UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Whm Data Bntarad)

READ INSTRUCTIONS
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER

4. TITLE fand Sub«tl«; 5. TYPE OF REPORT 4 PERIOD COVERED

F-16 APG-66 Fire Control Radar Final

Case Study Report July 1982 - August 1983
(IDA/OSD R&M Study) S. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
IDA Record Document D-21
7. AUTHORCi; 8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERf«J
Paul F. Goree MDA 903 79 C 0018
IDA R&M Case Study Director
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS 10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK
AREA a WORK UNIT NUMBERS
Institute for Defense Analyses
1801 N. Beauregard Street Task T-2-126
Alexandria, VA 22311
II. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS 12. REPORT DATE
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense August 1983
(MRA&L), The Pentagon 13. NUMBER OF PAGES
Washington, D.C. 20301 273
U. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & AOORESSCf/ dlllartnt Irom Controlling OHIca) IS. SECURITY CLASS, (ol thia raport)

DoD-IDA Management Office UNCLASSIFIED

1801 N. Beauregard Street
I5«. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING
Alexandria, VA 22311 SCHEDULE
N/A
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol thia Raport)

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT foi Iha abalract antarad In Block 20, It dlllarent Irom Raport)

None

IB. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

N/A

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on revars* aid9 If nmcmaamry and tdmnttty by block number)

reliability, maintainability, readiness, case study, program structxiring,

lessons learned, F-16, APG-66, radar

20. ABSTRACT (Contlrma on ravaraa aida It nacaaaMry and Idanttty by block numbar)

This document records the activities and presents the findings of the
F-16 APG-66 Fire Control Radar Case Study Working Group part of the IDA/OSD
Reliability and Maintainability Study, conducted during the period frcm
July 1982 through August 1983.

DO ,3^*^", 1473 EDfTtON OF t NOV SS IS OBSOLETE

UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATIOM PF THIS PAGE (Whan Data Entarad)
 Copy 1 0 of 200 copies

4PA142075 ^n%;^^ division

'""^ 33943
IDA RECORD DOCUMENT 0-21

F-16 APG-66 FIRE CONTROL RADAR

CASE STUDY REPORT
(IDA/OSD R&M STUDY)

Paul F. Goree
IDA R&M Case Study Director DTIC
ELECTEpi
JUN8 1984 '

August 1983

The views axprasssd within this docament are those of the working
group only. Publication oi this document does not indicate endorse-
ment fay IDA, its staff, or Its sponsoring agencies. ^^^

Prepared/or
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
and
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics)

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

H

84 06 06 007 IDA Log No. HQ m-ZmS5

The work reported in this document was conducted under contract
MDA 903 79 0 0018 for the Department of Defense. The publication
of this IDA Record Document does not indicate endorsement by the
Department of Defense, nor should the contents be construed as
reflecting the official position of that agency.

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

 IDA RECORD DOCUMENT D-21

F-16 APG-66 FIRE CONTROL RADAR

CASE STUDY REPORT
(IDA/OSD R&M STUDY)

Paul F. Goree
IDA R&M Case Study Director

August 1983

IDA
INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES
1801 N. Beauregard Street, Alexandria, Virginia 22311
Contract MDA 903 79 C 0018
Task T-2-126
 RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY STUDY
— REPORT STRUCTURE —
IDA REPORT R-272
VOLUME I

EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY

IDA REPORT R-272

VOLUME II

CORE GROUP
REPORT

IDA REPORT R-272

IDA REPORT R-272 A (
VOLUME III
VOLUME IV
Casa Study
Analysis

Casa Study w/G Reports Bibliography

IDA
RECORD
///////A
DOCUMENTS

iV
%
THIS DOCUMENT (IDA Record Document D-21)
 PREFACE

As a result of the 1981 Defense Science Board Summer Study on Operational Readi-
ness, Task Order T-2-126 was generated to look at potential steps toward improving
the Material Readiness Posture of DoD (Short Title: R&M Study). This task order was
structured to address the improvement of R&M and readiness through innovative program
structuring and applications of new and advancing technology. Volume I summarizes
the total study activity. Volume II integrates analysis relative to Volume III,
program structuring aspects, and Volume IV, new and advancing technology aspects.
The objective of this study as defined by the task order is:

"Identify and provide support for high payoff actions which the DoD can
take to improve the military system design, development and support pro-
cess so as to provide quantum improvement in R&M and readiness through
innovative uses of advancing technology and program structure."

The scope of this study as defined by the task order is:

To (1) identify high-payoff areas where the DoD could improve current
system design, development program structure and system support policies,
with the objective of enhancing peacetime availability of major weapons
systems and the potential to make a rapid transition to high wartime
activity rates, to sustain such rates and to do so with the most econom-
ical use of scarce resources possible, (2) assess the impact of advancing
technology on the recommended approaches and guidelines, and (3) evaluate
the potential and recommend strategies that might result in quantum in-
creases in R&M or readiness through innovative uses of advancing technology.
P-1
 The approach taken for the study was focused on producing meaningful implement-
able recommendations substantiated by quantitative data with implementation plans
and vehicles to be provided where practical. To accomplish this, emphasis was placed
upon the elucidation and integration of the expert knowledge and experience of engi-
neers, developers, managers, testers and users involved with the complete acquisition
cycle of weapons systems programs as well as upon supporting analysis. A search was
conducted through major industrial companies, a director was selected and the follow-
ing general plan was adopted.

General Study Plan

Vol. Ill • Select, analyze and review existing successful program

Vol. IV • Analyze and review related new and advanced technology

Vol. II (• Analyze and integrate review results
(• Develop, coordinate and refine new concepts

Vol. I • Present new concepts to DoD with implementation plan and recommen-
dations for application.

The approach to implementing the plan was based on an executive council core
group for organization, analysis, integration and continuity; making extensive use
of working groups, heavy military and industry involvement and participation, and
coordination and refinement through joint industry/service analysis and review.
Overall study organization is shown in Fig. P-1.
The basic case study approach was to build a foundation for analysis and to
analyze the front-end process of program structuring for ways to attain R&M, mature
it, and improve it. Concurrency and resource implications were considered. Tools
to be used to accomplish this were existing case study reports, new case studies
P-2
 DIRECTOR
EXECUTIVE
JOHN R. RIVOIRE (IDA) COUNCIL
CORE
GROUP
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
PAUL F. GOREE (IDA)

CASE STUDY DIRECTOR ANALYSIS DIRECTOR TECHNOLOGY DIRECTOR

PAUL GOREE RICHARD GUNKEL DR. HYLAN B. LYON, JR.

(IDA) (CONSULTANT) (TEXAS INSTRUMENTS)

FIGURE P-1. Study Organization

P-3
conducted specifically to document quantitative data for cross-program analysis, and
documents, presentations, and other available literature. In addition, focused
studies for specific technology implications were conducted by individual technology
working groups and documented in their respective reports. To accomplish the new
case studies, the organization shown in Fig. P-2 was established.
In some areas where program documentation and records did not exist, the actual
experience and judgement of those involved in the programs were captured in the case
studies. Likewise, in the analysis process, the broad base of experience and judge-
ment of the military/industry executive council members and other participants was
vital to understanding and analyzing areas where specific detailed data were lacking.
This document records the program activities, details and findings of the Case
Study Working Group for the specific program as indicated in Fig. P-2.
Without the detailed efforts, energies, patience and candidness of those inti-
mately involved in the programs studied, this case study effort would not have been
possible within the time and resources available.
The views expressed within this document are those of the working group only.
Publication of this document does not indicate endorsement by IDA, its staff, or
its sponsoring agencies.

P-4
 CASE STUDY CASE STUDIES
DIRECTOR STEERING
PAUL GOREE COMMITTEE

INDUSTRY
ADVISOR SERVICE ADVISOR
FRANK KRANT Z ART NORDSTROM

1 1 1 1
APG-65 M APG-66 ?**;:*?:;::: APG-63 TPO-36 TPO-37
RADAR ::*:;: RADAR SSfe:::::::::: RADAR RADAR
F-18 m F-16 im^M F-15 FIREFINDER

1 1 1 1
BLACKHAWK ASN-128 SOR-15 spy-i-A
T-700 ENGINE LIGHTWEIGHT TOWED ARRAY RADAR
DOPPLER NAV SONAR AEGIS
BLACKHAWK

FIGURE P-2. Case Study Organization

P-5
 F-16 APG-66 FIRE CONTROL RADAR
RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY CASE STUDY

40A/12
 FOREWORD

This case study represents an assessment of the predominant factors that most strongly
influenced the outcome of the F-16 Fire Control Radar Reliability and Maintainability
Program.
Radar systems used within the military and identified as successful programs were
selected for study to determine the factors that most strongly influenced the outcome of
the programs. The case study was directed toward identifying program elements that were
significant influencing factors on reliability and maintainability, documenting the lessons
learned and establishing recommendations for future programs. This study, although directed
specifically toward reliability and maintainability, encompassed a broad view of program
elements and considered the complex interrelationship between contractual arrangements,
management, design, manufacturing, and test and evaluation.
Reports documenting other case studies are published under separate cover. This
report documents the case study for the AN/APG-66 fire control radar used on the USAF F-16
airplane.

Ill
40B/13
 F-16 APG-66 FIRE CONTROL RADAR WORKING GROUP

AIR FORCE;
CART. BOB RUSSELL - F-16 PROGRAM OFFICE. RELIABILITY & MAINTAINABILITY ENGINEER
CARROLL WIDENHOUSE - RELIABILITY & MAINTAINABILITY ENGINEER. AF/ALD
LTC LARRY GRIFFIN - DIRECTOR, RELIABILITY & MAINTAINABILITY. AF/ALD

GENERAL DYNAMICS;
BILL BOOTON - MANAGER. SENSORS. PROCESSING AND DISPLAY SYSTEMS
NORMAN BUTLER - ENGINEERING CHIEF. RELIABILITY
MARVIN JOHNSON- ENGINEERING SPECIALIST. RELIABILITY
DAVID PARHAM - SENIOR ENGINEER. MAINTAINABILITY
BILL SUMMERS - MANAGER. RF SYSTEMS

WESTINGHOUSE:
DICK DOBYNS - APG-66 PROGRAM MANAGER
PHIL HATFIELD - MANAGER. FIELD PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
NAOMI McAFEE - MANAGER. DESIGN ASSURANCE AND OPERATIONS
ROY PYLE - SUPERVISOR. MAINTAINABILITY ENGINEER

IDA;
PAUL 60REE - DIRECTOR. R&M CASE STUDIES
MURRAY KAMRASS - RESEARCH STAFF MEMBER
TOM MUSSON - CONSULTANT
DICK GUNKEL - CONSULTANT
GENE KUNZNICK - CONSULTANT

40A/13
V
 r.ASF STUDY CONTENTS

PAGE
• INTRODUCTION ' I-l
- MISSION NEEDS IA-1
- SYSTEM DESCRIPTION IB-1
- PROGRAM SUMMARY IC-1
- MEASURES OF SUCCESS ID-1

• PROGRAM ELEMENTS II-l

- CONTRACT IIA-1
- MANAGEMENT IIB-1
- DESIGN IIC-1
- MANUFACTURING IID-1
- TEST AND EVALUATION IIE-1

• SUMMARY AND LESSONS LEARNED HI-l

^5A/3-l

VXl
 ABBREVIATIONS

APPRO Air Force Program Resident Office HAFB Hill Air Force Base
AIS Avionics Intermediate Shop HUD Head-Up Display
ATP Acceptance Test Procedure
ILS Integrated Logistic Support (System)
BIT Built-in-Test INU Inertial Navigation Unit
IR&D Independent Research and Development
CDR Critical Design Review
CDRL Contract Data Reguirements List LCC Life-Cycle Cost
CFE Contractor Furnished Eguipment LRU Line Replaceable Unit
CMSEP Contractor Management System Evalua- LSI Large Scale Integration
tion Program
CND Cannot Duplicate MCL Master Caution Light
COD Correction of Deficiencies MFL Maintenance Fault List
MFTBF Mean Flight Time Between Failure
DESC Defense Electronics Supply Center MHP Multiple Chip Hybrid Package
DLA Defense Logistics Agency MMH/FH Maintenance Man Hours per Flight
DSP Digital Signal Processor Hour
MOT&E Multi-National Operational Test and
ECP Engineering Change Proposal Evaluation
ECS Environmental Control System MRB Material Review Board
EPG European Participating Governments MRN Material Rejection Notice
EOT Environmental Qualification Test MTBF Mean Time Between Failure
ESD Electrostatic-Sensitive Devices MTBMA Mean Time Between Maintenance
ESS Environmental Stress Screening Actions - -

FAR Failure Analysis Report OFP Operational Flight Program

FCC Fire Control Computer
FET Field Effect Transistor PCB Printed Circuit Board
FFP Firm Fixed Price PDR Preliminary Design Review
FMC Fully Mission Capable PFL Pilots Fault List
FSD Full Scale Development PSP Programable Signal Processor
FTM Flight Test Model
RADC Rome Air Development Center
GD General Dynamics R&M Reliability and Maintainability
GFE Government Furnished Eguipment RAT Reliability Acceptance Test

ix
RGT Reliability Growth Test TAG Tactical Air Command
RIW Reliability Improvement Warranty TAT Turnaround Time
ROT Reliability Oualification Test TLSC Target Logistic Support Cost
RTOK Retest O.K. TWT Traveling Wave Tube
SOW Statement of Work WEC Westinghouse Electric Corporation
SRU Shop Replaceable Unit WUC Work Unit Code
STALO Stable Local Oscillator
ST Self Test
STFF Self Test Fault Flag
INTRODUCTION

i-l
 The Westinghouse APG-66 radar is the heart of the fire control system on the USAF F-16
airplane. This radar system comprises about 50 percent of the F-16 avionics.
This report describes briefly the APG-66 radar and then presents a historical roadmap
to show how the program developed. Quantitative measures are defined which were the design
criteria for a successful reliability/maintainability program. This is followed by a
description of the many factors that contributed to the R&M program. The lessons learned
during the course of the APG-66 program are summarized to provide insights and guidance
for later programs.

1-2

40B/1-1
 INTRODUCTION

• MISSION NEEDS

• SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

• PROGRAM SUMMARY

• MEASURES OF SUCCESS

40A/14

1-3
MISSION NEEDS

lA-l
 MISSION NEEDS

The fire control radar (FCR) for the F-16 is a coherent, multimode, digital fire con-
trol sensor designed to provide all-weather air-to-air and air-to-surface modes with advanced
dogfight and weapon delivery capabilities. The air-to-air modes provide the capability to
detect and track targets at all aspect angles and at all altitudes both in the clear and in
the presence of ground clutter. Target information in the air-to-air modes is presented as
synthetic video on a "clean scope" display, both on a head-up display (HUD) and a head-down
display, the Radar/Electro-Optical Display. Air-to-surface modes provide extensive mapping,
target detection and location, and navigational capabilities.

lA-3
40B/19-1
 DESCRIPTION OF
THE APG-66
FIRE CONTROL RADAR

IB-l
 APG-6 6 SYSTEM COMPONENTS

The F-16 Radar consists of six functional line replaceable units (LRUs) which are
organized for autonomy, logical function, minimum interconnection, ease of maintenance, and
co-production potential.
The six replaceable units are antenna, transmitter, low-power radio frequency (RF)
unit, digital signal processor, the radar computer, and a radar control panel. A digital
multiplex bus system provides a "party line" interface between the radar computer and the
other line-replaceable units, with the exception of the digital signal processor. A separate
high-speed data bus connects the radar computer with the digital signal processor.
All radar LRUs are mounted in the nose of the F-16 aircraft and are accessible from
ground level, except for the radar control panel installed in the cockpit.
The primary means of communication with the other F-16 avionic systems is by use of
MIL-STD-1553B Multiplex System. Video is provided to the cockpit displays in an RS-170
format.

IB-2
40C/1-1
 F'16 APG-66 SYSTEM COMPONENTS

Antenna
A aam
r P.S. „ Transmitter
RCP
TWT !-*-!
Uniphasor MCV*"- Power Supply
Drlver ^'<^ I IProtec-
Mode I Freq. f^Wli-,.Wfl?Mlt
Pulser I ol ' ''°" *
1_ J^on'^1 Range I Prf j Computer
dc Inputs
A LVPsT I'O Antenna Scan

7\ P.S.jCPUl.
a/c
Inter Synchro Inputs
7\ h-^1 ' N
,,^L. I Missile
rr^ "° l"'"-! ■ Me,
_i_ F-16 Avionics
A Mux Bus
uiQibus DSP Bus U^ .Analog to SMS
(AIM-9L)

BB^S
Processor
Triggers
PS
& Timirtg
Syncljronizer
-| r-Scan
1 b>
l-Q Bus
I/O Proc RS-170 Video

IB-3
 APG-66 RADAR LINE REPLACEABLE UNITS

1. ANTENNA
The planar array antenna, gimballed in two axes, provides high gain and low sidelobes
over all scan angles. It includes a lightweight balanced electric drive system.

2. TRANSMITTER
The transmitter contains an air-cooled traveling wave-tube (TWT), a solid-state grid
pulser, high voltage power supplies and regulators, and protection and control circuitry, The
entire transmitter is solid state, except for the final TWT output tube. The pilot may select
among four of the 16 available APG-66 operating frequencies in any given F-16 aircraft.

3. CONTROL PANEL
The radar control panel in the cockpit is used by the pilot to command the desired radar
channel mode, range scale, scan width, and elevation bar scan. The avionics system can, under
many conditions, assume control of the radar functions .

4. LOW POWER RF _
The low-power radio frequency unit contains a receiver protector, low-noise Field Effect
Transistor (FET) amplifier, receiver, analog/digital converters, stable local oscillator (STALO),
and the system clock generator. All needed analog processing of the radar return signal is
performed in this LRU. The LPRF also provides frequency agility for certain air-to-surface modes,

40C/1-30
lB-4
 APG-66 RADAR LINE REPLACEABLE UNITS

Trantmllter
Control Panel

fm

Low Power RF Digital Signal Processor Computer

lB-5
 APG-66 RADAR LINE REPLACEABLE UNITS

5. DIGITAL SIGNAL PROCESSOR

Clutter rejection and other radar signal processing is performed by the digital signal
processor. Digital radar techniques have been used extensively to replace contemporary
analog hardware. The digital signal processor uses standard integrated circuits mounted in
dual-in-line packages. Large scale integration (LSI) dej,^ices are used where industry
standards and multiple sources exist. Thus, a high circuit density is achieved which
decreases size and weight at a low cost. Custom LSI devices were avoided for cost and
availability reasons in favor of standard devices, which have exhibited reliability maturity.

6. COMPUTER
The radar computer configures the radar system for the various operating modes, directs
the digital signal processor to embed symbols in the video output, makes calculations,
routes data to the fire control computer, interfaces with other F-16 avionic systems as
well as other radar LRUs and controls all of the self-test and built-in-test functions of
the radar. Growth provisions have also been made in the F-16 Radar for addition of the
missile illuminator required for the Sparrow (AIM-7) missile. The computer is equipped
with 48,000 16-bit words of programmable, semiconductor read-only memory. Temporary scratch
pad memory requirements are met using volatile, semi-conductor random access memory.
Memory reserve exists for introduction of new features and modes.

40C/1-31 lB-7
 F-16 APG-66 RADAR INSTALLATION

The installation of the APG-66 is shown in the accompanying figure. The Radar Control
Panel is installed in the cockpit. The other LRUs are installed in the forward portion of
the aircraft. The forward-installed LRUs other than the antenna are mounted in a rack
which provides interface with the airplane. Key APG-66 parameters are shown in the table
in the upper left corner of the figure.

lB-8
40C/1-2
 F-16 APG-66 RADAR INSTALLATION

APG-66 RADAR PARAMETERS

VOLUME 3-6 FT3 (.102 M3)

WEIGHT 295 LB (134.3 KG)
FREQUENCY X BAND PULSE DoPPLER
RELIABILITY 97 HOUR LAB DEMONSTRATED MTBF
MAINTENANCE <.05 HR MCTT McT (MEAN) AND
<1.0 HR MCTT McT (MAX)
ELECTRONIC PARTS 9500
COOLING AIR COOLED AT 12 LB/MIN
INPUT POWER 358D VA. 400 Hz. 245 WDC
RANGE SCALES 10. 20. 40. 80 NMi
ELEVATION COVERAGE 1. 2. OR 4 BAR
ANTENNA AZIMUTH SCAN ±10. ±30. ±60 DEGREES
POWER OUTPUT AVERAGE ~200w

Radar Antenna J
Radar
Radar Transmitter-J Control Panel

Left-Hand
Side

41/5 i-LPRF
Right-Hand Dedicated Growth: DSP
• CW Illuminator Computer
Side • Etc lB-9
 F-16 APG-66 SYSTEM PARAMETERS

This table presents a number of the physical characteristics of the APG-66 radar by
LRU early in its development program. These bogies are allocations made by WEC to achieve
system objectives. Subsequent development efforts led to changes in these parameters that
are not reflected here. These parameters are as of May 29, 1976 only.

40B/1-56 lB-10
 F-16 APG-66 SYSTEM PARAMETERS
(AS OF MAY 29. 1976)

a.
3 a>

ACTIVE PINS/TOTAL PINS

e X • 0 a W f
U 0 p. ■

COMPONENTS (TOTAL)
a! 3 V*
a 0 tJ m

h ?a

INPUT POK£R (H)

X W m *^
fi m m
u. u. H ^ ■9 w ■ «t
He

NUMBER OF LRU
aa ■H W
X >-
UJ u «8 BC ac *j a
A. «

CONNECTIONS
81 ».
(!.».

WORST CASE
c a UJ l*J 52 • 3

ELECTRONIC
W ■3"

NUMBER OF
O1
!i
ac <^
i3 ee c
«S Z UJ u is •^ C

28 VDC
m

§ UJ UJ —• a. •
_j f^ UJ => •
w •s
u^ c\t 4n o
5 5 > IH Is 2 :^B
o at
O -J •> IE O r- O H

Sl| 10/13
A'lTENilA Aa a.9 NA Ui 733 4 0 Pwt 5/10 650 0 0.75 176; 0.34 18.4 317 192 900

BOG 57.2 KA 2C5 749 0 0 Sig 18/37 657 0 0 2877 0.33 18.8 335* 210 2000 .
Pwr 10/18

TRANSMITTER An (S.« 1.2 «9 750 11 SKA

3
Slg 15/22 1424 29 3.6 1366 1.123 19.9 1227 1227 1400
1 TWC P-r 7/10
BOG iZA 1.2 48 746 10 2 Slg 16/20 1269 48 2.S 2il61 1.75 20.0 1227 1227 2500 ..
Pwr 11/18

Sl| 60/79 3.6 582 582

LPRF ACT (7.i .9] 322 1620 62 4 P«r 7/10
603 106 755 0.7106 29.5 1200

BOC 37.7 .i 219 1781 40 3 Slg 74/81 660 86 1.9 1199 0.72 25.? 579 579 2500
Pwr 10/13
Slj 68/79 289 289
COMPUTER ACT I>.4 .35 760 1100 1 1 Pwr 8/10
209 0 1.4 1353 0.5035 13.x 900
(IIICL PWR. SUP)
BOC 27.4 .51 1015 1755 0 0 Slg 88/97 361 34 1.5 1071 0.50 15.1 284 284 1800 '
P«r 39/43

DSP Aa Sl| 68/100 963 0 4.3 21.0 900 900 1250

ii.i, .95 2738 3300 0 3 491 0.5106
Pwr 5/10
{INCL INVERTER)
BOC 52.7 .9 3083 3503 0 3 Slg 90/100 857 0 3.8 338 0.52 21.5 900 900 2500
Pwr 6/18

RACAR CONTL. PNL. Aa 3.5 .01 34 95 0 0

Sit 12/22
Pwr 8/13
3 12 - 12048 0,47 2.0 12 0 150

BOG 3.5 .08 65 112 0 0 Slg 6/22 0 17 0 13250 0.45 1.7 20 0 700
Pwr 13/22
Slg 41/55 0
RACK 1 CABLE 1 ACT 17.3 ,3S 0 13 0 2 Pwr 28/32
0 0 - 4808 - 34 0 650
WAVEGUIDE ASSY.
BOG U.7 NA 0 0 0 0 Slg 70/128 0 19 0 - - 2.6 0 0 1000
Pwr 3y43

Sl| 274/370
2li.< t.Oi 4039 1331 79 12 3995 147 12.1 176 0.7008 107.4 3327 3190 6450
Pwr 68/95
SrSTEH ACT
TOTAL Sl| 362/495
204 10.0 0.75 3345 3200
BOG 258.2 3.59 4725 1647 SO a Pwr 122/175 3373 17R 10t.4» 13000

N/A Not Ap|illcabl<

• wicci HI dliiliitclon tncludtd.
lB-11
>• Including 1.2 for ajiembly ind
ten.
 APG-66 RADAR SYSTEM EVOLUTION

The chart depicts the evolution that led to the development of the modular APG-66
radar. Westinghouse began design and development activity in 1971 for a new series of
modular radar, designed to a cost. The WX series of radars, and in particular the WX200,
used the pulse doppler principle and advanced digital techniques. Demonstration of these
balanced design techniques led directly to the subsequent balanced design and development
of the APG-66 in July 1974.

lB-12
40C/1-3
 AN/APG-66
Westinghouse Advanced Radar Systems Evolution
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984

F-4E APQ-120 / LRU-1 / Peace Rhine

>

r F-4J/AWG-10/11/12 / AWG-10A / . AWG-10B ^

F-15 EiVIR WX-200 Mod Radar F-4E/J APG-66J

}
F-16/APG-66

Electronically Agile Radar (EAR)

E-3A/AWACS

IB-13
PROGRAM SUMMARY

ic-i
 F-16 APG-66 PROGRAM SUMMARY

The APG-66 radar system development was highly concurrent; the design of the radar was
actually initiated long before the RFP was issued.
The F-16 APG-66 radar development effort started with the award of two contracts by
the Air Force in December 1974, to Hughes Aircraft and Westinghouse Electric Co. to develop
and build two flight test model (FTM) radar systems which were, at the time, essentially
air-to-air radars. The culmination of the development was a "fly off" flight test program
that was conducted by General Dynamics and the USAF. Each radar contractor flew its respec-
tive FTM radar in an F-4 aircraft under identical flight conditions. During October 1975,
approximately 80 flights were flown, data reduced and reports written.
As a result of the fly off and evaluation of FSD proposals, Westinghouse was awarded
the FSD contract in November 1975 to develop the F-16 FCR. Flight testing continued in
the Westinghouse F-4 vehicle at Baltimore. The first FSD radar was delivered to Fort Worth
16 March 1977 and began flight test in an F-16 airplane on 24 May 1977. On two different
occasions, F-16 flight test airplanes were based in Baltimore for the purpose of a concen-
trated effort to work radar problems. Flight test continued at Edwards AFB through 1979.
In December 1976, before FSD was completed, the go-ahead was received to procure long-
lead items for production. Production started in the middle of 1977, only weeks after FSD
flight test was initiated. Coincident with the initiation of production, reliability
growth testing was started. The FSD requirement of 60 hours MTBF was demonstrated in the
middle of 1978 shortly after the first production system emerged from the production line.
Moreover, the 100th production system was delivered before FSD and flight testing of the
full scale development items were completed. Note that after FSD was completed, the various
R&M activities continued with the production and fielding of the production systems.
Major delivery and R&M milestones are shown on the facing page.
40B/1-3 lC-2
 F-16 APG-66 PROGRAM SUMMARY

1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

^ GO AHEAD
BRASSBOARDi
DEMO DESIGN^ FAB AND TEST
FLYOFF A A^'^-'AIR-TO-GROUND ADDED
S FSD GO AHEAD
DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT
1 r-r-
FSD Ist FSD SYSTEMA A 12th SYSTEM I
FSD FLIGHT TEST

ALONG LEAD GO AHEAD

PRODUCTION
IZ 1st
PRODUCTION
50th 100th 500th 1000th
7 1300th
SYSTEM ^SYST^,SYSTEM ASYSTEM A SYSTEM ^SYSTEM
A
IOC
%
ATWT DEMO BLOCK 10
A A UPDATE
PDR CDR

RSM PCA 60 HOURS MTBF DEMONSTRATED

A_(FSD RQT.)
MILESTONES
97 HOURS MTBF
STARTED COMPLETED A DEMONSTRATED
RAT
A ATHERMAL VERIFICATION ^
DSARC-I IIA DSARC-IIIB STARTED COMPLETE i

lC-3
 F-16 APG-16 RADAR FSD RELIABILITY SCHEDULE

Planned versus actual FSD reliability test schedules and their relationship to major
program milestones are shown on the facing chart. Differences in planned and actual test
start dates were due primarily to unavailability of hardware.
The number of systems used for reliability growth and development reliability
qualification tests was also impacted by asset availability.

40C/1-33
lC-4
 F-16 APG-66 RADAR FSD RELIABILITY SCHEDULE
PLANNED
- = = ACTUAL
1976 1977 1978
11 it
TWT RELIABILITY 3 UNITS 1= m ^ -^

TEST
6
3 UNITS
5 10
RGT I] UNITS
7 12
1 UNIT
THERMAL ANALYSIS 2 3 3
AND VERIFICATION
7 10
RQT 3 UNITS "I
3 it 6
2 UNITS = \\==
#1 #2
GO AHEAD 11/2^/75 A

PDR it/76 A

CDR 6/8-11/76 AA

FIRST F-16 RADAR FLIGHT 5/27/77 A

RADAR PCA it/24/78 A

itl/38
lC-5
MEASURES OF SUCCESS

ID-l
 MEASURES OF SUCCESS

Program success can be measured in terms of reliability and maintainability character-

istics and their effect on field operations and supportability. Reliability and maintain-
ability emphasis throughout the AN/APG-66 program, from design inception through field use,
have resulted in high mean-flight-time-between-fallures (MFTBF) and low maintenance manhours
per flight hour (MMH/FH) accompanied by reduced support costs and increased operational
readiness in field use.

40C/1-4
lD-2
 MEASURES OF SUCCESS

FIELD RELIABILITY - MFTBF = 65 HOURS

OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT COST - LOWER THAN PREVIOUS RADAR

FIELD MAINTAINABILITY - MATURE PREDICTION ACHIEVED

PERCENT OF FLIGHTS WITH NO RADAR FAULTS - GROWTH FROM 35 TO 89%

DEPOT REPAIR TURNAROUND TIMES LESS THAN 20 DAYS

OPERATIONAL READINESS EXCEEDING 98% FULLY MISSION CAPABLE (FMC)

41/6 lD-3
 RADAR SET FIELD MFTBF EXCEEDS PREDICTION BY 45%

This figure shows the Mean Flight Time Between Failure (MFTBF) for the APG-66 radar,
installed in production F-16 aircraft, operated by Air Force personnel in service environ-
ments.
The measured field MFTBF is a 3-month moving average plotted monthly and compared to
the predicted MFTBF growth for the F-16 APG-66 radar. This MFTBF is based on Air Force AFR
66-1 data for the F-16 Tactical Air Command (TAC) fleet and is defined as

MFTBF = MTBMATYPE 1 = ___^_^_ FLIGHT HOURS

GROUND TYPE 1 FAILURES + FLIGHT TYPE 1 FAILURES

where Type 1 (inherent) failures are as defined in AFR 800-18.

The predicted growth curve was developed (during FSD) as an indicator to determine if
the radar would achieve its mature predicted MFTBF.
The growth in measured field MFTBF is the result of an aggressive failure analysis and
corrective action emphasis implemented for reliability testing, manufacturing tests and
field operations during the first 150,000 hours of flight.
The measured MFTBF for the six months ending in August 1982 is 65 hours and is 45%
above the mature predicted MFTBF of 45 hours for the radar. - - - -

ID-4

40B/15-1
 RADAR SET FJFID MFTBF* EXCEEDS PREDICTION BY ^5%
• AIR FORCE AFR 66-1 DATA
• TAC EXPERIENCE
• 150.000 FLIGHT HOURS
• 3 MONTHS MOVING MFTBF
80- / HAh ;-AUG '82
MFTBF
Jo ABOVE
lEDICTIO

60-
MEASURED
MFTBF
r^
n
MFTBF MO- PREDICTED
MFTBF /
IN
HOURS GROWTH / .--^"X^^A/^/

20-

1 ;z 1 3 n I 2 13 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 ^ L13
sz-Tz '
4
L979 1980 1981 iyxz 1
FLIGHT HOURS
*MFTBF = MTBMAjYPE 1 = GROUND TYPE 1 FAILURES + FLIGHT TYPE 1 FAILURES
WHERE TYPE 1 (INHERENT) FAILURES ARE AS DEFINED IN AFR 800-18
41/14 ^°-^
 IMPROVED RELIABILITY RESULTS IN LOWER O&S COSTS

The sensitivity of operations and support cost due to improved radar reliability is
presented on this chart. The operations and support cost includes replenishment spares;
organization-, intermediate- and depot-level maintenance labor and material costs for the
F-16 APG-66 radar. Program characteristics, upon which the O&S cost estimate is based,
reflect an F-16 program of procuring 1388 aircraft flying a total of 4,742,322 flight
hours over 15 years. The cost estimates were calculated using a General Dynamics operations
and support cost model for a range of radar system reliabilities from an MFTBF value of 10
to 80 hours.
The curve shows that an operations and support cost savings of $250M could be realized
throughout the life of the F-16 program over the costs that would have been incurred if the
F-16 radar had been a 20-hour MFTBF radar (typical of today's fighter radar). This cost
avoidance will more than offset the up-front cost of added reliability design, testing and
reliability improvement warranty programs that lead to the current high field MFTBF of the
APG-6 6 radar.

lD-6
40B/15-2
 IMPROVED REllABILITY RESULTS IN LOWER O&S COST

NOTES
- 1388 A/C BUY
- 4.742.322 FLIGHT HOURS
8-
- 15 YEARS LIFE
7- - FY '82 $
- O&S COSTS INCLUDE:
6- — REPLENISHMENT SPARES
OTHER FIGHTER
$100M 5- RADAR MFTBF —O.I&D LEVEL LABOR & MATERIAL COSTS
O&S
COST
4-

3-

2-
CURRENT RADAR FIELD'
1- RELIABILITY

W 50 60 70 80
MFTBF IN HOURS

41/7 ID-7
 APG-6 6 RADAR MMH/FH PREDICTION ACHIEVED

Excellent maintainability characteristics have been achieved by the APG-66 radar. As

shown in the figure, the APG-66 MMH/FH typically runs under one hour. This is derived
from the Air Force maintenance data collection system AFR 66-1, and applies to TAC exper-
ience with more than 150,000 flight hours. Other than the peaks at the beginning, there
is only one other large peak occurring in summer-fall of 1981. This peak does not reflect
radar maintainability problems but occurred because the F-16 airplane flying activity was
curtailed during this period to modify the airplane's electrical system. Since very few
flying hours occurred during this period and maintenance actions continued, the MMH/FH
increased drastically. However, after full flying schedules were resumed near the end of
1982 the MMH/FH rapidly improved and approached the predicted mature value of 0.5.
The predicted mature value (circa 1977) of MMH/FH for the APG-66 Fire Control Radar-
was 0.56 hours. Attainment of this value was predicated on the achievement of anticipated
system reliability, availability of necessary support equipment and personnel, and compliance
with the recommended maintenance concepts and procedures. This prediction did not include
travel times for maintenance personnel and administrative delay times. Reported field data
includes these additional time parameters. The fact that Air Force AFR 66-1 field data
indicates that this prediction is being met is a conservative estimate of the MMH/FH
measure. These results are based on monthly reports from Hill, MacDill and Nellis Air
Force Bases. '

lD-8
40B/1-5
 F-16 AP6-66 RADAR MMH/FH PREDICTION ACHIEVED

*PREDICTION DOES NOT

F-16 FLEET. INCLUDE
ELECTRICALX EXCESSIVE TRAVEL
MOD TIME
FORCE AFR 66-1 ADMIN DELAY TIME
TAC EXPERIENCE EXCESSIVE CREW SIZE
150.000 FLT HRS (E-G-. "ON-JOB-
MONTHLY MMH/FH TRAINING")
CANNIBALIZATION

MMH/FH

J F M A M J J A S 0 N D J F M A M^J J A S 0 N D J F M A M J J A S 0 N D J F M A M J J A S 0
19 7 9 19 8 0 19 8 1 19 8 2

40A-18
ID-9
 PERCENT OF FLIGHTS WITH NO RADAR FAULTS

Another measure of program success is the steady increase in the percentage of F-16
flights which had no radar malfunction reported. This parameter grew from approximately
35% in 1979 to 92% in 1982. Flights without fault would be even higher if flights which
contained repeat faults (faults which were known but not corrected) were discounted. The
improvement in flights without faults during the 1979-1980 time period is a result of a
number of modifications incorporated during that period. One of the most significant
improvements was General Dynamics ECP 331, which is discussed in more detail in the test
and evaluation portion of this report.

lD-10
40B/1-63
 1/
PERCENT OF F-16 FLIGHTS HAVING NO RADAR FAULTS"

100'
92
88
80' 76

PERCENT
OF 60
FLIGHTS
WITHOUT
RADAR
FAULTS
^0
35

20'
NITIAL 1317 10.000 FL GHTS
DEPLOYMENT FLIGH

1979 1980 1981 1982

MAJOR CLASS 1 CHANGES —> A"^^ AAA A
2977 > ^5700 PROGRESSIVE CLASS II CHANGES >
1/
"HILL AFB 1979-1980
2/
"NATO BASE 1981-1982

^1/16 ID-ll
 REPAIR TURNAROUND TIMES (TAT)

The RIW contract specified that units returned to the manufacturer were to be repaired
and made ready for return to the Air Force within 22 days. Those units manufactured
that were not under the RIW contract were given 30 days for TAT. It will be noted that
except for one short period of time a 20-day turnaround time (TAT) was achieved for the
entire period for both RIW and non-RlW units. This record is better than the records
associated with previous avionic systems and is better than the goals and requirements that
were originally set for this system. Non-RIW units benefited from the repair system set up
for the RIW units.

lD-12
40B/1-7 •
 F-16 APG-66 RADAR TURNAROUND TIMES (TAT)
BETTER THAN GOALS AND REQUIREMENTS

50-'

45-

40-

35-

30- NON RIW GOAL

IW (MONTHLY TAT)

NON-RIW (MONTHLY TAT)

MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MARIAPR MAY JUN JUL AUGlSEP OCT NOV1 DEC
1981 1982
ID-13
40A/16-1
 OPERATIONAL READINESS

The data on this figure represent operations at three Air Force bases. Nellis AFB is
represented in the top panel, while Hill and MacDill AFBs are jointly represented in the
bottom panel. The charts show the proportion of aircraft in each set that had fully mis-
sion capable radars on each of the calendar days shown in the abscissa. It should be
noted that for all bases represented, the radar FMC rate was in the range of 98-99 percent
for the most recent six months shown. This trend is expected to continue.

ID-14

40B/1-8
 F-16 RADAR SUPPORTABILITY

F-16 RADAR SUPPORTABILITY

100-T—r COMBAT READINESS

iJ
J
r.
1.

<
<

z
D
/)

FEB UAR APR WAY JUN JUL AUC SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB UAR APR UAY JUN JUL AUC SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB
1981 1982

KILUUACOia AND NELL IS AFB'S

lD-15
PROGRAM ELEMENTS

ii-i
 j , . PROGRAM ELEMENTS

Many factors contributed to the results of the APG-66 radar program. The key
development factors have been divided into five groups. We must caution, however, that
although this grouping may assist in this exposition, these elements are not independent
of each other and in fact have large overlaps. The more significant of these overlaps are
identified and described in the pages that follow.

40B/19-2 II-2
 PROfiRAM ELEMENTS

CONTRACT

MANAGEMENT

DESIGN

MANUFACTURING

TEST AND EVALUATION

II-3
41/8
 CONTRACT

STRUCTURE

I & Ti REQUIREMENTS

INCENTIVES

SOURCE SELECTION

LCC

^Qk/V IIA-l
 STRUCTURE—CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS

The contractual relationship that results from the radar procurement being contractor
furnished equipment (CFE) enjoys some flexibility over a government furnished equipment
(GFE) procurement during the development period. Not only does the flexibility exist in
the technical area but also in the program management efforts. Two examples illustrate
these points.
In the technical area, the prime/sub interface is such that problem solving can be
accomplished on either side of the interface and still be timely and in scope; that is, no
additional cost to the government. For instance, a software filter to correct a problem
could be either in the CFE procured radar computer (GD responsibility) or in the fire con-
trol computer (GD responsibility). The decision can be influenced not only by the techni-
cal consideration but also the cost and program schedule impact. If the interface were
between GFE radar and CFE avionics, then the flexibility is severely limited and any
problem on the GFE side of the interface results in an out of scope change on the CFE side
of the interface.
An example of a programmatic problem might be late delivery of radar equipment from
the supplier such that the installation into the airplane would be out of the planned work
station. With a CFE contract GD could consider the cost impact as in-scope, whereas with
GFE late delivery could be out-of-scope and subject of a cost claim to the government. '

IIA-2
40B/1-10
 ■STRUCTURE -- nONTRACTUAL KHATIQNSHIPS

CONTRACT INTERFACE SIMPLICITY

FREEDOM TO EFFECT CHANGES WITHIN SCOPE

FLEXIBILITY FOR MANAGEMENT DECISIONS

EXAMPLE;
1. GD HAD TOTAL WEAPON SYSTEM VIEW- DIRECTED OTHER SUPPLIERS
TO MAKE CHANGE TO HELP SOLVE PROBLEMS WITH RADAR INTEGRATION

2. RADAR SPARES-DIVERTED FROM GD BANK EARLY IN PROGRAM-

41/9 IIA-3
 REALISTIC REQUIREMENTS

Radar requirements were derived from the overall weapon system requirements. By
defining requirements from the "top down," the radar specification represented a firm,
practical performance level. The statement of work (SOW) to WEC contained a requirement
for verification through demonstrations. The design approach was formally documented
and contractually approved by GD.
The contract to Westinghouse Electric Corporation (WEC) from GD included a specifica-
tion (16ZE-009) that laid down the requirements for the F-16 radar. These were firm require-
ments, not goals, and were derived through a balanced design based on experience from
previously-designed radars. The requirement was considered stringent yet possible to
achieve at that time.
Other requirements included operating in an environment with 100% relative humidity
over a range of temperatures from -40°F to +70°C, to include sand and dust. At the 0-level
only external cleaning and wiping was allowed. Removals at the 0-level were to be rapidly
accomplished by one man using standard tools. The antenna was the one allowable exception
because of its weight. No adjustments, alignments or calibrations were allowed at the O
level. Mechanical boresighting requirements were such to permit replacement of the antenna
without further realignment.
The aircraft ready condition was specified as meeting performance requirements after
seven days without maintenance, checkout or flight. For ease of maintenance at the l-level,
functionally related parts were to be grouped within common SRUs with no adjustment required
when replacing an SRU. Also, it was to be made impossible to install equipment incorrectly,
either mechanically or electrically, by using methods other than tubing shape, color coding
or labeling.

IIA-4

40B/1-11
 REALISTIC REQUIREMENTS ESTABLISHED

• DEFINED IN SPECIFICATION 16 ZE 009

- REQUIREMENTS FIRM. NOT GOALS
- DERIVED THROUGH A BALANCED DESIGN
- DETAILED COMPARABILITY ANALYSIS
- STRINGENT BUT NOT IMPOSSIBLE

• SPECIFIC LINE ITEMS IN SOW AND CDRL

- VERIFICATION THROUGH DEMONSTRATIONS
- APPROACHES FORMALLY DOCUMENTED AND
CONTRACTUALLY APPROVED

41/10 . iiA-5
 CONTRACTOR INCENTIVES

Contractor motivation was provided by various incentives in the contract. Keeping

the costs to a minimum was encouraged by the cost sharing arrangement. Various award fees
were provided for achieving certain performance goals. With the CFE contractual arrange-
ment many of these incentives were passed on directly to the radar supplier.
A dynamic, continuing incentive was the reliability improvement warranty (RIW) program
where the supplier was constantly looking for ways to improve the reliability/maintainability
performance of the equipment. The supplier was given the freedom (from a configuration
management standpoint) to process and incorporate RlW-type changes. With the supplier
functioning as the depot for the production equipment, high visibility was afforded to
Westinghouse in areas which could benefit from RlW-related changes.
While there was an award fee for completing FSD RQT and production RQT early. Westing-
house received neither tee since the tests ended in a reject decision in the time allotted
for the award. However, the incentive was present and Westinghouse did attempt to meet the
award criteria for the tests. As a result of the RQT failure corrective actions were
incorporated early that matured the radar faster than would have otherwise happened.
A significant motivation was the correction of deficiencies (COD) clause of the contract
which basically required the contractor to fix problems at his own expense that did not
meet the requirements of the specification. ^ ^' ^ ^ ~ ^ ^
The developing of high quality equipment is always helpful in maintaining a good
company image and the opportunity for future sales. In the case of the F-16, this was
especially true, since the airplane was being marketed throughout the world. High relia-
bility from the radar would serve to increase its competitiveness with other contenders.
This type of contractor incentive may be the most powerful force at work in motivating
companies to produce reliable products. In addition, the modular APG-66 radar was a good
building block for other radar programs like DIVAD and the B-lB.
40B/1-12 IIA-6
 INCENTIVES WERE IMPORTANT TO PROGRAM SUCCESS

• FORMAL
- COST SHARING ABOVE/BELOW TARGET
- AWARD FEES-DESIGN TO COST/RQT
- CORRECTION OF DEFICIENCIES
- RELIABILITY IMPROVEMENT WARRANTY

• OTHER
- ADDED SALES _
- PRIDE/IMAGE

41/11 11 A-7
 COST SHARING

The AF contract with GD was a firm fixed price contract (FFP) with cost sharing. If
full-scale development costs went above or below the target, the Air Force and the contrac-
tor shared in the ratio of 85/15 percent, respectively. If production costs went above or
below the target, the sharing ratio was 60/40 percent. There was a cost floor and a cost
ceiling also. Above the ceiling all costs were assumed by the contractor, and below the
floor all costs were paid by the Air Force.
This is the classic FFP structural format; as the contractor risks are reduced, he is
expected to assume more liabilities of cost sharing.
In a CFE program the contracts are compatible between the USAF and GD as well as
between GD and WEC. Therefore, the incentives and cost sharing exist at both contractual
levels.

IIA-8

40B/1-14
 FIRM FIXED PRICE CONTRACT WITH COST SHARING — A MAJOR INFLUENCING FACTOR

TW PRODUCnON

ABOVE
CEILING ALL COSTS
ASSUMED BY
CONTRACTOR
CEILING (127.5%)

ABOVE
TARGET COSTS SHARED COSTS SHARED
85%/157 60%/40%
(USAF/CONTRACTOR) (USAF/CONTRACTOR)
PROGRAM TARGET (100%)
COST
• BELOW
TARGET UNDERRUN SHARED UNDERRUN SHARED
857/15% 60%/40%
(USAF/CONTRACTOR) (USAF/CONTRACTOR)

FLOOR ( %)

ALL COSTS ASSUMED BY USAF

• COST SHARING PASSED FROM

/ USAF TO GD
/ GD TO WEC
i|l/15
IIA-9
 RELIABILITY IMPROVEMENT WARRANTY (RIW)

In an attempt to further motivate the contractor after he won the contract award, the
Air Force included in the contract an option to exercise RIW provisions.
Twelve F-16 LRUs were selected as "control LRUs." These were selected because they
were expected to contribute at least 50 percent of the F-16 logistics support cost. The
proposed contract provisions would permit the government to select any or all of the 12
LRUs for the RIW option. The government could also select an RIW with an MTBF guarantee.
A firm fixed-price option was obtained from the contractor for these options.
During 1976, the 12 control LRUs were subjected to cost analysis, and the RIW option
was extended to the aircraft planned to be procured by the European Participating Govern-
ments (EPG). The contract was subsequently signed with CD in 1977 for RIW coverage of
nine LRUs for all five EPG nations participating in the Multinational Fighter Program. In
addition, two of the LRUs, the radar transmitter and the HUD Processor, were to have MTBF
guarantees. The following table presents the list of equipment selected for the RIW pro-
gram. Note that all five radar LRUs were selected for RIW coverage with one LRU (radar
transmitter) requiring an MTBF guarantee.

IIA-10
40B/1-15
 EQUIPMENT SELECTED FOR THE F-IB RIW PROGRAM

WUC NOMENCLATURE MANUFACTURER

1^1 AAO FLIGHT CONTROL COMPUTER LEAR-SIEGLER INDUSTRIES
74BC0 HEAD-UP DISPLAY (HUD) PROCESSOR* MARCONI AVIONICS. LTD-
74BA0 HEAD-UP DISPLAY (HUD) PILOT DISPLAY MARCONI AVIONICS. ETC
74DA0 INERTIAL NAVIGATION UNIT (INU) SINGER-KEARFOTT DIVISION
7^4 ACO RADAR TRANSMITTER* WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC
74AD0 RADAR SIGNAL PROCESSOR WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC
74AF0 RADAR COMPUTER WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC
74AB0 RADAR RECEIVER WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC
74AA0 RADAR ANTENNA WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC

THE WARRANTY APPLIES TO ALL UNITS INSTALLED IN THE FIRST 250 USAF AND THE FIRST
192 EPG PRODUCTION AIRCRAFT AND TO SPARES PROCURED FOR SUPPORT OF THESE AIRCRAFT^

RIW WITH MTBF GUARANTEE

IIA-11
40A/10
 RIW FEATURES

The nine LRUs were warranted for a period of four years or a total of 300,000 aircraft
flying hours, whichever occurred first. The four-year period began with the delivery of the
first production aircraft in January 1979. In case less than 250,000 hours of flying had
been accumulated at the end of the four-year period, the price of the contract was to have
been adjusted downward in accordance with a formula specified in the contract. The table
opposite shows the major features of the RIW contract.

IIA-12
40B/1-16
 MAJOR FEATURES OF THE F-16 RIW CONTRACT

PFSCRIPTION
CHARACTERISTIC

UNITS COVERED NINE DIFFERENT LRUS (5 RADAR)

AIRCRAFT
250 USAF AND 192 EUROPEAN F-16AS AND F-16BS

COVERAGE PERIOD
FOUR YEARS OR 300,000 FLYING HOURS (WHICHEVER OCCURS FIRST)

CONTRACT TIME PRIOR TO FULL-SCALE PRODUCTION

AIR FORCE LOGISTICS MANAGER OGDEN AIR LOGISTICS COMMAND (ALC)

PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES
UNITED STATES. BELGIUM. DENMARK. NORWAY, AND THE NETHERLANDS

CONTRACTOR
GENERAL DYNAMICS (PRIME) WITH FOUR SUBCONTRACTORS

PRICE
RANGE FROM 2% TO 6% PER YEAR OF LRU COST
RADAR TRANSMITTER AND HUD PROCESSOR MUST DEMONSTRATE 318 AND
MTBF GUARANTEE
500 HOURS, RESPECTIVELY, BY THE END OF THE WARRANTY

CONTRACT PRICE ADJUSTMENT APPLICABLE IF FLYING HOURS ARE LESS THAN 250.000 IN 4 YEARS
FOR FLIGHT HOURS SHORT-
FALL
TURNAROUND-TIME REQUIREMENT 22-DAYs AVERAGE (DEPOT)

FAULT ISOLATION AT BASE YES

IIA-13
40A/11
 SOURCE SELECTION

Reliability and maintainability were key factors in the RFP, which specified a support-
able radar system with the following supportability characteristics: accessibility, ST/BIT,
I-level testability/repairability, etc. Considerations included lower ownership costs of
the radar by reducing downtime and by requiring fewer maintenance resources.
In source selection and evaluation over a 3-month period, reliability engineering
provided four full-time members: two for reliability problems, one for RIW, one for parts
control and standardization. In addition, life-cycle cost and thermal design engineering
provided at least one member. Maintainability engineering provided two members. Contractor
inquiries and modification requests were sent to applicable functional engineering groups
for additional information for evaluation. These members were also part of the team at ■
negotiations with each competing vendor and required a meeting from each competitor relative
to the design and testing of TWTs, as well as the requirement for random vibration. Here
again, requirements were reaffirmed and failures defined. Reliability was a key factor in
all computations of life-cycle costs.

IIA-14
40B/1-17
 SOURCE SELECTION

R&M KEY FACTORS IN RFP

COMPETITION FORCED ACCEPTANCE OF STRINGENT REQUIREMENTS

CONTRACTOR PERCEIVED R&M A KEY FACTOR

REQUIRED RIW/MTBF GUARANTEE COMMITMENT

R&M EVALUATED ON AN EQUIVALENT BASIS WITH OTHER TECHNICAL FACTORS

R&M PRIMARY MEMBERS OF SELECTION COMMITTEE

41/12
IIA-15
 LIFE-CYCLE COST

Reliability and maintainability are driving forces in life-cycle cost. A major concern
in the APG-66 radar development program, relative to LCC, was the TWT. Problems identified
on earlier radar programs led to this concern. As a result, separate tests for the TWT
were required in addition to the design requirements for simplicity, ease of maintenance
and reliability. Data submitted by WEC in response to the RFP were analyzed by General
Dynamics and the Air Force using cost models specifically designed to measure LCC.

IIA-16
40B/1-19
 LIFE-CYCLE COST — AN IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION

DRIVING FORCE
- RIW/TLSC COD OPTION
- CONTRACTUAL RADAR R8M REQUIREMENTS

SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR ANALYSIS

SERVED AS BASIS FOR COST INCENTIVES/DESIGN TO COST

INFLUENCED DESIGN TO OPTIMIZE R&M

41/13 iiA-17
MANAGEMENT

IIB-l
 MANAGEMENT

Management is the second of the five areas identified as important to producing high
quality military equipment. The three major facets of management shown are discussed in
the pages following.

IIB-2

40B/1-21
 MANAGEMENT

• ORGANIZATION

• CONTROL & EMPHASIS

• SUBCONTRACTORS/SUPPLIERS

41/18
IIB-3
 MANAGEMENT

Management commitment to and involvement in reliability and maintainability objectives

set the stage for success early in the program. A management level organization was
structured with Support Requirements/Q&RA Managers and RIW Managers reporting to Vice
Presidents at General Dynamics and Westinghouse while working directly with their respective
Radar Program managers.
The reliability and maintainability management functions provided visibility and timely
information for management control. Aggressive and informed management emphasis assured
effective integration of reliability and maintainability considerations into the total
program.

IIB-4

40B/1-22
 EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT LEVEL ORGANIZATION

VP
LEVEL

RADAR SUPPORT
GD RIW <"""■"""""""""> PROGRAM / — __w**«»N
REQUIRE-
MANAGER MANAGER MENTS
PROJECT
ENGR

PRIME
SUB

VP
LEVEL

RADAR
WEC RIW PROGRAM • _«•«*•■ — — — — s
Q&RA
MANAGER MANAGER MANAGER

41/23

IIB-5
 O&RA ORGANIZATION

This chart shows the quality and reliability assurance organization at WEC. The
depth of the organization and how it is tied into the system program manager at the appro-
priate level is reflected.

IIB-6

40B/1-23
 MANAQER
QUALITY AND
RELIABILITY ASSURANCE

R.TO«M$HEND,JR.

lUIANAOER ENQINEERlNQ MANAGER MANAGERISI

MANAGER QUALIrRELASSUR PROG
tTANDARDIZINQ MANAGER QUALITY CONTROL
DUALITY J.E.WHITE-AD
LABORATORY ENQINEERlNQ SYSTEMS EFFECTIVENESS • -CCD

W.W.HILL T.H. HART VJ). MARDNE J.O. ClARKSON R.H. CONQUEST-SOD

CdibntlM Syitim PoUcy K Dkacllo* OkRA Pfoinffl MMIMI HaltablUty t MahitalmbllllY Ptocuramant Quality Englnaarini Oavaiop & Dalino Q&RA Program
Priclilcii Muturtminti SiHMltr* Duality PoHcy 0 Eo^Haarlni Suppllar Evaluation k Quatll. Raquirafflanli
CaltinllM Trtciiblllly Oualliy tnftm Hum • Ra^lianHiiti Sourca Impactlon Q&RA Profnm Tachnical and
Ctlbnllon StivlcM Ouillty PractduiM t DinclKfM • PioframPlaM Incomlni Impactlon.t Taat Managamant Propoul Inpuh
Cuitgnuf InlirUct Ouillty tpwHkillaii Imwyciuibii • Pradlttloii Faodac InapKtIoo Q&RA Program Cntt Eitlmila Rprlaw
MiuurmMiil Divtiopminl ft InptofMnuIlM Raltablllty Tatt hocoAmi Oaialab Q&RAPn-ComrKi Nagollalloniwith
Miuumninl Conwltitlon Ouillly Tninini Faiti Salaclloa Enjlnaarlnf HOL Infraction Cuitomar
NBS LUIwii Qtitlily RtCNdi MalntalnakBlly OamonMtatleii MRB Ceordlnatloo h Racorda Q&RA Prograni Colt and Schadula
Govt Rtf. lUboii ptani/Pracadurat hiapactloa Matkoda Control and yiilbillty
Wwlmuntlilp iMnitrit Salaly Standarda Aaaambly Inapactlon Q&RA Program Anlgnmant ol Q&RA
Ouillly PMlMnuKt Dm t VbUiUlty Salaly Raqulraownta Canllgutatlon Vatlllcatloii Functional Salaclloni Tatli
SEAT Eii|lnHrln| Hatard Idantllktllait Cuttomat Sad'Oil DIrKt and Managa Q&RA Raiounas
iKhnolofV Davtloprntfll MIBIOK MalnlanaiKa Ra<|iilraiMnli Sbifplni Impactlon to Fuinil Contract Raquiramanti
Induiuy Astochllofis Sirau Analyila SEAP Inapactlon & Tail 'Oualliy ContralWtilBidg
SPKW AtlMllM Oaslen Ravfaw Quality Data Raportinf Faadar Impactlon
FiHvn Aiulyilt Dailfii Moidtorlnt Gaga lab
Quality Aaunnca Eii«l«aafln| Spadllcatlon Ravlaw EnglnHrhg MDL Inqiiclign
Quality t Procan Control R&D SubconlrKtor Ravlaw MRB Coordination & Racordi
tyitama & hocaduiaa AudH luBt'lnTail Inipaction Mithodi
Quality Au4IU 0 Raqotninanli Ainmbly InipKllon
ElKlrlcal Partormanct 0 Fault Daiattlon Prailicllena Conllguiatlon Vatllicalion
Evalualloo En|l<wafln| 0 Fault Itolalion Fiadlctlom Cuitomar Sili'OII
MRB Dbpeillloo S Cstractlva Action a Synam Inlanogatlon Ehlpplm Inipaction
Tachnolofy Arat Eaflnaarini 0 Soltwara CaollfUfalloii Quality Data Rapof tin|
Piogram QuaUty Enfintailni Fredttct Qoalllicalloa
PaLFKBiUMnannlmt
MalntalnabBlty
Envlfonmanial Evaluation Tattlnf
Envlronnnntal Tait Piocadutaa
Envlronmantal Toolini
Eftvlronmantal Sampla Tatting
Tait Analyila & Raporti
Oaii|n & FaHura Ravlawa
FaBuia Analyih & Rapoftlni
Quality Data Cafitaf
ATL Quality Aaauranca
0 Inconilni Impactlon t Tut
0 Faadar InspKtion
0 Auambly jnipactlon
0 Quality Control Evaluation
SAoillt
a Quality Control Procadutu
a Manpowar Analyila
0 FKililiaa and Tachnoloiy
0 Quality Standards
• T'llnlni
« Ga|0 Control
IIB-7
 ST/BIT ORGANIZATION

The ST/BIT/Maintainability organization for the APG-66 radar was an integral part of
the design team as depicted in the chart. A BIT/Maintainability engineer was assigned to
each LRU project engineer to assure that the maintainability requirements were met. The
ST/BIT/Maintainability manager was responsible not only to the engineering design manager
but also to the program manager for support functions not directly related to design, per
se.

lIB-8

40C/1-5
 ST/BIT/M Organizational Interface

In-HouseTest LRU Design Team

and Support
Implementation of LRU
Requirements
'Mech Packaging

M Demo Custonner • Self-Test/BIT/Malntaln.

ILS Liaison ability Requirements,
Engineering Analysis, and Design
and Support
'Software Program Liaison
RBP 12/31/80

IIB-9
 PLANNING CONTROL AND EMPHASIS

The O&RA organization has direct access to the Operations Manager in the Systems
Technology Division at Westinghouse. The Operations Manager reports directly to the General
Manager of the Systems Technology Division. O&RA activities are the direct responsibility
of the APG-66 Program O&RA Manager who reports directly to the APG-66 Program Manager. Key
personnel serving as coordinators/directors are assigned to the program by the APG-66 Q&RA
Manager to whom they report for the duration of the program. The O&RA Manager maintains
quality and reliability control over all functions pertaining to the APG-66 fire control
radar from initial quality planning to shipment to the customer. All work affecting quality
is controlled through work instructions published in the functional manuals. Purchasing,
handling, machining, assembling, fabricating, processing, testing, modification, installation
and any other treatment of product or facilities, from the ordering of materials to the
dispatch of shipments, is under continuous quality control.
Quality assurance records are maintained to show that inspections and tests were
performed, to provide information, and to provide management with tools needed to determine
that the program is under control. Some of the more important records include:
1. Assembly/Inspection Control Tags. Used for all serialized units. Verifies that
- ^ - assembly and test operations have been completed. Discrepancies are documented
and must be cleared before hardware is approved. Also indicates and verifies that
approved mods have been incorporated. Provides configuration control for the end
product.
2. PROMPT Receiver Cards. PROMPT I is a mechanized data collection and information
reporting system for material control and manufacturing information. It assists
in following purchased material status from initiation of purchase order to material
disposition.
IIB-10
40B/1-24
 PLANNING CONTROL AND EMPHASIS (Continued)

3. Test Data. Test data and inspection measurements are entered on appropriate
data sheets developed exclusively for a particular operation or test level.
4. Material Rejection Notices (MRN). Rejects procured material when it is unacceptable
toi ncoming inspection or when it is rejected at higher level for reasons of vendor
fault not originally detected at incoming inspection. This record is submitted to
an MRN panel for disposition. Full records are maintained.
5. Material Review Board (MRB) Forms. Documents details of rejection, corrective
action and disposition of non-conforming material that cannot be adequately
reworked. MRB decides how to process such material.
6. Rejection/Failure Documentation. Non-conforming and Defective Material Reports
are used to document defects found after acceptance by incoming inspection. Defect
causes are determined and documented. System is used as a basis for reordering
parts, initiating repairs and recognizing trends that would trigger corrective
action.
7. Failure Analysis Reports (FAR). Delineates details of failure mechanisms and
establishes fault where possible. Trend analysis and records are maintained by
the laboratory.
8. Audit and Corrective Action Reports. Contractor Management System Evaluation
Program (CMSEP) audits are used to determine adequacy and compliance of each
requirement. Audits are randomly scheduled by Quality Systems Evaluation Engineering
and are conducted unannounced. Unsatisfactory conditions thus found are discussed
with the responsible supervisor and a commitment is obtained for corrective action.
Each unsatisfactory condition is reaudited within 10 workdays to ensure that
corrective action has been implemented and is appropriate for long-range correction.
IIB-11
40B/1-25
 PLANNING CONTROL AND EMPHASIS (Continued)

If reaudit shows unsatisfactory condition, next higher level of management is

notified to obtain the needed action.
^' Letters of Complaint. Details nature of a discrepancy and provides supporting
data. May require a formal reply as to the vendor's corrective action.
10. Submittal Records. Material submittal records, final system test logs, and
Assembly/inspection Control Tags will be maintained at the LRU and system levels.
11. Other Records. Physical Configuration Audit, calibration, training, certifica-
tions of personnel and processes, inspection and test stamp control.
Other procedures are set up to provide for maintaining control of the release of
drawings and changes and to control configurations. All assemblies have serial numbers
applied before inspection, and inspection control tags of all subassemblies are kept
together with the higher assembly's control tags. Control tags are kept for a period of
at least three years past the end of the contract.
Test equipment configuration is maintained by the Integrated Logistics Support (ILS)
group. Changes by Engineering are incorporated in the test tools. Initial certification
and compliance/compatibility checkouts of Engineering changes will be performed by a
cognizant Product Evaluation Test Engineer.
Other features of the Westinghouse plans for quality control include controls over "
drawings, serialization controls, test equipment configuration controls, controls over
measuring and test equipment, control over purchases, and evaluation of supplier performance,
source inspection, incoming inspection, certification of critical processes and personnel,
m-process documentation, various stages of inspections, control of registered components,
control of inspector's stamps, material review procedures, etc.

IIB-12
40B/1-26
 PLANNING CONTROL AND EMPHASIS

ACCESS TO OPERATIONS MANAGER

CHAIN OF RESPONSIBILITY

WORK INSTRUCTION MANUALS

QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORDS:

ASSEMBLY/INSPECTION CONTROL TAGS
PROMPT RECEIVER CARDS
TEST DATA
MATERIAL REJECTION NOTICES
MATERIAL REVIEW BOARD FORMS
REJECTION/FAILURE DOCUMENTATION
FAILURE ANALYSIS REPORTS
AUDIT AND CORRECTIVE ACTION REPORTS
LETTERS OF COMPLAINT
SUBMITTAL RECORDS
OTHER RECORDS

TEST EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATION

VARIOUS CONTROL PROCEDURES

40A/'4

IIB-13
 MANAGEMENT EMPHASIS ASSURED INTEGRATION OF R&M

TO assure integration of reliability/maintainability into the design process, each

discipline was required to sign-off all appropriate engineering drawings. Reliability and
Maintainability engineers were also members of the configuration control board, failure
review board and special corrective action teams to assure that design changes had no
adverse impact on reliability and maintainability parameters and that appropriate corrective
action was incorporated for identified problem areas.

IIB-14
40B/1-27
 MANAGEMENT EMPHASIS ASSURED INTEGRATION OF R&M

R&M DRAWING SIGN-OFF

R&M REPS ON CHANGE BOARD

FAILURE REVIEW BOARD

SPECIAL CORRECTIVE ACTION

EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT

IIB-15
40A/5
 PRIME SUB TEAM

During the course of this program confrontational negotiations were avoided. The
notion of team effort was strongly supported at all levels and actions were taken to
make this highly effective action work. For example, Westinghouse, in developing a set of
suppliers, undertook to provide assistance to small business to ensure that their products
were up to the quality level that was needed. To do this they provided motivational meetings
at which F-16 films were shown to the suppliers' employees, and award dinners were given
when goals were met.
On a rare occasion a part supplier was unable or unwilling to make sufficient effort
to provide the quality part that was needed. In such cases, after working with the supplier
to no avail, they were disqualified.

IIB-16
 PRIME. SUB AND SUPPLIER WORKED AS A TEAM

• REQUIREMENTS TAILORED
- TWT -- HIGHLY RELIABLE. 3 TIMES BETTER THAN PREDICTED
BASED ON MIL HANDBOOK 217

• ASSISTANCE -- SMALL BUSINESSES

- MULTIPLIER -- LOW POWER RF LRU

• MOTIVATED SUPPLIERS
- SELECTIVELY

• INTERNAL DESIGN ACTIVITY FOCUSED TOWARD SUBCONTRACTOR

AND SUPPLIERS
- TWT ' ~' ^
- MULTIPLIERS

• IF ALL ELSE FAILS. SUPPLIER DISQUALIFIED

- PHP
IIB-17

41/20
 SPECIAL EMPHASIS FOR TWT

The TWT development program is an example of special emphasis management placed on

system reliability.
During the competition it became evident that the TWT was a high-risk item and a
life-cycle cost driver. The Air Force and GD jointly devised a reliability test for the
TWT and included this test as a requirement in the RFP.
Westinghouse also imposed a reliability growth test on its subcontractors for TWTs.
As a result of these tests and the subsequent performance of the TWT in field use,
the next generation TWTs for the improved APG-66 has a similar reliability program specified,

IIB-18

40B/1-29
 SPECIAL RELIABILITY EMPHASIS ON TWT

• AIR CnnLED 16 KW PEAK POWER TWT INITIALLY CONSIDERED HIGH RISK COMPONENT

• SPECIAL RELIABILITY TESTING IMPOSED BY RADAR CONTRACT TO REDUCE RISK

^ 3000 HOURS TESTING ON 3 TUBES
/ ONLY ONE FAILURE ALLOWED
/ IF TEST FAILED, TUBE WAS TO BE IMPROVED AND TEST RERUN UNTIL TUBES
PASSED TEST
V 3 SOURCES OUALIFIED

• THE RESULT WAS EXCELLENT

/ CURRENT FIELD EXPERIENCE ON TWT DURING 45.000 FLIGHT HOURS SHOWS

- 1600 HOURS MEAN FLIGHT TIME BETWEEN FAILURE (-2250 HOURS MTBF)
/ PREDICTED MTBF BASED ON MIL-HDBK-217 IS 500 HOURS - -

SPECIAL RELIABILITY EMPHASIS RESULTED IN

FIELD PERFORMANCE OVER FOUR TIMES HIGHER
THAN THE PREDICTED TWT MTBF

i|l/26-l IIB-19
 DESIGN

IIC-l
 DESIGN FACTORS

System design is the fundamental element in achieving a supportable system. Key

factors in the system design are listed on the facing page and described in subsequent
charts.

IIC-2

40B/1-30
 DESIGN FACTORS

REQUIREMENTS

ALTERNATIVE STUDIES

DESIGN ANALYSES

PARTS AND MATERIAL SELECTION AND CONTROL

DERATING CRITERIA

THERMAL AND PACKAGING CRITERIA

ST/BIT MECHANIZATION AND GROWTH

FEATURES TO FACILITATE MAINTENANCE

^1/21
IIC-3
 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS

The APG-66 design requirement was developed cooperatively by both the Air Force and
General Dynamics considering experience on previous programs, the state of technology at
that time and the complexity involved. Requirements were determined to be compatible with
both mission and support needs and these were documented in the contractual statements
which were then given to GD and WEC.
Flexibility was considered a key parameter in the multi-level specification requirements
of a CFE development. The top specification which defines the weapon system performance
was supported by lower-level subsystem requirements. In the case of the APG-66 FCR, the
16ZE009 GD document contained a detailed level of performance requirements. The avionic
system specification necessary to effect weapon delivery accuracy is the next higher level
document. The flexibility existed wherein a difficult radar requirement could be analyzed
singly and in conjunction with avionics requirements. This flexibility made it possible to
modify the radar requirement and still not affect weapon delivery or to modify the avionics
mechanization without adversely affecting the radar. The system was designed from the top
down, thereby avoiding unrealistic subsystem requirements that have little or no weapon
delivery system effects.
Reliability Demonstration requirements were established and enforced using specific
accept/reject criteria. For example, the FSD RQT failed once and corrective action was
implemented before the test was restarted. As another example, the production reliability
qualification test and the reliability acceptance tests both failed twice before they were
successfully completed. In each case, a corrective action plan was submitted and approved
before a restart was allowed. This was in fact the case because the contract had firm
requirements vice goals. It should be noted that even for the successful tests, corrective
actions were taken and documented as part of the final report.
IIC-4
40B/1-31
 REQUIREMENTS BASED ON EXPERIENCE AND NEEDS

• DEVELOPED BY AIR FORCE AND GENERAL DYNAMICS

- BASED ON EXPERIENCE ON PREVIOUS PROGRAMS CONSIDERING TECHNOLOGY

AND COMPLEXITY DIFFERENCES

- COMPATIBLE WITH MISSION AND SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

- DOCUMENTED IN CONTRACT SPECIFICATIONS (009) AND SOW

• SPECIFIED AS FIRM CONTRACTUAL REQUIREMENTS TO GD AND WEC (AIR

VEHICLE SPEC & 009)

• SYSTEM CONTRACTUAL REQUIREMENTS TRANSLATED INTO DESIGN REQUIREMENTS

. BY RELIABILITY & MAINTAINABILITY DIRECTIVES (WEC)

- SUBSYSTEM REQUIREMENTS

- GUIDELINES

- CHECKLISTS

IIC-5
 DESIGN ALTERNATIVE STUDIES

The design process for the APG-66 provided for design alternative studies. One set of
design alternative studies specifically set objectives for improved R&M. In many cases
decisions were made in favor of R&M over performance such as the use of copper heat sinks
in some applications on the DSP rather than aluminum. This action resulted in increased
weight and cost but increased reliability and subsequently improved life-cycle costs. In
addition, the use of wedgelocks on every board rather than alternate boards increased cost
and weight but was accepted because it enhanced maintainability. A second set, although
undertaken primarily for design-to-cost and weight reduction, provided many fallout benefits
to R&M. These benefits were achieved by including R&M in all design tradeoffs.

IIC-6
40B/1-32
 R&M IMPROVED BY DESIGN ALTERNATIVE STUDIES

DESIGN ALTERNATIVE STUDIES SPECIFICALLY FOR R&M ENHANCEMENT

• MANY DESIGN TRADE-OFFS MADE FOR R&M AT EXPENSE OF

WEIGHT AND COST

• DESIGN ALTERNATIVE STUDIES WITH R&M BENEFITS

• R&M AN INTEGRAL PART OF DESIGN TRADE-OFFS IN EARLY

DESIGN-TO-COST AND WEIGHT REDUCTION STUDIES

IIC-7

^1/50
 STUDIES TO ENHANCE R&M

The next two charts list seven design alternative studies whose purpose was to improve
the R&M of the APG-66 radar. Note that some of these studies involved an improvement to
the design of a previous system's component to scale it down for use in the APG-66.
Typically, in such an improvement the number of parts involved was reduced, thereby increas-
ing the potential MTBF. Sometimes, however, as in the case of relocating a heat exchanger,
the primary purpose was to obtain better cooling and therefore lower temperatures in the
component involved.

IlC-f

40B/1-33
 DESIGN ALTERNATIVE STUDIES AIMED AT ENHANCING R&M

MAINTAINABILITY
DESCRIPTION PURPOSES RELIABILITY IMPACT IMPACT
INVERTER DESIGN REDUCE PARTS PARTS COUNT REDUCED
IMPROVEMENT FROM COUNT FROM 350 - 230
SCALED-DOWN AWACS
DESIGN REDUCE WEIGHT

A/D CONVERTER REDUCE PARTS PARTS COUNT REDUCED

DESIGN IMPROVEMENT COUNT FROM i\S2 - 112
FROM SCALED-DOWN
AWACS DESIGN TO NEW REDUCE WEIGHT
DESIGN

COMPARE LIQUID & IMPROVE R&M ELIMINATES LIQUID COOLING SYSTEM COMPONENTS
AIR-COOLED TWT AND THEIR MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS (REDUCE
DESIGNS REDUCE WEIGHT RADAR WEIGHT 8-5 POUNDS)

UPGRADE QUALITY IMPROVE SYSTEM APG-66 MTBF IMPROVED

LEVEL OF 7 MEDs RELIABILITY BY 4 TO 33%
USED EXTENSIVELY
IN SYSTEM

IIC-9

41/^11-2
 DESIGN ALTERNATIVE STUDIES AIMED AT ENHANCING R&M (CONTINUED)

MAINTAINABILITY
DESCRIPTION PURPOSES RELIABILITY IMPACT IMPACT
REPLACE HEAT EX- • BETTER HEAT SINK REDUCE TEMPERATURES SIGNIFICANT - EASIER
CHANGER ON BOTTOM ARRANGEMENT "I" LEVEL ACCESSI-
OF POWER SUPPLY BILITY TO SRUs
WITH VERTICAL EX- • SIMPLIFY MANUF.
CHANGER FROM BACK
TO FRONT THROUGH • REDUCE LCC
CENTER OF UNIT

COMPARE DISTRIBUTED DETERMINE IMPACT DISTRIBUTED POWER FAULT ISOLATION

POWER SUPPLY WITH ON PARTS COUNT & SUPPLY REDUCES PARTS SIMPLIFIED BECAUSE
CENTRAL POWER SUPPLY MAINTAINABILITY COUNT BY >200 LOAD VS. POWER SUPPLY
FOR ALL RADAR LRUs DETERMINATION IS NOT
REQUIRED SINCE BOTH
ARE CONTAINED IN THE
SAME SRU

STRUCTURE DSP SAVE WEIGHT. MTBF OF DSP INCREASED REDUCED REQUIRED

CORNER TURN MEMORY COST. COMPLEXITY BY 15 HOURS BY NUMBER OF BIT TESTS
FOR GROUND MAPPING ELIMINATING NEED FOR TO VERIFY SATISFAC-
MODES SEPARATE MEMORY TORY PERFORMANCE

IIC-ll

41/41-3
 ALTERNATIVE STUDIES WITH R&M BENEFITS

The second set of design alternative studies shows five studies that were intended to
result in reduced costs or reduced weight and which, in addition, produced better R&M
characteristics.

IIC-12

40B/1-34
 DESIGN ALTERNATIVE STUDIES WITH R&M BENEFITS

MAINTAINABILITY
DESCRIPTION PURPOSES RELIABILITY IMPACT IMPACT

SHOULD UNIPHASORS BE ELIMINATE COMPLEX FAILURE RATE REDUCED ELIMINATES HARMONIZA-

FURNISHED IN MATCHED MATCHING NETWORKS 88% TION REQUIREMENTS
SETS OF 4?
REDUCE ACQUISITION
COSTS

SHOULD PARAMETRIC REDUCE RECURRING FAILURE RATE REDUCED SIGNIFICANT IMPROVE-

AMPs BE REPLACED SYSTEM COSTS 66% MENT
WITH FETs?
REDUCE WEIGHT 13% INCREASE IN LRU
MTBF

SHOULD THE SEPARATE REDUCE COST FAILURE RATE REDUCED REDUCE "I" LEVEL
VCO AND BEACON LO 16% FAULT ISOLATION
OPERATING IN SAME REDUCE WEIGHT AMBIGUITY
FREQUENCY RANGE BE
COMBINED IN ONE
PACKAGE?

SHOULD A ^K BIT RAM REDUCE SRUs FROM FAILURE RATE REDUCED IMPROVED
BE SUBSTITUTED FOR ^ TO 2 18%
EXISTING IK BIT RAMS
IN DSP CT & SC/ REDUCE COST
MEMORY BOARD LRU MTBF INCREASED
REDUCE WEIGHT

ASSESS BENEFITS OF REDUCE COSTS INCREASED INHERENT

SINGLE CHANNEL MTBF BY 54 HOURS
RECEIVE & PROCES- REDUCE WEIGHT
lie-13
SOR

41/41-4
 DESIGN ANALYSES

Proven reliability and maintainability design analyses were performed early in the
design phase and updated as the design progressed to:
• Assure achievement of reliability and maintainability requirements
• Maintain current estimates of radar reliability and maintainability characteristics
• Evaluate impact of changes on reliability and maintainability
• Provide reliability and maintainability inputs for use in design trades, life-cycle
cost, and sparing analyses
A list of analyses performed is provided on the facing page.

IIC-14

40C/1-6
 DESIGN ANALYSES

RELIABILITY MAINTAINABILITY

RELIABILITY PREDICTIONS QUANTITATIVE MAINTAINABILITY ANALYSIS

APPORTIONMENTS MAINTAINABILITY PREDICTIONS
THERMAL ANALYSIS OPTIMUM REPAIR LEVEL ANALYSIS
ELECTRICAL/MECHANICAL STRESS ANALYSIS ST/BIT EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS
FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS TEST TOLERANCE ANALYSIS

lie-15

^1/51
 PARTS PROGRAM TO IMPROVE RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY

Aggressive Parts Control and Standardization—Parts requirements imposed on all new

designs by specific requirements in the equipment specifications and by statements of work.
All subcontractor and in-house parts selections reviewed for military standard part. Full
government support provided to develop new military standards for multiple use parts.
Achieved State-of-the-Art Design and Commonality—The F-16 Parts Control Board main-
tained contact with Rome Air Development Center (RADC) for state-of-the-art device recom-
mendations. Commonality was achieved by selecting, based on RADC recommendations, the
preferred state-of-the-art device such as the microprocessor for all equipments to use.
Enhanced Manufacturing Producibility and Field Repairability—Enhanced manufacturing
producibility and field repairability by requiring maximum use of military standard parts
and standard packaging such as dual-in-line microcircuits.
Required Support Equipment and Trainers to Utilize Sames Parts as Aircraft—All new
and peculiar designs are required to select parts from the F-16 Program Parts Selection
List the same as the aircraft.
Program Adopted as Model for Future Programs—The F-16 program proved that Parts
Control and Standardization is cost effective for aircraft, support equipment and trainers.
The F-16 program also developed several innovative approaches such as a formal Part
Substitution Board and the use of DESC drawings. Military specifications are being revised
to incorporate F-16 techniques.

IIC-16

40C/1-7
 PARTS PROGRAM TO I|viPROVE RELIABILITY ANP MAINTAINABILITY

• AGGRESSIVE PARTS CONTROL AND STANDARDIZATION

• ACHIEVED STATE-OF-THE-ART DESIGN AND COMMONALITY

• ENHANCED MANUFACTURING PRODUCIBILITY AND FIELD REPAIRABILITY

• REQUIRED SUPPORT EQUIPMENT AND TRAINERS TO UTILIZE SAME PARTS AS AIRCRAFT

• PROGRAM ADOPTED AS MODEL FOR FUTURE PROGRAMS

IIC-17
^1/29-1
 AGGRESSIVE PARTS CONTROL AND STANDARDIZATION PROGRAM

Use of high failure rate electromechanical parts was limited for all F-16 avionics.
For the radar this resulted in use of only six potentiometers, two relays and four motors.
Commonality was forced by reducing number of standards available to designers and
subcontractors. The F-16 Program Parts Selection List was established after a comprehensive
review of military specifications. The number of standards was reduced to only those with
established reliability requirements.
Several microcircuit technologies were eliminated from the parts selection list. The
F-16 Parts Control Board reviewed the microcircuit industry and established that the low
power shottky technology would be the leading technology for the 1980s. The 54H and 54L
technologies were eliminated from the PPSL. The dual-in-line microcircuit package was
selected over the flat pack.
Fastener types were reduced from 226 to 47 and the fastener recess standardized.
The military standards available for designers to select from were reduced to those
with established reliability requirements.
All variations from the selection list required detail justification such as the design
parameter necessitating the nonstandard. This justification was reviewed by the prime
contractor, the military review agency and finally by the F-16 Parts Control Board.
All part requests were reviewed for multiple usage. If two or more subcontractors ~ ^
used the same part, the review agency recommended that a military standard be developed for
the part.

IXC-18

40C/1-8
 AGGRESSIVE PARTS CONTROL AND STANDARDIZATION PROGRAM

• USE OF HIGH FAILURE RATE ELECTROMECHANICAL PARTS LIMITED IN THE F-16

BY A VERY AGGRESSIVE STANDARDIZATION PROGRAM

• FORCED COMMONALITY BY REDUCING NUMBER OF STANDARDS AVAILABLE TO

DESIGNERS AND SUBCONTRACTORS

• ELIMINATED SEVERAL MICROCIRCUIT TECHNOLOGIES FROM SELECTION LIST

• REDUCED TYPES OF FASTENERS FROM SELECTION LIST

• LISTED ONLY ESTABLISHED RELIABILITY MILITARY STANDARDS

• JUSTIFICATION REQUIRED FOR ANY VARIATION FROM SELECTION LIST

• REVIEWED VARIATIONS FOR COMMON USAGE TO BECOME MILITARY STANDARDS

• WORKED WITH DEFENSE ELECTRONICS SUPPLY CENTER TO DEVELOP NEW DESC

DRAWINGS TO REPLACE MULTIPLE NONSTANDARD PART DRAWINGS

IIC-19

40/7
 PARTS PROGRAM

A film describing the F-16 parts program was produced by DLA to describe the program
they believed to be a model. The film is available through DESC-EP.

IIC-20

40/1-52
 MODEL PARTS PROGRAM

' FILM DOCUMENTATION

• DLA TO DOD

• AVAILABLE THROUGH
DESC-EP

IIG-21
41/39 .
 DERATING

The General Dynamics reliability specification for subcontractors of F-16 major

electronic/electrical equipment, 16PP137 , required derating be implemented by Westinghouse.
Each piece part had to be derated consistent with its intended use, specified environment
and contribution to equipment unreliability. This information was used for a detailed
reliability prediction for the equipment at the piece part level using operating stress
and temperature environments. This piece part prediction was used to establish the predic-
tion for each higher level assembly and was kept current with design development. Derating
was reviewed at the PDR/CDR and reliability design reviews. Thermal derating was evaluated
during thermal verification tests.

IIC-22

40B/1-42
 DERATING VITAL TO RELIABLE DESIGN

• GD CONTRACT REQUIRED WEC TO FORMULATE DERATING POLICY

• RADAR PROGRAM PLAN ESTABLISHED POLICY

• Q&RA DIRECTIVE IMPLEMENTED POLICY

• REVIEWED DURING PDR/CDR

• VERIFIED BY RELIABILITY DESIGN REVIEW AND STRESS

ANALYSIS AS DESIGN PROGRESSED

IlC-23

41/28-1
 DERATING CRITERIA

A Westinghouse Q&RA directive dated 6 November 1975 establishes the Parts Derating
policy for the APG-66 radar. This policy states that the purpose of derating is to select
a part so that the manufacturer's rating of that part is well in excess of the stress values
that the part will actually experience in service in order to decrease part failure rate
The following tables present examples of the kinds of derating criteria that were used.

IIC-24

40B/16
 APG-66 RADAR DERATING POLICY
EXAMPLES FROM Q&RA DIRECTIVE: R-3

MICROCIRCUITS 60% RATED JUNCTION TEMPERATURE

TRANSISTORS
DIODES 60%

RESISTORS
COMPOSITION 50% RATED POWER (FOR A GIVEN TEMPERATURE)
WIRE WOUND. ACCURATE 50%
WIRE WOUND. POWER 20% " "

CAPACITORS
CERAMIC 60% RATED VOLTAGE
TANTALUM. SOLID 60% ^ «

IIC-25
i|l/28-2
 DERATING FOR COILS. CHOKES AND TRANSFORMERS

MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE PERCENTAGE OF

MANUFACTURER'S STRESS RATIO
VOLTAGE CURRENT
MAXIMUM TRANSIENT OPERATING
COIL. INDUCTOR SATURABLE REACTOR 50% 90% 60%
COIL-RADIO FREQUENCY FIXED 60% 90% 70%
INDUCTOR GENERAL 60% 90% 70%
TRANSFORMER. AUDIO 60% 90% 70%
TRANSFORMER PULSE. LOW POWER ' 60% 70% 60%
TRANSFORMER. POWER 60% 90% 70%
TRANSFORMER. RADIO FREQUENCY 60% 90% 60%
TRANSFORMER. SATURABLE CORE 60% 90% 60%

I (APPLIED)
STRESS = I (ALLOWED)

PERCENT = (1-STRESS) x 100

DERATED

lie-27
40/8
 THERMAL ANALYSIS AND VERIFICATION

Thermal analysis and verification was an important aspect of the APG-66 design. The
process is illustrated on the facing page.
The Air Force and GD established a practical limit of 140°F exit air temperature for
the F-16. Forced-air-cooled electronic equipment was provided cooling air from the environ-
mental control system to achieve the desired exit air temperature. This reduced exit air
temperature by approximately 20°F relative to earlier GD aircraft. To further enhance
reliability, the higher-powered components were placed nearest the edge or coolest part of
the SRU where possible and copper heat sinks were used in several locations rather than
aluminum since they conduct heat to the cooling plate much better than aluminum. After
these design features were incorporated, thermal verification tests were conducted to
assure that the analyses were valid.
Two test conditions were established for laboratory thermal verification. These
conditions were:
- Radar at maximum heat dissipating mode
- Test conditions
TEST A TEST B
~ ^ Surrounding air 25° ± 2°C 55° ± 2°C
Cooling air
Temperature 2° ± 2° 40° ± 2°C
Flow rate 7 Ib/min 19 Ib/min
Corrective action was taken if any measurement varied more than ±5°C from predicted
thermal analysis values.
A confirmation of key laboratory thermal values was obtained during flight tests.

IIC-28
40B/1-44
 THERMAL ANALYSES AND VERIFICATION CRITICAL TO IMPROVED RELIABILITY

DEFINE THERMAL VERIFICATION VERIFICATION

THERMAL —> ANALYSIS -> ->
ENVIRONMENT LABORATORY FLIGHT TEST
1 1
f
t

1 1
i 4-
<- , .-
DESIGN

4-

DESIGN fRESULTS __ _. - :: ^ - -

/ RELOCATION OF PARTS
/ RELOCATION OF CIRCUIT BOARDS
/ CHOICE OF HEAT SINK MATERIALS
/ APPORTIONMENT OF COOLING AIR BETWEEN LRUs
IlC-29

41/52
 SELF TEST/BUILT-IN TEST

The F-16 avionic system incorporates a comprehensive fault detection and isolation
capability in support of the standard three level maintenance concept. During the mission,
continuous non-interruptive self testing is utilized to alert the pilot to malfunctions.
After the flight, maintenance personnel can utilize operator initiated built-in-tests (BIT)
for confidence checks and to supplement the self-test fault isolation. These two types of
test (self tests and BIT) provide both the capability to inform the pilot of any faults
that may require his attention or limit his mission and also provide maintenance personnel
with a detailed history and description of avionics failures.

40C/1-9 IIC-30
 SELF-TEST/BUILT-IN TEST
TERMINOLOGY AND MODES OF OPERATION

•
SELF-TEST IS A CONTINUOUS NONINTERRUPTIVE FAULT DETECTION FUNCTION

THAT IS MODE ORIENTED

- CPM: CONTINUOUS PERFORMANCE MONITOR

- NI: NONINTERRUPTIVE

- OFFBAR: TESTS CONDUCTED AT ANTENNA TURNAROUND

• SELF-TEST IS USED TO DETERMINE HEALTH STATUS OF THE RADAR

- SELF-TEST REPORT TO FCC IS A SINGLE BIT REPORT ■

- SELF-TEST FAULT KEYED TO 80 DIFFERENT CHECKS

• BUILT-IN TEST IS A HIERARCHICAL GROUP OF INTERRUPTIVE TESTS THAT

DETECT AND ISOLATE FAILURES TO A SINGLE LRU

- BITRADAR: AUTOMATICALLY INITIATED AT SYSTEM TURN-ON

- BITpcc: PILOT INITIATED VIA A/C FIRE CONTROL NAV PANEL

• PASS/FAIL FILTER PARAMETERS CAN BE DIFFERENT FOR SELF-TEST AND BIT

^1/53 iic-31
 ST/BIT MECHANIZATION

The F-16 APG-66 radar system is packaged into six functional LRUs as indicated in the
facing block diagram. The ST/BIT Software program is an integral part of the Software
Operational Flight Program (OFF) that resides in the radar computer. All ST/BIT control
set-ups and monitoring is done via the system radar digibus/DSP bus—no special command
lines or monitor lines are required for ST/BIT. The ST/BIT fault reports and status are
transmitted to the A/C FCC for display to the operator via the Fire Control Navigation
Panel.

IIC-32

40C/1-10
 F-16 SIMPLIFIED BLOCK DIAGRAM
(ST/BIT MECHANIZATION)

/SBSBSSSQll"^
Antenna |
juarmnmnmMasw^
p.s. Transmitter
Uniphasor T^ _
Driver
Mode I Freq. jgBBE^asBBBBaaam
Pulser
Servo Rarifle '"pTt
^■"P"'^' ! do Inputs
A LVPS 1/0 Anienna!
P.S.JCPUI ,n,er
fl/C
Synchro Inputs
A A ~ »^ —I—
"°|^n Inter
F-16 Avionics

DigiJiiia. DSP Bus L Mux Bus

Analog to SMS
(AIM-9L)

SESSsyDBSBn
,imuiaiiinwaw«ftfffliHM Processor
LPRF Triggers
p.s.
Controller Slalo & Timlr^g
1 Syncl)ronlzer
Video & I
Rec 1
I
I
A/D Conv

PS
!i
p
1
l-Q Bus
b^ I ■ Scan
"O I P'°« • Conv
1 1
RS-170 Video

IIC-33
 F-16 ST/BIT READOUT

The Self-Test function of the F-16 Fire Control System is mechanized to serve a dual
purpose. Not only is the maintenance crew provided with all fault information, but the
pilot receives certain fault information which he may use to determine any degradation in
system performance. To accomplish these functions, two fault reporting schemes are used.
The Maintenance Fault List (MFL) contains the detailed information for all reported faults
while the pilot's fault list (PFL) contains the same information for only those faults that
would be of interest to the pilot. Thus, the PFL is merely a subset of the MFL. A degree
of severity is assigned to each fault which is easily interpreted by the pilot under flight
conditions.

IIC-34
40C/1-11
 F-16 ST/BIT READOUT

• Faulty Subsystem
• Test Number Failed
• Number of Occurrences
(Up to 91
Degree of
SeverifY • Time into Flight of
First Occurrence
(Tenths of Minutel

• Fault Acknowledge
Causes Sequence to
Next Fault

Call Up
Maintenance
Fault List

77 0328V4

IlC-35
 ST/BIT GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT

ST/BIT design, development, integration and check-out was developed in parallel with
system design and mode development. The facing diagram shows the growth and development of
the ST/BIT as a function of time. This concurrent development approach provided the
opportunity to obtain early data on ST/BIT effectiveness and also provided additional test
capability to other engineering test programs such as RQT, RGT, EQT, and flight tests.

IIC-36
40C/1-12
 ST/BIT Growth

% ST/BIT
Complete

lie-37
81-0104-BB-e
 PRE-DEMO FAULT INSERTION

In an effort to get an early evaluation of ST/BIT effectiveness, a fault insertion

program was instituted. The results of these incremental tests are included in the attached
figure. These test results are prior to any formal MIL-STD-471 demonstration and many test/
fix/retest occurrences resulted from this self-imposed WEC program.

IIC-38

40C/1-13
 Pre-Demo Fault Insertion Status

No.ofSRUs Faults Detected No. of Tests

Faulted Faults Inserted Exercised

Antenna 5 54/56 13

LPRF 11 80/120 30

TransnilUe|r 8 27/33 14

DSP 27 958/1090 19

Computer 13 86/103 17

RCP 3 43/60 6

67 1 248 _ oro/ 99
Total
1462"^^'^
lie-39
 FEATURES TO FACILITATE MAINTENANCE

The Avionic Systems on the F-16, including the Radar, are designed around the standard
Air Force three-level maintenance concept: Organizational, Intermediate and Depot. At the
Organizational level (aircraft). Self Test and Built-in-Test are used as the primary tool
to checkout, detect and isolate malfunctions to a Line Replaceable Unit (LRU). The system
is functionally partitioned to facilitate isolating malfunctions to an LRU at the aircraft
level. At the Intermediate level (Avionics Intermediate Shop-AIS), sufficient test points
and access to internal circuits are designed into the system to allow position fault isola-
tion to a single Shop Replaceable Unit (SRU). The third level of maintenance like the AIS
uses automatic test equipment and special features designed into the circuits to provide
positive fault isolation to components on the SRUs. Additional features listed on the
facing page are designed into the hardware and software to accommodate the maintenance
concept.

IIC-40
40C/1-14
 FEATURES TO FACILITATE MAINTENANCE

DESIGNED FOR EASE OF MAINTENANCE

- LRU ACCESSIBILITY

- NO LRU BLIND CONNECTORS

- NO ADJUSTMENTS/CALIBRATIONS (ONLY 1 ADJUSTMENT AT I-LEVEL)

- NO PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE
- DESIGN EMPHASIS TO PRECLUDE IMPROPER INSTALLATION

- LRU/SRU INSTALLATION HARDWARE IS CAPTIVE

- NO ON-AIRCRAFT BORESIGHTING

• ST/BIT RESULTS DISPLAYED IN COCKPIT

- STORED IN NON-VOLATILE MEMORY
- RECALLABLE BY PILOT OR MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL

ill/35 iic-41
 MAINTENANCE CONCEPT

This system was designed for ease of maintenance and compatibility with the standard
three-level maintenance policy.
Organizational Level
Radar fault detection is provided by self-test features integral to the system design,
and reported to the pilot or maintenance personnel via cockpit displays. Self-test is a
continuous, non-interruptive process that requires no operator interaction. upon detection
of a fault, the operator may initiate built-in-test which provides fault isolation to the
failed line replaceable unit (LRU). This LRU is then removed from the aircraft, replaced
with a like serviceable unit, and system operation verified. The maintenance time require-
ments specified for these functions are: <0.5 hour mean corrective task time and 1.0 hour
maximum corrective task time.

IIC-42

40B/1-45
 ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL MAINTENANCE CONCEPT

SELF TEST 95% DETECTION OF MALFUNCTIONS OR OUT-OF-TOLERANCE CONDITIONS

ST/BIT 95% ISOLATION TO FAULTY LRU

• REMOVE AND REPLACE

1N
FAULTY LRU

. FORWARD TO INTERMEDIATE ' LOW SKILL LEVEL REQUIRED-GENERALLY LEVEL THREE

SHOP FOR REPAIR _ _ -

2-9-83-g

lie-43
 MAINTENANCE CONCEPT (Continued)

Intermediate Level
intermediate level maintenance consists of LRU checkout and fault isolation to a shop
replaceable unit (SRU). This is accomplished on the avionics intermediate shop test
equipment. LRU repair consists of removal and replacement of SRUs. Mean and maximum
corrective maintenance task times are specified at 1.0 hour and 2.0 hours, respectively.

IXC-44

40C/1-15
 Intermediate Level Maintenance Concept

• LRU Maintenance Time

- Mean (Met) <1.0 Hour

- Max (Mf^axct)<2.0 Hours

• Avionics Intermediate Test

Station (AIS)
- "^(0% Isolation to
Faulty SRU
- Remove and Replace
Faulty SRU
- Verify Repair of LRU

• Within Skill Level Five

Capability

♦
Repaired LRU Faulty SRU Forwarded to
Returned to Depot for Repair
Base Stores
B1-0104-BB-4
 MAINTENANCE CONCEPT (Continued)

Depot Level
Depot level maintenance consists of SRU checkout and fault isolation to the failed
component(s), and includes all maintenance activity necessary to restore the unit to
serviceable condition. Additionally, any LRUs received from I-level due to NON-SRU failures
(i.e., chassis failures) are repaired at the depot.

IIC-46

40C/1-16
 DFPnT LEVEL MAIMTFMAMCE CONCEPT

SRU FAULT ISOLATION REQUIREMENTS

- SINGLE ELEMENT >80%
- TWO ELEMENTS >85%
- THREE ELEMENTS >90%

DEPOT TEST STATION

- ISOLATION TO COMPONENT
- REMOVE AND REPLACE FAULTY
COMPONENT
- VERIFY REPAIR OF SRU

REPAIRED SRU RETURNED TO STORES

IIC-47

40A/21
 MANUFACTURING

IIEHl
40A/29-4
 MANUFACTURING

The fourth area identified as important to producing high quality military equipment
is in manufacturing or the actual production of the system. A number of techniques were
used by WEC in the production of the APG-66 radar. Key techniques are shown on the
following page.

40B/1-46 IID-2
 MANUFACTURING

EXTENSIVE USE OF ENVIRONMENTAi, STRESS SCREENING (ESS)

/ SUPPLIERS
/ INCOMING PIECE PARTS
/ PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARDS
/ SUB-ASSEMBLIES
/ LINE REPLACEABLE UNITS

SYSTEM LEVEL SAMPLE TEST

/ RQT ENVIRONMENTS
/ SELF IMPOSED BY WEC

• PARTS SUBSTITUTION BOARD - --

/ PART OF PARTS CONTROL PROGRAM
/ ASSURE USE OF RELIABLE SUBSTITUTE PARTS WHEN
SUBSTITUTIONS ARE NECESSARY TO SUPPORT
PRODUCTION LINE

^1/43 IID-3
 ENVIRONMENTAL STRESS SCREENING

Westinghouse followed a screening process they called "Environmental In-Line Testing."

This program was implemented throughout the production test cycle and was required of all
production systems with the objective of minimizing reliability defects and test escapes on
delivered systems.
The program attempted to test at the lowest practical level to avoid rejection at
higher levels (which is always more expensive and time consuming). Environmental testing
is also accomplished at the LRU level for each deliverable LRU. The following environmental
tests were performed in-line: Vendor Assemblies, subjected to thermal cycling; Burn-in and
Selected Special Parameter Tests; and Active Components, from suppliers, undergo performance
tests over a range of temperatures including the extremes specified in MIL-STD-883.
Multiple Chip Hybrid Packages (MHPs) were tested environmentally per MIL-STD-883.
After initial acceptance, the MHPs were baked for 24 hours at 125°C, cycled through ten
repetitive exposures for ten minutes at -55°C, five minutes at room ambient and
ten minutes at 125°C followed by high g acceleration in a centrifuge for one minute. The
number of g's, from 5,000 to 15,000, varied with component size. Leak test and burn-in
followed to remove marginal performers. Burn-in was accomplished using normal dc voltages,
applied for 168 hours at 125°C, followed by the final electrical test at -54°C and +71°C,
in addition to the normal ambient test.
Printed Circuit Boards (PCBs) were tested as follows:
1. Active thermal cycling (-54°C and +71°C)
2. Subassemblies. Two subassemblies, the STALO and the receiver, were designated for
environmental testing with chamber temperature at -40°C and +71°C with
electrical tests occurring at the stabilized temperatures. After the temperature
test the PCB was exposed to random vibration. On completion of one failure-free
cycle, these subassemblies were installed in the LPRF LRU.
40B/1-47
IID-4
 MANUFACTURING

• ENVIRONMENTAL STRESS SCREENING USED EXTENSIVELY

• ASSEMBLY VENDORS - THERMAL CYCLING; BURN-IN; GROSS/FINE LEAK;

OTHER SPECIAL SCREENS

• W INCOMING - MIL STD SEMICONDUCTOR AND ICs PERFORMANCE OVER

TEMPERATURE EXTREMES

• W MHPs - THERMAL SHOCK; THERMAL CYCLING; HI TEMP STORAGE;

ACCELERATED BURN-IN

• PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARDS - HI-LOW THERMAL CYCLING. PERFORMANCE

TEST

• SUB-ASSEMBLIES - HI-LOW THERMAL CYCLING; RANDOM VIBRATION

(COMBINED) ONE FAILURE FREE CYCLE

• LRUs - HI-LOW THERMAL CYCLING. RANDOM VIBRATION (COMBINED);

PERFORMANCE TESTS. ONE FAILURE FREE CYCLE

• FAILURE RESOLUTIONS—ESS FAILURE DATA PROVIDED BY TEST

ENGINEERING TO PROBLEM ACTION TEAMS FOR INVESTIGATION AND
TO PROBLEM ACTION BOARD FOR RESOLUTION
41/33-1
IID-5
 All LRUS receive environmental tests as described above. In the event of a part
failure at the LRU level, the failure and associated corrective action was examined and if
it was determined that the integrity of the particular LRU performance had been affected,
the environmental testing was repeated.
All burn-in data on deliverable LRUs was continuously evaluated to ensure reliability
control and to avoid increasing failure trends. Each LRU must demonstrate one failure-free
cycle prior to delivery (Test Level F). Failure data was provided to the problem action
teams for investigation and to the problem action board for correction.

IID-7

40B/1-
 SYSTEM LEVEL SAMPLE TEST

Beginning in 1983, one radar system per month was selected to undergo combined
environmental testing including thermal cycling, random vibration and power on-off cycling
in accordance with the RQT environmental profile.
The system level sample test was initiated by Westinghouse after completion of
Reliability Acceptance Test to assure that any new problems are identified and corrected
Benefits derived from RAT testing provided the motivation for incorporation of the system
level sample tests.

IID-8

40C/1-17
 SYSTEM LEVEL SAMPLE TEST

• SELF-IMPOSED BY WESTINGHOUSE STARTING JANUARY 1983

• SAMPLE: ONE RADAR PER MONTH

• ENVIRONMENT: SAME AS RQT

/ TEMPERATURE CYCLING

/ RANDOM VIBRATION
/ POWER ON-OFF CYCLING

• LENGTH OF TEST: 5 DAYS/SYSTEM

• OBJECTIVE: TIMELY IDENTIFICATION AND CORRECTION

OF ANY NEW PROBLEM AREAS

IID-9
40A/29-3
 F-16 PARTS SUBSTITUTION BOARD

In 1977, the demand for parts exceeded the supply. Lead time for selected military
standard parts was running 26 weeks to 28 weeks. To ensure that production manufacturing
lines at the contractor and subcontractor were not shut down due to parts shortage, a
formal Part Substitution Board was authorized by the customer and established.
. The Air Force member of the board was selected from the local Air Force Program
Resident Office (AFPRO) and designated the Air Force agent.
• The Chairman of the Board was appointed from the Fort Worth Division Parts Advisory
Council to represent Fort Worth Division management.
• The technical advisor to the board was selected from the Fort Worth Division Parts
Engineering to serve as technical advisor on the acceptability of the part. The
Defense Electronic Supply Center was available for consultation as needed to assure
the best part available was used in the hardware.
• The material member of the board had access to the Fort Worth Division Material
Department to establish facts about the shortage, best available sources and the
implementation of the substitution authorization. The Material Board member was
^^^° ^^^ point of contact for subcontractors' request for substitutions.
Parts Engineering establishes best alternate part by coordination with part suppliers,
DESC and Air Force.
The Part Substitution Board reviewed each substitution request for schedule impact.
The Part Substitution Board examines all part deviations. The board reviews these
deviations to ensure that the best part available is used.

IID-10
40B/1-51
 F-16 PARTS SUBSTITUTION BOARD

• FORMAL BOARD ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW ALL PART SUBSTITUTIONS

(CONTRACTOR AND SUBCONTRACTOR)

• FOUR MEMBERS ON BOARD AT GD/FW

- AIR FORCE (LOCAL)
- CHAIRMAN (MEMBER OF PARTS ADVISORY COUNCIL)
- PARTS ENGINEER
- MATERIAL REPRESENTATIVE

• PARTS ENGINEERING ESTABLISHES BEST ALTERNATE PART OR PARTS

• BOARD APPROVES BEST PART THAT IS AVAILABLE FOR A LIMITED

QUANTITY BUY -- - - - '

• BOARD ALSO REVIEWS PART DEVIATIONS

IID-ll

i|l/i|6
 MANUFACTURING YIELD AND FIELD RELIABILITY

The APG-66 Parts Control Board established the dual-in-line package as the preferred
package for manufacturing and field repairing. The flat pack was being phased out by many
microcircuit manufacturers. Also, the dual-in-line provided the best solution for multi-
layered printed circuit boards.
Studies of the APG-66 manufacturing lines revealed that microcircuits were exhibiting
higher than expected failures during the manufacturing cycle. A check of as-received stock
also confirmed the problem. Management elected to have all APG-66 microcircuits rescreened,
A dramatic reduction of microcircuit failures in manufacturing and field returns resulted.
Industry research revealed that electrostatic discharge was affecting manufacturing
and field reliability. The APG-66 Parts Control Board participated in the industry studies
and the subseguent DOD standards for electrostatic-sensitive devices (ESD). The APG-66
subcontractors were alerted to the problem and corrective action was taken to install ESD
prevention systems.

IID-12
40B/1-41
 MANUFACTURING YIELD AND FIELD RELIABILITY IMPROVED

ESTABLISHED DUAL IN-LINE MICROCIRCUITS AS STANDARD

ESTABLISHED MICROCIRCUIT RESCREEN TO IMPROVE MANUFACTURING YIELD

AND FIELD RELIABILITY

• ESTABLISHED ELECTROSTATIC DAMAGE PREVENTION SYSTEM TO IMPROVE

MANUFACTURING YIELD AND FIELD RELIABILITY

IID-13

^1/29-4 .
TEST & EVALUATION

IIE-l
 TEST EVALUATION SUMMARY

A SUMMARY OF THE FSD AND PRODUCTION ASSETS AND SCHEDULES FOLLOW

itOA/29-6

IIE-2
 TEST & EVALUATION SUMMARY
AP6-66 RADAR

AS? :TS SCHE )ULE

PLANNED ACTUAL PLANNED ACTUAL
FSD
RGT 4 1 5-10/77 7-12/77

PRE-RQT 2 2

RQT 7-10/77
#1 3 2 3-4/78
#2 2 2 4-6/78
PROD-

RGT 0 1 7-11/78 7-11/78

RQT
#1 5 2 3-5/79
_ __ - #2 5 3 11/79-
2/80
#3 3 3 8-10/80

RAT
#1 4 4 11/80-
1/81
#2 2 2 7/81
#3 8 8 11/81-
41B/48 10/82
IIE-3
 The fifth area is Test and Evaluation. A great many different kinds of tests were
used to identify and correct problem areas and verify compliance with specified requirements.
These tests and evaluations are grouped into the following four categories and are described
in more detail in the following pages.

IIE-4
4 OB/1-5 4
 TEST AND EVALUATION

LABORATORY TEST (DEVELOPMENT)

DT&E FLIGHT TEST (DEVELOPMENT)

MOT&E (OPERATIONAL)

IN-SERVICE ASSESSMENT

i^l/32 , . IIE-5
 LABORATORY TESTS

Laboratory testing played a vital role in the maturation of the APG-66 radar. The
ccmbined test activities have resulted in an MTBF, measured in the field, that is closer
to that measured in the laboratory than experienced on previous systems.
The extensive testing not only ferreted out failures but also provided a tool for
verifying the effectiveness of corrective actions. Reliability engineering was responsible
for the reliability testing while maintainability engineering monitored for effectiveness
of ST/BIT, and the hierarchy of tests, and added failure modes above those required in
maintainability demonstration tests. During the testing, a system acceptance test procedure
was run for each mode, and BIT was activated subsequent to each mode text.
Westinghouse management felt strongly that the tests were beneficial since, although
they had met their contractual commitments for formal testing demonstration, they committed
to continue testing one system per month under the reliability test environment to identify
any problems that result from the production process.
Extensive laboratory tests were conducted using FSD and production hardware. Tests
conducted are shown.

IIE-6
40B/2-1
 LABORATORY TEST

RELIABILITY TEST MAINTAINABILITY TEST

FULL SCALE DEVELOPMENT (FSD) TESTS • MAINTAINABILITY DEMONSTRATION TEST

• THERMAL VERIFICATION TEST • ACCEPTANCE TEST: UTILIZES ST/BIT
• RELIABILITY GROWTH TEST CONTINUOUSLY
• RELIABILITY QUALIFICATION TEST • AIS COMPATIBILITY TEST
• RELIABILITY GROWTH/RELIABILITY
QUALIFICATION TWT TEST

PRODUCTION TESTS
• RELIABILITY GROWTH TEST
• RELIABILITY QUALIFICATION TEST
• RELIABILITY ACCEPTANCE TEST

41/31 HE-7
 LABORATORY RELIABILITY TESTING

Reliability testing was performed during development and production in the laboratory
under combined environments including random vibration, rapid temperature excursions and
power on-off cycling with limited use of humidity and altitude environments. The purpose
of the testing was early detection and correction of problem areas and demonstration of
compliance with specified MTBF.
Types of testing included reliability growth and reliability qualification during full-
scale development and reliability growth, reliability qualification and reliability acceptance
testing during production.
Reliability growth testing was performed at the system and equipment level and at the
component level for critical components such as the TWT. An example of the effectiveness
of growth testing is the 23 corrective actions identified during 420 hours of development
growth testing.
Reliability, qualification and acceptance testing was performed at the radar system
level in compliance with MIL-STD-781 test plans. In each case incorporation of extensive
corrective action followed by retests were necessary prior to successful completion.
Corrective action was incorporated for all identified problem areas.

IIE-8
40B/2-2
 APG-66 RADAR IABORATORY RELIABILITY TESTING

PROGRAM APPROACH
PERFORM RELIABILITY GROWTH TESTING FOR EARLY DETECTION AND CORRECTION OF
PROBLEM AREAS — COMBINED ENVIRONMENTS
- TEMPERATURE CYCLING - ALTITUDE CYCLING
- HUMIDITY - POWER ON-OFF CYCLING
- RANDOM VIBRATION
PERFORM EXTENDED TIME REL-QUAL TESTS UNDER TEMPERATURE AND RANDOM
VIBRATION ENVIRONMENT FOR EARLY DETECTION/CORRECTION OF PROBLEM AREAS
AND DEMONSTRATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH SPECIFIED MTBF
PERFORM EXTENDED-TIME REL-ACCEPTANCE TEST UNDER TEMPERATURE AND RANDOM
VIBRATION ENVIRONMENT TO VERIFY RELIABILITY CONTROL
TEST SUMMARY
MI.-S ■D-781B TOIAL NUMBER OF
TYPE " SPECIFIED SYSTEM TEST CORRECTIVE
PHASE TEST PLAN LEVEL MTBF (On) QUANTITY HOURS ACTIONS

FSD GROWTH - 1 420 23

FSD PRE-RQT - F* - 2 470 19

FSD RQT Ill F* 50 2 730 22

PROD. GROWTH - - 1 230 6
PROD. RQT III/IV F* 97 3 720 56

PROD. RAT V F* 97 8 420 48

*TEST LEVEL F EXCEPT LOWER TEMPERATURE LIMIT OF -40°C AND RANDOM VIBRATION
IN LIEU OF SINUSOIDAL.
m/i\2 IIE-9
 TEMPERATURE AND RANDOM VIBRATION PROFILES

Pictorial representation of temperature and random vibration for RQT and RAT is
shown. For the temperature cycling, the following conditions apply:
• During the cooling portion of each cycle the chamber was stabilized at -54°C.
When the point of maximum thermal inertia (as determined by thermal survey) of the
equipment under test reached -40°C, the chamber was then stabilized and maintained
at that temperature for 45 minutes.
• Equipment power, cooling air, and chamber heating were then applied to initiate
the heating portion of the cycle.
• Test time following stabilization at high temperature was one hour and 45 minutes.
• Any cooling air to enhance transition to cold temperature was applied at a
temperature no greater than the existing chamber ambient temperature. Any cooling
air applied to enhance transition from -54°C to -40°C was applied at -40°C.
Cooling air at +27°C was applied at the beginning of the heating portion of each
cycle and was maintained throughout the high temperature portion of the cycle.
• All references to "test time," "test duration," and "equipment operation" are
understood to mean equipment "on-time" for the purpose of calculating MTBF.
— Random vibration was performed during the tests. The duration and test levels were
maintained within ±10% of the values identified in the figure. Vibration was applied
normal to the plane for the majority of the circuit boards contained in the equipment.
The equipment was turned on and operated at -40°C at the start of the high temperature
cycle. After stabilization at high temperature, the equipment was operated at least 1-3/4
hours. The total system operation time was five hours, five minutes for each temperature
cycle. During equipment test time the equipment was cycled through its various modes of
operation.
IIE-10
40B/2-4
 RQT AND RAT WERE ACCOMPLISHED USING
COMBINED ENVIRONMENTS OF TEMPERATURE AND RANDOM VIBRATION

TEMPERATURE RANDOM VIBRATION

fcawitrt*«i»i*—> >

V TlwiiHl lanmr - t-Xt N«l

IHt
2Hf WMin
IHrlMhl-
JHrHMIa

ao 70' SQO 1000 2000

Fraquancy (Hz)
TtitLtvtl 1
T«Tim«* W, (r'Hz) WQ 0/t^ rm»
8min 0.0003 0.0014 1.32G
A mni 0.00042 0.0030 1.94G
2niin aooio 0.0070 2.96G

*Expr«Md M Uin Out of Each Oparadng Hour

' Vikraa lor 14 Mhi Ovi ol fad* OairMmt
Hour par Nqr Pvoaduf*
^ammammm Svtnm Tamil

T, SiMMMiMMn tram loom lo -4a°C

Tj SialMlifMMMi (ram -W°C lo ''I'c

■IlE-11 -J
 RANDOM VIBRATION TEST REPRESENTATIVE OF ACTUAL FLIGHT CONDITIONS

Extensive random vibration was used. The vibration test levels specified in 16PS002
were to be used unless actual data became available. The charts depict both the specified
level from 16PS002 and the current requirement based on measured aircraft vibration levels.

40B/17 ,,,,:_ . ,, I^E-12

CURRENT RANDOM VIBRATION SPECTRUM IS REPRESENTATIVE
-| ORIGINAL"^ ■\ CURRENT"^

• 16PS002 STATES - "F-16" DERIVED VIBRATION

LEVELS WILL BE USED IF LESS SEVERE THAN • DATA PLOTS
THIS SPECTRUM" ARE PEAK G2/HI
FWD AVIONIC
POINTS FROM
BAY - BASIC
FLIGHT TEST DATA
STRUCTURE ATTACH

G^/Hi

.0001

HE-13 BI3B37
 RELIABILITY GROWTH PREDICTION

Westinghouse instituted a reliability growth "test-and-fix" effort as an integral part

of the overall growth program. It was planned that this effort would mature the APG-66
production radar to a demonstrable 100 hours MTBF. The test involved cycling a sample in a
simulated use environment to accelerate the occurrence of failures and then to identify,
analyze, and correct the causes of such failures in a closed-loop cycle. The figure
following shows the intended reliability growth as a function of the program milestones.
The starting point is assumed to be 10% of the predicted inherent MTBF (163 hours for the
FSD system). The first inflection point of this curve represents the level of growth
expected to occur during the early part of FSD as a result of environmental testing and
screening at and below the LRU level. The second inflection point on this chart represents
the level of MTBF expected to be achieved by learning from the combination of environmental
qualification tests and the dedicated reliability growth test.

IIE-14

40B/18-2 -
 RELIABILITY GROWTH PREDICTION

_ PBOpU£TiqN BASELINE PREDICTION

247

FSO BASELINE PREDICTION

163

PRODUCTION QUAL TEST REQUIREMENT

100

FSD DUAL TEST REQUIREMENT

60
DC
3
o PRODUCTION
X
BASELINE
GROWTH

[
1500 2000 10000
100
TEST AND FIX (SYSTEM HOURS) 75-0723-VB-17.J

HE-15
 RELIABILITY GROWTH

A dedicated reliability growth program was planned for a simulated F-16 environment.
Expected values are illustrated. The initial reliability value was assumed to be 10% of'
the predicted inherent reliability, and was predicated on a growth rate (a) of 0.5. This
prediction was based on equipment growth rates attained by Westinghouse on earlier systems.
It was expected to take about 1500 Test & Fix hours to mature the FSD model to achieve
the 60-hour MTBF required. Following this milestone, FSD RQT and continuation of the
dedicated growth test for an additional 500 hours would be accomplished. As illustrated '
in the figure on the previous page, 2000 hours of growth testing was expected to mature
the production model radar to the 100-hour MTBF level. Growth predictions relative to
program events are shown in the following figure.

IIE-16

40B/2-6
 APG-66 RELIABILITY GROWTH HRtUICTIUNS

III!
w tin III!

100 HR
IM

)l -
J
'V^
INTROOUCIIOHOniORE

^OUAMflEOrARTt

Hiir MHR l£

mm

11H -- - "' ' -

?» ""■ — /
II HI

■EICROWTH
4 fiST , UHR 1
fNC. .[Hvmouil.. (to ROT .1 1^ RQI 100 HRrROQl
imaMioav (vtiNTfe ,„.
aEtiCN courif TiOH UNtE cvi.Tm.T
n
rr" Go/rwrii J
lESI

»OIIIV}M

IlE-n
 FSD RELIABILITY GROWTH TEST (RGT)

One system (#6) was used for RGT. The system was tested a total of 420 hours and 23
corrective actions were subsequently taken as a result. Examples of resultant changes are
shown.

40A/24-4
IIE-18
 RELIABILITY GROWTH TESTING LED TO DESIGN IMPROVEMENTS

EQUIPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT

• BLOCK 11 SYSTEMS - 651 HOURS OF TEMPERATURE VARIANCE, HUMIDITY AND FROST.

RANDOM VIBRATION. AND ALTITUDE CYCLING
• TRANSMITTER - 425 HOURS OF TEMPERATURE CYCLING, ALTITUDE CYCLING AND
RANDOM VIBRATION
• LPRF - 30 HOURS OF RANDOM VIBRATION AND ACOUSTIC NOISE
• TWT - 950 HOURS OF RANDOM VIBRATION AND TEMPERATURE CYCLING

EXAMPLES OF RESULTANT CHANGES

• VIBRATION
• Component Adhesive Added to Prevent Breaking Leads
•Special Mounting for Larger Components
• Special Cable Tie-Downs
• Specified Internal Torque Requirements
• TEMPERATURE RELATED
• DSP Power Supply Redesign
• Computer Power Supply Redesign
• Computer EPROM and Auxiliary Board Redesign
• Increased Screening of Microcircuits
• Purging of Bad Lots of Ceramic Capacitors and Microcircuits
•OTHER
•Redesign of Mission Phase Circuit
• Redesign of Antenna Band Holding Fixture
• Redesign of Transmitter Pressure Vessel

HE-19
 FSD RELIABILITY GROWTH (Continued)

Typical test cycles used during RGT are shown,

IIE-20
 «aaaFT

KHM I—I'r W.TITUDE

Si 0

2 -O

1
W 13 20 S x
TWE mous
Reliability GxuwtL T-A-H Test Cycle - 2 Cydea Prior
to and after Testing and after £ae2i 200 Hours of Operation
44J«C
•40

•n

•39

FLOW RATES AS OESmtBEO IN S?EC

STSOFF »■■ SYS ON

J. J_ _L _L
U 12 U IS II a s 2«
TIME-HOURS 75.B723-VA-7U1

IIE-21 System Cooling Air Cycle for Reliability GxtiwOi

T*A>H Test Cycle
 FSD PRE-ROT TESTING

Prior to the initiation of Reliability Qualification Testing, Westinghouse performed

environmental integration testing to identify and resolve problems. This pre-RQT testing
was expected to improve the probability of passing the RQT. Two systems were tested (SYS 9
& 10) for a total of 470 hours. Nineteen corrective actions were subsequently incorporated,
Failure types and corrective action taken are shown on subsequent charts.

IIE-22
40A/24-5 , ;
 FSD PRE-RQT FAILURES AND CORRECTIVE ACTION

CORRECTIVE ACTION INCORPORATED

LRU TYPE FAILURE CONFIGURATION "A' CONFIGURATION "B'

NO.
1 DSP Power Supply-Tripped YES - Design
Breakers (Cold)

2 COMPUTER Power Supply-Automatic

Shutdown "Volts Good" Up YES - Design
Before 5V Up (Cold)

3 ANTENNA Bit III (Circos)-Cold- YES - Design & Screen

Op Amp Slew Rate

4 ANTENNA Waveguide Leak-Cold YES - Design One Vendor

5 ANTENNA ST/Bit "Azelon"-Cold- ROT Selected Systems-Design YES

Thermistor Impedance

6 ANTENNA Rotary Joint Leak-Cold YES - Design

7 LPRF Microprocessor Fails to YES - Test Procedure Change

Start-Cold

8 LPRF Excessive False Alarms- YES - Part Purge

Cold Resistor Pack

9 COMPUTER Capacitor Short-Power YES - Part Purge

Supply-Hot

10 LPRF ST/Bit Xmit Cal-Hot YES-DesignSWPatch

11 TRANSMITTER Bit 4434-Hot-lon Pump YES - Design

I Power Supply
BI3932

IIE-23
 FST PRE-RQT SYSTEMS 9 AND 10 FAILURES
AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (CONTINUED)

CORRECTIVE ACTION INCORPORATED

NO. LRU TYPE FAILURE CONFIGURATION "A" CONFIGURATION "B"

12 LPRF False Alarms-Hot-Resistor

YES - Part Purge See 8
Pack

13 COMPUTER R2 Broken Loose-Vibration YES - Application Proced

14 ANTENNA Boresight Shift-Vibration YES - Design

15 ANTENNA Drive Band Broke-Vibration YES - Design

16 DSP ST/Bit "Ext Wat"Vibration YES - Adjust Procedure

Power Supply

17 ANTENNA Broken Lead Digibus MHP- YES - Assembly Spec

Vibration
.

18 TRANSMITTER Pressure Vessel Leak at YES - New Test Equip

Cover

19 ANTENNA Flex Cable Damage YES - Design

dl9»S3

IIE-25
 FSD RELIABILITY QUALIFICATION TEST

At the completion of FSD growth testing, Westinghouse was required to demonstrate

full compliance with the specified APG-66 radar reliability requirement of 60 hours MTBF
(70 hours excluding ground modes). The test was conducted in accordance with MIL-STD-781B,
Test Level F as modified by the contract. Three radar systems were required to be tested.
The test duration depended on the number of failures, and the environmental schedule includ-
ing vibration as contractually specified was to be followed. The results of the RQT are
shown in the following table.

APG-66 RADAR RELIABILITY QUALIFICATION TEST (RQT)

Test Relevant
Test Type Attempt No. Hours Failures Corrective Actions*

ROT 1 33 3 (failed) 3
2 721 13 (passed) _23
26

'Corrective actions were taken for failures that occurred during set-
up for RQT, RQT and troubleshooting periods.

Relevant failures and subsequent corrective actions are itemized on subsequent charts,

40B/2-9 "■'' ■ '" ■'

IIE-26
 APG-66 RADAR FSD RELIABILITY QUALIFICATION TEST
PASS/FAIL CRITERIA
SPECIFIED HTBFfe ) 60HRS
o
TEST PLAN III

18 1
REJECT
PASSED
16 «; F r n N n
•
^
y -1 ATTEMPT

/
14

(/> /
12

10
\ y^ CONTINUE
TEST
•
\y
y
a *'
Ui
en
8 — FAILED
•
1
J ^/
>

FIRST
ATTEMPl y ^^\ /
ACCEPT

a
»-
6

'/A Y' __
r
// - —
.'
4 1 1
/ y^ • DESIGN COfERECTIONS
2 n ^
/^

\ ^^
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800

TOTAL TEST TIME IN HOURS

IIE-27
 INITIAL FSD RQT
FAILURES AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

CORRECTIVE ACTION CORRECTIVE ACTION

INCORPORATED INCORPORATED
NO. LRU TYPE FAILURE CONFIGURATION "A" CONFIGURATION "B"
1 LPRF Bit PLOKFL - Vibration YES - Design

2 COMPUTER Broken Lead Power Supply YES - Design

Vibration

3 DSP False Alarms YES - Design

BIStSS

IIE-29
 RQT FOR THE TWT

During the competition for a radar supplier it became evident that the TWT was a high-
risk item and likely to be a cost driver. The Air Force and GD jointly devised a reliability
test for the TWT and included this test as a requirement in the RFP. Westinghouse, as the
successful contractor, then further imposed a reliability growth test on their subcontractors
for TWTs. Up to this time no production air-cooled TWT had ever been flown. But for
reasons of weight and simplicity, WEC decided that an air-cooled TWT would be desirable for
the F-16 application. Their specification for potential suppliers included the need for a
reliability growth program. As a result of the subsequent performance of the TWT in field
use, the next generation of TWT on the improved APG-66 also has a similar reliability
program specified. The resulting design currently has demonstrated four times the MTBF
that had originally been predicted and three suppliers have been qualified to provide such
a TWT. The high reliability is even more impressive when one considers that the failures
of a number of TWTs were maintenance-induced, i.e., waveguides were not connected properly
and the subsequent loss of pressurization caused repeated arcing that cracked the TWT
window. ,. — _

IIE-30

40B/2-8
 TWT RELIABILITY QUALIFICATION TEST

PURPOSE
DEDICATED RELIABILITY TESTING BECAUSE THIS IS THE FIRST PRODUCTION AIR COOLED TWT

FOR AIRBORNE USE AND IS A MAJOR LIFE-CYCLE COST DRIVER

REQUIREMENT

• 3 TUBES FOR A TOTAL OF 3000 HOURS

• 1 ALLOWABLE FAILURE

• TEST LEVEL "F" OF MIL-STD-781B EXCEPT LOWER TEMPERATURE -40°C AND RANDOM

VIBRATION

RESULTS ^
3 TUBES COMPLETED 3080 OPERATIONAL HOURS. 300 COLD STARTS. 35 HOURS RANDOM

VIBRATION TO 4-9 G'S (RMS)

NO FAILURES

41/49 IIE-31
 PRODUCTION RELIABILITY GROWTH TEST

One production system (#20) was used to accomplish production reliability growth
testing. Production growth testing was implemented to further mature radar reliability
after development RQT and prior to production RQT. Environments included temperature
cycling, power on-off cycling and random vibration. RQT performance measurement procedures
were used. However, temperature and vibration profiles were used to increase stress levels
and radar power-on time efficiency.

IIE-32
40B/2-28
 PRODUCTION RELIABILITY TEST

EQUIPMENT & ENVIRONMENT

• ONE SYSTEM - PRODUCTION SYSTEM #20

• 230 TEST HOURS

• TEMPERATURE CYCLING
1^ PROFILE A EMPHASIZED TURN-ON STRESS AT COLD TEMPERATURE (-40°C)
-^ PROFILE B EMPHASIZED HIGH TEMPERATURE STRESS (+71°C)
• RANDOM VIBRATION - 14 MINUTES/OPERATE HOUR FROM 20 TO 2000 HZ
"I 8 MINUTES AT IGRMS
^ 4 MINUTES AT 2-6GRMS
^ 2 MINUTES AT 4-6GRMS

EXAMPLES OF RESULTANT CHANGES

• VIBRATION
^ DEDICATED GROUND WIRE ADDED
^ ASSEMBLY AND INSPECTION IMPROVEMENTS INCORPORATED
• TEMPERATURE ^
^ CAPACITANCE INCREASED ON POWER TRANSFORMER
• OTHER
"I DIGITAL SIGNAL PROCESSOR TESTS ADDED
^ PROCESS AND DESIGN CHARGES INCORPORATED TO CORRECT
TRANSMITTER HIGH VOLTAGE DIODE BLOCK PROBLEM

40B/2-26

IIE-33
 PRODUCTION RQT

Westinghouse was required to demonstrate full compliance with the specified requirement
of 100 hours MTBF (125 hours excluding ground mapping modes). This production RQT was to
be conducted in accordance with the test plan used for FSD, and was performed on 5 of the
first 25 deliverable production radars. Compliance with MIL-STD-781B was demonstrated
when Test Plan III accept criteria for number of failures versus operating times were met.
The results of the Production RQT are also shown in the following table.

Test Total Relevant Corrective

Attempt No. Hours Hours Failures Actions

Prod ROT 1 80 192 4 (failed) 21

2 229 364 6 (failed) 24
3 271 400 2 (passed) 10
55

Sixty-five corrective actions were made for failures that occurred during RQT as well as
for problems identified while troubleshooting.

IIE-34
40B/2-10
 RADAR PRODUCTION ROT PASS/FAILURE CRITERIA
SPECIFIED MTBF (eo) = 97 HOURS
TEST PLAN IV*

7
RQT#2 y
e
h
,.'••
CO
UJ
oc
=3
;JECT I
CONTINUE TEST
..'"
u. RQT#1
o I
^^ .^
UJ
\ .•• •
I

-r
^
ACCEPT
£ 2
^X
RQT#3
I I
■

I
■

0 J
100 200 300 400 500
TOTAL TEST TIME IN HOURS
2-9-83-7 *RQT #1 and #2 were conducted using Test Plan III.

HE-35
 PRODUCTION RELIABILITY ACCEPTANCE TESTS

Reliability acceptance testing (RAT) began on November 17, 1980 and was completed on
September 30, 1982. Two attempts resulted in reject decisions. Testing was conducted in
accordance with MIL-STD 781B, Test Plan V, Level F, amended to include random vibration and
a lower test temperature of -40°C. RAT 3 demonstrated that the radar meets the specified
MTBF (9o) of 97 hours.

HE-36

40A/22-1
 APG-56 PRODUCTION RELIABILITY ACCEPTANCE TESTS

I I ' ' I ' ' I ' I ' ' ' ' I ' ' ' I ' ' ' I

-RAT 3

TOTAL NUMBER
OF FAILURES

RAT 2

I I I II I I I
100 200 300 400 500

TOTALTESTTIME (HOURS)

HE-37
 RELIABILITY ACCEPTANCE TEST

The first Reliability Acceptance Test was initiated on November 17, 1980 and was
stopped on January 28, 1981. Four systems were used for the test.
A test reject condition was reached when the fifth test failure occurred at the 75-
hour test point. During the 161 hours of reference testing and troubleshooting (non-test
hours), 18 additional failures were identified. All failures were evaluated for cause and
possible corrective action. For the total of 23 failures, the causes of failure were iden-
tified for 14 failures, while 9 were for unknown causes. Twelve corrective actions were
taken to correct the 14 failures for which the causes of failure were known.
The second RAT attempt began on July 2, 1981 and was stopped on July 18, 1981. Two sys-
tems were tested. A test reject condition was reached when the second test failure occurred
at the twelve-hour test point. During the 49 hours of reference testing and troubleshooting
(non-test hours), nine additional failures were identified. All failures were analyzed for
cause and possible corrective action. For the total of 11 failures, the causes of failure
were identified for 10 failures while one was for unknown causes. Nine corrective actions
were taken to correct the 10 failures for which the causes of failure was known.
The third attempt of the RAT was started on November 20, 1981 and was successfully com-
pleted on 30 September 1982. During this period, 335 test hours were accumulated with five
relevant failures. This test demonstrated that the radar meets the specified MTBF (BQ)
of 97 hours. Eight systems were used for the test. During the 85 hours of reference test-
ing and troubleshooting (non-test hours) 25 additional failures were identified.
All failures were analyzed for cause and possible corrective action. For the total of
30 failures, the causes of failure were identified for 26 failures while 4 were for unknown
causes. Twenty-six corrective actions were taken to correct the 26 failures for which the
causes of failure were known.

IIE-38
40A/2 2-4
 RELIABILITY ACCEPTANCE TESTS

HOURSA FAILURES

SYSTEM NO. TEST NON-TEST TOTAL OPERATING TEST NON-TEST TOTAL

TEST #1 IR 15 52 67 2 5 7
2R 22 37 59 1 4 5
3R 17 31 m 1 6 7
^R 21 ill 62 1 3 4
TEST 1 TOTALS 75 161 236 5 18 23
TEST #2 lA 0-1 27 27 1 3 4
2A 12 22 34 1 6 7
TEST 2 TOTALS 12 i|9 61 2 9 11
TEST #3 1 21 0 2 2
2 21 1 1 2
3 31 1 3 4
—- - —^ "
4 61 1 1 2
5 81 1 4 5
6 76 0 2 2
7 21 0 10 10
8 23 1 2 3
TEST 3 TOTALS 335 85 420 5 25 30
AHOURS MAY NOT ADD DUE TO ROUNDING
40A/23-2 HE-39
 RELIABILITY ACCEPTANCE TEST CORRECTIVE ACTION SUMMARY

A summary of the corrective actions taken as a result of the three reliability acceptance
tests is shown. The failures for which the corrective actions were taken identify the most
probable cause of failure by failure type. The three types of failures used here are
component, design and workmanship.

IIE-40

40A/22-5
 RELIABILITY ACCEPTANCE TESTS CORRECTIVE ACTION SUMMARY

LRU XMTR COMP LPRF ANT DSP

FAILURE TYPE C D W C D W C D W C D W C D W

TEST #1 # OF CORREC- 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 2 4 1 1 0 0
TIVE ACTIONS

TEST #2 • # OF CORREC- 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 3 lA 1 0 1 0 0
TIVE ACTIONS

TEST #3 • # OF CORREC- 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 6 4 0 6 2 4 0 1
TIVE ACTIONS

C = COMPONENT D = DESIGN W = WORKMANSHIP

^VENDOR WAS DISQUALIFIED

40A/23-i
IIE-41
 MAINTAINABILITY DEMONSTRATION

A maintainability demonstration was performed on the radar system to verify that

0-Level and I-Level requirements were met. The demonstration was based on Method 9
>^ Of MIL-STD-471 and utilized tools, test equipment, personnel and technical data closely
approximating that to be used for operational support. This exercise verified the selL
test/built-xh-test capabilities of the system and provided a measure of corrective task
times associated with system repair. One hundred and fifty simulated faults were
inserted into the system. Quantitative distribution of the faults (to the LRU/SRUs) was
based on the predicted relative failure frequency of each unit, with a minimum of one
tault being inserted on each SRU.

in ..^^T^T' '"' "'"''' "''' '''"'^^' '°^ "^'- °'^^" "°^ ^"-^^ assets are provided
in the development phase to accomplish the planned tasks in a timely manner. m this
program, two systems were planned for growth testing and three for development RQT; however
because of additional modes hardware and software requirements, two systems were released
for other purposes and the maintainability demonstrations were delayed

IIE-42
4OB/2-12
 F-16 0-LEVEL MAINTAINABILITY DEMONSTRATION REQUIREMENTS AND RESULTS

• MAINTAINABILITY DEMONSTRATION REQUIREMENTS

- 150 FAULTS TO BE INSERTED INTO SIX LRUs
- DISTRIBUTED ACCORDING TO RELATIVE FAILURE RATES
- SELECTED VIA RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION
- EACH SRU (79 TOTAL) SHALL HAVE AT LEAST ONE FAILURE INSERTED

• MAINTAINABILITY DEMONSTRATION RESULTS

0-LEVEL I-LEVEL
SPEC REQ. DEMO RESU.T SPEC REQ. DEMO RESULT
FAULT DETECTION 94% 94% - -

FAULT ISOLATION 95% 98% 96% 96%

MEAN TASK TIME '^ .5 HR ^" <15'/50" 1 HR 58'/0"
MAX. TASK TIME 1.0 HR 15'/50" 2 HR 1 HR/4873"

IIE-43

41/34
 MAINTAINABILITY GROWTH PLAN

Westinghouse initiated a maintainability growth program in the very early stages of

the development phase to track the growth of ST/BIT and other maintainability features of
the APG-66 radar. The growth plan established procedures for data collection, failure
reporting, problem area review, and corrective action. This plan provided a method of
tracking the growth and effectiveness of maintainability features and test philosophy of
the F-16 radar.

40B/2-29
r V , L ■ - IIE-44
 MAINTAINABILITY GROWTH PLAN

" ^5 MONTHS OF SYSTEM TEST TIME AT WESTINGHOUSE EXCLUDING FACTORY

ACCEPTANCE TEST

FAILURE REPORTS

ST/BIT/M EFFECTIVENESS DATA COLLECTED VIA TAPE RECORDED TELECONS

ABOVE REPORTING PROVIDES:

- LARGE DATA BASE
- REPAIR/RETEST CONCEPT IMPLEMENTED EARLY IN FSD
- MEASURED EFFECTIVENESS OF: FACTORY TEST EQUIPMENT
ACCEPTANCE TEST SPECIFICATION
SYSTEM TEST SPECIFICATION
^ ' ST/BIT/M

IIE-45
^0^/27-10
 PRE-DEMO FAULT INSERTION

A fault insertion program was instituted by Westinghouse during the development phase
of the program in an effort to achieve early visibility in the area of ST/BIT effectiveness,
This testing, conducted prior to any formal MIL-STD-471 demonstration, provided valuable
insight relative to potential improvements in ST/BIT mechanization. The results of these
incremental tests are included in the attached figure.

40B/2-30 Ijg_^g
 PRE-DEMO FAULT INSERTION STATUS

NO. OF SRUs FAULTS DETECTED NO. OF TESTS

FAULTED FAULTS INSERTED EXERCISED

ANTENNA 5 54/56 13
LPRF 11 80/120 30
TRANSMITTER 8 27/33 14
DSP 27 958/1090 19
COMPUTER 13 86/103 17
RCP 3 43/60 6

TOTAL 67 1248/1462 = 85% 99

IIE-47

40A/27-12
 DT&E FLIGHT TEST

The DT&E (FSD) flight test effort was accomplished using several airplanes over a 2-1/2
year period. Several organizations and bases were involved. Most of the testing was done
at Air Force bases with contractor support in varying degrees.
The pre-FSD testing began during the Air Force sponsored flight test model evaluation,
first by the two radar competitors—Hughes and Westinghouse, and later by the winner—
Westinghouse. The purpose of this testing was to gather engineering data to evaluate end-
to-end radar performance in the air-to-air modes. Testing was in a relatively benign
environment using F-4 air vehicles with non-F-16 avionics.
The FSD flight test program tested the radar in the F-16 air vehicle with a full comple-
ment of avionics. Radar performance data were gathered during this period. Included in the
data were evaluations of the self test and built-in-test, reliability and maintainability.
As the testing procedures progressed, design changes were incorporated and tested. This
progress soon resulted in the installation of production hardware into the FSD flight test
program, and later, design changes to the production equipment. The testing satisfied all
the formal requirements of the air vehicle and procurement specifications.
Reliability and maintainability engineering personnel followed the DT&E flight test
through all phases. During the F-4 flights at fly-off competition at General Dynamics,
failure data were analyzed and utilized in the selection process. During F-16 radar flights
for development and R&M demonstration at General Dynamics and Edward AFB, R&M personnel
from GD and Westinghouse were assigned for data gathering, analysis and corrective action.
Hands-on maintenance was accomplished and maintenance times verified.
A large amount of the testing and evaluation was accomplished by the Multinational
Operational Test and Evaluation (MOT&E) group. This special Air Force testing organization
was located at Hill AFB, the first operational TAG base for F-16. The testing at Hill had
a heavy emphasis on self test/built-in-test evaluation, as well as overall radar usability
in the F-16 aircraft in a field environment using standard Air Force maintenance personnel,
facilities, and procedures.
IIE-48
40B/2-14
 DT&E FLIGHT TEST

• TEST AIRCRAFT
ONE F-4 -T RADAR DEVELOPMENT
FOUR F-16S '- RADAR DEVELOPMENT
TWO FT16S " R&M DEMONSTRATION

• 181 FLIGHTS USING BRASSBOARD RADAR 1.2 HRS/FLT = 217

• ^41 FLIGHTS USING FSD RADARS -1.5 HRS/FLT = 662

• 1241 FLIGHTS USING PRODUCTION RADARS ~1.5 HRS/FLT = ]M2

~ TOTAL 2741

••• PLUS AN ADDITIONAL -254 FLIGHT HOURS

SPECIFICALLY FOR RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY

inWi M I 1 I 2
Wi
u n 2 mi
1 o:
^ ;^5-F^4 BRASSBOARD FLIGHT TEST
FSD FLIGHT ThTT
I •v-f--R&M DEMO

41/36 IIE-49
 AN/APG-PRODUCTION IMPROVEMENTS

Initial APG-66 radar production deliveries to the F-16 aircraft started in June 1978.
As a result of these aircraft integration tests, RQT, and other engineering tests, a number
of hardware and software changes were instituted as depicted in the chart.
The first fleet activation occurred in January 1979 at Hill AFB, Utah. A number of
design problems were revealed as a result of the operator using modes in different roles
than anticipated, aircraft interface problems, and intermittent malfunctions due to system
transients. Design changes to correct these problems were incorporated into Configuration
B improvements.
In 1979, USAF user personnel requested additional changes in the ST/BIT mechanization.
GD/W/& MOT&E personnel met and set up a task team to test and evaluate a new ST/BIT
mechanization and submit a correction of deficiency system design change. The following
charts reflect the new ST/BIT mechanization. These design changes were flight tested at
Hill AFB, Utah, by MOT&E personnel and approved for fleet retrofit by SPO in the fall of
1979. After these changes, the number of flights occurring without an MFL increased from
35% in 1979 to 92% in the fall of 1982.

40C/1-18
IIE-50
 AN/APG-66 Production
Improvements

• ST Changes
Required
S/W Changes for Pilot
Required Reporting
• Field Data • Minor H/W
Showed: Intermlttents
• Changes • A/Cinterfece • S/W Changes
Problems Required
Required - Operator
- H/W Design Usage
. S/W Design T Intermllle'nts 11/80
- RQT 10/79 2/80
. ST/BIT 8/79
4/79
12/78
I1-0104-BB-7

IIE-51
 AN/APG-66 PRODUCTION IMPROVEMENTS

The overall objective of the team effort (GD/W/MOT&E) was to logically approach the
problems being experienced with ST/BIT on the Radar. The approach included three phases to
adequately define the problems based on field data collected at the time, evaluate potential
corrections and assure that they were consistent with USAF maintenance philosophies and then
develop an implementation approach to incorporate the changes into the F-16 aircraft fleet.

40 C/2-4 N,
IIE-52
 MOT&E COMMITTEE PLAN FOR EVALUATING ECP 30 ST/BIT PROGRAM

COMMITTEE MEMBERS: AFTEC. SPO. GD AND W

PHASE I PHASE II PHASE III

• COLLECTION OF DATA FROM • REAFFIRM GROUND RULES • DECISION ON THE IMPLE-

EAFB AND COMMITTEE AND POLICIES EMPLOYED MENTATION OF ST/BIT
EVALUATION ON M CONCEPT AND PROCE- PROGRAM INTO THE FLEET
DURES
• MODIFY MOT&E A/C
• PERIODIC COMMITTEE EVAL-
• COLLECT AND EVALUATE
UATION OF RESULTS
DATA FROM MOT&E AND
ESTABLISH M CONCEPT • UPDATE GROUND RULES AND
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES DATA COLLECTION
(2-4 WEEK INTERVAL) TECHNIQUES
IIE-53

40A/28-1
 MOT&E DATA ANALYSIS

The MOT&E conducted between March and December 1980 consisted of 1317 total flights.
Only 54 flights (4%) had catastrophic fault reports which led to the conclusion that previous
nuisance indicators of self test failures had been resolved.

IIE-54
40A/24-1
 MOT&E DATA ANALYSIS
(3/80 TO 12/80)

1317 TOTAL FLIGHTS

54 FLIGHTS WITH CATASTROPHIC FAULT REPORT

IIE-55
40A/29-5
 MOT&E DATA ANALYSIS

Additional analysis of MOT&E data suggest that only 11.5% of flights required Self
Test Fault Flag (STFF) usage (worst case). Once the Maintenance Fault Test Report was
cleared by LRU removal, everything worked. Performance, reliability, availability and
ST/BIT were all good. In addition, the STFF is a good indicator of system degradation.

40A/24-2
IIE-56
 MOT&E DATA ANALYSIS
(3/80 THRU 12/80)

1317 FLIGHTS ANALYZED

9 A/C

IIE-57
 MOT&E DATA ANALYSIS

The Avionic System ST/BIT concept implemented on newly developed hardware for the F-16
weapon system is characterized by two types of test(s): (1) Self-Test; automatic, non-
interruptive tests intended to detect failures or out-of-tolerance conductions and (2)
Built-in-Test; interruptive of normal operation and are used primarily to supplement ST in
isolating faults to an LRU. Further, the concept includes provisions to report malfunctions
to the pilot that: (1) require his attention or (2) reduce capabilities. The requirements
imposed on F-16 avionic subsystems include detection of 95% of malfunctions and isolation
of 95% of detected malfunctions to a single LRU.
The APG-66 Radar, instead of implementing ST/BIT at the LRU level (which may not have
been practical) implemented it at the system level which consisted of six (6) LRUs. This
coupled with the nature of Radar systems, in general, makes setting of sensitivity
thresholds for ST/BIT criteria difficult in a dynamic environment. The charts shown on
the next two pages indicate the results of early testing and the need for additional
development and refinement of ST/BIT for the Radar System.

IIE-58
40C/2-3
 WHAT WERE THE PILOT-NOTED PROBLEMS
AFFILIATED WITH SELF-TEST AND
BUILT-IN TEST? (BLOCK B)

SELF-TEST REPORTS OCCURRED IN-FLIGHT TOO OFTEN, ILLUMINATED

THE MASTER CAUTION LIGHT. AND THE PILOT DEBRIEF REPORT STATED:

- FREQUENTLY THE RADAR WORKED OK

- FREQUENTLY. CAN'T RUN BIT DURING FLIGHT. PARTICULARLY

AT TIME OF SELF-TEST FAILURE REPORT

- FREQUENTLY NO FAILURES NOTED WHEN BIT WAS RUN

- CONCLUSION: FAULTS REPORTED IN-FLIGHT BY SELF-TEST

^^--- WERE OF LIMITED VALUE TO THE PILOT

40A/29-2

IIE-59
 PILOT-NOTED PROBLEMS

For the Radar system, redefining the objectives of Self Test and Built-in Test in
view of the problems experienced in the field became necessary.
In that the Radar performed essentially end-to-end self-test of the system, fault
isolation to a single LRU by built-in-test proved to be difficult without additional
system level information. Many of the in-flight out-of-tolerance conditions detected
(either correctly or erroneously) were not duplicatable back on the ground in a non-
dynamic Radar environment. Because of the problem experienced early, confidence in ST/
BIT test as a measure of acceptable performance of the Radar was considerably reduced
and resulted in numerous manhours being expended in trying to duplicate problems. When
the Radar experienced hard failures/non-dynamic situations, Built-in-Test satisfactorily
detected and isolated the problems during ground testing.

IIE-60
40C/2-2
 APG-66 ST/BIT PROBLEMS INCURRED AT HAFB
WITH BLOCK B CONFIGURATION

• SELF-TEST REPORTS DO NOT PROVIDE AN INDICATION OF WHICH LRU IS DEFECTIVE

• FREQUENTLY P0STFLI6HT MAINTENANCE FAILS TO REPRODUCE IN-FLIGHT ST REPORTS

• SELF-TEST PROBLEM CREATED THE FOLLOWING SITUATIONS:

- PILOT HAS LITTLE CONFIDENCE IN SELF-TEST OR BUILT-IN TEST
- MANY MAINTENANCE HOURS SPENT TRYING TO DUPLICATE SELF-TEST/
BUILT-IN TEST REPORTS
- MANY CNDs AND RTOKs DUE TO "SHOT-GUN" REMOVAL OF LRUs

• BUILT-IN TEST IS NOT A PROBLEM

- LRUs REMOVED FOR BIT REPORT ARE USUALLY DEFECTIVE

IlE-61

^OA/29-1
 F-16 APG-66 RADAR IMPROVEMENTS IN ECP-331

At the ECP 331 change block point several changes were made to the self test (ST) and
built-in-test (BIT) implementation. A number of detailed problems were uncovered and
corrected. These are listed on the facing chart. The corrections consisted of software
changes to permit proper sequencing and timing to prevent false reports. In a few isolated
cases, certain tests were masked when a failure was detected in other related tests.
A major re-mechanization was implemented for the ST. A separate radar list was
generated for reporting only radar self tests. These data were sent to the FCC for storage
and future recall. Additional technical order data were generated to enable maintenance
crews to utilize the ST data on the ground in conjunction with BIT reports and pilot com-
ments to better isolate failures to specific LRUs or to prevent the removal of LRUs when
the report was initially intermittent. The re-mechanization also increased the number of
catastrophic fault reports which are reported to the pilot via the master caution light
(MCL). And, in addition, a general report (ST fail) was removed from the MFL to prevent
nuisance occurrences to the pilot. As a result of this re-mechanization, the cannot
duplicate (CND) rate was reduced by approximately 3:1 from aircraft with the old mechaniza-
tion.

IIE-62

40B/1-6
 F-16 APG-56 RADAR IMPROVEMENTS
IN ECP-331 THAT CORRECT
BLOCK B ST/BIT PROBLEMS

ST/BIT SOFTWARE CORRECTIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS SUMMARY:

TRANSMITTER PEAK DETECT FAILURE -ST REPORTS BEFORE REQUIRED WARM-UP

TRANSMITTER HIGH VOLTAGE FAILURE - BIT 6i|50 REPORTS AT INITIAL TURN-UN
TRANSMITTER CALIBRATION FAILURE - TRANSMITTER PEAK DETECT FAILURE IN DBS MODE
MSL 2001 REPORT - MSL 2001 REPORTR AT RADAR TURN-ON
ANTENNA DRIVE DEFECTIVE - MSL 2001 REPORTS DURING ST
SYNCHRONIZER TEST FAILURE - INTERMITTENT RECEIVER VERIFICATION FAILURE
Tx PEAK. DETECTOR FAILURE AT TOF - SELF-TEST FAILURES NOT DUPLICABLE ON GROUND
- ONLY CATASTROPHIC FAULT REPORTS ILLUMINATE MCL

IIE-63

40A/15-1
 F-16 APG-66 RADAR IMPROVEMENTS
IN ECP-331 THAT CORRECTED
BLOCK B ST/BIT PROBLEMS (CONT'D)

• COMPUTER HARDWARE CHANGES TO ELIMINATE HANG-UP CONDITION (1005)

• ANTENNA FLIPPER HARDWARE CHANGE AND RETROFIT

• SYSTEM OFP SOFTWARE CHANGES THAT AFFECT ST/BIT

- SYSTEM CALIBRATION ROUTINES MODIFIED TO MEET OPERATIONAL SCENARIO
- TRANSMITTER PROTECTION AND CONTROL LOGIC MODIFIED
- ANTENNA OVERTEMPERATURE LOGIC MODIFIED
- A/C INTERFACE MODIFICATIONS - SQUAT SWITCH BOUNCE
-- ECS SHUTDOWN
-- INU DOWN ACCOUNTED FOR
- DSP INITIALIZATION HEADER WORD FIX
- COMPUTER HANG-UP RESTART LOGIC MODIFIED

40A/15-2 IIE-65
 APG-66 RADAR IMPROVEMENTS

During and after the evaluation phase of field testing, a number of candidate changes
were identified (some flight tested) for inclusion in the hardware and software to improve
Radar ST/BIT reliability and utility.
A joint GD/W/AF decision was made with regard to incorporating needed changes into the
airborne hardware. The items listed on the facing page regarding ST/BIT were included in
ECP 331. The ST/BIT restructuring minimized the possibilities of CNDs while at the same
time improved the meaningfulness of faults reported to the pilot. The changes subsequently
restored pilot and ground maintenance crew confidence in Radar ST/BIT as a reliable
maintenance tool.

40C/2-1
IIE-66
 CHANGES INCLUDED IN ECP-331 REGARDING SELF-TEST REPORTING SYSTEM

CATASTROPHIC FAULT REPORTS INCREASED TO 31 TESTS

6 WORDS (80 BITS) SENT TO THE FCC IN SELF-TEST, INDICATING THE FAILED PARAMETER

LOGIC CHANGE TO ELIMINATE ST REPORT FLAG FROM ILLUMINATING THE A/C MASTER CAUTION LIGHT

MASTER CAUTION LIGHT ILLUMINATES AS A FUNCTION OF CATASTROPHIC FAULTS, ONLY (1010)

MAINTENANCE FAULT LIST (MFD CONTINUES TO STORE lOlO's. 6002's. BIT REPORT NUMBERS,

AND THE NEW ST FAULT FLAG REPORTS

- NEW ST FAULT FLAG REPORTS STORED IN SEPARATE LIST (RST)

^OA/27-9 iiE-67
 RELIABILITY GROWTH THROUGH ST/BIT

Performance and fault circumstance data obtained through the self test/built-in-test
capability of the radar allowed identification and correction of problem areas in field
use. The availability of the self test/built-in-test data permitted ST/BIT performance
analysis. This identified design improvements which improved reliability growth.

IIE-68
40A/2-1
 RFLIARILITY GROWTH AS A RESULI
OF ST/RIT TREND INDICATORS
ANALYSIS & APPROPRIATE DESIGN
75-r CHANGES

60-

^5..

FIFTBF
HRS

30- INITIAL DEPLOYMENT ECP FIELD

PROBLEMS RETROFIT
TREND ANALYSIS
&
REL./QUAL LED TO
15. CLASS II IMPROVEMENT
CHANGES

(1317 FLTS) ^ 10.000 ■LIGHTS

'79 '80 '81 '82
y* "" 3S% OF FLTS N#- 76% OF FLTS
WITH NO MFL WITH NO MFL
f^8% OF FLTS 8/^^-♦H•92%-H<92%lf
WITH NO MFL
OF ALL FLT WITH NO MFL
IIE-69
RDP 11/29/82.
 IN-SERVICE ASSESSMENT

These figures show some selected data from in-service operations of the F-16 APG-66
radar. The chart shows MTBMA as a function of cumulative flight hours. Problems such as
the radar drive band breakage, chafing of the wire harness, and transistor failures in the
AZ compensation assembly prevented the results from attaining higher levels. As a result of
field data and laboratory evaluation of these problem areas, corrective action has been
identified and is being incorporated. The MTBMA trend is upward as the number of flight
hours passes 104,000. The 3-month moving average MTBMA by May 1982 is better than 60
hours.

IIE-70
40B/2-15
 APG-66 RADAR niBMA
VS. CUMULATIVE FLIGHT HOURS

I see
THPEE (3> HOHTH MOMINC AUERAGE Trt.f*CK OS Of. tlAV, 82 ■
UUC>r4AXX TYPE-1 EMSE-USMF F/C PAOHA SUntlARY

lOd
M
T
B
M
A

10

I" ^,''111/^
1
isaoe isooa?
CUMULATIUE n.ICHT HOURS

IIE-71
LESSONS LEARNED

iii-i
 Competition has many benefits —the most obvious being cost. When performance of the
requirements is linked with incentive (either monetary or assignment of additional liability),
the resolve to perform is emphasized early and stressed throughout the development and
subsequent production phases.
The generation of requirements should follow a controlled logic supported by sufficient
rationale to justify the requirements. Contribution by all participants who can ultimately
agree on the requirements normally adds to the commitment that must be followed.
Good results are obtained when the government engages in cooperative efforts with the
reputable contractors to develop requirements, thereby avoiding unacceptable extensions of
the technological state of the art and causing unwarranted performance and reliability
expectations as well as high costs. Support requirements should also be a primary consid-
eration in developing a new system concept.
The ability of contractors to be flexible during early development is enhanced by a
prime/sub relationship. This allows the two parties to make needed changes without having
to follow a lengthy chain of command. The integration of the APG-66 into the overall
weapon/aircraft system was much smoother due to the contractual arrangement used during
the FSD and early production phases.

III-2
40C/1-19
 LFSSONS (RE)LEARNEn

• COMPETITinW IS A KEY MOTIVATOR

• RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY MUST BE STATED AS

REQUIREMENTS -- NOT GOALS

• INCENTIVES WORK TO EMPHASIZE REQUIREMENTS

• DEVELOPMENT OF REQUIREMENTS REQUIRES PARTICIPATION

OF BUYERS AND SELLERS TO ASSURE THAT THEY ARE
RATIONAL AND REASONABLE

• MIL-STD-AZO NEEDS TO BE REVISED

• THE PRIME/SUB RELATIONSHIP OFFERS INTERFACE SIMPLICITY,

FLEXIBILITY. AND FREEDOM TO MAKE CHANGES IN THE FORMA-
TIVE STAGES OF THE PROGRAM

40A/28-2 III-3
 Cost and/or liability incentives have a significant impact on the attention and commit-
ment of high-level management.
A major part of the emphasis by management is the generation of development plans for
both R&M. These plans must be integrated with the system plans to be sure that the proper
attention is given to R&M. Without such planning the R&M functions may tend to become
satellite activities.
In order to implement the R&M plans, the initial design team must include engineers to
fold maintainability and reliability into the inherent design and development process. It
is through their activities that the reguirements will be visible to the whole team.
The need for management of concurrent activities is normally dictated by reduced acqui-
sition cycles. The need to maintain follow-up of the various results of concurrent activities
requires an integrated knowledge of those results. All of the data from the activities
such as environmental qualification, reliability qualification, maintainability demonstrations,
etc., should be combined to form the appropriate corrective actions.
Asset management is a critical facet of concurrency. It is crucial that plans include
dedicated hardware for R&M testing and development. As the need for hardware always exceeds
the amount of hardware that is available, allocations must be planned and made. The exact
number of sets of hardware required is dependent on many factors. Data from hardware use
is needed for evaluation of the need for and adequacy of corrective action. Thus, the more
hardware actually in use, the better the analysis data base becomes.

III-4

40C/1-20
 LESSONS (RE)L£ARNED

• MANAGEMENT EMPHASIS. INFLUENCED BY COST INCENTIVES.

IS A SIGNIFICANT DRIVING FORCE IN R&M SUCCESS

• R&M DEVELOPMENT PLANS MUST BE INTEGRATED WITH

SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT PLANS

• THE DESIGN TEAM MUST CONTAIN AS INTEGRAL MEMBERS

ST/BIT/MAINTAINABILITY ENGINEERS AND RELIABILITY
ENGINEERS

• CONCURRENCY CAN BE MANAGED

• DEDICATED HARDWARE FOR R&M GROWTH AND TEST MUST BE

PLANNED AND ALLOCATED

^OA/28-3
III-5
 Parts selection and control are of prime importance in achieving high reliability and
keeping low levels of maintenance.
The inclusion of the suppliers of the parts as members of the team is one way to
maintain their support. The main incentive for these suppliers is volume. Other types of
incentives are difficult to apply to piece part suppliers.
The specifications outlined for MIL-M-38510 parts are not sufficiently defined or
controlled for parts which must operate in high data rate applications. The screening
requirements for these devices are also inadequate. As a result, Westinghouse has imposed
100% testing of all such components over temperature to ensure that they will operate in
the specific application.
While much effort and attention is being focused on higher technology for digital
devices very little attention is being focused on analog components for improved reliability
and performance. RF devices are components which deserve particular attention.
The ability to pass down R&M requirements is in many cases difficult to accomplish
because of the ability of many suppliers to accept such requirements without excessive
capital investments. Small businesses are of particular concern. In most cases significant
assistance is required to bring their manufacturing and quality capabilities up to their
design capabilities. The assistance from government personnel is also vital.

III-6
40C/1-21
 LESSONS (RE)LEARNED

• MANUFACTURERS OF MILITARY PARTS MUST BE A PART OF THE

TEAM—VOLUME IS THE KEY INCENTIVE

• SCREENING AND CHARACTERIZATION OF PARTS IS NECESSARY

IN CURRENT AND FUTURE HIGH DATA RATE ELECTRONICS-

MIL-M-38510 AND MIL-STD-883 ARE NOT ENOUGH

• MAJOR EMPHASIS ON TECHNOLOGY IMPROVEMENTS IS ON

DIGITAL COMPONENTS-ANALOG DEVICES RECEIVE LESS

ATTENTION —PARTICULARLY RF DEVICES

• DOLLAR PERCENTAGES ARE SPECIFIED FOR SMALL BUSINESSES-

PASS DOWN OF REQUIREMENTS (MIL Q 9859. ETC) ALSO

SPECIFIED-TWO EXTREMES DICTATE ASSISTANCE

/40A/28-4

III-7
 The application of development through IR&D in advance of firm requirements was of
significant importance toward the development of the APG-66. A major part of the activity
on the Westinghouse WX series radar was aimed at improved reliability and maintainability.
The tools of computer designs, thermal analyses, maintainability/reliability predic-
tions, trade-offs, etc., if properly applied, will provide a baseline design which has a
fundamental R&M capability. Without such a baseline the management of subsequent problems
becomes intolerable. The APG-66 has a sufficient base inherent in the early design to allow
for the management of problems and the subsequent corrective actions for those problems.
The development of the ST/BIT during the development of the radar was key to ensuring
that the maintainability requirements could be achieved. ST/BIT has proven to be an impor-
tant tool in evaluating the reliability of the radar. This is due largely to the fact that
the ST/BIT development was integral with the overall radar development.
The continuation of design support after development is important in determining cor-
rective actions throughout the production and operational phase. An understanding of this
by cost analysts on production quotes is important.

III-8
40C/1-22
 LESSONS (RE)LEARNED

• INDEPENDENT R&D IS A FEEDING FUNCTION FOR FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS

• USE OF PRUDENT DESIGN TOOLS. ANALYSES. TRADE-OFFS. ETC. "

PROVIDE AN INHERENTLY GOOD DESIGN—A MUST FOR MANAGEMENT OF
PROBLEMS THAT OCCUR

• ST/BIT DEVELOPMENT. INTEGRATION AND CHECK-OUT MUST BE CONCURRENT

WITH SYSTEM PERFORMANCE DEVELOPMENT

• DESIGN SUPPORT THROUGHOUT PRODUCTION IS ESSENTIAL FOR CORRECTIVE

ACTION

III-9
^OA/28-5
 Lessons Learned (Continued)

Exposure to environment and insertion of faults prior to formal R&M tests is an

effective means of identification of problem areas which require corrective action.
Incorporation of such corrections prior to the tests provides for a thorough evaluation
during the testing.
For many years there has been concern about the differences between laboratory and
field reliability. The application of random vibration over environment has provided a
more accurate simulation of field conditions and allowed for corrective action which can
influence the field performance.
Continuous acceptance test procedure was accomplished during all reliability testing
at all environmental conditions with BIT activated at the end of each mode. The performance
measurements of the ATP can then be correlated to ST/BIT performance and each checked
against the other. Simulation of interfaces can also be accomplished to identify problem
areas.
Follow-on reliability testing on a periodic basis is an effective means of identifying
new problem areas. From the development phase through completion of reliability acceptance
testing new problems were identified in each test. Although the required reliability tests
have been completed, Westinghouse planned for and is continuing testing on a monthly basis
to assure that any new problems are identified and corrected.
The true evaluation of R&M requirements and their effectiveness is how well they are
being met in operational usage. Programs for this evaluation must be planned.

III-IO
40B/2-19
 LESSONS (RE)LEARNED

• RELIABILITY GROWTH AND MAINTAINABILITY PRE-DEMO ARE INVALUABLE

TOWARD GETTING EARLY LOOK AT POTENTIAL PROBLEMS AND IS AN

INTEGRAL PART OF TEST AND FIX

• RANDOM VIBRATION DURING ENVIRONMENT BRINGS LABORATORY CLOSER

TO FIELD CONDITIONS

USE OF ATP RATHER THAN ABBREVIATED TEST DURING RELIABILITY

TESTING ENSURES ALL ELEMENTS ARE ASSESSED

• FOLLOW-ON RELIABILITY TESTING PERIODICALLY DURING PRODUCTION

IS EFFECTIVE TOWARD IDENTIFYING NEW PROBLEMS AS WELL AS
MAINTAINING CONTROL ^ ^ ^

• VALIDATION OF R&M REQUIREMENTS/EFFECTIVENESS MUST INCLUDE

OPERATIONAL USAGE

aOA/28-6 iii-ii
 A key element of achieving continued reliability after development and qualification
is improving factory yields. Improved yield results in lower rework and handling which are
potential causes of failures. Additionally, Westinghouse experience has shown that factory
problems tend to show up again in the field. Productivity improvements also affect yield
and provide better field performance.
The monitoring of all in-house problems makes use of ST/BIT. This in turn allows for
changes to testing based on significant trends. By using ST/BIT to identify factory problem
a continuous evaluation of the effectiveness of ST/BIT is maintained.
Testing in the factory must be continually evaluated to determine that problems are
not only detected but the detection is at the lowest level possible. Since most tests are
controlled by approved documents, some flexibility must be allowed.

III-12

40C/1-23
 LESSONS (RE)LEARNED

• YIELD/PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENTS ARE A DEFINITE FACTOR IN

OBTAINING GOOD RELIABILITY

• MONITORING OF IN-HOUSE PROBLEMS CAN MEASURE EFFECTIVENESS

OF ST/BIT AND ASSIST IN DETERMINING PROBLEM TRENDS

• MANUFACTURING TESTING MUST HAVE SOME FLEXIBILITY TO

ALLOW FOR REDUCTION OF PROBLEMS AT HIGHER LEVELS

40A/28-7
III-13
 The introduction of hardware into the operational environment introduces new variables
which can affect the R&M performance. Because of these variables it is vital that a
continuous evaluation of the field performance be maintained.
The normal government data are insufficient to allow for trend evaluation and subsequent
corrective action. In order to obtain such data it is important that planning be made to
obtain the field results.
Contractor engineering support in the field is critical to operational problem under-
standing, feedback and correction. Engineering support in the field has been provided by
both GD and Westinghouse since the beginning of the program and has significantly assisted
in solving interface problems, test equipment problems, T.O. problems, hardware and
operational problems. When the Air Force decided to eliminate contractor support in late
1982, Westinghouse management felt strongly that this support was necessary in the solution
of field problems and provided personnel at no additional cost to the government.
I-level testing is most critical from the point of view of accurate fault determination
and verification. Results of factory test and field experience dictate modification of
some tests and tolerances. Without this iterative process good units are tested bad and
bad units are tested good.
The training of maintenance personnel needs to be strengthened. This is particularly
important in light of the high turnover rate of technicians at a given location. Identifica-
tion of aircraft interface problems is sometimes a last resort. This at times results in
abnormal pull rates on specific aircraft.
The identification of a field problem and incorporation of corrective actions is
impeded by the flow of technical orders. Up to 12-18 months can elapse between the
identification of a problem and some relief getting to the user.

III-14
40C/1-24
 LESSONS (RE)LEARNED

• FIELD PERFORMANCE EVALUATION IS MANDATORY FOR IMPROVING R&M

• NORMAL DATA ARE INADEQUATE

• RIW PROVIDED ONE POINT OF EARLY IDENTIFICATION OF FIELD

PROBLEMS

• CONTRACTOR ENGINEERING SUPPORT IN THE FIELD IS CRITICAL TO

OPERATIONAL PROBLEM UNDERSTANDING. FEEDBACK AND CORRECTION

• ITERATION OF I-LEVEL TESTING IS CRITICAL TO EFFECTIVE AND

ACCURATE IDENTIFICATION OF FAULTS. SITE-TO-SITE VARIATIONS

IN GROUNDING AND POWER CREATE DIFFERENT TEST RESULTS

TRAINING IS INADEQUATE; TURNOVER IS HIGH

• THE FLOW OF FORMAL TECHNICAL DATA IS TOO SLOW. NO RAPID

VEHICLE EXISTS TO ALERT THE FIELD TO SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OR

METHODS FOR IMPROVING MAINTENANCE .

40A/28-8 III-15
 An improved method to incorporate required changes, particularly early in field opera-
tions, is needed to rapidly incorporate those changes to avoid unnecessary costs and mature
the systems earlier. The ECP route is very slow and costly to incorporate and unnecessarily
costly in maintenance actions required before incorporation. The RIW program on the radar
set the stage for a quicker change. However, it still proved very slow and a means was
found to incorporate quasi-Class II changes in production and retrofit if the test equipment
(AIS) was not affected. Commercial industry is far better in timeliness in correcting some
deficiencies at no cost to the customer.
A key element in overcoming some of the current inhibitors is a cooperative atmosphere
between the hardware contractor, the T.O. and I-level contractor, the aircraft contractor,
the SPO, and the users.

III-16

40C/1-25
 LESSONS (RE)LEARNED

• CORRECTIVE ACTION IS KEY TO IMPROVING R&M

• CURRENT PRACTICES INHIBIT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS DUE TO

STRICT INTERPRETATION OF MIL-STD-i|83

• IN-LINE BREAK INTO PRODUCTION OF CORRECTIVE ACTION

WITH INCORPORATION INTO FIELD RETURNS HAS BEEN
MOST EFFECTIVE

• TEAM WORK BETWEEN ALL PARTIES IS A PREREQUISITE TO

- ACHIEVING SUCCESS "" * '

III-17
40A/28-9
 Lessons Learned

Cost incentives are significant driving forces for obtaining management emphasis to
ensure R&M success. Cost incentives operative early in the program, structured to produce
significant R&M effort, can reduce life-cycle cost. Management must constantly be aware
of all problems in a program and be a driving force in the solution of those problems in
order to plan effectively to meet incentive objectives. Management emphasis is also a key
factor in working as a team rather than in an adversary relationship. The team effort was
a major contribution to the success of this program.
Contractor engineering support in the field is critical to operational problem under-
standing, feedback and correction. Engineering support in the field has been provided by
both GD and Westinghouse since the beginning of the program and has significantly assisted
in solving interface, test equipment, T.O., hardware and operational problems. When the
Air Force decided to eliminate contractor support in late 1982, Westinghouse management
felt strongly that this support was necessary in the solution of field problems and
provided personnel at no additional cost to the government.

III-18
40B/2-17
 LESSONS (RE)LEARNED

• COST INCENTIVES ARE DRIVING FORCE FOR MANAGEMENT EMPHASIS

SIGNIFICANT TO ENSURE R&M SUCCESS

• COMPETITION IS A KEY MOTIVATOR

• CONTRACTOR ENGINEERING SUPPORT IN THE FIELD IS CRITICAL TO

SOLVING OPERATIONAL PROBLEM

41/22-1
III-19
 Lessons Learned (Continued)

An improved method is needed to incorporate required changes, particularly early in

field operations to avoid unnecessary costs and to mature the systems earlier. The ECP
route is too slow and costly in maintenance actions required before incorporation. The
RIW program for the radar should have provided for quicker change, but the ECP approvals
were so slow that their purpose was circumvented by other actions.
Electrostatic sensitive devices are a problem that must be dealt with not only in the
manufacturer's plant but in field use as well. Early in the program it was discovered that
many electrostatic sensitive devices were not marked or packaged properly in normal prac-
tice. RNC resistors were a case in point, wherein the specification had to be changed to
have them marked and packed properly, which in turn made them a non-standard part. Special
attention was required by Westinghouse in setting up the manufacturing area to cope with
this problem in providing conductive materials in packaging work areas, grounding and the
control of humidity and operating procedures. The growth in new technology with smaller
and more sensitive devices will likely magnify this problem.

III-20
40B/2-18
 LESSONS (RE)LEARNED

AN IMPROVED METHOD TO INCORPORATE REQUIRED CHANGES IS NEEDED

(EXPEDITE)

ELECTRO-STATIC DISCHARGE CAN CAUSE DAMAGE TO MICROELECTRIC PARTS

AND ASSEMBLIES DURING MANUFACTURE AND REPAIR ACTIVITIES

- SOME DEVICES TODAY ARE NOT TREATED AS ELECTRO-STATIC

SENSITIVE THAT NEED TO BE

- ADDITIONAL PRECAUTIONS ARE NEEDED FOR I LEVEL AND DEPOT

LEVEL ACTIVITIES

40C/22-3
III-21
 Financial incentives, when appropriately applied, have the effect of motivating manage-
ment to act in the best interests of the government because they will also be acting in
their own best interests. The kinds of financial incentives that seemed to work effectively
in the case of the APG-66 radar are the following: Reliability Improvement Warranty (RIW),
guaranteed MTBF for selected subsystems, and reward or penalty sharing for surpassing
or falling short of requirements. Such sharing was extended contractually to the major
subcontractor. The proportions of sharing are shown on page IIA-9 of this report.
The APG-66 was highly concurrent in the sense that production started before full-scale
development was completed. The success seems to stem partly from the fact that WEC had
done a considerable amount of relevant design work before winning the contract for the
APG-66.
The amount of the financial incentive necessary to produce that extra bit of top manage-
ment interest is unclear. In the case of the APG-66, evidence supports the hypothesis that
top management will press to achieve each incentive since it tends to reflect on the overall
program and on their company reputation.

40B/2-21 III-22
 I FSSQNS (RE)LEARNED (CONTINUED)

• GOOD UP-FRONT DESIGN MAKES LATER PROBLEMS MANAGEABLE

- CONTINUING ENGINEERING SUPPORT IS A LEGITIMATE AND NECESSARY
ACTIVITY AETER PRODUCTION BEGINS

• CONCURRENCY CAN BE MANAGED

• DEDICATED TEST ARTICLES ARE REQUIRED FOR R R M

• RELIABILITY MUST BE STATED AS A REQUIREMENT - NOT A GOAL

• SCREENING AND CHARACTERIZATION OF PARTS IS NECESSARY IN CURRENT

AND FUTURE HIGH DATA RATE ELECTRONICS APPLICATIONS. MIL-38510
IS NOT ENOUGH (MIL STD 883)

• FOLLOW-ON RELIABILITY TESTING ON A PERIODIC BASIS IS AN

EFFECTIVE MEANS OF IDENTIFYING NEW PROBLEM AREAS AND OF
MAINTAINING QUALITY THROUGH PRODUCTION

• RUN CONTINUOUS ATP DURING RELIABILITY TESTING

41/22-2 III-23
 Lessons Learned

Development for the APG-66 did not originate at the moment that a military requirement
was stated for it. It originated considerably before that time, partly through IR&D that
resulted in developing a prototype of the system. This "pre-development" activity reduced
risks by helping to train the designers for the specific kind of equipment that would
become the APG-66.
It also is apparent that competition produces better equipment at lower cost. Hence
proposals should be sought from as many potential contractors as are available.

III-24

40B/2-20
 LESSONS LEARNED

• CONTRACT
- SUPPORT IR&D
- ENCOURAGE COMPETITION
- DEVELOP SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS COOPERATIVELY (GOVERNMENT & INDUSTRY)
- REQUIREMENTS SHOULD REFLECT SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS

• FINANCIAL INCENTIVES CAN BE USED TO PROMOTE R&M

• KEEP CONTRACTS SIMPLE. ALLOW FLEXIBILITY TO MAKE CHANGES EARLY

IN PROGRAM

THE LEVEL OF FINANCIAL INCENTIVE APPEARS TO BE SECONDARY IN IMPORTANCE

III-25
i|0A/27-2
 Lessons Learned (Continued)

Management commitment to quality is important to producing a good product. More-

over, the commitment must be at a high enough level of management to influence all relevant
operations (i.e., no conflict must arise between the company components that are required
to produce high-quality installed equipment and those components whose job is to sell
spares).
In the F-16 program, both WEC and GD set up parallel project organizations. Another
factor was that teamwork among the prime and subcontractors and their suppliers was estab-
lished early and maintained throughout the program. In the final analysis, people resolve
problems.

III-26

40B/2-22
 LESSONS LEARNED

• MANAGEMENT
- MANAGEMENT MUST SUPPORT R&M IF R&M IS TO RE ACHIEVED
- THE MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION SHOULD PROVIDE THE Q&RA MANAGER
AUTHORITY TO GET THE JOB DONE
- EMPHASIS MUST INCLUDE THE INTEGRATION OF R&M AS A REQUIRED
CHARACTERISTIC OF THE EQUIPMENT UNDER DEVELOPMENT
- PRIME CONTRACTOR AND SUBCONTRACTORS AND THEIR SUPPLIERS WORKING
AS A TEAM HAVE THE BEST CHANCE OF PRODUCING RELIABLE EQUIPMENT

III-27
^OA/27-4
 LESSONS LEARNED

• DESIGN

- EMPHASIZE GOOD DESIGN UP FRONT (EARLY)

- SCREEN AND CHARACTERIZE ALL PARTS IN ALL HIGH DATA RATE
ELECTRONIC APPLICATIONS
- EMPHASIZE THE USE OF VARIOUS ANALYTICAL TOOLS (E.G.. TRADE
STUDIES) BY DESIGN ENGINEERS
- EMPHASIZE THE USE OF ALL OTHER TOOLS BY DESIGN ENGINEERS
THAT ARE AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT RELIABLE AND MAINTAINABLE DESIGNS
- ENSURE THAT DESIGN ALTERNATIVE STUDIES INCLUDE ATTENTION TO R&M
CHARACTERISTICS
- ST/BIT DEVELOPMENT. INTEGRATION. AND CHECK-OUT SHOULD BE CONCURRENT
WITH SYSTEM PERFORMANCE DEVELOPMENT
- ST/BIT DEVELOPMENT REQUIRES THE ASSIGNMENT OF PERSONNEL AND
EQUIPMENT ASSETS
- MAKE ST/BIT/MAINTAINABILITY ENGINEERS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE
DESIGN TEAM WITH SUFFICIENT ASSETS COMMITTED TO DO THE JOB

40A/27-5

III-29
 Lessons Learned (Continued)

Sometimes, the notion of testing is discarded after a program gets into production.
Of course, testing is extremely important during the production of any system and especially
during the production of high-performance electronic systems. The testing that must be
done includes environmental stress screening at all levels of the production line—from
parts through LRUs. The parts control program must be energetically enforced to ensure and
maintain quality. And reliability acceptance tests, which usually occur early in the
production program, if continued can uncover problems that might creep into the hardware.
The number of systems to be tested under such a program is variable.
The damage that can be done by electrostatic discharge during normal handling of modern
electronic devices mandates that the potential for damage be controlled. Through packaging
and methods of discharging static electricity from workers and tools, parts and assemblies
handled during manufacture, testing and repair can be protected.
Problems in the field that are environmentally related invariably appear. Additional
environmental tests may be called for during early stages of production to handle problems
identified in field use.

III-30

40B/2-24
 LESSONS LEARNED

• MANUFACTURING

- THE EXTENSIVE USE OF ESS AND IMPLEMENTATION AT ALL LEVELS OF THE

PRODUCTION PROCESS FROM INCOMING PARTS TO LRUs IS EFFECTIVE

- AN AGGRESSIVE PARTS CONTROL PROGRAM PAYS BIG DIVIDENDS

- AN ELECTROSTATIC DAMAGE PREVENTION SYSTEM IN PRODUCTION AND IN

THE FIELD IS NECESSARY

- CONTINUE RELIABILITY TESTING THROUGH THE PRODUCTION PROGRAM

^OA/27-6 III-31
 Lessons Learned (Continued)

Historically, ST/BIT testing always gets a lower priority than the classic performance
tests. This lower priority is partly driven by the lack of assets. Therefore, systems
should be dedicated to early evaluation of R&M functions. Tests should include ST, BIT,
growth and environmental testing.
The presence of contractor personnel at operating bases is important in maintaining
the operational availability of the fleet of aircraft, since they are capable of providing
quick fixes. Moreover, they also provide an important information system for the contractor
that enables the designers to effect rapid improvement in the product after it is fielded.
Environmental chambers at the Intermediate Shop level, particularly for cold soak,
relatively simple and inexpensive, could help to avoid reinstalling potentially defective
parts and assemblies in repaired LRUs. They would also be very helpful in finding problems
associated with RETOKS with reliable fault reporting.

III-32

40B/2-25
 LESSONS LEARNED (CONT)

TEST AND EVALUATION

- EARLIER R&M TESTING IF PLANNED. FUNDED. AND IMPLEMENTED FOR FSD CAN BE
BENEFICIAL TO RELIABILITY MATURATION
- GROWTH TESTING DURING FSD CAN MINIMIZE THE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY A CONCURRENT
PROGRAM
- DEDICATED R&M TEST ARTICLES FOR FSD AND PRODUCTION TESTING ARE VERY
IMPORTANT TO A CONCURRENT PROGRAM
- MAINTAINABILITY TESTS WITH ENOUGH SIMULATED FAULTS TO PROVIDE A RELIABLE
SAMPLE OF THE EFFICACY OF THE SYSTEM FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION IS
NECESSARY TO MATURE slTSlNi^YSTEM
- THE COLLECTION OF R&M DATA AT GOVERNMENT FACILITIES FOR THE PURPOSE OF
PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT IS ESSENTIAL TO MATURING THE SYSTEM
- COLD SOAK CHAMBERS AT THE INTERMEDIATE SHOP LEVEL MAY SOLVE MANY PROBLEMS
AT I-LEVEL RATHER THAN ?????

III-33

40A/27-7
f>0

o
so