ABSTRACT

Showing the
Pakistan history
and culture briefly.
Compiled by
Nabiha Iqbal

THE HISTORY OF
PAKISTAN
People and culture
 CONTENTS
The Indus heartland and Karakorum country........................3
People and places................................................................13
Education And gender.........................................................22
Governance And economy..................................................31
The indus valley clapton: dravidians to aryans...................35
Periods In THE subcontinent’s history...............................40
Persians, Greeks, And The Maryann...................................46
Islam and south asia: the indus and delhi sultanates...........51
Index 66

2
3
 The Indus heartland and
Karakorum country
Pakistan, once the largest and most populated Muslim country in
the world, still remains a significant actor in regional and global
affairs. Formed in 1947 from what used to be called British India,
Pakistan was idealized by south Asian Muslims to be a state where
the forces of tradition and modernity would unite, offering
economic welfare and peaceful coexistence to its inhabitants.
Achieved through a constitutional struggle led by Muhammad Ali
Jinnah (1876–1948) under the banner of the All-India Muslim
League (AIML), Pakistan was the term coined by some Muslim
students at the University of Cambridge in 1933. Inclusive of areas
like Punjab, the Frontier (identified as Afghania), Kashmir, Sindh,
and Balochistan, it was visualized as the heartland of the Indus
Valley, which has been the home of some of the oldest cultures in
this part of the subcontinent.1 Sought as a political dispensation for
various ethnic communities living across the Indus regions,
Pakistan was not only perceived as a neutral term among all these
regional identities, but was also seen as a utopia where rural, tribal,
and urban population groups would have equal opportunities and
unalienable citizenry irrespective of their religious and ideological
diversities. Although Pakistan was established as a Muslim state
(owing to Islam as the common denominator for most of the
4
inhabitants in the Indus Valley and likewise in the lower Gangetic
Bengal delta),

Jinnah and his associates were emphatic with regard to equal rights
and opportunities for all Pakistanis. Even today, despite Muslims
being an absolute majority, around 10 percent of Pakistanis belong
to various other religious traditions, although further Islamization
of the country has never been too far away from the public
discourse and the agenda of religiopolitical parties. 2 Pakistan, like
several other countries, is a pluralistic society, although Islam and
Urdu are two of its main national characteristics. From its history
to its population and from its topography to its climate, however,
the country is quite diverse. Various epochs in its history offer a
greater sense of antiquity and continuity to an otherwise young
state. Although it is defined as a recent state, Pakistan is, in fact,
the inheritor of the Indus Valley civilization, viewed as one of the
oldest continuing cultures in the world. This civilization is
reflected in Pakistan’s history through its various political,
religious, and territorial identifications. In that sense, Pakistan is
privileged to be the successor of a continuum of cultural and
historical traditions all the way from its ancient Dravidian, Aryan,
Hindu, Persian, Greek, and Buddhist past to its 13-centuries-old
Islamic heritage as bequeathed by the Arab, central Asian, and
Indian influences.

Geography: Karakorum’s to karat

Comprised of 310,000 square miles, with 16,000 square miles
covered with water, Pakistan is slightly smaller that twice the size
of California and overall about a twelfth the size of the United
States. Three times as large as Britain, it is inhabited by 160
5
million people. To its north, the People’s Republic of China shares
Pakistan’s immensely majestic and scenic Kararkorams, and the
Sino-Pakistani borders run for 330 miles through the glacial
mountains. To the west, Afghanistan neighbors Pakistan for 1,600
miles across a predominantly mountainous region extending from
the peaks of the Hindu-Kush in the north toward the borders with
Iran farther south. Demarcated by the British in the closing years
of the nineteenth century and often called the Durand Line, this
borderland retains the world’s oldest and still intact tribal heritage,
where traditional values like hospitality, resistance against alien
influences and control, and a greater devotion to one’s own family,
land, religion, and language supersede everything else. Iran,
located to the west of Pakistan, shares a 570-mile border;
Pakistan’s southern frontiers are in fact demarcated by 660 miles
of the coastline on the Arabian Sea, which brings it quite close to
the vital Straits of Hormuz in the west. Toward the east, coastal
Pakistan extends well into the marshes of Kuchh. India is
Pakistan’s only neighbor in the east; they share 1,835 miles of
borders, mostly characterized by the plains of Punjab and the
deserts of Sindh and Rajasthan. The disputed territory of Jammu
and Kashmir—equal to the size of the United Kingdom—is
wedged between China, Pakistan, and India, with all three states
controlling parts of it. Here the Line of Control (LOC), demarcated
after the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1948 and 1971, keeps these two
rivals apart, although in recent years their often tense relations
have greatly thawed, allowing some restrictive movements of
relatives and goods across the borders.
Pakistan’s location might pose serious geopolitical challenges to
its rulers, but it also accounts for its regional and extraregional
significance, allowing the country a rather larger-than-life profile
6
in foreign relations. Pakistan’s northern regions proximate it with
central Asia and the historic Silk Road; its northwestern territories
have been geographically and culturally linked with Afghanistan
and the Turkic regions farther north, which, for centuries,
fashioned the sociopolitical life in the Indian subcontinent.
Pakistan’s shared history with Iran and other west Asian regions
over the centuries played an important role in the evolution of a
unique Perso-Islamic culture, sometimes referred to as Persianate,
or the Indo-Islamic heritage. Pakistan’s multiple relations with the
Gangetic valleys and areas farther south forming the present-day
Indian Union allowed it a vanguard role in the expansion of the
Indus Valley civilization. Future waves of immigrants and invaders
played

Provinces and regions of Pakistan. Iftikhar Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistan:
Politics of Authority, Ideology, and Ethnicity, 1997, Palgrave Macmillan. Reproduced
with permission of Palgrave Macmillan. Reproduced by Bookcomp, Inc.
a crucial role in the evolution of Hinduism and the formation of
ancient Persian and Greek empires during the classical era. In the
7
same vein, the arrival of Islam, although initially only on the coast,
has been largely through the mountain passes opening into western
and central Asian regions. The arrival of Islam provided enduring
Sufi, artistic, literary, philosophical, and other influences, infusing
the subcontinent with newer and dynamic ideas and institutions.
Concurrently, it is vital to note that these Pakistani regions also
operated as the bridgeheads for south Asian influences such as
Buddhism, which then flourished into the interiors of the Asian
continent.
Pakistan’s geographical features have certainly played a pivotal
role in the historical, political, and ecological realms. Here, other
than ongoing geological changes, mountains, glaciers, rivers,
alluvial plains, deserts, and other topographical features retain their
own imprints. Pakistan has the distinction of being home to some
of the world’s tallest mountains, which are concentrated in its
northern regions. Although they serve as a lifeline for millions in
south Asia by harboring vital river and climate systems, they can
also usher frequent and even destabilizing geological events in the
forms of earthquakes, floods, landslides, and avalanches. The
large-scale deaths and devastation brought about in Pakistani
Kashmir and the adjoining regions on September 8, 2005 is proof
of the invincibility of the powerful forces of nature manifesting
themselves through ongoing tectonic movements in an area where
the Himalayas, Karakorams, and Hindu Kush converge. This
earthquake affected most of Azad Kashmir, in addition to the
neighboring districts of Pakistan in the Frontier province, with the
death toll reaching almost 100,000.4 In addition, hundreds of
thousands of people were severely injured as a result of falling
buildings and massive rockslides in busy urban centers such as
Balakot, Batrasi, Shinkiari, Muzaffarabad, Bagh, and Rawlakot.5
8
 Pakistan’s northernmost regions of Chitral, Gilgit, Hunza, Chilas,
and Baltistan are popular for trekkers and mountaineers and,
within a rather small area, offer some of the most daunting and
equally captivating scenes featuring valleys, cliffs, snowbound
peaks, and certainly some of the largest glaciers in the world.
Closer to Afghanistan lies Pakistan’s northwestern district of
Chitral, which, among other features, is known for its historic
Kalasha community living in the three adjacent valleys of the
Hindu Kush. Lying at about 5,000 feet above sea level, the district
is not too hot in summer and is snowbound during most of the
winter months. The district is accessible only through the Lowari
Pass, which is at the altitude of 10,500 feet, or via air travel. At the
other end of the district is a unique mountain peak known as
Tirichmir.6 With an altitude of 25,230 feet, this is the highest peak
in the Hindu Kush and is often covered in a thin film of clouds.
According to the local traditions, the peak, known for sudden
icefalls, is defended by fairies who welcome mountaineers with
bowls of milk or blood, stipulating happiness or grief. Farther
south one finds quite a few natural hot springs and the region
retains its own distinct ethnocultural features.
More popular than Tirichmir is Nanga Parbat situated between
the Kaghan Valley and the Indus that has attracted attention from
the mountaineers and writers, as it lies close to the flight route on
the way to Gilgit. Deriving its name from Sanskrit and meaning
“naked mountain,” this 26,660-feet peak is the loftiest amongst its
other Himalayan counterparts in Pakistan. Some of its slopes are
bare of snow or any greenery and are quite sharp and steep. Nanga
Parbat is the westernmost peak in the Himalayas and is made of
several successive ridges. No other peak within the radius of 60
miles comes close to its gigantic size. On its southern side is one of
9
the world’s greatest precipices at a drop of 16,000 feet, which is
also the starting point for Kashmir.7 To the west of Nanga Parbat
lie the valleys of Astor and Buner; the Indus, coming in from the
Karakorams, flows to its north. The area in between is
characterized by massive slopes rather than sheer precipices.8
Although the Hindu Kush and Western Himalayas retain their
higher peaks in Chitral and Kaghan, it would not be wrong to
describe Pakistan as “the Karakoram country,” given that it houses
the K-2 and several other higher peaks and large glacial systems in
its extreme northeastern region, administratively grouped as the
Federally Administered Northern Areas (FANA). Siachin, Baltoro,
Godwin-Austen, Concordia, Biafo, Kaberi, and Hispar are the
gigantic glaciers lying on this side of the K-2 and are situated in
Baltistan, which neighbors China and Indian-controlled Kashmir.
These glaciers source several rivers such as the Shyok, Saltoro,
and Shigar, which join the Indus on its fresh entry from Tibet,
along with several lakes dotting the entire mountainous regions
that are often identified as the mythical Shangri La, or Little
Tibet.9 K-2 reaches an altitude of 28,253 feet and is often viewed
as the highest mountain in the world. Compared to Mount Everest,
it is quite formidable. It was first successfully climbed in 1954 and
is visible only from certain points in the region owing to its
distance and to the fact that it is surrounded by some of the world’s
tallest mountains. In fact, within 15 miles around the icy Baltoro
Glacier are 10 of the world’s 30 highest peaks, which seem to be
protecting K-2 from all encroachments. Other peaks include
Gasherbrum I at an altitude of 26,470 feet, Broad Peak at 26,400
feet, and Mashebrum at 25,660 feet.
Farther west and adjacent to Baltistan lie the Karakoram regions
of Gilgit and Hunza, which have become more accessible since the
10
opening of the Karakoram Highway (KKH), a road connecting
Pakistan to China. It passes through these majestic mountains and
breathtaking scenery until it reaches the Khunjerab border post at
an altitude of 15,000 feet. Here the valleys of Gilgit, Hunza, and
Nagar are watered by the Gilgit, Khunjerab, and Hunza rivers that
originate from glaciers such as Passu, Hispar, and Hoper. Among
the known peaks in and around Hunza, the Lady’s Finger,
Shimshal Cones, and Rakapohsi are quite preeminent. The
Rakaposhi is visible from many points in and around these valleys
and, in fact, the KKH itself has been built on its northernmost
reaches.10 The peak is 25,550 feet high and remains the most
photographic of all the Karakorams. It appears to be more
accessible given its location near Hunza, which is the center of
northern Pakistan’s cultural and recreational activities. From Gilgit
and Hunza, the Shandur Pass is the entry point into the
neighboring Chitral. Lying at an altitude of 12,250 feet, it is the
birthplace of the sport of polo, which is played even today with
much fanfare.
Pakistan’s Koshistan and Hazara regions, like other border
districts located in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), are
predominantly mountainous, with valleys and passes allowing
human habitation and movement. In the same way, western and
coastal regions of Balochistan and those of northern Punjab feature
low-lying mountains. Unlike the Suleiman Mountains, situated to
the west of the Indus, the Salt Range hills are the final eastern
frontier for Pothowar Plateau and give way to the great plains of
Punjab that extend all the way to Bangladesh. These plains are fed
by five rivers called the Indus River system, which itself is formed
by the mountains and glaciers discussed previously. Since the
canalization dating from the 1870s and 1880s, Punjab— the land
11
of five rivers—has been the breadbasket for the subcontinent.
Emerging through the Salt Range, the Indus at Kalabagh finally
enters the plains of Punjab; the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, and Sutlej
join its waters until the former reaches the plains of Sindh before
emptying itself into the Arabian Sea. Rivers such as the Kabul,
Swat, Chitral, Kunhar, and Kurram flow through the NWFP and
eventually merge with the Indus; but Balochistan is largely arid
and lacks any major rivers, although occasional monsoon rains
cause some flash floods in low-lying areas. Since the evolution of
canals and barrages in the early twentieth century, Sindh has
become quite fertile, although the demands for water for power
and irrigation purposes create serious friction among the four
constituent provinces of Pakistan. The distribution of scarce water
resources in the subcontinent led to Indo-Pakistani tensions soon
after independence in 1947. The complex issue was largely
resolved with the intervention by the World Bank in 1959, but as
both countries seek to generate more power and water storage for
irrigation, they have often contested the construction of newer
upstream dams and barrages.
Sindh still includes some areas in the interior and farther east that
feature sandy deserts. Closer to the sea its soil is more fertile. On
the other hand, Balochistan, which accounts for 43 percent of
Pakistan’s territory but only 5 percent of its population, shares
topography with some Iranian and Middle Eastern regions where
arid land is desert-like but without sand, consisting mostly of
pebbles, smaller hills, dunes, and bushes. The coastal areas such as
Makran, lying closer to the Arabian Sea, feature some sandy
patches that are bordered by the rising hills and plateaus, making it
ideal for sheep and goat herding. Compared to the glacial north
and tall mountains, southern Pakistan is largely arid and dry.
12
Canals, especially in Sindh, have greatly transformed land features
and potentials. Pakistan, like India and several other Asian regions,
is a tropical country where summers are long and winters are short
and tolerable, at least in the plains. Temperatures in summer can
rise to 120 degrees Farenheit (45 degrees Celsius). Cities such as
Jacobabad in Sindh and Sibi in Balochistan are usually identified
as the hottest spots on earth. Whereas hills and mountains in and
around Murree, Quetta, Hazara, Hunza, Kaghan, Baltistan,
Kashmir, Waziristan, and FANA face harsh winter months, it is
only during the nights in December and January that temperatures
may drop in the plains; however, wintry dawns and dusks are often
characterized by a thick fog that covers the entire subcontinental
plains for several hours each day. Occasional Siberian weather
systems during the winter months may bring in some extra chilly
spells as far as Balochistan. Summer lasts from late March to late
September, but it usually stays dry and hot until late June, when
rainy systems build over the Indian Ocean and are redirected by
the Himalayas as showers over Pakistan. July and August bring in
relief besides filling up the reservoirs. From September to late
November, autumn sets in before the winter takes over. Spring in
Pakistan is short-lived. It is characterized by blossoms and harvests
and, like autumn, is greatly celebrated in literature and the arts.

13
 People and places
At the time of independence, both East and West Pakistan were
predominantly rural and agrarian societies, but after the Green
Revolution—marked by increased mechanized agriculture and
high yield seeds—and industrialization centered in big cities, rural
and tribal people began to flock to the cities. After 1971, despite
the separation of its eastern wing as the new state of Bangladesh,
Pakistan experienced several new demographic trends including
the movement of labor overseas, especially to the Gulf States such
14
as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, and
Oman. In the wake of intense urbanization and as a result of
geopolitical developments in Afghanistan and Iran during the
1980s, Pakistan received millions of refugees. People could enjoy
comparatively better living standards and some improved health
facilities. As a consequence, the country’s population increased
through the 1980s and 1990s. In 1947, the present-day territories
of Pakistan had about 37 million inhabitants, including the huge
population influx in 1947 from across India. By early 2007,
Pakistan’s population was estimated at 160 million, resulting in
added pressure on land and resources. About 65 percent of these
people are young and eager to work and achieve better living
standards. Given the limited resources and opportunities, however,
they are confronted with serious roadblocks. In addition, the
country’s major expense has been on a costly defense
establishment, resulting in part because of its thorny relationship
with India and also because the country has been mostly ruled by
the military, preventing any major changes in national budgetary
allocations earmarked for the development sector. Greater demand
for better education, competition over jobs, professionalization of
urban population groups, remittances from expatriates, and a vocal
civil society have allowed greater national integration, although
ethnoregional and ideological tensions abound and often converge
with thorny regional political events. Pakistan has survived
through various chasms and crisis in its more than six decades of
recent history, and, with a vocal media and alert civic groups
seeking peace within and without, its populace might gradually
move forward to create a better welfare system.
Pakistanis are, by majority, descendants of the people who have
inhabited the Indus Basin for thousands of years. They are
15
certainly an Indo-European stock of people who interacted with
other ethnic communities such as Persians, Arabs, Afghans, and
Turks and in the process evolved a synthesized identity that
combines these pluralistic traditions. Islam has been an important
factor in the collective lives of these people for many centuries,
especially because of a long period of Muslim rule and demand for
Muslim statehood. This religious identification has strengthened
Pakistani blood relationship with the west Asian co-religionists. It
is true that many of the early ruling and religious Muslim elite
came into the northwestern subcontinent from Muslim societies to
the north and west, but their interaction with the local south Asian
families and cultures underwrote their steady assimilation into a
cooperative Indo-Muslim culture. Even though Pakistan received
about 8 to 10 million Muslim refugees from India in 1947 while
the Hindus and Sikhs left Pakistan for their new home across the
borders, these newcomers also shared a common ethnocultural
consciousness with the people already living in the young country.
Such religious and national similarities might have worked to
help Pakistanis achieve a greater sense of shared belonging, but
they still need to override existing regional and ethnic pluralities
predating the formation of the country. Although in British India,
religion came to operate as the bedrock of collective identities
(communities), as Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and others, in Pakistan
language and territory have both largely defined group-based
ethnicity. While the former East Bengalis now defined as East
Pakistanis began seeking equity with the West Pakistanis by
identifying themselves as Muslim Bengalis and eventually as
Bangladeshis, languages such as Sindhi, Balochi, and Pushtu
turned into identity markers for the respective communities living
in well-defined provinces.11 In the case of Punjab, such an ethnic
16
identification remained diluted because the province, despite its
partition in 1947, turned into the power engine of Pakistan and
opted for a larger role. For most of the Punjabis, unlike Sindhis,
Balochis, and Pushtuns, Urdu and not Punjabi had been the lingua
franca; and Pakistan, not Punjab, defined their territorial
nationalism. It is true that over the past several decades, Urdu and
English have greatly overshadowed regional languages. An
accentuated mobility within the country has allowed more
openness toward pluralism, yet a centralized government presiding
over weaker participatory institutions has not been helpful in
establishing a cohesive federalism.

Punjab
The province of Punjab, the most populated and powerful part of
the country, is certainly pluralistic given all the barometers of
regional and economic diversity. Generally known as Punjabis, its
inhabitants account for 60 percent of Pakistan’s population.
Traditionally the heart of the Indus Valley, Punjabis have been
peasants most of their history, although some became soldiers
given the location of the province as the gateway to the
subcontinent. Descending from the ancient inhabitants of these
regions, Punjabis share religious and historical associations with
the west Asians, as well as with their counterparts in the
subcontinent. Divided between rural and urban communities,
Punjabis take pride in their lands and property, and for centuries
cities such as Lahore and Multan have been political and cultural
centers in northern India. Although second to Karachi in
population, Lahore, with its numerous Mughal and British
monuments, is viewed as the cultural capital of Pakistan, and its
once famous gardens are now hemmed in by ever- increasing posh

17
and exclusive housing developments. With good universities,
publishing houses and art galleries, and the National College of
Arts—the oldest of its kind in all of south Asia—Lahore is a
peaceful, tolerant, and affluent city whose inhabitants, irrespective
of their religious traditions, are famous for festivities, fun, and
food. Multan, Ucch Sharif, Pakpattan, and Jhang are located in
western Punjab and remain known for their age-old Sufi shrines,
domed architecture, and folk traditions. Faisalabad, once a hub in
the newly developed irrigational systems, is a city of sprawling
textile factories and related industries. Sialkot, Wazirabad, and
Gujranwala are famous for sports goods, cutlery, leather, furniture,
and other manufacturing items. Jhelum, Attock, and certainly
Rawalpindi have been garrison towns situated on the open plains
lying between the Indus and Jhelum. Some of the prehistoric towns
such as Taxila, Rawat, Bhaun, Kattas, and Tillah Jogian are
located in this Pothowar Plateau, which, according to some
archaeologists, was once an ocean that dried up several millennia
back. Such an explanation is offered to understand the rock
formation of the Salt Range, which houses the Khewra Salt Mines,
the oldest and perhaps the largest of their type on earth. Other than
housing Sufi shrines, ornate mosques, and grand Mughal and
British buildings, Punjab was the birthplace of Sikhism in the
sixteenth century, and several Sikh holy places are located in
Lahore, Nankana Sahib, and Hassan Abdal.12
Being in a majority and enjoying better economic and
professional prospects, Punjabi Muslims are the least ethnic;
instead sectarian and kinship/ caste-based identities remain more
visible. Since this province was divided between India and
Pakistan in 1947, it still carries the memories and scars of the
communal violence that engulfed all the major religious
18
communities. While Hindus and Sikhs left for India, millions of
Muslims came into Punjab from eastern Punjab and wider India,
drastically changing the demography of Lahore, Gujranwala,
Faisalabad, Sahiwal, Multan, and other cities. Given a higher
degree of acceptance for pluralism in view of greater opportunities
for all, the refugees from India—both Punjabis and other Muslims
—found their new home more tolerant and even supportive. Since
the heady days of 1947, Punjab has never experienced ethnic riots
or violence of that scale, and this sustained peace has helped
Punjabis in assuming the flagship role for the country, which
creates jealousy in the other three provinces, where it is not rare to
hear complaints of a Punjabi domination.

Sindh
Sindh, the second most populous province in the country, has a
more explicit ethnoregional divide, with the Sindhi-speaking
inhabitants living mostly in the hinterland and the Urdu-speaking
inhabitants settled in cities such as Karachi, Hyderabad, and
Sukkur. The former account for 20 percent of the country’s
population and are believed to be the descendants of Dravidian
inhabitants of the ancient Indus Valley. A sizable number claim
Arab and Iranian origins. The Urdu-speaking Sindhis prefer to be
called Muhajireen13 and do not like being identified as refugees or
settlers, as these terms might trivialize the significance of their
exodus from India in 1947. Most of these Muhajireen, accounting
for 7 percent of the country’s population—were born in Pakistan,
however, whereas their forefathers came from a wide variety of
Indian regions. Other than migration, Urdu and a shared urban
demography underpin their claims for a distinct ethnicity.14 Rural
Sindhis have surely benefited from canalization and irrigation
schemes and have often felt squeezed by the arrival of Muhajireen
19
and other Pakistanis into urban areas. Karachi is Pakistan’s largest
city and its financial capital, besides operating as the only port
with its high commercial and defense profile. It remains one of the
most pluralistic cities in the country, and its growth from a small
fishing town in the 1930s to a megalopolis has occurred in the
wake of several urban and demographic challenges.
The ruins of one of the world’s oldest cities, Mohenjo Daro, are
in rural Sindh. A vast graveyard near Makli is known as an
unparalleled necropolis, containing thousands of graves and
mausoleums dating from early times and representing various past
architectural traditions. These uniquely designed graves, also
known as Chaukhandi tombs, are scattered all over the province of
Sindh and in the adjoining areas of Balochistan. Sindh is not only
the home of the ancient Indus Valley cultures, it is also known as
Babul Islam, the Gateway for Islam, as the earliest Muslim
community in the subcontinent is known to have evolved in Sindh.
Sindh, named after the Indus (Sindhu), gave the world Arabic
terms such as Hind, Hindustan and Hinduism, and its English
version, Indus, became India. All across Sindh are located the
shrines of preeminent Sufis, who, in many cases, were the known
poets and humanists of their times. The shrines of Shah Latif at
Bhit Shah and of Shahbaz Qalandar and Sachal Sarmast at Sehwan
Sharif annually attract millions of pilgrims from across Pakistan
and Afghanistan, whereas Sindhi folklore (especially in the Thar
Desert) retains its own unique place in regional traditions.

Baluchistan
Balochistan, the largest province of Pakistan, lies on the western
bank of the Indus, stretching westward and deep into the south. It
borders Afghanistan, Iran, and the Arabian Sea. Named after the
20
Baloch ethnic group, northwestern Balochistan is inhabited by
Pushtun tribes who share kinship with fellow Pushtun elsewhere.
Historic cities include Kalat, Sibi, Chaman, Khuzdar, Gwadar, and
Turbat, whereas Balochistan’s modern capital is Quetta, which was
founded during the British period. The Baloch claim to be non-
Semitic people of Indo-Persian origins, and some of them speak
Brohi, a uniquely Dravidian language, different from other
present-day Indus Valley languages that surround the Brohi-
speaking region in central Balochistan. A poor agricultural region
because of the paucity of water and fertile soil, Balochistan is
immensely rich in natural resources, and its strategic location adds
to its geopolitical significance. Pakistan’s major natural gas
reserves are concentrated in the Bugti tribal regions, often leading
to dissention over the amount and distribution of royalty given to
the tribal chiefs.
The Baloch tribes are ruled by chieftains called sardars, and over
time their hold on people seems to be withering away as more and
more Baloch migrate to Karachi and the Gulf, seeking better
economic prospects and political autonomy. With a total
population of 7 million equally divided between the Baloch and
Pushtun tribes, Balochistan accounts for almost half of Pakistan’s
territory.15

Northwest frontier
Northwestern Pakistan, largely inhabited by Pushtuns and some
other proto-Punjabi ethnic groups, is known as the NWFP. It is a
land of mountains, passes, and valleys that have ensured the
sustenance of one of the world’s oldest and well-organized tribal
systems. Other than Hindko speakers in the urban localities of
Peshawar and Abbotabad and some hilly people called Kohistanis,
21
most of its residents are Pushtuns whose tribal belt adjoining
Afghanistan is divided into seven semiautonomous agencies.
These tribal regions enjoy domestic autonomy and straddle
Pakistan-Afghan borders, whereas the Pushtuns in urban centers,
such as Peshawar, Mardan, Charsadda, Kohat, and Bannu, are less
tribalized and are prominently visible in businesses and other
professions. In addition, the former princely Pushtun states of Dir
and Swat have been redesignated as regular districts, although the
anomalous nature of these tribal agencies is often debated by a
growing demand for full integration within the country. Pushtuns
are immensely proud of their language, Pushtu, and remain quite
attached to their land, where traditional values such as hospitality
and revenge reflect preferences for tribal solidarity. After Punjabis
and urban Sindhis, urban Pushtuns are now well represented in the
country’s services. Given the mobility in recent decades, Karachi
has become the largest Pushtun city in the country, whereas the
NWFP itself accounts for only 13 percent of Pakistan’s total
population.
Farther north of Dir, on the other side of the Lowari Pass, lies
Chitral where the non-Pushtun population originates from their
Indo-Persian ancestors. Here the prehistoric communities such as
the Kalasha are identified with the ancient Greeks, who, led by
Alexander, ruled this area for some time. A former princely state,
Chitral is quite pluralistic in its religious composition; southern
regions are Sunni and the northern territories are inhabited by
Ismaili Shias, also known as the Aga Khanis because of their belief
in the constant spiritual leadership of a living imam.16
The inhabitants of FANA settled in Gilgit, Hunza, and Baltistan.
They speak several languages such as Shina and Balti and belong
to both Sunni and Shia denominations. The KKH increased trade
22
and tourism, and a greater investment in education and service
sector have opened these distant lands to a variety of influences.
Over the past two decades, The Aga Khan Support Programme has
invested considerably in education and home-based industries,
leading to almost universal empowerment and prosperity in Hunza.
Other communities in Gilgit, Skardu, and Khaplu are also trying to
establish similar institutions.

23
 EDUCATION AND GENDER
Urban Punjabis, Sindhis, and Pushtuns from settled territories
have benefited from the economic and educational improvements
in Pakistan, but the tribal sections and certain rural areas have been
left behind. Here feudal and clerical influences, often in league
with bureaucracy, prevail over local affairs. Thus the pace of
development has been rather abysmal and will continue to be
unless the regimes displace such intermediaries in their efforts to
reach out to the grassroots, as well as to women. Urdu is the
medium of instruction and official language at various levels, but
English continues to carry more status and is the cherished
medium of instruction across private schools and institutions of
higher learning. Young pupils may speak various mother tongues
at home, yet a growing use of Urdu is a familiar phenomenon even
in the farflung areas. On the contrary, urban professionals and
younger Pakistanis seek pride in speaking English. 17 Familiarity
with multiple languages is a natural response to the Pakistani
plural ethos but can be a hurdle to national cohesion. Learning
Quran and related Islamic literature in its original Arabic is not
controversial, for most Pakistanis and even the hitherto debate over
the relationship between one’s mother tongue and Urdu or between
Urdu and English have given way to a growing pragmatism.
Accordingly, more and more Pakistanis, including the ethnic and
clerical groups, have come to accept that that these languages can
coexist, although English provides the only key in moving higher
in worldly affairs.
The abundance of private English-language schools across the
country and a substantial growth in technical colleges and
multidisciplinary universities are visible phenomena. The tradition
of religious seminaries (madrassas) also persists as a parallel
24
system of private education. Although these seminaries have often
been found wanting in modern disciplines and competent faculty,
they have been able to impart basic Islamic learning, as well as
shelter many orphans and other disadvantaged groups. The
tradition of charity also enables the establishment of more
mosques, shrines, and seminaries to keep younger children off the
streets and away from drugs.18 In 1947, only 10 percent of
Pakistanis were literate, and the life expectancy was still in the
early thirties. In the early twenty-first century, the literacy rate was
somewhere in the 50 percent range, although in tribal regions of
the NWFP and Balochistan, a vast number of women remained
unschooled. Pakistan’s avowed preoccupation with security and
high defense expenditure is mostly to blame for not spending more
on education, along with the pervasive rural poverty and a land-
based feudalist system. In a class-based educational system,
schools and institutions of higher learning have their own
problems, such as low-salaried teachers and inadequate
infrastructures.19 The state-run, elitist, and mosquebased tiered
education system, despite its various benefits, offers a formidable
challenge for a society where demographically youth abound both
in numbers and aspirations. As with any other similar society,
Pakistan is challenged by globalization, and Pakistani planners are
offered incentives if they can find ways to change the nation’s
priorities. The solution lies in reformism based on urgent
initiatives.
Views about Pakistani women are often unclear or fall victim to
generalizations based on assumptions about their inherent
inequality, if not sheer inferiority. These assumptions are based on
religious strictures and maledominated socioeconomic structures.
There are serious problems of inequities and even of domestic and
25
tribal violence against women, but in a protectionist society like
Pakistan, women are not viewed as mere sexual objects. By virtue
of being mothers, wives, sisters, and daughters, they are to be
protected. To many scholars, the multiple disempowerments of
women might reflect a wider malaise by which underprivileged
sections, irrespective of their gender or ethnicity, stay vulnerable.
The demographic division of the populace into urban, rural, and
tribal categories, further criss-crossed by class-based fissures,
determines gender realities in the country. A growing middle class
may reveal greater professionalization among women and resultant
economic and social assertion if not total autonomy, but then, as in
North Atlantic regions, it could also spawn more conservative
attitudes. Pakistan may have had female prime ministers,
ministers, ambassadors, and governors, but most Pakistani women,
like their male counterparts, are preoccupied with issues of family
survival. Despite the romantic images of nonphysical love
celebrated in ballads, folk traditions, and literary compositions, a
woman is idealized both as a delicate being and a strong defender
of her honor. In addition to some cases of forced marriages, there
are periodic reports of honor killing owing to some capricious
vendetta. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, numerous
official and private watchdogs, and an alert media, along with
greater awareness and education, offer further hope for tangible
safeguards for the rights of women and minorities.20

Religion and politics of identity

Even a casual mention of Pakistan often strongly evokes images
of a Muslim country, with almost everyone believing in the
monotheistic religion of Islam and exhibiting some form of
intolerance. This may be partly true, as most of its inhabitants are
26
Muslim, but there are several million non-Muslim Pakistanis as
well. Muslims themselves include several denominational sects.
Campaigned as a predominantly Muslim country during the
closing decades of the British control of India, Pakistan certainly
has been a self-confessed Muslim state, although the perceptions
about the extent and ways of being Muslim or Islamic have varied
among sections. Other than geography and the pluralistic ethos of
the Indus Valley culture, it is Islam that continues to fashion the
perceptions and lifestyles of Pakistanis, and it is equally reflected
in official pronouncements on issues such as education, the legal
system, and foreign policy. Although many Muslims may define
Islam as more than a mere religion, they also differ on its
connection to and role vis-à-vis politics. Many of them desire to
see their polity transformed into a theocracy through an
Islamization of private and public spheres; others posit religion as
a private matter and a significant factor in collective lives. Such an
ideological polarity is not unique to Pakistan, as the pulls between
the sacred and secular are an integral part of recent human
history.21
Islam, literally meaning peace, is the belief in the unity of God
(Allah); prophethood with Muhammad (570–632 c.e.), the last
divine messenger; and the Quran as the recent most divine word to
guide the community. It shares with Christianity a belief in angels
and the Day of Judgment. In addition, a Muslim is required to
pursue Quranic teachings and the prophetic traditions while trying
to create equilibrium between this existence and the world
hereafter. Defining itself as a moderate and tolerant creed over and
above racial and ethnonational proclivities, Islam advocates a
balance between duties unto Allah and to one’s fellow beings. The
Prophet Muhammad’s role modeling through a diverse career as
27
the Messenger, husband, father, trader, general, and politician is
idealized by Muslims and may often blur distinctions between the
state and the sacred. The strong emphasis on a collective identity
built through daily and weekly congregational prayers and
pilgrimage to Makkah stipulates a greater sense of religion-based
community (Ummah), where camaraderie is idealized over and
above local, ethnic, and even national associations. Other than
these shared denominators and related practices, Muslims have
historically evolved into various sects. The Sunnis account for an
overwhelming majority, followed by Shias, who make up 10–15
percent of the total Muslim population. Despite common beliefs
and practices with their Sunni co-religionists, Shias allocate the
highest status to Ali, whereas Sunnis, despite a great respect for
Muhammad’s son-in-law, still accord respect to his other
companions.22 These two larger sects further include numerous
denominations, given the expansion of Muslim communities amid
the ever-growing interpretations of classical Islamic heritage. Most
Pakistanis are Sunnis; 20 percent are Shias. Several political
groups representing them demand Islamization or implementation
of ecclesiastic and legal laws as seen and interpreted by their
clerics. Recent developments in a predominantly Shia Iran and
overwhelmingly Sunni Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan have also
played a crucial role in accentuating divergences between Sunni
and Shia Pakistanis, although, curiously, in most cases these two
sects often exist even within the same extended family and may
not be completely hostile to each other.
Islam in Pakistan certainly has its Middle Eastern roots but
maintains a distinct subcontinental personality where local
influences appear to unite with core beliefs. Two parallel distinct
trends of scripturalism and syncretism characterize Pakistani
28
Islamic experiences and are often described as the Deobandi and
Brelvi approaches, named after two seminaries established in
British India that articulated these two schools of thought. The
former emphasizes a purist approach by shunning any
intermediaries in sacred pursuits, whereas the latter acknowledges
and even celebrates the spiritual intermediaries called Sufis or Pirs.
These Sufis or their descendants are divided into various orders
(silsilahs) and, over the centuries, have played a vanguard role in
establishing bridges with non-Muslim communities and thus
heralded the entry of Islam among the underprivileged people in
Africa and Asia. The purists are revivalists, seeking their
sustenance from the seminary of Deoband where Muslim scholars
(ulama) felt that over the successive centuries Muslims had diluted
pristine Islamic values by co-opting various alien traditions,
including seeking intercessions from spiritual mentors. These two
main revivalist strands emerged in British India when the
contemporary Muslim elite agonized over a general Muslim
decline, especially in the wake of a colonial vendetta after the
Revolt of 1857 and the disappearance of Muslim political authority
from the subcontinent.23
Along with these two trends was a third among Muslim
intelligentsia. Although asserting Muslimness, they sought a
connection with modernity instead of a back-to-roots approach.
These modernists established schools and urged Muslims to
acquire Western education, unlike some of their successors. For
such elements Islam needs to be seen as a civilization open to
positive influences from other cultures and communities.
Ideological chasms between the revivalists and reformers remain
as contentious as they were during the British era, and given the
popular recourse to Islam, it has often been difficult for secularists
29
to air their views publicly, as both the purists and syncretists
strongly adhere to Islam being the raison d’être of Pakistan.
A sizable number of Pakistanis are non-Muslim and practice
Hinduism and Christianity. There are about 6 million Hindus,
mostly in Sindh, with smaller groups in urban centers; Christians
are predominantly concentrated in Punjab, with a visible presence
in cities. Their numbers vary between 5 and 6 million, with
Catholicism and Protestantism claiming equal followings. The
Indus lands were influenced by Christianity in the early era, as St.
Thomas is reported to have visited Taxila before going south to
Goa. Like Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, and Jainism—the other three
contemporary religious traditions— Christianity disappeared when
an assimilationist Hinduism reestablished its dominance over these
regions.
Hinduism was further strengthened with the establishment of
Hindu kingdoms during the classical era until Islam made its entry
in the Indus Valley.
With the passage of time, the regions west of the Indus became
overwhelmingly Muslim; Punjab and Sindh remained quite
pluralistic despite being Muslim majority areas. The evolution of
Sikhism within central Punjab and the reemergence of Christianity
as a result of the presence of missionaries during the colonial era
further increased religious plurality in Punjab. Although most of
the Sikhs and Hindus left for India, and likewise Indian Muslims
especially from eastern Punjab sought home in Pakistan in 1947,
the Christians in Punjab did not move en masse across the new
borders. As a consequence, Christian communities in Punjab also
underwent partition, which still remains a largely under-researched
subject. Most of its Hindu citizens live in lower Pakistan, and even
30
during the stormy days of 1947 amid the world’s largest migration,
the level of communal volatility here remained low. There is a
small community of Sikhs, again mostly in Punjab, who are either
engaged in business or are attached with the Sikh holy places.
Parsis, or Zoroastrians, make up one of the world’s smallest
religious communities and have traditionally lived in
subcontinental cities such as Mumbai and Karachi. This
enterprising community is quite successful in business sectors, and
in Pakistan, except for a few well-known families in Lahore and
Gujranwala, most of them live in Karachi, although successive
migrations to the West have been diminishing their numbers.
Other than a smaller and almost invisible community of Bahais,
there are several million Ahmadis, who, despite their own
identification as a Muslim sect, were officially declared a minority
as a result of their own specific views on the finality of
prophethood. Pakistan’s parliament had passed legislation
declaring them a minority in 1974, and their leadership eventually
sought shelter in London. Mostly concentrated in central Punjab,
Ahmadi families are found in several other towns and cities and
excel both educationally and professionally.

31
 GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMY

Pakistan is a federation that consists of the four provinces of

Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, and the NWFP, along with FATA and
FANA, and is run through a three-tier administration. Azad
Kashmir is technically not a formal part of Pakistan and has its
own government headed by a president and run by a prime
minister. The latter is a small piece of land wedged between
Pakistan and the Indian-controlled Kashmir,
which was liberated by the locals around Partition and has often
contested India’s claims on Kashmir. Pakistan itself has had many
constitutions in its early years, until 1973, when a final document
was agreed on that allowed a parliamentary form of government
administered through a bicameral legislature. The upper house,
elected on the basis of parity among the federating units, consists
of 100 senators; the lower house, known as the National Assembly,
is elected for five years through an adult franchise. The party in the
parliamentary majority forms the central government and is headed
32
by a prime minister. As a result of successive amendments,
especially in recent years, the Pakistani president has now assumed
greater powers, including the dismissal of the cabinet and
parliament, which has led to a presidential form of government.
Pakistan’s second tier is anchored on four provinces that retain
their own separately elected provincial legislatures where chief
ministers and their respective cabinets form governments on the
basis of electoral majority, although here again vital powers have
been delegated to provincial governors who sit as chief executives
and are appointed by the central government in Islamabad. The
third tier of administration involves local government in villages,
towns, and counties where several powers have been devolved to
the elected councils, yet the tradition of a strong bureaucracy
remains largely sacrosanct. In the same vein, Pakistan’s judicial
system follows Western legal traditions inherited from the British,
but since the 1980s, several Sharia benches have been added at the
higher level to implement certain specific legal injunctions as
interpreted in the Islamic writings.
Pakistan’s civil service, consisting of various cadres, is selected
through a complex system of merit and positive discrimination—
called a quota system—to allow some representation to numerous
underprivileged groups. Given the centralized nature of
governance, bureaucracy at the higher levels remains quiet
powerful, although the army is the strongest pressure group, and a
small group of generals have traditionally made vital decisions on
domestic and external matters. As shall be seen in subsequent
chapters, Pakistan has periodically experienced military coups, but
the blame has been routinely pushed on to politicians for poor
administration and corruption. The army is so entrenched in the
system that the possibility of a full-fledged civilian system
33
operating on its own with full autonomy is often slim. Other than
the education system, the army employs the largest number of
Pakistanis, although many of the foot soldiers come from Punjab.
Pakistan’s free press, both in English and other national languages,
is usually vocal on the issues of governance and corruption and has
been a strong voice for civic causes. The country has several
political parties varying from national to ethnic, and religious to
sectarian, and in many cases their politics revolves around some
resourceful dynasties. As a result of administrative
authoritarianism, Pakistan’s political parties have often fallen
victim to bureaucratic high-handedness, and for a long time, three
national political leaders remained in exile in London. Benazir
Bhutto, the leader of Pakistan People’s Parity (PPP); Mian Nawaz
Sharif, the leader of a strong faction of the Muslim League (ML-
N); and Altaf Hussain of the Karachi-based Muttahida Qaumi
Movement (MQM)—an ethnic urban group—were based in
London for longer periods, as the army disallowed their return. In
addition, there were several cases pending against them in the
higher courts, which they often decried as fictitious and venomous.
Pakistani newspapers and television channels in the Diaspora
ensured the political survival of these Pakistani leaders, who were
away for unlimited time obviating the possibility of their return
unless they could strike some arrangement with the generals.
Pakistan’s economy, compared to the state of affairs at its
formation and also seen within the context of a burgeoning
population pressure, is quite impressive. In recent years, despite a
severe post-9/11 downturn, the country’s economic growth has
been among the top three or four fastest growing economies. Most
Pakistanis are agriculturalists, but urbanization has been allowing a
steady development of industries and other economic sectors such
34
as manufacturing and services, the latter being the fastest to grow.
Textiles, sports goods, surgical instruments, leather commodities,
food items, and dry fruit have been some of the notable Pakistani
exports, along with about four to five million citizens working
abroad. The export of oil, weaponry, chemicals and heavy
industries continue to underwrite trade imbalances. The foreign
exchange reserves have grown in recent times, and Pakistan has
escaped any default on its loan servicing, although the volume of
domestic and external borrowing remains quite high. The lack of
land reforms, a smaller tax base, and a burdensome
nondevelopment sector persist as serious economic challenges. For
ordinary people it is not the lack of resources but the absence of
will amid corrupt practices that prevents substantial economic
improvement of the poor, who account for one-third of the total
population. Founded on the basis of a mixed economy, despite the
nationalization of several concerns during the 1970s, Pakistan has
been pursuing privatization since the late 1990s. Remittances by
Pakistani expatriates, further streamlined since 9/11, along with
some foreign aid, have helped the economy rebound from an
earlier slowdown, although long-term structural changes and more
efficient planning within a balanced sectoral allocation might
produce tangible dividends. In addition, peace within and without
could ensure further economic uplift and optimism among the
teeming millions. For the eradication of poverty, other than the
numerous charity organizations and societal generosity, the
government would have to make specific efforts in the larger
interest. Given the untapped resources in Balochistan and FANA,
an efficiently run Pakistan can certainly accelerate its economic
growth and equitable wealth redistribution. Despite the usual
hazards of consumerism and class-based divisions, the country’s
overall preference for frugality, recourse to traditional moral
35
values especially in reference to alcohol, gambling and safe sex,
and extensive support for the

36
 THE INDUS VALLEY CLAPTON:
DRAVIDIANS TO ARYANS

The Indus River, like the Nile in Egypt, not only has been the
lifeline for Pakistan since ancient time but also denotes the name
of one of the oldest human cultures. The Indus Valley civilization
evolved in the areas fed by the mighty river and its tributaries. In
addition to signifying several prehistoric cultures, Indus, locally
known as Abasin, Sindh, and Sindhu, is the root of the words
India, Indica, Hindu, Hinduism, and Hindustan. It has symbolized
the cultural history of the entire south Asian subcontinent. The
ancient Indus Valley inhabitants, often known as Dravidians,
established their settlements many millennia before the
development of great Indian religions such as Brahmanism,
Hinduism, Jainism, and Buddhism. As their ancient hymns
suggest, these religions evolved in the Indus regions.
The Aryans, or “noble men,” ushered in a new era in the northern
subcontinent and formulated Brahmanism in its all religious,
social, and literary realms. Despite recent political- and ideology-
driven theories that the Aryans were indigenous Indians, it seems
that earlier inhabitants pioneered the Indus Valley civilization.
With a possible ability to decipher their pre-Sanskrit language,
major gaps in ancient history could be bridged, enabling a more
complete reconstruction of the Indus past. The ruins of the two
ancient cities of Harappa and Mohenjo Daro discovered in
Pakistani territory during the 1920s also continue to offer
archaeologists and historians a steady stream of information on
pre-Aryan Indus regions. Questions about the origins and sudden
37
disappearance of the ancient cultures in the Indus Valley challenge
historians, who might otherwise routinely focus on the better-
known evolution of Aryan domination and the subsequent
evolution of Brahmanism.2
Another major question concerns the land of origin of the Aryans,
whose Vedic age saw the documentation of early Hindu creed and
practices in Sanskrit that evolved in the Indus regions. Now
understood by only a few scholars, Sanskrit was a synthesis among
the ancient Indians who had recently settled in the northern
subcontinent. The Indus Valley and subsequently the Gangetic
regions became home to the Aryans and their caste-based
communities, but recent nationalist discourse has sought to define
them not as invaders and immigrants but as inherently Indian.3

What’s In A name?
Etymological controversies about terms such as India, Hindu,
Indica, Bharat, and Indus defy consensus on their origins, time
span, and spatial frontiers. One could write a whole volume on the
historical and ethnic connotations of the term Indian. In the early
modern era, exploring Europeans often identified the regions all
the way from southern Africa to China as India. Columbus and his
successors stumbled on the Native Americans who were and are
still largely identified as “Indians.”4 Like the ancient Greeks and
Persians, however, British historians and administrators pioneered
a monolithic definition of the subcontinent in reference to its
geography, territory, religions, and history. Except for the
Buddhist Emperor Ashoka (273–232 b.c.e.) and the Great Mughals
(1526–1707 c.e.), who both made multiple efforts to unify India
along with present-day Afghanistan, the subcontinent remained a
vast region of varying natural, political, and ethnographic
38
characteristics. Efforts to consolidate India certainly merit some
attention, especially when its leaders such

as Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948) and Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru

(1889–1964) continuously attempted to retain a unified India,
despite its cultural, religious, and political pluralism. The Ultra
Right Hindus, in recent decades, have gone several steps beyond
these leaders with demands to reclaim a united India all the way
from Afghanistan to Burma, but also to establish this Greater India
as Hindustan or Bharatvarsha—the land of (only) Hindus. This
notion of communalized utopianism not only spawned
intercommunity tensions, but to a great extent led to Partition in
1947 and has kept the communal cauldron boiling with dissentions
and anxieties.
Bharat is the name for ancient Hindu India that has often been
used for the post-1947 Union in textbooks. The name can be
controversial, however, as historically it lays claim on the areas
making up contemporary Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh.
Bharat was an Aryan leader, mentioned in the Vedas, whose name
is derived from Bharati, the goddess of goodness. In Rigveda,
Bharat referred to the Aryan victory in the battle of 10 kings that
took place 3,000 years ago in present-day Pakistan and resulted in
triumph for the Bharatas clan. These victorious tribesmen called
their land Bharatversha or Bharatvarta (the land of Bharat). In
contemporary, post-Dravidian literature, this region is also known
as Aryavarta—the land of Aryans. Both Bharatvarta and
Aryavarta were loosely defined in a territorial sense, but in modern
times they have been appropriated by some Indian nationalists as
synonymous with Hinduism.5 Consequently, these terms have

39
become irredentist, romanticizing the entire Aryan past and their
claims for the entire Indus Valley civilization.
In contrast, Hindustan, a Persian term also used in Turkish and
Urdu, means the land of Indus or Sindh, as well as the home of
Hindis/Hindus, making it a geographical term. Application of this
term for sheer religious purposes would exclude several non-Hindu
communities and ignore the vast and complex topography of the
subcontinent. Hind was used by the Achaemenid Persians because
of the centrality of the Indus until after the Greek invasion, when it
began to be called Indica. Indica came into currency with the
invasion of Alexander the Great, who crossed the Hindu-Kush in
May 327 b.c.e. and fought with the tribes in northern Pakistan until
he was able to cross the Indus in February 326 b.c.e. He was
welcomed by the ruler of Taxila (Takshashila) who assisted the
Greeks with troops, horses, and cattle in their march to the plains
of Punjab. After defeating King Porus by the Jhelum, Alexander
moved on beyond Lahore but decided to return home from the
eastern fringes of the Beas.
He returned to Susa, Persia, in 324 b.c.e. and died a year later in
Babylon.
Indica, according to ancient Greek historians, referred to the
entire subcontinent, and Hind began to reappear in Middle Eastern
accounts only after the decline of the Greek military presence in
southwestern Asia. The Achaemenids were Parthian-Aryans who
referred to their own country as Paras, which later yielded the
terms Faras, Parthia, or Persia.6 These Persians and their Indus
Valley contemporaries were two rival branches of the same ethnic
group. The Persians subscribed to the beliefs of Zoroastrianism;

40
the Indo-Aryans developed Brahmanism, which eventually
evolved into Hinduism.7
Borrowing from ancient Persians, the Arabs called this whole
region AlHind, a term still in use but now primarily referring only
to the northern and northwestern territories, many of which now
form Pakistan. According to these west Asians, a
Hindi/Hindustani would refer to anybody living in the
subcontinent irrespective of religion or region; thus for a long time
Hind remained a territorial rather than a religious identity. 8
Ultimately, the Greek term Indica was anglicized as India by
modern Europeans; Al-Hind and Hindustan remain prevalent in
Urdu, Persian, and Turkish even today.9

PERIODS IN THE SUBCONTINENT’S

HISTORY
Like any other complex and immensely contested historical
matter, south Asian history has precipitated several theoretical
debates. Until recently, many historians had unhesitatingly
41
accepted the division of south Asian history into ancient, medieval
and modern periods, originally attributed to the early British
chronicles of India. In the breakdown of these three overarching
phases, the Indus Valley civilization and classical Hindu period
would usually form the earliest phase combining early history with
prehistoric times. Curiously, the Dravidian past received little
attention in this category, but the Aryan and Hindu epochs,
particularly in the northern regions, monopolized a major portion
of scholarship. This long period was further subdivided into two
separate phases: the Greco-Buddhist or Indo-Greek period and the
Christian era. The Hindu empires of the early Christian period are,
accordingly, followed by regional kingdoms owing to the periodic
regionalization of the subcontinent and a series of invasions from
the north.
The medieval period begins with the establishment of Muslim
sultanates, as well as some Hindu regional empires in the south
(Deccan). Some British historians group the Mughal era with the
medieval dynasties; some view it as proto-modern. The full-
fledged inauguration of the modern era, according to this
classification of Indian history, however, ensued with the advent of
British control and specific efforts for modernization after India’s
failed rebellion against the East India Company in 1857.
According to this grand narrative of Indian history, the
contemporary era began in the twentieth century with India’s
integration into the global scheme of empires, wars, expeditions,
and economies.
The preceding categorization of Indian history is challenged by
several recent historians who refuse to accept a Eurocentric
classification of south Asia’s totally distinct and complex heritage.

42
To many of them, the emphasis on modern itself seems a self-
celebratory commendation by the Raj, which proudly

ascribed India’s administrative unity and industrial progress to

itself. The other parallel classification of Indian history divides the
entire realm into interconnected periods respectively defined as
prehistoric (Dravidian), Hindu (Aryan), Zoroastrian (Persian),
Gandhara (Greco-Buddhist), Hindu Shahis, Muslim (Delhi
Sultans, Bahimnis, and Mughals), Deccan kingdoms
(Shatavahanas, Pandyas, Cholas, Chalukyas, Vijayanagar, and
Bahmanis), British/ European (British East India Company and the
Crown), and Sikh and Nationalist (secularist and Hindu in India,
Islamic in Pakistan and Bangladesh). The main objection to this
classification is its focus on religion as the main anchor of
collective identities, assuming India to be inherently communal if
not communalist, with people owing allegiance only to their own
religious group. Such a categorization may be acceptable to
religiopolitical parties in south Asia, yet for secularists and liberal
historians this is a dangerous oversimplification of an otherwise
diverse heritage in which various communities and cultures had
fluid, even co-optive, boundaries.10 Certainly, the colonial period
and communal tensions have been the underlying factors for this
historiographical debate, which goes beyond the polarity between
the imperial and nationalist schools of Indian history. The former
credited the British with discovering and identifying a unified
India, whereas nationalists believe that a united Indian identity had
always existed in south Asian history and did not owe itself to a
modernist engineering.11 Emerging historical scholarship is diverse
and explores areas such as gender, peasants, tribes, ethnicities,
ideologies, resistance, ecology, arts, ideas, and subalterns. Such a
43
wide range of historical perspectives accounts for an expansive
debate.12

The Indus valley civilization: The Harappa Past

Long before the Aryan and the Vedic eras culminated in the
classical Hindu period, the Indus Valley had developed its own
urban culture featuring township, trade, and statecraft, although
agriculture remained the mainstay of these indigenous people,
often called Dravidians. As suggested earlier, there is scant
information concerning them or their ancestors who inhabited
these valleys several millennia before the birth of Hinduism. The
south Asian land mass had been formed around 50 million years
ago, when the Indian plate, like Australia, broke away from Africa
and began to thrust itself into the Eurasian plate. As a consequence
of this collision, the Hindu-Kush, Karakorams, and Himalayas
emerged, pushing the Indian plate farther underneath their weight
and causing frequent tremors in the adjoining territories, which
continue to occur even today. These monumental geological
changes also formed two major water systems: the Indus system,
which initially flows westward before heading south toward the
Arabian Sea, and the Gangetic system, which moves eastward
before shifting its course toward the Bay of Bengal in the south.
The Indus, or Sindhu as it was later called in Rigveda, was joined
by six other rivers in its southward journey: the Jhelum, Chenab,
Ravi, Sutlej, Beas, and Saraswati. The Sarawati dried up long ago
somewhere in Rajasthan, but not before establishing its historical
sanctimony in the Hindu epics. Around 40,000 to 12,000 years
ago, a period generally identified as the Middle Stone Age, the
erstwhile food gatherers who traversed the river valleys in India
began to settle down in smaller communities. By about 10,000
44
years ago, they had formed agricultural settlements. 13 Further
graduation to sociopolitical institutions rapidly followed, as
political authority evolved in the persons of priest-kings who
looked after the religious and temporal needs of their respective
communities. Thousands of seals excavated from the Indus Valley
display the figures of these bearded leaders often accompanied by
inscriptions still waiting to be deciphered. The period since the
evolution of agriculture is known as the ancient Indus Valley
civilization and is called the Harappa culture after one of the
historic sites in Pakistani Punjab.
Jainism And Buddhism In The genetic valley
The dualism of raja and prohit, led by Brahmans and fortified by
a segregationist caste system, reorganized Gangetic societies by
mixing politics with religion, yet did not allow sufficient space to
the lower castes, who suffered from serious discrimination. The
control of the upper castes up until present times was aided by the
diverse nature of the lower castes, which suffered from a lack of
autonomous political or religious organization. Their continued
economic dependency on the upper castes kept them confined
within the sharp caste boundaries. The rural nature of Indian
communities also worked against the lower castes, and it is only in
recent times that education, urbanization, and some politicization
have begun to ameliorate this enduring state of deprivation.
Changes have not occurred, however, without strong retaliation
from India’s upper castes.
To pacify social violence resulting from the caste system and to
establish greater human camaraderie over and above priestly
monopoly, two new spiritual movements appeared in the Gangetic
regions and soon became known as Buddhism and Jainism.
Gautma, later known as Buddha or Siddhartha, the enlightened
45
one, was a prince who left his family and luxurious life in Kapal
Vastu to find peace and self-knowledge. Buddha is believed to
have lived from 563 to 483 b.c.e. Mahawira, Buddha’s
contemporary, was born during the middle of the first millennium
of the common era in that part of the Gangetic Valley that forms
the present-day Indian state of Bihar and died around 477 b.c.e.
Both were deeply disturbed by the Brahamanical control of
mundane and ecclesiastic affairs, as well as caste-based violence,
and they revolted against contemporary norms through their own
teaching and pacifism. Jainism, pioneered by Mahavira, eventually
led to greater respect for life, which turned into a more
individualistic form of worship and connection with deities. The
preservation of life in Jainism gradually resulted in the rejection of
all professions that might claim the lives of humans, animals, or
other such beings. Thus in trying to escape sin (karma), Jains
gradually began to practice trade and business only.
Buddha, on the other hand, after finding enlightenment (Gyan) at
the age of 35, rejected the priestly control over human freedom and
both sought and preached individual ways to achieve reunion with
the soul. He urged recourse to three truths: that the individual life
was a sad experience but transient (anicca) and lacking in
spirituality (anatta); that human suffering (dukhha) owed to the
cycle of transmigration, and the ignorance of this truth led to the
desire to live (avidya); and that all this malaise can be broken by
nirvana, sought through character, awareness, speech, struggle,
livelihood, aspiration, and meditation. Disciples were tutored to
adhere to group-based (sangha) efforts, and greed and temptation
were to be shunned by living in monasteries and not seeking
power. Unlike Brahmans, disciples would accept whatever the
community offered them without striving for office. Like Buddha
46
himself, a disciple carried a begging bowl to highlight humility
and otherworldliness, not to promote a parasitic existence.
Jainism, despite challenging several Brahmanical practices,
remained a minority creed and usually avoided missionary efforts.
It maintained its own distinct identity without being reabsorbed by
a revitalized Hinduism or Buddhism and even today is followed by
a small community living across the West Indian regions.
Buddhism, on the other hand, was viewed as a serious threat,
especially when the Maurya emperor, Ashoka (273–232 b.c.e.),
accepted Buddhism and tried to popularize it across the
subcontinent, Sri Lanka, and central Asia. A reformed Hinduism,
however, which strengthened during the reigns of the later
Mauryan and Gupta kings, staged a strong comeback. Buddhism,
despite the tolerance shown by King Harsha in the seventh century
c.e., almost vanished from India until the 1950s, when several
Dalits, led by Bhimrao Ambedkar, converted to Buddhism.

PERSIANS, GREEKS, AND THE MARYANN

In addition to the religious divisions across the subcontinent over

the six centuries preceding the Christian era, political
regionalization was another enduring feature, with different
dynasties controlling various regions of India. The Indus
territories, however, despite their early Vedic cultural influences,
were largely ruled by the west Asian dynasties. Here,
Zoroastrianism had begun to be established, especially in those
areas ruled by the Achaemenids, until the invasion by Alexander
when Greek traditions began to mingle with west Asian mores.
47
The influence of the Greeks was then followed by a resurgence of
Buddhist influences. As mentioned earlier, Cyrus the Great of
Persia (558–530 b.c.e.) crossed the Hindu Kush after conquering
Kabul and received tributes from the rulers of Gandhara, a region
located in what is now northern Pakistan whose capital at Taxila
stood quite close to Pakistan’s new capital of Islamabad. This area
was comfortably prosperous because of its location along major
trade routes connecting with the Silk Road, but it was equally
vulnerable to several intermittent invasions by the central and west
Asian tribes. Persian control of the Indus territories was challenged
by Alexander the Great who, after his defeat of Darius III in 330
b.c.e., attacked Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and then Gandhara.
Alexander next marched into northern Chitral and fought a high-
altitude battle in Swat before reaching Taxila to initiate his journey
across the Salt Range into the plains of Punjab.26
Alexander built cities and temples all across his empire and
fought a memorable battle by the Jhelum River where Raja Porus,
a tributary of Persepolis, put up a formidable resistance. 27 Porus
used his vast collection of elephants to fight the Greeks and their
allies, but was finally defeated near the present town of Dipalpur in
Punjab when Alexander crossed the Jelum at night to mount a
surprise attack. Porus’s elephants panicked when attacked by
Alexander’s cavaliers and snipers and, according to Greek
historians and oral traditions, stampeded their own troops. Porus,
however, was rehabilitated as a tributary, and the Greek conqueror
moved on to the Beas, the eastern fringes of the Punjab as well as
of the Persian Empire. Here his troops refused to fight the Nanda
confederacy belonging to Maghda, and Alexander decided to
return home. He would die not long after in Babylon in present-
day Iraq. Thus ethnic and religious pluralism remained the
48
hallmark only of the conquered Indus regions, whereas Deccan and
other eastern, central, and southern areas escaped foreign invasions
and saw centuries of rule by the same dynasties. Even these areas,
however, would be disrupted during the early modern era when
Vijayanagar and Bahmani kingdoms prevailed and the Europeans
appeared on the coasts (Ghats).
It was again from the central Gangetic region of Magdha that an
adventurer raja took it upon himself to displace the regional power
holders and, with the help of Kautilya, the author of Arthashastra,
established a new empire with its capital in Patna. Chandragupta,
the founder of the great Mauryan Empire, struck his fortune after
Alexander’s withdrawal, which left a power vacuum in the
northern subcontinent. The Greek successors of Alexander, the
Selucids, could not manage a huge empire, and with the capital in
distant Mesopotamia, the Indus possessions tended toward
autonomy.
It is generally held that the great Brahman luminary Kautilya,
also known as Chanakya, had been grievously insulted by
Maghda’s Nanda king and, out of revenge, aligned himself with
Chandragupta. The author of a political classic, like Machiavelli
two thousands years later, Kautilya had devised a policy of control,
conquest, and imperial management that would ensure the
longevity of a king’s rule. According to Kautilya, the imperial
authority must employ spies and build alliances with his
neighbor’s neighbors, as one’s neighbors could never be trusted.
This realistic strategic planning, anchored in a policy of alliances
and espionage, would guarantee greater territorial security and
expansion. Kautilya’s Arthashastra became a blueprint for the
dauntless Chandragupta, whose conquests would establish a

49
transregional Hindu Empire in 323 b.c.e., only two to three years
after Alexander’s departure from the Indus Valley.28
After deposing the Nanda king, Chandragupta based his capital in
Patna and used military offensives and matrimonial alliances to
expand his possessions across the subcontinent. By 305 b.c.e., he
had more than a million men in arms and felt strong enough to
challenge Selecucus I, one of Alexander’s generals, who, after the
emperor’s death, had established his own autonomous kingdom
called Parthia. Chandragupta’s troops had reached the Beas and
threatened Selecucus’s Parthian possessions in the Indus Valley.
After a limited war, the Greek king agreed to cede the Indus lands
all the way to Afghanistan to the Maurya king and also gave his
daughter in marriage to establish closer fraternity. In return,
Chandragupta offered a gift of 500 Indian elephants to the defeated
foe and restored many of his privileges to keep him pacified.
For the first time in known history, both the Indus and Gangetic
regions came under the control of a single ruler. Selecucus retained
Megasthenes, an ambassador at the Mauryan court whose notes
filtered down to subsequent generations, offering a host of
information on ancient India. The Greek ambassador was deeply
impressed by his hosts and wrote a detailed commentary, Indica.
The work was eventually lost, but many of its details found their
way into works authored by early Greek historians. According to
these narratives, Kautilya had ensured implementation of many of
his ideas in the Mauryan administration, which sought help from a
Parisad, or council of ministers, along with a civil service that
helped run the empire. The empire had two major parts, each
overseen by a viceroy; villages were administered by rural
chieftains called gopas.

50
 Around 300 b.c.e., Chandragupta, the founder of a unified Indian
Empire, retired to pursue an ascetic life and surrendered his
authority to his son, Bindusara, who pioneered the conquest of
Deccan. In addition to the Indus and Gangetic regions, the south
now also formed part of the Indian Empire, which reached even
greater heights in administration, architecture, and human
excellence under Ashoka the Great (273–232 b.c.e.). In 261 b.c.e.,
Ashoka undertook a successful campaign to conquer Kalinga
(eastern India). In capturing it, however, he witnessed hundreds of
deaths on both sides and large-scale destruction of property and
animal life. These horrors made him recant his imperial designs
and also led to his conversion to Buddhism. The emperor’s
multiple contributions in the arts and the humane administration of
his empire did not receive recognition, however, until 1837 when a
number of his inscriptions and edicts were deciphered by James
Prinsep, who was able to identify the language as Pali. Pali was
one of several derivatives from Sanskrit and was Buddha’s own
mother tongue. Ashoka used it for his edicts in Magdha in a local
script called Brahmi.
Ashoka built magnificent stupas and monasteries all across his
empire, extending from the western reaches of Afghanistan to
western Burma. His edicts espousing tolerance, kindness, and
humility were inscribed on the walls, rocks, and other public
places across this vast kingdom. The Ashokan philosophy, known
as Dhamma, advocated tolerance, humility, and honesty and, to a
great extent, offered uniform moral foundations to an extensive
empire.29 Two giant statues of Buddha were carved in Bamian in
central Afghanistan, and all across the Karakorams Buddha’s
profiles and sermons, along with Ashokan edicts, were carved at
open and visible places for all to see. Ashoka believed in peace
51
(ahimsa) and vegetarianism and appointed moralist preachers
(Bhikshus) to administer state affairs more humanely. Thus he
earned the respect of his subjects. His wheel and the lions that
adorned pillars of his buildings are now India’s national symbols,
and the monasteries and Greco-Indian statues of Buddha,
especially a fasting and meditating Buddha, have become emblems
of this classical age.

52
 ISLAM AND SOUTH ASIA: THE INDUS
AND DELHI SULTANATES
The advent of Muslim political power in south Asia resulted from
a number of factors including the absence of a strong, central
authority in the subcontinent. Islam expanded because of its
pronounced emphasis on human equality, which attracted
underprivileged groups to its fold. Establishment of Muslim
empires in the Middle East benefited from an enduring power
vacuum resulting from wars among the Greeks, Persians, and
Romans that had sapped their vitality. In the same vein, Judaism,
Christianity, and Zoroastrian could not stop Islam’s entry because
of its persistent emphasis on simplicity, anticlericalism, and the
humanness of the prophet Muhammad (570–632). Despite his
modest and disadvantaged upbringing, his personal life, both as a
messenger and a successful statesman, enthused Arab tribes
seeking to carve out their preeminence on the world map. For
generations, these tribes had been either looked down upon by
other civilizations or periodically conquered by the Romans,
Byzantines, and Persians. Taking pride in their Abrahamic
genealogy and associations with the Kaaba in Makkah, one of the
oldest worship houses in the world, underpinned the common Arab
desire for a mainstream role, which had not come their way yet,
unlike their other Semitic cousins. Thus the Prophet not only
appeared at the opportune time with a befitting message in one of
the oldest and widely cherished languages, but also symbolized a
journey from humble origins to a sublime status. His role modeling
53
toward a cherished universal profile kindled hopes and dynamism
among the peninsular Arabs, whose urban and nomadic divisions
appeared to have gradually declined to underwrite a new assertion
that historians detect among communities at the threshold of major
breakthroughs.
Islam’s political and spiritual presence in the Indus Valley since
the late seventh century gradually helped the emergence of an
enduring Muslim factor that over the subsequent centuries, became
quite pluralistic as its indigenous, Arab, African, Persian, and
central Asian strands converged to form what came to be known as
the epochal Indo-Islamic culture. With Persian as the native
language and Persian imperial structures imbibed by dynasty after
dynasty in India, including the British, there evolved a
multidimensional political, literary, and artistic tradition. Known
as Persianate, it decisively globalized the subcontinent by
integrating it with other Muslim regions, collectively known as the
Islamicate. In a powerful way, this interplay between Islam and
Indian values continued with their cultures, as both avoided
completely assimilating each other. South Asian Islam was part of
a larger Muslim tradition, but it simultaneously reflected its own
Indian embodiment in many areas, which made this interaction
complex but mostly constructive. Islam did not Islamize India, nor
did the latter overshadow Islam’s own distinct character. 1 For a
long time, similarities and competition characterized this
multicultural exchange in south Asia, unlike some other places
where one culture might come to dominate everyone else.2
The latter-day Hindu nationalists decry the Muslim Sultanate as
an inherently anti-Hindu and non-Indian Turkic trajectory, while
Pakistanis and Bangladeshi see in it the victory of Islam and the
early formation of their own separate identities. But history
54
demands a more responsible and comprehensive perspective of the
three centuries of the Delhi sultans. First chosen by Qutb-ud-Din
Aibak, a former Turkish slave of the deceased Muslim king of
Afghanistan, Delhi remained the capital of various dynasties and
kingdoms, collectively known as the Delhi Sultanate. Along with
Aibak’s own immediate successors, Delhi was the capital for 320
years of the future dynasties of Khaljis, Tughluqs, Sayyids, and
Lodhis. Despite their fondness for Agra, the Mughal emperors
preferred Delhi as their imperial capital from the inception of their
power in 1526 until 1857, when the East India Company formally
deposed the last Mughal monarch, Bahadur Shah Zafar. Thus
Delhi and other regions across the subcontinent, including present-
day northern India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, have been the
repositories of an endowed Indo-Muslim culture. Historically,
Afghanistan has been part of a larger Indus Valley heritage, but its
own pluralism and distinct cultural heritage also reflect the
country’s role as the crossroads between several cultural traditions.
Surely, Afghanistan had been the vanguard region of the Delhi
Sultanate, which owed itself to the rulers and conquerors venturing
in from the former. In 1757, it became a sovereign monarchy under
Ahmed Shah Abdali, whose Durrani Pushtun descendants have
ruled this country until recently.

Muslim Arab rule in the Indus valley

Soon after the Prophet’s death, the Muslim caliphs devoted
attention to the consolidation and expansion of the newly formed
Muslim state that was eager to make its existence and message felt
across the neighboring lands. By 644, the Medina-based Muslim
caliphate led by the second Caliph, Umar al-Farooq, had been able
to conquer Palestine, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Persia, and Yemen, along

55
with some coastal regions across the Arabian Sea. After the victory
over the Persian Sassanids, Caliph Umar had, in fact, sent some
fact-finding missions to coastal regions of Balochistan and Sindh.
These missions brought information that warned him of inclement
weather, scarce resources, and the prevalence of highwaymen. But
the total defeat in 651 of the remaining Sassanids by Caliph
Usman, the third caliph, brought Muslim troops into Indian coastal
regions in close proximity to India’s Rajput kingdoms. It was
under the Umayyads in 711–712, however, that Spain, central
Asia, and the Indus Valley were formally annexed by the
Damascus-based Muslim caliphate. The conquest of Sindh and
lower Punjab was motivated by an act of piracy on a Sri Lankan
ship bound for Basra with Muslim pilgrims and expensive goods.
The perpetrators were reputed to owe their allegiance to Raja
Dahir, the Hindu ruler of lower Sindh. Hajjaj bin Yusuf, the
governor of Mesopotamia and a man of iron will, demanded of the
Raja a punitive action against such frequent acts of piracy and not
being happy with the latter’s inaction dispatched Arab troops to
Sindh in 711 c.e. These forces were led by Muhammad bin Qasim,
the 17-year-old nephew and son-in-law of the governor, who
landed at Deebul, near Karachi, and was able to defeat Dahir in
712.3
Ibn Qasim’s victory did not end with a homeward journey; instead
it turned into a south-north conquering campaign until the Arab
general—more like his contemporary Tariq ibn Ziad in Spain—
reached Multan in Punjab. The Muslims were tolerant of the
inhabitants of the Indus Valley and, despite the former’s aversion
to idol worship, designated them as dhimmis (tax-paying citizens)
at par with Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians of west Asia who
had been defined as “people of the Book.” This was a worthy title
56
guaranteeing respect for fellow believers but would absolve them
of military service in lieu of paying a tax called jizya. Muslim
kings applied this system to non-Muslim subjects in India and
elsewhere and avoided clerical and other pressures for en masse
conversions of non-Muslims under their control. The tax money, in
a visible way, deterred Muslim rulers from forcibly converting
their subjects to Islam along with pure logical reason of not
alienating vast sections of the population within the kingdom. That
is why at places like India, Spain, or Sicily religious identity was
largely a private matter, although Muslim rule certainly added to
the hopes and status of Muslim scholars (ulama) and mystics
(Sufis). The ulama often exerted pressure on monarchs for
conversion of nonMuslims, yet the stately considerations and even
a greater element of tolerance deterred rulers from state-led
proselytization. Islam’s own emphasis on simplicity and equality
carried significant attraction for possible conversions, which
usually came from the underprivileged groups and lower castes
seeking better status under a new dispensation. Muslim rulers of
the subcontinent and their west Asian elite often married Indian
women, and these matrimonial alliances led to greater tolerance on
all sides.
The Arab conquests of the Indus Valley happened rather quickly
but were stalled owing to Ibn Qasim’s sudden recall by the new
caliph in Damascus who was not enamored of an ambitious Hajjaj
and his victorious nephew. Arab rule of these territories continued
as a low-profile affair, and most of the local population remained
peaceful because the Arab rulers, who were interested only in
establishing homes and raising families in their adopted lands,
avoided mass-based conversions and even slaughters. A stable
peace, further helped by the arrival of religious publicists and Sufis
57
through the western passes, led to considerable conversions within
the Indus societies, which were now part of a diverse and
expansive Muslim caliphate that included numerous areas across
the three continents. This new role opened up fresh commercial
and cultural opportunities for the Indus people and helped to
integrate them into one of the most forward-looking and tolerant
systems of the time.
Arab rule of the Indus Valley was followed by that of Ismailis, a
branch of Shia Islam, who, like the Fatimids in Egypt and Tunisia,
carried on the policies of their predecessors and avoided forcible
conversion. The Ismailis had been a smaller Muslim sect who
found these territories conveniently distant from Syria and Iraq, the
heartland of the Muslim caliphate. In 750, Umayyads had been
deposed by another Arab dynasty of the Abbasids who were
helped by the Persians in gaining control of the Muslim Empire.
The Abbasids built Baghdad as their capital instead of Damascus
at a time when Spain had become autonomous with its own
Umayyad caliphate. Muslim rulers in India and elsewhere would
often accept the spiritual primacy of the Abbasid caliph in
Baghdad, but they were otherwise autonomous, pursuing their own
policies until the Crusades and the Mongol invasions from the
tenth to thirteenth centuries destroyed the Arab-Persian caliphate.
It was at this juncture that the central Asian Turks began to play a
leading role in Baghdad and also pioneered efforts to establish
regional kingdoms in Persia, Anatolia, Egypt, and Afghanistan. A
new series of invasions of the northern subcontinent began in
Afghanistan and led to the establishment of the Delhi Sultanate.

58
Index

59