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AGENTS OF CHANGE YOUTH FELLOWSHIP 2023

The Cradle of Civilization is in Peril:

a closer look at the impact of Climate Change in Iraq
By Abdullah J. Alfayadh

The severity of water scarcity in Diyala, Iraq, bells. Iraq has been cited as one of the most
and in the region writ large, evokes sharp vulnerable country to climate change by the
expressions from those who study the problem. United Nations, and it is particularly affected
by ever increasing temperatures, flooding, and
“Water is as cheap as buying onion and water,”
droughts.1 All of these impacts lead to severe
observed one Iraqi water expert, amusingly
consequences such as reduced livelihoods,
recalling a local expression from 30 years ago to
climate induced migration, food insecurity, and
describe a clear problem: the cradle of civiliza-
water scarcity.
tion, the land between the two rivers, once fa-
mous for its agriculture and farming, is in peril. Multi-faceted climate change issues exacerbate
The spiraling rivers and abundance of irrigation these conditions. Communities find themselves
canals are no longer what they used to be. The stuck between challenges including the com-
crisis is here, and is not one of the future, it is a plex cross boundary water policies of neighbor-
crisis of today. ing countries, and outdated irrigation canals and
technologies. The strain on vital water resourc-
Surveying reliable primary and secondary
es inside and outside the country—spurred by
sources about this challenge should ring alarm

Middle East Environmental Change

Program and Security Program
rapid population growth, formal and informal of climate security, and its multi-disciplinary
urbanization, and significantly under-resourced impact on communities throughout Iraq, and in
and weak governance bodies2, 3—is ever pres- Diyala governorate in particular.4
ent on the mind of Iraqis.
Diyala as a Case Study
Iraq’s climate challenge is also part of a larger
regional problem. The MENA region is one of Diyala governorate is famous historically for
the most vulnerable regions in the world when its luscious pomegranate and citrus orchards.
it comes to climate stressors—and these It is located in the central-eastern part of
drivers of instability compound and exacer- Iraq, sharing its long border with a number of
bate climate fragility. In particular, the region is governorates, as well as with neighboring Iran.
impacted by high temperatures, water scarcity, The governate’s ethnoreligious composition is
and climate induced migration, all of which add a unique reflection of the nation at large: Sunni
further pressure on governmental infrastructure and Shia Arabs, Shia and Sunni Kurds, Turkman,
and services. as well as small populations of Christians and
Yazidis.
This study draws upon a wide range of ma-
terials, including a thorough literature view Administratively, Diyala is divided into six
and assessment of traditional media channels districts—with a number of them considered
and social media. Broad interactions through to be disputed between the Iraqi and Kurdistan
interviews and in other venues with local and Regional governments.5 Having experienced
international experts were especially useful in years of cycles of conflict since the Iraq-Iran
approaching the issue and impact of climate war in 1980s, Diyala has been recently (and
change in Iraq. The focus of these efforts was gravely) impacted by the larger conflict with
to survey the interaction of climate vulnerabil- ISIL, which has heavily affected rural housing,
ity and communal cohesion in particular sur- infrastructure, and most critically agricultural
rounding communities dealing with ruptured livelihoods and water resources.6 According
social ties due to cycles of recent and historical to the International Organization for Migration
conflicts. Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), 311,282
individuals were displaced from Diyala during
Multidimensional issues of competition over the conflict and 239,310 people have since
natural resources, climate induced migration, returned to their areas of origin. This represents
strained public services, and intra-state water numerous cycles of conflict and displacement
allocation drive climate vulnerability and in- since the US-led invasion in 2003, which have
stability in Iraq. There is indeed an increasing created social, economic, and financial vulnera-
consensus that climate change in the region bility and fragility susceptible to external shocks
acts as a “threat multiplier” that can exacerbate and stressors.7, 8
drivers of conflict and fragility and have negative
effects on peace and stability. This analysis will Displacement and individual experiences are
explore number of dimensions to the impact key factors contributing to vulnerability to en-
of climate change, and in particular, the issue vironmental change—including unique experi-

The Cradle of Civilization in Peril:

Page 2
A Closer Look at the Impact of Climate Change in Iraq
ences by historically marginalized populations.9 Figure 1: Map of Iraq showing Diyala15
Indeed, cycles comprised of an intersection of
IRAQ
individual/communal fragility, climate induced Diyala Governorate Reference Map 2020
vulnerability, and conflicts are ever present, Tawila Salukan Salihi Qadir Barus Khazar Rihan
45°0'0"E
Khdr Gulbakh Upper Kichan Old Rabat Koshk Upper Qala Qaymiz Maswata Kani Tu Bedan Ahmad Brna Besalmen Grd Gulbakh Kani Shekh Dalen
46°0'0"E
Bnjoy Drra Narin Jalla

Kirkuk
Matara Zardah Qunbich Raihan Penj
Shawuk Helana Qal Mirauli Anguhsti
Koshk Lower Sola Bardakar Kani Qaramani Ghulami Ka Grdal Bakrawa Khwaru Hana Nawti Hana Nawti Darga Shekhan
Mam Asha Darbaru Sewsenan Chnara
Lak Hidayat
Qircha
Mustafa Timar Azaban Wazol Mrwari Lower Khrpani
Said Najm Hoba Cham Surkhawa Tappa Masoyi Kareza Shiwbaz Takya Chnara Gomata Kalosh Mcha Kwer Jardasana Chalga Zamaqy Upper Anab Balkha Lower
Ali Mustafa Mishkiban Rabat Gara Chya Qalaga Nawtaq Gulany
Qadir Karam Arab Barde Aliawa Sedara Khrpani Jawur Sosakan Tawela
Tal Maghar Jambur Nawrozh Qara Chwar Qalwazarash Penj Angust Haji Faraj Nergzajar Darazarena Pris Lower Jalila
Goma Zard
Nariman Kelabarza Astel Upper Police
Tappa Sawz Khel Agha Ahmad Imam Qadir Hasan Kara Kani Tu Bakhtiary Tawera Palaniyan
Halabjah

Al-Sulaymaniyah
Pariawla Harmola Hazar Kani Balkha Upper Balkha Lower Dewana Banabanan Hasanawa Post
Kawala Biyaban

both in Iraq and in post-conflict communities in

Darus lower Banka Hanjira Ababaili
Prisy Upper Halabja
Kareza Dalu Bawa Khoshen Mam Qadran Birke Mamashahi Belanga Hawar
Kilishan Topkhana Tepe Sabz Hasan Darawar Upper Awa Spi Sira [2] Biyabe Dolbyan
Said Husain Abdullah Jamrez Upper Kani Betash Zalaki
Dobrraw Sarchawa Mirawli Hanjana Sur Trifa
Nasrulla Shekh Muhammad Tappa Kanush Chamrag Faqe Jina Bawa Shinirwe Hawara Dara Tfe
Yangija Nuri Jamjur Qara Birun Kula Kani Arab Lower Segomatan Tappa Qala Sulaiman Umar
Umar Qala Qala Chamarash Kani Tolabi Nawar Gunda Safan Chawg Kochak
Dalamar Kon
Said Haidar Daquq Chakraka Marf Ali Haji Tappa Spi Darzila Tawilaga Garus Gulan Upper Kani Qashti Shindirwe
Said Sanur Zarda Likaw Kawa Hanazhalla Gulan Shawkara
Jane Uzbak Mamsik Darawar Lower Kalakran Bani Sard Darbandikhan Baisa Nadr Grdi
Muhammad Qadir Drozna Gulan Lower Sazan Rishaw
Qalqanlu Big Ali Khan Bag Masoi Miran Ahmad Bag Smaqan Griana
Ali Saray Shekh Jalal Chami Rahim Drozna Chirchaqala Ulwur Police Kani Gwez
Tobzawa Bayk Zadah Masoy Mamaran Brawagal Upper Paykuli Zmnako Wulwar Sarshat Kawta
Farhad Beg Mala Omar Raz Shekh Isa Gulani Hama Post
Qalqanlu
Bagzada Koyik Tamtama Barkal Mahmud Upper Bashi Ali Boyin
little Taza Shar Shekh Hamid Masui Hama Masoy Bargach Chiya Tilakoy Pskan Zhalanaw Dangawara Warmn Tawanabal Grdanawe Sazan Kosawa
Abdullah Hori Takya Old Faraj Charmic Qalandar Darawana Gulmkawa Shakh Dara Dwen Lawaran
Faqe Mustafa Zhalanaw Zaren Bimarok Mordin Chnar Lima
Shorawa Cham Badakar Aziz Bag Hanari Hasan Parchun Tura
Arab Koy Haft Nafar Kakarash Bani Khelan Kani Zhnan Garraw Pega
Chalaw Dewana Shekh Ramazan Mamka Harmola Spisar Jar `Umar Gor Asp Awbar Mortka
Dalish

general. The residents of villages and commu-

Hamid Kani Qadir Kurdamir Qalwaza Luqman Kurdamir Quli Matkan
Aghaja Mashad Aghajan Bakr Bayf Nejala
Ali Agha Talabi Bakragara Kurdamir Faqi Husain Tazade Imam Garmk Banabi
Mansur Agha Namiq
Zarinkol Takhta Mina Takhta Mina Muhammad Tawisana Qulijan Amin Ahmad Talaban Muhmmad
Karezai
Bani Bolan
Sufi Riza Kurdamir Bestana Lower
Kani Qadir Majid Kurdamir Baram Bichuk Pungala Nawde
Tal Hama Sankur Goma Yi Talaw Karim Bassam Khan Rauf Khan Rostam Qulijan Sarhad Hama Amin Imam Muhammad Qalb Gomah
Qala Shekh Awbarik

35°0'0"N

35°0'0"N
Ramazan Khan Qulijan Lower Hardi Barda Turka Kani Gul Saraw Gma
Khidr Wali Khidr Wali Awayi Hamad Shasha Sari Rash Chamashor Darka Niska Jo Qalb
Dartu Sur Kunar Lower
Albu Najm Quli Tappa Namiq Koshk Middle Balakawi Turshka Upper Basak
Qushalan
Haidar Sur
Koshk Upper Babakr Said Bekhan Murada Qal`at Tapzah Darka Lower Taza De Glejal Said Karim
Nawjul Laki Qadir Zainal Hardi Haji Hasan Kawzay Nail
Albu Siraj Tappa Busal Para Para Kani Ubed
Omar Sofi Galalkawa
Chachan
Kushak Sarhang Binzekhil Haji Namiq Razyana Girda Rash Kela Lalikhan Lalikhan Kani Solawa Balasur Pshta
Kharabah Qala Tobzan Abdul Qadr upper Kani
Changalawa Shekh Hawwazi Qawali Alyan Big Hawara Raqa Sarkal Aziz Kalashera Spi Kuna Hanjira Horen Zhala
Albu Imam Muhammad Garmk Kozakul Middle Kalashera Lower Horen Shekhan Qal
Sarkal Mishiaw Balasu

nities displaced during the war with ISIL, for

Zagilbana Sabah [2] Darka Kaka Bra Pebaz Qaslan ?
Piramoni Khapakwer Gamakhal Khusraw Bna Baraz Rostam Trshaka Ali Yaqub Brwen
Ibrahim Big Qala Charmala Lower Lower Gulshin Gundok Topkhana Twa Wishka
Shahiwan Tappa Tappa Spi Hawara Zhalan Shamar Kani Pusha
Kushak Warani Upper Alyan Little Yarmand Maidan Dar Imam
Albu Zajji Qala [1] Charmuk little Qula Roghzayi Sarnawa Taimana Jalka Roste Bani Khan Kamtaran
Upper Pariawla
Sabah [1] Zinava Waran Middle Zindana Hazar Kani Palawshk Khalwa Mansur Alkan Wrela Papiaolla Upper Arabakan Zalcha Khr Kni
Dabaj Hulaiwa Big Yasin
Hulaiwa
Tuz Kourmato Tepe Charmuk Miri
Chawri
Little
Aziz Qadir
Qrzhala Upper Qala Rewila Little Hawara Zangaka Upper Zairin
Pariawla Tappa Sufi Shawazi Shahbazi
Shuwara
Little Zindana
Smaqa Hawara Lara Nawa Barza Zangaka Lower lower Pariawla Lower
Shawazi
Shekh Darband Belula
Salayi Jwamer Agha Tukn Qrzhala Middle Tunga Big Awa Khweri Muhammad Bakhanaran
Tappa Sawz
Tal Adha Khashamila Yanija Big Tilako Tilako Dangawara Garmk Galalkawa Daruni
Sekhran

Tooz
Tula Be Khurkhur Hasar Prdi Ali
Big Little
Legend
Zhalan Haji Muhamad
‫اﻟﻣﺻطﻠﺣﺎت‬
Palkana Khan
Taza De Robitan Tilaku Qabri Ahmadawa Khrnaw Taq Upper
Saydan Chwar Shakhan Segrdan Shatri Sofi Rahim Bani Goran
Mahmud Bag Shoraw Khurkhur
Pyazajar
[1] Zarda Khalifa Mala Kani Borka Haji Hasan
Bawanur Lower
Sarchnar Baytkul

instance, “often return after years of displace-

Chardaghli Duraji Balakai Big Kani Maran Zarin Domilan Upper Zhala Baveysi
Drozna little Qala Quchali Zardi Qadir

Khurmato
Kalawand Khala Bag Haji Qadr Sartak
Qara Cham Ali Pakan
Bir Ahmad
Bi'r Ahmad
Bustamli
Qala Belaqa Rashid
Balakai Drozna Big Mlasura Zardi Hama
Zarda Mahmud Gomazarday Bichuk
Khalubig Said Mahmud
Hajilar
Sardar
Border point ‫ﻣﻌﺑر ﺣدودي‬
Palkani Yasin Balakah Little Haji Qazi
Mahmud Puqa Twaqut Biyarash Qala Tappa Upper
Azza as Sughra Omar Bl Zalka Gori Masjid
Fattah Umar
Abbud
Pir Ahmadli Albu Hasan middle Chammas Sharaf Khan Sekhiran
Turan
Shekh Said Nazi Gawra
Kani Chaila
Upper Chama Zamawanga Rand Ali Khan
Gori Gunush Gunush Desutak
Capital ‫اﻟﻌﺎﺻﻣﺔ‬
Albu Hasan
Quru Chay Bakra Said Jazhni
Turan Shekh Shoraw
Turka Bismillah Qadir Isawi Lower Upper
(Nahrawan) Shala Pirwais Banabor
Zanjaliya Sayyid [1]
Albu Ridha
lower
Habs
Goban
Haydar Kal
Sarqala Wali Haidar Hasira Salam
Mil Qasim
Said Khidr Goban
Qara Chel Zhala Safar Qala Mala Ali Khala Jabrawa Khalifa Ahmad Governorate capital ‫ﻣرﻛز ﻣﺣﺎﻓظﺔ‬
Imam Hasan Amirli Hafriya Asda Said Khalil Chalarash
Kutabiro New Ibrahim Khan Baba Mahmud Kawa Charmu Garmk Faqe Qasim Taza Awayi
Yak Chalaw Khrpunga
Haji Ali Mustafa Agha Mcha Qula Sutaw Gorashala Major city ‫ﻣدن رﺋﯾﺳﯾﺔ‬

ment to destroyed housing, infrastructure, and

Pasha Galan Lukhum Zaki Shal Hasan Maha Kani Pamu Razwar
Kfri Nasalih
Basha Shakil [2]
Sadawa Said Khalil
Tazade Mahmud Pasha Khan Chwarklaw
Said Khalil
Para Zahab Albu Ghannam
Shadida Kakul Abdulla Qut
Saida
Khalifa
Darwesh Husen Hama Sangar
Upper Minor city ‫ﻣدن ﺻﻐرى‬
Chaft Asha Kingirban Shekh Fijla Chwarklaw
Uch Tappa Tal Hanash Smud Barlut Tannura Sada
Jamil Bag
Bardi Ali Lower
Amitli Khezir Maftul Big
Sarigul
Archan Karez hama Kaifi Sarcham
Barda Sur
Sangar Upper Tanurah Chya Surkh
Qurat Bardi
Upper Locality ‫ﺗﺟﻣﻊ ﺳﻛﺎﻧﻲ‬
Chahariz
Qala Takhtanj Maftul Little
Shetakan (Yalanchiia)
Pasha Kuzhraw Dwanza Imam Kalar Hasan Galali
Banzamin Said Mustafa Said Mustafa Ali Lower
Muwailih Tal Naqqar Debna Bngird Said Karim Upper
Thuailib Tal Sharif
Salim Aski Kfri Chama Zardaw Said Husen Said Malala Hama Karim Subhanawa Kani Sekawan
Shirina Sekawand
Sarqizl International boundary ‫ﺣدود دوﻟﯾﺔ‬
Albu Kabir Qumbat Hamzah Tal Abiad Rahim Warqa Qala Sherwana
Shamakh little Tilishan Ali Agha Ali Agha Bzainan Sar-i Qizil
Hadidi Chalaw Surk Dawra
Damir Qapu Muwailih Razuq Tlishan Qoratu
Governorate boundary ‫ﺣدود ﻣﺣﺎﻓظﺔ‬

farming assets, and with no financial reserves

Tal Ahmad Sanajira
Wali Agha

Kifri
Sandij Little Grda Gozina
Ayn Abu Akfa Sharif
Ain Shukr Qilabat
Chalaw Khalid Salim Gumar `Aziz Khan Majid Salar Qala Charni
Sarha Big Haddam Ahmad Wali Khidr Badr
Ahmad Samir Khidr Salih Agha Dawra
Abu Ghuraib Awsaja
(Karez old)
Ain Shukr
Pira Faqira Sya Mro
Shekh Khayal
Hawshkura Parwezkhan Mahmu Majid Qadir
District boundary ‫ﺣدود ﻗﺿﺎء‬
Little Zardaw Little Kokha Hasan Langar New Kirakan
Garin
Ausaja Chincha Arab Ibrahim Shilan Top Askar Qadr Markaz Hudud Hanjira Ali Mir Qajar Qal`at Charni
Abu Aliq Sherawand Tairok
Albu Talha Tiyawa
Chinchal Big `Ayn Shukr
Faqa
Gazna Qukha Lawa Shekh Langar Old
Qara Bulaq Shaykh Lankar Gakul
Agha
Markaz Shekh Husainabad Police Tangi Hamam Highway ‫طرﯾﻖ ﺳرﯾﻊ‬
Ghuzlan Gaznak Abbara Khalifa Murad Post
Kulajoi New Qarabor Jabrawa Dawud Ali Shafi Jihangir
Jarayat
Husain
Ain Faris Safsafa
Tappa Saray Kokz
Kani
Masi
Agha
Kani Husain Ismail Qalami Lower
Primary road ‫طرﯾﻖ رﺋﯾﺳﻲ‬
Tazashar Zard
Humaiyid Injana Yalanghoz Qarataq Hajilar [1] Sayyid `Ali
Sadr Muqtadir
Sunaydij Agha Tappa Ali Basanduq Dara Khurmai
Other road ‫طرﯾﻖ اﺧر‬

available to cope with or adapt to climate

Said Ahmad Said Tazade Mala Hasan
Sunadij Zarghush Kochiquragh Tapan Ali
Zang Abad `Ruwani
Zarloka Umar Mandan Gakhur Qubba Uthman Mala Hasan
Daka
Quraish Dalo
Zarkosh Juspa
Hawd Ali
Lailubin Qulaju
Qala Wahha
Abdullah Bag Awihazir Safiya Doli Bagzada Railway ‫ﺳﻛﺔ ﺣدﯾد‬
Qara Tapa

Salah
Shawkat Bag
Janbaz Muhammad Musa Muhammad Haji Ibrahim
Saritappa Iman Baba Mahmud Amara
Sawwat Kanda Sur [3]
Perennial river ‫ﻧﮭر داﺋﻣﻲ‬
Khanaqin
Sar-i-Tepe Qaratappa Sayyid `Alan
`Alwash Mustafa Pasha
Balut Faqa Marut Faqqah Hamad
Dahluj
Ballat Jahir
Qultappa
Kashkawel
Jamil
Alwash Marut Muslih Muhammad
Salih Khanaquin Lake ‫ﺑﺣﯾرة‬
Amin Habib Qala Karam

Al-Din
Said Alan Kashkawel Farhan Mekhas
Aski Kopri Rahamalla
Wadi Ibrahim Tal Manqul Mahmud `Ali Qasr Mulk Qamishlan

change.”10 Moreover, agricultural assets, irri-

Khanjaran Uch Tappa Madan Jarba
Mardan Sulaiman Bey
Sebazaw Parks ‫ﺣداﺋﻖ‬
Jjtappa
Ahmad Haq Said Qadduri Shekh Jasim Khanaqin
Safra Narin Kopri Khalat Munthiriya
Maita Ahmad al Haqq Hulwan
Shatik Agha
Kokha Shah Muhammad Kani Bi Residential area ‫ﻣﻧطﻘﺔ ﺳﻛﻧﯾﺔ‬
Mahmud Bag Muhammad
Tayish Chai Khana Buhilab Hasan Bag Ranmil
Uyun Khshilat
Elevation In Meters ‫اﻻرﺗﻔﺎﻋﺎت ﺑﺎﻟﻣﺗر‬
Bahiza Ain Yusif Habib Abdullah
Chaykhana `Ayn Laylin Yusif Agha South
Sau Kabir Jalawlah
Uzaim Qara Ghan Faisal Iyaman
Koshk
Ainul Hilal Balkhana Pika < -200 -199 - 0 1 - 200
Wadi Awsaj Nawdoman

gation canals, and farming infrastructure was

Karwi
Rashid
Abdurrahman Ibrahim Nasib Nakna
Qarfa 201 - 400 401 - 600 601 - 800
Salman Ali Saghir
Khalifa
Shudhaif Shuhaniya
Sadiya
Kani Masi-i 801 - 1000 1001 - 1200 1201 - 1400
Kani Masi Pichuk
Mafa Arab Salim Little Kani Masi [1]
Shuzayf Salum Zarkosh [1] Arab Juwamer
`Ayn Samak
Kani Masi > 1400
Mutlaq Nijris

Al-Khalis
destroyed by ISIL or in subsequent military op-
Shaikh Habib
Kurdarreh Arab Zarkosh
Siaila Habib Khizran Shekh
Habib Ibrahim Turkey
Hasan Kazim Duhok
‫دھوك‬
Umm al Jahash Mashru Abbud Dalli Abbas Mukariyin Mansuriyat
Chari al Jabal
Suwaija Zmbur Shaikh
Al Mansuriyah
Ash Shaykh Kharaib Abdur Duwailib Erbil
Tal Rahman Shekh Mubarak Ninewa ‫ارﺑﯾل‬
Shunayf Abdurrahman Saray
Abuturaba Najm Suwayd Abbas ‫ﻧﯾﻧوى‬
Huwair
Dawud Ramidi Qala Mala Khadim
Dakhil Abdullah Ismail Iss Mansuriyah Naft Khaneh Naftkhana Al-Sulaymaniyah
Ali Malih
Hawija Haji Muhammad Sarajiq
Ali
Hanshi
Sulaymani Ma`dan Khayjaran Mansuriya Shahrinaw
Chalay
Syria Kirkuk ‫اﻟﺳﻠﯾﻣﺎﻧﯾﺔ‬
‫ﻛرﻛوك‬

erations against the group, leaving households

Hasan Jasim Iran

34°0'0"N

34°0'0"N
Qawam Mala Alwan Jasim Qarya Yusuf
Balda Albu Shukr Khaylaniyah Yusif
Kazim as `Atiyat Salah Al-Din
Samail Humayrah al `Abd Imam Shaykh Hamada `Ali ash ‫ﺻﻼح اﻟدﯾن‬
Latif
Yasin Abdul Kasara Imam Ujaimi Muhammad Miqdadiya Shaykh
Qaryat Khalil Diyala
Abbas `Arab al Dhiyabah ‫دﯾﺎﻟﻰ‬
Zunbur Chiyailah Qulay`ah Sikkah Al Wajihiyah Khalifah
Sayyid `Abbas
Husayn Mahmud Abu Hassawiya Baghdad
Majidiyah Mehdi al `Abd Sati Khalifah Al-Anbar
Khamis Khan Abu Duwij ‫ﺑﻐداد‬
Sayyid Mahmud ‫اﻻﻧﺑﺎر‬
Shaykh `Abbas al Qata Al Haj `Ali Abu Saydah Jisrah Hasan Ahmad

Al-Muqdadiya
Jahiz Wassit
`Ali Bin Hasan Kerbala Babil ‫واﺳط‬
Qaryat

without access to basic access to the main

Fayyad al `Alawi Qaryat al ‫ﻛرﺑﻼء‬ ‫ﺑﺎﺑل‬
Abu Siba`
Abu Tamur Shakir Hazzal Qubbah [1] Mukhaysah Kharir Majid Hamid Husayn Fayzi
Sayyidiyah Shaykh Makatu Al-Qadissiya Maysan
As Sayyid Qaryat Zaghiniyat Sa`id [2] `Arab Abu Nuwas Bustan Saluji ‫اﻟﻘﺎدﺳﯾﺔ‬ ‫ﻣﯾﺳﺎن‬
Qaryat
Jamil Jadidah
Al Khalis al Kabir `Arab al Khadir
Tuwayr Muhammad Amin Kazim Shalash Baba Guyi Thi Qar
al `Imran Budijah Al-Najaf
Qaryat ‫ذي ﻗﺎر‬
Had Maksar Qaryat `Abd al Hamid As Sayyid As Sayyid ‫اﻟﻧﺟف‬
Muhammad Bin al Hasan Abu Nakh `Ali an `Umraniyah `Abd Allah Jasim `Ajil
Kiwan ash Ad Dariyyan Majid Mustafah Beg
Shaykh Dawrah Qusaybah Naqib
Baqir Shalabi Khalis Al-Basrah
Jamil Aswad Qaryat Zuhrah Sayfulla Al-Muthanna ‫اﻟﺑﺻرة‬
Qaryat Rakkah Qarnabiyah Mahdi al Haji Khalaf
Jayzani Unis `Ali ‫اﻟﻣﺛﻧﻰ‬
Ja`far
Aghah
Shalabi al Imam Hibhib Ahmad Majid Abu Tinah Shaykh Ali Nayir

Ba`aqubah
Yahya al

source of livelihood: agriculture.11

Qamar
Yasin Sa`id [1]
`Abdulla
Tuwayjiri
Hasan
`Ayn Baghdadi Sungar
Kumah Sang Saudi Arabia

Ku
al Ibaichi Sab`ah Qaryat al Yusuf al `Abadi
Mansuriya [1] Hudayd Qatun Huwaydir Mukhibar Kazim al `Ali Dawud Salim

wa
Husayn ash
Jasmiya `Abbas Sharrad Jisr Naft
Mahjub Mahmud ash Salman as Abas ar Rajib Mandali

it
Sa`dun Nubi Tahrah Hawasi [2]
Shuwayl Khamis
`Ayyar al `Abbas as `Abbud al `Ali
Ahmad `Ali Kazim Kir Kush Bayf Halbut
Qishlaq Ibrahim [3] Salih Sayyid Khamis al `Ali Mahmud [3] Hawasi [1]
`Ayn Naddar
Qaryat `Ali Ibrahim al Duk-hela Muradiyah
Buhriz Balad Ruz Nadib
al Ahmad Hammadi
Muhammad
Muhammad
Chawsh
Imam Abbas
Midan [2]
0 12.5 25
`Abdul Mahmud al Habib Huwaysh `Abbas Khalaf Sayyid Imam Hay
Mustafa' Dhiyab
Latif al
Faras Mahmud al At Tarmiyah Ibrahim [2] Kan`an Mahmud [2]
al Hamad Yusuf `Abd al Karim KM 1:270,000
Husayn Amiriyah `Abd al Gharibah
Mahmud al Abu Basal Husayn
Al Bawadish Muhammad Min Hal Talak Du Shaikh Lajmah
Husayn Karim Shatib
al Hassun
Jadida Al Qadhawi Ibrahim [1] `Adday Mizil al Hamid Hanash Bihjah Nasir
Muhammad Mahbubiyah Birayjil al Hasan

Baquba
Ahmad al Mahmud Sha`ab Jurani
al Jeb Mahmud Sumayr al Ghadir Sultan Finjan Musa
al Khamis
Mehdi al Muhammad Kitan [2] Khafif
Ahmad Jamil Sayyid Mansur Husayn `Alwan al Karim

In the backdrop of these cycles of conflict-in-

Muhammad Musa Agha Hasan Muhammad
Dawshan Hadi as Shir Sh`alan
Ahwiz Hasan Sultan al Barrak Imam Salih Minhal `Aziz
Fatah `Ulwan Muhammad Dawud Mukhaybir
Jarimat Khalf al Jabbar [1] Khalaf al Wadi Shaykh Baba
Khalaf al al `Abd al `Abbas Bani Sa`d Husain Salim [1] Hasan Gurzuddin
Salih al `Abd al Hasan Mahmud Ayayi Muhsin
Ja`atah Hamud as Shamir Mahmud
Rashidiya Yasin Hadi Shalahi `Awad Faz `ah Hasan al `Adi `Awad as
Dawudiyah Tall Tamdar Samir Abruk
Suwaylim

Iran
Qaduri Al Muhsin Khalaf Shahin Ghatar `Ashirat Hizam Muhammad [2]
Mahmud al al Harith
Hasan Laftah `Abd al Salman Farraj
Hamd Allah Mahmud [1] Bandar Shaykh Dawud
Jawad al Nayif La`ul Hasan `Abbud Kisarah Hassun Mahar `Ali

Baladruz
Kazim Majid `Abd Allah
Hamdan Husayn Ariz Binyan Salim
Falij ad ad Duwar Ar Rusaynm Humayyid
Dulaym Umm ash Hadi al Kahar Lihmah Shanun Muhayhay

duced vulnerabilities, Diyala is at a greater risk

Amin Khan al Bi'r Shuways Turki
Qasr `Abbas al Abu Risyan
Effendi Shams ar Mutlag al
Kazim Murshid Umm al Kuways
Sarhan Rahim Ma'mur
Basha Gharah Ghul
Sahil Haji Mahmud Tursak
Salih al Haj Salum
Khalaf Birij Dal`ah

Diyala
`Arab Yahudah Rashid
Qal`at `Abd al Nazl Salman `Abbas
Jasadi Afandi Midan [1]
Bustan `Abd
As Sulaykh Umm al `Abid Lazim al Hasan
Adhamiyah Nazal
Haj Jabir Abu `Uruq Rumah

Kadhimiyah Thawra City Hasan al `Abd ar Kharbut Muhammad [1] Insif

of drought and water shortage due to its reli-

Hamzah Rahman
Riyah
Washshash 7 Nissan Khafaji `Amil
Village Rusafa Fuzailiya Ajrab Shandrukh
Karikur
Afandi Sultan [1]
Mansour Bayt Ahmad

Karkh Qal`at
Kazim al
Karadah
Jawad Madinat Hashimah Kani Sakht
Baghdad al Rustumiya
Salm Jabbar Jadidah

Al-Mada'in
Jubur
Dora Muradiyah Midhat Mizban

ance both on lakes and on sources of tributary

Jisr `Abd al `Ali
Rasheed

Baghdad
Husayn al
Ghafus
`Ali ad
Dayyan
Nasir Khan Sayyid Ra'uf Umm ar Rawwaf
Majjasim `Uwayrij Nazl `Usfur
`Ulwi
Muhammad
Salth Hurkayjah
Bi'r Muhammad Mashali Beg
Jasim al Al Haj `Ubayd `Ali Salih Al Madaane Deh Nuk Zurbatiya Khasham
`Udwan Chalbi Muhammad
Mulla `Abud Qiyawi

rivers flowing from Iran, where water levels

Khan Azad
al Qadim Ulwan
Husayn Salih Imam Muqam
Badrah Baramadad Ta`an
al Khalf
Al`ltan `Ali `Ali Hasan Sadr `Arafat Bahramabad
Zaydan Salman Pak
Qal`at `Ali Mahmud
Hadi Bak Zinagrad Rahah
`Arab al
Sakran Dalim Karim Sayhah
Mahmudiya Simamah

Badra
Haji `Ali Imam `Ali
ash Shahim Nasir [2] Yithri
Qal`at
Tawfiq

have dropped significantly since 2020. This

Qasr ar Riyy `Abud al Munir Bak Shaffaf
Qal`at `Abhul Midakhkhat
33°0'0"N

33°0'0"N
`Abbas `Abbas at Jangah
Al Latifiyah Sad`an al Qal`at Rashid Diwaniyah
al `Amir Ti`mah
`Asi [2] Rashid ar Rawt Dawar
Qasr Hamid
az Zibar Qal`at Daftari Qal`at
Sayyid Dilif Zunbur Hawel
Jassan Muzaybilah
Salman al `Aziz al Basi
Mudallil Sad`an `Ubaydah Hamid Karmashiya
al `Asi [1] `Abbas
al Jasim Musa

Wassit
As Suwayrah Hajji Fallah
Mustafa Muhammad
Ar Rahim
Sayyid `Ulaywi Qataniyah Al Aziziya
Shaykh Mazhar Qataniyah

situation has affected agriculture and prevented Al-Suwaira

Khala'if Muhsin
Sikandariyeh Mullat al
Muhammad Makhlaf `Affan Mashkur Shoka
`Asriyah
al `Aziz
Hamid
Husayn Ghariri Qal`at Faysal
Burnuj
Sayyid Khattab
Mahawish `Abbas Finjan Hammud Shalabi
Hajji `Abbas al `Abid Hasan `Ali Hamadi
Humaytiyah Saiyid Musa
Maktuf Shamiyah

IDPs from returning,12 in addition to causing in- Babil

Ar Ghaif Kambush
Sharjan Sudhayf Muhammad Shaykh
Al Ya`qub
Mashru` Zubaydiyah `Ali al Yusuf
Bustan Anhad
Shaykh `Abbas Tawil
Ghannam Rajibiyah
Shaykh Jasim
Awlad Kazim Umm Salim

45°0'0"E 46°0'0"E

creased communal tensions between upstream The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Creation date: 05 May 2020 Feedback: [email protected] www.unocha.org/iraq www.reliefweb.int

and downstream villages.13 This water scarcity

and resultant conditions represent an adverse
trend, especially for a governorate that relies
on resources from outside its sovereign land.
Since 1974 and progressively ever since, Iraq’s
neighbors to the north and east have built more
than 30 dams, hydroelectric plants and irrigation
projects on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.
These projects have had a devastating impact
on Diyala, “which was known just 10 years ago
for its peaches, apricots, oranges, and dates. Yet
the tributaries from Iran are the only source of
water in the province, other than the dwindling
rainfall in the region.”14

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A Closer Look at the Impact of Climate Change in Iraq
Drilling Down to Causes: The water remains an issue throughout the year.19
Case for Viewing Climate Impact Diyala also faces a significant risk of drought
Through a Nexus Lens and water scarcity. As noted above, this is primar-
ily attributable to its reliance on lakes and tributary
The interplay between climate change and
rivers originating from Iran, where water levels
peace and fragility in Iraq is intricate.16 This in-
have experienced a substantial decline since
teraction also frequently intersects with a range
2020. These environmental strains pose a threat
of environmental, political, and socioeconomic
to agriculture, which historically had been the
elements. Nevertheless, there is general agree-
main source of livelihood there, and are a barrier
ment that climate change in Iraq functions as a
in the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs)
“threat multiplier,”17 intensifying the underlying
to areas of origin prior to the conflict.
causes of conflict and fragility. This escalation
leads to adverse impacts on the prospects for Fraying societal connections are one of the
peace and stability, further spurring communal pressing issues that is ever-present throughout
vulnerability and potential conflicts. the history of the governorate. Most recent-
ly, this challenge surfaced as a result of the
To understand this interplay more comprehen-
military campaigns to quell ISIL. The governor-
sively, exploring the common understanding of
ate continues to experience ethno-sectarian
climate-induced challenges in Iraq nationally, as
conflicts, as it has for two decades since the
well as the unique set of challenges in Diyala,
US and allied invasion in 2003. Attacks by ISIL
is a useful case study. The barriers to recovery
sleeper cells on farmers are a more recent
that post-conflict communities face in relation
problem. These events—and many others in the
both to resource (un)availability and competi-
recent history of Diyala—have led not only to
tion over scarce resources caused by climate
heightened sectarian tensions between Sunni
change is particularly acute and visible there.
and Shia Muslims, but also to spells of ex-
One issue that stands out prominently is dwin- treme violence and significant displacement as
dling access to water, which has been impeded recently as 2022. The rise in insurgent attacks
by crises with multiple causes, including high and takeover by ISIL of large areas of Diyala
and rising temperatures and outdated irrigation Governorate in 2013–14 also led to population
methods, amongst many others. This situation displacement, particularly in Muqdadiya, where
is further compounded by widespread damage the group held territory and approximately 40
to the water network, the absence of a sewer villages north of Muqdadiya City for several
network and insufficient water treatment infra- months.20
structure in Diyala,18 where access to potable

The Cradle of Civilization in Peril:

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A Closer Look at the Impact of Climate Change in Iraq
Figure 2: Displacement and return dynamics21

Current political and societal conditions in Diyala problem-set, so any proposals to mitigate it
are equally complex, as the Government of Iraq must also take in the full range of factors and
and the KRG, as well as a range of state, non- repercussions. The necessary multidimensional
state and foreign armed actors operate in the response therefore should encompass govern-
area. Competing interests on national, sub-na- mental policy efforts, a role for the international
tional, and external levels are key drivers of con- community, and community-level work to bol-
flict and instability. They also spill into issues of ster and support resiliency.
localized control, ranging from political spheres
In the MENA region, states, practitioners and
of influence due to the distributed nature of
the international community should view this
some of the locations, illicit activities through
issue from the perspective of the “peace-fra-
drug and weapon smuggling, or conflicts over
gility-climate change” nexus.22 All three factors
natural resources.
intersect and impact each other, often work-
Peace, Fragility and Climate Change: ing as a multiplier of fragility risks. Taking the
Surveying the Interconnections case of Iraq, issues of climate vulnerability are
at times reflected in rural-to-urban migration,
The impact of climate change, and climate causing tensions in urban centers. Disparate
security in particular, is a multidimensional groups sometimes clash over reduced access

The Cradle of Civilization in Peril:

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A Closer Look at the Impact of Climate Change in Iraq
to natural resources, while non-state armed communal peace and state legitimacy. Evident-
groups may exploit the perception of govern- ly, as seen previously through multitude of re-
ment inaction to enhance their legitimacy. cent conflicts, these challenges transcend and
These factors collectively contribute to broader impact nation states regardless of international
civil unrest and security challenges. border delineation.

The combination of these challenges reinforces

cycles of tension and threatens already-fragile

Figure 3: WFP temperature and vegetation map of Iraq23

The Cradle of Civilization in Peril:

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A Closer Look at the Impact of Climate Change in Iraq
Recommendations and Areas of climate change, fragility, and peacebuilding. Is-
Further Investigation sues of climate change, nation-state resilience,
and community resilience are all interconnect-
What can be done? What follows are a series ed, and their impacts transcend borders.
of actionable recommendations and paths for
further investigation. It is critical to highlight that Climate adaptability and community re-
actionable recommendations were limited by silience interventions that support social
design to community and local government-lev- cohesion and community reconciliation
el resilience-building for communities in transi- should take climate security considerations
tion and in post-conflict settings. into account, utilizing existing communal
and governmental mechanisms. This would
The climate change – fragility – peacebuild- include resource-sharing agreements, dispute
ing nexus is a cross-cutting issue. Therefore, resolutions, or governmental mechanisms for
it should be treated as such. Climate change resource allocations (such as land allocation
also is widely understood to be a threat mul- for agricultural use and water distribution). A
tiplier—exacerbating conditions for conflicts, growing body of evidence suggests that an
displacement, and human suffering. This must integrated communal resiliency support should
also be seen as part of the equation. Finally, incorporate and target particular members of
the international community—be it suprana- enabling communities to break the cycles of vi-
tional organizations, donor states, or NGOs—all olence and instability, with the aforementioned
have a critical role to play in driving discussions background information in mind.
forward, centered around the connectivity of

Figure 4: Map of districts hosting families affected by climate-induced

displacement24

The Cradle of Civilization in Peril:

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A Closer Look at the Impact of Climate Change in Iraq
Support connections between national and reduce emissions;26 (3) Support for access to
local governance. Given the complexity and in- climate technologies and existing governmental
tertwined nature of climate vulnerability, stron- grants that promote a transition from traditional
ger emphasis should be placed on identifying fossil fuels and outdated agricultural practices.
and strengthening the engagement around and This is equally important to support GoI advo-
connection between GoI efforts, civil society, cacy and connection with the forthcoming UN
and sub-national level. It is also necessary to COP28, around the climate peace, security
encourage problem-solving dialogue processes agenda and advocacy around increased financ-
that connect and engage local, provincial, and ing and support to conflict effected countries.27
national actors.
Additional research is necessary to
Support mediation and conflict understand the impact of climate change on
resolution. Considering the significant stress- historically vulnerable segments of society.
ors associated with existing networks and While this was not the focus of this study, it
natural resources, it is essential to emphasize was clear through numerous interactions and
support for established governmental and articles that vulnerable segments of Iraqi so-
community dispute resolution mechanisms. For ciety are impacted at greater levels by climate
instance, in many of Diyala’s districts, there are change. Experiences with climate change and
“water committees” that include the district’s barriers to climate resilience vary significant-
administrative head, representatives from water ly across groups, including women, youth,
and agricultural directorates, as well as commu- and persons with disabilities. Indeed, climate
nity and security stakeholders. Such communal change exacerbates and amplifies structural
and governmental infrastructure should be sup- inequalities. This is anecdotally evident in nu-
ported, engaged, and empowered to mediate merous interactions whereby segments of the
conflicts stemming from resource constraints. population that depend on climate-sensitive oc-
Work must also be done at a national level. cupations such as agriculture and manual labor
This study focuses on one particular governor- for their livelihoods experience outsized impacts
ate and recommendations are made to address of climate change.
the sub-national and community level. This ap-
proach does not outline significant national level
needs and gaps. There must be an articulation
of the intersection of international and national
civil society with Government of Iraqi efforts.
These should be informed by and in align-
ment with: (1) the Government of Iraq’s green
paper detailing plans intended to assess and
implement measures to mitigate the impact
of climate change and support Iraq’s net-zero
transition;25 (2) Support for the GoI in delivering
the Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC),
which is the plan to adapt to climate change and

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A Closer Look at the Impact of Climate Change in Iraq
Endnotes
1 United Nations Environment Programme - (04 MARCH 2019), Global Environment Outlook 6: https://www.unep.org/re-
sources/global-environment-outlook-6

2 Berghof Foundation, Peace Paradigm Organization (PPO) (2023), Climate Security challenges in Iraq – Entry points for
local-level dialogue, report Climate Security in Iraq report. [unpublished report].

3 Social Inquiry and IOM Iraq (2022) ‘Migration into a fragile setting: Responding to climate-induced informal urbanization
and inequality in Basra, Iraq,’ accessed from: : https://iraq.iom.int/resources/migration-fragile-setting-responding-climate-in-
duced-informal-urbanization-and-inequality-basra-iraq

4 Tänzler, Dennis and Nikolas Scherer, 2019, Guidelines for conflict-sensitive adaptation to climate change, Adelphie. https://
adelphi.de/en/publications/guidelines-for-conflict-sensitive-adaptation-to-climate-change-2019

5 Kifri, Muqdadiya, Baladrooz, Ba’quba, Khalis and Khanaqin, Parts of Diyala are disputed between the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) and the central Government. Northern Diyala (Kifri and Khanaqin), especially the northern parts of Kifri
(Markaz Kifri) and Khanaqin (Midan and Qaratoo) are controlled by the KRG security forces.

6 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Climate Induced migration, accessed on July 15, 2023, https://iraqdtm.iom.int/files/
Climate/20237105016440_2023-07-10_ET_Clim_June_2023.pdf

7 Environment-Fragility-Peace Nexus, CDA collaborative, (n.d) https://www.cdacollaborative.org/cdaproject/environment-fra-

gility-peace/

8 Ibid.

9 Although this study does not delve into the experience of women, youth, Persons with Disability, and other marginalized
voices, it is important to denote that these segments facing significant vulnerabilities and power asymmetry in society.
This study recommends further research to explore these experiences and the impact of climate change.

10 The international Organization for Migration (IOM), Iraq, MIGRATION, ENVIRONMENT,

AND CLIMATE CHANGE IN IRAQ, (2022), https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1411/files/documents/
Migration%2C%20Environment%20and%20Climate%20Change%20in%20Iraq.pdf

11 NRC, Iraq’s drought crisis and the damaging effects on communities, (2022) https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/
iraqs-drought-crisis/iraqs-drought-crisis-and-the-damaging-effects-on-communities.pdf

12 Alissa J. Rubin (July 29, 2023), New York times, A warning from the cradle of civilization, https://www.nytimes.
com/2023/07/29/world/middleeast/iraq-water-crisis-desertification.html

13 Personal communication, KIIs with local Diyala CSOs, GOI officials, and IOM personnel in Baquaba, Diyala, July 26.

14 Ibid.

15 iMMAP Inc., (2020). Iraq: Diyala Governorate Reference Map 2020 [Map]. ReliefWeb. https://reliefweb.int/map/iraq/iraq-di-
yala-governorate-reference-map-2020-5-may-2020

16 Given that the nexus of Fragility – Climate change – and conflict is an emerging field, there is no causal link that can be
established, though it is useful to use this model to articulate the strong interplay links.

17 Ibid. CDA, Adelphie

18 According to ILA VI (IOM), 10 per cent of the respondents in Muqdadiya district report always relying on water trucking and
42 per cent report they sometimes do. Damage to water network, absence of sewer network and insufficient water treat-
ment infrastructure are widespread in the two districts. Garbage collection and solid waste management have also been
identified has a challenge, with 32 per cent of the ILA VI respondents in Khanaqin and 42 per cent in Muqdadiya declaring
that no such service is available in their location.

19 IOM Integrated Location Assessment: https://iraqdtm.iom.int/ILA6

20 Personal communication, KIIs with local Diyala CSOs, GOI officials, and IOM personnel in Baquaba, Diyala, July 26.

The Cradle of Civilization in Peril:

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A Closer Look at the Impact of Climate Change in Iraq
21 International Organization for Migration Iraq, (2021). Locations in Diyala that recorded new arrivals from camps, by num-
ber of individuals between November and December 2020 [Map]. IOM Iraq. https://iraqdtm.iom.int/images/ReturnIn-
dex/20216102232463_iom_dtm_Return_Dynamics_in_Diyala_June2021.pdf

22 Ibid, Resilience and Social Cohesion in Fiji’s Climate-Affected Informal Settlements: An Environment-Fragility Peace Nexus
project case study. Cambridge, MA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2023. Lead author Dr. Siad Darwish, with contri-
butions from Conciliation Resources and the Pacific Center for Peacebuilding; https://www.cdacollaborative.org/cdaproject/
environment-fragility-peace/

23 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2023). Iraq: Vegetation Condition Index [Map]. FAO: Earth Observa-
tion. https://www.fao.org/giews/earthobservation/country/index.jsp?lang=en&type=22&code=IRQ

24 International Organization for Migration Displacement Tracking Matrix. (2023). Districts hosting families affected by
climate-induced displacement [Map]. Climate-Induced Displacement Southern Iraq. https://iraqdtm.iom.int/files/Cli-
mate/20237105016440_2023-07-10_ET_Clim_June_2023.pdf

25 IOM Iraq, POLICY BRIEF: OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION IN IRAQ, (2022), accessed
through: https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1411/files/documents/Policy%20Brief%20-%20Opportu-
nities%20for%20Action%20Climate%20Change%20and%20Migration%20in%20Iraq%20_0.pdf

26 UNEP, [N.D.], accessed through: https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/32941/FAQsNDCs.pdf?se-

quence=1&isAllowed=y

27 The government grants citizens loans to produce electricity from solar energy, [anonymous] (2,7, 2022), Rudaw News agen-
cy, https://www.rudawarabia.net/arabic/business/020720225

The Cradle of Civilization in Peril:

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A Closer Look at the Impact of Climate Change in Iraq
About the Author

Abdullah J. Alfayadh is an international development and peacebuilding

practitioner with over 9 years of experience internationally and in the MENA
region. He currently works as part of the United Nation’s Iraq Mission, specif-
ically with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) as a Program
Coordinator overseeing a programming portfolio of three governorates in
Central and Northwest, Iraq. In Particular, Abdullah oversees programming
that supports community resilience and cohesion, reintegration, and support
to communal peace through direct support and partnerships with commu-
nity groups, including CSO, CBOs, and Local Peace Mechanisms. Prior to joining the Iraq IOM
mission, Abdullah was a Program Manager with Chemonics international in Iraq, Nepal, and Tu-
nisia with a diverse technical focus, most recently on post-conflict recovery and social cohesion.
He holds a Master of Arts in International Relations from the University of Manchester, UK, and a
Political Science Bachelor’s degree from Elizabethtown College, US.

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