Torts

A. Articles 1156, 1557, 1170, 1173, 2176

TORTS AND DAMAGES

CHAPTER 1: CONCEPT OF TORTS
Art. 2176.
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)

ELEMENTS OF QUASI DELICT/TORTS:

1. Act or omission
2. Damage or injury is caused to another
3. Fault or negligence is present
4. There is no pre-existing contractual relations between the parties
5. Causal connection between damage done and act/omission

NEGLIGENCE
The omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the
circumstances of the persons, time and place. (Art. 1173, NCC)

KINDS OF NEGLIGENCE
1. Quasi delict (Art. 2176 NCC)
2. Criminal negligence (Art. 356 RPC)
3. Contractual negligence (NCC provisions on contracts particularly Arts. 1170 to 1174)

Art. 1156. An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do. (n)

Obligation – The requirement to do what is imposed by law, promise, or contract. Obligation is synonymous with duty.
It’s a tie which binds us to pay or to do something agreeably to the laws and customs of the country. According to
Arias Ramos, obligation is nothing more than the duty of a person (debtor or obligor) to satisfy a specific and
demandable claim of another person (creditor or obligee) which if breached is enforced in court.\
Elements of Obligation
1. Active subject (creditor or obligee). – the person who has the right to demand the fulfillment of the obligation.
2. Passive subject (debtor or obligor).- the one who is bound to the fulfillment of the obligation.
3. Prestation or object – It may consist in giving, doing, or not doing. Without prestation, there is nothing to perform.
Object refers to the property or the things. Prestation is the subject matter of the obligation.
4. Efficient cause (juridical or legal tie) – that which binds or connects the parties to the obligation. The tie is an
obligation can easily determined by knowing the source of the obligation.
Right and obligation, Correlated – When there is right there is a corresponding obligation. Right is the active
aspect (credit) and obligation is the passive aspect (debt).
Prestation – Particular conduct of the debtor. It may consist in giving, doing or not doing something.
1. Obligation to give – consist in the delivery of a movable or immovable thing to the creditor. Example:
Obligation to deliver the thing in sale, deposit, pledge, donation, anti-chresis.
2. Obligation to do – covers all kinds of works or services whether physical or mental. Example: Contract for
professional services like painting, modelling, singing.
3. Obligation not to do – consist in refraining from doing some acts like producing aggravating noise, offensive
odor, smoke, heat.
Nature of obligations in Art. 1156; Civil and Natural Obligations Distinguished. –
The definition of obligation in Article 1156 refers to civil obligations which are enforceable in court when breached. It
does not cover natural obligations.
Kinds of Obligations
(a) As to judicial enforceability
1. Civil obligation – It is an when the debtor or obligor did not fulfilled its obligation to the creditor or obligee that
can be enforced through a civil suit or action in a court.
2. Natural obligation – It is a special kind of obligation which cannot be enforced in court but which authorizes
the retention of the voluntary payment or performance made by the debtor.
3. Moral obligation – It is a duty which one owes, and which he ought to perform, but not legally bound to fulfill.
 This is an obligation from moral law developed by the church the church and not enforced on court. It deals
with the spiritual obligation of a person in relation to his God or Church.
(b) As to the subject matter
1. Real obligation – obligation to give
2. Personal obligation – obligation to do or not to do.
(c) As to the number of persons bound to perform
1. Unilateral obligation – It is when only one of the parties are bound to fulfill a prestation.
2. Bilateral obligation – It is when both parties are bound to perform.
Reciprocal obligation are which arise from the same cause, wherein each party is a debtor and a creditor of the other.
(ASJ Corporation vs. Evangelista, 545 SCRA 300)
(d) As to the capacity of fulfillment
1. Possible obligation – It is when an obligation that can be fulfilled in nature or in law.
2. Impossible obligation – It is when an obligation that cannot be fulfilled in nature or in law.
(e) As to susceptibility of partial fulfillment
1. Divisible obligation – Requires the giving of definite things and the same can be partially performed.
2. Indivisible obligation – Requires the giving of definite things and the same cannot be partially performed.
(f) as to their dependance upon one another
1. Principal obligation – Main obligation created by the parties.
2. Accessory obligation – Secondary obligation created to guarantee the fulfillment of the principal obligation.
(g) As to the existence of a burden or condition
1. Pure obligation – Not subject to any conditions and no specific date is mentioned for its fulfillment but
immediately demanded.
2. Condition obligation – Subject to conditions, it can be suspensive and performance of which depends on an
uncertainty.
3. Obligation with a term – Subject to the happening of an event which will surely happen, but the date is
uncertain. The obligation becomes demandable only when the term expired.
(h) As to the nature of performance
1. Positive obligation – When the debtor is oblige to give or to do something in favor of the creditor.
2. Negative obligation – When the debtor is not oblige to give or to do anything. That is, he must refrain from
doing something.
(i) As to the nature of creation of the obligation
1. Legal obligation – Obligation imposed by law.
2. Conventional obligation – Obligation established by the agreement of the parties like contracts.
(j) As to the character of responsibility or liability
1. Joint obligation – Obligation where creditor has the right to demand full and complete compliance of an
obligation against both of the debtors.
2. Solidary obligation – Obligation that are bound together, each liable for the whole performance, or obligees to
be bound together, all owed just a single performance and each entitled to the entirety of it.
(k) As to the grant of right to choose one prestation out of several, or to substitute the first one.
1. Alternative obligation – Obligation where the obligor may choose one out of several prestation.
2. Facultative obligation – Obligation where there are only one prestation. But the obligor may render one in
substitution of the first one.
(l) As to the imposition of penalty
1. Simple obligation – Obligation where there is no penalty imposed for violation of terms thereof.
2. Obligation with penalty – Obligation where there is a penalty imposed for violation of terms thereof.

Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:

(1) Law;

(2) Contracts;

(3) Quasi-contracts;

(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and

 (5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)

Enumerated Source of Obligation, Exclusive – The enumeration of the sources of obligations are exclusive. No
obligation exist it its source is not one of those enumerated in Art. 1157 (Navales vs. Rias, 8 Phil. 508)
Illustrative of the Sources of Obligation. –
1. Obligation arising from law – Like the duty of the spouses to provide mutual support and respect to one
another. Duty of tax payer to pay their taxes to the government (BIR)
2. Obligation arising from contract – Like the duty of a contracting to fulfill his undertaking in the contract.
3. Obligation arising from a quasi-contract – like the duty of the recipient to return what was delivered to him by
mistake.
4. Obligation arising from delict or crime – such as duty of the culprit to pay actual damages for causing the
death of a person.
5. Obligation arising from quasi-delict or tort – like the duty of the tortfeasor to pay damages for injuries of
damages to his fault, omission or negligence

Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who
in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. (1101)
In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those
that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of obligation and which the parties have foreseen or
could have reasonably foreseen at the time obligation was constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be
reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.

Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the
nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When
negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected
of a good father of a family shall be required. (1104a)
Fault or negligence – the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance whereby other person suffers injury.
Factors
(1) Nature of obligation
(2) Circumstances of the person
(3) Circumstance of time
(4) Circumstances of place
In contracts and quasi-contracts, the dames for w/c the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are
the natural and probable consequences of the breach and w/c the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably
foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages w/c may be
reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
Ex. B suffered a heart attack and was hospitalized for 5 days because of the breach by S resulting to loss of 5000
profit and this angered the former. If S acted in good faith, the damage w/c B ought to receive should be the amount
of 5000, the profit w/c B failed to realize.
If S acted in bad faith, he is also liable to pay for the hospitalization expenses w/c clearly originated from the breach.
Kinds of Diligence (hierarchy)
(1) Agreement
(2) in the absence of agreement, required by law in the particular case
(3) in the absence of agreement and law, the diligence of a good father of a family
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)

REGINO VS. PCST Case Digest

REGINO VS. PCST
G.R No. 156109. November 18, 2004

FACTS: Petitioner Kristine Regino was a poor student enrolled at the Pangasinan College of Science and
Technology. Thus, a fund raising project pertaining to a dance party was organized by PCST, requiring all its
students to purchase two tickets in consideration as a prerequisite for the final exam.

Regino, an underprivileged, failed to purchase the tickets because of her status as well as that project was against
her religious belief, thus, she was not allowed to take the final examination by her two professors.

ISSUE: Was the refusal of the university to allow Regino to take the final examination valid?

RULING: No, the Supreme Court declared that the act of PCST was not valid, though, it can impose its
administrative policies, necessarily, the amount of tickets or payment shall be included or expressed in the student
handbooks given to every student before the start of the regular classes of the semester. In this case, the fund raising
project was not included in the activities to be undertaken by the university during the semester. The petitioner is
entitled for damages due to her traumatic experience on the acts of the university causing her to stop studying sand
later transfer to another school.

B. Defenses: Articles 2177-2179

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant. (n)

Art. 2178. The provisions of Articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict. (n)

Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being
the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded. (n)

I. Calalas vs. CA
Facts:
Private Respondent Eliza Saunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Petitioner Vicente Calalas. As
the jeepney was already full, she was just given an “extension seat”, a wooden stool, at the rear end of the vehicle.

On the way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Since Sunga was seated at the rear end, she gave way to the
outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu Elf Truck driven by Igclerio Verena and owned by Francisco
Salva, bumped to the left rear end of the jeepney. This incident cause injury to Sunga.

She filed a compliant for damages against Calalas on the ground of breach of contract of carriage. On the other hand,
Calalas filed a third-party complaint against Salva, the owner of the truck.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Salva guilty and absolved Calalas from liability holding that it was the truck
owner who is responsible for the accident based on quasi-delict.

However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the appellate court reversed the RTC’s decision, on the ground that
Sunga’s cause of action was based on a breach of contract of carriage and not on quasi-delict.
Hence, this appeal from Calalas.

ISSUE: Whether or not the negligence of the truck driver as the proximate cause of the accident which negates
petitioner’s liability?

RULING:
No.
First, the issue in this case is the liability under contract of carriage. In this case, the petitioner failed to transport his
passenger safely to his destination as a common carrier in violation of Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the New Civil Code.

Moreso, there is no basis that the ruling of the RTC binds Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the
collision was the truck driver, because the doctrine of proximate cause applies only to cases of quasi-delict.

The doctrine of proximate cause is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him
and another party. But in the case at bar, there is a pre-existing relation between petitioner and respondent in their
contract of carriage. Hence, upon happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose on Calalas’
part, which makes him liable.

II. Jarco Marketing Corporation Vs. CA

FACTS:
§ May 9 1983: Criselda and her 6 year-old daughter Zhieneth were at the 2nd floor of Syvel's Department Store,
Makati City.
• While Criselda was signing her credit card slip at the counter, she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud
thud. As she looked behind her, she saw Zhieneth's body pinned by the bulk of the store's gift-wrapping
counter/structure. Zhieneth was crying and screaming for help. Although shocked, Criselda was quick to ask
the assistance of the people around in lifting the counter and retrieving Zhieneth from the floor. Zhieneth was
quickly rushed to the Makati Medical Center where she was operated on.
§ Next day: Zhieneth lost her speech and communicated by writing on a magic slate.
§ 14 days after: She died on the hospital bed. The cause of her death was attributed to the injuries she
sustained.
§ After the burial of their daughter, Criselda demanded upon Jarco Marketing the reimbursement of the
hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses which they had incurred. But, they refused to pay.
§ Criselda filed a complaint for damages
• Jarco Marketing: answered with counterclaim and denied any liability.
• Criselda was negligent in exercising care and diligence over her daughter by allowing her to freely roam around
in a store filled with glassware and appliances. Zhieneth too, was guilty of contributory negligence since she
climbed the counter, triggering its eventual collapse on her. Petitioners also emphasized that the counter was
made of sturdy wood with a strong support; it never fell nor collapsed for the past fifteen years since its
construction.
• maintained that it observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection, supervision and control of its
employees.
§ trial court dismissed the complaint and counterclaim
• proximate cause of the fall of the counter on Zhieneth was her act of clinging to it.
§ CA: favored Criselda judgment. It found that petitioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous
counter. The counter was shaped like an inverted "L" with a top wider than the base. It was top heavy and the
weight of the upper portion was neither evenly distributed nor supported by its narrow base. Thus, the counter
was defective, unstable and dangerous; a downward pressure on the overhanging portion or a push from the
front could cause the counter to fall. Two former employees of petitioners had already previously brought to the
attention of the management the danger the counter could cause. But the latter ignored their concern.

ISSUE: W/N Jarco marketing was negligent or it was an accident

HELD: YES. CA affirmed

§ accident
• pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant
• a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening
• an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event
which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens
• occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any person and
which could not have been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence
§ negligence
• omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do
• the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury
§ Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other
§ Under the circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for Zhieneth, a child of such tender age and in extreme
pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life. W
§ Without doubt, Panelo and another store supervisor were personally informed of the danger posed by the
unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the
store's employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done. Thus, as confronted
by the situation petitioners miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family.
§ Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that favors children below 9
years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of
age is conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from criminal
liability. The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a person over nine
and under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment.
§ Even if we attribute contributory negligence to Zhieneth and assume that she climbed over the counter, no injury
should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and sturdy.
§ Criselda too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence.
• Initially, Zhieneth held on to CRISELDA's waist, and only momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch
when she signed her credit card slip. At this precise moment, it was reasonable and usual for her to let go of her
child.
• Further, at the time Zhieneth was pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot away from her mother; and the
gift-wrapping counter was just 4 meters away - time and distance were both significant.

III. Taylor Vs. The Manila Electric Railroad

FACTS:
§ September 30, 1905 Sunday afternoon: David Taylor, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more
mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics with a boy
named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose
of visiting Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature
engine
§ After leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy, they walked across the open space in the
neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces
• they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground
• These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it 2
long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity
• They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a
considerable explosive power
§ the boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and carried them home
• After crossing the footbridge, they met Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and they went to Manuel's home
§ The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps
• trust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket - no result
• break the cap with a stone - failed
• opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches
 • David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents
• An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three
• Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and started
to run away, received a slight cut in the neck
• Manuel had his hand burned and wounded
• David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such
an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons
§ Trial Court: held Manila Electric Railroad And Light Company liable

ISSUE:

1. W/N the elemnents of quasi-delict to make Manila Electric Railroad And Light Company liable - NO
2. W/N Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. sufficiently proved that they employed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to avoid the damage - NO

HELD: reversing the judgment of the court below

ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and illicit acts and omissions or by those
in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.

ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be
obliged to repair the damage so done.

ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions,
but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.

The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors who live with
them.
xxx xxx xxx
Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for damages caused by their employees in
the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.

ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused —
1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due diligence, and for kindling of explosive
substances which may not have been placed in a safe and proper place.

§ in order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence:

1. Damages to the plaintiff
2. Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond, was
guilty.
3. The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.

While we hold that the entry upon the property without express invitation or permission would not have relieved
Manila Electric from responsibility for injuries incurred, without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable
to his negligence, the negligence in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the
injury received
• cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and
of the resultant injuries inflicted
• Manila Electric is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred
§ 2 years before the accident, David spent 4 months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the interisland transports.
Later he took up work in his father's office, learning mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering. About a
 month after his accident he obtained employment as a mechanical draftsman and continued in that employment
for 6 months at a salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears that he was a boy of more than average intelligence, taller
and more mature both mentally and physically than most boys of 15
• The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by Jessie who even
ran away
§ True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be
expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries
which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and
yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to
his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or
that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such
circumstances.
§ The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand and
appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to
exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and
perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things the question of negligence necessarily depends on
the ability of the minor to understand the character of his own acts and their consequences
§ he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the
necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his
own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result
of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred
but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's
own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury
§ rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non intelligitur sentire
• just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own fault, and that he can not
demand reparation therefor from another
§ Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven by him who alleges it.

IV. Nikko Hotel Vs. Reyes

FACTS:

Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila and Ruby Lim assailed the decision of the Court of Appeals in reversing the decision
of RTC of Quezon City. CA held petitioner liable for damages to Roberto Reyes aka “Amang Bisaya”, an
entertainment artist.

There are two versions of the story:

Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of Nikko Hotel was
approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him to join a
birthday party at the penthouse for the hotel’s former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart
agreed to vouch for him and carried a basket of fruits, the latter’s gift. He He lined up at the buffet table as soon as it
was ready but to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotel’s Executive Secretary, asked him to
leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by the people around them. He was asked to leave the party and a Makati
policeman accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All these time, Dr Filart ignored him adding to his shame and
humiliation.

Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner claimed by the plaintiff. Ms.
Lim approached several people including Dr. Filart’s sister, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, if Dr. Filart did invite him as the captain
waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr. Filart’s group. She wasn’t able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart
since the latter was talking over the phone and doesn’t want to interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave because
the celebrant specifically ordered that the party should be intimate consisting only of those who part of the list. She
even asked politely with the plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party.

During the plaintiff’s cross-examination, he was asked how close was Ms. Lim when she approached him at the buffet
table. Mr. Reyes answered “very close because we nearly kissed each other”. Considering the close proximity, it
was Ms. Lim’s intention to relay the request only be heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing
everybody to know what happened.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.

HELD:

Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. Plaintiff failed to
establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did all the necessary precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes
will not be humiliated in requesting him to leave the party. Considering almost 20 years of experience in the hotel
industry, Ms. Lim is experienced enough to know how to handle such matters. Hence, petitioners will not be held
liable for damages brought under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code

C. Doctirne of Vicarious Liability (Doctrine of Imputed Negligence)

I. Article 2180 of the Civil Code

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company.

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and
live in their company.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been
caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be
applicable.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed
all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)

1. Tamargo Vs. CA

FACTS:
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, a minor, shot and killed Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle. Jennifer's natural
parents filed civil complaints for damages with the RTC against Bundoc's natural parents.
In December 1981, spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto. The petition was granted in November 1982.
Adelberto's parents, in their Answer, claimed that the spouses Rapisura were indispensable parties to the action
since parental authority had shifted to them from the moment the petition for adoption was decreed. Spouses
Tamargo contended that since Adelberto was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not
ceased by mere filing and granting of the petition for adoption. Trial court dismissed the spouses Tamargo's petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the spouses Rapisura are the indispensable parties to actions committed by Adelberto.
RULING:
No. In Article 221 of the Family Code states that: "Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be
civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children 聽 living in
their company 聽 and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defences provided by law." In the case
at bar, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents at the time the shooting incident
happened. It follows that the natural parents are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

SC held that parental authority had not been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, at the
time the shooting happened. It do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of the adoption so
as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when adopting parents had no actual custody
over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may be essential if it permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in
favor of the adopted child.

II. Cuadra Vs. Monfort

Facts:

Maria Teresa Cuadra and Maria Teresa Monfort were schoolmates in Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary School in
Bacolod City. On July 9. 1962 their instructor assigned them. together with three other schoolmates. to weed the
grass in the school premises. While therefore engaged Maria Teresa Monfort found a fictile headband. an cosmetic
object normally worn by immature misss over their hair. Jokingly she said aloud that she had found an angleworm
and. obviously to scare the Cuadra miss. tossed the object at her. At that precise minute the latter turned around to
confront her friend. and the object hit her right oculus. Aching from the hurting. she rubbed the injured portion and
treated it with some pulverization. The following twenty-four hours. July 10. the oculus became conceited and it was
so that the miss related the incident to her parents. who thereupon took her to a physician for intervention. She
underwent surgical operation twice. on July 20 and August 4. 1962 severally. and stayed in the infirmary for a sum of
23 yearss. for all of which the parents spent the amount of P1. 703. 75. Despite the medical attempts. nevertheless.
Maria Teresa Cuadra wholly lost the sight of her right oculus. Maria Teresa Cuadra’s parents sued Alfonso Monfort
( Maria Teresa Monfort’s male parent ) based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Issues:

Whether or non Alfonso Monfort should be held apt under Article 2180.

Business Law
Opinion of the tribunal:

The suspect is non apt and hence can non be sued under Article 2180. This article provides that the male parent and.
in instance of his decease or incapacity. the female parent. are responsible for the amendss caused by the minor kids
who live in their company. The footing of this vicarious. although primary. liability is. as in Article 2176. mistake or
carelessness. which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or skip. The given is simply based
on the ?rst feeling ( leading facie ) and may hence be rebutted. This is the clear and logical illation that may be drawn
from the last paragraph of Article 2180. which provinces “that the duty treated of in this Article shall discontinue when
the individuals herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good male parent of a household to
forestall harm. ”

In this instance. there is nil from which it may be inferred that the suspect. Alfonso Monfort. could hold prevented the
harm by the observation of due attention. or that he was in any manner remiss in the exercising of his parental
authorization in neglecting to anticipate such harm. or the act which caused it. On the contrary. his kid was at school.
where it was his responsibility to direct her and where she was. as he had the right to anticipate her to be. under the
attention and supervising of the instructor. And every bit far as the act which caused the hurt was concerned. it was
an guiltless buffoonery non unusual among kids at drama and which no parent. nevertheless careful. would hold any
particular ground to expect much less guard against. Nor did it uncover any arch leaning. or so any trait in the child’s
character which would re?ect unfavourably on her upbringing and for which the incrimination could be attributed to
her parents.

a. Parental and Pseudo-Parental Vicarious Liability

i. AGAPITO FUELLAS, petitioner, vs. ELPIDIO CADANO, ET AL., respondents. G.R. No. L-14409
[October 31, 1961]
FACTS:
Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of defendant-appellant Agapito Fuellas, were both 13 years old and classmates
at St. Mary’s High School, Dansalan City. While Pepito was studying his lessons in the classroom, Rico took the
pencil of one Ernesto Cabanok and surreptitiously placed it inside the pocket of Pepito. When Ernesto asked Rico to
return the pencil, it was Pepito who returned the same, an act which angered Rico, who held the neck of Pepito and
pushed him to the floor. Villamira, a teacher, separated Rico and Pepito and told them to go home. Rico went ahead,
with Pepito following. When Pepito had just gone down of the schoolhouse, he was met by Rico, still in an angry
mood. Angelito Aba, a classmate, told the two to shake hands. Pepito extended his hand to Rico, but the latter
instead held the former by the neck and with his leg, placed Pepito out of balance and pushed him to the ground.
Pepito fell on his right side with his right arm under his body, whereupon, Rico rode on his left side. While Rico was in
such position, Pepito suddenly cried out “My arm is broken.” Rico then got up and went away. Pepito was helped by
others to go home. That same evening Pepito was brought to the Lanao General Hospital for treatment and the
results of the x-ray revealed that there was a complete fracture of the radius and ulna of the right forearm which
necessitated plaster casting. As a result, a civil case for damages was filed against Agapito Fuellas, father of the
minor Rico.

ISSUE:
WON Agapito Fuellas may be held liable for damages for the deliberate criminal act of his minor son.

HELD:
YES. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. This civil liability of the father or
the mother, as the case may be, is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them and
the only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Since children and wards do not yet have the capacity to govern
themselves, the law imposes upon the parents and guardians the duty of exercising special vigilance over the acts of
their children and wards in order that damages to third persons due to the ignorance, lack of foresight or discernment
of such children and wards may be avoided. If the parents and guardians fail to comply with this duty, they should
suffer the consequences of their abandonment or negligence by repairing the damage caused”.

ii. Libi vs. IAC, G.R. NO. 70890 SEPT. 18, 1992

FACTS:
Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were a sweetheart until the former broke up with the latter after she found out the
Wendell was irresponsible and sadistic. Wendell wanted reconciliation but was not granted by Julie so it prompted
him to resort to threats. One day, there were found dead from a single gunshot wound each coming from the same
gun. The parents of Julie herein private respondents filed a civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover
damages. Trial court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence but was set aside by CA.

ISSUE:
WON the parents should be held liable for such damages.

HELD:
The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed under Art 2180 of the Civil
Code and Art. 101 of Revised Penal Code covered obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.
The court held that the civil liability of the parents for quasi-delict of their minor children is primary and not subsidiary
and that responsibility shall cease when the persons can prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent damage. However, Wendell’s mother testified that her husband owns a gun which he kept in a
safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of the spouses had their own key. She likewise
admitted that during the incident, the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. Wendell could not have gotten
hold of the gun unless the key was left negligently lying around and that he has free access of the mother’s bag
where the key was kept. The spouses failed to observe and exercise the required diligence of a good father to
prevent such damage.

iii. ARTICLE 58 OF CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE

Art. 58. Torts. - Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental
authority in accordance with the Civil Code.

iv. ARTICLE 211, 218-219, 221, 236 OF FAMILY CODE

Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children.
In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as long as
the children are under parental authority.

Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall
have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or
custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school,
entity or institution. (349a)

Art. 129. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily
liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or
the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they
exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on
quasi-delicts.

Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages
caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental
authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. (2180(2)a and (4)a )
Art. 236. Emancipation for any cause shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who
shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life.

V. ARTICLE 101 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE

Article 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. - The exemption from criminal liability established in
subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code does not include exemption
from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane
person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted
without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it
appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or
if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property
exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has been prevented
shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability also attaches
to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damages have
been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner
prescribed by special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fears shall
be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always
to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution.

1. MERCADO VS CA, G.R. No. L-14342, May 30, 1960

FACTS:
A "pitogo", which figures prominently in this case, may be described as an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy
bank. On February 22, 1956, Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. quarrelled over a "pitogo". As a result,
Augusto wounded Manuel, Jr. on the right cheek with a piece of razor. ("pitogo" belonged to Augusto Mercado)
The parents of Manuel filed a complaint for damages against the herein defendant-appellee (Augustu Mercado and
his parents). CFI dismissed the complaint. CA awarded P2, 000 as moral damages but denied the prayer for atty fees.
counsel for Mercados argues that since the incident of the inflicting of the wound on respondent occurred in a
Catholic School (during recess time), through no fault of the father, petitioner herein, the teacher or head of the
school should be held responsible instead of the latter.

ISSUE:
WON the teacher or head should be held responsible? NO.

HELD:
This precise question was brought before this Court in Exconde vs. Capuno and Capuno, 101 Phil., 843, but we held,
through Mr. Justice Bautista:
We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above-quoted, "teachers or directors of arts and trades are
liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody", but this provision only
applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution (Padilla, Civil Law, 1953 Ed.,
Vol. IV, p. 841; See 12 Manresa, 4th Ed., p. 557)
The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, upon which petitioner rests his claim that the school where his
son was studying should be made liable, is as follows:
ART. 2180. . . .
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
It would be seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody," contemplates a situation where the pupil
lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the
parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the
father and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not
appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their
parents after school is over. The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply, nor does
paragraph 2 of said article, which makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children.
The claim of petitioner that responsibility should pass to the school must, therefore, be held to be without merit.

2. Palisoc v. Brillantes (G.R. No. L-29025 October 4, 1971)

FACTS:
Involved in this case were Dominador Palisoc (16 yrs old) and Virgilio Daffon ( of legal age), who were students of
Manila Technical Institute, a school of arts and trades. Sometime in March 1966, during recess, while Palisoc was
watching Virgilio Daffon and Desiderio Cruz work on a machine in their laboratory class, Daffon scolded Palisoc for
just standing around like a foreman. This caused Palisoc to slightly slap the face of Daffon and a fistfight ensued
between the two. Palisoc retreated but Daffon went after him until Palisoc stumbled, falling face down. The parents of
Palisoc sued Daffon, the school president (Teodosio Valenton), the instructor (Santiago Quibulue), and the owner
(Antonio Brillantes). The basis of the suit against Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes was Article 2180 of the Civil
Code.
The lower court, as well as the CA, ruled that only Daffon is liable for damages and that Valenton, Quibulue, and
Brillantes are not liable because under Article 2180, they are only liable “so long as they [the students] remain in their
custody.” And that this means, as per Mercado vs Court of Appeals, that teachers or heads of establishments are only
liable for the tortious acts of their students if the students are living and boarding with the teacher or other officials of
the school – which Daffon was not.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the ruling or interpretation of Art 2180 in the Mercado Case still applies.

HELD:
No. The SC abandoned the ruling in the Mercado Case as well as the ruling in the Exconde Case as they adopted
Justice JBL Reyes’ dissenting opinion in the latter case. Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of
the school must be held jointly and severally liable for the quasi-delict of Daffon.
The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the students could have been avoided, had said defendants
but complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school
premises to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties. At any rate, the
law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article
2180, Civil Code, by “(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.” In
the light of the factual findings of the lower court’s decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption from
liability.
The SC reiterated that there is nothing in the law which prescribes that a student must be living and boarding with his
teacher or in the school before heads and teachers of the school may be held liable for the tortious acts of their
students.

3. Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-47745, April 15, 1988

FACTS:
Alfredo Amadora (victim) died after being mortally hit by a gun fired by his classmate in the auditorium of Colegio de
San Jose Recoletos (CSJR). Both the victim and the offender were graduating 17-year-old students. The crime
happened 3 days before graduation ceremony. The student was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence.
Additionally, the victim’s parents filed a civil action for damages under Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code against the
school, its principal, dean, physics teacher, the offender, two other students, and their parents.
The respondent Court reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu and absolved ALL defendants on
the grounds that:
• 2180 of the New Civil Code is not applicable to CSJR because it is not a school of arts and trades but an
academic institution.
• The semester had already ended, thus the students were no longer in the custody of the school.
• There was no clear identification of the fatal gun
• The defendants exercised the necessary diligence in preventing injury.

ISSUES:
Is Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code applicable to establishments which are technically not schools of arts and trades?
– YES.
Were the students considered under the custody of the defendants at the time of the crime? – YES.
Are the defendants liable for damages under Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code? – NO.

RULING:
None of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by their students against the victim student.
RATIO:
Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code should apply to all schools, academic and non-academic.
The general rule is that all teachers shall be held liable for the acts of their students. The exception to the rule is
where the school is technical in nature, it is the head thereof who should be held responsible. There is no substantial
distinction between the academic and non-academic schools in so far as torts committed by their students are
concerned. The reasons for disparity in liability of teachers and heads are no longer material at present BUT Art.
2180 remains unchanged and must be interpreted according to its clear legislative intent until further amendment
The students are considered to be at the custody of the school authorities at the time of the crime.
Custody is not co-terminous with the semester. The student shall be considered to be in the custody of the school
authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises. As long as the
student is in school fora legitimate student purpose, legitimate exercise of student rights and privileges, the
responsibility of the school authorities continues
Custody does not connote actual and physical control, but refers more to the influence on the child and the discipline
instilled in him. Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code directly imposes liability on the teacher or the head is technical school
and not on the school itself. If any, the school may be held to answer for acts of the teachers or heads and may be
allowed to exculpate liability by proof of exercise of diligence The same provision treats parents more favorably than
teachers. Unlike parents who are only liable for children until they turn 18 years old, teachers are held answerable by
law for acts of students regardless of their age. Nevertheless, there is leniency in assessing liability of teachers
especially in cases where students involved are no longer minors
None of the defendants may be held liable for damages.
As to the principal and the dean, they only exercise general authority since they were not teachers-in-charge. The
Dean of boys could have been held liable in view of the undisputed evidence on his confiscation of an unlicensed gun
from one of the students, which he returned without any disciplinary measures. However, there’s no proof of the
identity of the gun used against the victim.
As to the Physics teacher, his absence during the time of the crime is not considered negligence because he was not
required to be in school at the time. The Teacher-in-charge of the erring student was not identified.
As to the school, it may not be held liable under Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code.
4. Salvosa v. IAC, G.R. No. 70458 [October 5, 1988]
Facts of the Case:
Baguio Colleges Foundation is an academic institution. However, it is also an institution of arts and trade because
BCF has a full-fledged technical-vocational department offering Communication, Broadcast and Teletype Technician
courses as well as Electronics Serviceman and Automotive Mechanics courses.
Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit. The Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as
its duly appointed armorer. As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his appointment from the AFP.
Not being an employee of the BCF, he also received his salary from the AFP, as well as orders from Captain
Roberto C. Ungos. Jimmy B. Abon was also a commerce student of the BCF.
On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student
of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the
BCF. As a result, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of
Homicide.
Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages, impleading Jimmy B. Abon and the BCF .

Issue:
WON BCF is subsidiarily liable.

Ruling of the Case:

Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades are liable for “damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody.” The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter
“stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis as to the student and is called upon to exercise reasonable supervision
over the conduct of the student.” Likewise, “the phrase used in [Art. 2180 — ‘so long as (the students) remain in their
custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the
pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time.” Jimmy B. Abon cannot
be considered to have been “at attendance in the school,” or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro.
Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon
for damages resulting from his acts.
5. ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GR No. 82465 February 25, 1991

FACTS:
Ferdinand Castillo, a 13-year-old freshman student of Section 1-C at the St. Francis High School (SFHS) wanted to
join a school picnic at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. However, his parents, Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Castillo,
because of short notice, did not allow him.
He was only allowed to bring food (adobo) to the teachers for the picnic. However, the teachers persuaded him to go
with them to the beach.
During the picnic, a teacher was apparently drowning. Some students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but
in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. He was brought to Mt. Cannel General Hospital but was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Ferdinand’s parents filed a case for damages against SFHS and the teachers.
The CA declared that the teachers failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family to guard against the
foreseen harm. Also, SFHS and principal Benjamin Illumin was declared jointly and solidarily liable with the teachers
for the death of Ferdinand, under Art 2180.

ISSUE:
WON the school SFHS, principal and teachers were liable for the death of Ferdinand? – NO.

HELD:
NO. petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the required diligence.
It is the rule in Art 2180 that the negligence of the employees in causing the injury or damage gives rise to a
presumption of negligence on the part of SFHS and its principal; and while this presumption is not conclusive, it may
be overthrown only by clear and convincing proof that the owner and/or manager (SFHS and principal) exercised the
care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and/or supervision of the employee or employees
causing the injury or damage (in this case, the defendants-teachers).
Art 2180, par. 4 provides:
“The obligation imposed by Art 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.”
“Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.”
SC found that CA committed an error in applying Art 2180 of the Civil Code in rendering SFHS liable for the death of
respondent's son.
SC found that the teachers are neither guilty of their own negligence nor guilty of the negligence of those under them.
Consequently they cannot be held liable for damages of any kind.
At the outset, it should be noted that respondent spouses, parents of the victim Ferdinand, allowed their son to join
the excursion. The fact that he gave money to his son to buy food for the picnic even without knowing where it will be
held, is a sign of consent for his son to join the same.
In the case at bar, the teachers were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. The incident happened
outside the school premises, not on a school day and most importantly while the teachers and students were holding
a purely private affair, a picnic. This picnic had no permit from the school head or its principal, because this picnic is
not a school-sanctioned activity or an extra-curricular activity. Mere knowledge by the principal of the planning of the
picnic by the students and teachers does not in any way show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the same.
It was shown that Connie Arquio, the class adviser of I-C, did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic.
Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez (who conducted first aid on Ferdinand) and Luisito Vinas who are both
P.E. instructors and scout masters who have knowledge in First Aid application and swimming.
Even respondents' witness, Segundo Vinas, testified that the teachers brought life savers in case of emergency.
The records also show that both petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all what is humanly possible to save the child.
Moreover, as already pointed out hereinabove, the teachers are not guilty of any fault or negligence, hence, no moral
damages can be assessed against them.
“Art. 2217. Moral Damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation,
moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.”
While it is true that Ferdinand’s parents did give their consent to their son to join the picnic, this does not mean that
the school and teachers were already relieved of their duty to observe the required diligence of a good father of a
family in ensuring the safety of the children. But in the case at bar, petitioners were able to prove that they had
exercised the required diligence. Hence, the claim for moral or exemplary damages becomes baseless.
As for Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones, the two teachers who came to the picnic late and after the drowning because
they previously conducted entrance examinations in said school, they had no participation in the alleged negligence.
Accordingly, they must be absolved from any liability.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
Other SC members dissented, saying that the teachers failed to exercise diligent supervision over the students,
including the two late teachers. Their negligent acts are the proximate cause of the death.

6. Phil. School of Business Administration v. CA G.R. No. 84698, Jan. 4, 1992

School's responsibility in loco parentis over its own students: the harm or negligent act must be committed by its
students against another student, not by an outsider
General rule on the application of quasi-delict: no pre-existing contract between the parties
FACTS:
Carlitos Bautista, a third-year commerce student of PSBA, was stabbed to death while on the second-floor premises
of the school. The assailants were not members of the schools’ academic community but were elements from outside
the school. The parents of Carlitos filed a civil action against the school authorities, alleging them negligent, reckless
and with failure to take security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim.
The appellate court found in their favor, primarily anchoring its decision on the law of quasi-delicts. Hence, the
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court was correct in deciding the case based on Article 2180 (in loco parentis)
Whether or not the application of the law on quasi-delict is proper when there is a pre-existing contract

HELD:
The SC did not agree with the premises of the CA’s ruling. Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, establishes the rule in in loco parentis. It had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the
damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held
liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the
present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of PSBA, for whose acts the school
could have been made liable.
IS PSBA EXCULPATED FROM LIABILITY?
It does not necessarily follow. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a
contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. Moreover, there
is that “built-in” obligation to provide students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary
undertaking of imparting knowledge. The school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and
order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between PSBA and Carlitos, the rules
on quasi-delict do not really govern. However, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not
relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may
break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have
constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties. Art. 21 of the
Civil Code comes to mind, so that should the act which breaches a contract be done in bad faith and violative of Art.
21, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict.
In the present case, there is no finding that the contract between the school and Carlitos had been breached thru the
former’s negligence in providing proper security measures.
7. ST. JOSEPH’S COLLEGE, SR. JOSEPHINI AMBATALI, SFIC, AND ROSALINDA TABUGO, petitioners vs.
JAYSON MIRANDA, REPRESENTED BY HIS FATHER, RODOLFO S. MIRANDA

FACTS:
November 17, 1994, 1:30PM, inside SJC’s premises, the class to which Jayson Miranda (a sixth-grader) belonged
was conducting a science experiment about fusion of sulphur powder and iron fillings under the tutelage of petitioner
Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the subject teacher and employee of SJC. The adviser of Jayson is Estefania Abdan.
Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having adequately secured it from any untoward
incident or occurrence. In the middle of the experiment, Jayson, who was the assistant leader of one of the class
groups, checked the result of the experiment by looking into the test tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was
being held by one of his group mates who moved it close and towards the eye of Jason. At that instance, the
compound in the test tube spurted out and several particles of which hit Jayson’s eye and the different parts of the
bodies of some of his group mates. As a result, thereof, Jayson’s eyes were chemically burned, particularly his left
eye, for which he had to undergo surgery and had to spend for his medication.
Upon learning of the incident and because of the need for finances, Jayson’s mother, who was working abroad, had
to rush back home for which she spent P36,070.00 for her fares, and had to forego her salary from November 23 –
December 26, 1994, in the amount of at least P40,000.00.
Jayson and his parents suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish and wounded feelings as a result of his injury due
to petitioners’ fault and failure to exercise the degree of care and diligence upon each one of them.
Jayson sent a demand letter to petitioners for the payment of his medical expenses as well as other expenses
incidental thereto, which the latter failed to heed.
On the other hand, petitioners alleged that before the science experiment was conducted, the class was given strict
instructions to follow the written procedure for the experiment and not to look into the test tube until the heated
compound had cooled off. Jayson violated such instructions.
Jayson was rushed by the school employees to the school clinic and thereafter transferred to St. Luke’s Medical
Center for treatment.
After the treatment, Jayson was pronounced ready for discharge and an eye test showed that his vision has not been
impaired or affected. In order to avoid additional hospital charges due to the delay in Jayson’s discharge, Jayson’s
father Rodolfo requested SJC to advance the amount of P26,176.35 (the hospital bill) until his wife could arrive from
abroad and pay back the money. SJC acceded to the request.
On December 6, 1994, however, the parents of Jayson wrote SJC a letter demanding that it should shoulder all the
medical expenses of Jayson that had been incurred and will be incurred further arising from the accident. SJC
refused, saying that the accident occurred by reason of Jayson’s failure to comply with the written procedure for the
experiment and his teacher’s repeated warnings. Because of this, the Mirandas filed for an action for damages
against petitioners.
RTC ruled in favor of the Mirandas, holding the petitioners jointly and solidarily liable to pay the amount of P77.338.25
as actual damages. However, Jayson is odered to reimburse SJC the amount of P26,176.36 representing the
advances given to pay the hospital expenses or to deduct said amount to the 77,338.25 by way of compensation;
P50,000 for moral damages; and P30,000 for attorney’s fees. CA affirmed in toto.

ISSUE:
WON the proximate cause of Jayson’s injury was his own act of looking at the heated test tube, hence petitioners
shouldn’t be held liable

HELD:
NO.
RTC: The immediate and proximate cause of the accident which caused injury to Jayson was the sudden and
unexpected explosion of the chemicals, independent of any intervening cause. Petitioners failed to show that the
negligence of Jayson was the proximate cause of the injury.
Petitioners could have prevented the mishap if they exercised a higher degree of care, caution and foresight. All of
the petitioners are equally at fault and are liable for negligence because all of them are responsible for exercising the
required reasonable care and prudence to prevent or avoid injuries to the students. The individual petitioners are
persons charged with the teaching and vigilance over their students as well as the supervision and ensuring their
well-being. Based on the facts presented before this Court, they were remiss in their responsibilities and lacking in
the degree of vigilance expected of them.
No evidence was presented to establish that Tabugo was inside the classroom for the whole duration of the
experiment. The Court is inclined to believe that Tabugo was NOT inside the classroom when the incident happened.
It was unnatural in the ordinary course of events that Jayson was brought to the school clinic for immediate treatment
not by Tabugo but by somebody else. Estefania Abdan is equally at fault as the subject adviser in charge because
she exercised control and supervision over Tabugo and the students themselves. It was her obligation to insure that
nothing would go wrong and that the science experiment would be conducted safely and without harm to the students.
Sr. Josephini Ambatali is likewise culpable under the doctrine of command responsibility because the other individual
petitioners were under her direct control and supervision.
It was shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the supervision of its teachers (despite an apparent rigid
screening process for hiring) and in the maintenance of what should have been a safe and secured environment for
conducting dangerous experiments. The school is still liable for the wrongful acts of the teachers and employees
because it had full information on the nature of dangerous science experiments but did not take affirmative steps to
avert damage and injury to students.
An educational institution may be held liable under the principle of RESPONDENT SUPERIOR. The liability of the
employer for the tortuous acts of negligence of its employees is primary and solidary, direct and immediate and not
conditioned upon the insolvency or prior recourse against the negligent employee.
Proximate cause was the concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent the forseeable mishap that occurred during the
conduct of the science experiment. They were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care, caution and
foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and teachers.
Article 218 of the Family Code bestows special parental authority on the following persons with the corresponding
obligation, thus:
FC 218: The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall
have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or
custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school,
entity or institution.
And as provided in Art. 2180:
Art. 2180: The obligation imposed by Art 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.
Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. Petitioners’ negligence and failure to exercise the
requisite degree of care is demonstrated by the following:
Petitioner school did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to its students, although uit had full
information on the nature of dangerous science experiments conducted by the students during class;
Petitioner school did not install safety measures to protect the students who conduct experiments in class;
Petitioner school did not provide protective gears and devices, especially goggles, to shield students from expected
risks and dangers; and
Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the classroom the whole time her class conducted the experiment, specifically when
the accident involving Jayson occurred.
The mishap which happened was forseeable by the school. This neglect in preventing a forseeable injury and
damage equates to neglect in exercising the utmost degree of diligence required of schools, its administrators and
teachers, and ultimately, was the proximate cause of the damage and injury to Jayson.
As regards the contributory negligence of Jayson, he should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must
likewise bear the consequences of his own negligence. Petitioners should be held liable only for the damages
actually caused by their negligence.
Award of actual and moral damages, and attorney’s fees affirmed.

8. AQUINAS SCHOOL vs. SPS. JOSE INTON and MA. VICTORIA S. INTON, on their behalf and on behalf of
their minor child, JOSE LUIS S. INTON, and SR. MARGARITA YAMYAMIN, OP, G.R. No. 184202, January 26,
2011

FACTS:
Respondent Jose Luis Inton was a grade 3 student at Aquinas School while Respondent Yamyamin was a religion
teacher at said school. Yamyamin caught Luis misbehaving in class twice, going over to his classmate instead of
copying what was written on the blackboard. She allegedly kicked him in the legs and shoved his head on the
classmate's seat.
The parents of Luis filed an action for damages on behalf of their son against Yamyamin and Aquinas school.
With regard to the action for damages, the Intons sought to recover actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as well
as attorneys fees, for the hurt that Jose Luis and his mother Victoria suffered. The RTC dismissed Victorias personal
claims but ruled in Jose Luis favor, holding Yamyamin liable to him for moral damages of P25,000.00, exemplary
damages of P25,000.00, and attorneys fees of P10,000.00 plus the costs of suit.
Not satisfied, the Intons elevated the case to the Court of Appeals and they asked it to increase the award of
damages and to hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin. Finding that an employer-employee relation existed
between Aquinas and Yamyamin, the CA found them solidarily liable to Jose Luis.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Aquinas is solidarily liable with Yamyamin for the damages awarded to Jose Luis Inton.

HELD:
No.
In this case, the school directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement with a congregation of sisters under which,
in order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation would send religion teachers to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its
students. Aquinas insists that it was not the school but Yamyamins religious congregation that chose her for the task
of catechizing the schools grade three students, much like the way bishops designate the catechists who would teach
religion in public schools. Under the circumstances, it was quite evident that Aquinas did not have control over
Yamyamins teaching methods. Consequently, it was error for the CA to hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.
Of course, Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps to ensure that only qualified outside catechists are
allowed to teach its young students. In this regard, it cannot be said that Aquinas took no steps to avoid the
occurrence of improper conduct towards the students by their religion teacher.
First, Yamyamins transcript of records, certificates, and diplomas showed that she was qualified to teach religion.
Second, there is no question that Aquinas ascertained that Yamyamin came from a legitimate religious congregation
of sisters and that, given her Christian training, the school had reason to assume that she would behave properly
towards the students.
Third, the school gave Yamyamin a copy of the schools Administrative Faculty Staff Manual that set the standards for
handling students. It also required her to attend a teaching orientation before she was allowed to teach beginning that
June of 1998.
Fourth, the school pre-approved the content of the course she was to teach to ensure that she was really catechizing
the students.
And fifth, the school had a program for subjecting Yamyamin to classroom evaluation. Unfortunately, since she was
new and it was just the start of the school year, Aquinas did not have sufficient opportunity to observe her methods. At
any rate, it acted promptly to relieve her of her assignment as soon as the school learned of the incident. It cannot be
said that Aquinas was guilty of outright neglect.

2. DAMAGES

a) Actual Damages
In tort law, actual damages are a type of damages which refers to compensation awarded by a court in response
to a loss suffered by a party.
The Supreme Court held in Birsdall v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. 64 (1876) that the phrases "compensatory damages"
and "actual damages" are identical.
The amount awarded is based on the proven harm, loss, or injury suffered by the plaintiff. This award does not
include punitive damages, which may be awarded when the defendant's actions are especially reckless or
malicious.
Calculating Actual Damages
In Birsdsall, the Supreme Court wrote that "the amount awarded shall be precisely commensurate with the
injury suffered, neither more nor less." When calculating damages, courts will often look at lost wages/income,
related medical bills, the cost of repairs to damaged property, the costs of materials needed to deal with the
injury (i.e. wheelchairs, prosthetic limbs, etc), and related job search expenses for a wrongful termination.
Courts may include damages for emotional distress, however some are more hesitant to include these emotional
damages.
Purpose
Actual or compensatory damages simply make good or replace the loss caused by the wrong.
Manner of Determination
Claimant must produce competent proof or the best evidence obtainable such as receipts to justify an award
therefore. Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed but must be proved with reasonable certainty.
(People v. Ereno, Feb. 22, 2000)
i. Actual Damages
Actual damages refer to the financial amount that is paid to a victim that suffered loss that can be calculated. 3
min read
Actual damages refer to the financial amount that is paid to a victim that suffered loss that can be calculated.
Actual damages are often known as real damages or, legally, as compensatory damages. These are damages that
arose from the neglect or mistake of another party.
Important Components of Actual Damages
Compensatory damages, or damages that are payable, should be measurable and can be proven. A few examples
of payable actual damages include:
• Loss of income
• Medical expenses
• Property repairs
• Business losses
• Legal fees
It can be difficult to prove actual damages in a family law case. Although some states do allow for actual
damages to be recouped when one parent is the cause of measurable loss to the other, specific proof of
documentation is required in these cases. The actual damages are only paid out if the judge deems the costs
payable by the person who is responsible for the loss. The payout amount will usually not be the requested
amount, but instead, the judge will also determine the exact amount of The actual damages occurred.
Evidence Needed for Actual Damages
Actual damages that are paid out are often easily provable. The following types of evidence are acceptable as
documentation:
• Receipts for medical care received
• Receipts of hospital visits
• Receipts of medical equipment purchased
• Receipts for equipment repairs
• Receipts for vehicle repairs
• Bills for intended repairs
• Bills for expected medical procedures
• Paycheck stubs for loss of income
• Receipts for needed in-home medical care
• Receipts for home services required due to an injury
Every damage case is unique, so it is important that the plaintiff provide the type of measurable documentation
that best supports their individual legal case. Documentation that works for one case may not be ideal for
another one.
Actual Damages for Pain and Suffering
The amount of pain and suffering incurred is also considered a payable damage. These are often known as
hedonic damages, and they include pain and suffering in terms of emotional and mental health. This amount can
be difficult to calculate in measurable terms. However, the following pieces of evidence can be used to prove
evidence of pain and suffering:
• Testimony of the plaintiff
• Testimony of the plaintiff's family and friends
• A medical physician's or therapist's testimony
Pain and suffering damages are often based on a person's difficult to adapt to everyday life after a serious injury.
Actual damages in terms of pain and suffering might also include damages paid to the plaintiff's family
members.
 • Loss of consortium: This occurs when the spouse also suffers from the injury of the plaintiff. This might
include emotional and physical intimacy, loss of assistance around the house and with childcare duties,
and a loss of emotional guidance.
• Loss of guidance and care: This occurs when children suffer from the injury or death of a parent or their
primary caregiver. This might include the emotional loss of losing the care of a parent or caregiver or the
actual parenting duties the parent can no longer perform.
ii. Compensatory
What is Compensatory Damages
Compensatory damages is money awarded to a plaintiff to compensate for damages, injury, or another incurred
loss. Compensatory damages are awarded in civil court cases where loss has occurred as a result of the
negligence or unlawful conduct of another party. To receive compensatory damages, the plaintiff has to prove
that a loss occurred, and that it was attributable to the defendant. The plaintiff must also be able to quantify the
amount of loss in the eyes of the jury or judge.
BREAKING DOWN Compensatory Damages
Compensatory damages differ from punitive damages, which may compensate over and above any loss or
damage incurred and are meant to provide an incentive against repeating the act that caused the plaintiff's loss
or damages. Cases related to compensatory and punitive damages are a major source of debate in the field of
health insurance, as proponents of tort reform claim that excessive damages above the actual loss incurred
increase the overall cost of healthcare. Compensatory damages are intended to compensate the plaintiff of a
lawsuit with enough money to cover the loss caused by the defendant. Compensatory damages can be classified
as two types: actual and general. Actual damages are intended to provide the monetary amount necessary to
replace what was lost and nothing more.
Actual compensatory damages include:
• Medical and hospital bills
• Medical treatments
• Rehabilitation expenses
• Physical therapy
• Ambulance expenses
• Medicine and Prescription drugs
• Nursing home care
• Domestic services
• Medical equipment
• Lost wages or lost employment income
• Increased living expenses
• Property replacement or repair
• Transportation
To be awarded actual compensatory damages, the plaintiff must prove that losses suffered equate to a defined
monetary value.
General compensatory damages, meanwhile, include estimates of loss not involving actual monetary
expenditure. Some courts use the "multiplier method," which calculates general damages by multiplying the
sum total of one's actual damages by a number that signifies the seriousness of injury. In other jurisdictions,
courts will use the "per diem" method, which attaches a dollar value to each day a plaintiff suffers and adds the
value of all those days together. In some cases, a court will use a hybrid of these two methods to calculate
general compensatory damages.
General compensatory damages include:
• Mental anguish
• Disfigurement
• Future medical expenses
• Future lost wages
 • Long-term physical pain and suffering
• Loss of consortium
• Inconvenience
• Loss of enjoyment of life
• Loss of opportunity
Compensatory damages are typically awarded in medical malpractice lawsuits, usually for medical bills,
hospital bills, rehabilitation expenses and compensation for lost earnings. Some compensatory damages can be
difficult to assess. For example, the value of lost wages will be much higher for a more affluent member of
society versus someone who is poor or retired.
b) Moral Damages (Article 2217)
Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's
wrongful act for omission.
Purpose
Awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusement that will alleviate the moral
suffering he has undergone, by reason of defendant’s culpable action. (Robleza v. CA, 174 SCRA 354)
Manner of Determination
No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary. The assessment is left to the discretion of the court according to the
circumstances of each case. However, there must be proof that the defendant caused physical suffering etc.
(Compania Maritima v. Allied Free Worker’s Union, G.R. No. L-31379, Aug. 29, 1988). GR: Factual basis must
be alleged. Aside from the need for the claimant to satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis of the
damages, it is also necessary to prove its causal relation to the defendant’s act (Raagas v. Trava, G.R. No.
L-20081, Feb. 27,1968; People v. Manero, G.R. Nos. 86883-85, Jan. 29, 1993).
Exception: Criminal cases. Moral damages may be awarded to the victim in criminal proceedings in such
amount as the court deems just without need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof (People v. Paredes, July
30, 1998).
c) Nominal Damages (Article 2221-2223)
Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
Art. 2222. The court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any source enumerated in
Article 1157, or in every case where any property right has been invaded.
Art. 2223. The adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude further contest upon the right involved and all
accessory questions, as between the parties to the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns.
Purpose
Vindicating or recognizing the injured party’s right to a property that has been violated or invaded. (Tan v.
Bantegui, 473 SCRA 663)
Manner of Determination
No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary. Proof that a legal right has been violated is what is only required.
Usually awarded in the absence of proof of actual damages.
Special/Ordinary
Special
NOTE: Special Damages are those which exist because of special circumstances and for which a debtor in good
faith can be held liable if he had been previously informed of such. circumstances.
d) Temperate Damages
Art. 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages,
may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not, from
the nature of the case, be provided with certainty.
Art. 2225. Temperate damages must be reasonable under the circumstances.
Temperate damages mean reasonable damages. It is usually more than nominal damages but less than
compensatory damages and may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered
but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
Purpose
When the court is convinced that there has been such a loss, the judge is empowered to calculate moderate
damages rather than let the complainant suffer without redress. (GSIS v. Labung-Deang, 365 SCRA 341)
Manner of Determination
May be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from
the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary.
Special/Ordinary
Special
NOTE: Special Damages are those which exist because of special circumstances and for which a debtor in good
faith can be held liable if he had been previously informed of such. circumstances.
e) Liquidated Damages
Art. 2226. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract, to be paid in case of breach
thereof.
Art. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if
they are iniquitous or unconscionable.
Art. 2228. When the breach of the contract committed by the defendant is not the one contemplated by the
parties in agreeing upon the liquidated damages, the law shall determine the measure of damages, and not the
stipulation.
A fixed or determined sum agreed by the parties to a contract to be payable on breach by one of the parties. If a
liquidated damages payment constitutes a penalty it will be unenforceable. The term also describes sums
expressly payable as liquidated damages under statute. In all other cases where the court quantifies or assesses
damages or loss, whether pecuniary or non-pecuniary, the damages are known as unliquidated damages.
Purpose
Liquidated damages are frequently agreed upon by the parties, either by way of penalty or in order to avoid
controversy on the amount of damages.
Manner of Determination
If intended as a penalty in obligations with a penal cause, proof of actual damages suffered by the creditor is not
necessary in order that the penalty may be demanded (Art. 1228, NCC). No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary.
Special/Ordinary
Special
NOTE: Special Damages are those which exist because of special circumstances and for which a debtor in good
faith can be held liable if he had been previously informed of such. circumstances.
f) Exemplary Damages (Article 2229)
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good,
in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from
fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.
Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
Art. 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide whether or not
they should be adjudicated.
Art. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is
entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or
not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have been agreed upon, although no
proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court
may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show
that he would be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for
liquidated damages.
Art. 2235. A stipulation whereby exemplary damages are renounced in advance shall be null and void.
Purpose
Exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrongdoings. (People v. Orilla,
422 SCRA 620)
Manner of Determination
1. That the claimant is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages; and
2. That the crime was committed with 1 or more aggravating circumstances, or the quasi--‐delict was committed
with gross negligence, or in contracts and quasi-contracts the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in
wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary.

Special/Ordinary
Special
NOTE: Special Damages are those which exist because of special circumstances and for which a debtor in good
faith can be held liable if he had been previously informed of such. circumstances.