Duty Bodies, have The key element of this technique is the false
recently started to examine a range of different representation of product/service price in
methods used for money laundering through order to transfer an additional value between
the international trade system, along with the the importer and exporter.
areas these institutions need to identify and By issuing such invoices, bearing the prices
bankarstvo �� - �� ����

restrict this type of activities. lower than the fair market ones, the exporter is
Many of these studies also analyzed the in the position to transfer money to the importer,
established techniques for assessing whether since the payment for goods or services will be
the reported import and export prices affect lower than the price the importer will get once
the fair market values. One of the methods he/she offers them at the open market.
currently being analyzed includes the use Alternatively, issuing invoices bearing the

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 Primer 1 dosluhu u ovakvoj nepoštenoj transakciji.
Kompanija A (inostrani izvoznik) šalje Drugo, ne postoji nijedan razlog da
brodom milion jedinica robe koji vrede 2$ po Kompanija A i Kompanija B ne budu
komadu, ali Kompaniji B (domaći uvoznik sa kontrolisane od strane jedne organizacije.
kojim je u dosluhu) šalje fakturu koja uključuje Obrnuto, ne postoji ništa što sprečava matičnu
milion jedinica robe, ali po ceni od samo 1$ po kompaniju da osnuje inostranu filijalu u oblasti
komadu. Kompanija B plaća Kompaniji A za sa manje rigoroznom kontrolom pranja novca
proizvode slanjem novca elektronskim putem i da prodaje robu svojoj kompaniji kćerki po
i to 1 miliona $. Kompanija B tada prodaje robu tržišnim cenama fer tržišta. U takvoj situaciji,
na otvorenom tržištu za 2 miliona $ i ulaže 1 matična kompanija može da pošalje svojoj
milion $ extra sredstava (razlika između filijali legitimnu komercijalnu fakturu, a filijala
prikazane cene na fakturi i cene na “fer” tržištu) onda može da preproda ove proizvode po
na bankovni račun kako bi se isplatila prema značajno nižoj ili višoj ceni krajnjem kupcu. Na
uputstvima Kompanije A. ovaj način, kompanija može da prebaci lokaciju
Kao alternativa, Kompanija C (domaći izdavanja svojih lažnih faktura na inostrano
izvoznik) šalje brodom milion jedinica robe po područje, gde takve trgovačke nedoslednosti
ceni od 2$ po komadu, ali Kompaniji D (strani imaju mnogo manju mogućnost da budu
uvoznik sa kojim je u dosluhu), šalje uvećanu primećene.
fakturu za milion gore pomenutih proizvoda, Treće, izdavanje lažnih izvoznih i uvoznih
ali po ceni od 3$ po komadu. Kompanija D plaća faktura može da ima značajne poreske posledice.
Kompaniji C za dobijena dobra elektronskim Izvoznik koji uveća vrednost dobara koja je
transferom u vrednosti 3 miliona $. Kompanija otposlao može biti u mogućnosti da značajno
C tada plaća 2 miliona $ svojim dobavljačima uveća vrednost izvoznih taksi ili vrednosnog
i ulaže preostalih 1 milion $ (razlika između rabata koji dobija. Slično, uvoznik koji dobija
fakturisane, više cene i cene na “fer” tržištu) na fakture sa vrednostima nižim od realnih za
račun u banci kako bi ta sredstva bila isplaćena robu koju je dobio, moći će značajno da umanji
prema uputstvima Kompanije D. vrednost svojih izvozničkih ili carinskih taksi
koje plaća. Oba ova
slučaja pokazuju
vezu između pranja
novca baziranog na
trgovini i zloupotrebe
poreskog sistema.
Istraživanja
pokazuju da su
umanjene fakture
jedan od najčešćih
metoda pranja novca
Slika 3. Lažno fakturisanje robe zasnovanog na trgovini koje se koriste kako
(Izvor: preuređeno po B. Begović, M. Vasović bi se vršio transfer novca. Ovo ukazuje na
i dr., 2003.) činjenicu da je osnovni fokus većine carinskih
službi smanjenje važnosti krijumčarenja i
U nekoliko slučajeva, međutim, ovakvi sigurnost u smislu prikupljanja uvozničkih
procesi gube na značaju. Prvo, nijedna od dažbina. Do sada, carinske službe, uopšteno
navedenih transakcija ne bi se mogla sprovesti gledajući, izvoz nadgledaju sa mnogo manje
bankarstvo �� - �� ����

sem ako izvoznik i uvoznik nisu u dosluhu. Na rigoroznosti nego uvoz.

primer, ukoliko bi Kompanija A poslala brodom Takođe je važno pomenuti da što je složenija
robu vrednu 2$ po komadu, a zatim fakturisala roba kojom se trguje, veće su teškoće koje će
njihovu vrednost od 1$ po komadu, izgubila bi carinske službe imati u identifikovanju lažnih
1$ milion po isporuci. Takav slučaj ne bi imao faktura i ispravnom pristupu porezima i
smisla sem ukoliko izvoznik i uvoznik nisu u dažbinama. Delom, ovo je zbog toga što mnoge

��
 prices higher than the fair market ones enables
the exporter to gain certain benefits from In several cases, however, such processes lose
the importer, since the payment for goods their importance. First, none of the mentioned
or services will be higher than the one the transactions could be conducted unless the
importer will get once he/she offers them at exporter and importer are in connivance. For
the open market. instance, if the Company A shipped goods
worth 2$ per item, and then invoiced its value
Example 1 at 1$ per item, it would lose one million dollars
Company A (foreign exporter) ships a per shipment. Such a case would not have any
million items of goods, worth 2$ per item, but sense unless the exporter and importer were in
sends an invoice for a million items of goods, at connivance in such a fraudulent transaction.
a price of only 1$ per item, to Company B (local Secondly, there are no reasons for Company
importer with which it connives). Company B A and Company B not to be controlled by an
pays for the products to Company A by sending organization. On the other hand, nothing
money electronically, in the amount of 1 million prevents a parent company to establish a
dollars. Company B then sells the goods at the foreign subsidiary in a region with a less
open market for 2 million dollars, and deposits a rigorous money laundering supervision, and
million dollars of the extra funds (the difference then sell the goods to its daughter company
between the represented invoice price and the at the fair market prices. In such a situation,
fair market price) at a bank account, in order the parent company can send a legitimate
for these funds to be paid out according to the commercial invoice to its subsidiary, and the
instructions of Company A. subsidiary can, in turn, re-sell these products
Alternatively, Company C (local exporter) at a significantly lower or higher price to the
ships a million items of goods at a price of end user. Thus, the company can relocate the
2$ per item, but sends an over-invoice for site of issuing its false invoices onto the foreign
the above-mentioned million products to territory, where such trading discrepancies
Company D (foreign importer with which it stand a much lower chance of being detected.
connives), at a price of 3$ per item. Company Thirdly, issuing false export and import
D then electronically pays 3 million dollars for invoices can bear significant tax consequences.
the received goods to Company C. Company Exporter who increases the value of goods
C in turn pays 2 million dollars to its suppliers he/she has shipped may be in the position to
and deposits the remaining one million dollars significantly increase the value of export taxes
(the difference between the represented, or rebate value he/she is entitled to. Similarly,
higher invoice price and the fair market price) importer who receives invoices bearing the
at the bank account, in order for these funds significantly lower amounts than the actual
to be paid out according to the instructions of price of the goods is may considerably reduce
Company D. the value of the import taxes or custom duties
he/she has to pay.
Both these cases
Ship transport of a million product units at 2$ per unit prove the connection
between trade-based
money laundering
Company B Transfer of 1 million USD to
Company A
Importer
the importer
Exporter
and tax system
abuse.
Country B Country A Research shows
bankarstvo �� - �� ����

Payment for a million product units at 1$ per unit that under-invoicing

is one of the most
frequent, trade-based
Figure 3. False invoicing of goods money laundering methods, used in order to
(Source: adapted from B. Begovic, M. Vasovic, conduct money transfers. This indicates the fact
et al, 2003) that most custom offices focus on reducing the

��
carinske službe nemaju pristup podacima i kako bi sva carinska i transportna dokumenta
izvorima kako bi ustanovile tržišnu, realnu koja su u vezi sa ovo tzv. “fantomskom
cenu mnogih proizvoda. Osim toga, većina isporukom” bila rutinski procesuirana. Banke
carinskih uprava ne razmenjuje podatke sa i druge finansijske institucije mogu bez
drugim zemljama i na taj način može da uoči svog znanja biti uključene u obezbeđivanje
samo jedan deo transakcije. Kao takva, njihova finansiranja ovakvih fantomskih isporuka.
mogućnost da otkriju proizvode sa inkorektnim
cenama, je često ograničena na one proizvode Primer 2
kojima se često trguje (i čije su cene često Kompanija E (domaći izvoznik) prodaje
navođene) na međunarodnim tržištima. milion jedinica proizvoda Kompaniji F (strani
uvoznik, saučesnik) po ceni od 2$ po komadu,
Izdavanje višestrukih faktura ali u stvari isporuči 1.5 miliona jedinica.
Još jedna tehnika koja se koristi za Kompanija F plaća Kompaniji E za proizvode
pranje novca uključuje izdavanje više od 2 miliona $ elektronskim transferom novca.
jedne fakture za jednu istu međunarodnu Kompanija F tada prodaje proizvode na
trgovinsku transakciju. Fakturisanjem jednog otvorenom tržištu za 3 miliona $ i ulaže 1
istog proizvoda ili usluge više od jednom, extra milion $ (razlika između “doterane”
onaj koji pere novac ili je finansijer terorističke količine i one stvarne) na bankovni račun kako
organizacije, može da opravda višestruke bi ta sredstva bila isplaćena po instrukcijama
isplate za jednu istu isporuku proizvoda ili Kompanije E.
učinjenu uslugu. Upošljavanje većeg broja Nasuprot tome, Kompanija G (inostrani
različitih finansijskih institucija kako bi se izvoznik) prodaje milion jedinica proizvoda
ostvarila ova dodatna plaćanja može samo Kompaniji H (domaći uvoznik, sa kojim je u
da uveća nivo složenosti koji okružuje ovakve dosluhu) po ceni od 2$ komad, ali isporuči samo
transakcije. 500.000 jedinica. Kompanija H plaća Kompaniji
Osim toga, čak iako je slučaj izdavanja G za proizvode i to elektronskim transferom 2
višestrukih faktura za istu isporuku proizvoda miliona $. Kompanija G tada plaća 1 milion
ili učinjenih usluga otkriven, postoje $ svojim dobavljačima i ulaže preostalih 1
mnogobrojna zakonska objašnjenja za ovakve milion $ (razlika između “doterane” i stvarne
situacije, uključujući tu dopunu uslova isplate, količine) kako bi ta sredstva bila isplaćena po
ispravke prethodnih instrukcija za plaćanje instrukcijama Kompanije H.
ili plaćanje zakasnelih isplata. Za razliku
od umanjenih ili
uvećanih faktura,
treba napomenuti
da ne postoji
potreba za uvoznika
ili izvoznika da
pogrešno prezentuje
cenu proizvoda ili
usluga na trgovinskoj
fakturi.
Slika 4. Umanjivanje / uvećavanje isporuke
Umanjene ili uvećane isporuke proizvoda ili robe
usluga (Izvor: preuređeno po B. Begović, M. Vasović
bankarstvo �� - �� ����

Kao mogućnost manipulisanja izvoznim ili i dr., 2003.)

uvoznim cenama, perač novca može da umanji
ili uveća količinu robe koja se isporučuje ili Ukoliko želi da manipuliše izvoznim i
usluga koje se vrše. Kao krajnji slučaj, izvoznik uvoznim cenama, perač novca može lažno
može uopšte da ne isporuči robu, već da se da prezentuje kvalitet ili vrstu proizvoda ili
jednostavno u dosluhu sa uvoznikom osigura usluge. Na primer, izvoznik može da isporuči

��
 importance of smuggling and increasing safety price in the commercial invoice.
in terms of collection of import taxes. So far,
generally speaking, custom offices have been Over- or Under-Shipment of Goods or Services
much less rigorous when supervising export Another possibility of manipulation with
than import. export or import prices is for the money
It is also important to mention that the launderer to reduce or increase the quantity
more complex the goods traded, the bigger of goods delivered or services provided. As an
the problems that the custom offices will have extreme case, exporter can chose not to deliver
when identifying false invoices and correct the goods at all, but to simply connive with
approaches to taxes. This is partly due to the the importer, ensuring that all customs and
fact that many custom offices do not have access transport documents related to this, so-called
to relevant data and sources when determining “phantom delivery” are routinely processed.
the real market price of many products. In Banks and other financial institutions can get
addition, most customs offices do not exchange unknowingly involved in providing finance for
data with other countries, which is why they such phantom deliveries.
can only monitor one part of the transaction.
As such, their ability to detect incorrect priced Example 2
products is o�en limited to those products that Company E (local exporter) sells a million
are traded frequently (and whose prices are units of a product to Company F (foreign
o�en quoted) at the international markets. importer, accomplice) at a price of 2$ per unit,
but, in fact, delivers 1.5 million units. Company
Issuing Multiple Invoices F pays to Company E for the received products
Another technique used in money an amount of 2 million dollars by means of
laundering includes issuing of more than electronic transfer. Company F then sells the
one invoice for the same international trade products at the open market for 3 million
transaction. By invoicing one and the same dollars and deposits one extra million dollars
product or service more than once, the party (the difference between the “fixed” and
laundering money or financing a terrorist actual amount) at a bank account in order for
organization may justify multiple payments these funds to be paid out according to the
for one and the same shipment of products or instructions of Company E.
delivery of services. Employing a large number Conversely, Company G (foreign exporter)
of various financial institutions in order to sells a million units of a product to Company
conduct there additional payments may only H (local importer, with which it connives) at a
increase the level of complexity surrounding price of 2$ per unit, but actually delivers only
such transactions. 500,000 units. Company H pays 2 million dollars
Apart from this, even if the case of a multiple to Company G by electronic transfer. Company
invoicing for the same shipment of products G then pays 1 million dollars to its suppliers
or delivery of services gets detected, there are and deposits the remaining one million dollars
numerous legal explanations for such situations, (the difference between the “fixed” and actual
including revisions of payment conditions, amount) in order for these funds to be paid out
modifications of previous payment instructions, according to the instructions of Company H.
or payment of
overdue payments. As
opposed to the over- Payment for a million product units at 2$ per unit
or under-invoicing
bankarstvo �� - �� ����

technique, it should
Company E Transfer of 1 million USD to
Company F
be underlined that Exporter the importer
Importer
there is no need for
importers or exporters
Ship transport of 1.5 million product units at 2$ per unit
to falsely represent
the product/service
Figure 4. Over-/Under-Shipment of Goods
�� (Source: Adapted from B. Begovic, M. Vasovic, et al, 2003)
relativno je�ine proizvode, a zatim lažno da Složene tehnike pranja novca zasnovanog na
ih predstavi na fakturi kao znatno skuplje ili trgovini
čak potpuno različite proizvode. Ovo stvara U praksi, strategije za pranje novca obično
neslaganje između onog što se nalazi na kombinuju nekoliko različitih tehnika. One
carinskim i transportnim dokumentima i onog često uključuju istovremenu zloupotrebu i
što je realno isporučeno. Upotreba lažnih opisa finansijskog i međunarodnog trgovinskog
može se takođe koristiti u prometu usluga, kao sistema. Aranžmani razmene pezosa na
što su finansijsko savetovanje, savetodavne crnom tržištu predstavljaju korisnu ilustraciju
(consulting) usluge i istraživanje tržišta. U kako veći broj različitih tehnika pranja novca
praksi, realne cene ovih usluga mogu da može biti kombinovan u jednoj, pojedinačnoj
dovedu do dodatnih teškoća u procenama. kriminalnoj operaciji.

Primer 3 Aranžmani razmene pezosa na crnom tržištu

Kompanija I (domaći izvoznik) isporučuje 1 Severne i Južne Amerike (“Black Market Peso
milion zlatnih jedinica robe od 3$ po komadu Exchange”)
Kompaniji J (inostrani uvoznik, saradnik), Mehanizmi ovakvih operacija postali
ali fakturiše Kompaniji J milion srebrnih su predmet značajne studije 1980-ih kada
jedinica po ceni od 2$ / kom. Kompanija J plaća je Kolumbija postala vodeći i dominantan
Kompaniji I putem elektronskog transfera 2 izvoznik kokaina u SAD. Ove ilegalne prodaje
miliona $. Kompanija J zatim prodaje zlatne droge donele su oko 10 milijardi US dolara
jedinice robe na tržištu za 3 miliona $ i godišnje kolumbijskim narko kartelima, od
ulaže preostalih 1 milion $ (razlika između kojih je nekih 4 milijarde US dolara oprano
fakturisane i stvarne vrednosti) na račun u putem aranžmana razmene pezosa na crnom
banci kako bi ta sredstva bila isplaćena po tržištu. Mehanizmi jednostavnog crnog tržišta
instrukcijama Kompanije I. pezosa mogu biti izloženi kroz sledeće korake
Kao alternativa, Kompanija K (inostrani (Đorđević, 2008):
izvoznik) isporučuje milion bronzanih jedinica • Prvo, kolumbijski narko kartel ilegalno
robe po ceni 1$ / kom. Kompaniji L (domaći krijumčari drogu u SAD i prodaje je za keš;
uvoznik sa kojim je u dosluhu), ali šalje fakturu • Drugo, narko kartel ugovara prodaju US
Kompaniji L za milion srebrnih jedinica po ceni dolara ispod cene sa pezos brokerom za
2$ / kom. Kompanija L plaća Kompaniji K 2 kolumbijske pezose;
miliona $ putem elektronskog transfera novca. • Treće, pezos broker plaća narko kartelu
Kompanija K tada plaća 1 milion $ svojim pezosima sa svog bankovnog računa u
dobavljačima i ulaže preostalih 1 milion $ Kolumbiji (čime eliminiše narko kartel iz
(razlika između fakturisane i stvarne vrednosti) bilo kakve dalje umešanosti u aranžman);
na bankovni račun kako bi ta sredstva bila • Četvrto, pezos broker strukturiše ili
isplaćena po instrukcijama Kompanije L. “prošvercuje” SAD monetu u njihov
bankarski sistem kako
bi izbegao potrebne
izveštaje i ulaže taj
novac na svoj račun u
američkoj banci;
• Peto, pezos
broker pronalazi
kolumbijskog uvoznika
bankarstvo �� - �� ����

kome su potrebni dolari

kako bi kupio dobra od
američkog izvoznika
Slika 5. Realizacija SREBRNO-ZLATNIH (broker obično nudi kurs koji je značajno
transakcija povoljniji nego onaj koji je dostupan u
kolumbijskoj banci);

��
 If they want to
manipulate export and Payment for a million SILVER units at 2$ per unit
import prices, money
launderers can falsely
present the quality Company I Transfer of 1 mill. USD to Company J
Local exporter the importer Foreign importer
or type of products/
services. For instance,
an exporter can deliver
Ship transport of a million GOLDEN units at 3$ per unit
relatively cheap
products, and then
falsely present them Figure 5. Execution of SILVER-GOLD
in the invoice as significantly more expensive transactions
or even as completely different products. This
creates a discrepancy between what is wri�en Compound Trade-Based Money Laundering
in the customs and transport documents, and Techniques
what is actually delivered. False descriptions In practice, money laundering strategies
can also be used in the services market, e.g. o�en combine several different techniques.
in financial advising, consulting services and They o�en include simultaneous abuse of both
market research. In practice, the actual prices financial and international trade systems. The
of these services can cause additional problems arrangements of pesos exchange at the black
in assessments. market represent a useful illustration of how
a large number of different money laundering
Example 3 techniques can be combined in a one single
Company I (local exporter) delivers one criminal operation.
million of golden units of goods at a price of
3$ per unit to Company J (foreign importer, Arrangements of Pesos Exchange at the North
accomplice), but sends an invoice to Company and South Americas Black Market (“Black Market
J for one million silver units at a price of 2$ Pesos Exchange”)
per unit. Company J pays 2 million dollars to The mechanisms of such operations were
Company I by means of electronic transfer. the subject of a significant study in 1980s when
Company J then sells the golden units of goods Columbia became the leading and predominant
at the open market for 3 million dollars and exporter of cocaine into the USA. These illegal
deposits the remaining one million dollars drug sales yielded about 10 billion USD per year
(the difference between the invoiced and to the Columbian drug cartels, about 4 billion
actual value) at a bank account, in order for USD out of which were laundered through the
these funds to be paid out according to the pesos black market exchange arrangements.
instructions of Company I. The simple, pesos black market mechanisms
Alternatively, Company K (foreign exporter) can be broken down into the following steps
delivers one million of bronze units of goods (Djordjević, 2008):
at a price of 1$ per unit to Company L (local • First, a Columbian drug cartel illegally
importer with which it connives), but sends an smuggles drugs into the USA and sells it
invoice to Company L for one million silver for cash;
units at a price of 2$ per unit. Company L pays • Second, the drug cartel makes an
2 million dollars to Company K by means of arrangement with a peso broker to sell
electronic transfer. Company K then pays one US dollars below the price for Columbian
bankarstvo �� - �� ����

million dollars to its suppliers and deposits the pesos;

remaining one million (the difference between • Third, the peso broker conducts a payment
the invoiced and actual value) at a bank account, to the drug cartel in pesos from his/her
in order for these funds to be paid out according account in Columbia (thus eliminating any
to the instructions of Company L. further connection of the drug cartel and the
arrangement);

��
• Šesto, broker
uređuje plaćanje
a m e r i č k o m
izvozniku sa svog
računa u nekoj
američkoj banci;
• Sedmo, izvoznik
i s p o r u č u j e
proizvode u
Kolumbiju i
• K o n a č n o ,
kolumbijski
uvoznik prodaje
robu (veoma često je to skupa roba kao što Slika 6. Mehanizam razmene na "Crnom
su PC računari, aparati za domaćinstva, tržištu pezosa"
elektronika) za pezose i vraća novac brokeru.
Na ovaj način se ponovo popunjavaju Studije slučaja
brokerove zalihe pezosima. Studija slučaja 1
Ove transakcije kombinuju različite ilegalne • Brazilska kompanija potpisuje ugovor o
aktivnosti, kao što su krijumčarenje droge, izvozu sojinog zrna nemačkoj kompaniji
pranje novca kroz finansijski sistem i pranje • Nemačka kompanija unapred plaća
novca zasnovano na trgovini. Kao dodatak, ne brazilskoj kompaniji za isporuku
postoji ni jedan razlog zbog koga narko kartel • Brazilska kompanija istog momenta vrši
ne bi mogao da se ponaša kao svoj sopstveni transfer sredstava trećoj strani koja nije u
broker ili uvoznik. U stvari, mnogi karteli kao vezi sa transakcijom
da su objedinili ove funkcije. • Sojina zrna koja su bila kupljena od
Za razliku od osnovnih tehnika pranja novca strane nemačke kompanije nikada nisu
o kojima je ranije govoreno, ovde takođe ne isporučena.
postoji potreba za dosluh uvoznika i izvoznika
u obmanjujućoj
transakciji kako bi
aranžmani razmene
pezosa na crnom
tržištu mogli da
funkcionišu. Umesto
toga, cene i količina
robe mogu biti
predstavljeni u
realnoj vrednosti
carinskim službama, pa se ipak može vršiti Slika 7. Shema pranja novca putem
transfer sredstava preko granica. Iako se termin kupovine robe koja neće biti isporučena
“razmena pezosa na crnom tržištu” odnosi kupcu
na tehniku pranja novca koja je prvobitno
povezivana sa kolumbijskim prometom Komentar
narkotika, ovi aranžmani su u širokoj upotrebi U ovom slučaju, nemačka kompanija izvršila
bankarstvo �� - �� ����

u mnogim zemljama kako bi ujedinili različite je transfer sredstava brazilskoj kompaniji kao
tipove kriminala. plaćanje unapred za isporuku sojinog zrna.

��
 • Fourth, the peso broker structures or “smuggles” black market exchange” refers to the money
the US currency into their banking system in laundering technique originally associated
order to avoid necessary reports, and deposits with the Columbian drug trafficking, these
that money at his/her account with a US bank; arrangements are widely used in many
• Fi�h, the peso broker finds a Columbian countries in order for different types of criminal
importer who needs dollars to purchase activities to be combined.
goods from a US exporter (the broker usually
offers the FX rate
significantly more BANK Columbian
Drug Cartel Importer
favourable than
the one available in
USD
Columbian banks);
• Sixth, the broker
arranges payment to

Goods
the US exporter from
Drugs

his/her account with Pesos

Pesos
a US bank; Peso broker
• Seventh, the
exporter delivers
the products in
Columbia; and
• Finally, the Columbian importer sells the Figure 6. Exchange mechanism at the “Pesos
goods (it is very o�en expensive goods, such Black Market”
as PCs, household appliances, electronics)
for pesos and returns the money to the Case Studies
broker. In this way the broker’s stock of Case Study 1
pesos is refilled. • A Brazilian company signs a contract
These transactions combine different illegal on exporting soya beans to a German
activities, such as drug smuggling, money company;
laundering through the financial system, and • The German company pays to the Brazilian
trade-based money laundering. In addition, company in advance;
there are no reasons why a drug cartel would • The Brazilian company immediately
not be able to behave as its own broker or transfers the funds to a third party which
importer. In fact, many cartels seem to have has no relation to the transaction;
combined these functions. • Soya beans bought by the German company
As opposed to the basic money laundering have never been delivered.
techniques mentioned
before, there is no 1. German company pays in advance for the delivery
need here either
for the importer
and exporter to be
conniving in the
deceiving transaction 2. Brazilian company transfers the funds to a third
company unrelated to the delivery
in order to make
the pesos black 3. Brazilian company does not conduct delivery
bankarstvo �� - �� ����

market exchange
arrangements work.
Instead, the price and quantity of goods can Figure 7. Scheme of money laundering
be presented in their real value to the customs through purchase of the goods that will not be
offices, and the cross-border fund transfer can delivered to the buyer
still be conducted. Although the term “pesos

��
Sumnje su podgrejane kada je ustanovljeno Komentar
da izvoz sojinog zrna nije u vezi sa regularnim Za razliku od aranžmana razmene pezosa
poslovnim aktivnostima brazilske kompanije, na crnom tržištu, radije nego da krijumčari
kao i to da je prijavljena količina bila u američku monetu na račune SAD bankarskog
disproporciji sa skalom svakodnevnih operacija sistema, kartel bira da minimizira rizik
te kompanije. od otkrivanja kroz upotrebu lažnih opisa
isporučene robe. Transportna dokumenta
Studija slučaja 2 povezana sa ovim lažnim južnoameričkim
• Kolumbijski kartel ilegalno krijumčari drogu zlatnim polugama korišćena su kako bi se
u SAD i prodaje je za keš ozakonila prodaja zlatnih poluga iz SAD-a.
• Kartel koristi keš kako bi kupio staro zlato u Prihod od prodaje ovih američkih poluga je
SAD, koje se topi i preliva u zlatne poluge zatim transferisan u bankarski sistem SAD-a.
• Istovremeno, kartel prevozi brodom
olovne poluge iz Urugvaja u SAD, koje su Studija slučaja 3
fakturisane kao zlatne poluge. • Kompanija koja se bavi trgovinom
• Kada pošiljka stigne, olovne poluge se prehrambenim proizvodima je osnovana
uništavaju i zamenjuju se prelivenim kao ofšor finansijski centar i u poslovnom je
zlatnim polugama kontaktu sa nekoliko afričkih prehrambenih
• Sa pravom dokumentacijom, zlatne poluge kompanija.
se prodaju na otvorenom tržištu. Ovaj novac • Novac koji kompanija dobija za prodaju
se zatim elektronskim putem šalje nazad u svojih proizvoda je istog momenta prebačen
Urugvaj i eventualno u Panamu. sa kompanijinog ofšor računa na lični račun
svog menadžera u
Belgiji. Naizmenično,
sredstva se zatim brzo
prebacuju na račune
nekoliko stranih
kompanija.
• Kompanija
takođe prima sredstva
od strane kompanije
koja nije umešana u ove
radnje, a koja je u poslu
sa dijamantima. Novac
iz kompanije koja trguje
dijamantima tada se
izmeša sa kompanijskim
prihodima iz drugih
poslova i prebaci kroz
Slika 8. Shema OLOVNO-ZLATNIH Belgiju istim inostranim kompanijama.
transakcija
bankarstvo �� - �� ����

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 Comment Comment
In this case, the German company transferred As opposed to the arrangements of pesos
the funds to the Brazilian company as a form exchange at the black market, instead of
of advanced payment for the delivery of soya smuggling American currency into the USA
beans. The doubts were confirmed when it was banking system accounts, the cartel chooses to
established that the export of soya beans has no minimize the risk of being exposed by using
relation to the regular business activities of the false descriptions of the delivered goods. The
Brazilian company, and that the agreed quantity transport documents related to these false
was disproportionate to the scale of everyday South American gold bars are used in order to
operations of the company concerned. legalize the selling of gold bars in the USA. The
profit from sales of these American bars was
Case Study 2 then transferred into the USA banking system.
• A Columbian cartel smuggles drugs into the
USA and sells it for cash; Case Study 3
• The cartel uses the cash to buy old gold in • A company trading in food products has
the USA, which is then melted and turned been established as an offshore financial
into gold bars; centre and has had business contacts
• At the same time, the cartel ships lead bars with several African food-processing
invoiced as gold bars from Uruguay into the companies;
USA; • The money the company receives a�er
• Once the shipment arrives, lead bars are selling its products is immediately
destroyed and swapped with melted gold transferred from the company’s offshore
bars; account to the personal account of its
• With the proper documentation, gold bars manager in Belgium. Alternately, the funds
are sold at the open market. This money is are then quickly transferred to the accounts
then sent back electronically into Uruguay of several foreign companies;
and, possibly, Panama. • The company also receives funds from
a foreign company
1. Columbian cartel smuggles the drugs into the USA not involved in these
operations, trading in
3. The cartel imports lead bars from Uruguay into the USA diamonds. The money
from the company
trading in diamonds
is then mixed with the
4. Lead bars
2. The cartel company’s profit from
are swapped
uses the 6. Payment via
with gold
money from
ones and sold
a third country other operations and
the drug to Columbia
sales to buy
transferred through
old gold Belgium to the same
foreign companies as
before.

5. Payment for the gold bars to a company in

Uruguay

Figure 8. Scheme of LEAD-GOLD transactions

bankarstvo �� - �� ����

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 kreditna pisma i
prodaje ih za keš
novac.
• Ova grupa
zatim ulaže novac na
račun u nekoj belgijskoj
banci i uređuje sledeće
kreditno pismo.
• Grupa prodaje
dodatne falsifikovane
proizvode iz Azije
koristeći novo kreditno
pismo.
• Ovi dodatni
falsifikovani proizvodi
Slika 9. Mešanje legalnog i ilegalno stečenog su prodati i prihodi su
novca uloženi u banku, a zatim iskorišćeni kako bi
se ugovorila nova kreditna pisma.
Komentar
Ovaj slučaj ilustruje
nivo dodatne složenosti
koja može biti pridodata
novčanim prevarama
mešanjem nezakonito
stečenih sredstava sa
novčanim tokovima
legalnog biznisa.
U ovom slučaju,
kompanija koja trguje
dijamantima je kasnije
bila predmet istrage u
trgovini nelegalnim,
takozvanim “krvavim
dijamantima” (Blood
Diamonds). Slika 10. Korišćenje kreditnih pisama

Studija slučaja 4 Komentar

• Kriminalna grupa uvozi falsifikovane U ovom slučaju, kriminalna grupa je bila
proizvode iz Azije u Belgiju koristeći u mogućnosti da upotrebi keš novac koji je
bankarstvo �� - �� ����

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 2. Cooperation and transfer with other countries • This group
then deposits the
money at the account
in a Belgium bank, and
arranges another le�er
of credit;
• The group
sells additional
1. Mixed funds are counterfeit products
transferred to a personal
manager’s account from Asia using a new
3. Food-processing le�er of credit;
company receives funds
from other companies,
• T h e s e
including the company additional counterfeit
dealing in diamonds
products are sold and
the profit deposited
Figure 9. Mixing of legally and illegally at a bank account,
obtained money which is later used to arrange new le�ers of
credit.
Comment
This case illustrates 1. Criminal group imports counterfeit goods from Asia into
Belgium
the level of additional
complexity that may
be added to the money
frauds by mixing
5. Counterfeit goods
illegally obtained funds 2. Selling
manufacturer in Asia
of goods
with the cash flows
of a legal business. In 3. Cash in
this case, the company a Belgium
bank
trading in diamonds
was later a subject
of investigation of
the trade in the so- 4. Criminal group arranges new counterfeit goods
called illegal “blood import operations by means of le�ers of credit

diamonds”.
Figure 10. Using le�ers of credit
Case Study 4
• A criminal group imports counterfeit Comment
products from Asia into Belgium using In this case, the criminal group was in the
le�ers of credit, and sells them for cash; position to use the cash deposited at the bank
bankarstvo �� - �� ����

��
uložila na račun u banci kako bi ugovorila Sumnje su bile podgrejane kada je otkriveno
nova kreditna pisma. Zatim, ova pisma su se da su falsifikovana dokumenta bila korišćena
mogla iskoristiti kako bi se mogle finansirati za izvoz ovih proizvoda i da se organizacija
serije novih isporuka falsifikovane robe. nikada nije prijavila za povraćaj poreza na
Kriminalna grupa je mislila da će upotreba dodatu vrednost.
kreditnih pisama povezanih sa trgovinskim
transakcijama, pre nego elektronski transfer Finansijske obaveštajne jedinice
novca, povećati legitimnost ovih transakcija i (FIU)
smanjiti mogućnost otkrivanja.
Polovina finansijskih obaveštajnih jedinica
Studija slučaja 5 dobija izveštaje o sumnjivim aktivnostima
• Kriminalna organizacija ilegalno prodaje koji su aktivirani zabrinutostima o procesima
drogu u Japanu. Organizacija zatim povezanim sa trgovinom. Ipak, u mnogim
krijumčari keš novac iz zemlje i to u zemljama, broj ovih izveštaja je relativno nizak
Francusku. (često manje od 25 godišnje). Pored toga, ovi
• Novac se koristi kako bi se kupili luksuzni izveštaji dolaze od carinskih i organa gonjenja,
proizvodi u objektima renomiranih a u manjoj meri, od strane poreskih vlasti i
dizajnera, koji se zatim izvoze u Japan i bankarskih supervizora. Negde jedna trećina
prodaju od strane kompanije školjke. finansijskih obaveštajnih jedinica koristi
• Prihodi od prodaje ovih luksuznih roba trgovačke informacije kao deo svojih tekućih
se zatim ulažu na račune u bankarskom analiza pranja novca i finansiranja terorističkih
sistemu Japana. aktivnosti, a ove informacije često doprinose
istragama i gonjenjima
suskim putem.
Finansijske
obaveštajne jedinice
istakle su da bi mogle da
počnu sa intenzivnijim
korišćenjem tzv.
“crvenih zastavica”
indikatora. Kao
dodatak, većina
veruje da postoji
prilična namera za
poboljšanjem upotrebe
ovih indikatora i
drugih analitičkih
tehnika, kako bi se
promovisao pristup
Slika 11. “Pranje” putem trgovine luksuznom koji je više zasnovan na riziku, a koji služi
robom detektovanju aktivnosti pranja novca. U
ovom slučaju, interesantno je da je samo jedna
Komentar četvrtina finansijskih obaveštajnih jedinica
Radije nego da “ugura” japansku monetu istakla da ima koristi od trgovinskih baza
u japanski bankarski sistem, kriminalna podataka kao dela svojih analiza.
bankarstvo �� - �� ����

organizacija bira minimiziranje rizika od Neiznenađujuće, finansijske obaveštajne

otkrivanja krijumčarenjem keš novca iz zemlje, jedinice su u mogućnosti da dele
a zatim koristi međunarodni trgovinski sistem informacije sa organima gonjenja, carinskim
za uvoz luksuznih dobara nazad u Japan. službama, poreskim vlastima i bankarskim
Prihodi od prodaje ovih dobara su zatim supervizorima. Međutim, napominje se da
uloženi na račun u nekoj japanskoj banci. striktna komercijalna poverljivost koja se

��
 account in order to arrange new le�ers of credit. the export of these products were counterfeit,
These le�ers of credit were, in turn, used to and that the organization never applied for the
finance the new deliveries of counterfeit goods. value added tax refund.
The criminal group believed that the use of
le�ers of credit related to the trade transactions Financial Intelligence Units (FIU)
would, more than electronic money transfer,
increase the legitimacy of these transactions Half of the financial intelligence units receive
and reduce the probability of being exposed. reports on suspicious activities, triggered by
concerns about trade-related processes. Still,
Case Study 5 in many countries the number of these reports
• A criminal organization illegally sells drugs is relatively low (o�en less than 25 a year). In
in Japan. The organization then smuggles addition, these reports are sent by customs and
cash from Japan to France; prosecution bodies, and, to a smaller extent,
• The money is used to buy luxurious by tax authorities and banking supervisors.
products in the renowned designer stores, About a third of financial intelligence units use
which are then exported to Japan and sold trading information as a part of their current
by the shell companies; analyses in respect of money laundering and
• The profit from the sale of these luxurious terrorist activities financing, and these pieces of
products is then deposited at the bank information o�en facilitate investigations and
accounts in the Japanese banking system. court proceedings.
F i n a n c i a l
2. Luxurious clothes are exported to Japan and sold through a intelligence units
shell company pointed out that they
could start using the
so-called “red flag”
3. Sales indicators to a greater
profits are
deposited at extent. In addition,
a Japanese
bank most of them believe
account
that there is a firm
A renowned fashion
Japanese Criminal designer in France intention to improve
Shell bank organization
company the use of these
indicators, along
with other analytical
1. Smuggling money from the drug sales
techniques, in order
into France and purchasing luxurious to promote a more
products (e.g. luxurious clothes)
risk-based approach,
which would be used
Figure 11. Laundering by means of trade in to detect money laundering activities. In this
luxurious goods case, it is interesting that only a quarter of
financial intelligence units claimed that the
Comment trade databases are useful as a part of their
Rather than “pushing” the Japanese currency analyses.
into the Japanese banking system, the criminal It does not come as a surprise that the
organization chose to minimize the risk from financial intelligence units are in the position
being exposed by smuggling the cash out of the to share information with prosecution bodies,
bankarstvo �� - �� ����

country, and then using the international trade customs offices, tax authorities and banking
system for importing luxurious goods back to supervisors. However, it has been underlined
Japan. The profit from the sale of these goods is that the strict commercial confidentiality of
then deposited at the account with a Japanese these pieces of information limits their use
bank. The doubts were confirmed when it for intelligence purposes. Also, it has been
was discovered that the documents used for emphasized that the exchange of information

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daje ovim informacijama ograničava njihovu označene kao visokorizične sa poslove
upotrebu u obaveštajne svrhe. Takođe, ističe pranja novca
se da je razmena informacija često ograničena • se isporuka vrši kroz jednu ili više oblasti bez
na slučajeve kriminalnih istraga koje su u toku. neke očigledne ekonomske opravdanosti
Domaće finansijske obaveštajne agencije su • se način plaćanja ne podudara sa
u mogućnosti da razmenjuju informacije sa karakterističnim rizicima transakcije
inostranim jedinicama, ali ovo obično zahteva (plaćanje unapred za isporuku od novog
memorandum razumevanja ili međunarodnog dobavljača iz visokorizične zemlje)
reciprociteta (protivusluge). • transakcija uključuje uplatu u kešu ili
Po analizama FATF, otprilike polovina druga plaćanja od strane trećeg lica ili
službi u okviru svog personala ima specijaliste kompanije koja nije očigledno povezana sa
za trgovinu, ali samo četvrtina njih omogućava transakcijom
treninge svojim analitičarima kako bi poboljšala • transakcija uključuje upotrebu često
njihovo razumevanje tehnika pranja novca izmenjenih ili frekventno proširenih
baziranog na trgovini. Činjenica je da bi kreditnih pisama
finansijske obaveštajne jedinice imale koristi od • transakcija uključuje upotrebu fasadnih ili
efikasnijeg treninga i svesnosti različitih tehnika kompanija školjki.
aktivnosti pranja novca. U načelu, veruje se da Carinske službe koriste više preciznih
su države ozbiljno ranjive na polju zloupotrebe informacija koje se odnose na specifične
trgovinskog sistema u kriminalne svrhe. uvozne, izvozne ili transportne kompanije. Kao
dodatak, “crvene zastave” koje se koriste za
Indikatori “crvene zastave” (“Red otkrivanje drugih metoda pranja novca mogu
flag” indicators) biti korisne u otkrivanju potencijalnih slučajeva
pranja novca koje je zasnovano na trgovini.
Po analizi, ispitanici koji su uzeli ušešća u
popunjavanju upitnika FATF-ovog projektnog Zaključna razmatranja
tima istakli su veliki broj indikatora crvenih
zastava koji se rutinski koriste za otkrivanje Na osnovu mnogobrojnih analiza i
aktivnosti pranja novca. Ovo uključuje situacije istraživanja relevantnih međunarodnih
u kojima: institucija, došli smo do ključnih saznanja
• se javljaju značajna odstupanja između opisa u pogledu pranja novca u međunarodnoj
robe na tovarnom listu i same fakture; trgovini:
• se javljaju značajna odstupanja između opisa • Ova vrsta pranja novca je važan kanal
robe na tovarnom listu ili samoj fakturi i kriminalnih aktivnosti i, uz rast u obimu
stvarno isporučene robe; svetske trgovine, prikazuje sve više važnu
• se javljaju značajna odstupanja između ranjivost sistema od uticaja procesa pranja
vrednosti robe prijavljene na fakturi i njene novca i finansiranja terorizma (najčešće od
vrednosti na realnom tržištu; trgovine narkoticima, oružja, ljudi, cigareta
• obim isporuke deluje protivrečno sa skalom itd.)
regularnih poslovnih aktivnosti uvoznika ili • Ova vrsta pranja novca razlikuje se od slučaja
izvoznika do slučaja u smislu svoje kompleksnosti.
• je vrsta robe koja se isporučuje označena Najosnovnije šeme jesu prevare vezane za
kao “visokorizična” za aktivnosti pranja praksu u trgovini (umanjene ili uvećane
novca fakture). Ipak, složenije šeme integrišu
• je vrsta robe koja se isporučuje protivrečna ovu vrstu prakse u mrežu kompleksnijih
bankarstvo �� - �� ����

sa regularnim poslovnim akrivnostima transakcija, koja takođe uključuje prenos

uvoznika ili izvoznika vrednosti kroz finansijski sistem (elektronski
• isporuka nema ekonomsku opravdanost transferi ili bankovne uputnice, čekovi)
(upotreba kontejnera od 40 stopa za i/ili fizički prenos novčanica (keš kuriri).
transport male količine relativno lake robe) Upotreba ovih složenih transakcija dalje
• se isporuka vrši u ili iz oblasti koje su otežava ulazak u trag opranom novcu i

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 is o�en restricted to the criminal investigation • The delivery is conducted to/from a region
cases that are in progress. Local financial considered to be ‘highly risky’ in terms of
intelligence agencies are in the position to money laundering operations;
exchange information with foreign units, • The delivery is conducted through one or
but this o�en requires a memorandum on more regions without any evident economic
understanding or on international reciprocity justifiability;
(counter-service). • The method of payment is not adjusted to
According to the FATF analyses, about half the characteristic risks of the transaction
of the agencies have trade specialists within (advanced payment for the delivery from a
their personnel, but only a quarter of them new supplier from a highly risky country);
provide trainings for their analysts in order to • The transaction includes a cash payment
improve their understanding of trade-based or other payments from a third party or
money laundering techniques. The fact is that a company not evidently related to the
the financial intelligence units would benefit transaction;
from more efficient training and awareness • The transaction includes the use of the
of the various money laundering techniques. frequently altered or frequently extended
Generally speaking, it is believed that countries le�ers of credit;
are considerably vulnerable in the field of trade • The transaction includes the use of ‘shell’
system abuse for criminal purposes. companies.
Customs offices use various precise
“Red Flag” Indicators information related to the specific import,
export or transport companies. In addition,
According to the analysis, the participants the “red flags” used for detection of other
who took part in completing the FATF project money laundering methods may also be useful
team questionnaire, pointed to the large in detection of potential trade-based money
number of red flag indicators routinely used in laundering cases.
detection of money laundering activities. This
includes the situations in which: Concluding Remarks
• There are significant discrepancies between
the description of goods in the bill of lading Based on the numerous analyses and
and the invoice itself; studies conducted by the relevant international
• There are significant discrepancies between institutions, we have come to some key
the description of goods in the bill of findings in respect of the money laundering in
lading or the invoice itself and the actually international trade:
delivered goods; • This type of money laundering is a major
• There are significant discrepancies between channel for criminal activities and, with
the value of goods stated in the invoice and the increase in world trade volume, it
its real market value; increasingly demonstrates the significant
• The scale of delivery seems to be in vulnerability of the system to the impact
contradiction with the scale of regular of money laundering process and financing
activities of the importer or exporter; of terrorism (most o�en through trading
• The type of goods delivered is considered in drugs, weapons, cigare�es, human
to be ‘highly risky’ in terms of money trafficking, etc.);
laundering activities; • This type of money laundering differs from
• The type of goods delivered is in case to case in terms of its complexity. The
bankarstvo �� - �� ����

contradiction with the regular business most basic schemes are frauds related to
activities of the importer or exporter; trade practice (over- or under-invoicing).
• The delivery is not economically justified However, the more complex schemes
(the use of 40-feet containers for the integrate this type of practice into a network
transport of a small quantity of relatively of more complex transactions, which also
light goods); includes the transfer of value through the

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 komplikuje otkrivanje. oblicima pranja novca i finansiranja
• Analiza trgovinskih podataka i njihova terorizma. Delom, ovo izgleda da odražava
međunarodna razmena su korisni alati za njihovo ograničeno razumevanje tehnika
otkrivanje anomalija u trgovini, koje mogu koje su vezanu za ovu vrstu pranja novca.
odvesti do same istrage i sudskog gonjenja • Većina organa gonjenja, carinskih službi,
za slučajeve pranja novca. poreskih vlasti, finansijskih obaveštajnih
• I dok carinske službe, organi gonjenja, jedinica i bankarskih supervizora je
finansijske obaveštajne agencije, poreske identifikovala neodložnu potrebu za jačim
vlasti i bankarski supervizori mogu treningom kako bi bile sigurne da će njihovo
razmenjivati informacije o trgovini, ovo je osoblje posedovati dovoljno znanja da
često zabranjeno u određenim okolnostima prepozna proces pranja novca baziranog na
ili se preduzima na dobrovoljnim više trgovini.
nego na obaveznim osnovama. Kao • Većina organa gonjenja, carinskih službi,
dodatak, većina finansijskih obaveštajnih poreskih vlasti, finansijskih obaveštajnih
agencija ne dobija konstantno izveštaje o jedinica i bankarskih supervizora istakla je
sumnjivim aktivnostima koje su povezane ozbiljnu zabrinutost zbog ranjivosti njihovih
sa trgovinskim transakcijama. država na ovu vrstu pranja novca. Osim
• Većina organa gonjenja, carinskih službi, toga, većina njih veruje da njihove zemlje
poreskih vlasti, finansijskih obaveštajnih poseduju ograničene mere kojima se mogu
jedinica i bankarskih supervizora se čini umanjiti aktivnosti pranja novca koje je
nedovoljno sposobnim u identifikovanju zasnovano na poslovima u međunarodnoj
i borbi sa pranjem novca zasnovanom na trgovini.
trgovini nego što je to slučaj sa drugim

Literatura / References

1. Begović, B., Vasović, M. i dr. (2003), Korupcija 6. Financial Action Task Force (2006),
na carini, CLDS, Beograd Background Documents - Summary
2. Bošković, G. (2005), Pranje novca, Beosing, of Responses to Trade-Based Money
Beograd Laundering Questionnaire, FATF Secure
3. Financial Action Task Force (2004), Website.
“Alternative Remi�ance Systems”, Money 7. Klasens, R. (2007), Sprečavanje pranja novca,
Laundering and Terrorist Financing Typologies Udruženje banaka Srbije, Beograd
2004-2005, June 2005. 8. Kovačević, M. (2002), Međunarodna
4. Financial Action Task Force (2004), “Money trgovina, Ekonomski fakultet, Beograd
Laundering and Terrorist Financing Trends 9. Lilley, P. (2006) Dirty Dealing - The Untold
and Indicators: Initial Perspectives”, Money Thruth about Global Money Laundering,
Laundering and Terrorist Financing Typologies International Crime and Terrorism, 3rd edition,
2004-2005, June 2005. Kogan Page Ltd.
bankarstvo �� - �� ����

5. Financial Action Task Force (2006), 10. Đorđević, B. (2008), “Underground Banking:
Background Documents - Summaries of Legitimate Network or Money Laundering
Trade-Based Money Laundering Case System?”, International Scientific Conference
Studies and Domestic Regimes, FATF Secure “Challenges of economic sciences in the
Website. 21st century”, Book of papers, Institute of
Economic Sciences, Belgrade, pp. 552 - 559.

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 financial system (electronic transfers or bank insufficiently capable to identify and fight
orders, cheques), and/or physical transfer of trade-based money laundering, more than
banknotes (cash couriers). The use of these any other form of money laundering and
complex transactions makes it even more financing of terrorism. In part, this seems
difficult to track the laundered money and to reflect their limited understanding of the
hinders detection. techniques related to this form of money
• Analysis of trade-related data and their laundering.
international exchange are useful tools for • Most prosecution bodies, customs offices,
detecting trade anomalies, which may lead tax authorities, financial intelligence units
to investigation and court prosecution for and banking supervisors identified an
the money laundering cases. urgent need for be�er training in order
• And although customs offices, prosecution to ensure that their personnel owns the
bodies, financial intelligence agencies, tax knowledge sufficient to recognize the trade-
authorities and banking supervisors may based money laundering process.
exchange trade-related information, this is • Most prosecution bodies, customs offices,
o�en forbidden in certain circumstances or tax authorities, financial intelligence units
is undertaken more on a voluntary than on a and banking supervisors pointed out their
mandatory basis. In addition, most financial serious concern about the vulnerability
intelligence agencies do not regularly receive of their countries to this form of money
reports on suspicious activities related to laundering. Apart from this, most of them
trade transactions. believe that their countries possess limited
• Most prosecution bodies, customs offices, measures that can reduce money laundering
tax authorities, financial intelligence activities based on international trade
units and banking supervisors seem to be operations.
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